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For Final Exam History 354 – Russian History Study Guide for Final Examination 3:30 - 5:30, Tuesday, December 13, 2011 Needed: ABSOLUTELY blank bluebook, pens (not red, not pencil) The final exam will consist of three parts: I. Identification (40%); II. Essay—Covering material since last exam (30%); and III. Essay—Comprehensive (30%). You will be required to identify 5 identification items, and answer ONE essay covering material since the last exam, and ONE comprehensive essay. I. IDENTIFICATION: (40%) Each item is worth 8 points. (You will be given a list of 7 items, from which you must choose 5 to identify. Your answer should include such things as "Who [or what], when, where, and historical significance." Your answers should not exceed 3 or 4 brief sentences or phrases for each item [complete sentences will NOT be required for identification answers].) Yalta, Potsdam, Comecon, Warsaw Pact, Cominform, Eduard Beneš, Truman Doctrine, Andrei Zhdanov, (“Zhdanovshtina”), Josip Broz (Tito), Georgi Malenkov, Lavrentiy Beria, Vyacheslav Molotov, 20th Party Congress, Austrian State Treaty, “Spirit of Geneva,” Wladyslaw Gomulka, János Kádár, sputnik, John Foster Dulles, Christian Herter, Anastas Mikoyan, “Spirit of Camp David,” U-2, Virgin Lands Project, Alexsei Kosygin, Alexander Dubcek, Ludvik Svoboda, Brezhnev Doctrine, Andrei Sakharov, Iurii Andropov, Mikhail Gorbachev, Glasnost, Perestroika, Eduard Shevardnadze, Chernobyl, Solidarity, Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, Nashi II. Essay--covering material since last exam: (30%) You will be given three (3) essay questions, of which you must answer one (1). In general, the actual questions will be similar, but not necessarily identical, to those provided here. (The material covered by the actual questions is included in the following samples, although the actual questions may cover 2 or more of the following sample questions.) In all cases, be sure to support your generalizations with specific examples. 1. Within a few months, the wartime “Grand Alliance” had deteriorated into the type confrontation characteristic of the “Cold War.” Explain. 2. What were the major factors directing Stalin’s postwar policies regarding the states of Eastern Europe? To what extent was he successful in achieving his goals? 3. Several times between 1945 and 1989, Berlin was the focal point of tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Answer the following question, both from the Soviet and Western perspectives: “Why Berlin?” 4. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, some Eastern European countries were allowed at least some degree of variation from Soviet policies, while others were not. Consider the examples of Yugoslavia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and explain the relative success of reform movements in each country. What roles did Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” have in any of those developments? 5. What were Khrushchev’s major domestic and foreign goals? To what extent was he successful in achieving them? 6. What were the major effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis? (Consider this from the perspective of the Soviet Union as well as the United States.) 7. How was the Soviet Union affected by nationalism? How did that conform to Marxist ideology? 8. Discuss the relationship of Glasnost and Perestroika to the end of the Soviet Union. What were they, and why were they developed? To what extent can the “Brezhnev era” be blamed for the breakup of the USSR? To what extent was Gorbachev responsible? 9. What was the relationship between developments within the Soviet Union and those in Eastern Europe in terms of the end of Communism in both areas? 10. Describe the major political developments in Russia since 1991. To what extent have those developments represented advances in democracy and free market capitalism? III. Essay--Comprehensive (30%) 1. Like every nation or ethnic group, Russia has developed unique qualities. What are the major factors that have contributed to the uniqueness of the Russian experience? How have they shaped Russian history? Which do you think are the most significant? How has Russia responded to challenges? 2. Over the past millennium, Russia has had varied relationships with Western Europe. Do you see any consistent patterns in those relationships, or have they simply been random? What elements, if any, of Russian foreign policy have remained consistent over the centuries? What have been different? .
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