Language, Necessity and Convention
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Language, Necessity and Convention Reconsidering the Linguistic Approach to Modality Fredrik Nyseth This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Wolfson College, University of Cambridge September 2017 Language, Necessity and Convention Reconsidering the Linguistic Approach to Modality Fredrik Nyseth Abstract This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as ‘linguistic conventionalism’) – i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in “making a consistent empiricism possible”. Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be “created” by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the ob- jection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly empirical matter. In part C, finally, I turn to objections which purport to show that there are limits to what can be explained in terms of linguistic convention. Specifically, I consider whether we need to assume a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissi- ble linguistic rules, a non-conventional consequence relation, or a non-conventional starting-point in order to get the linguistic approach off the ground. An overarching question is whether we are forced to take some logic for granted in a way which would undermine the explanatory ambitions of the approach. I argue that some of the prominent objections rely on misunderstandings, that some can be answered head-on, and that some point to genuine challenges and constraints which put pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant a wholesale rejection of the view. Instead, they point to areas where further work is needed. Preface Declaration: This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as de- clared in the Preface and specified in the text. It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is be- ing concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qual- ification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee. Acknowledgements: Throughout the work on this thesis, my supervisor, Tim Button, has been a constant source of encouragement, invaluable advice and insightful comments. It is abundantly clear to me that both the thesis and I have improved greatly as a result of his help, and I will always remain grateful for this. I also want to thank my shadow supervisor, Michael Potter, whose prob- ing criticisms, perceptive comments and wealth of knowledge has served as both an antidote to complacency and a source of inspiration. In addition, I have benefited from a great many seminars and lectures at the University of Cambridge, and from conversations and exchanges with a number of people. For suggestions and comments concerning various topics related to the thesis, I would like to thank: Arif Ahmed, Simon Blackburn, Fiona Doherty, Hugh Mellor and Mat Simpson. For advice on translating German and French: Trym Nohr Fjørtoft and Chlo´ede Canson. And for all things practical: the graduate secretary at the Faculty of Philosophy, Zoe Walker-Fagg. I owe a special thanks to Luke Cash who has read and com- mented on substantial parts of the thesis, and who has been a particularly important colleague and friend over several years. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank those who have played important roles at earlier stages in my academic career: Tim Crane, Luca Incurvati and, again, Michael Potter who all supervised me during my time as an MPhil student in Cambridge; and Jan Harald Alnes, Kjersti Fjørtoft, Beatrix Himmelmann, Johan Arnt Myrstad and Petter Nafstad, who were especially supportive during my time as an undergraduate at the University of Tromsø. Finally, I want to thank my family – and in particular my parents, Ann- Helen and Asgeir, for their unending support. And Marit, whose affection, support and patience has been invaluable over the course of these past four years. Contents Introduction 1 A Articulating the Linguistic Approach 7 1 The Commitments of the Linguistic Approach 9 1.1 Paradigmatic Characterisations . 10 1.2 A Quinean Concern . 13 1.3 The Threat of Triviality . 17 1.4 The Threat of Obscurity . 19 1.5 A Different Perspective on Explanation . 21 1.6 Characterising the Commitments . 23 2 The Roots of the Linguistic Approach 27 2.1 Kant’s Subjective-Constitutive Strategy . 28 2.2 Poincar´e’sGeometric Conventionalism . 38 2.3 Wittgenstein’s Linguistic Turn . 45 3 The Linguistic Approach and Logical Positivism 59 3.1 Schlick on the A Priori ..................... 60 3.2 Hans Hahn and Consistent Empiricism . 67 3.3 Carnap and the Linguistic Approach . 73 3.4 More on the Commitments of the Linguistic Approach . 85 B Defending the Essentials 89 4 Language, Truth and Necessity 93 4.1 Versions of the Truth-Contrast Thesis . 94 4.2 Standard Objections . 97 4.3 In Favour of Ordinary Truth . 104 4.4 From Truth to Necessity . 110 4.5 In Defence of the Logical Positivists . 114 5 The Contingency Problem 117 5.1 Blackburn’s Dilemma . 118 5.2 The Wright-Sidelle Strategy and Its Limits . 121 5.3 Doubts about Hale’s Formalisation . 123 5.4 Making Sense of Covariance . 125 5.5 External Covariance and Genuine Necessity . 130 5.6 A Glaring Disanalogy . 133 6 The Character of Linguistic Rules 137 6.1 Rejecting the Myth of a Museum . 138 6.2 The Threat of Indeterminacy . 140 6.3 The Retreat to Idiolects . 147 6.4 External and Internal Standards of Correctness . 151 6.5 Avoiding Idiolects . 154 C Exploring the Limits of Convention 161 7 Inadmissible Conventions? 165 7.1 The Problem of Disharmonious Rules . 166 7.2 The Peacocke-Boghossian Response . 167 7.3 Disharmony as a Pragmatic Problem . 170 7.4 Excessively Weak Elimination Rules . 175 7.5 Explaining the Correspondence . 177 8 Conventions and Consequences 183 8.1 The Quine-Carroll Regress . 184 8.2 Explaining Consequences . 195 8.3 The Rule-Following Considerations . 202 9 First Principles 215 9.1 The Problem . 216 9.2 Rule-Circular Explanations . 218 9.3 Implicit Definition . 222 9.4 Assertibility in All Cases . 224 9.5 Case Study I: Conjunction Elimination . 227 9.6 Case Study II: The Law of Non-Contradiction . 230 Conclusion 239 Bibliography 243 Introduction ‘The philosophical problem of necessity’, Dummett tells us in a much-quoted passage, ‘is twofold: what is its source and how do we recognize it?’ (1959: 327) A once popular response to this problem – which, of course, was a problem long before Dummett’s formulation of it – goes roughly as follows: The source of necessity lies in language and specifically in the conventionally adopted rules that govern the use of linguistic expressions. We are able to recognise necessity insofar as we know what these rules are and can reflect upon them. This rough idea has been given various names, including ‘linguistic conven- tionalism’ and ‘the linguistic doctrine of necessary truth’. I shall call it ‘the linguistic approach to modality’, or just ‘the linguistic approach’. Although this view is not without contemporary defenders,1 it is now rather unfashionable. Two important developments are often said to be responsible for this: the attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction2 and 1Alan Sidelle (1989; 2009), Jody Azzouni (1990; 2014), Amie Thomasson (2007a; 2007b: ch. 3; 2009; 2013), and Jared Warren (2015a; 2015b; 2017) have all provided recent defences of the idea. In addition, Hans-Johann Glock has defended a broadly speaking Wittgensteinian approach (2003a; 2003b: ch. 3; 2008), and Richard Creath has defended Carnap’s views against some of Quine’s objections (1987; 1990a; 2003). 2The classic attack is of course due to Quine (1951), but White, Goodman and Tarski all voiced similar concerns at the time (cf. e.g. White 1950; Goodman, Quine, and White 1947; Tarski 1944; and Frost-Arnold 2013: 94–101). Introduction Kripke’s discovery of necessary a posteriori truths.3 The full story, how- ever, is bound to be more complicated, and has to do with related but broader changes in the philosophical climate, such as the demise of logical positivism, the weakening of Wittgenstein’s influence, the backlash against “ordinary language philosophy”, and the revitalisation of “robust meta- physics”. However, while the linguistic approach is currently unpopular, it is not neglected. Instead, it remains a quite popular target. It remains a target, it seems, not so much because there are occasional defenders, but because it is regarded as superficially – perhaps very superficially – appealing, and because it is perceived to have a certain grip on philosophers even if they do not explicitly endorse it – perhaps even explicitly reject it.