THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY

UNDERSTANDING THE SPREAD OF ISIS IN

WILLIAM D. COUGHLIN SPRING 2016

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for baccalaureate degrees in Geography and International Politics with honors in Geography

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Rodger Downs Professor of Geography Honors Advisor and Thesis Supervisor

Donna Peuquet Professor of Geography Faculty Reader

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College. i ABSTRACT

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) first took control of territory in Iraq in 2013 and the group has continued to expand its control and influence despite international intervention. The rise of ISIS was unexpected and unprecedented, and there continues to be a lack of understanding of how ISIS was able to gain a large amount of territory in such a short amount of time. This paper aims to establish what the core factors are that allowed ISIS to form, spread and govern territory in Iraq.

The ESRI exploratory regression tool was used to create a multivariate regression model and to analyze twelve factors that may play significant roles in the spread of ISIS. The factors that were considered are ethnicity (Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and mixed), water resources, civilian deaths, suicide bombing deaths, distance from Syria, population, location of Iraqi military brigades, and major cities.

The final multivariate regression model had Kurdish majority, water resources, civilian deaths, distance from Syria and Iraqi military brigades as significant factors. These five exploratory variables has an R2 of .77, explaining 77% of towns controlled by ISIS. These factors provide insight into the rise of ISIS and help to explain what type of environment within

Iraq allowed for the spread of ISIS. This qualitative and quantitative research allows for greater understanding of the adversary, which is the first step in defeating them.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iii

LIST OF TABLES ...... iv

Chapter 1 Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 2 Context ...... 3

Chapter 3 Methods and Data...... 8

Chapter 4 Results ...... 16

Chapter 5 Conclusion ...... 27

Appendix A Maps ...... 30

Appendix B Data...... 37

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 39

Academic Vita of William Coughlin ...... 42

iii LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Extent of ISIS Control ...... 4

Figure 2 Iraqi Provinces ...... 7

Figure 3 ISIS Control July, 2014 ...... 19

Figure 4 ISIS Control August, 2014 ...... 20

Figure 5 Kurdish Majority ...... 22

Figure 6 Water Resources ...... 23

Figure 7 Civilian Deaths ...... 24

Figure 8 Distance from Syria ...... 25

Figure 9 Iraqi Military Brigades ...... 26

Figure 10 Sunni Majority ...... 30

Figure 11 Shia Majority ...... 31

Figure 12 Mixed Ethnicity ...... 32

Figure 13 Suicide Bombing Deaths ...... 33

Figure 14 Population ...... 34

Figure 15 Major Cities ...... 35

Figure 16 Oil Fields ...... 36

iv LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Ethnicity, Water Resources, Civilian Deaths, Suicide Bomb Deaths & Major Cities Data37

Table 2 Water Resources, Civilian Deaths, Suicide Bomb Deaths and Major Cities Data ..... 38 1

Chapter 1

Introduction

“I think the analogy we use around here sometimes, and I think is accurate, is if a JV team puts on

Lakers uniforms, that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant.” – President Obama (January, 2014)

President Obama made the above statement in regards to the Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria (ISIS) capturing the town of Fallujah in Iraq. As ISIS began to conquer large swaths of territory in

Iraq and Syria, Obama qualified his statement by saying that he was not speaking directly about ISIS even though transcripts of the conversation show clearly that he was. Obama’s naive statement referring to

ISIS as the “JV Team” illustrates how unexpected and surprising the rise of ISIS was. The United States

Intelligence Community and the US Government failed to predict the growth of ISIS and failed to understand the root factors that allowed for an extremist insurgency to control and govern major towns and areas in Iraq. The rise of ISIS was not a spontaneous movement but rather had historical and social roots allowing ISIS, which is called many names including the Islamic State, (IS), Daesh and the Islamic

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), captured the attention of the United States and the international community in June of 2014 when ISIS captured the strategically significant town of in Iraq. Until the fall of Mosul to ISIS, the group was not well known and not considered a grave threat by the international community. Most expected that the Iraqi army, which received its training from the United

States military, would quickly respond and retake the city. However, instead of responding to ISIS, many

Iraqi soldiers fled the battlefield, leaving their American- 2

issued weapons behind. Even with the collapse of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, the

Iraqi Prime Minister broadcasted on Iraqi state television that the Iraqi government would not allow the remainder of the province and city to fall (Carter, 2014). The idea that ISIS was a short-term problem, where the Iraqi military and civilian militias could quickly restore control shows the lack of understanding of the underlying reasons for the success of ISIS.

This paper aims to establish what core factors allowed ISIS to form, spread and govern territory within the boundaries of Iraq despite international interference. The Iraqi government and the international community failed to determine and understand these factors and work to mitigate their effects in contributing to an armed extremist insurgency. Without understanding why ISIS was able to accomplish such monumental gains in a relatively short amount of time, it will be difficult to preventing the further spread of ISIS and to regain territory lost to ISIS.

Using a multivariate regression model, I will incorporate societal, cultural, demographic and environmental data in order to better understand what factors have the largest influence on ISIS taking control of a town. Using a statistical approach combines qualitative research with quantitative analysis to provide an explanation of the rise of ISIS.

In this paper Chapter Two will provide a brief history of ISIS, explaining their goals and ideology and how they rose to power. Chapter Three will discuss the multivariate regression model that is used to analyze ISIS and the data that was used. Chapter Four will explain the results of the model and offer an explanation and interpretation of the outcome.

Finally, Chapter Five will focus on putting ISIS into context and the strengths and weaknesses of the analysis used. 3 Chapter 2

Context

Rise of ISIS:

ISIS can trace its roots back to a branch of the well-known terrorist organization al-Qaeda. ISIS was originally part of the branch known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) but after the leader’s death in 2006 an umbrella organization was created called the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)

(BBC, 2015). This insurgency group was carrying out attacks within Iraq but remained significantly weakened due to the large American presence and the rejection of the group by

Sunni Arab Tribesman. However in 2010, Baghdadi who is the current leader of ISIS, began to rebuild the group’s strength. By 2013 the group was becoming more potent and was conducting dozens of attacks per month in Iraq (BBC, 2015). With the unrest and civil war ongoing in Syria,

Baghdadi joined fighters loyal to him from the al-Nusra Front and ISI to create ISIS. Using the combined strength and the assistance of the disenfranchised Sunni Arabs in Iraq, ISIS captured the city of Fallujah in Iraq in December of 2013. This was the group’s first major territorial gain in Iraq. However, this was largely dismissed by the international community as an isolated incident that could quickly be resolved. However in June 2014 ISIS made news across the world when it seized control of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. Since that time ISIS has continued to gain territory throughout Iraq and Syria using brutal tactics that has gained it international attention. ISIS has inspired lone-wolf terrorist attacks throughout the world and has taken responsibility for numerous attacks against western nations. ISIS has proven that it is capable and determined to accomplish their goals. 4

Figure 1 Extent of ISIS Control Institute for the Study of War, 2016 ISIS Ideology:

ISIS is comprised of many individuals who all have their own intrinsic motivations and ideologies. However as a collective ISIS follows a Salafi interpretation of Islam

(Bunzel, 2015). Salafism focuses on purifying Islam by eliminating idolatry and affirming

God’s Oneness (Bunzel, 2015). Idolatry includes those who practice a religion outside of Islam, but it also includes Shia Muslims and smaller Muslim communities such as Sufi Muslims.

Salafist believe that the time of Muhammad and the subsequent generation under the guidance of the rightly guided Caliphs were the ideal Muslim community and that Muslims should strive to 5 implement that community today. ISIS has a unique interpretation of the Quran and hadiths, using these as sources that shape the groups visions and goals (Lister, 2015). In addition to following the Salafi school of Islam, they follow a political movement called Jihadi-Salafism.

ISIS wishes to restore Islam to its former glory by declaring war against ‘enemies of Islam’ (The

Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2014). This movement believes in liberating all lands with non-Islamic cultures through jihad and that it is every Muslim’s duty to participate in this struggle (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2014).

According to ISIS, in order to return Islam to its former glory, it must establish a Caliphate, making the group’s ultimate goal to create a global Caliphate (Lister, 2015).

Spread of ISIS:

ISIS’ first territorial gains in Iraq were at the end of 2013 when the group captured

Fallujah and parts of Ramadi on December 30th (Wilson Center, 2016). ISIS continued to grow in power and on June 10th, 2014, they seized control of Mosul. Iraqi security forces were incompetent and unable to retake the city. Two days later ISIS took control of , and at this time Iraq asked Iran and the United State to assist in combating the extremist group (Wilson

Center, 2016). On June 29, 2014, ISIS officially declared the establishment of a caliphate. ISIS continued their success and swept throughout Northern Iraq even though the U.S and Iranian military assisted the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In 2015 ISF with the help of Iranian militias and U.S. airstrikes and training began to stall the ISIS advancement and started the journey of retaking lost territory. Despite ISIS still acquiring some territory, Kurdish forces in northeastern

Iraq began to expel ISIS from towns in northern Iraq in mid to late 2015 (Wilson Center, 2016).

In the first quarter of 2016 ISF began to gain momentum and achieved several battle victories including the key victory of removing ISIS from the Iraqi town of Ramadi. The ongoing 6 struggle between ISIS and the Iraqi security forces continues today and a long-term solution to the conflict is not in the immediate future. The underlying question is what factors allowed ISIS to rise with such dominance and take control of large swaths of territory. The environment within

Iraq must have been ripe for a Sunni extremist insurgency to grow and develop. Variables that likely facilitated the growth and spread of ISIS in Iraq are the ethnic makeup of Iraq, water resources, civilian deaths, suicide bombing deaths, distance from Syria, population, location of

Iraqi military brigades, and major cities. This paper will investigate each of these factors and seek to understand if they play a significant part in explaining the spread of ISIS in Iraq.

7

Figure 2 Iraqi Provinces

Belmont Club, 2004 8

Chapter 3

Methods and Data

Multivariate Regression Model:

To create a multivariate regression model I used the ESRI software ArcMap. The first step to create the model was the gathering of data. The data had to be formatted in a way that was compatible with the software and model. The model is based on the 18 provinces of Iraq.

Each variable therefore had to be on the provincial level and in tabular form. I took the data from each variable that was geographically stored in a Shapefile and converted it to tabular form that was centrally located in one Shapefile.

The data was then processed using the ESRI exploratory regression tool. The exploratory regression tool uses multiple explanatory variables and evaluates all combinations of explanatory variables that produce the best model that answers the question at hand (ArcGIS). All regression models must meet a number of requirements to ensure the results are accurate and not influenced by outside factors.

The following requirements must be met for all regression models; the p-values must be significant, the variance inflation factor should be low and the model should not spatially autocorrelated. The p-values for regression models are broken down into two categories, coefficient and Jarque-Bera. Coefficients represent the strength that the explanatory variable

(independent variable) has on the dependent variable and the type of relationship it has, either positive or negative. In order for the p-value for coefficients to be significant, the explanatory variable must be notably different from zero, signifying that it has meaning for the model 9 (ESRI). The Jarque-Bera p-value determines if the residuals of the dependent variable are normally distributed (ArcGIS). In order to have a non-biased model, the residuals should be normally distributed (ArcGIS). The Jacque-Bera coefficient should be greater than .05, because the null hypothesis is that the model is normally distributed. Any value greater than .05 means that you are unable to reject the null hypothesis and that the residuals are normally distributed. A good model also has a low variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF measures the redundancy amongst exploratory variables. If one variable has a high VIF value then it is redundant and should be removed from the model because it is not serving a specific purpose. Finally for an effective model, the regression residuals should be random and not clustered. The results of a

Morans I test needs to be run in order to ensure that there is no spatial clustering. After the exploratory regression tool tests all of these requirements, it produces any model that passes all of the requirements. The tool also produces a R^2 value for each of the models. The R^2 value is way to measure the modes performance, with a number from 0 to 1.0 (ArcGIS). A perfect model would have a value of 1.0, meaning the model explains 100% of the variation in the dependent variable. Therefore the higher the R^2 value, the better the model.

For the model I created, I originally put in 12 explanatory variables: Sunni ethnicity,

Shia ethnicity, Kurdish ethnicity, mixed ethnicity, water resources, civilian deaths, suicide bombing deaths, distance from Syria, population, Iraqi military brigades, and major cities.

Data:

The gathering of data and research into each of these variables was the first step into creating an accurate multivariate regression model. Qualitative research was necessary to have an understanding of how each of these variables related to ISIS.

Ethnicity: 10 At the conclusion of the World War I, Britain gained control of the Iraqi territory through the San Remo Conference of 1920 (Palmer 2006, 224). At this point, the three distinct Ottoman districts of , Karbala and Mosul became known as Iraq. In 1932, Iraq was formally granted independence and Britain ruled indirectly through King Faisal I, who followed the commands of the British (Palmer 2006, 225). In order to maintain control of Iraq, the British purposely pitted different ethnic groups against each other (Palmer 2006, 224). The British created a strong Sunni ruling class that has plagued the country and its domestic ethnic relations until this day. Ethnic conflict was exploited due to this “divide and conquer” policy of the British

(Palmer 2006, 224). This animosity with historical roots was a major concern in post- Saddam government building efforts. The United States transitioned Iraq from a dictatorship to a plural political system where each political faction would compete for representation in the government

(Katzman, 2014). The US wanted to promote power sharing and cooperation among the three major ethnicities but underlying resentment and mistrust was still evident (Katzman, 2014). The

Sunnis were disillusioned with the new government as their power in government was significantly weakened, while the Shiites and Kurds became more dominant (Katzman, 2014). A sectarian civil war broke out, but due to the US surge and political effort to appease the Sunni militants, the Sunnis rejoined the political process (Katzman, 2014). When the US withdrew from Iraq in 2011, any types of Sunni insurgency were at low levels. However, Maliki, Prime

Minister of Iraq, began sectarian politics aimed at the Sunni population to include the removal of

Sunni political figures from office and a crackdown on Sunni protests. This re-sparked Sunni anger and resentment and allowed for the rise and support of ISIS by a growing number of Sunni

Iraqis because of the discontent and anger with the Shiite dominated Iraqi government. 11 This variable was separated into four different categories: Sunni, Shia, Kurdish or mixed.

This is a binary variable, where if the vast majority of a province is Sunni, Shia or Kurdish then it received a ‘1’ in its respective category and if it was a mix between ethnic groups than a ‘1’ was placed in the mixed category of the regression model. The data came from Princeton

University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict.

Water Resources:

Water is a scarce but massively important resource in Iraq. Iraq and the region have faced a drought that has put pressure on the limited resources of the , Euphrates and

Karoon rivers (Chulov, 2010). Competition for the water resources from neighboring countries,

Iran, Turkey and Syria, and mismanagement has led to a lack of water security for Iraq (Chulov,

2010). The amount of water reaching Iraq by the Euphrates River is down 50-70% resulting in millions of Iraqis facing severe drinking water shortages (Chulov, 2010). ISIS knows the importance of water and is using its control of key areas to cut off water to other areas of Iraq, similar to the tactics conducted under Saddam Hussein (Paraszczuk, 2015). ISIS has taken control of key including the Tabqah and Ramadi (Paraszczuk, 2015). With control over key dams, ISIS is able to control the amount of water that reaches other provinces of Iraq and is cutting off water to government controlled and Shiite majority southern Iraq. The reduction in water is affecting multiple aspects of Iraqi life. Food security has become increasingly vulnerable, since agricultural fields are drying up. Industries in Iraq are also suffering because many are water dependent (Paraszczuk, 2015). Water is crucial for everyday life in Iraq. Security analysts say a key factor that could determine the outcome of the ISIS conflict is who controls the region’s water resources (Vidal, 2014). Water supplies are of 12 strategic value and are being effectively used as a weapon by ISIS. This makes the existing water in Iraq valuable and a important resource control.

The water resources variable was recorded in the regression model as the length

(kilometers) of water resources in Iraq by province. This data was obtained from Open Street

Map as a hydrology layer. The hydrology layer was then filtered to have only rivers and streams that contained water year-round. The remaining water features were then measured and recorded as kilometers per province.

Civilian Deaths and Suicide Bombings:

The variable of civilian deaths includes deaths that were committed by any weapon and by any perpetrator from 2012 to 2013, before ISIS took control of territory in Iraq. Violence began to increase with the initial drawdown of US troops, but then rapidly increased when US troops officially withdrew in 2011 (Freeman, 2013). Cases of major violent events more than quadrupled from the withdrawal to 2013 (Freeman, 2013). Civilian deaths can play a key role in starting and sustaining an insurgency. Civilians often bear a large cost of counterinsurgency efforts and civilian deaths generate anger and mistrust of the counterinsurgency forces. This mistrust often causes a portion of the general population to cooperate with the insurgency group

(Condra, 2010). Even when the insurgency group kills civilians, a disproportional amount of the blame is usually focused at the government and the counterinsurgency effort (Condra, 2010).

Even if civilians don’t join the insurgency due to anger about the death of innocent civilians, often time family members passively cooperate with the insurgency allowing insurgency groups to gain strength and spread.

Civilian deaths are often a result of suicide bombings, but suicide bombings have a specific psychological consequence on a population. Suicide terrorism is one of the most 13 aggressive forms of terrorism where the aim is to kill as many people as possible (Pape, 2003).

Suicide terrorism’s goal is to inflict pain on the opposition and to overwhelm society and to have the opposition succumb to the terrorist demands (Pape, 2003). Suicide bombing disrupts everyday life and inhibits the government from functioning effectively. While suicide attacks are inexpensive and effective, it raises awareness to the attackers demands, heightens the citizens level of anxiety and disrupts the economy (Ganor).

The data is from Iraq Body Count project that uses media reports that are then confirmed through hospital, morgue, NGO and other official figures (Iraqi Body Count Project, 2016). The data is from recorded deaths from 2012 to 2013, before ISIS took control of territory in Iraq. The civilian deaths include all civilian deaths committed by any perpetrator, including U.S, Iraqi or anti-governmental forces. Civilian deaths and suicide deaths are based on exact numbers, not estimates according to the Iraq Body Count.

Distance from Syria:

This geographic variable is used to take into account the importance of Syria. One of

ISIS’s goals is to create a caliphate that ignores the political boundaries of Iraq and Syria. Syria is experiencing a civil war amongst the dictator Bashar al-Assad and multiple warring rebel groups, allowing for ISIS to take root and operate with limited interference. ISIS uses Syria for training camps, where new recruits are trained in urban warfare and arms training (Roggio,

2015). Syria is a recruiting base from which fighters and resources are sent throughout the region. ISIS is allowed to thrive due to Syria’s disorder, which carries over to the neighboring state Iraq. 14 The data was derived by creating centroids for each of the provinces in Iraq. Using the centroids, the closest point on the Syrian border was measured. The data was recorded as kilometers away from Syria for each province.

Population and Major Cities:

The majority of the world came to know ISIS when is captured the second largest city of

Iraq, Mosul. ISIS has continued to employ urban warfare and has fought to gain control of cities throughout Syria and Iraq. Vast portions of Iraq are scarcely populated. These two variables aim to examine if ISIS spreads in provinces with high populations with a large quantity of cities of

100,000 people or if ISIS tends to have more control over provinces with smaller populations.

The population data comes from Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict.

The data come in the form of total population for each of Iraq’s provinces. The ‘major city’ data comes from the World Population Review. For this model, a major city is considered any city with a population over 100,000 people. The data was entered into the model as the number of major cities per province.

Iraqi Military Brigades:

A brigade is a subdivision of the military, which typically is comprised of 1,500 to 4,000 soldiers. The Iraqi military is a key player in the ISIS conflict. When ISIS first started their capture of Mosul in June of 2014, the weakness of the Iraqi military became evident as large number of Iraqi soldiers deserted their post and left their weapons behind. Corruption was also rampant throughout the military at this time, adding to its ineffectiveness (George, 2016). The

Iraqi military proved unsuccessful in stemming ISIS and was unable to retake territory without outside help. The US led coalition began to re-train the Iraqi military in December of 2014 in order to provide a more effective tool against ISIS (George, 2016). 15 The data was from The Long War Journal, which provides reporting and analysis on the

‘Global War on Terror.’ The data is from 2009 due to the difficulty in obtaining reliable unclassified locations of the Iraqi military.

Oil Fields:

Oil revenue serves as ISIS top source of revenue and is imperative in financing the terrorist organization (Gillespie, 2015). ISIS controls approximately 10% of Iraq’s oil fields

(Gillespie, 2015). ISIS is able to pump the oil, and then sells it at a discounted rate to independent traders. In addition to supporting ISIS’s activities, the loss of oil fields is hurting the

Iraqi government budget, as oil is how the country receives a large portion of its revenue.

Having constant and consistent revenue is crucial for ISIS due to the high cost of running the organization and paying their soldiers. Keeping control of oil resources is vital for continued success for ISIS. The data is from ESP Lift, oil and gas professionals, and is recorded in the model as the number of oil fields per province.

16 Chapter 4

Results

After the exploratory regression tool was run with all twelve exploratory variables, it resulted with five significant variables. The result was a multivariate regression model with Iraqi military brigades, water resources, civilian deaths, Kurdish majority and distance from Syria as significant exploratory variables. This model had an R^2 value of .77, Jarque-Bera coefficient of

.658, a VIF of 3.47 and no spatial autocorrelation.

The R^2 value of .77 means that 77% of the towns under ISIS control are explained by the five significant exploratory variables. A Jacque-Bera coefficient value of .658 means that the residuals for the model are normally distributed. The VIF is low, with a value of 3.47 meaning that there is no significant redundancy amongst the variables. Finally there is no spatial autocorrelation meaning that all requirements for the regression model have been met.

Each of the exploratory variables also has a related positive or negative correlation towards the dependent variable of towns under ISIS control. Of the five exploratory variables of the regression model, the presence of Iraqi military brigades has a 90.93% positive correlation, the length of water resources in Iraq has a 100% positive correlation, the number of civilian deaths has a 63.17% positive correlation, provinces with a Kurdish majority has a 88.55% negative correlation and distance from Syria has a 97.51% negative correlation.

These five variables offer insight into the spread of ISIS. One interesting result was with the variable Iraqi military brigades. The model says that as Iraqi military brigades increase, then towns controlled by ISIS increase. An explanation might be that Iraqi soldiers defected to ISIS, bringing their knowledge and expertise to the terrorist organization. Many current ISIS advisors and leaders were formerly officers in the Iraqi army (Ali, 2014). Reports show that entire 17 divisions within the Iraqi military conceded Mosul to ISIS with out any attempt of fighting, largely due to sectarian and historical ties (Sherlock, 2014). Defection and sympathy to ISIS’s cause amongst the Sunni members of the Iraqi military help explain the positive correlation for the Iraqi military brigade variable.

Water resources also had a strong positive correlation. As the length of water resources increase in a province, the amount of towns controlled by ISIS increases. As discussed previously water is scarce resource in Iraq and necessary for everyday life. ISIS has learned to use water as a weapon and seeks to control it. Water has proven to be a strategic value to terrorist group.

Civilian deaths also have a positive correlation. Large numbers of civilian deaths before

ISIS began to control territory in Iraq causes mistrust of the government and lack of faith that they can provide security. Feelings of mistrust and anger at the government laid the groundwork for the rise of an insurgency group like ISIS to rise to power.

The Kurdish majority variable has a negative correlation. The strong fighting force of the

Kurds can help to explain the correlation. The Pershmerga, the military force of the Kurds, has a history of fighting and includes fighting Saddam Hussein’s forces. This group is battle tested, which has help prepare them for the current ongoing crisis. The Kurds have been a steady, reliable force in the fight against ISIS and have had multiple battle successes recapturing towns and securing Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq.

The final explanatory variable is distance from Syria, which has a strong negative correlation. The closer the province is to Syria the greater amount of towns control by ISIS. As discussed previously, ISIS’s network and resources set up in Syria can help explain this. The chaos and civil war that has engulfed Syria has set up the ideal environment for ISIS to thrive 18 and serve as a base to send soldiers and resources into Iraq. These five variables give insight and understanding to the spread of ISIS in Iraq.

In order to test the results of the regression model and apply them to the situation on the ground, analyze one month of ISIS control in Iraq and then using the explanatory variable predict which province(s) are likely to experience an increase in ISIS control. Using the Institute of

Wars “Control of Terrain in Iraq” series of maps, I will be able to test the variables on past spread of ISIS in order to investigate the accuracy of the model. I choose to start with July 1,

2014 because this was shortly after ISIS gained international attention after gaining control of

Mosul and the group was gaining momentum. Using the July 1, 2014 map, I will apply the variables to predict what province(s) will likely experience an increase ISIS presence in August

2014. 19

Figure 3 ISIS Control July, 2014 20

Figure 4 ISIS Control August, 2014 21

Using the five variables to help predict the spread of ISIS, the province of Ninawa will likely experience an increased ISIS presence. Ninawa matches each of the five exploratory variables. Ninawa province has the second most Iraqi brigades, only behind Baghdad. Iraqi military brigades have a positive correlation with towns under ISIS control. Since Ninawa has a large amount of brigades, using the regression model results, the province is likely to experience an increase in ISIS control. Ninawa is predominately Sunni. The Kurdish majority variable has a negative correlation with towns under ISIS control. Since Ninawa is not predominately Kurdish it does not experience a negative correlation with towns under ISIS control, which would have given the province a lower likely hood of ISIS control. For the variable of water resources, Ninawa has the fourth largest amount of water resources (as measured by the model) out of the 18 Iraqi provinces. The length of water resources has a positive correlation with towns under ISIS control, making Ninawa at greater risk of increase ISIS control because of its substantial length of water resources. The civilian deaths variable also has a positive correlation. Ninawa ranks second out of all Iraqi provinces for number of civilian deaths. This high amount of civilians deaths put the province at greater risk of having more territory fall to ISIS. The final variable of distance to Syria can be seen on the map. Ninawa shares a border with Syria. Distance to Syria has a positive correlation, adding addition risk of ISIS capturing more territory in Ninawa. The combination of all five variables leads to the conclusion that Ninawa province is at the greatest risk of increased ISIS control

Comparing the map of July 2014 and August 2014 verifies my prediction. Ninawa experienced a significant increase in ISIS control. Multiple towns in the province fell to ISIS within this one month period. The towns include Sinjar, Bashiqa, Qaraqoush, Tilkif, Wana and the dam. Rabia also went from being under Pershmerga control to contested. This helps show that the five significant variables in the regression model has relevancy to the actual situation on the ground in Iraq. This example demonstrates how the model can provide insight into the spread of ISIS in Iraq. 22

Figure 5 Kurdish Majority 23

Figure 6 Water Resources 24

Figure 7 Civilian Deaths 25

Figure 8 Distance from Syria 26

Figure 9 Iraqi Military Brigades 27 Chapter 5

Conclusion

ISIS is an evolving and intelligent terrorist organization that it is capable of gaining and maintaining territory throughout the Middle East. The group came to power unexpectedly and has made unprecedented gains, particularly in Iraq. The advancement of ISIS has puzzled the

US government and the international community. This paper aimed to explain what factors allowed ISIS to form, spread and govern territory within Iraq.

Using a statistical approach and creating a multivariate regression model we discovered that Iraqi military brigades, water resources, civilian deaths, Kurdish majority and distance from

Syria are all significant factors that help explain the spread of ISIS. Each of these variables helps to explain a part of the larger story of the rise of ISIS. These five variables help to explain 77% of towns controlled by ISIS and therefore gives us a solid understanding of what influences the terrorist organization’s spread within Iraq.

I first collected data for all twelve variables and then using the ESRI exploratory regression tool I created a multivariate regression model. The first variable, Iraqi military brigades, has a positive correlation with towns controlled by ISIS. A possible explanation for this is because soldiers in the Iraqi military have deserted and joined ISIS, and when many soldiers fled they left behind their weapons and equipment that ISIS has utilized. The second variable, water resources, is a scarce resource and critical for everyday life in Iraq. ISIS understands the strategic importance of controlling water in the region, creating a positive correlation between water resources and towns controlled by ISIS. The third variable, civilian deaths, creates an environment of mistrust of the government and cause a portion of the population to become sympathetic to a insurgency group, in this case ISIS. For this reason 28 civilian deaths have a positive correlation with towns controlled by ISIS. The fourth variable is predominately Kurdish provinces. Kurds have a history of fighting and have a well trained and effective fighting force that has been successful in combating ISIS. Finally the variable distance from Syria has a positive correlation with towns controlled by ISIS. ISIS has set up training camps and used Syria as a recruitment center for foreign fighters and sends soldiers and supplies from Syria into Iraq. These five variables provide insight into the spread of ISIS in Iraq.

The analysis used has both strengths and weaknesses in understanding the spread of ISIS.

The main weakness of the analysis is the availability of the data. High quality, accurate data of

Iraq that is publically available is hard to acquire. Some of the data used in the model, including

Iraqi military brigades, is dated and therefore not as accurate. An additional improvement that could be made with more data is analysis at the district level. There are 18 provinces and 120 districts. Having data available at the district level would have allowed for a more detailed analysis and a more accurate regression model that could better explain the spread of ISIS in

Iraq. One strength of the analysis is the statistical approach to the problem. By approaching the problem with a regression model, the results can be quantified and give a greater understanding of the significance of each individual variable that qualitative analysis cannot provide.

For future research I would like to include the GDP, infant mortality and percentage of the population that are of fighting age as variables. I would also analyze the reduction of ISIS control in Iraq. The Iraqi military and international coalition has begun to make significant strides in regaining control of territory from ISIS. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said

“2016 will be the year of the big and final victory, when Deash’s presence in Iraq will be terminated” (Kalin, 2015). Creating a model that will give insight about how ISIS will compress will be important for the future. I anticipate that ISIS will begin to diminish slowly from Iraq. I 29 believe that ISIS will be pushed back from the Northeast by the Peshmerga and by Shia militias and Iraqi military from the South, pushing ISIS to a last stand in Ninawa province in Northern

Iraq on the Syrian border. This is supported by the regression model and the five explanatory variables. Northern Iraq has a substantial lengths of water resources, large number of civilian deaths, it is close to Syria and a it had a large number of Iraqi military brigades, all which have positive correlations to towns under ISIS control. Northeast Iraq has majority Kurdish population, which has a negative correlation with towns under ISIS control. Due to this I believe

ISIS will diminish to a final stand in Northwest Iraq. However the rise and potential fall of ISIS in complicated and will likely be a lengthy progression.

Having a deep understanding of what allowed ISIS to spread is imperative to stop ISIS and to prevent another terrorist insurgency from taking root. The Sun Tzu quote “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster” captures the importance of this knowledge. 30 Appendix A

Maps

Figure 10 Sunni Majority 31

Figure 11 Shia Majority 32

Figure 12 Mixed Ethnicity 33

Figure 13 Suicide Bombing Deaths 34

Figure 14 Population 35

Figure 15 Major Cities 36

Figure 16 Oil Fields 37 Appendix B

Data

Iraqi Province Sunni Majority Shia Majority Kurdish Majority Mixed Ethnicity Al-Anbar 1 0 0 0 Al-Basrah 0 0 0 1 Al-Muthannia 0 0 0 1 Al-Qadisiyah 0 1 0 0 An-Najah 0 1 0 0 Arbil 0 0 1 0 As-Sulaymaniyah 0 0 1 0 At-Tamim 0 0 0 1 Babil 0 1 0 0 Baghdad 0 0 0 0 Dhi-Qar 0 1 0 0 Dihok 0 0 1 0 Diyala 0 0 0 1 Karbala 0 1 0 0 Maysan 0 1 0 0 Ninawa 1 0 0 1 Sala ad-Din 1 0 0 0 Wassit 0 1 0 0

Iraqi Province Water Resources (KM) Civilian Death Suicide Bomb Deaths Major Cities Al-Anbar 2958 1447 262 3 Al-Basrah 1082 217 64 5 Al-Muthannia 488 16 0 1 Al-Qadisiyah 465 74 0 1 An-Najah 371 26 0 2 Arbil 1027 15 0 1 As-Sulaymaniyah 2351 69 0 1 At-Tamim 1184 760 110 1 Babil 726 885 124 1 Baghdad 341 4193 480 1 Dhi-Qar 378 85 45 1 Dihok 692 10 0 1 Diyala 3970 2073 216 1 Karbala 98 65 3 1 Maysan 694 50 0 1 Ninawa 1650 2221 220 3 Sala ad-Din 1241 2070 357 1 Wassit 598 171 6 1

Table 1 Ethnicity, Water Resources, Civilian Deaths, Suicide Bomb Deaths & Major Cities Data 38

Iraqi Province Oil Field Population Distance to Syria (KM) Brigades Al-Anbar 0 1074525 177.918 6 Al-Basrah 5 1900478 747.374 5 Al-Muthannia 0 549784 625.785 0 Al-Qadisiyah 0 934794 472.764 1 An-Najah 0 987408 454.817 0 Arbil 0 1326721 186.505 0 As-Sulaymaniyah 0 1660324 311.057 0 At-Tamim 0 920666 245.184 3 Babil 0 1821000 382.55 1 Baghdad 0 6303662 332.695 11 Dhi-Qar 1 1498283 612.828 1 Dihok 0 544249 69.669 1 Diyala 0 1229240 420.175 0 Karbala 0 783595 339.923 0 Maysan 1 805811 626.644 3 Ninawa 2 2301627 87.872 8 Sala ad-Din 0 907634 218.541 3 Wassit 2 1000030 476.705 2

Table 2 Water Resources, Civilian Deaths, Suicide Bomb Deaths and Major Cities Data

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Academic Vita of William Coughlin [email protected]

Education: The Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA Major: Bachelor of Science, Geography; Concentration in Geospatial Information Science Bachelor of Arts, International Politics; Concentration in International Relations Minor: Bachelor of Arts, Middle Eastern Studies Schreyer’s Honor College; Deans List All Semesters

Experience: Geospatial/ Imagery Analyst Intern National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, May 2014- Jan. 2016  Provided imagery, map-based intelligence and geospatial information in support of the nation's military forces and national policy makers  Produced multiple imagery intelligence reports and assisted coworkers in the production of shapefiles, maps and imagery graphics Pennsylvania State University Gould Center  April 2015  Worked for the Gould Center to create multiple spreadsheets of skills and knowledge taught in each of PSU Geography classes and helped to create a database to store the information. Teaching Intern (TI) The Pennsylvania State University, Introduction to Cartography, Aug. 2014- Dec. 2014  Assisted Professor in Lab-based instruction and assisted students in the course

Extracurricular Activities: Undergraduate Students in the Department of Geography (UnderDoGs)  President, May 2015- Present  Vice President, Sept. 2014- May 2015  Planned weekly meetings that include guest speakers from professionals in the field of Geography, service projects, special events and field trips. Penn State Dance Marathon (THON) Hospitality Captain  Sept. 2015- Feb. 2016  A leader in the world’s largest student-run philanthropy, directly responsible for 24 people.  Working directly with donors to secure over $10,000 in food donations for events throughout the year.

Conferences and Presentations: GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence) Symposium  July 2015  Presented academic research and help set up and run the conference as a student assistant. American Association of Geographers (AAG) Annual Conference  April 2014, 2015, 2016  Represented Penn State and presented research to Academics and researchers in Tampa, Florida. Chicago, Illinois and San Francisco, California.  Attended multiple sessions about ongoing research and projects in the field of Geography Pennsylvania Geographical Society Annual Conference  Nov. 2012  Represented Penn State at the conference held at Salisbury University  Attended different sessions about ongoing research and projects in the field of Geography