The Rise and Fall of Logging Networks and Biodiversity Conservation Projects on Sumatra’S Rainforest Frontier

ISSN 0854-9818 CIFOR OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 31 October 2000 CENTERFORINTERNATIONALFORESTRYRESEARCH ‘Wild Logging’: The Rise and Fall of Logging Networks and Biodiversity Conservation Projects on Sumatra’s Rainforest Frontier John F. McCarthy CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY RESEARCH Office address: Jalan CIFOR, Situ Gede, Sindang Barang, Bogor 16680, Indonesia Mailing address: P.O. Box 6596 JKPWB, Jakarta 10065, Indonesia Tel.: +62 (251) 622622; Fax: +62 (251) 622100 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.cifor.cgiar.org CIFOR CIFOR was established in 1993 as part of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in response to global concerns about the social, environmental and economic consequences of forest loss and degradation. CIFOR research produces knowledge and methods needed to improve the well-being of forest-dependent people and to help tropical countries manage their forests wisely for sustained benefits. This research is done in more than two dozen countries, in partnership with numerous parners. Since it was founded, CIFOR has also played a central role in influencing global and national forestry policies. CGIAR The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), established in 1971, is an informal association of nearly 60 public and private sector donors that support a network of 16 international agricultural research centers. The CGIAR’s mission is to contribute to food security and poverty eradication in developing countries through research, partnership, capacity building and policy support. The CGIAR promotes sustainable agricultural development based on environmentally sound management of natural resources. This publication is supported by International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) Contents Abstract 1 Introduction 1 Power and interest at the district level 2 Background 3 ‘Wild logging’: The emergence of logging networks 5 Logging networks and district level networks of power and interest 5 Logging and district finances 6 Adat, leadership and logging 8 Logging operations at the village level 10 Resolving the logging problem 11 Community-based conservation in Menggamat 11 Other agents of change: Economic crisis and reform 15 Conclusions 17 Towards sustainable community-based forest management 18 Acknowledgements 20 Endnotes 20 Bibliography 24 Glossary 26 List of Maps: Map 1. North Sumatra and Aceh provinces 3 Map 2. Gunung Leuser National Park 4 ‘Wild Logging’: The Rise and Fall of Logging Networks and Biodiversity Conservation Projects on Sumatra’s Rainforest Frontier John F. McCarthy* Abstract Unregulated logging networks in South Aceh, Sumatra, 1996–1999. During 1999–2000, the illegal and unregulated logging of Indonesia’s forests became the focus of critical attention. It has been estimated that logging outside the State legal regime produces approximately half of the total timber production from Indonesia’s forests. In 2000, as Indonesia’s forests continued to rapidly recede, the problem had become so critical that, without serious changes, the World Bank and other foreign donors considered withdrawing entirely from forestry sector projects in Indonesia. While on a national scale the extent of the problem is now understood, insufficient attention has been paid to how this ‘informal sector’ operates at the district level. The paper is based on research carried out in the district of South Aceh (Aceh Selatan) during 1996–1999, before and during the crisis that marked the end of the Suharto era. Through considering the emergence of logging networks in this district, this paper examines the institutional arrangements associated with this phenomenon, explores how logging networks emerge, how they operate, and how they respond to economic and political changes as well as interventions by outside conservation agencies. Webs of political, economic and social exchanges have emerged around illegal logging, constituting institutionalized sets of relationships that operate in ways antithetical to State legal norms. Extra-legal logging generates revenue for local clientelist networks and the district budget and offers impoverished villagers viable survival strategies, but threatens the ecological future of Indonesia’s once vast forests. By considering the changes that most affected logging networks over this period, the paper concludes by discussing the conditions necessary for successful project interventions. Key Words: illegal logging, Indonesia, forestry, conservation intervention, institutions; customary law, state Introduction ‘uncontrolled logging’ as it is known in Indonesian), estimating that timber extraction outside of the State legal In response to the rapid loss of Indonesia’s tropical framework harvests around 30 million cubic metres of rainforests, international NGOs and foreign donor roundwood from Indonesia’s forests each year. This agencies have embarked on ambitious projects to decrease amounts to the same quantity of wood as that produced the rate of environmental destruction and encourage more legally by the timber industry, or approximately half of sustainable management of rainforest ecosystems. the total timber production from Indonesia’s forests Despite the large sums of money invested so far, at best (ITFMP 1999: 13). By 2000, the problem had become so these projects have had very mixed results. One of the critical that, without serious changes, the World Bank most significant problems has been the extensive illegal and other foreign donors considered withdrawing entirely logging networks operating at the district level. from forestry sector projects in Indonesia. While on a national scale the extent of the problem is now During 1999–2000, the illegal and unregulated logging understood, insufficient attention has been paid to its of Indonesia’s forests became the focus of critical attention (Keating 2000).1 An Indonesia-UK Tropical Forest Management Programme report (ITFMP 1999) * The author is with Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University analysed the extent of this penebangan liar (‘wild’ or (E-mail: [email protected]). 2 ‘Wild Logging’: The Rise and Fall of Logging Networks and Biodiversity Conservation Projects on Sumatra’s Rainforest Frontier underlying causes; how this ‘informal sector’ operates On the other hand, there is every incentive for officials at the district level has not been well studied. to be less than diligent about implementing State policies and laws. Often there are few outside controls on local This paper is based on research carried out in South Aceh, officials and a lack of effective supervision. At the same Sumatra, during 1996–1999, before and during the crisis time, those State clients who would benefit from that marked the end of the Suharto era and just before reforming the local rules of the game are too weak the current separatist conflict. 2 Through investigating politically to apply pressure on or support local officials. the emergence and operation of logging networks and Consequently, local officials are able to freely enter into the problems faced by a conservation intervention by an exchange relationships with local politicians and NGO in one district of Sumatra, the paper examines how entrepreneurs (Migdal 1988). Moreover, officials have a district level networks of power and interest determine lot to exchange: not only is the local bureaucracy the environmental outcomes. Drawing on Migdal’s (1988) key actor in the allocation of State resources, but officials study of State capacity, it investigates how the web of are in charge of implementing State regulations. This political, economic and social exchanges that surround gives them a privileged position within the system of illegal logging have constituted institutionalized sets of exchange: they can choose how to use their discretionary relationships that have operated in ways antithetical to powers over licensing, permits and law enforcement. This State legal norms. This paper finds that district level power can be employed to secure local priorities, gain networks of power and interest have coalesced around the support of clients, reciprocate the support of a logging, offering impoverished villagers viable survival factional peer or patron, and for self-enrichment. strategies, and creating a most serious obstacle to biodiversity conservation. By considering the changes Other parties at the district level — such as community that most affected logging networks over this period, the leaders, local businessmen and entrepreneurs — wish to paper discusses the conditions that might support maintain or improve their position by extending their successful project interventions. control over sources of revenue and the patronage that enables them to offer their clients strategies of survival. To this end, they enter into exchanges with local officials Power and interest at the district level responsible for allocating State resources as well as implementing State regulations. As the third party in what Drawing on studies in several developing nations, Migdal calls a ‘triangle of accommodation’, regional Migdal’s (1988) work on State and society helps outline politicians can use their discretion over budgetary the logic determining patterns of power and interest allocations, contacts at the centre and other assets at their operating at the district level. On the one hand, according disposal for their own purposes. Accordingly, these to Migdal, district officials attempting to implement State politicians also enter into exchanges

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