DIVINE WILL and HUMAN CHOICE Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought
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A Rehabilitation of Scholasticism? a Review Article on Richard A. Muller's Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol
A REHABILITATION OF SCHOLASTICISM? A REVIEW ARTICLE ON RICHARD A. MULLER'S POST-REFORMATION REFORMED DOGMATICS, VOL. I, PROLEGOMENA TO THEOLOGY* DOUGLAS F. KELLY REFORMED THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI For decades the idea of scholastic theology has tended to raise very nega tive images, especially among Protestants. The very words 'Protestant scholasticism' or 'seventeenth-century Orthodoxy' conjure up mental pic tures of decaying calf-bound Latin folios covered with thick dust. Of forced and inappropriate proof-texting inside, of abstract and boring syl logisms, far removed from the dynamism of biblical history and concerns of modem life, of harsh logic, a polemical spirit and an almost arrogant propensity to answer questions which the ages have had to leave open. The 'Biblical Theology' movement inspired by Barth and Brunner earlier this century, and the great flowering of sixteenth-century Reformation studies since World War 11 have given seventeenth-century Protestant scholasticism very poor marks when compared with the theology of the original Reformers. The fresh emphasis on the dynamic development of the theology in tfie Scriptures among Evangelicals (post-V os) and vari ous approaches to the 'New Hermeneutics' among those in the more lib eral camp have raised serious questions about the scriptural balance (if not validity) of the more traditional Protestant text-book theology. R. T. Kendall, for instance, has quite negatively evaluated the seventeenth-cen tury Westminster confessional theology in light of the very Calvin whom the Westminster divines certainly thought they were following. 1 Can anything good, therefore, be said these days about Protestant scholasticism? Is it even legitimate to reopen this subject in a serious way? Richard A. -
Antoine De Chandieu (1534-1591): One of the Fathers Of
CALVIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY ANTOINE DE CHANDIEU (1534-1591): ONE OF THE FATHERS OF REFORMED SCHOLASTICISM? A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CALVIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY THEODORE GERARD VAN RAALTE GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN MAY 2013 CALVIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 3233 Burton SE • Grand Rapids, Michigan • 49546-4301 800388-6034 fax: 616 957-8621 [email protected] www. calvinseminary. edu. This dissertation entitled ANTOINE DE CHANDIEU (1534-1591): L'UN DES PERES DE LA SCHOLASTIQUE REFORMEE? written by THEODORE GERARD VAN RAALTE and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has been accepted by the faculty of Calvin Theological Seminary upon the recommendation of the undersigned readers: Richard A. Muller, Ph.D. I Date ~ 4 ,,?tJ/3 Dean of Academic Programs Copyright © 2013 by Theodore G. (Ted) Van Raalte All rights reserved For Christine CONTENTS Preface .................................................................................................................. viii Abstract ................................................................................................................... xii Chapter 1 Introduction: Historiography and Scholastic Method Introduction .............................................................................................................1 State of Research on Chandieu ...............................................................................6 Published Research on Chandieu’s Contemporary -
Anglican Reflections on Justification by Faith
ATR/95:1 Anglican Reflections on Justification by Faith William G. Witt* This article reexamines the Reformation doctrine of justification by faith alone in the light of traditional criticisms and misunder- standings, but also of recent developments such as agreed ecu- menical statements and the “New Perspective” on Paul. Focusing on formulations of justification found in Anglican reformers such as Thomas Cranmer and Richard Hooker, the author argues that justification by grace through faith is a summary way of saying that salvation from sin is the work of Jesus Christ alone. Union with Christ takes place through faith, and, through this union, Christ’s atoning work has two dimensions: forgiveness of sins (jus- tification) and transformation (sanctification). Union with Christ is sacramentally mediated (through baptism and the eucharist), and has corporate and ecclesial implications, as union with Christ is also union with Christ’s body, the church. The Reformation doctrine of justification by faith is much misun- derstood. Among Roman Catholics, there is the caricature of justifica- tion by faith as a “legal fiction,” as if there were no such thing as a Protestant theology of either creation or sanctification. Similar to the accusation of “legal fiction” was the older criticism that justification by faith was an example of the tendency of late medieval Nominalism to reduce salvation to a matter of a divine voluntarist command, with no correlation to any notion of inherent goodness. For Luther, it was said, the Nominalist God could declare to be righteous someone who * William G. Witt is Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology at Trinity School for Ministry, where he teaches both Systematic Theology and Ethics. -
Hegel's Critique of Contingency in Kant's Principle of Teleology Kimberly Zwez [email protected]
Florida International University FIU Digital Commons FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School 3-26-2014 Hegel's Critique of Contingency in Kant's Principle of Teleology Kimberly Zwez [email protected] DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI14040885 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons Recommended Citation Zwez, Kimberly, "Hegel's Critique of Contingency in Kant's Principle of Teleology" (2014). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1194. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1194 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY Miami, Florida HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF CONTINGENCY IN KANT’S PRINCIPLE OF TELEOLOGY A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in RELIGIOUS STUDIES by Kimberly Zwez 2014 To: Dean Kenneth G. Furton College of Arts and Sciences This thesis, written by Kimberly Zwez, and entitled Hegel’s Critique of Contingency in Kant’s Principle of Teleology having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content is referred to you for judgment. We have read this thesis and recommend that it be approved ____________________________________________________ Christine Gudorf ____________________________________________________ Kenneth Rogerson ____________________________________________________ Whitney Bauman, Major Professor Date of Defense: March 26, 2014 This thesis of Kimberly Zwez is approved. -
Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems
NIST Special Publication 800-34 Rev. 1 Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems Marianne Swanson Pauline Bowen Amy Wohl Phillips Dean Gallup David Lynes NIST Special Publication 800-34 Rev. 1 Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems Marianne Swanson Pauline Bowen Amy Wohl Phillips Dean Gallup David Lynes May 2010 U.S. Department of Commerce Gary Locke, Secretary National Institute of Standards and Technology Patrick D. Gallagher, Director Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose. There are references in this publication to documents currently under development by NIST in accordance with responsibilities assigned to NIST under the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. The methodologies in this document may be used even before the completion of such companion documents. Thus, until such time as each document is completed, current requirements, guidelines, and procedures (where they exist) remain operative. For planning and transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new documents by NIST. Individuals are also encouraged to review the public draft documents and offer their comments to NIST. All NIST documents mentioned in this publication, other than the ones noted above, are available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-34 Natl. -
Special Events Contingency Planning
Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual March 2005 FEMA IS-15: Special Events Contingency Planning Job Aids Manual TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... 1 Introduction Preface ....................................................................................................... 1 Background ................................................................................................. 2 Scope ......................................................................................................... 3 Synopsis ..................................................................................................... 4 Chapter Overviews........................................................................................ 4 Chapter 1: Pre-Event Planning Introduction.............................................................................................. 1-1 Definition of Special Event and Mass Gathering .............................................. 1-1 Planning Meetings for Special Events/Mass Gatherings .................................... 1-2 The Planning Process.................................................................................. 1-3 State and Federal Roles in Terrorism Incident Prevention ................................ 1-4 Crowd Types ............................................................................................. 1-9 Crowd Composition ................................................................................. -
Protestant Experience and Continuity of Political Thought in Early America, 1630-1789
Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School July 2020 Protestant Experience and Continuity of Political Thought in Early America, 1630-1789 Stephen Michael Wolfe Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the Political History Commons, Political Theory Commons, Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Wolfe, Stephen Michael, "Protestant Experience and Continuity of Political Thought in Early America, 1630-1789" (2020). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 5344. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/5344 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. PROTESTANT EXPERIENCE AND CONTINUITY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EARLY AMERICA, 1630-1789 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of Political Science by Stephen Michael Wolfe B.S., United States Military Academy (West Point), 2008 M.A., Louisiana State University, 2016, 2018 August 2020 Acknowledgements I owe my interest in politics to my father, who over the years, beginning when I was young, talked with me for countless hours about American politics, usually while driving to one of our outdoor adventures. He has relentlessly inspired, encouraged, and supported me in my various endeavors, from attending West Point to completing graduate school. -
Ten PROBLEMS with AQUINAS' THIRD
Ten PROBLEMS WITH AQUINAS' THIRD WAY Edward Moad 1. Introduction Of Thomas Aquinas’ five proofs of the existence of God, the Third Way is a cosmological argument of a specific type sometimes referred to as an argument from contingency. The Aristotelian argument for the existence of the First Unmoved Mover was based on the observation that there is change (or motion), coupled with the principle that nothing changes unless its specific potential to change is actualized by an actual change undergone by some other thing. It then arrives at the conclusion that there exists something in a constant state of pure activity, which is not itself moved but sets everything else in motion. The operative sense of contingency this argument turns on, then, is that of motion. That is, things have the potential to change in certain ways (depending on the kind of things they are), but may or may not do so; whether they actually do being contingent on whether they are acted on in the right way by something else. For this reason, Aristotle’s argument delivers a first mover, which brings about the motion in all that exists, but not a being that brings about the very existence of everything else. The argument referred to specifically as the argument from contingency, by contrast, turns on the idea of the contingency of the very existence of anything at all. That is, if something exists which may not have existed, and the fact that it does exist rather than not is contingent on the action of other existing things which are themselves contingent, then the existence of the whole lot of contingent things, taken together, is also contingent. -
Aquinas' Third
Aquinas’ Third Way A chain of causes cannot be infinite. Last time we had arrived at the following provisional interpretation of Aquinas’ second way: 1. At least one thing has an efficient cause. 2. Every causal chain must either be circular, or infinite, or it has a first cause. 3. If something were the efficient cause of itself, it would be prior to itself. 4. Nothing can be prior to itself. 5. Nothing is either the efficient cause of itself, or is causally responsible for itself. (3,4) 6. A chain of causes cannot be infinite. __________________________________ C. There is a first cause. (1,2,5,6) Our main topic today will be a discussion of Aquinas’ third way. But before moving on to that argument, let’s talk briefly about a way in which the above reconstruction of the second way might be improved, and about a further criticism of the second way. Last time there was some confusion about the roles of premises 2, 5, and 6 in the argument. One way in which the roles of these premises might be made more clear is by splitting premise 2 up into the following three sub-premises: Every causal chain must either be circular or non-circular. Every causal chain must either be finite or infinite. Every non-infinite, non-circular causal chain must include a first cause. We’re making progress. We’ve got a valid argument, and we have seen that there’s good reason to believe that premises 1, 2, 3, and 4 are true. So the only independent premise - that is, the only premise which does not follow from other premises - which remains to discuss is premise 6. -
1 the Summa Theologiae and the Reformed Traditions Christoph Schwöbel 1. Luther and Thomas Aquinas
The Summa Theologiae and the Reformed Traditions Christoph Schwöbel 1. Luther and Thomas Aquinas: A Conflict over Authority? On 10 December 1520 at the Elster Gate of Wittenberg, Martin Luther burned his copy of the papal bull Exsurge domine, issued by pope Leo X on 15 June of that year, demanding of Luther to retract 41 errors from his writings. The time for Luther to react obediently within 60 days had expired on that date. The book burning was a response to the burning of Luther’s works which his adversary Johannes Eck had staged in a number of cities. Johann Agricola, Luther’s student and president of the Paedagogium of the University, who had organized the event at the Elster Gate, also got hold of a copy of the books of canon law which was similarly committed to the flames. Following contemporary testimonies it is probable that Agricola had also tried to collect copies of works of scholastic theology for the burning, most notably the Summa Theologiae. However, the search proved unsuccessful and the Summa was not burned alongside the papal bull since the Wittenberg theologians – Martin Luther arguably among them – did not want to relinquish their copies.1 The event seems paradigmatic of the attitude of the early Protestant Reformers to the Summa and its author. In Luther’s writings we find relatively frequent references to Thomas Aquinas, although not exact quotations.2 With regard to the person of Thomas Luther could gleefully report on the girth of Thomas Aquinas, including the much-repeated story that he could eat a whole goose in one go and that a hole had to be cut into his table to allow him to sit at the table at all.3 At the same time Luther could also relate several times and in different contexts in his table talks how Thomas at the time of his death experienced such grave spiritual temptations that he could not hold out against the devil until he confounded him by embracing his Bible, saying: “I believe what is written in this book.”4 At least on some occasions Luther 1 Cf. -
Kant on the Cosmological Argument
Philosophers’ volume 14, no. 12 Introduction may 2014 Imprint In the section of the first Critique entitled “The Ideal of Pure Reason,” Kant constructs an elaborately layered critique of the so-called “cos- mological proof” of the existence of God.1 He portrays the cosmologi- cal argument (as I shall more neutrally term it) as having three main phases.2 First, one observes that there is at least one existent being, and argues that it exists contingently (28: 1006). Second, appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, one argues for the existence of Kant on the an absolutely necessary being as the ultimate cause (A 605/B 633n*) or ground (28: 1006) of this contingently existing being. Third, one argues that this absolutely necessary being is a most real being — or ens realissimum (A 605–6/B 633–34). In “The Ideal,” Kant presents Cosmological Argument this third step as drawing the argument to a close (A 606/B 634). But, judging by his discussion in the Religion Lectures, he sometimes con- ceives of the argument as intended to be completed by a sort of coda in which one argues that the absolutely necessary being, since it is an ens realissimum, must possess each of the traditional “divine attributes.”3 Kant raises three main objections to this version of the cosmologi- cal argument. First, it “presupposes” the correctness of the ontological argument in the sense, apparently, of tacitly incorporating the onto- logical argument as a proper part (A 607/B 635; A 608–9/B 636–7). Second, it commits an ignoratio elenchi, a fallacy of arguing for some- thing other than what was at issue (A 609/B 637). -
Truth and Truthmaking in 17Th-Century Scholasticism
Truth and Truthmaking in 17th-Century Scholasticism by Brian Embry A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Brian Embry 2015 Truth and Truthmaking in 17th-Century Scholasticism Brian Embry Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2015 Abstract Some propositions are true and others are false. What explains this difference? Some philosophers have recently defended the view that a proposition is true because there is an entity, its truthmaker, that makes it true. Call this the ‘truthmaker principle’. The truthmaker principle is controversial, occasioning the rise of a large contemporary debate about the nature of truthmaking and truthmakers. What has gone largely unnoticed is that scholastics of the early modern period also had the notion of a truthmaker [verificativum], and this notion is at the center of early modern scholastic disputes about the ontological status of negative entities, the past and future, and uninstantiated essences. My project is to explain how early modern scholastics conceive of truthmaking and to show how they use the notion of a truthmaker to regiment ontological enquiry. I argue that the notion of a truthmaker is born of a certain conception of truth according to which truth is a mereological sum of a true mental sentence and its intentional object. This view entails the truthmaker principle and is responsible for some surprising metaphysical views. For example, it leads many early modern scholastics to posit irreducible negative entities as truthmakers for negative truths, giving rise to an extensive literature on the nature of negative entities.