Air & Space Power Journal 2Nd Quarter Summer 2021
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Air & Space ASPJ Power Journal Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Charles Q. Brown, Jr., USAF Chief of Space Operations, US Space Force Gen John W. Raymond, USSF Commander, Air Education and Training Command Lt Gen Marshall B. Webb, USAF Commander and President, Air University Lt Gen James B. Hecker, USAF Director, Academic Services Dr. Mehmed Ali Acting Director, Air University Press Maj Richard T. Harrison, USAF Editorial Staff Maj Richard T. Harrison, USAF, Editor Randy Roughton, Content Editor Gail White, Content Editor Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator Megan N. Hoehn, Print Specialist Air & Space Power Journal 600 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6010 e-mail: [email protected] Visit Air & Space Power Journal online at https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ASPJ/. TheAir & Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly in both on- line and printed editions, is the professional journal of the Department of the Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. In this edition, articles not bearing a copyright notice may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice may be reproduced for any US government purpose without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air & Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line. To obtain permission to reproduce material bearing a copyright no- tice for other than US government purposes, contact the author of the material rather than the Air & Space Power Journal. https://www.af.mil/ https://www.spaceforce.mil/ https://www.aetc.af.mil/ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ VOL. 35 NO. 2 SUMMER 2021 FEATURES 3 Thinking about Thinking Training Aircrew to Make Decisions in Complex Situations Lt Col E. Aaron Brady, USAF 20 Game- Theoretic System Design in the Development Captof Space Dustin L.Power Hayhurst Sr., USAF John M. Colombi, PhD 37 Coming to a Theater near You Evolving Air Combat to Counter Anti-Access and Area-Denial Maj Tom “Banger” Lawrence, Royal Canadian Air Force 55 OverSTEMulated The Science and Art of Space Power Leadership Maj Brian Stewart, USSF Col Raj Agrawal, USSF VIEWS 68 ColA Concept James R. Ayers, for USAF,Next- Retired Generation Combat Search and Rescue Alec Wahlman, PhD 77 Every Airman and Guardian a Technologist Reinvigorating a Disruptive Technology Culture Maj Gen William T. Cooley, USAF, PhD Col George M. Dougherty, USAF, PhD COMMENTARY 91 Harvesting the Rewards of Multinational Cooperation The Royal Air Force’s Project Seedcorn Steven Paget, PhD Air & Space Power Journal Reviewers Christian F. Anrig, PhD Tom Keaney, PhD Swiss Air Force Senior Fellow, Merrill Center at the School of Filomeno Arenas, PhD Advanced International Studies USAF Air Command and Staff College Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Executive Director, Resource Management and Bruce Bechtol, PhD Angelo State University Planning Board of Veterans’ Appeals, Veteran’s Affairs Kendall K. Brown, PhD NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Benjamin S. Lambeth, PhD Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Anthony C. Cain, PhD Wetumpka, Alabama Maj James Maher, USAF Norman C. Capshaw, PhD US Air Force Academy Department of Computer Military Sealift Command Washington and Cyber Sciences Navy Yard, District of Columbia Rémy M. Mauduit Christopher T. Colliver, PhD Montgomery, Alabama Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Chad Dacus, PhD West Chicago, Illinois USAF Cyber College Richard R. Muller, PhD Lt Col Andrew Dulin, USAF USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 16th AF Information Operations Director of Staff Lt Col Jason M. Newcomer, DBA, USAF USAF Air Command and Staff College Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Retired Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Duke University Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, Air Force Review Board Agency USAF, Retired Lt Gen John E. Shaw, USAF Naval War College Deputy Commander, United States Space Command Col Jeffrey J. Gomes, USAF Sixteenth Air Force/J39 Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Isle of Palms, South Carolina Col Mike Guillot, USAF, Retired Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly Lt Col Michael Tate, USAF, Retired USAF Air University Col Dale L. Hayden, PhD, USAF, Retired Birmingham, Alabama Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, John M. Hinck, PhD USAF, Retired USAF Air War College CyberSpace Operations Consulting Lt Gen S. Clinton Hinote, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration and Requirements, Headquarters, United States USAFR, Retired Air Force Auburn University Thomas Hughes, PhD CMSgt Michael J. Young, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Montgomery, Alabama Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Xiaoming Zhang, PhD Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine USAF Air War College Development and Education Brent A. Ziarnick, PhD USAF Air Command and Staff College FEATURE Thinking about Thinking Training Aircrew to Make Decisions in Complex Situations LT COL E. AARON BRADY, USAF Difficult Decisions Recently, a flight of fighters in Syria saw evidence that a proregime aircraft struck friendly forces. A rigid command and control structure, coupled with strict rules of engagement that prevented aircrew from deciding to engage without higher- headquarters approval, led to extensive delays in targeting the threat to friendly forces. The aircrew, in this case, acted as most Air Force aircrew likely would—they felt they did not have the authority to make a decision and needed a high- level headquarters to provide guidance. Several years before, a different fighter squadron deployed to Afghanistan to provide close air support. One day, a pilot participated in a strike controlled by a special task force. As the pilot’s flight lead rolled in to attack after hours of prepara- tion, the pilot noticed a collateral damage potential. Unsure of the ramifications of aborting the strike, the pilot quietly radioed “abort” a single time. The flight lead and attack controller missed the quiescent call in the heat of the moment. The flight lead fired, killing the target but also incurring unnecessary collateral damage. In both stories, highly- trained and well- qualified aircrew faced ambiguous situations—situations in which the fog of war prevented the aircrew from clearly observing the variables or perceiving a single desired outcome. In the first case, AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2021 3 Brady the aircrew did not perceive that they were authorized to make a decision and instead were stuck in an interorganizational dilemma as component- level head- quarters debated action. For this discussion, aircrew includes those officers at the air component headquarters coordinating with the aircrew in flight. These people were all products of the Air Force training model, although they came from sev- eral different communities within the Air Force. Of note, when the situation be- came more clear- cut, the headquarters rapidly approved action. In the second case, the aircrew’s decision was correct but poorly executed due to a lack of confidence. These aircrews went through the typical predeployment training regimen that squadrons usually conduct should time allow. Further, they were the products of perhaps the most robust and high-fidelity aircrew training programs in the world. So why did they perceive they either could not make a decision or not aggressively act when a decision was made? The common thread between these vignettes is a breakdown of normal Air Force decision-making processes in a complex, ambiguous environment. This situation begs a simple question: why could well- trained Air Force aircrew not make or apply effective decision-making in these situations? The answer is also relatively simple. They did not perceive they could act, or they did not know how to act. This predicament, unfortunately, leads to a more challenging question: why did they not know after years of training? This article attempts to address this question by examining the theory behind Air Force tactical aircrew training. The author posits that the Air Force excels at teaching aircrews to perform in unambiguous, large- scale tactical environments. However, the Air Force should place more emphasis on proactively developing aircrew judgment and improving the recognition of strategic context as a fundamental attribute of situational awareness. This argument rests on the logic that at its core, sound tactical decision- making rests on the ability to effectively orient. If training only develops judg- ment and familiarity within clear- cut environments, aircrews will continuously have difficulty making decisions in more complex environments. This difficulty will reinforce the notion that detailed guidance is required for any situation that falls outside clearly defined parameters (leading to repeats of the first vignette) or more simply or poorly made or executed decisions (resulting in undesirable tacti- cal outcomes like in the second vignette). The Air Force needs to think about how it teaches aircrews to think. The Theory of Air Force Training Currently, Air Force training for tactical aircrews generally follows a decentral- ized building- block approach. This model relies mostly on squadron- level instruc- tors teaching younger aircrews to solve tactical problems and upgrading those pilots 4 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2021 Thinking about Thinking to higher levels of responsibility. As aircrews grow more experienced, the problems they are expected to solve become commensurately more challenging. This meth- odology produces superbly trained aircrews in the world for solving identifiable tactical problems.