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The Mosul Dam Is the Fourth Largest Dam in the Middle East, Obstructing About 11 Billion Cubic Meters

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The Mosul Dam Is the Fourth Largest Dam in the Middle East, Obstructing About 11 Billion Cubic Meters The Mosul Dam is the fourth largest dam in the Middle East, obstructing about 11 billion cubic meters (388+ billion cubic feet) of water from rushing down the Tigris River towards Mosul, and ultimately southward to Baghdad. According to structural surveys from the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Union of Iraqi Schol- ars, the dam is threatening imminent collapse, which would affect the lives of millions of Iraqis living down- stream of the dam – ultimately killing anywhere between 500,000 to 1.47 million people. With nearby strategic assets necessary for the dam’s full reconstruction in the control of ISIS – in addition to an overwhelmingly-high required financial investment – the path to remedying the crisis will be fraught with multiple obstacles as the situation continues to grow more dire each day. On April 20th in Rome, Italy, PAFI (Peace Am- bassadors for Iraq), in partnership with Centro Studi Americani, conducted a collaborative symposium that hosted the minds best suited for providing solutions to a majorly disastrous crisis Mosul Dam aerial view. Source: commons.wikimedia.org in Iraq: the Mosul Dam. The symposium panel was made up of several esteemed international engineers and Iraqi scholars whose discus- sions addressed the most prevailing issues for best mitigating the situation, and how Iraq and the international community can thus avoid the largest possible catastrophe in the Middle East and providing a stronger founda- tion for peace in the region. This report will provide a detailed analysis of the physical construction of the dam and its geotechnical status, a synopsis of the presentations given during the symposium, and conclude with several prescriptive takeaways for best mitigating this disastrous situation. Mosul Dam “….in terms of internal erosion potential of the foundation, Mosul Dam is the most dangerous dam in the world… If a small problem [at] Mosul Dam occurs, failure is likely.” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, September 2006 Key Facts § The Mosul Dam provides critical irrigation, flood control, and hydropower to NW Iraq § Leaks were discovered within months of operation § U.S. Army study concludes that the dam is at a “high risk” of failure § Projected loss of life from dam failure 500,000 (U.S. Embassy est. 1.47 million) § Only permanent solution is to construct second dam at estimated cost of $2 billion Mosul Dam § Located on Tigris River in Northwest Iraq 60 km (37 miles) north of Mosul § Fourth largest dam in the Middle East with over 11.11 billion cubic meters of storage; equivalent to twice the size of Lake Pontchartrain – the lake that broke the levies in New Orleans § Operated by Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources Structural problems § Built on soft, dissoluble Gypsum, Anhydrite and karstified limestone bedrock § Foundation has been severely eroded by water (karstified) § Short-term solution has been constant mass-scale grouting (cement filling) Safety concerns § Dam’s safety problems concealed by Ministry until a post-2003 US Army Corps of Engineers investigation § The study reports that grouting is not a viable long-term solution § Study reports that the soft Gypsum and Anhydrite foundation will collapse from dam weight and water erosion § Only permanent solution is to build a second dam at cost of $2 billion Consequences of the Dam failure § Projected loss of life from total dam failure is 500,000 (the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad have even estimated that this could grow to 1.47 million without adequate evacuation) § The initial wave will peak at 55m (180 ft) and reach Mosul city within 4 hours of dam failure § Floodwater will reach the capital city within 38 hours and will inundate a 261km (138 miles) area of Baghdad 10 hours after that § Flooding will eventually stop 700km South of dam (15 miles south of Baghdad) after 48 hours, having caused an “enormous” loss of life and property § PM Al-Abadi’s government has downplayed safety risk and rejected new dam construction History § Originally called Saddam Dam, construction began in 1981 and made operation by 1986 § A Ba’athist Party deputy under Saddam chose the sit to bring jobs to Mosul § Daesh (IS) captured the dam for several weeks in July 2014, generating concerns of a planned demolition § Currently, Daesh is in control of Mosul city 50km (30 miles) SE of the Dam The Mosul Dam: Then and Now The Mosul Dam, formerly known as the Saddam Dam, began construction in January of 1981 and became opera- tional in July of 1986. Located on the Tigris River just 60 kilometers (37 miles) north of the city of Mosul, the dam is the largest in Iraq and considered the fourth largest in the Middle East. Planning for the dam had begun in the 1950s as demand for water for irrigation and consumption began to increase in Iraq. Iraq had consulted with several international firms in hopes of locating the best location for the proposed dam. In 1978 the Swiss Consultants Consortium ultimately became the official consultant for the dam’s planning. In 1981 during the time of Saddam Hussein’s rule a German-Italian consortium began construction of the dam. The site of the dam is situated on top of a foundation of gypsum, which is highly water- soluble. Due to the concern of this mineral’s interaction with water, the dam’s engineers performed thorough grouting of the foundation before construction. In order to expedite the construction of the dam, limited grouting was performed during its construction with the intention of continuous grouting projects in the future. Construction for the dam ended in 1984 and in the spring of 1985 the dam basin began to collect water streaming from snowmelt from the mountains in Turkey. About a year later in July of 1986 the dam’s power station began generating power for the region from the grow- ing reservoir. The area that the dam eventually inundated by 11.11 billion cubic meters of water – submerging many archeological sites – is known today as Lake Dahuk. Multiple grouting projects have taken place in the decades following the dam’s construction as structural integrity of the dam became more of a mounting concern. The Mosul Dam is an earthen dam with a clay core for added support, and earthen dams tend to be effective in their own right. As pressure continues to build up behind the dam, the strength of the geological foundation is continu- ally tested. With the foundation below the dam being composed of gypsum and limestone – relatively weak compos- ites when exposed to large concentrations of water – the overall integrity of the dam has been severely compromised over time. The first speaker at the symposium was Dr. Nadhir Al-Ansari, professor at the Department of Civil, Environmental and Natural Resources Engineering at Lulea University Sweden and a published expert in dams and reservoirs. Dr. Al-Ansari noted during his presentation that the base of the Mosul Dam is rife with cavities due to the natural ero- sive force that water has highly soluble minerals such as gypsum and limestone. Naturally these cavities have contrib- uted to seepage appearing around the site, whose occurrence has only increased with time. Typically natural sedimentation from the down flow of water into the lake would aid in lowering the rate of erosion, but according to recent surveys very little natural sediment deposition has occurred, even less so concentrated by the region closest to the dam. To prevent total structural failure of the foundation a grouting project was implemented that continually fills the cavities with cement to reinforce them, but their effectiveness is based off of how frequent the grouting takes place. In July of 2014 the dam fell under the control of Daesh, thus tempo- rarily suspending the grouting that happened routinely around the site. These few weeks under Daesh control contributed to the growth of these sinkholes and cavities, thus ultimately furthering the occurrence of seepage around the site. The reclamation of the dam from Daesh by Kurdish forces only ben- efitted the dam so much; certain issues have persisted since before the occupation of Daesh. One of the dam’s two spillage gates has not been properly functioning since 2013, thus con- tributing to the building mass of water behind the dam. Should the capacity of water get so great that spillover happens this would only further diminish the structural integ- rity of the dam and expedite its collapse. The doomed narrative behind the dam’s construction and current status was only reinforced by Dr. Al-Ansari’s in- depth presentation. Backed by his expansive knowledge of dam systems, the question begged is not if the dam will collapse due to current factors, but when. The country of Iraq is facing a monumental problem: the foundation of the Mosul Dam is crumbling while the Iraqi government’s continual downplay the issue remains fueled by propaganda and conspiracy. The reality of a deluge of almost Biblical proportions rushing down the Tigris River killing millions of people is very apparent and time is running out. It has come down to essentially two options: invest heavily in reinforcing the dam or building a new structure entirely, or focus on how to evacuate millions of lives from the impending devastation following the dam’s inevitable failure. Click here to watch the first part of the Mosul Dam Crisis : The Current Crisis Under the event that the Mosul Dam collapse, a wall of water 110 meters (360 feet) would be released upon the low-lying countryside below. The consequences of this event would be absolutely catastrophic, devastating multiple cities in its wake. The city of Mosul, the second largest in Ira q, is situated just 60 kilometers (37 miles) south of the dam on the Tigris River; it would only take two hours at the soonest for the unstoppable wall of water to reach the city.
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