Rhetorics of Stoic Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Discourses of Sentiment
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
31 the Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium MALCOLM SCHOFIELD In
The Syllogisms of Zeno of Citium MALCOLM SCHOFIELD in memoriam Colin Macleod I At paragraph 20 of Book II of de Natura Deorum Cicero has Balbus pause in his defence of the theology of the Stoic school. He reflects with satis- faction on the excellence of the exposition Cicero is going to put in his mouth: "When these tenets are argued in a richer and more expansive style, as I have it in mind to do, it is easier for them to escape the captious objections of the Academics. But when they are inferred by briefer and closer reasoning, as Zeno used to do, then they are more open to criticism. For just as a river in full flow suffers little or no pollution, but an enclosed body of water is easily contaminated, so the censures of the critic are washed away by a stream of eloquence, but the confinement of a closely reasoned argument affords it no easy self-defence. The ideas we develop at length Zeno used to compress in this fashion: What employs reason is better than what does not employ reason. But nothing is better than the universe. Therefore the universe employs reason. One can similarly bring it about that the universe is wise, is happy, is eternal: for all these are better than those which lack them, nor is anything better than the universe. And from this one can bring it about that the universe is god." Balbus' Roman urbwnity seems barely to conceal Cicero's acute consciousness of fundamental and radical differences between Greek and Roman taste, culture, and national temperament. -
What Is and Is Not in Our Power: a Response to Christian Coseru
Reason Papers Vol. 40, no. 2 What Is and Is Not in Our Power: A Response to Christian Coseru Massimo Pigliucci City College of New York 1. Introduction The ancient Stoics were known for putting forth a number of “paradoxes,” so much so that Cicero wrote a whole treatise to explore them, aptly entitled Paradoxa Stoicorum.1 Of course, the term “paradox,” in that context, did not have anything to do with logical contradictions, but rather with para doxan, that is, uncommon opinions. Certainly, two of the most uncommon opinions put forth by the Stoics are that we should live “according to nature” and that things in general can neatly be divided into those that are “up to us” and those that are “not up to us.” In my previous article for this two-part symposium,2 I proposed that these are two cardinal pillars of both ancient and modern Stoicism. The first notion is famously summarized by Diogenes Laertius: This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end “life in agreement with nature” (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, 1 Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum ad M. Brutum, ed. J. G. Baiter and C. L. Kayser, accessed online at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:abo:phi,0474,047:1. 2 Massimo Pigliucci, “Toward the Fifth Stoa: The Return of Virtue Ethics,” Reason Papers 40, no. -
Stoicism and the Virtue of Toleration
STOICISM AND THE VIRTUE OF TOLERATION John Lombardini1 Abstract: This article argues that the Stoics possessed a conception of toleration as a personal and social virtue. In contrast with previous scholarship, I argue that such a conception of toleration only emerges as a product of the novel conceptions of the vir- tue of endurance offered by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. The first section provides a survey of the Stoic conception of endurance in order to demonstrate how the distinc- tive treatments of endurance in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius merit classification of a conception of toleration; the second section offers a brief reconstruction of the argu- ments for toleration in the Meditations. Introduction In his history of the concept of toleration, Rainer Forst identifies its earliest articulation with the use of tolerantia in Stoic philosophy. Though the word tolerantia first occurs in Cicero, it is used to explicate Stoic doctrine. In the Paradoxa Stoicorum, Cicero identifies the tolerantia fortunae (the endurance of what befalls one) as a virtue characteristic of the sage, and connects it with a contempt for human affairs (rerum humanarum contemptione);2 in De Finibus, endurance (toleratio) is contrasted with Epicurus’ maxim that severe pain is brief while long-lasting pain is light as a truer method for dealing with pain.3 Seneca, in his Epistulae Morales, also identifies tolerantia as a virtue, defending it as such against those Stoics who maintain that a strong endurance (fortem tolerantiam) is undesirable, and linking it -
Cicero's Eclecticism and Originauty
http://akroterion.journals.ac.za CICERO'S ECLECTICISM AND ORIGINAUTY D.H. van Zyl, Pretoria One of the most strenuous debates in regard to Cicero turns upon the comroversial subject of his eclecticism and originality, or lack of originality. Much of what is said on this subject, however, is simplistic or ill-considered, since it does not take account, on the one hand, of the relevant circumstances pertaining to Cicero's eclecticism nor, on the other hand, of the basis upon which his originality should be adjudicated. Cicero's education at Rome and his subsequent peregrination to Greece and Asia Minor brought him into contact with virtually all the then-known schools of thought. He: drank deeply from the cup of learning offered to him, and by virtue of his academic bent, soon acquired the skill to distinguish between discrete doctrines, to accept what appealed to him and to reject what he found objectionable. This task must have been greatly facilitated by his knowledge of the Greek language, which opened up a new world of thought and culture unknown to the average Roman. It must likewise have been facilitated by his basic knowledge of Rom;m law and his love of literature, Latin and Greek. In his deep-seated urge to acquire knowledge and to enjoy success in his career, he doubtless required no persuasion to fling himself wholeheartedly into the study of rhetoric and philosophy. It was inevitable that his own thought in respect of every aspect of existence should develop accordingly. And even if such thought was not, as appears to have been the case, original in any marked degree, he was nevertheless soon equipped with a vast store of knowledge which he was able, in his inimitable way, to convey to the world of his time and to countless subsequent generations. -
Stoic Enlightenments
Copyright © 2011 Margaret Felice Wald All rights reserved STOIC ENLIGHTENMENTS By MARGARET FELICE WALD A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in English written under the direction of Michael McKeon and approved by ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ New Brunswick, New Jersey October 2011 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Stoic Enlightenments By MARGARET FELICE WALD Dissertation Director: Michael McKeon Stoic ideals infused seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought, not only in the figure of the ascetic sage who grins and bears all, but also in a myriad of other constructions, shaping the way the period imagined ethical, political, linguistic, epistemological, and social reform. My dissertation examines the literary manifestation of Stoicism’s legacy, in particular regarding the institution and danger of autonomy, the foundation and limitation of virtue, the nature of the passions, the difference between good and evil, and the referentiality of language. Alongside the standard satirical responses to the ancient creed’s rigor and rationalism, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century poetry, drama, and prose developed Stoic formulations that made the most demanding of philosophical ideals tenable within the framework of common experience. Instead of serving as hallmarks for hypocrisy, the literary stoics I investigate uphold a brand of stoicism fit for the post-regicidal, post- Protestant Reformation, post-scientific revolutionary world. My project reveals how writers used Stoicism to determine the viability of philosophical precept and establish ways of compensating for human fallibility. The ambivalent status of the Stoic sage, staged and restaged in countless texts, exemplified the period’s anxiety about measuring up to its ideals, its efforts to discover the plenitude of ii natural laws and to live by them. -
The Stoics and the Practical: a Roman Reply to Aristotle
DePaul University Via Sapientiae College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 8-2013 The Stoics and the practical: a Roman reply to Aristotle Robin Weiss DePaul University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd Recommended Citation Weiss, Robin, "The Stoics and the practical: a Roman reply to Aristotle" (2013). College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations. 143. https://via.library.depaul.edu/etd/143 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE STOICS AND THE PRACTICAL: A ROMAN REPLY TO ARISTOTLE A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August, 2013 BY Robin Weiss Department of Philosophy College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences DePaul University Chicago, IL - TABLE OF CONTENTS - Introduction……………………..............................................................................................................p.i Chapter One: Practical Knowledge and its Others Technê and Natural Philosophy…………………………….....……..……………………………….....p. 1 Virtue and technical expertise conflated – subsequently distinguished in Plato – ethical knowledge contrasted with that of nature in -
Roman Political Thought: from Cicero to Augustine Dean Hammer Frontmatter More Information
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-19524-9 - Roman Political Thought: From Cicero to Augustine Dean Hammer Frontmatter More information ROMAN POLITICAL THOUGHT Roman Political Thought is the first comprehensive treatment of the political thought of the Romans. Dean Hammer argues that the Romans were engaged in a wide-ranging and penetrating reflection on politics. The Romans did not create utopias. Instead, their thinking was relentlessly shaped by their own experi- ences of violence, the enormity and frailty of power, and an overwhelming sense of loss of the traditions that oriented them to their responsibilities as social, political, and moral beings. However much the Romans are known for their often complex legal and institutional arrangements, the power of their political thought lies in their exploration of the extra-institutional, affective foundations of political life. The book includes chapter on Cicero, Lucretius, Sallust, Virgil, Livy, Seneca, Tacitus, Marcus Aurelius, and Augustine and discussions of Polybius, the Stoics, Epicurus, and Epictetus. dean hammer is John W. Wetzel Professor of Classics and Professor of Gov- ernment at Franklin and Marshall College. He is the author of The Puritan Tradition; The Iliad as Politics: The Performance of Political Thought; and Roman Political Thought and the Modern Theoretical Imagination and editor of A Companion to Greek Democracy and the Roman Republic. From 1999 to 2000, he was a Fellow at the Center for Hellenic Studies and is currently on the editorial board of Polity. His articles -
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, Cato Maior De Senectute
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, Cato Maior de senectute [On Old Age]; Paradoxa stoicorum [Stoic Paradoxes]; Somnium Scipionis [The Dream of Scipio] In Latin, decorated manuscript on parchment Northern Italy, c. 1440-1470 ii (parchment) + 32 + ii folios on parchment, a palimpsest, parchment reused from fourteenth-century documents (under-text is perpendicular to the present text), and at least one other source, probably fifteenth-century, where the under-text and present text have the same orientation (under-text scrubbed away but partially visible in margins, see especially ff. 2v, 8v-9, 11, 12v-13, 15, 17, and 18v; on f.18v, a previous cataloguer read “Johannes de V” in Cremona, dated 1[3]53; there is a notary mark on f. 19), modern foliation in pencil top outer corner recto, wanting an unknown number of quires at the end (only the first page of the Somnium Scipionis present), else complete (collation: i12, ii- iii10), horizontal catchwords center lower margin, no leaf or quire signatures, ruled very lightly in lead or brown crayon with single vertical bounding lines, some prickings remain top and bottom margins (justification, 138 x 82-80 mm.), written in an accomplished humanist bookhand in twenty-nine long lines, red rubrics on f. 32v only, blank lines for rubrics, three large six- to four-line red initials with delicate contrasting penwork in brown, some folds from vellum’s original use, discoloration to first and last leaves, and some worm holes in the closing leaves, but overall in good condition. Bound in modern blue morocco over pasteboard by Bernard Middleton (b. -
In Defense of Stoicism
In Defense of Stoicism by ALEX HENDERSON* Georgetown University Abstract This article employs Cicero’s assault on Stoic philosophy inPro Murena as a point of departure to engage three critical aspects of Stoicism: indifference to worldly concerns, the sage as an ideal, and Stoic epistemology. It argues that Cicero’s analysis fails to clearly distinguish between these elements of Stoic philosophy and, therefore, presents Stoicism in a misleadingly unfavorable light. harges of bribery were brought against Lucius Licinius Murena in 62 bce. Despite entrenched opposition from the popular Cparty, Murena was able to enlist the aid of the famed orator and presiding consul Marcus Tullius Cicero. His prosecutor was the most conservative of senators—Marcus Porcius Cato, famed for his rectitude and his unbending adherence to Stoic philosophy. In order to defend Murena, who was almost certainly guilty, Cicero chose to go on the offensive and discredit his opponent by undermining Stoic philosophy in the eyes of the jury. Cicero portrays Stoicism as follows: A wise person never allows himself to be influenced… Philosophers are people who, however ugly, remain handsome; even if they are very poor, they are rich; even if they are slaves, they are kings. All sins are equal, so that every misdemeanor is a serious crime… The philosopher has no need to offer conjectures, never regrets what he has done, is never mistaken, never changes his mind.1 Cicero’s portrayal seems to argue that (1) the Stoics’ commitment to remain indifferent to worldly influence causes them to lack compassion for the circumstances of other people, (2) Stoics are too severe when * [email protected]. -
Cicero on the Philosophy of Religion
CICERO ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: DE NATURA DEORUM AND DE DIVINATIONE. A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by John Patrick Frederick Wynne January 2008 CICERO ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: DE NATURA DEORUM AND DE DIVINATIONE. John Patrick Frederick Wynne, Ph. D. Cornell University, 2008 Cicero wrote de Natura Deorum (dND), de Divinatione (Div.) and de Fato (Fat.) in succession and describes the latter two as continuations of the first. I argue that the three dialogues form a trilogy, in which Cicero as author indicates a stance on the material he presents (but that too little of the fragmentary Fat. remains to be useful for my purposes). There are much-debated attributions of preferences to Cicero’s propriae personae at the conclusions of dND and Div.; I take these preferences to express Cicero’s authorial stance. I examine relevant parts of the speeches to which they react and, first, make philosophical interpretations of each (often comparing other sources for Hellenistic thought) and, second, pay attention to the interaction of Cicero’s characterization of each speaker with the arguments the speaker gives. I find that Balbus in dND advocates the avoidance of superstition and the reform of religious beliefs in line with Stoic physics and that Cotta has a strong commitment to traditional Roman religious views consistent with his sceptical epistemology. Cotta’s scepticism is elusive in its details but perhaps yields a kind of fideism. I find that Quintus Cicero’s advocacy in Div. -
Paradoxes and Disputes
The Stoics | οἱ Στωικοί 9 Paradoxes and Disputes (1) Stoic Paradoxes. In his Letters, Seneca occasionally appeals to views that appear unexpected or strange (e.g., 71.7–8; 71.21). Throughout antiquity, Stoic doctrines were seen as counterintuitive and hence unbelievable: in short, contrary to common opinion and thus paradoxical; i.e. going against (‘para’) the beliefs (‘doxa’) that are common. (There is another meaning: a paradox can also refer to an inconsistent set of propositions, i.e. a set of claims that could not be true together. This is more the idea behind Plutarch’s collection.) Epictetus reports Cleanthes: ‘what philosophers say may conflict with common opinion but not with reason’ (Discourses 4.1.173): it seems certain peculiarities are the consequence of the systematic nature and coherence of Stoic philosophy. In Paradoxa Stoicorum, Cicero lists six ideas that violate common sense: I. Virtue/excellence is the only good (ὅτι μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν; hoti monon to kalon agathon). Remark. The indifferents are subject to fate, or ‘playthings of fortune’ (ludibria fortunae, §9), and thus not really in our possession, or ‘up to us’. They are also merely naturally valuable, but not morally good. Hence, the idea seems to be that something is a good only if it benefits us at all times. (For the association of good and benefit, see Readings 24 May LS60G). But virtue is the only good that is up to us at all times. So, virtue is the only good. II. Virtue is itself sufficient for happiness/flourishing (ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν; hoti autarkês hê aretê pros eudaimonian). -
Table Bay, Labrador, Is TAB T 3O Km East Of
TACK'S BEACH 335 LE BAY (pop. 1945, 33). Table Bay, Labrador, is ophiolites (or sections of the ocean crust and upper TAB t 3o km east of Cartwright. The Bay is about 10 mantle), including the "transition zone" between the abou ·de across tts· mouth an d runs m· 1an d 10r~ more t h an two. The rocks of the Tablelands consist of peridotite, kill Wl . km- Table Harbour 1s ~bout 10 km_t~ the Bay, on with the exposed surface weathered to a tan colour that 20 the north side with severaltslands provtdmg shelter, at contrasts with the surrounding hills, all the more so the point where the Bay narrows. The Harbour and Bay since the unusual chemistry of the rocks is inhospitable ke their names from a flat-topped landmark, Table to most plant life. The ophiolites of the Tablelands are ~ill, which is visible for some distance out to sea. The not only well-exposed, but also uniquely accessible h ad of the Bay formerly had a small year-round popu (from the road through Trout River Gulch from Woody l ~ion and was also a winter place of Indian Tickle qv. Point). The area has been protected since the establish ;here were several small fishing stations on the north ment ofGros Morne National Park in 1973. In 1987 the side including Table Bay Point (North Head) and Mul Park was declared a world heritage site, chiefly be lins 'Cove, while the south side was once dotted with cause of the geological significance of the Tablelands.