Philoponus on Topos

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Philoponus on Topos Philoponus on τόπος. Redefining Place in Late Antiquity D i s s e r t a t i o n zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil.) eingereicht an der Philosophischen Fakultät I der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin und verteidigt am 25. October 2013 von Ioannis Papachristou Der Präsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Prof. Dr. Jan-Hendrik Olbertz Der Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät I Prof. Michael Seadle, PhD Gutachter Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Christoph Helmig Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Christian Wildberg The dissertation attempts to interpret afresh, on the one hand, the form, methodology and structure of Philoponus’ commentary on the Physics and, on the other hand, to study in depth his theory of place (topos). The book extends over five chapters and includes a preface, an epilogue and a bibliography. Philoponus attempts a double determination of place. He distinguishes between the place which is void, three-dimensional extension that is ontological different from bodies, and the concept of place that is filled by bodies. Philoponus wishes to redefine the relationship between place and body and he underlines the ontological difference that a bodiless extension should have from a bodily extension. The thesis also focuses on Philoponus’ critique of Aristotle’s definition of place and the Peripatetic tradition (Eudemus, Themistius) regarding the place of the heavens. The book concludes that, Philoponus’ strategy in the digressions of the commentary, but also in certain parts of his exegeses, can be seen in three stages: first, he repudiates the cogency of Aristotle’s and Themistius’ critique to the concept of local extension; second, he attacks the Aristotelian definition of place by showing its weaknesses and inconsistencies with the nature of things; and third, he establishes his own theory of place. The result is a valuable set of arguments regarding place and a major contribution to the physics of late antiquity. Die Dissertation versucht einerseits die Form, die Methode und die Struktur von Philoponos Kommentar zur Physik neu zu interpretieren und andererseits seine Theorie des Ortes (Topos) eingehend zu untersuchen. Das Buch besteht aus fünf Kapiteln und es enthält ein Vorwort, einen Epilog und ein Literaturverzeichnis. Philoponus schlägt eine doppelte Ortsbestimmung vor. Er unterscheidet zwischen dem Ort, der leer ist, der dreidimensionalen Erweiterung, die sich ontologisch von Körpern unterscheidet, und dem Begriff des Ortes, der von Körpern erfüllt wird. Philoponos strebt danach die Beziehung zwischen dem Ort und dem Körper neu zu definieren und unterstreicht den ontologischen Unterschied, den eine körperlose Erweiterung von einer körperlichen Erweiterung haben sollte. Die Arbeit konzentriert sich auch auf Philoponos Kritik an der Definition von Ort laut Aristoteles und an der Peripatetischen Tradition (Eudemos, Themistios) bezüglich des Ortes des Himmels. Abschließend kommt das Buch zu dem Schluss, dass Philoponos Strategie sowohl in den Exkursen des Kommentars als auch in gewissen Teilen seiner Exegese in drei Stufen dargestellt werden kann: Er weist erstens die Gültigkeit der Kritik von Aristoteles und Themistios gegen das Konzept der lokalen Erweiterung zurück; zweitens greift er die aristotelische Definition des Ortes an, indem er seine Schwächen und Unstimmigkeiten mit der Natur der Dinge zeigt; und drittens stellt er seine eigene Theorie des Ortes dar. Das Ergebnis ist ein wertvolles Argumentarium über den Ort und ein wichtiger Beitrag für die Physik der Spätantike. 2 CONTENTS 5 ׀ Acknowledgements 6 ׀ Preface 14 ׀ CHAPTER 1 Form, Method and Structure of the Physics Commentary 14 ׀ The form of the Physics commentary 1.1 17 ׀ Dividing Aristotle’s Physics into lectures 1.2 23 ׀ A note on Vitelli’s edition 1.3 25 ׀ Defining corollarium and digressio 1.4 27 ׀ Corollaries and digressions in the Physics commentary 1.5 31 ׀ Levels of interpretation 1.6 35 ׀ The commentator and the truth 1.7 39 ׀ Introduction to the digressions .1.8 42 ׀ A note on Philoponus’ opponents in the digressions 1.9 44 ׀ The argument of the digressions 1.10 49 ׀ CHAPTER 2 Philoponus Defending Place as Extension 50 ׀ Aristotle’s rejection of place as extension 2.1 53 ׀ Themistius’ exegesis of Aristotle’s argument 2.2 56 ׀ Philoponus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s argument 2.3 59 ׀ Philoponus against the infinity of places 2.4 64 ׀ Philoponus against changing and coinciding places 2.5 70 ׀ CHAPTER 3 The Ontology of Place 70 ׀ Three-dimensionality of place 3.1 74 ׀ Place as measure 3.2 3 80 ׀ The empty universe 3.3 85 ׀ Place and the ‘violation’ of nature 3.4 94 ׀ Place, substance, qualities, and quantity 3.5 98 ׀ CHAPTER 4 The Voided Place 99 ׀ The concept of plērōsis 4.1 101 ׀ The definition of place as a voided extension 4.2 105 ׀ Natural bodies moving through void 4.3 117 ׀ Void as the necessary condition for locomotion 4.4 121 ׀ CHAPTER 5 Philoponus against the Aristotelian Definition of Place 122 ׀ Place as the limit of the containing body 5.1 125 ׀ Place in motion 5.2 131 ׀ A walk from Athens to Thebes 5.3 133 ׀ The place of the heavens 5.4 143 ׀ Epilogue 147 ׀ Bibliography 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The doctoral dissertation of which this book is a revised version was written within the framework of the Excellence Cluster Topoi “The Formation and Transformation of Space and Knowledge in Ancient Civilizations” during the period when I was a Doctoral Fellow of Topoi, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (2009-2012). I owe much to Topoi and the Graduate School of Ancient Philosophy (Humboldt-Universität) for their generous funding during my studies. I am grateful to the supervisors of this dissertation, namely Prof. Dr. Christoph Helmig (Universität zu Köln) and Prof. Dr. Christian Wildberg (Princeton University), for their assistance and advice throughout all these years. It has been a great pleasure to work under their supervision, since they repeatedly forced me to develop my thought with fresh insights. I also wish to thank Prof. Wildberg for the period I spent at Princeton University as Visiting Student Research Collaborator (November 2011-March 2012). In addition, I would like to thank my colleagues of the Topoi Research Group D-II-2 ‘Place, Space and Motion’; their work along with the lively academic atmosphere of our seminars always inspired me. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Frans A. J. de Haas for hosting me at Leiden University (July 2012); I have greatly benefited from our conversations on final stages of my work. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Keimpe Algra, who trusted me with the translation of Philoponus’ commentary on the Physics, IV, 1-5 before its publication. I would also like to thank the director of Aristoteles Archiv (Berlin), Prof. Dr. Dieter Harlfinger, for giving me permission to work on the microfilms of Philoponus’ manuscripts. Of course, this dissertation could not have been completed without the constant encouragement, the spiritual generosity, and the friendship of Katerina Ierodiakonou, Anna Ntinti, Ervin Kondakçiu, and Christine. Finally, I could not forget Michael Frede, whose stimulating personality motivated me to exercise my mind thoroughly on ancient philosophical thought. I owe him much, but above all, in respect of this book, the fact that he mentored me to study Iōannēs Philoponus’ work. 5 Preface This is a philosophical study on the concept of τόπος (place) in Late Antiquity (6th century C.E.).1 The book centres on the theory of place held by a Christian theologian and commentator on Aristotle known as Ἰωάννης γραμματικός, φιλόπονος, Ἀλεξανδρεύς. His birth name, Iōannēs, indicates that the commentator was a Christian.2 He was given the last epithet because he is thought to have been born in Egyptian Alexandria in ca. 485 and certainly lived there up to 570.3 The epithet ‘grammatikos’ shows his early education as a grammarian or philologist and his intense interest in the field, as attested in his surviving grammatical works.4 Finally, the epithet ‘philoponos’ testifies to his character as a working scholar, for it signifies that Iōannēs was a lover of (spiritual) labour or toil. Iōannēs Philoponus was a member of the Platonic school of Alexandria when Ammonius (ca. 435/445–517/5265), the son of Hermeias (ca. 410–450), held its chair.6 We have one clue concerning Philoponus’ arrival at the philosophical school. Simplicius, who first attended the school at Alexandria under Ammonius and then left to join the Platonic school at Athens, reports that he never met Philoponus in the school of Alexandria; therefore we can assume that Philoponus joined the school shortly after Simplicius left Alexandria in ca. 510.7 Whether or not Philoponus succeeded Ammonius as head of the school is uncertain, but Philoponus’ philosophical association with the Platonic school lasted until his death. His surviving philosophical works show that he edited the lectures of his master Ammonius (commentaries). Despite these duties, Philoponus later continued working on Aristotle’s and 1 All dates, unless otherwise stated, are C.E. 2 Supporting monophysitism as indicated by his late theological work (after 551), Arbiter. See Lang 2001, pp. 40; 41-60. 3 Golitsis (2008, p. 7) places Philoponus’ birth around 485; Wildberg (2008a) believes that Philoponus was born around 490. See also Verrycken 2010, p. 733. 4 For instance, the De vocabulis quae diversum significatum exhibent secundum differentiam accentus. In addition, Simplicius attests that Philoponus signed himself as ‘grammarian’ (in De caelo, 119, 7). 5 For
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