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JCC Six Day War: Israel SILTMUN IV JCC Six Day War: Israel SILTMUN IV Chair: Brian Forcier Political Officer: Sam Bugaieski Vice Chair: Kelly Roemer December 7nd, 2013 Lyons Township High School La Grange, Illinois Dear Delegates, My name is Brian Forcier, and I will be serving as your chair for SILMUN IV. My political officer is Sam Bugaieski, and my Vice Chair is Kelly Roemer. I am a junior at Saint Ignatius, while Sam and Kelly attend Lyons Township. I enjoy studying history, politics, and current events. I have been in Model U.N. since I was a freshman. My name is Sam Bugaieski, and I will be your PO in this year’s SILTMUN conference. I'm looking forward to seeing the interesting debate I'm sure you will all have when we start committee this December. I have been doing MUN for a little over a year now, and have taken part in a variety of conferences, both local and international. This is my first time participating as a leader in an event like this, and I can't wait to get a view of things from the perspective of the dais. I'm sure you will all do great when opening ceremonies end and the fun begins. I wish you all the best of luck in your research, and am excited to see the resolutions you come to early next year. The way we have arranged this cabinet is to provide the greatest depth into the topic. However, this obstacle proved to be difficult, accounting for the length of the war. I have decided to choose these topics as they provide the greatest depth, even though they shift in time. The first topic takes place a few months after the war, while the second topic is during the war. This format allowed me to include the greatest possibility for heated and extended debate. Once the first topic is finished, then the second topic will shift in time, taking place during the war. In this cabinet, each one of you will have a chance to re-write history as your respective person sees fit. Since this is also a joint crises cabinet, each delegate should expect to handle a plethora of crises including the Egyptian Cabinet. The first topic will take place in October of 1967 after the Khartoum Resolution. The second topic will take place during the war on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. Good luck to all in researching! Sincerely, Brian Forcier, Chair Sam Bugaieski, Political Officer Kelly Roemer, Vice Chair My email is [email protected] . Please feel free to contact me with any questions you may have with committee or papers! 2 Topic One: The Israeli Occupation of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula The Jewish and Arab peoples have been fighting for thousands of years after territorial disputes arose over holy cities, such as Jerusalem, a city that carries symbolic meaning for both the Jewish Israelis and the Muslim Arabs. Understanding the more modern tensions that led to the Six Day War and the current occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, one must review key events in Israel’s short history as a nation. Prior to 1948 and reflecting the colonialism present in many parts of the world, Britain occupied the current state of Israeli directly after the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War Two. After the Treaty of Versailles, Britain was granted rule over the region near the Mediterranean Sea, naming the region the British Mandate or Trans-Jordan region. In 1917, Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour wrote the Balfour Declaration, a document expressing gratitude towards the Jewish people for their assistance to the British war effort in World War One (Sorko-Ram). More importantly, the declaration expressed favor for a national Jewish homeland. Furious, the Arabs protested to the British government. Caving under pressure and appeasing the Arabs, Winston Churchill, then the British Colonial Secretary, drafted the White Papers in 1922 (Sorko-Ram). These documents stipulated that seventy six percent of the eastern portion of the promised Jewish Homeland was to be restricted from future Jewish immigration and current Jewish inhabitants. The Arabs were not satisfied by the terms of the documents, and they continued to kill Jewish people. The British again caved to Arab pressure and outrage by drafting a second White Paper in 1930 (Sorko-Ram). These documents limited Jewish immigration to anywhere in the Holy Land, citing the economic impact of Jews stealing Arab occupations. The Arab population still continued to riot and murder Jews. The British crown became frustrated with the continuous violence, and they created the Peel Commission. This royal commission of inquiry, headed by Lord Robert Peel, searched for a solution in 1936 to 1939 to end the violence between Israelis and Palestinians (Sorko-Ram). In 1937, the body issued a statement calling for the partition of an Arab state, Palestine, and a Jewish state, Israel. The commission also recommended two small buffer zones ruled by the British in Jaffa and Jerusalem. The Arabs rejected this recommendation, 3 while the Jewish people were split on its benefit. Eventually, the recommendation was discarded due to the lack of compromise. Signaling the dissolution of colonial states in the Middle East, France granted independence to Lebanon in 1943 and Syria in 1946 (Sorko-Ram). Moreover, Britain granted independence to Iraq in 1932 and Jordan in 1946 (Sorko-Ram). However, Britain refused to grant Israel independence, tossing the question to the newly formed United Nations. Using the Balfour Declaration as legal precedence and despite great pressure from every Muslim nation, the United Nations, Britain abstaining, voted to make part of the remaining British Mandate a nation for Jews in the Middle East (Sorko-Ram). The announced partition plan on November 27, 1947 cast a shadow over the Muslim world. Riots erupted between November 30 and February 1, causing the deaths of thousands of Arabs and Jews (“Israeli War of Independence: Background”). On January 9, 1948, 1,000 Arabs ransacked northern Palestinian communities (“Israeli War of Independence: Background”). Echoeing previous abandonment, the remaining British forces handed over defense responsibilities to the Arab irregulars. Palestinians from November 29 to April 1, 1948 disrupted all major road access and slaughtered many Israelis, while King Abdullah of Jordan expressed delight (“Israeli War of Independence: Background”). The United Nations Palestine Commission cited major concerns about Arab intentions in the region to the Security Council, but United Nations resolutions, 181 and 273, that called for a Zionist state continued to be in effect. From April 1- May 14, 1948, the Haganah, a Jewish resistance army launched offensives against the Arab invaders, capturing several cities (“Israeli War of Independence: Background”). On May 14, the nation of Israel was officially created through the United Nations resolutions 181 and 273. One day after Israel’s creation, Egyptian, Trans- Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Iraqi forces invaded Israel. The Israeli Defense Force (formerly the Haganah) held back invaders, while international pressure mounted against the invading Arab armies. The United Nations sensed the dire situation in the region, and it commissioned Count Folke Bernadotte to mediate a truce in the summer of 1948 (“Israeli War of Independence: Background”). Noticing the Israeli Defense Force gaining momentum, the five invading Arab armies signed individual peace settlements in 1949. After two decades of Israeli appeals to negotiate with Arab nations, The Arab nations continued to foment animosity, aiding the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. After its formation in 1964, the group launched 113 terrorist attacks against civilians in two years (“The Six Day War: Overview”). During 1965 and 1966, the Syrian army shelled the Golan Heights after Israel created the National Water Carrier (“The Six Day War: Overview”). The Security Council failed to act or even denounce the attack after a veto from the Soviet Union. Attacking a small Israeli rural community near the Golan Heights, Israel retaliated against Syria. Dramatizing the event, Syria called on 4 Egypt to honor their mutual defense treaty, inching the nations towards another war. In the Middle of May 1967, Syrian and Egyptian forces massed on the Israel border as United Nation’s buffer forces, the United Nations Emergency Force, withdrew according to Egyptian requests. On May 22, 1967, Egypt blocked the Straights of Tiran, denying Israel access to any imported oil (“The Six Day War: Overview”). Seventeen international maritime powers denounced the blockade, but they failed to organize a flotilla against it. Meanwhile, President Nasser of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq taunted Israel to fight daily after the blockade, threatening Israel with annihilation (“The Six Day War: Overview”). Sensing immediate danger from mass war preparations, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol authorized on June 5, a pre-emptive strike against Egypt. Israel was isolated internationally, yet the Arabs nations received generous military aid from the Soviet Union. The same day, nearly the entire Israeli air force launched strikes against Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian air bases. Highly effective, nearly the entire Egyptian and Jordanian air force was destroyed, and half the Syrian air force was destroyed (“The Six Day War: Overview”). Intense tank battles in the Sinai Desert ensued, and Israeli paratroopers seized the city of Jerusalem after three days of fighting. After defending against Syrian forces near the Golan Heights, Israeli Defense Forces pushed back Syrian forces, and the Israeli Defense Forces neared the capitals of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt (“The Six Day War: Overview”). Bowing to international pressure from the Soviet Union who threatened to intervene and the United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Israeli forces halted their advance. Israel accepted a cease fire on June 10, 1967, possessing a dramatically different nation.
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