The is the fourth largest dam in the , obstructing about 11 billion cubic meters (388+ billion cubic feet) of water from rushing down the River towards Mosul, and ultimately southward to . According to structural surveys from the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Union of Iraqi Schol- ars, the dam is threatening imminent collapse, which would affect the lives of millions of Iraqis living down- stream of the dam – ultimately killing anywhere between 500,000 to 1.47 million people.

With nearby strategic assets necessary for the dam’s full reconstruction in the control of ISIS – in addition to an overwhelmingly-high required financial investment – the path to remedying the crisis will be fraught with multiple obstacles as the situation continues to grow more dire each day.

On April 20th in Rome, Italy, PAFI (Peace Am- bassadors for ), in partnership with Centro Studi Americani, conducted a collaborative symposium that hosted the minds best suited for providing solutions to a majorly disastrous crisis aerial view. Source: commons.wikimedia.org in Iraq: the Mosul Dam.

The symposium panel was made up of several esteemed international engineers and Iraqi scholars whose discus- sions addressed the most prevailing issues for best mitigating the situation, and how Iraq and the international community can thus avoid the largest possible catastrophe in the Middle East and providing a stronger founda- tion for peace in the region.

This report will provide a detailed analysis of the physical construction of the dam and its geotechnical status, a synopsis of the presentations given during the symposium, and conclude with several prescriptive takeaways for best mitigating this disastrous situation. Mosul Dam

“….in terms of internal erosion potential of the foundation, Mosul Dam is the most dangerous dam in the world… If a small problem [at] Mosul Dam occurs, failure is likely.” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, September 2006

Key Facts

§ The Mosul Dam provides critical irrigation, flood control, and hydropower to NW Iraq § Leaks were discovered within months of operation § U.S. Army study concludes that the dam is at a “high risk” of failure § Projected loss of life from dam failure 500,000 (U.S. Embassy est. 1.47 million) § Only permanent solution is to construct second dam at estimated cost of $2 billion

Mosul Dam

§ Located on Tigris River in Northwest Iraq 60 km (37 miles) north of Mosul § Fourth largest dam in the Middle East with over 11.11 billion cubic meters of storage; equivalent to twice the size of Lake Pontchartrain – the lake that broke the levies in New Orleans § Operated by Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources

Structural problems

§ Built on soft, dissoluble Gypsum, Anhydrite and karstified limestone bedrock § Foundation has been severely eroded by water (karstified) § Short-term solution has been constant mass-scale grouting (cement filling)

Safety concerns

§ Dam’s safety problems concealed by Ministry until a post-2003 US Army Corps of Engineers investigation § The study reports that grouting is not a viable long-term solution § Study reports that the soft Gypsum and Anhydrite foundation will collapse from dam weight and water erosion § Only permanent solution is to build a second dam at cost of $2 billion

Consequences of the Dam failure

§ Projected loss of life from total dam failure is 500,000 (the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad have even estimated that this could grow to 1.47 million without adequate evacuation) § The initial wave will peak at 55m (180 ft) and reach Mosul city within 4 hours of dam failure § Floodwater will reach the capital city within 38 hours and will inundate a 261km (138 miles) area of Baghdad 10 hours after that § Flooding will eventually stop 700km South of dam (15 miles south of Baghdad) after 48 hours, having caused an “enormous” loss of life and property § PM Al-Abadi’s government has downplayed safety risk and rejected new dam construction

History

§ Originally called Saddam Dam, construction began in 1981 and made operation by 1986 § A Ba’athist Party deputy under Saddam chose the sit to bring jobs to Mosul § Daesh (IS) captured the dam for several weeks in July 2014, generating concerns of a planned demolition § Currently, Daesh is in control of Mosul city 50km (30 miles) SE of the Dam

The Mosul Dam: Then and Now

The Mosul Dam, formerly known as the Saddam Dam, began construction in January of 1981 and became opera- tional in July of 1986. Located on the Tigris River just 60 kilometers (37 miles) north of the city of Mosul, the dam is the largest in Iraq and considered the fourth largest in the Middle East.

Planning for the dam had begun in the 1950s as demand for water for irrigation and consumption began to increase in Iraq. Iraq had consulted with several international firms in hopes of locating the best location for the proposed dam. In 1978 the Swiss Consultants Consortium ultimately became the official consultant for the dam’s planning.

In 1981 during the time of ’s rule a German-Italian consortium began construction of the dam. The site of the dam is situated on top of a foundation of gypsum, which is highly water- soluble. Due to the concern of this mineral’s interaction with water, the dam’s engineers performed thorough grouting of the foundation before construction. In order to expedite the construction of the dam, limited grouting was performed during its construction with the intention of continuous grouting projects in the future.

Construction for the dam ended in 1984 and in the spring of 1985 the dam basin began to collect water streaming from snowmelt from the mountains in . About a year later in July of 1986 the dam’s began generating power for the region from the grow- ing reservoir. The area that the dam eventually inundated by 11.11 billion cubic meters of water – submerging many archeological sites – is known today as Lake Dahuk.

Multiple grouting projects have taken place in the decades following the dam’s construction as structural integrity of the dam became more of a mounting concern.

The Mosul Dam is an earthen dam with a clay core for added support, and earthen tend to be effective in their own right. As pressure continues to build up behind the dam, the strength of the geological foundation is continu- ally tested. With the foundation below the dam being composed of gypsum and limestone – relatively weak compos- ites when exposed to large concentrations of water – the overall integrity of the dam has been severely compromised over time.

The first speaker at the symposium was Dr. Nadhir Al-Ansari, professor at the Department of Civil, Environmental and Natural Resources Engineering at Lulea University Sweden and a published expert in dams and reservoirs. Dr. Al-Ansari noted during his presentation that the base of the Mosul Dam is rife with cavities due to the natural ero- sive force that water has highly soluble minerals such as gypsum and limestone. Naturally these cavities have contrib- uted to seepage appearing around the site, whose occurrence has only increased with time.

Typically natural sedimentation from the down flow of water into the lake would aid in lowering the rate of erosion, but according to recent surveys very little natural sediment deposition has occurred, even less so concentrated by the region closest to the dam.

To prevent total structural failure of the foundation a grouting project was implemented that continually fills the cavities with cement to reinforce them, but their effectiveness is based off of how frequent the grouting takes place. In July of 2014 the dam fell under the control of Daesh, thus tempo- rarily suspending the grouting that happened routinely around the site. These few weeks under Daesh control contributed to the growth of these sinkholes and cavities, thus ultimately furthering the occurrence of seepage around the site.

The reclamation of the dam from Daesh by Kurdish forces only ben- efitted the dam so much; certain issues have persisted since before the occupation of Daesh. One of the dam’s two spillage gates has not been properly functioning since 2013, thus con- tributing to the building mass of water behind the dam.

Should the capacity of water get so great that spillover happens this would only further diminish the structural integ- rity of the dam and expedite its collapse.

The doomed narrative behind the dam’s construction and current status was only reinforced by Dr. Al-Ansari’s in- depth presentation. Backed by his expansive knowledge of dam systems, the question begged is not if the dam will collapse due to current factors, but when.

The country of Iraq is facing a monumental problem: the foundation of the Mosul Dam is crumbling while the Iraqi government’s continual downplay the issue remains fueled by propaganda and conspiracy.

The reality of a deluge of almost Biblical proportions rushing down the Tigris River killing millions of people is very apparent and time is running out. It has come down to essentially two options: invest heavily in reinforcing the dam or building a new structure entirely, or focus on how to evacuate millions of lives from the impending devastation following the dam’s inevitable failure. Click here to watch the first part of the Mosul Dam Crisis : The Current Crisis

Under the event that the Mosul Dam collapse, a wall of water 110 meters (360 feet) would be released upon the low-lying countryside below. The consequences of this event would be absolutely catastrophic, devastating multiple cities in its wake.

The city of Mosul, the second largest in Ira q, is situated just 60 kilometers (37 miles) south of the dam on the Tigris River; it would only take two hours at the soonest for the unstoppable wall of water to reach the city. The water upon entering the city limits would be 55 meters (180 feet) tall. Even two hours after being initially impacted by the wave Mosul would remain covered under 24 meters (79 feet) of water.

Twenty-two hours following the wave’s destruction of Mosul it would begin to flood the city of with 15 me- ters (49 feet) of water, eventually reaching the capital city of Baghdad eight hours later, flooding the majority of it.

The threat of such an event could cause anywhere between 500,000 to 1.47 million human casualties, according to estimates conducted by the U.S Embassy in Iraq, not to mention the devastating impact the resulting wave would have on the infrastructure of some of Iraq’s largest cities.

With such potential for devastation and massive loss of life one would think that the Iraqi government would cast stern observation over the situation. Modest investment aimed at mitigating the threat proves that the situation has yet to illicit a serious response from leading Iraqi officials.

While government officials seem to mostly turn a blind eye towards the impending threat of devastation, the man- ager of the Mosul Dam Abdulkhalik Thanoon Ayoub in 2004 ordered that the dam’s water level be capped at 319 meters (1,047 feet) above sea level from the previous 330 meters (1,083 feet) in an effort to alleviate pressure on the structure. Instead of taking heed to the several collective voices of concern, the Iraqi government has focused its attention towards attempts to placate those most likely to be affected by the dam’s collapse by insisting that the government is taking preventative measures against such a disaster. Misinformation regarding the situation is so widespread that even at one point during President George W. Bush’s administration there was a floating conspiracy that the notion of the dam’s collapse was American propaganda to assist in vacating the region to allow for easier occupation move- ment by American military forces.

The initial construction of the Dam 14 kilometers downstream of the Mosul Dam was a brief glimmer of hope of lessening the impact of a potential dam failure at Mosul, but the project never reached completion. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers had proposed to the Iraqi government that they expand the in order to better obstruct the wave from the Mosul Dam’s collapse. Government officials resisted this proposal stating that the initial $300 million Badush Dam project is intended to provide hydroelectric power and irrigation, whereas the expansion would cost $10 billion.

Seeing that the suggestion of erecting additional supporting structures wasn’t favorable in the eyes of the Iraqi gov- ernment, in 2007 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers followed up with another proposal of maintenance and repairs to the dam at $27 million, but only provides a short-term solution.

Slide detailing inundation effects on the city of Mosul following dam collapse. Source: Enrica Caporali

Recently the Iraqi government under the direction of the Ministry of Water Resources announced that it has award- ed Italian firm Trevi Group a $236 million dollar contract to begin work on reinforcing and maintaining the dam. While the work is already underway, experts argue that the current efforts are not nearly enough needed for fully reinforcing the structure of the dam. Italy itself intends on sending 450 of its troops to act as protection for the Trevi Group’s engineers from Daesh, who continues to this day to occupy Mosul. To make matters worse, Daesh also controls the nearest cement mixing facili- ties integral to the dam’s refortification, a variable not fully realized in the proposal.

Following Dr. Al-Ansari’s presentation was a presentation given by Mr. Raimondo Luciano, an engineer and pro- fessor highly knowledgeable in the construction and maintenance of dams. Mr. Luciano’s presentation provided a deeper dive of the physical structure of the dam and the geological makeup of the foundation.

As a professor in the Department of Engineering at Universita degli studi di Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale in Cassino, Italy, Mr. Luciano led the discussion of various types of dams. From their structural design to the types of materials used to build them (concrete or earthen), Mr. Luciano stated that in by looking at different dams and the foundations they are built upon, one can ascertain a measure of structural fidelity for each dam.

In the case of the Mosul Dam, Mr. Luciano affirmed the belief that the Click here to watch the second part of dam is indeed facing structural failure from causes extending beyond the the Mosul Dam Crisis : physical makeup of the dam; in fact, earthen dams are common in the Middle East. Based off the foreboding signs suggested by Dr. Al-Ansari’s presentation backed by Mr. Luciano’s insight into dam structural engi- neering, it became clear that failure is certainly imminent.

As if their expert opinion wasn’t reason enough, a September 2006 report by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers stated that “in terms of internal erosion potential to the foundation, Mosul Dam is the most dangerous dam in the world.”

While currently the threat from the Mosul Dam is great, a good amount of its potential for destruction could be mitigated with our knowledge of how and when it can happen and the hours following. Dr. Al-Ansari stated that the number of human lives lost during such a tragedy could be greatly reduced if a good evacuation plan is instituted and executed upon. The Path Forward

Both presentations by Dr. Al-Ansari and Mr. Luciano provided strong evidence that the Mosul Dam is teetering on the brink of collapse, and physical reinforcement of the dam’s structure is merely a tactic in delaying the inevitability of disaster.

With the reality of disaster fully recognized, the panel discussion progressed onto the topic of mitigation efforts fol- low the inevitable failure of the dam. These efforts focused namely on evacuation procedures for saving those lying in wake downstream of the wave, as well as engineering projects aimed at curtailing the effects of the collapse.

Mrs. Enrica Caporali, Associate Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Università degli Studi di Firenze in Florence, Italy spoke in full detail about the impact of the Mosul Dam’s collapse: the flood coverage, the estimated damage, and the various concerns contributing to the disaster. An interesting segment of Mrs. Caporali’s presentation was her Dam Failure Simulation, which essentially provided an evacuation guide built off variables one inputs into the simulation. The data inputs taken into account were probability maximum flood, reservoir elevation-area-storage relations, spillway rating curve and other dam and reservoir features. These factors play a huge role in determining the full extent of such a disaster event and also contribute to more accurate predic- tions aiding in the formation of more realistic evacuation protocols.

Mrs. Caporali continued to present more evidence of the devasta- Click here to watch the third part of the tion from the wave of water pummeling downstream from the Mosul Dam Crisis : reservoir. Various charts and measurements provided a visual of the actual flood coverage, which at its worst scenario would leave at about 53% of Mosul flooded.

Using the 1966 flood in the city of Florence (Firenze), Italy as an example, Mrs. Carorali elaborated on how the Italian response to flood events was shaped after the incident. Many strides were made in safety studies (flood preparedness in infrastructure), civil protections (evacuation procedures) and population communica- tions (inundation maps printed in local phone books to educate the populace on the various degrees of flood risk).

Mrs. Caporali reiterated that governments need to focus on risk assessment and dam safety studies through dam break models (to properly estimate flood wave and inundation areas for differ- ent scenarios), monitoring systems for the dam and reservoir, and lastly emergency plans for civil protection purposes (population communication, evacuation plan and promotion of risk percep- tion).

Mr. David Dewane is an architect and professor at the Catholic University in Washington, D.C. with a strong background in ecologically and socially equitable design. During Mr. Dewane’s presentation he provided a thorough coverage of what the impact of a failure event occuring at Mosul could possibly look like while integrating other pre- vious international evacuation events as case study examples. One such event he highlighted was Hurricane Katrina in 2005 that debilitated the city of New Orleans, Louisiana for many months following the event. The response of the government (whether municipal, the state of Louisiana and the ) to the event of the storm was a prime example of how not to execute an evacuation procedure for millions of civilians facing peril. Due to the lack of a proper evacuation plan, hundreds of lives were impact by the storm; either stranded, displaced or dead. When Hurricane Rita threatened to impact Houston, Texas, the devastation of Hurricane Katrina was fresh on the minds of Houston’s city officials. The municipality moved quickly to enact proper evacuation procedures well in advance of the storm, but even with more preparation in place than New Orleans, Houston still faced several issues. Even with contraflow with all lanes of traffic vacating a city, evacuees still found themselves stuck miles outside on highways as the storm still approached. Luckily Hurricane Rita avoided Houston, sparing it severe damage, but the embarrassment of the city’s poor evacuation planning still left its mark.

With the potential for disaster at Mosul seeming more and more imposing the need for more addressed concern on proper evacuation protocols is becoming all too dire. If Iraq should want to save its people, it needs to fully under- stand how to move them away from the onslaught of danger, and quickly.

Mr. Lucio Ubertini, former Officer of the Italian Army Corps of Engineers and long time professor in engineering at La Sapienza University in Rome, Italy, strongly reinforced the assertions made by Mr. Dewane that a strong action plan is needed in the event of the Mosul Dam’s failure. Mr. Ubertini, possessing a long time knowledge of infrastructural systems throughout Italy, assessed that while an evacuation plan is a highly necessary protocol in its own right, a thorough un- derstanding of local terrain and urban layouts is absolutely essential for crafting a complex yet highly effective evacuation procedure with the potential for saving many more lives.

Mr. Ubertini stated that in order to save as many lives as pos- sible city and regional officials must have an intimate familiar- ity with maps of local buildings, surrounding infrastructure and the topography of the area. Mr. Ubertini affirmed that “the victims of hydrological disasters are typically the victims of inadequacy”, and that inadequacy can be mostly attributed to the incompetence of the surrounding authorities.

Mr. Ubertini continually stressed how involving as much local insight as possible into the mitigation process. Many inadequacies can be ruled out with a comprehensive understanding of local insight, data that must be collected at a hyper-local level. If a failure event occurs at Mosul Dam that evacuation plan absolutely needs to be highly custom to the local area seeing that the response time must operate within merely hours.

During much of the conference there existed a strong notion that the Iraqi government needs to fully understand and evaluate the concerns around the Mosul Dam before it is able to craft a plan to completely address these con- cerns. In order to prevent the possibility of a million or higher death toll an evacuation plan needs to not only be thorough in its planning but also in its execution.

Outside of the evacuation plan being the best solution for mitigating the impact of the Mosul Dam’s collapse some – the Iraqi government included – believe that the solution exists around reinforcing the dam or building a whole new structure entirely. This has been proven by Iraq’s investment with the Italian engineering firm Trevi Group, which according to a government statement will assist in “carry[ing] out the project of rehabilitating and maintaining the Mosul Dam.”

Trevi Group has been awarded $296 million dollars (273€ million euros) to see the project through of reinforcing and sustaining the integrity of the dam. While the Iraqi government seems optimistic of the future endeavors of the Trevi Group, some experts warn that simply patching up the dam isn’t a viable enough solution, and the next best solution is would require much more than $296 million dollars.

If engineering is going to be the savior solution at the Mosul Dam, an entirely new dam would need to be built to contain the failing pre-existing structure. Should a practical engineering solution be put it place, some fear that the estimated cost associated with building a new dam would be closer to $2 billion dollars.

With the threat of disaster looming and the ideal solution difficult to grasp, one thing is certain: the Iraqi govern- ment needs to fully accept the reality of the Mosul Dam’s collapse and to immediately begin working towards the solution that saves the most innocent lives.

Click here to watch the fourth part of the Mosul Dam Crisis : Conclusion

Thanks to Peace Ambassadors for Iraq, Centro Studi Americani and the speakers that presented, the symposium was an intrepid first step in finding a solution to the Mosul Dam crisis, whether through human engineering ingenuity or by comprehensive protocol aimed at reducing the loss of life.

The reality is that the Mosul Dam is more likely to experience failure than it is not. Being built on karst topography made up of gypsum, limestone and anhydrite, the dam’s fidelity was threatened from the beginning. With the dam’s foundation being slowly dissolved away and the closest sources to provide reparation under Daesh control, the obsta- cles preventing the dam’s rebuilding efforts are beyond merely financial means. Furthermore, the Iraqi government has not accessed the threat with nearly enough urgency; therefore failure at the Mosul Dam is becoming quickly a highly likely event.

The most realistic scenario in saving the most lives of those living in the disaster’s wake would be to derive a com- prehensive evacuation plan that accounts for all variables of the event. This plan would look to local input as well as detailed statistical analyses of the impacted areas that could provide a plausible evacuation route when every minute is utterly crucial.

Click here to watch the fifth and final part of the Mosul Dam Crisis : Sources Cited:

Borger, Julian, “Mosul dam engineers warn it could fail at any time, killing 1m people”. , 2 March 2016. Retrieved 8 May 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/02/mosul-dam-engineers-warn-it- could-fail-at-any-time-killing-1m-people

Alkhshali, Hamdi; Damon, Arwa, “Inside the world’s most dangerous dam.” CNN. 9 April 2016. Retrieved 8 May 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/08/middleeast/inside-the-mosul-dam/

“Italy’s Trevi wins contract to fix imperiled Iraq dam.” The Local It, 02 February 2016. Retrieved 8 May 2016. http://www.thelocal.it/20160202/iraq-awards-italys-trevi-contract-to-fix-imperilled-mosul-dam

Nadhir Al-Ansari; Issa E. Issa; Varoujan Sissakian; Nasrat Adamo; Sven Knutsson (2015). “Mystery of Mosul Dam the most Dangerous Dam in the World: The project” (PDF). Journal of Earth Sciences and Geotechnical Engineer- ing 5 (3): 15–17. ISSN 1792-9660. Retrieved 4 March 2016.

Paley, Amit R. “Iraqi Dam Seen In Danger of Deadly Collapse”, , October 30, 2007. Re- trieved 8 May 2016. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/29/AR2007102902193. html?hpid=topnews

“The Mosul dam: A watery time-bomb: The most dangerous dam in the world”. , 13 February 2016. Retrieved 8 May 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21692903-most-dangerous-dam- world-watery-time-bomb