Canadian Military History

Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 20

1993

Churchill and the Historians

Robert Vogel

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Recommended Citation Vogel, Robert "Churchill and the Historians." Canadian Military History 2, 2 (1993)

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More seriously but not Copp's First (of which Lord Balfour so aptly fault there is a major problem with Churchill said; "I hear that he has written a the transcription of French names. big book about himself and called it Major Leon Brosseau, D Company and the 'The World Crisis."'). Apparently commander, killed in action, is everyone whoever talked to him or referred to as Lucien. Killed in the saw him in the distance has left same action is the mortar platoon Historians behind some clever entry in his commander, Captain Orieux, diary or memoirs. Consequently referred to in the book as Oriens. A Robert Vogel there exists an absolute treasure friend of this reviewer, Major Alex trove of material from which to Angers, shot through the throat, is mine endless quotations by which referred to as Alexander not as Robert Blake & Roger Louis, eds. one can prove a variety of likely Alexandre, which is his real name. Churchill: A Major Reassessment of his and not so likely interpretations of These may seem small errors.but Life in Peace and War. London: Oxford his actions. in work such as this, precision is University Press, 1992. 581 pages. most desirable ifonly out ofrespect. "Not only did Mr. Churchill £19.95 (Not yet available in Canada). In a three-line quote requiring both get his war and run it: he also simple transcription (p.lll) there got in the first account of it."1 It are five mistakes. An alert and Tuvia Ben-Moshe. Churchill: Strategy was an account, moreover, that was qualified proof reader could have and History. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne not only massive and well-written, spotted these errors. Rienner Publishers, 1992. 397 pages. but one that was also replete with $45.00 U.S. documentation. That meant that Copp's conclusion that the Churchill had not only "run" the Canadians proved the equals, Richard Lamb. Churchill as War Leader: Second World War but that he had indeed, the betters oftheir enemies Right or Wrong? London: Bloomsbury, also set the agenda for those, at is contrary to the impressions 1991. 400 pages. $22.95 U.S. least those concerned with British created by Canada's dean of History, who began the process of military history, C.P. Stacey. The writing about it. But after fifty John Charmley. Churchill, The End of tendency in Stacey's time was to years and the opening of most of Glory: A Political Biography. London: perpetuate the Canadian the archives, this advantage has propensity to self-denigration: Hodder and Stoughton, 1992. 742pages. begun to wear off. Now Churchill something which Copp and others $45.00. can be criticized not only for what are no longer willing to accept. The he did but also for what he said he performance ofthe officers and men had done. No doubt that is a of 5 CIB bears witness to their mong the vast number ofbooks problem for all those who are forbearance in the face of the Arecently published about the tempted to write their memoirs, staggering odds stacked against Second World War, a large number which nowadays seems to be a them emanating paradoxically at are biographies of Churchill or substantial portion of the times from the pettiness and analyses of his place in that strug­ population, but a book about incompetence of some of their own gle, a reasonable enough endeavour Churchill, his actions and memoirs superiors. Had they been trained in that not even his harshest critics can still create enough interest to in the best way to meet the realities can deny his importance in World get the author close to the best­ of the battlefield? At a very heavy War Two. seller list. cost, they bested those who had for too long been considered the best. The immediate reaction to the That Churchill had enormous The leadership, Copp correctly selection of books on Churchill influence on the direction of the concludes, had been much too slow reviewed below is that, with one British war effort has not yet been in realizing the absolute need for exception, they add little to the called into question, at least not in adequate force-ratios to overcome vast body ofmaterial which already the four books reviewed below. He well-equipped and desperate exists on the subject of Churchill was aware that "running" a war defensive forces. and the war in general. was not an easy matter, as he had personally experienced in World Gil Drolet is a retired Professor of Churchill was a prolific writer War One during his somewhat War Literature at Le College and he has left behind a huge body disastrous stint as First Lord of militaire royal de Saint-Jean. He of written material. Moreover he the Admiralty. He was also aware has a special interest in the French rushed to publish his memoirs that strategy and war-making only Canadian infantry regiments of the immediately after the Second look easy "That is why critics can Second World War. World War as well as after the write so cogently, and yet successful

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performers are so rare."2 The same which seem to add little to what is comment might well be made about already well known, although they writers, particularly perhaps, contain very few instances where writers and historians whose one can seriously quarrel with the subject is Winston Churchill and authors. Perhaps R.V. Jones's, his wars. These fall into a number "Churchill and Science," should be of categories: 1) Those who are singled out as an essay which does concerned with trying to deal not even live up to its title- it is seriously with some issues of his really an essay about the career which might need some relationship between Churchill and further exploration; 2) Those who Lindemann and not a very useful have some special case to make one at that. It does not deal with about a particular but naturally the really important issues-such crucial aspect of his work; 3) Those as "Operational Research"-which who seem to write simply because is surely as important an aspect of so many others have and 4) Those Churchill's use of science as who have some contemporary Lindemann's ability to calculate political axe to grind and want to the amount of champagne use him for that purpose. Churchill had drunk - an extremely well-worn story. Churchill: A Major Reassessment of his Life in Peace On the other hand, Addison ideas of historians who have made and War, edited by Robert Blake provides a very useful and effective distinguished contributions in their and Roger Louis is the result of a summary ofhis latest book,4 which fields. Individually some of the conference held at the University should provide much food for essays are often highly critical of of Texas in March 1991 and clearly thought for those who see Churchill Churchill but collectively, as the falls into the first category. It was only as a somewhat flamboyant editors point out in their a gathering of some of the most warrior. D.C. Watt's essay on introduction: distinguished historians of the Appeasement is critical but fair, as period and the book reflects the is Hinsley's on Intelligence. Blake The book pays tribute to his expertise which they brought to provides a meticulous and detailed stature, though sometimes the the conference. There are twenty­ account of Churchill's succession investigation is critical and the nine different essays, each dealing to Chamberlain in May 1940, which judgements are unflattering. The with a particular aspect of is an important balance to the often critical line of approach must not be misinterpreted as an attempt Churchill's life and career. The held view that his succession was to diminish Churchill's reputation. essays are naturally rather uneven both popular and inevitable. On the contrary, when subjected in quality-Craig manages to write Keegan has perhaps the most to scrutiny in the light ofhistorical about Churchill's view of Germany difficult task because of the vast evidence, Churchill emerges with without dealing with literature in the field of both his integrity and his "unconditional surrender" or Churchillian strategy. He offers a greatness intact. [p.8] "strategic bombing" in a rather reasonable account of an often innocuous essay on an important highly emotional and controversial It remains to be said that it is subject; Johnson similarly has very subject, which includes everything a pity that neither Martin Gilbert, little new to say about Churchill's from strategic bombing, the the author of the massive relationship with France; Pelling, "Second Front," and the "authorized" biography nor any of dealing with Churchill and the Mediterranean strategy to the the now fairly numerous detractors Labour Party, leaves out what is Balkans and Churchill's relations were present at the conference. surely one of the most important with Stalin. elements of that relationship, Tuvia Ben-Moshe's book namelythatofChurchill andAttlee This is not a book which can Churchill: Strategy and History during the War itself;3 Michael easily be read in a single sitting belongs in many respects to the Howard contributes a somewhat but it will surely become a serious second category. The author disappointing essay on Churchill reference work. Its footnotes promises not only to clarify and the First World War which is provide the reader with a fair cross­ Churchill's strategy in both World rather bland for that usually section of current research into Wars but also to show how brilliant historian but nevertheless many aspects of the first half of the Churchill's versions of what covers all the main points. There twentieth century and it expresses, happened are at great variance are a good many other contributions often elegantly and succinctly, the with what he actually did. This is

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a formidable task and Ben-Moshe Churchill in opposition is more accused of foolhardiness because claims that he only reluctantly to Ben-Moshe's liking. He thinks he did not know, when he made his came to it after he had devoted that although Churchill's major decisions, that Hitler "years to the study of military "assessments were now partly regarded the Mediterranean by the history and strategy." [p.4] The mistaken and characterized by spring of1941 as a distraction from first chapter traces Churchill's conservatism" they nevertheless his more important concerns. This changing views, particularly on the were more correct "when compared is not a point, however, which the question of the "continental with predictions of most military author emphasises. Rather he commitment" from 1900-1914. Its men in Britain and France ..." takes issue with Michael Howard's conclusion is rather unexceptional, [p.120] Again Ben-Moshe is view that the "real" Mediterranean as is Ben-Moshe's narrative over convinced that he can tell what strategy should be dated from the the question ofBritain's declaration was likely to happen if, in this case, fall of 1942 and that what went of war in 1914. The question of the Churchill's policy had been before were simply the piecemeal Dardanelles campaign is obviously adopted. Churchill's stay at the responses to the difficulties of the the centrepiece of the discussion Admiralty receives little attention summer of 1940. [p.166] It is not about the first war. The failure of in this book. In matters which unreasonable to argue that that enterprise and Churchill's part seem marginal to the author, the obviously the British had in it are well established, 5 and Ben­ Norwegian campaign for instance, committed themselves to a serious Moshe's attempt to place this he simply claims that this fiasco campaign in the Mediterranean failure into a much wider context was just a repetition ofthe Gallipoli before either the Russians or the of grand strategy and historical campaign [he again leaves out the Americans were attacked, but it is understanding are somewhat French dimension] and suggests not so easy to dismiss the essence unconvincing. "Churchill wanted that in this case "the strategic of Howard's argument that the to have the best of all worlds: he consequences were not far commitment to the North-African wished to avoid the extremely costly reaching." [pp.123-4] Indeed much campaign [Operation "Torch"] direct offensives: but at the same of the summer of 1940, including represented the point at which the time he called for a strategy of the Battle of France, the Battle of Mediterranean strategy becomes a attrition (which involved killing as Britain and the Battle of the matter for serious debate, both from many Germans as possible) and for Atlantic hardly receive any the point of view of Anglo-U.S. the sort of grand maneuver that mention at all. It is naturally the relations and in terms of the timing has not been possible since 1916." decision to defend the of the invasion of North-West [p. 79] The author then rightly Mediterranean strategy and the France. points out that such strategy was consequences of this action with impossible in that war and that the respect to the U.S. Alliance and Ben-Moshe tries to prove that only alternative was a compromise the second front which are the in fact Churchill did not change in peace. This is no doubt correct but centrepiece of the book. his strategy after Pearl Harbour, it did not happen. Concluding this and that indeed his strategy had section, the author states that "the In this Ben-Moshejoins a long neither an imperial nor a clear broad tenor of the spirit conveyed line of authors who have very political aim in 1943. Certainly in Churchill's "World Crisis"is that, definite views on this question.6 the existing documentation does had his strategic plans been fully He describes carefully and bear out the idea that in the period accepted and properly carried out, reasonably the usual catalogue of 1940-3, Churchill's overwhelming the war would have been shorter errors made during 1941, pre-occupation was the winning of and less costly to the Allies." [p.81] particularly the halt of the British the war, rather than preserving Of course Churchill is entitled to a armies in North Africa and the the Empire. That seems to be the hypothetical and egocentric opinion decision to intervene in Greece. main thrust of Ben-Moshe's but such an opinion is surely no However it is important to note accusation, that Churchill really more amenable to proof than the that these decisions were made had no strategy at all, in the sense author's view that " ... had the within the context of the that strategy ought to have a clear strategy that Churchill advocated Mediterranean strategy, not political aim. Although why so after the end of 1915 indeed been alternatives to it. Surely the whole many authors seem to think that fully implemented, then Germany question of Churchill's decision to winning the war against the Axis would not have been defeated in defend the Eastern Mediterranean Powers was not a political aim 1918." [p.81] Unfortunately the in the fall of 1940 was based on the remains mysterious. However the idea that one can readily tell the premise that German strategy was lack of political aim is certainly the outcome of what did not happen bound to give first priority to the main thrust of the conclusion of lies at the heart of Ben-Moshe's defeat of Britain. Churchill can be Chapter 8. critique of Churchill's strategy.

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Churchill at the controls of the Boeing Flying Boat which carried him across the Atlantic on 14 January 1942.

Unlike others who have the German Army, but the author change drastically until June 1944; accused Churchill of deliberately does not help his case by failing to although the siege of Leningrad delaying the opening of the second recognize the actual course of the was lifted and the Estonian border front for political reasons, Ben­ battle in Russia, on which, after reached by 2 March 1944. Clearly Moshe takes a rather different line. all, so many calculations with the German Army's offensive power He does not think that an invasion respect to the "second front" were had been effectively contained, but of France could have succeeded in based. For instance his claim that the notion that it had been fully 1943, adding "By its nature, that the German Armies had effectively defeated is simply untrue. hypothesis is not amenable to been defeated by the end of 1943 decisive proof." [p.27 4] But he does comes as something of a surprise. It is into this general context, not follow his own advice about "By the end of 1943 it [the Soviet [Kiev was not recaptured by the hypotheses, because he now argues Union] had effectively defeated the Russians until 6 November 1943] that had the issue been left to German Army; its forces had plus the growing apprehension of Churchill alone, there would not reached lines approximating the new German weapons that the have been an invasion in 1944 Russia's old borders before the meeting of 19 October needs to be either. But surely that again rests outbreak ofWorld War II." [p.284] placed. The argument that this on an even more remote hypothesis It is true that Vatutin's First meeting, as well as some others, -which is that in 1944, there was Ukrainian Army Group had were clear indications that no Russian Front and no U.S. Army crossed the 1939 Polish border in Churchill wanted to avoid in Europe. It is also based on a the centre of the Pripet marshes "Overlord" altogether are really far rather special reading of certain and taken Sarny by January 12th, from obvious. 7 But again the major documents, most particularly the but on that same date Leningrad difficulty is that in fact the invasion meeting of 19 October 1943. But was still under siege, Army Group did take place and therefore surely that meeting, like so many Centre was less than 7 5 miles from Churchill's intentions during the others, has to be put into context. Smolensk, the Crimea was still second half of 1943, had he been Churchill may have had occupied, Oddessa was still in without any allies, remain a matter exaggerated fears of the power of German hands, in fact the line for speculation. north ofPri pet marshes would not

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In Ben-Moshe's last chapter, at least in their books. Nor, given In the chapter in which Lamb which deals with the post-invasion some of the questions raised above, considers the question of the Far strategy, Churchill is again accused can one readily agree that East, he argues that Churchill was of misunderstanding the Churchill's "Second World War," anxious for a war between Japan relationship between military whatever its faults, "is a false and the U.S.A., as that would draw strategy and political aims which version of events." [p.333] the Americans into a war with now naturally revolve around the Germany. The problem is that Russian question. Ben-Moshe Richard Lamb's book Churchill none of the evidence which Lamb quotes Liddell Hart tentatively to as War Leader: Right or Wrong? presents supports this argument. suggest that a great opportunity offers a quite different fare from had been missed in September to the two books reviewed above. It Unfortunately much ofthe rest bring the war to an end in 1944. He really falls into the third category. of the book follows this pattern. also enlists Martin van Creveld to Lamb claims that this book was Unquestionably the surrender of suggest that Montgomery's especially designed to introduce the Singapore marked one of the lowest strategy, the proper way to win in subject to "University and sixth points for Churchill in the war; 1944, might at least have brought form students" and that he is an still it remains a puzzle why there the Allies to the Ruhr, although admirer of Churchill. In fact he is a long chapter on the fall of van Creveld concludes his concludes that, "Alone Winston Singapore, with considerable detail discussion of this whole subject Churchill saved Western about the sinking of Force Z, with "In the final account the civilization from destruction at the [Lamb's view that the Japanese question as to whether hands of the Nazis." [p.339] The "Zero" was far superior to the Montgomery's plan presented a real difficulty is that there is very little Brewster Buffalo available in the alternative to Eisenhower's in this book that would convince Malaya peninsula is of course quite strategy must be answered in the anyone that this was so and it is, right, except that the Japanese negative."8 moreover, often expressed in a attacking aircraft had no fighter rather simplistic fashion. cover.] A chapter on India follows In his concluding chapter Ben­ but nothing on the submarine war, Moshe argues that by the time the Surely Lamb is wrong to think then also at its height, and far invasion took place, the Germans that students should be fed a fare more serious, in Churchill's view, had already been defeated and that of utter simplicity, such as his first than his problems in India. Nor the only real purpose for the chapter on appeasement. "Post­ can we find anything about the invasion was to shorten the war war evidence entirely vindicates resources and the debates devoted and to find a reasonable political Churchill's claim that the military to the strategic air offensive against settlement with the Soviet Union. situation in 1938 was such that it Germany [except for the short [p.320] That no doubt will come as was folly to capitulate to Hitler at reference, on p.151, quoted above.] a surprise to the millions of Allied Munich." [p.12] is one of many and Axis soldiers who had to fight declaratory sentences which turn There seems no explanation their way through those last bitter this first chapter into something for the emphasis that Lamb puts months of the war. Given that he less than a reasonable historical on various aspects of the war. has argued previously that the exercise. Churchill's policy in the Aegean, invasion was not really possible in his desire to bring Turkey into the 1943, it is difficult to understand Lamb takes us through the fall war and his "blunders" in what the real alternatives were or of France and the summer of 1940 Yugoslavia are described in two why he considers that the Germany without mentioning either the informative chapters but somewhat was already beaten in 1943, except, Battle of Britain or the air attacks out of proportion with respect to of course, in hindsight. on Britain during the winter of the other elements in the war, 1940-1. In Chapter 8 we are told particularly since the other Despite the meticulous that "Churchill had secret resistance movements are hardly scholarship and the carefully intelligence that the risk ofinvasion mentioned. Lamb is on somewhat nuanced paragraphs, it is difficult was diminishing," [p.83] so he sent firmer ground when he deals with to find this book convincing; tanks to the Middle East. It is a the campaign after D-day, having nevertheless its criticisms of pity that Hinsley did not know this already written a book on this Churchill's strategy are often when he wrote his careful study of subject. Still even here there some thought-provoking and will the British Intelligence on the very curious ideas for someone who certainly find their place with the German invasion plans [see professes to admire Churchill. For others who have attempted to be particularly Hinsley, British instance the notion, which is also better strategists than Churchill, Intelligence, Volume I Chapter 5]. in his larger work,9 that Churchill

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feared that General Montgomery Board of Trade and at the Home The Dardanelles failure was stealing his limelight. [p.281] Office. However the strain is obviously made Churchill's position beginning to show although only in precarious. Still Charmley argues Lamb's conclusion goes over a minor way- on p.65 Charmley that it was because Churchill had much the same ground as his deals fairly with the question of alienated so many that he could chapters-Mers-el-Kebir remains the sending oftroops to Tonypandy not survive the failure [p.126], it - "possibly his gravest wartime but on p.67 he declares that "The was the fact that he was so blunder" [p.340]-"In his memoirs myth of Churchill calling out the "immensely self-absorbed ..."" ... Churchill has falsified history not troops at Tonypandy was, like that such egoism is common in children only over the pusillanimity of of King Mred burning the cakes, but has usually rubbed away by Halifax and Chamberlain in 1940, symbolically true; it epitomized an the time adulthood is reached" but over other important episodes attitude." And at the bottom of the [p.136] In other words the ... Why? He had nothing of which same page, the "battle of Sydney substance of the failure had less to to be ashamed ...." [p.340] Street" "seemed to epitomise do with his loss of office than his Churchill may have been a great Churchill's defects." So the rather character. It is a point to which wartime leader but that surely amusing young man is beginning Charmley returns on numerous cannot be illustrated from a book to turn into a rather more occasions in this long book. It is of which leaves out some of the most dangerous political animal. course a view of history which important and difficult campaigns spares historians the necessity of of the war and makes a good many Charmley's opinion ofthe work trying to trace the course of events mistakes which are so elementary of Churchill at the Admiralty before and allows them to deal largely that a reasonable editor ought to the outbreak of the First World with extracts from diaries and have caught them ... with friends War underlines this change. He memoirs, a technique that used to like this who needs enemies? signals this on p.74 " ... indeed be called "scissors and paste," now without Churchill at the Admiralty, made even simpler with the use of Still there are enemies. the policy of the Entente might computers! Charmley's book clearly belongs in well have broken down," and ends the fourth category. Once upon a the discussion of the whole naval The second section of the book time there was a great and peaceful question by showing how far covers the period from 1915 to 1939 Empire called the British Empire Britain was committed to France - "The Lost Leader." After his until a man called Winston by 1914 and that this was the result time in the trenches - Charmley Churchill came along and was of Churchill not understanding the never robs Churchill of his personal nasty to a nice man called Hitler political consequences of his naval courage - there is the return to and nice to a nasty man called policies. [p.82] That is not an politics. Lloyd George wanted Roosevelt and so brought about the indefensible position. Certainly "someone who would cheer him up," end of Glory! Actually, the theme British Naval policy in the pre-war so he brought back Churchill of Charmley's Churchill, the End period was of political consequence despite the opposition of virtually of Glory is only slightly more and Churchill, inconcentratingthe all his colleagues. [pp.144-5] With complicated than the above Fleet in the North Sea, gave the this begins his second career, the summary. It is a very large political French the sense that their security main event of which, according to biography (742 pp), which stops in outside the Mediterranean Charmley, was the futile 1945, divided into fifty-five depended on British Naval intervention in Russia, which chapters, all of them with witty dispositions. Still one would have brought down on him the ire of the titles. The first section which takes more confidence in Charmley's Prime Minister. By February 1920 Churchill from birth to 1915 deals naval judgements if he had not another of Churchill's schemes lay briefly and sharply with the young started World War One with "the in ruins and "once again, Churchill Churchill and his overweening sinking of several ships at Scapa had demonstrated his greatest gift ambition and selfishness. It shows Flow by German submarines" and - that of isolating himself by Charmley at his best, the writing demoting the German alienating his supporters without has flair and the quotations, from a Battlecruiser Goeben to the status winning over his old enemies." variety of sources, are trenchant of a cruiser. [p. 99] As a cruiser she [p.157] and amusing. Churchill's first would no doubt have had little parting with the Conservative influence in creating the situation The pattern for the book has Party over the question of Free in which the Russians declared war now been set. There are passages Trade is handled with vigour and on Turkey ... as a Battlecruiser, where Charmley seems to consider even fairness. So, in some respects, which bombarded Russian naval seriously the policies and ideas of are his policies as President of the ports in the Black Sea, it really was Churchill and the Governments in quite another matter. which he served, there are passages

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which are elegant and caustic ... power" better than his critics. But Catherine," there is nothing here "Churchill's defense of the treaty that should not lead Charmley into about the German submarines, or [the Irish Treaty] in the Commons the startling conclusion that "The about Ocean raiders, about the following day was one of his real effect ofthe German occupation magnetic mines. Charmley seems most effective speeches, thus of Prague was on the position of to have read Lamb, [whom he proving the truth of his own Churchill," [p.359] although it does accuses of" addictions to old myths" comment that "the essence of illustrate Charmley's almost p.381, fn. 70] but not anything statesmanship is platitude," there unbelievable parochialism. serious about the war at sea. He would be a final reconciliation Chamberlain may well have thinks that naval historians are a between all the Irish and the continued to believe that he could peculiar "sub-species" [see p.373 English, " . . . Lacking both find a way to avoid war, but he now fn.16 in which he even gets Lamb's fanaticism and religion, Churchill set about it in a manner that cannot view wrong]; still they might have was singularly ill-placed to be described as simply minor helped him to understand what it understand those over-endowed changes in tactics. Charmley was that Churchill and the Royal with both." [pp.175-76] However spends some time dealing with the Navy were doing in the winter of the temptation to get in another abortive negotiations with the 1939-40. He might even have got sharp quotation prevents Russians and mentions the the month of Operation "Menace" Charmley from developing any guarantees to Poland but the right [p.421], or stopped believing single theme coherently for more critical decision to commit the that "Ultra" was a German code than a couple of pages, so the British Army once again to the [p.437] which had been broken by reader is often left with a jumble of continent and the beginning of October 1940. confused and contradictory ideas. conscription seems to have entirely Churchill's espousal oflost causes escaped his attention. The naval historians might in this section-Free Trade, Egypt, also have helped him in his India, 10 Edward VIII-are difficult description of the Norwegian to reconcile with the ruthless, campaign. It was of course a single-minded ambitious politician disaster for which much blame can described so far. It may be that be attached to Churchill's handling Charmley really has much of the Fleet. But nothing in sympathy with Churchill's attempt Charmley's narrative clarifies a to stop the continuous erosion of very confusing campaign nor does British power and influence and is it add anything to our really rather angry at him for not understanding of Churchill's part succeeding. Still Charmley in it. Naturally judgements are recognizes that "The considerations not lacking, "At this stage of the of economy, of public opinion and of war, and for years to come, the strategic weakness of the Churchill grossly overestimated Empire which informed imperial what could be achieved by sea­ policy also informed British foreign power." [p.384] 11 This is a most policy; in both cases Churchill peculiar judgement about a ignored the limitations of power." campaign in which the German [p.290] Navy had just achieved precisely the sort of successful landing This informs much of the operations of which Churchill so discussion ofChurchill's opposition often dreamt. to Chamberlain's policy after 193 7. Part III, "The Trumpets Silver That Churchill was often wrong, Sound, 1939-1945" represents The domestic consequences of for example in his calculations nearly a third of the book. But once this failure brings Charmley back about German air power, that he the war begins Charmley, to borrow to his home ground, back to did not object to appeasing Italy, one of his chapter headings, is snippets from diaries, that his call for "Grand Alliance" completely"at sea." His description parliamentary debates and with a suspicious Russia and a of Churchill at the Admiralty leaves Churchill's views ofhistory and his isolationist America was wishful out almost everything that oratory. For the next three chapters thinking is really no longer happened; one cannot tell whether we go through the summer of 1940, seriously disputed. Nor can there Churchill, the second time around, a summer of cabinet meetings and be much dispute with the fact that was a successful First Lord or not, great speeches, for example Chamberlain seems to have because while we are treated to a Churchill's speech on June 4th" ... understood the "limitations of garbled account of "Operation We shall go on to the end . . ." "It

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was" concludes Charmley, "sublime - nonsense - but sublime nonsense." [p.411] Perhaps we can be persuaded to accept this judgement if we were told something about what actually happened in the summer of 1940 outside Spears' and Sackville­ West's diaries, but this is a summer of 1940 with no Germans at all. No German aircraft over Britain, no Dowding, who is not mentioned in this account, no German invasion plans, no German submarines sinking ships and as we get to the fall and winter, no Blitz. It is indeed magic. Chapter 37, is entitled "The Struggle for Survival," but the survival that Charmley has in mind is Churchill's position as Prime Minister, not the relationship between German and British plans and actions. Almost everything about the war is reduced to single sentences, "The R.A.F. The strain of recent events shows clearly in Churchill's could maintain Britain's face at Moscow airport, 12 August 1942. independence from Germany, but there was not much anyone could Charmley sums up his view of that the Soviet Union under Stalin do to preserve it vis-a-vis America," what happened: expanded into Eastern Europe at [the only mention of the R.A.F. in the end ofthe war and that a reign this connection, p.431] ... but to Germany, Churchill had said, was ofterror descended onto those areas follow this critique through would a menace to the balance of power, as well as Eastern Germany, it is mean dealing with virtually every and it was obvious that her equally true that in contrast with ambitions were greater than page of the book. As the war goes Hitler during the war, when all of Hitler admitted; she must be Europe lay under his power, Stalin on, German, Italian and Japanese stopped. But in order to do so actions become more and more had "only" a small part of it. It was Churchill was forced to bankrupt not perhaps an ideal outcome of remote, noises off-stage. The Britain and mortgage its future to Russo-German conflict gets one the United States - and, in the the war, but it was not the total sentence mentions here and there, process, he had helped raise the catastrophe which Charmley as do the U.S. campaigns in the spectre of a menace which was claims. Pacific. To write a biography of even greater than the one he had Churchill without the slightest destroyed, if only because there If Charmley set out to destroy understanding of the course of the was no balance of terror on the myths, as he says so often, he has Continent. Hitler had had to keep war seems fool-hardy- but that is failed to do so, both because the an eye on the Soviet Union; who essentially what Charmley has did Stalin have to keep an eye myths he tackles are petty and done. The last chapters become upon? This, then, was where the because he has failed to understand muddled and weave together road to victory led. [pp.589-90] the major problems of the war and different themes often over-lapping with them Churchill's part in that and sometimes contradictory. It is The "balance of power" war. Perhaps some knowledge of all an attack on St. George, but becomes a "balance ofterror" within military history is, after all, a there are no dragons, except the space of two sentences and the requirement for writing about the Roosevelt and Stalin. Indeed while notion that Stalin did not have to war. Moreover a totally insular poor Mosley gets arrested just to keep his eye on a United States view of the world which revolves support Churchill's attempt to find and Britain armed with an atomic exclusively around the diaries of unity at home [p. 425], there is no bomb would no doubt come as a English politicians and "literati" mention ofNazi policies in occupied surprise to him. But it is typical of makes it difficult to understand a Europe, not even the massacre of the kind of judgements that World War. IfCharmleyis a typical the Jews. Charmley offers, for while it is true example ofthe new breed of British

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historians it is truly the "end of he, together with those who particularly with respect to the 19 Glory." supported him, and they were a October meeting, before. For a rea­ large portion of the British and soned rebuttal of his position see Possibly a reassessment of Dominion populations, managed, B.P. Farrell, War by Consensus: Churchill has become necessary with considerable difficulty, to Power, Perception and British fifty years after the end of the prevent Britain from suffering the Second World War, but none of the fate that befell nearly all of the Grand Strategy 1940-1943. Unpub­ books reviewed, except the first, other European states at the hands lished Ph.D thesis, McGill Univer­ can be taken as a successful or of theN azi Regime. Ifthat is myth, sity 1991. pp.627-630. even a serious attempt at such a what is reality? 8. Martin van Creveld, Supplying task. Perhaps Taylor, a historian War, (Cambridge, 1977), p.230. also fond of "making the facts fit 9. Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Eu­ his phrases," should have the last rope 1943-45, Success or Failure word: (London, 1983), p.72. NOTES 10. For a more reasonable description Late in life Churchill pronounced of Churchill and the India issue, as a gloomy verdict on his career. He remarked that the final verdict of well as other questions relating to history would take account not 1. H.N. Fieldhouse, The Anglo-Ger­ the "Old Tories" see A. Krishtalka, only of the victories achieved man War of 1939-42: Some move­ The Old Tories and British Foreign under his direction, but also of the ments to end it by a negotiated Peace. Policy, 1930-1939. Unpublished political results which flowed from Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, them and he added: "Judged by Transactions of the Royal Society this standard, I am not sure that of Canada, 1971. 1983, particularly Chapter V. I shall be held to have done very 2. W.S. Churchill, Marlborough, His 11. One of the consistent problems with well." Churchill did himself an Life and Times, Volume II (Lon­ Churchill's strategy throughout the injustice. The results were not don, 1967), p.93. war was his failure to give adequate his doing; the victories were. The priority to the Royal Navy, because results were foreshadowed when 3. See in particular T.D. Burridge, the British people resolved on war British Labour and Hitler's War, while he understood that the Navy with Hitler. From that moment which surely remains a key book on could lose the war, he was con­ on it followed inexorably that, that particular war-time partner­ vinced that only the Air Force could unless Hitler won, Soviet Russia ship. win it. If one wishes to take excep­ would establish her domination of tion to this well documented, one Eastern Europe and b.et;ome a 4. Paul Addison, Churchill on the world power.12 Home Front, 1900-1955 (Cape, might even say elementary, aspect 1992) of Churchill's view of how to con­ Even that domination has now come 5. Nevertheless Ben-Moshe's bibliog­ duct the war against Germany, one to an end. raphy in this subject is rather re­ does need to understand and ex­ stricted. His discussion virtually plain the disputes, among the most The British Empire has also ignores the French part in the Gal­ critical of the war, which surround gone, and despite Charmley, it was lipoli campaign - see for instance this question. That Charmley does not really inherited by the United G.H. Cassar, The French and Dar­ not even touch this issue simply States; there are even those who danelles (Allen and Unwin, 1971). underlines his total lack of under­ argue that Canada still has some This is surely an important aspect standing of the war. independence. Nor is it certain ofthe whole campaign, particularly 12. A.J.P. Taylor, "Daddy, What was that the end of Empires was Winston Churchill?" in Essays in brought about by the war; the war its political ramifications. English History (Pelican Books, ironically only reinforced the 6. For example: Turnball-Higgins, nationalism which was already Winston Churchill and the Second 1976), p.306. such a powerful force in the early Front(Oxford, 1957),J. Grigg,1943 20th century. Churchill's place in -The Victory That Neuer Was(New all this is clearly important but he York, 1980), W.S. Dunn, Second Robert Vogel is Professor ofHistory at McGill University and co-author did not have the power to reverse Front Now -1943(Alabama, 1980). of the Maple Leaf Route series. this trend. Among the Hitlers, 7. Ben-MosheinhisarticleintheJour­ Professor Vogel is a Contributing Stalins, Mussolinis and Francos nal ofModern History [Volume 62, Editor for CMH. he can hardly be accused of making No.3, 9/1990] 'Winston Churchill the world an even worse place than and the Second Front: A Reap­ it already was. Whatever his faults praisal," has made this argument,

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