Performance Cambodia: Provincial Towns Evaluation Report Improvement Project
Independent Evaluation
Performance Evaluation Report
December 2014
CambodiaCambodia:::: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
This document is being disclosed to the public in accordance with the Asian Development Bank 's Public Communications Policy 2011.
Reference Number : PPE: CAM 2014 -19 Loan Numbers: 1725-CAM(SF) and 2013-CAM Independent Evaluation: PE-778
NoteNotessss
(i) The fiscal year of the Government of Cambodia ends on 31 December.
(ii) In this report, “$” refers to US dollars.
Director General V. Thomas, Independent Evaluation Department (IED) Director W. Kolkma, Independent Evaluation Division 1, IED Team leader G. Rauniyar, Principal Evaluation Specialist, IED Team members P. Lim, Evaluation Officer, IED V. Melo-Cabuang, Senior Evaluation Assistant, IED
The guidelines formally adopted by the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) on avoiding conflict of interest in its independent evaluations were observed in the preparation of this report. To the knowledge of IED, there were no conflicts of interest of the persons preparing, reviewing, or approving this report.
In preparing any evaluation report, or by making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, IED does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
Abbreviations
ADB – Asian Development Bank CSHAP – Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program EIRR – economic internal rate of return FIRR – financial internal rate of return HDPE – high density polyethylene IED – Independent Evaluation Department JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency M&E – monitoring and evaluation MDG – Millennium Development Goal MIME – Ministry of Industry, Mines , and Energy MPWT – Ministry of Public Works and Transport NGO – nongovernment organization NRW – nonrevenue water O&M – operation and maintenance PCR – project completion report PIU – project implementation unit PMU – project management unit PVR – PCR validation report PPTA – project performance completion report PPWSA – Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority RRP – report and recommendation of the President UMC – urban management committee WACC – weighted average cost of capital WMU – wastewater management unit WSS – water supply and sanitation WWTP – wastewater treatment plant
Currency Equivalents
Currency unit – Riel (KR)
At Appraisal At Project Completion At Evaluation 31 October 1999 31 March 2007 31 October 2014 KR1.00 = $0.00025 $0.00024 $0.00025 $1.00 = KR3,950 KR 4,155 KR 4,076
Weights and Measures
km – kilometer l – liter lpcd – liters per capita per day m3 – cubic meter
Contents
Acknowledgments ...... viiviivii Basic Data ...... ixixix Executive Summary ...... xixixi Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 111 A. Evaluation Purpose and Process ...... 1 B. Expected Results and Project Objectives ...... 3 C. Project Completion and Validation Reports Assessment ...... 3 Chapter 2: Design and Implementation ...... 555 A. Formulation ...... 5 B. Rationale...... 6 C. Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements ...... 6 D. Procurement, Construction, and Scheduling ...... 8 E. Design Changes ...... 8 F. Outputs ...... 9 G. Consultants ...... 12 H. Loan Covenants ...... 13 Chapter 3: Performance Assessment ...... 14141414 A. Overall Assessment ...... 14 B. Relevance ...... 15 C. Effectiveness ...... 16 D. Efficiency ...... 20 E. Sustainability ...... 22 Chapter 4: Other Assessments ...... 25252525 A. Impacts ...... 25 B. Water Consumption ...... 26 C. Health Impacts ...... 27 D. Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice ...... 27 E. Affordability and Willingness to Pay ...... 28 F. ADB, Development Partners, and Borrower Performance ...... 29 G. Technical Assistance...... 30 Chapter 5: Issues, Lessons, and FollowFollow----UpUp Actions ...... 31.. 313131 A. Issues ...... 31 B. Lessons ...... 33 C. Follow-up Actions ...... 33
Appendixes 1. Project Framework 37 2. Project Costs at Appraisal, Reappraisal, and Completion 43 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 44 4. A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 46 5. Suggested List of Actions for the Government of Cambodia 61
Supplementary Appendixes (Available on request) A. Technical Evaluation of the Provincial Towns Improvement Project B. Summary of Physical Accomplishments under the Project C. Status of Compliance with Loan Covenants D. Economic and Financial Analysis
Acknowledgments
This report is a product of the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Ganesh Rauniyar, Principal Evaluation Specialist, led the evaluation, with support from Patricia Lim (Evaluation Officer) and Valerie Anne Melo-Cabuang (Senior Evaluation Assistant). The team acknowledges the valuable inputs from consultants recruited for this study—Tse Yau Shing and Bunrith Seng.
The evaluation team acknowledges the support provided by the Cambodia Resident Mission. The team benefited from discussions with officials of the Government of Cambodia, particularly senior project management staff at the two central executing agencies—the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy; and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport, and with other development partners active in water supply and sanitation in Cambodia during the field visit. The team is also grateful to staff of the provincial waterworks, the wastewater treatment plant, and Cambrew for sharing their experiences and candid views on project design and implementation and for providing support during the field visit. Feedback from sample respondents of the four provincial towns who participated in the willingness-to-pay and knowledge-attitude-practice survey strengthened the study.
The report was peer reviewed by Tomoo Ueda, Principal Evaluation Specialist, IED. The evaluation team is grateful for the valuable comments on the draft report made by the Southeast Asia Department and an external reviewer M. Fortin.
The report was prepared under the overall guidance of Vinod Thomas, Director General, IED; and Walter Kolkma, Director, Division 1, IED. IED retains full responsibility for the report.
Basic Data
Loans 17251725----CAMCAM (SF) and 20132013----CAM:CAM: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
As Per ADB Loan Actual Key Project Data ($ million) Documents Total project cost 26.30 46.13 ADB loan amount/utilization Loan 1725-CAM 20.00 20.84 Loan 2013-CAM 6.26 6.70 ADB loan amount/cancellation Loan 1725-CAM 0.15 Loan 2013-CAM 0.00 ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Key Dates Expected Actual Appraisal mission 6–17 Sep 1999 Inception mission 24 –28 Apr 2000
Original Loan (1725 ---CAM [SF]) Loan negotiations 17 –18 Nov 1999 Board approval 17 Dec 1999 Loan agreement 2 Feb 2000 Loan effectiveness 11 Apr 2000 Loan closing 31 Dec 2005 12 Dec 2007 Months (effectiveness to completion) 92 Supplementary Loan (2013 ---CAM) Loan negotiations 8–9 Sep 2003 Board approval 28 Oct 2003 Loan agreement 18 Dec 2003 Loan effectiveness 2 Jan 2004 Loan closing 30 Jun 2006 17 May 2007 Months (effectiveness to completion) 40
Borrower Kingdom of Cambodia Executing Agency Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy Ministry of Public Works and Transport
Type of Mission NNNumber of NNNumber of Person --- Missions Days Fact finding 1 3 Appraisal 1 9 Inception 1 2 Review 12 77 Project completion review 1 27 Independent evaluation mission 1 13
Executive Summary
This report presents the findings of the evaluation of the Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia, supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It provides lessons and recommendations for future water supply and sanitation (WSS) interventions in Cambodia, and in other countries with similar development contexts. A mission visited project sites in March 2013. The evaluation assessed the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, as well as its impact and the performance of ADB and the borrower.
ADB approved a loan of $20.00 million for the Provincial Towns Improvement Project on 19 December 1999, and a supplementary loan of $6.26 million on 28 October 2003 to cover project cost overrun. The first of these loans closed nearly 2 years later than originally envisaged and the second 11 months later.
The project aimed to expand access to WSS for the population in seven provincial towns in Cambodia: Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Pursat, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng. The project was expected to help Cambodia progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets associated with improved access to water and basic sanitation.
ADB prepared a project completion report (PCR) in November 2008 and the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) finalized a PCR validation report (PVR) in December 2012. The PCR rated the project successful , but the PVR rated it less than successful .
Overall Assessment
The evaluation rated the overall project performance less than successful , consistent with the earlier PVR rating. The project was rated relevant, less than effective, less than efficient , and less than likely sustainable.
The project was rated relevant . It was consistent with Cambodia’s development priorities and with ADB’s country and sector strategies to improve access to water and wastewater management in provincial towns. Improved access to water supply for the population in provincial towns positively contributed to Cambodia’s progress towards MDG 7C (improved access to water supply and basic sanitation). Notwithstanding, the project design was weak in some respects and this prevented the evaluation from rating the project highly relevant. It would have benefited from more extensive stakeholder consultations and geotechnical and topographical surveys during project design, thereby avoiding some of the later witnessed implementation delays, design changes, and project cost overrun. More attention for capacity development would have helped deal with the weak institutional capacity of provincial waterworks and Sihanoukville wastewater treatment plant (WWTP). Better design would also have taken into account the very high cost of land purchase for the WWTP in Sihanoukville in the cost estimates. The best design would have taken out the WWTP altogether, and perhaps set it up as a separate project.
The project was rated less than effective . The project contributed to improvements in access to piped water in the six provincial towns and wastewater treatment in Sihanoukville. The proportion of nonrevenue water (NRW) declined
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significantly across the six provincial towns, from 30% in 2005 to 17% in 2013. However, the coverage of piped water in these provincial towns was less than envisaged at appraisal and remained grossly inadequate. As of 2013, only 39% of the towns’ population (141,003) were connected to the water supply compared with a project target of 350,000. The number of wastewater connections in Sihanoukville had increased from only 580 at project completion to 1,326 in 2013 but this was still below the project appraisal target of 3,344. Cambrew, a company producing beer and soft drinks, envisaged as a primary client during project design, did not connect to the WWTP until 2010, when it was forced to by regulatory requirements. Since then, Cambrew’s production has expanded significantly and it is expected to exceed the capacity of the WWTP in 2014. In addition, several new industries producing garments and shoes have become prime candidates for WWTP connection. This makes it unlikely that the originally foreseen 3,344 beneficiary households will all be connected.
The project was rated less than efficient . The cost overrun was significant, as was the implementation delay, and the 3-year delay in the connection of Cambrew to the WWTP. The economic internal rate of return of all six waterworks at evaluation remained lower than at appraisal, reappraisal, and project completion, due to construction cost overruns and a lower number of household connections than anticipated at appraisal. The economic internal rate of return of three of the six waterworks were below 12%. The expensive Sihanoukville WWTP alone accrued half of the project cost with, due to lack of data, unknown economic return.
Project outcomes were rated less than likely sustainable . The financial internal rate of return (FIRR) at evaluation for Battambang was negative (indicating that the waterworks were not viable), while that of Kampot was below the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (5%). These two waterworks accounted for 48% of water production, 46% of water sale, and 66% of NRW. Four other waterworks (Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Pursat, and Svay Rieng) were financially viable with FIRRs ranging from 5.9% to 6.7%, above the WACC. However, the waterworks and the WWTP faced continued operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The financial position of the WWTP was not sustainable, and remains so as long as Cambrew is paying only a nominal fee for its use.
There was no consistency among the six provincial towns as to the amount of connection fee charged or water tariff levied. Each waterworks levied its own tariff scale for domestic, institutional, and commercial users. There was no tariff standard for industrial users, as industries sourced their own water and were not supplied by the waterworks. While the water tariff was generally low, the connection fee, at $100– $150 per household, proved prohibitive for poorer households. Meanwhile, full recovery of the cost of the Sihanoukville WWTP is unlikely unless the Wastewater Management Unit can enter into an agreement with Cambrew and other industrial users regarding a price based on volume and quality of discharge. Only a small proportion of consumers were willing to pay for a substantial increase in water tariff, although there was general support for tariff increases of up to 10%.
The overall project impact was moderate . The prevalence of diarrhea for children under 5 years of age (a proxy measure for improved health status) declined from 16.4% in 2000 to 13.2% in 2010 in the six project towns. The achievement, however, remained below that of Phnom Penh (11%) and well below that of Siem Reap (4%). Due to a lack of in-house expertise in the two executing agencies, the project’s community health awareness component did not receive adequate attention. As a result, there was a wide gap between knowledge and practice. Except for the practice of hand washing after use of the toilet, which was wider spread in the project area, Introduction xiii
the awareness of health and hygiene between project and non-project areas was not markedly different.
ADB's performance was satisfactory . ADB responded to project needs when required. The Borrower’s performance was found less than satisfactory . It was satisfactory at the start-up stage; however, several issues surfaced during implementation and the waterworks were unable to get full support from the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy. While the government agreed to adopt administrative and legal reforms, the recommendations of the study aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the project were not implemented. Moreover, some of the key loan covenants were only partially complied with.
Issues
The key issues facing urban WSS in Cambodia underscore the need to: (i) address institutional disconnects between water supply and sanitation, which failed to consider the symbiotic relationship between the two; (ii) devolve decision making and financial authority to provincial and municipal governments to expand financial revenue sources, carry out O&M, undertake capital replacement, and improve the quality of urban services; (iii) develop master plans for the urban centers with an aim to tackle water supply, wastewater management, and sanitation challenges in an integrated way; (iv) institute tariff reform measures to promote full cost recovery and ensure the long-term sustainability of waterworks and the WWTP; (v) address arsenic contamination in the water supply of provincial towns; and (vi) identify new and innovative technologies and treatment processes that optimize land use for future WWTP expansion.
Lessons
The evaluation provides the following lessons: (i) Project preparation should allow for sufficient time for consultation and active involvement of key stakeholders during project design and redesign to strengthen ownership and to capture local knowledge and experience. (ii) Upfront assessment of institutional capacity of executing and implementing agencies is important at the design stage, supported by measures to address critical training needs. Failure to do so leads to less than satisfactory implementation of the project. (iii) ADB and the executing agencies need to supervise and critically assess consultants’ performance during implementation to ensure proper knowledge transfer takes place between the consultants and national and local staff. (iv) An equitable tariff structure based on quantity and type of users (household, commercial, industrial) is necessary to ensure project sustainability.
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FollowFollow----upup Actions
The evaluation notes that there have been positive developments in the WSS sector in Cambodia, since the evaluation mission in March 2013. These include ADB’s re-engagement in the WSS sector, the establishment in 2014 of a Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts responsible for urban water supply, and which takes over from the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy, and the close coordination of ADB with other development partners regarding the WSS sector, including with the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the French Agency for Development (Agence Française de Développement), and the World Bank. ADB has approved the Urban Water Supply Project in December 2014, which will include rehabilitation and improvement of works in five of the six towns of the project evaluated here, and prepare another more reform oriented water and wastewater project to be approved probably in 2017. In this context, the report offers the following recommendations for ADB: (i) ADB, in partnership with other active development partners, should support a number of WSS assessments and master plans for major provincial towns including those supported under this project. The plans should include delivery of safe water supply to consumers, treatment of wastewater, and solid waste management. (ii) ADB should support capacity development of provincial town WSS initiatives through dedicated technical assistance. (iii) ADB should encourage the government to adopt technical and administrative solutions to ensure continuation of current project benefits and scaling up of these benefits to wider areas, with support from development partners active in Cambodia.
CHAPTER 111
Introduction
1. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported the Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia, which aimed to expand access to water supply and sanitation (WSS) for the population of seven provincial towns (Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Pursat, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng). The project was expected to help Cambodia progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets associated with improved access to water and basic sanitation. This report evaluates the project’s relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability based on evaluation guidelines and a field mission that visited all seven towns in March 2013.1 A.A.A. Evaluation Purpose and Process
2. The evaluation assessed performance 6 years after project completion in 2008, because it was deemed that the project would be mature and delivering the intended benefits to provincial towns. At the time when the project completion report (PCR) was made, intended benefits were just emerging, but the extent of progress could not be fully determined. With additional data, and more water connections installed after the cessation of ADB support, the evaluation was able to properly assess project results and come up with some lessons.
3. The PCR was completed in 2008 and it rated the project relevant , less effective , 2 efficient , and likely sustainable . The overall rating of the project was successful . The PCR, however, did not assess some of the components of the project, such as community sanitation and health awareness initiatives. It also cited inadequate technical due diligence carried out for a supplementary loan to the project. At project completion, only 20% of Sihanoukville’s households and businesses were connected to the wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) constructed with project support.
4. The PCR validation report (PVR) prepared in 2012 by the Independent Evaluation Department (IED) downgraded the project to less than successful. The PVR assessed the PCR quality to be less than satisfactory based on data inconsistencies, conflicting statements, inadequate reasoning and evidence supporting the conclusions, and non-reporting of progress against the targets set in the project design and monitoring framework (Appendix 1).3
1 Independent Evaluation Department. 2006. Guidelines for Preparing Performance Evaluation Reports for Public Sector Operations . Manila: ADB. 2 ADB. 2008. Completion Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia. Manila. 3 ADB. 2012. Validation Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia. Manila.
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5. A review of project documents, the PCR, and PVR noted the following: (i) non-achievement of a key policy dialogue agenda on decentralization and devolution of urban functions to provincial and municipal governments; (ii) a large discrepancy in the number of beneficiary households of the Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program (CSHAP) in the original loan document (1,500) and the supplementary loan (3,500); (iii) lack of clarity on the changes in planned physical outputs under the project and inadequate technical due diligence carried out for the supplementary loan (which led to high cost overruns); (iv) inadequate explanation for low water supply coverage at the end of the project (99,000 connections against a target of 350,000 households); (v) underachievement of the intended reduction in nonrevenue water (NRW) and lack of clarity on the reasons for rerouting some pipelines during implementation; (vi) lack of clarity on the reasons for the cessation of the community sanitation committees, very low uptake (only 20%) of connection to the Sihanoukville WWTP at project completion, and design changes to the waterworks funded by the supplementary loan; (vii) discrepancies in the computation of economic internal rates of return (EIRR) and financial internal rates of return (FIRR) for water supply and wastewater management between the PCR and the PVR; and (viii) insufficient operation and maintenance (O&M) funds due to low tariffs, raising concerns about project sustainability.
6. The evaluation followed a three-step process: (i) review of project documents including back-to-office reports, aide-memoirs, PCR, and PVR; (ii) field visits to all seven provincial towns covered by the project and discussions with key stakeholders; and (iii) analysis of additional data obtained by the evaluation team during the field visits. The evaluation team also benefited from discussions with senior project management staff at the two central executing agencies—the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME) and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT)—and other development partners active in WSS in Cambodia. 4
7. The evaluation team conducted a willingness-to-pay and knowledge-attitude- practice survey in four of the seven provinces (Battambang, Kampong Cham, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng) covering 448 project and 448 non-project respondents. The team also collected data and information for the economic reevaluation of the project. Water companies provided financial data. The team held an in-depth interview with a senior official of Cambrew, a company that produces beer and soft drinks, which is now connected to the WWTP.5 The team assessed project assets in all seven provincial towns (Supplementary Appendix A) and reevaluated the costs and benefits of six waterworks. Data limitations did not allow an economic reevaluation of the WWTP.
8. The project sustainability analysis was based on financial data of the operators, results of the willingness-to-pay survey and an assessment of the institutional capacity of the executing agencies and operators, and an analysis of the policy environment for promoting access to safe water and basic sanitation in selected towns.
4 These were the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); PLAN International; the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Enterprise Development (WaterSHED); and the World Bank. 5 Cambrew was not connected to the wastewater treatment plant at the time of PCR preparation. Introduction 3
B.B.B. Expected Results and Project ObjectiveObjectivessss
9. ADB approved a $20.00 million loan for the project on 19 December 1999, and a supplementary loan of $6.26 million on 28 October 2003 to cover project cost overrun. 6 The Asian Development Assistance Facility of New Zealand provided a grant of $0.23 million for initial project management support. The first loan closed on 12 December 2007, nearly 2 years later than intended, and the supplementary loan closed on 17 May 2007, 11 months later than envisaged.
10. The project comprised five components: (i) community sanitation and health awareness in three towns (Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Sihanoukville); (ii) water supply improvement in six towns (Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Pursat, and Svay Rieng); (iii) wastewater management in Sihanoukville; (iv) local governance and resource mobilization at the local level; and (v) implementation assistance through the provision of consulting services, project administration, equipment and facilities, incremental administrative costs, and training.
11. The supplementary loan was approved to cover cost overruns due to design changes, which included construction of new water intake and treatment facilities rather than rehabilitation of existing infrastructure; installation of generators rather than reliance on the grid to provide electric power; an increased sewer pipe diameter because of changes in layout and incomplete topographical surveys; a change in the lining of wastewater ponds due to higher than expected groundwater levels and unstable soil conditions; and generally higher unit prices for pipe materials. 7 The supplementary loan preparation replaced the midterm review. C.C.C. Project Completion and Validation Reports Assessment
12. The PCR rated the project performance successful , but the PVR assessed overall performance as less than successful .8 The Southeast Asia Regional Department requested a more detailed evaluation of the project in December 2009. The final validation report also recommended that IED may consider preparing a project performance evaluation report. The validation report downgraded the efficiency rating from efficient to inefficient on the ground of (i) lower economic benefits based on recomputed EIRR, (ii) project delays, and (iii) non-achievement of the devolution of urban functions to provincial and municipal governments. It downgraded the sustainability rating from likely sustainable to less than likely sustainable because future tariff levels may not be sufficient to cover O&M costs and non-viability of the WWTP.
13. ADB approved the project based on environmental Category B and it envisaged positive social impacts. The PCR noted that there were no significant adverse environmental impacts, and assumed that the environmental management plans had addressed negative environmental impacts during implementation. 9 However, it did not specify if the environmental management plan was effectively implemented as envisaged in the project design. It further stated that the social impact of the project
6 ADB. 1999. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial Towns Improvement Project , Manila; and ADB. 2003. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Supplementary Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial Towns Improvement Project . Manila. 7 Footnote 2, para. 8. 8 Footnote 2, para. 28. 9 Footnote 2, para. 66.
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had been moderate because water connections were still being established and the number of beneficiaries was below the target at the time of the PCR review mission. 10 Furthermore, the lessons presented in the PCR related to weaknesses in the project design that made it less suitable for the local context, which could have been addressed with due diligence at the time of project preparation. The PCR also stated that the government did not support the findings of a planned study on local government reform. The findings raised an important question for the evaluation: How, and to what extent, did the project improve public health in the towns, and ensure equitable access to WSS services by limiting the cost for the poor who had no access to safe water before the project? This evaluation attempted to address that question.
14. The validation report rated the project impact modest for the following reasons: (i) failure to sustain the sanitation committees will likely reverse any initial impact of the CSHAP component, (ii) the water supply component will provide positive benefits but only 40% of those under the maximum coverage can enjoy these benefits, (iii) any impact of the wastewater component will be limited because of the low connection rate, and (iv) failure to achieve institutional reforms and decentralization.
10 Footnote 2, para. 67.
CHAPTER 2 Design and Implementation
15. This chapter draws on a review of documents relevant to the project; discussion with key informants at ADB and in Cambodia; and data provided by the executing agencies (MIME and MPWT), the waterworks in six provincial towns, and the WWTP at Sihanoukville. It discusses project formulation and the rationale behind the project and summarizes project costs, financing and implementation arrangements, procurement, construction and scheduling, and design changes justifying additional financing. It also highlights key outputs achieved under the project, reviews consultant performance, and updates loan covenants associated with the project. A.A.A. Formulation
16. The water supply systems in the six project towns were constructed in the 1920s, and their production capacity had become insufficient to meet the growing demand. The systems were also in a state of disrepair; water pipes in the distribution networks were leaking. There was no comprehensive system for wastewater or storm water management in Sihanoukville prior to the project. By improving water supply and wastewater management in these provincial towns, the project was expected to contribute to poverty reduction in both rural and urban areas. These towns served as economic centers for the surrounding rural areas and linked the rural and urban economies. They were considered an immediate market, transportation depot, and processing center for agricultural products in their respective provinces. The development of these towns was expected to help absorb rural migrants and reduce pressures on the urban environment, infrastructure, and employment in the capital city of Phnom Penh; promote tourism in Sihanoukville; and bring about long-term positive social and environmental impacts in and around the project areas.
17. The project’s five components were generally appropriate to address the needs of the towns, given their growth potential at the time of project formulation. The involvement of two line ministries was also appropriate based on their operational jurisdictions. However, the coverage and design of the WWTP was limited, mainly targeting the brewery, Cambrew and 3,344 private properties, including small businesses in Sihanoukville town.
18. The PCR noted that project design changes, and part of the cost overrun, could have been avoided if the project appraisal had conducted more stakeholder consultation and completed geotechnical and topographical surveys. 11 Investment costs were underestimated during project appraisal. This led to ADB approving a supplementary loan in 2003 to address design shortcomings. 12
11 Footnote 2, para. 9. 12 Footnote 2, para. 11.
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B.B.B. Rationale
19. The report and recommendation of the President (RRP) provided a strong rationale for the project,13 which included: (i) the deterioration of water supply systems and environmental sanitation during the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of war, ineffective management, and poor maintenance; (ii) a rapid influx of population from rural areas to the provincial towns; (iii) the deterioration of environmental and public health conditions in urban areas due to inadequate potable water; and (iv) high child mortality and hospitalizations associated with waterborne diseases. 14 It also noted a very high leakage rate (60%) in the water supply, and groundwater contamination due to environmental pollution, poor drainage, and high siltation in wells. Furthermore, residents without a piped water connection incurred very high costs for potable water (2.5 to 4.0 times compared to those with a piped water connection). The RRP also highlighted sanitation and environmental problems arising from untreated sewage flowing into rivers and water bodies, haphazard dumping of solid waste, and overflow of soakaways during the rainy season. In addition, poor institutional capacity at both national and provincial levels, lack of incentives for provincial or municipal governments, and poor cost recovery figured prominently in the project rationale.
20. The project was consistent with Cambodia’s development priorities. ADB support was appropriate as the water supply infrastructure in the six towns prior to the project was in a less-than-satisfactory state and did not meet public requirements for safe drinking water. The wastewater infrastructure in Sihanoukville was lacking. The project was consistent with ADB’s country and sector strategies in improving access to water and wastewater management in provincial towns for a better urban environment.
21. According to the PCR, the selection of provincial towns factored in ADB’s previous support, economic growth potential, the status of cost recovery, and institutional capabilities of the provincial towns. For example, Kampong Cham, Kampot, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng were covered under ADB’s first Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project (Loan 1385-CAM).15 Battambang, Kampong Thom, and Pursat were along the major national highways, to which ADB provided financial assistance. Battambang was located near the Cambodia-Thailand border and along national highway 5, was the largest provincial town, and had the potential to become the major trade center in northern Cambodia. The seaport and tourist resources made Sihanoukville the fastest growing town in the country. Kampong Cham was the capital town of what was traditionally the country’s richest province, and could become the major center of agro-industries. Hence, the project-supported towns had economic growth potential. Given the prevailing socioeconomic conditions, the project rationale remained sound during implementation and at the time of this evaluation.
C.C.C. Cost, Financing, and Executing Arrangements
22. At appraisal, the project cost was estimated at $26.30 million, of which ADB financed 76%—after the supplementary loan ADB’s support also remained at the same
13 Footnote 6, paras. 4–9. 14 Almost 20% of children died before reaching the age of five, and waterborne diseases accounted for about 30% of hospitalizations. 15 ADB. 1995. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan and Technical Assistance to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Rural Infrastructure Improvement Project . Manila. Design and Implementation 7
level (76%). At completion, the actual project cost stood at $46.15 million equivalent, of which ADB financed $24.88 million in foreign exchange, including a service charge of 0.46 million and $2.65 million in local currency costs. ADB’s support amounted to 60.5% of actual project costs. Appendix 2 provides details of appraisal, reappraisal, and actual project costs. The wastewater treatment component alone absorbed 48% of the total project cost, followed by water supply, taking 35% of the cost.
23. When the project was reappraised, cost estimates overlooked the land acquisition cost for the WWTP in Sihanoukville. Also, an incorrect estimate of construction contracts led to a further 50% cost overrun after reappraisal. According to the PCR and reconfirmation from key informants, the project encountered cost overruns for parts B (water supply component for six towns) and C (WWTP in Sihanoukville) due to underestimation at appraisal and technical shortcomings. Total loan proceeds available at completion were $27.68 million, against which ADB disbursed $27.53 million and cancelled $0.149 million. Likewise, contract awards amounted to 98.3% of the total loan amount.
24. Substantial deviations needed to be made from the appraisal estimates. The project did not recruit an international consultant for community sanitation and health awareness, spent only 40% of funds on television and radio campaigns, and 30% less on the construction of latrines (Part A). It incurred an overrun of 50% compared to the original estimates for water supply (Part B). The project did not expect to incur substantial land acquisition costs ($11.34 million) during appraisal and reappraisal stages for the WWTP in Sihanoukville (Part C). It spent only 5% of the amount set aside for local governance and resource mobilization at the local level (Part D). Lastly, it incurred 60% more costs for implementation assistance and incremental administrative costs (Part E) from the government’s internal resources.
25. At appraisal, the MPWT was to be the executing agency for parts A, C and D; MIME for Part B; and both agencies were to implement their respective components for Part E. ADB approved a change in implementation arrangements on 6 October 2000, transferring all of Part A implementation from the MPWT to MIME. The change was for ease of project management after the inception mission following an assessment of the project management unit (PMU) responsibilities, workload, and institutional capacity of the two executing agencies and the resource requirements of each part of the project. As such, the MPWT became the executing agency for parts C and D; MIME for parts A and B; and both agencies implemented their respective components for Part E.
26. For Part B (water supply), each of the provincial or municipal governments in the project towns set up a project implementation unit (PIU) or urban management committee (UMC) to be responsible for (i) coordinating implementation of the project in the provincial towns; (ii) jointly approving the engineering designs with MIME; (iii) supervising the progress and quality of construction; and (iv) mobilizing local financial resources for O&M of the project components. For Part C (wastewater management), a PIU was set up in Sihanoukville to oversee the day-to-day project implementation and coordinate with the local government office and residents affected by the construction.
27. Some PIU or UMC members were senior operators and had been retained at the waterworks or wastewater management unit (WMU). Most of the personnel trained under the project had stayed on with the waterworks and WMU, which was good for the sustainability of the project. The project documents such as study reports, progress reports, design reports, O&M manuals, etc. were in English. According to PIU
8 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
and UMC staff trained, insufficient technical support was extended by the PMU or consultants to the waterworks for them to understand the reports, and as such, they could not constructively offer their comments during the planning and design stages. D.D.D. Procurement, Construction, and Scheduling
28. Local competitive bidding was adopted for Part A. For parts B and C contractors were firstly prequalified and then invited to participate in international competitive bidding. The lowest compliant bids were then awarded in accordance with ADB’s Procurement Guidelines (2013, as amended from time to time). One main civil contract package was awarded for each of the water and wastewater components, and their scope included equipment.
29. The PCR noted that the performance of the joint ventured contractor for the water component was unsatisfactory, due to (i) delays in starting construction; (ii) limited equipment and qualified staff; (iii) noncompliance of constructed works with the contract requirements; and (iv) delays in submitting payment certificates. Problems reported to the evaluation team included (i) widespread quality issues on the treatment equipment installed across all the six waterworks, and (ii) poor construction planning.
30. The PCR stated that the performance of the civil works contractor for the wastewater component was satisfactory and the civil works quality was good, although internal squabbling over various matters by the joint-venture partners often had to be dealt with by the consultant in order to ensure timely workflow. There were also some delays in initial mobilization and material procurement, but this did not lead to the overall delay in construction completion.
31. The actual contract award for the civil works of parts A, B and C was delayed for about a year because it took longer than expected to recruit consultants. While the Part A construction period was shortened by a year to catch up with delays, parts B and C encountered 2–2.5 years of overall delay in completion. Civil works contracts for parts B and C were extended by 1.5 years due to higher than expected bid prices for the original works. Such delays necessitated extensions in the project and loan closings. E.E.E. Design Changes
32. The following design changes were made: (i) Generators were installed for waterworks.16 (ii) The iron removal treatment works were replaced by an iron bacteria filter in Svay Rieng waterworks.17
16 One of the reasons for the cost overrun of Part B (water supply) was that the anticipated extension of the power grids had not taken place at the time of construction. The installation of generators as additional works was therefore required to provide power for the waterworks. At the time of this evaluation, grid power supply was available, three waterworks (Battambang, Kampot, and Svay Rieng) had switched to using the grid supply and the generators were retained for emergency use. The other three waterworks (Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Pursat) were still generating their own electricity, with cost savings quoted as a reason. 17 According to the O&M manual, the filters are supposed to be operated as biological filters to use bacteria to remove dissolved iron and manganese. This alternative design was supposed to do away with aeration and chlorination upstream of filters in the original design (both aeration and chlorination were originally for oxidation of the dissolved iron into particulates). However, pre-chlorination just at the inlet of the biological filters was also practiced. The pre-chlorination and biological filtration combination is incompatible. Chlorine disinfects and would inhibit the biological reactions in the filters. The present Design and Implementation 9
(iii) A new raw water pipe was laid to serve 200 households to replace leaking asbestos cement pipes in Kampot.18 (iv) Stage I capacity of the WWTP in Sihanoukville doubled from 6,900 m3/day, to 13,800 m 3/day in Stage II.19 (v) A high density polyethylene (HDPE) lining was placed on top of the concrete slabs on the pond slopes at the WWTP.20 (vi) The WMU started to require new household connections to sewers to include a septic tank and grease trap. 21
F.F.F. Outputs
1.1.1. Improved Community Sanitation and Health Awareness
33. The Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program (CSHAP) aimed to educate communities on sanitation issues and improve the sanitation conditions in the poor communities of Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Sihanoukville provinces through community participation in project design, cost sharing, and O&M. It intended to benefit 1,503 households supported by 15 sanitation committees, and construction of 1,500 household latrine substructures and 75 public and school latrines.
34. The PCR states that the intended output was completed during May 2002 to June 2004, but the CSHAP was no longer monitored by the executing agency. During the field visit, the evaluation team was unable to trace any functioning sanitation committees and it could not access a list of households that benefited from latrine substructure construction. The evaluation team did not find any official records within the executing agency and there was no institutional memory about this output. Hence, the evaluation was unable to determine the actual achievements the CSHAP.
arrangement appears to be depending solely on chlorine to oxidize, and the filters operating as regular sand filters to trap the iron precipitates. 18 However, to limit costs, eventually the asbestos cement pipe was retained to serve as the supply pipe. While this saved capital costs, problems associated with the retention of the pipe included (i) the loss of treated water through the leaking pipe; and (ii) low pressure supply for 200 households. Since project completion, a hydropower dam has been built upstream of Kampot’s intake at the Teuk Chhou River. While the quantity of raw water for Kampot can now be more secured, the river level depends on the release from the new reservoir. The river intake for Kampot has been lowered and extended some 6 m towards the middle of the river in order to extract water when the river level is low. 19 The eventual WWTP has a reported capacity of 5,700 m 3/day. Land has not been secured for the Stage II extension. Such design changes are believed to be for cost-saving reasons. The deletion of sludge drying beds imposes O&M restrictions in pond desludging. The pond system requires a large footprint and expansion potential is now limited as land has not been reserved. Insofar as the WWTP is concerned, the as-constructed works include just the basic pond system. All the ancillary works such as flow meters, water supply, administration building, and sludge drying, have not been provided. 20 As constructed, a HDPE lining is on top of the concrete slabs on the pond slopes. This appears to be an inappropriate design. HDPE lining in a pond system is typically used to minimize wastewater seepage into the ground. Concrete slabs are typically laid on top of HDPE lining so that vehicles can be driven down the pond slope into the ponds during desludging without damaging the HDPE lining. In the Sihanoukville design, concrete is used to line the sides and base of the anaerobic ponds, but they do not offer protection to the HDPE lining. Now that the lining is on top of the concrete, any cracks would trap sewerage gas and promote hydrogen sulfide corrosion of the concrete slabs. 21 The initial house connections under the ADB project were made directly into the sewers. However, frequent sewer blockages were encountered due to solid waste and heavy oil and grease contents in the local sewage. The new arrangement is a good approach towards protecting the sewerage system. The municipal sewage has undergone a certain degree of primary treatment before entering the sewers and then into the wastewater treatment plant. However, the practice of disposing of the septic tank contents back into the pond system is unnecessarily loading the plant with solids. Consideration could have been given to allowing the pump-out to dewater in some form of sludge drying bed.
10 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
2.2.2. Improved Water Supply
35. The evaluation found that the scope of water supply work was consistent with the appraisal estimates. It noted that higher capacity equipment had been provided at all six waterworks. In addition, works undecided at appraisal (repair or replacement) were generally replaced with new equipment. The data provided by the waterworks revealed significant improvement in the output measures between the PCR and this evaluation. The number of connections had doubled and the length of network had expanded two to three times, depending on the province. There was sufficient scope for expanding additional connections in all provincial towns, since capacity utilization ranged from 39% in Svay Ring to 77% in Battambang. A summary of key outputs is in Table 1. Detailed assessment of outputs at each waterworks is in Supplementary Appendix B.22
Table 1: Outputs Generated by the ProjectProject:: Water Supply Component (Part B) Provincial Town Kampong Kampong Svay Output/Stage Battambang ChamChamCham ThomThomThom Kampot Pursat Rieng Total Production (m 3/day) At design (planned) 11,520 9,000 5,760 5,760 5,760 4,800 42,600 At completion 4,500 1,675 1,174 3,092 1,102 453 11,996 At evaluation 8,877 6,043 2,534 3,971 3,619 1,850 26,894 Length of Network (km) Before the project 20 14 28 29 17 4 112 At completion 66 28 41 40 32 29 211 At evaluation 124 81 66 80 a 96 45 492 Number of Connections Before the project 4,614 1,632 796 1,570 1,452 303 10,376 At completion 4,999 2,927 1,459 2,352 2,172 851 14,760 At evaluation 9,877 5,714 3,177 4,248 5,016 1,792 29,824 a Approximate number of connections in Kampot. Actual figure could not be obtained from the waterworks. Source: Provincial waterworks data collected by the Independent Evaluation Department team.
36. At individual waterworks, technical inspection by the evaluation team confirmed most of the activities undertaken by the project. Wherever possible, repairs were undertaken, and where not possible, new equipment was provided. Some activities surpassed the target envisaged in the original loan document. For example, in Battambang, three new raw water pumps of 240 m3/hour capacity were installed instead of two pumps with 200 m 3/hour. Likewise, two generators were provided instead of one planned in the same town.
37. The PCR noted that NRW was 28% against the target of 35%. At the time of this evaluation, the NRW had declined to 17% from 32% at appraisal.
3.3.3. Improved Wastewater Management
38. The project supported construction of a WWTP in Sihanoukville, a rapidly growing provincial town with a port and booming tourism industry. It intended to connect 3,344 properties to the plant. However, at the time the PCR was prepared, only
22 The output figures reported in the PCR (Table 1) are substantially different from what was provided by each of the six waterworks. For example, the PCR reported that in total 19,116 water supply connections were established, while data provided by waterworks stood at 14,760 connections. Likewise, at the PCR stage, water production according to the waterworks data remained 35% less than the volume reported in the PCR. While the source of discrepancies could not be established, it may have occurred due to aggregation errors at the project level. Design and Implementation 11
665 (20%) of the properties had been connected to the WWTP. Despite low uptake, treatment efficiency was considered high and effluent quality was within an acceptable standard. 23 The PCR also noted that since Cambrew had its own treatment plant, it was not willing to connect to the project’s treatment plant; although, it was expected to do so at the time of project formulation.
39. At the time of this evaluation, the situation had changed. The production capacity of Cambrew had significantly increased, and as a result of environmental regulatory requirements, it had connected to the treatment plant in 2010. The evaluation team noted that the construction of the plant had been accomplished as per the original plan, with some minor adjustments. 24
40. There were several other industries, such as leather and garment factories that produced a large amount of wastewater, but these were yet to be connected to the treatment plant. Household connections are still low (around 25%) and part of the problem stemmed from their low lying locations relative to the wastewater pipes, which suggested design error.
41. The gravity sewerage and pond system required minimum O&M effort and almost no power consumption. As such, the current tariff collection, though low, was sufficient to cover regular O&M costs including staff salaries. The number of household connections remained low. The wastewater facilities, however, were overloaded by one single industrial discharger, Cambrew. The pond system requires a large footprint and expansion potential was limited as land has become scarce and expensive, particularly at Sihanoukville. Sludge removed from septic tanks was disposed of at the anaerobic ponds, unnecessarily loading the ponds with solids. The pond system required regular desludging to ensure continual performance but this had not been diligently carried out. The design was not conducive for desludging and sludge drying.
4.4.4. Improved Local Governance and Resource Mobilization
42. The project commissioned a study on local government reform that reviewed the legal and administrative structure of the provincial governments of Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Sihanoukville. While the study was completed early on in June 2002, the government did not support its recommendations and as a result they were not implemented.
43. A review of potential revenue sources for provincial towns and municipalities recommended increased revenue collection to cover: O&M costs, provide performance incentives to waterworks staff, and generate internal funds to expand the system. The PCR noted that all waterworks were able to generate positive cash flows. At the time of evaluation, four of six waterworks had positive cash flows; while two could not keep up with the rising O&M cost structure.
44. Initially, the revenue base for the WWTP was limited, largely due to the small number of connections. The situation improved with the Cambrew connection. However, the evaluation notes that the lump sum annual fee agreed between the plant operator and Cambrew was too low. As a result, the plant was not likely to generate
23 Footnote 2, para. 17. 24 The only minor discrepancy was that the RRP envisaged a 1.44 ha wetland for treated effluent discharge. This had not been provided.
12 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
positive cash flow in the foreseeable future, unless the tariff structure was set taking into account volume and type of wastewater discharge.
45. Two recent developments have had some positive impact on Cambodia’s tariff setting policy: (i) Kampong Cham started a scheme to offer subsidized connection to “very poor” and “poor households” and (ii) on instruction from local government, Battambang waterworks started collecting wastewater discharge fees in the same bill as the water tariff, on behalf of the local government. This was a first step in the right direction, and forms a basis for Cambodia to levy tariffs for both water supply and wastewater management. G.G.G. Consultants
46. The PCR noted that the performance of the consultants was satisfactory, and their working relationship with PMUs and other agencies was effective. The evaluation team, however, noted certain issues with their performance, which are outlined in paras. 47–51.
47. The performance of the project preparatory technical assistance (PPTA) consultants was not always satisfactory. One of the reasons for cost overrun in the water supply component, leading to the supplementary loan, was that reconstruction of new facilities was necessary rather than rehabilitation of some of the old structures. This reflected inadequate due diligence prior to loan appraisal. Kampong Cham Waterworks reported that during the TA stage, the consultants visited Kampong Cham for only 1 day, during the rainy season. Part of the town area was flooded and was therefore not visited. As such, the issue that existing dug wells were of insufficient depth was not identified. That area was therefore not included as part of the service area in the project. After that single visit, Kampong Cham Waterworks was not consulted until the project was in its implementation stage.
48. Secondly, the evaluation team also noted oversight and mistakes on the part of the implementation consultant in initiating or reviewing changes in the course of the project. These included: (i) under sizing of degritting, flocculation, and clarification tanks; (ii) no lightning protection other than for the elevated water towers; (iii) the approval of an incompatible design change at Svay Rieng proposed by the contractor; and (iv) retention of the old leaking asbestos cement raw water pipe for Kampot.
49. Thirdly, the waterworks staff complained that the consultant who served as supervising engineer was not sufficiently diligent in safeguarding the interests and contractual rights of the employer (i.e., MIME). All waterworks reported problems with the quality of equipment supplied and installed by the project. Some of the defects were noticeable before turnover, while some manifested during the 1-year defect liability period. However, insufficient support was provided by the supervising engineer resulting in the waterworks accepting defective constructed works right from the beginning. Some waterworks recalled having only one site engineer deployed by the supervising engineer during construction. This level of construction supervision was insufficient as different engineering disciplines were required in completing a water treatment project together with extensive pipe laying works. The supervising engineers on site were also not diligent in checking and approving the contractor’s method statements, or were not effective in monitoring the contractor’s civil works.
50. Fourthly, training of local staff by consultants in O&M and laboratory testing was insufficient and not tailored to suit the low educational level of the waterworks Design and Implementation 13
personnel. As such, some waterworks were unable to conduct meaningful water quality testing after project completion. This deficiency had only been partly rectified, with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) offering more in-depth and extensive laboratory training to the responsible personnel. The O&M manuals and equipment catalogs were mainly in English. The O&M manual was believed to be rarely (if at all) referred to by the operators. Although the contractor was responsible for O&M training and preparation of O&M manuals, the implementation consultant was responsible for reviewing and approving such outputs.
51. Lastly, consultants conducted subsoil investigation to arrive at the pond design for the WWTP. This led to design changes during construction to account for the poor subsoil conditions, which resulted in cost overruns in Part C (WWTP). In the consultant’s design, provisions had not been made for (i) future extensions; and (ii) regular O&M. Now that land has become more valuable in Sihanoukville, treatment plant expansion would face increasing objections and difficulties. Wastewater infrastructure should have been designed with provisions for convenient O&M. Provisions for pond desludging and dewatering of dredged material should have been made, to make it more convenient to carry out such operations. H.H.H. Loan Covenants
52. Not all covenants were included in the RRP of the original loan. A list of 18 clauses was included in the supplementary loan RRP, and this list was used as the basic list by the evaluation team. The PCR, however, provided a status for only 15, not entirely identical, clauses. The discrepancy was due to the fact that the supplementary loan RRP did not take account of the changed situation in its covenant list.
53. The status of compliance with loan covenants is shown in Supplementary Appendix C. The PCR reported that three covenants related to (i) water supply tariffs, (ii) water collection and financial ratios, and (iii) WWTP cost recovery were only partially complied with. Small improvements had been made in relation to these three issues since the PCR. Some other clauses were found by the evaluation to be “partially complied with” rather than “complied with” as assessed in the PCR, and they were also generally tariff related.
CHAPTER 333 Performance Assessment
54. This chapter assesses the project’s performance based on established core criteria—relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. These criteria are based on the guidelines developed by IED and approved by ADB (footnote 1).
A.A.A. Overall Assessment
55. The evaluation rated the overall project performance less than successful , which is consistent with the PVR rating given earlier. The project contributed to improvements in access to piped water in the six provincial towns and the WWTP in Sihanoukville. However, the coverage of piped water in these provincial towns was less than intended and still remains grossly inadequate, although the government is seeking external support from development partners to address this problem. The WWTP was facing capacity constraints largely due to rapid expansion of Cambrew and the emergence of several small industries, such as garment and shoe factories. Incentives for wastewater connections were inadequate in the absence of an effective regulatory framework and the enforcement of environmental regulations.
56. Even nearly 7 years after project completion, waterworks and the WWTP face weak technical and managerial capacity, although capacity varies across the towns. Faulty water meters, poor-quality water pipes, and lack of funds for regular and periodic O&M have hampered full capacity utilization of the infrastructure developed under the project. Without legal and administrative reforms and devolution of power to waterworks and the WWTP, the viability of utilities remains questionable. The core evaluation criteria assessed by the evaluation team is summarized in Table 2.
Table 222:2: Assessment of Overall Performance Weight Criterion (%) Assessment Rating Value aaa Weighted Rating Relevance 25 Relevant 2 0.50 Effectiveness 25 Less than 1 0.25 effective Efficiency 25 Less than 1 0.25 efficient Sustainability 25 Less than likely 1 0.25 Overall Less than successful 1.25 a The rating values are: 3 = highly relevant/highly effective/highly efficient/most likely sustainable; 2 = relevant/effective/efficient/likely sustainable; 1 = less than relevant/less than effective/less than efficient/less likely sustainable; and 0 = irrelevant/ineffective/inefficient/not likely sustainable. Source: Independent Evaluation Department assessment.
Performance Assessment 15
B.B.B. Relevance
57. The evaluation rated the project relevant , consistent with both the PCR and PVR ratings. The project was consistent with Cambodia’s development priorities 25 and with ADB’s country and sector strategies in improving access to water and wastewater management in provincial towns for a better urban environment. Improved access to water supply for the population in provincial towns had positively contributed to Cambodia’s progress toward achieving part of the MDG pertaining to ensuring environmental sustainability (MDG 7C) in terms of improved access to safe water for the wider population. ADB support was appropriate in improving the water supply infrastructure in the six underserved provincial towns. This resulted in improved access to drinking water in six towns and wastewater treatment in Sihanoukville.
58. The water treatment process design was in general appropriate for the individual towns. Where the raw water was from a river source, a full spectrum of conventional treatment processes were called for to settle out larger particles and filter out the fine particulates. As such, waterworks at Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, and Pursat were provided with flocculation, clarification, filtration, and chlorination processes. As the ground water source for Kampong Cham was of a good quality, only chlorination was required to render the water potable. The ground water source for Svay Rieng, on the other hand, was high in iron, and an iron removal process was appropriately specified. The technical skills required for operating and maintaining the waterworks were not difficult. A purely gravity-based sewerage system was provided for in Sihanoukville such that no electricity was required for pumping. The low cost and near-zero power consumption sewage conveyance and wastewater treatment design required very low maintenance efforts. The technical skills required for O&M were low. The project should have introduced a tariff structure based on type and volume of use for water supply and source, type, and quantity of discharge for WWTP connections.
59. A water tariff system was already established in each of the six towns, which formed a basis for future refinement of the fee mechanism for (i) connection to the supply network and (ii) the amount of water consumed. Similarly, there was already an established wastewater tariff system in Sihanoukville that charged lump sum fees for connection to the sewerage network, and monthly flat rates for wastewater treatment. However, the tariff system did not take into account the amount and types of wastewater generated by the clients.
60. The evaluation team noted feedback from the officials at provincial waterworks regarding the TA team’s inadequate consultations with the technical staff, which could have strengthened the project design and enhanced the relevance of the project to the intended stakeholders (paras. 67–71). According to the respondents, the TA engineers spent very little time in the field. The PCR also noted that more consultations with stakeholders and thorough geotechnical and topographical surveys during the design phase could have provided better project cost estimates, avoided design changes, and prevented cost overruns, supplementary loan financing, and implementation delays. 26
25 Cambodia’s Rectangular Strategy (Rectangular-II) para. 84 states that “the Royal Government will pay more attention to the rights of people to clean water supply to ensure food safety and better livelihoods in accordance with the Cambodia MDGs and will also preserve the ecosystem of unpolluted water and clean environment,” cited in Overview on Urban Water Supply Sector in the Kingdom of Cambodia, Sub- Technical Working Group for Urban Water Supply, Infrastructure and Regional Integration Technical Working Group (IRITWG), Phnom Penh, January 2012. 26 Footnote 2, para. 55.
16 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
61. The CSHAP was relevant to the stakeholders in terms of public health outcomes. However, due to lack of expertise in the two executing agencies, it did not take off. The program lacked ownership and wound down prematurely without any visible footprints. The evaluation mission did not find any evidence supporting such activities in any of the project towns even though funds were spent. There was no serious ownership for implementing this component. Involvement of a competent nongovernment organization (NGO) and/or health ministry staff for this purpose could have helped implement the activities under the program. Overall, efforts to address sanitation challenges were deemed grossly inadequate.
62. Improved local governance and resource mobilization was relevant for Cambodia at the time of project formulation given weak institutional structures. However, the government’s commitment to implement reform measures was not clear at the outset, partly due to uncertainty about the envisaged ramifications of such measures. Inadequate consultations and varied expectations from stakeholders demonstrated that envisaged measures were externally imposed.
63. The institutional capacity of provincial waterworks and Sihanoukville WWTP was found to be weak. None of the provinces had the adequate technical and managerial capacity to expand the program as envisaged in the project design. The support from the executing agencies to provincial towns was limited.
64. The project design rightly identified the need for including a cost recovery mechanism, implementation of a community awareness and education program to encourage community participation in environmental sanitation, and institutional strengthening and capacity building. The identification of these needs formed the basis for two key project components—CSHAP and local governance and resource mobilization. However, the implementation modalities for these components were poorly understood or owned by the government.
65. The inclusion of Sihanoukville in the project scope was misplaced. The project could have either covered another provincial town or Sihanoukville municipality for improving water services. Given that Sihanoukville was included largely to cover Cambrew’s wastewater treatment, a separate initiative would have been more relevant. Due diligence carried out for Cambrew’s inclusion in the project was inadequate. Cambrew had its own treatment plant and it was not willing to connect to the WWTP during project implementation. The company eventually connected to the WWTP following rapid expansion but only after project completion and when regulatory measures were enforced. C.C.C. Effectiveness
66. The evaluation rates the project as less than effective , which is consistent with the PCR and PVR ratings. Despite improvement in water supply coverage in six towns and sewer connection coverage in Sihanoukville since project completion, the full potential of the project benefits have not been met even at the time of evaluation.
67. Water supply. Table 3 summarizes improvement in access to water supply in the six provincial towns. Overall, the population in these towns increased by 23% during 2008–2013, with significant variations across the towns served. Over the same period, the number of water supply connections and the population served nearly doubled. However, this achievement still accounts for only 39% of the population of Performance Assessment 17
the towns (141,003 against a target of serving 350,000 people). This would imply that either the targets were set too high or institutional capacity to expand continued to remain weak. Nevertheless, there was enough scope to expand access to the remaining 61% of people in these towns.
Table 333:3: Access to Provincial Waterworks at Project Completion and Evaluation Kampong Kampong Svay Waterworks Battambang ChamChamCham ThomThomThom Kampot Pursat Rieng Total Population in Service Area At completion 135,539 42,302 29,883 39,621 28,406 21,895 297,646 At evaluation 171,605 47,379 31,998 46,899 46,347 21,113 365,341 Change (%) 27 12 7 18 63 (7) 23 Number of Connections aaa At design 4,614 1,632 796 1,570 1,452 303 10,376 At completion 4,999 2,927 1,459 2,352 2,172 851 14,760 At evaluation 9,877 5,714 3,177 4,248 5,016 1,792 29,824 Change (%) 98 95 118 81 131 111 102 Population Served At design … … … … … … 350,000 At completion 24,020 14,615 6,860 11,490 10,880 4,160 72,025 At evaluation 40,217 30,284 16,037 20,940 25,080 8,445 141,003 Change (%) 67 107 134 82 131 103 96 Coverage (Population Served/Total Population in Service Area) At completion (%) 18 35 23 29 38 19 24 At evaluation (%) 23 64 50 45 54 40 39 Change (%) 5 29 27 16 16 21 15 () = negative number, … = data not available. a Funding for network extension after project completion came from various sources, including a loan from the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), UN- Habitat, and domestic allocation. The funding allocation for such extension and improvement works is not evenly spread across the six towns; some towns such as Battambang and Pursat have received more funding than the others, such as Kampong Thom. Source: Independent Evaluation Department evaluation mission data collected by the evaluation team from provincial waterworks.
68. All six waterworks reported an impressive reduction in NRW since project completion (Table 4). 27 The target of reducing NRW to 35% by 2004 and 30% by 2005 has been exceeded. The average NRW in 2013 was assessed to be 17%, down from 32% in 2007. The reduction was mainly realized due to (i) replacement of leaking water pipes; (ii) replacement of inaccurate water meters; (iii) more diligent meter reading and billing; and (iv) replacement of old or leaking water pipes. Further improvement in NRW reduction would have been achieved through active leakage detection and control. More advanced training in leakage control and network management, conducted by the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA), for relevant waterworks staff would have further helped in this endeavor.
69. Several quality issues were reported on plant, equipment, pipe fittings, and water meters installed under the project. Frequent breakdowns were affecting the performance of all the waterworks to a varying extent. The inherent quality issues in the waterworks required budget allocation to enable more robust water supply. All equipment requires periodic inspections, servicing, and change of parts, and overhaul after some years of operation. Such servicing schedules should have been clearly indicated in the O&M manual for the operators’ reference. However, since the
27 Para. 15 of the validation report noted that the NRW for two towns was high—55% for Kampong Cham and 47% for Pursat. However, the quoted NRW figures should have been 18% for Kampong Cham and 27% for Pursat, and these were not high. The validation report misquoted the water supply coverage percentage of the two towns as the NRW levels.
18 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
O&M manuals were in English, they were rarely referred to. Staff capabilities varied significantly across the six waterworks. Continuous tailored training and skill development for the operators was necessary to help ensure sustainability in O&M of the supply systems. However, this was not done. Experience gained at any one of the waterworks was not shared with the others. A structured framework for sharing mutual experience was needed to better promote the sustainability of the project.
Table 444:4: Water Production, SalesSales,,,, and NonNonrrrrevenueevenue Water in Provincial Towns Kampong Kampong Waterworks Battambang ChamChamCham ThomThomThom Kampot Pursat Svay Rieng TotalTotalTotal Production (m 3/annum) At design 4,204,800 3,285,000 2,102,400 2,102,400 2,102,400 1,752,000 15,549,000 At completion 1,642,500 611,375 428,510 1,128,580 402,230 165,345 4,378,540 At evaluation 3,240,105 2,205,695 924,910 1,449,415 1,320,935 675,250 9,816,310 Water Sales (m 3/annum) At completion 1,165,770 499,437 308,049 626,921 291,666 78,606 2,970,449 At evaluation 2,576,986 1,946,561 767,715 1,178,629 1,096,583 577,794 8,144,268 NRWNRWNRW (m 3/annum) At completion 508,663 112,094 120,617 501,699 110,494 86,774 1,440,341 At evaluation 663,196 259,025 157,203 270,789 224,243 97,690 1,413,380 NRW (%) At design … … … … … … 30 At completion 29 18 28 44 27 52 32 At evaluation 20 12 17 19 17 14 17 … = data not available, NRW = nonrevenue water. Source: Independent Evaluation Department evaluation mission data collected by the evaluation team from provincial waterworks.
70. Water quality. The waterworks were reported to be generally able to meet Cambodia’s 2004 national drinking water standard (Table 5). Water quality testing was carried out once or twice a day at each waterworks: (i) at the inlet; (ii) after clarification; (iii) after filtration; and (iv) in the treated water tank to test for temperature, pH, turbidity, free chlorine, total dissolved solids, conductivity, color, and alkalinity in water. Such a regime would have been sufficient only if carried out regularly and faithfully. However, water quality records at the waterworks laboratories had many blank data fields suggesting that due diligence in waste quality sampling for testing and monitoring remained inadequate. Lack of trained staff and operating expenditure limitations contributed to this.
Table 555:5: Cambodia Drinking Water Standard 2004 Water Quality 2004 Standard Water Quality Standard Parameter UnitUnitUnit Value Parameter UnitUnitUnit Value pH 6.5 –8.5 Hardiness mg/ l 300 Color TCU 5 Iron mg/ l 0.3 Turbidity NTU 5 Manganese mg/ l 0.1 Ammonia mg /l 1.5 Sodium mg/ l 200 Chloride mg /l 250 Total dissolved solids mg/ l 300 NTU = nephelometric turbidity unit, TCU = true color unit. Source: Ministry of Mines, Industry and Energy, Phnom Penh.
71. For example, in Svay Rieng, tests for concentrations of iron and manganese were additionally required as indicated in its standard water quality recording format. However, the two parameters were not routinely tested. According to staff at Kampong Cham, training in water sampling and testing during project implementation was insufficient and not tailored to suit the low educational level of the personnel. Only a 2-day training at Battambang was organized for all six waterworks. After the laboratory was set up by the contractor, no further training was conducted. This shortcoming Performance Assessment 19
should have been immediately addressed by ADB during project implementation. As such, the waterworks was unable to conduct meaningful water quality testing. This deficiency was partly rectified, with JICA offering an in-depth and extensive training to the laboratory staff.
72. Wastewater management. The wastewater collection system in Sihanoukville was purely a gravity system with a total length of 65.7 km and no pumping stations. The trunk sewer is 900 mm in diameter, discharging wastewater into the pond system. There had been no extension of the system since project completion. The initial house connections under the ADB project were made directly into the sewers. However, frequent sewer blockages were encountered due to solid waste and heavy oil and grease contents in the local sewage. The WMU had only one functional high-pressure water jetting machine to clear the blockages.
73. The number of wastewater connections in Sihanoukville was only 580 at project completion, and had grown to 1,326 in 2013 (an increase of 129% since project completion) but was still below the project target of 3,344 connections. While the town’s population had increased substantially over the last 5 years on the back of a tourism boom, wastewater connection remained low, which was largely attributable to lack of awareness by households, the lack of a proper awareness campaign, relatively high connection fees as perceived by the residents, and the absence of an effective regulatory framework to address waste disposal and pollution control in the town. Coastal and other low lying areas in Sihanoukville were lower than the sewers. These areas were not connected to the sewerage networks, and could not be connected unless pumping was provided. 28
74. Since 2007, all new connections were required to include a septic tank and a grease trap. The new arrangement was reported to be very effective in minimizing sewer blockages and thus maintenance efforts. The households would clear the grease traps themselves once in a while; restaurants have to clear the traps about every 2 days. Households would call the WMU when their septic tanks were full. The WMU then sent a vacuum truck to pump out the contents of the septic tank, charging a fee. The truck then disposed of the pump-out into the anaerobic ponds of the WWTP. 29 Since the WMU had only one vacuum truck, with a steadily increasing number of septic tanks, they could not keep up with demand, which led to a delay in desludging services.
75. The anaerobic ponds had not been desludged since 2011 and only three of the four ponds were operating, but they appeared to perform reasonably well. 30 The maturation ponds had not been desludged since project completion and were fairly full with solids at the upstream end of the ponds. The municipal sewage had undergone a certain degree of primary treatment before entering the sewers and then the WWTP. However, the practice of disposing of the septic tank contents back into the pond system was unnecessarily loading the WWTP with solids. Furthermore, as observed on site, an HDPE lining was put on top of concrete slabs on the slopes of the anaerobic ponds, and on top of rip-rap at the other ponds. This is an inappropriate design. 31
28 If pumping was introduced, it would have faced challenges such as (i) additional land requirements; (ii) increased need for plant and equipment; (iii) greater power consumption; (iv) increased O&M demands; and (v) environmental impacts associated with sewerage facilities. 29 The WMU has only one vacuum truck, which was still functioning well. 30 Due to algae growth, one pond was not used. 31 Placing HDPE lining on top of rip-rap makes in susceptible to puncture by the stones, and once punctured it would no longer prevent seepage into the ground.
20 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
76. A 400 mm diameter sewer served Cambrew. The PCR reported that the sewer was dedicated to the brewery, but according to the WMU the sewer was also collecting sewage from some households and a dyeing factory. Cambrew’s water demand stood at about 4,900 m 3/day in 2013.32 Wastewater from the brew house, soft drink factory, and packaging plant is combined, and since 2010 has been discharged into the Sihanoukville sewerage system. 33 The discharge was estimated at 1,500 m 3/day in 2010, and a lump sum treatment tariff of KR4 million (or about $1,000) per year was levied. This was equivalent to only KR90/m 3.
77. The WWTP apparently could not cope with the increased flow and heavy pollution loads, leading too much of the solids escaping from the anaerobic ponds into the facultative ponds. The WMU then instructed Cambrew to install a pretreatment plant. 34 The discharge in 2013 was estimated at 2,652 m 3/day. While the WWTP is rated at 5,700 m 3/day, the actual flow quantity into the system was not monitored. 35 According to the WMU, the total flow from Cambrew was high, but there was no flow meter or water quality monitoring system at the discharge point for Cambrew. The brewery’s wastewater was expected to increase from about 2,652 m3/day to 6,000 m3/day in the near future as a result of massive expansion of the plant, surpassing the WWTP’s capacity. D.D.D. Efficiency
78. The evaluation rated project performance less than efficient .36 The assessment of post-completion progress has been taken into consideration in determining the project’s efficiency rating.
79. The PCR assessment was largely based on EIRR computations, although such an assessment was not undertaken for the WWTP. The PVR’s inefficient rating, was based on (i) a much lower recalculated EIRR (compared to the PCR’s EIRR calculation), (ii) 17 months implementation delays due to design changes, and (iii) lack of government support for devolution of urban functions to provincial and municipal governments. The project encountered nearly 2 years of delay (two extensions), largely due to design and capacity issues in provincial and municipal governments. Wastewater management alone accounted for almost half of the total project cost.
80. The project’s efficiency improved considerably after completion as
32 The WMU reported that the sewer was insufficient to cope with the flow, and manhole covers would at times be blown open by the excess discharge. As a stopgap measure, the WMU reduced Cambrew’s connection to a 200 mm pipe, so as to restrict the flow entering the 400 mm sewer. However, by doing so, any excess partially treated wastewater would leak into the environment. 33 Raw beverage wastewater was initially discharged into the pond system without any treatment. 34 The pretreatment plant was being commissioned in 2013, and partially treated beverage wastewater was already being discharged into the Sihanoukville WWTP. It was rated at 6,000 m 3/day and designed to produce a treated effluent for sewer discharge and not for direct discharge into the sea. There was only one unit each for each treatment step (e.g., one anaerobic tank and one clarifier); there was no standby or redundancy to deal with any major breakdown of any of the treatment process steps. 35 According to the design report, sewers were designed to flow at a maximum velocity of 0.9 m/s. As such, the 400 mm sewer was expected to carry an average flow of not more than 5,000 m 3/day. The MPWT subsequently confirmed that the 400 mm sewer was intended to carry 1,600 m 3/day of wastewater. 36 This evaluation notes that the PVR incorrectly linked water supply coverage and wastewater generation under the project. The sites are in different provinces and, hence, the following statement from the PVR (para. 17) is inaccurate: “since water supply coverage appears to be greater (40%) than the connections to the sewage system (20%), there is an issue as to whether the wastewater treatment capacity is adequate to treat the incremental wastewater generated from operation of the project’s water supply components.” Performance Assessment 21
demonstrated by the significant reduction in NRW. Likewise, capacity utilization also improved considerably post completion (Table 6). No major improvements or upgrading of infrastructure had taken place at any of the waterworks after project completion. There were, however, quality issues in the installed equipment at the water treatment plants, causing the waterworks to operate in a less efficient manner.
Table 666:6: Capacity Utilization of Waterworks at Project Completion and Evaluation Kampong Kampong Svay Assessment at Battambang ChamChamCham ThomThomThom Kampot Pursat Rieng Overall Completion (%) 39 19 20 54 19 9 28 Evaluation (%) 77 67 44 69 63 39 63 Source: Data collected by Independent Evaluation Department evaluation team from the provincial waterworks.
81. As shown in Table 3, there is still a huge shortfall in meeting demand for drinking water. The evaluation team learned during the field visits that JICA was considering supporting new waterworks in Battambang and Kampong Cham, while MIME was considering supporting waterworks expansion in Pursat from internal resources to address excess demand. ADB has approved a new water supply project for Cambodia which will aim to rehabilitate five of the six waterworks of the project.
82. Economic efficiencyefficiency. Table 7 summarizes EIRR computations at different stages of the project. Overall, the EIRR at evaluation was lower than at appraisal, reappraisal, and project completion. Lower EIRR values at evaluation were primarily the result of construction cost overruns and lower than expected achievements (i.e., fewer connections than anticipated at appraisal). At the operational phase of the project, the lower EIRRs were primarily because of increasing operating costs but no increase in water tariff (other than Pursat) since 2007. The EIRRs of Battambang (9.2%) and Svay Rieng (10.8%) were below the standard opportunity cost of capital of 12%. Kampot, at 11.8%, was also marginally below this threshold. While Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Pursat were higher than the 12% threshold, their EIRRs were very much lower than calculated at appraisal. The economic performance of the six waterworks was rated satisfactory at the border line (average 11.8%). Pursat, at 13.8%, was the best performer among the six waterworks, largely due to an increase in the water tariff in 2010 to KR1,600/m 3, the highest among the six towns. The project economic analysis is presented in Appendix 3.
Table 777:7: Economic Internal Rate of Return of Project WaterworksWaterworks at Different Stages EIRR (%) Project Performance Project Town Appraisal Reappraisal Completion Evaluation Battambang 15.6 17.1 13.3 9.2 Kampong Cham 34.6 22.7 16.1 12.4 Kampong Thom 16.6 15.5 12.1 12.9 Kampot 25.0 23.9 13.8 11.8 Pursat 20.2 15.4 14.9 13.8 Svay Rieng 15.9 14.7 12.3 10.8 EIRR = economic internal rate of return. Source: Independent Evaluation Department computation.
83. No comparative figures were available to compute the EIRR of the WWTP. Neither the RRP nor the PCR estimated the EIRR for this component. Given the significant cost of the WWTP, the likely effect is that the project becomes less than efficient .
22 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
E.E.E. Sustainability
84. The project was rated less than likely sustainable , unless more funds are allocated by the executing agencies for O&M, repairs, replacements, upgrades, or extension of the project assets on a regular basis. The tariff structures are not yet conducive to achieving reasonable cost recovery. This assessment was consistent with the PVR rating. The PVR, based on an update from the Cambodia Resident Mission in 2012, also reported that long-term project sustainability was unlikely. The financial status of each of the six waterworks (see Appendix 3) suggests that under the current water tariff structure financial viability is less likely since there is resistance to increasing water tariffs.
85. The FIRR for each of the waterworks is given in Table 8. The FIRR for Battambang waterworks was negative, and the FIRR for Kampot is well below the WACC. Based on available data, this evaluation considers Battambang waterworks not viable and Kampot waterworks less viable. The negative FIRR for Battambang waterworks was largely associated with increasing operating costs and a very low water tariff. These two provincial towns (Battambang and Kampot) accounted for 48% of water production, 46% of water sale, and 66% of NRW. Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Pursat, and Svay Rieng were financially viable, with FIRRs ranging from 5.9% to 6.7%, higher than the WACC of 5%.
Table 888:8: Financial Internal Rate of Return for Project Waterworks at Different Stages FIRR (%) Project Project Town Appraisal Reappraisal Completion Performance Evaluation Battambang 6.6 6.7 5.4 (2.8 ) Kampong Cham 9.5 7.8 6.7 6.6 Kampong Thom 4.4 7.9 5.4 6.0 Kampot 4.5 3.3 7.5 3.9 Pursat 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.9 Svay Rieng 4.2 6.0 5.3 6.7 () = negative number, FIRR = financial internal rate of return. Source: Independent Evaluation Department computation.
86. Waterworks had to refer to MIME for a review of connection fees and water tariffs. There was no consistency among the six towns (Table 9) in terms of the level of connection fee or unit water tariff. Every waterworks levied its own tariff scale for domestic, institutional, and commercial users in its own service area. There was no tariff standard for industrial users, as they source their own water and were not supplied by the waterworks. While the water tariff was generally low, the connection fee at $100–150 is prohibitive for poorer households. Kampong Cham has recently started a scheme to offer subsidized connections to “very-poor” and “poor” households.37 A similar subsidy scheme could have been considered in other provincial towns, based on a proper identification of eligible poor households. However, any such cross-subsidization must be carefully examined so that the balance sheet of waterworks remains healthy.
37 In water pricing, a “lifeline tariff” is normally set below cost to provide the poor with inexpensive water. Higher prices are charged to richer customers and companies who are known to use more water and have a greater ability to pay. Performance Assessment 23
Table 999:9: Water Supply Connection Fee and Water Tariff LeviLevieded by Provincial Town Waterworks Kampong Kampong Waterworks Battambang ChamChamCham ThomThomThom Kampot Pursat Svay Rieng Connection Fee (KR/connection) At completion 200,000 200,000 200,000 58,748 370,000 200,000 At evaluation 600,000 440,000 400,000 452,000 370,000 420,000 Domestic Water Tariff (KR/m 3) At completion 1,400 735 1,000 –1,300 1,200 800 –1,300 900 At evaluation 1,500 876 1,500 1,400 1,600 1,200 Source: Independent Evaluation Department evaluation team.
87. The sewer and WWTP design did not give due consideration to future flow increases. The capacity of the WWTP was already insufficient to cater for more flow. The coverage of the sewerage system was only 40%, necessitating some form of upgrade. Otherwise, no further improvement of the water environment could be realized. If the volume of Cambrew discharge continues to increase, the quality of effluent discharged from the WWTP will deteriorate. WWTP expansion using the currently employed technology would take up too much land, but adopting a different treatment process for the extension to optimize land use, would require additional O&M resources, including different skill sets. The WWTP desperately requires desludging, but the current design is not conducive for desludging and sludge drying. Furthermore, cost recovery is unlikely, unless the agreement with industries such as Cambrew is based on volume of discharge at appropriate pricing to ensure sustainability.
88. On instruction by the local government, Battambang waterworks has started collecting wastewater discharge fees in the same bill as the water tariff, on behalf of the local government. This was a first step in the right direction, and forms a basis for Cambodia to levy tariffs for both water supply and wastewater management. Some households were unwilling to pay or could not afford to connect to the sewerage system, according to the survey conducted for the evaluation (see Appendix 4 for key findings). Thus, connected properties had to deal with the unhygienic conditions of unconnected neighbors. In addition, the immediate benefits of the wastewater system were not provided to the most popular tourism areas. The beaches for which Sihanoukville is famous were in low lying areas that would have required pumping in order to be connected to the existing sewers.
89. Both the connection fee and monthly lump sum wastewater tariff were generally low. While the low connection fee was conducive to achieving more connections, there was no effective pollution control regulation to prohibit illegal wastewater discharge. As such, the number of voluntary household and business connections remained low. Charging a higher connection fee to the industrial and commercial dischargers to subsidize poor household connections was required in the loan covenants, but this did not happen. The existing fixed rate wastewater tariff structure was not sustainable. It needed to be equitable and refinement was needed to correlate wastewater disposal to the actual volume and type of discharge.
90. One of the key features of the project design was improved local governance. However, government did not implement the recommendations of a study on legal and administrative structures for a model local government with fully decentralized authority for urban development. 38 Had proper decentralization of waterworks taken place, waterworks authorities would have paid more attention to enhancing technical and economic efficiency, further reduction of NRW, ensuring a sustainable basis for
38 The study was completed in June 2002 (footnote 2, para. 22).
24 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
retaining trained technical staff, and administering water pricing based on production and distribution costs.
91. One loan covenant called for comprehensive monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the project’s technical performance and social and economic benefits, in particular benefits for disadvantaged social groups. The supplementary loan RRP noted that for MIME, initial development of an M&E program, delivery of an M&E training program, and the baseline surveys were carried out in two provinces during September 2000. PIU staff in the four other provinces were trained in August 2002, under the guidance of the project implementation consultants. An initial M&E report was to be submitted to ADB by September 2003. For the MPWT, it was agreed that an M&E program was to be submitted to ADB by September 2004, after receiving and reviewing the O&M manuals to be prepared by the construction contractors. However, there was no further update on the project’s M&E program. The evaluation team learned that this activity was not carried out, although this covenant was reported as “complied with” in the back-to- office report. Hence, the M&E covenant was deemed only “partly complied with”.
CHAPTER 444 Other Assessments
92. This chapter covers assessments of other non-core evaluation criteria: (i) project impacts, (ii) performance of ADB, (iii) performance of the borrower, and (iv) performance of the technical assistance provided for preparing project design. A.A.A. Impacts
93. The RRP stated that the project was classified as environmental category B and positive social impacts were expected. 39 The evaluation concluded that the overall project impact had been moderate, and this was consistent with the PVR assessment.40 The PCR did not provide a rating on project impacts. According to the PCR, (i) the project did not have significant adverse environmental impacts, (ii) proper environmental management plans were designed with specific mitigating measures that included traffic rerouting, phasing of construction works, and appropriate design and construction methods, including guidelines for groundwater protection measures. 41 However, the PCR did not explain how these conclusions were arrived at. Moreover, there was no clarity as to whether the environmental management plans were effectively implemented and monitored.
94. Similarly, the PCR also stated that the project improved people’s health by providing safe WSS, and ensured equitable access to these services by limiting the cost for the poor who had no access to safe water. It reported that the project had positive socioeconomic impacts, including increased access to improved WSS, a reduction in waterborne diseases, and increased hygiene awareness and more hygienic practices, resulting in improved health and quality of life for the communities. The PCR acknowledged that the social impact had been only moderate because the connections were still being established and the number of beneficiaries was below target. This was confirmed by the number of connections established at completion (Table 3).
95. The PCR, however, lacked evidence to support these socioeconomic impact claims. The PCR confirmed that all affected people were compensated as reported by the Resettlement Unit of the Ministry of Economics and Finance. However, it did not report the number of affected people compensated. At a bare minimum, some statistics on this should have been incorporated in the report.
96. The evaluation team visited all waterworks sites and based on its assessment, found that the operation of the waterworks generally had little negative impact on the
39 The project was expected to improve the environmental conditions in the project towns by introducing appropriate sanitation measures, and rehabilitating and expanding water supply systems and a sewerage system. Expected social impacts included equitable access to water and sanitation services (footnote 6, paras. 60–61). 40 The PVR rated project impact modest for the following reasons (i) failure to sustain the sanitation committees will likely reverse any initial impact of the CSHAP component; (ii) the water supply component will provide positive benefits, but only 40% of those under the maximum coverage can enjoy these benefits; (iii) any impact of the wastewater component will be limited because of the low connection rate; and (iv) failure to achieve institutional reforms and decentralization. 41 Footnote 2, para. 66.
26 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
environment. Only three minor negative impacts were identified: (i) noise pollution caused by pumping plants and blowers for the filters; (ii) risks due to the delivery, storage, and use of chlorine, which is a poisonous gas; and (iii) clarifier sludge and filter backwash generated as wastewater from the treatment processes being discharged into a nearby river without any treatment. Addressing the risk of chlorine usage, forced ventilation is provided in the chlorine plant at each works to diffuse any accidental spills. An emergency shower and eye wash system is also provided, although such provisions were found to be not working in most of the works (except in Kampong Cham). With regard to wastewater from the treatment process, such discharge containing pollutants (removed from the raw water and carry-over water treatment chemicals) increased turbidity and chemical contents in the surrounding water environment. However, it is recognized that the potential capital and running costs of sludge treatment facilities are high, and such provisions are not yet considered appropriate for the economic conditions in Cambodia.
97. The project enabled a significant amount of wastewater to be collected and treated, thereby reducing pollution released into coastal waters. Such positive environmental benefits outweigh the unavoidable negative visual and odor impacts of the pond system on the environment. The current wastewater generation from Cambrew was overloading the sewerage and treatment system, and an increased flow was expected. The stopgap measure of restricting Cambrew discharge was causing an overflow of partially treated or untreated wastewater into the environment. The WWTP desperately required a responsible and cost-effective approach to regular desludging.
B.B.B. Water Consumption
98. While the water supply tariff schemes provide drinking water and convenience to the residents, they also promote higher water usage. In designing the schemes, a unit consumption of 120 liters per capita per day (lpcd) was adopted. This was equivalent to approximately 84 lpcd of actual consumption, allowing for losses. As shown in Table 10 the per capita consumption had steadily increased across all six towns, far exceeding the project design estimate of 84 lpcd. This may mean that some households were sharing their connections with their unconnected neighbors. As such, the per capita consumption figure was either unrealistic or, after the initial investment of paying for the water connection, most households found that the water tariff was affordable and were willing to pay for the convenience of having water from the taps, with little consideration for conserving water or making savings in the water bills. Some public education would have been appropriate during implementation to remind consumers of conserving the water resource despite the relatively low water tariff levied.
Table 110000:: Per Capita Water Consumption in Provincial Towns at Project Completion and Evaluation Kampong Kampong Svay Waterworks Battambang ChamChamCham ThomThomThom Kampot Pursat RiengRiengRieng TotalTotalTotal Per capita consumption (liters/day) At design 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 At completion 133 94 123 149 73 52 113 At evaluation 176 176 131 154 120 187 158 Source: Independent Evaluation Department computations based on data collected by the evaluation team from the waterworks. Other Assessments 27
C.C.C. Health Impacts
99. In absence of a results-based M&E system, it was difficult to ascertain the actual contribution of the project to the improvement in the overall socioeconomic status of the beneficiaries. Moreover, many other factors would have led to improvements over time.
100. While the PCR claimed that the project contributed to an improved health status, including a reduction in waterborne diseases, the project did not collect any data on this. Hence, as a proxy measure, the evaluation relied on Cambodia Demographic Health Survey data for three time points—2000, 2005, and 2010. Data presented in Table 11 confirms that the prevalence of diarrhea for children under 5 years of age in the six project towns declined from 16.4% in 2000 to 13.2% in 2010, which represents a 20% decline in diarrhea prevalence.
Table 111111:: Prevalence of Diarrhea in Children Under 5 Years of Age (%) YearYearYear Provincial Town 200020002000 200520052005 201020102010 Battambang 3.92 15.12 16.33 Kampong Cham 0.00 19.05 16.92 Kampong Thom 11.59 24.56 7.04 Kampot 0.00 10.53 7.58 Pursat 26.56 24.29 6.15 Svay Rieng 25.00 6.25 12.28 Sihanoukville 18.75 11.11 17.54 Overall 16.41 15.11 13.15 Phnom Penh 22.06 16.07 11.36 Siem Reap 15.69 11.24 3.60 Overall urban 17.54 17.22 11.25 Overall rural 20.71 19.27 15.68 Source: Cambodia Demographic Health Survey data 2000, 2005, and 2010.
101. The achievement was significantly less than that for the two big cities: Phnom Penh recorded a reduction from 22.1% in 2000 to 11.4% in 2010 (a 50% reduction) and Siem Reap from 15.7% in 2000 to 3.6% in 2010. The prevalence rate in 2010 for the project-supported provincial towns was still higher than other urban centers (13.2% vs. 11.3%). Likewise, rural areas showed higher prevalence than urban areas. According to key informants, the achievement in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap was a result of health promotional initiatives by NGOs active in the towns. Survey data collected by the evaluation team for this evaluation (based on 2-week recall) did not show statistically significant difference in the incidence of diarrhea between the project and non-project areas, implying that any reduction in the incidence of diarrhea was largely due to other factors, such as the improving economic condition of the population over the period, and possibly other initiatives undertaken independently of the project.
D.D.D. Knowledge, AttitudeAttitude,,,, and Practice
102. A survey of sample households was carried out in April-May 2013 for this evaluation; results are presented in Appendix 4. The survey revealed that knowledge about the consequences of an unsanitary environment was reasonably high among both project-supported and non-supported households (Table A4.10). Almost three-
28 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
quarters (74% of households in the project area and 76% in the non-project area) of respondents were aware that an unsanitary environment and drinking unclean water made their family members sick. However, less than a quarter of the respondents believed that these factors spread disease (23% in project and 22% in non-project areas) and insect growth in the surrounding areas (19% in project and 21% in non- project areas). Diarrhea was cited as the most prominent health issue resulting from drinking unclean water (95% of project and 93% of non-project respondents). However, awareness about other waterborne diseases such as cholera and scabies was very low.
103. More than 80% of the respondents stated that keeping the surrounding environment clean and drinking clean water were effective disease prevention measures (Table A4.11). Sanitary practices varied across the four sample towns 42 with the exception of washing hands before eating, which was practiced by almost all respondents. However, practices associated with general cleaning and hand washing, other than before eating, remained very low (Table A4.9). Hand washing after going to the toilet was practiced by 41% of respondents in the project area compared to 30% in the non-project area. 43
104. The method of getting drinking water out of containers varied significantly between project and non-project households (Table A4.7). Key differences were scooping with a drinking cup (62% project vs. 77% non-project), using a tap attached to the container (35% project vs. 13% non-project), and using a long handled scoop (6% project vs. 14% non-project).
105. Among the households with no access to piped water or water in their household premises, back strain was the most common problem (49%), followed by long distance traveled to fetch water for daily use (25%) (Table A4.6).
106. Soak away pits and surface seepage comprised the two most common methods of wastewater discharge by the non-project households (Table A4.8). Only a handful of households relied on watercourse ponds, open channels or other methods. Only a quarter of the households surveyed (25.5%) were connected to a sewer system. This was a marked difference between the project and non-project areas.
107. The conclusion is that the project may have raised awareness on the importance of hand washing, but larger awareness changes were absent. It is assumed that this was related to the rather limited effort that the project had made in awareness campaigns. Nevertheless, the water connections may have improved the lives of the people who received them in several ways. E.E.E. Affordability and Willingness to Pay
108. The response from the sample survey shows that the affordability of increased water tariffs remained low. About 38% of those with a water supply connection and one-third of those willing to connect to water supply services stated that they would not be able to afford any increase in the water tariff beyond what was currently charged. About 45% of households in the project area were willing to absorb a small increase in the water tariff—of up to 10% (Table A4.14).
42 The survey was conducted in four of the six provincial towns: Battambang, Kampong Cham, Sihanoukville, and Svay Rieng. 43 Statistically significant at 1%. Other Assessments 29
109. The survey asked respondents in non-project areas about their willingness to connect to the water supply system. The findings indicated that the majority were willing to connect, provided that the water tariff remained low (Table A4.12). Of those who were not willing to connect (35% from the non-project area), 43.5% felt that they could not afford the connection and 21.3% responded that connection costs were prohibitive (Table A4.13). This means that 15%-20% of the population of the provincial towns is reliant on communal sources of water rather than individual water connections.
110. In Sihanoukville municipality, where the WWTP is located, only 9% of households were connected to the WWTP (Table A4.15). An average connection cost about KR400,000 (about $1,000) and a monthly fee amounted to less than one dollar. In the non-project area of the town, the likelihood of connection would have been higher if connection charges were lower. For example, 70% of households were willing to connect to the system, but could only afford a connection fee of less than $250 (Table A4.16). When it came to monthly wastewater collection and treatment charges, two-thirds in the project area and one-third in the non-project area were not willing to pay any increase (Table A4.17).
111. The awareness of waste collection and proper disposal was higher in the project serviced areas of the provincial towns but it tended to vary across the four towns. Nearly 65% of households in the project areas were willing to use a waste collection service, compared to only 28% in the non-project areas (Table A4.18). Those that were not willing to use such a service perceived their quantity of waste to be very small (49%) and, hence, they could dispose of it easily, either by burning or dumping rubbish on common ground. About 18% did not see any benefit from an organized waste disposal system (Table A4.19).
112. The general perception was that the provision of WSS services was a government responsibility and hence should be provided at minimum cost or for free. F.F.F. ADB, Development Partners, and Borrower Performance
1.1.1. Asian Development Bank
113. The overall performance of ADB was rated satisfactory . ADB addressed implementation issues and fielded an adequate number of missions during the implementation period. 44 It responded to project needs when required, including approval of additional financing for completing the project. The executing and implementing agencies also informed the evaluation team that they were satisfied with ADB’s support as and when needed.
114. ADB could have played a more effective role in some areas. The project design team’s consultation with technical staff at waterworks proved inadequate. The record keeping practice during project implementation was somewhat lacking. There were discrepancies, confusion, or oversight in (i) the number of covenant clauses (see para. 52), (ii) the number of projected beneficiaries (para.94), and (iii) the WWTP land cost. These, and many other discrepancies, were mainly due to a weak due diligence exercised by ADB in preparing the supplementary loan RRP. ADB should have critically
44 There is a discrepancy in the number of missions fielded and it could be either 17 or 21. The PCR reported 20 missions.
30 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
assessed the performance of consulting services during implementation. Better supervision by the consultants would have helped the project to take remedial action as needed.
115. The evaluation concluded that for the WWTP component, ADB performance was less than satisfactory . The evaluation team encountered difficulties in locating project documents, such as the technical assistance reports, design reports, list of covenants in the original loan, and other documents. Technical due diligence was deemed inadequate as a proper assessment of demand and supply had not been done.
2.2.2. Borrower Performance
116. The performance of the borrower is rated less than satisfactory , which differs from PCR and PVR’s satisfactory assessment. The evaluation concurs with the PCR that the borrower’s performance was satisfactory at the start up stage. However, during implementation several issues surfaced and waterworks were unable to get full support from MIME. The PCR notes: “Project accounting activities by the PIUs were not as well organized and controlled at the PMU level, despite the existence of dedicated accounting staff at the PIU. Payment to the contractors and consultants were generally late, causing cash flow problems for all parties contracted by the Borrower and executing agencies.” 45
117. At the time of evaluation, the waterworks were getting only limited support from MIME. In particular, the technical support needed by the waterworks was not forthcoming, largely due to capacity limitations and funding constraints. During implementation, more support could have been extended to waterworks staff. While the borrower agreed to implement needed administrative and legal reforms, it did not implement the recommendations of the study aimed at strengthening the institutional capacity of the project. Also, some of the covenants were only partially complied with by the borrower.
118. It is true that the borrower was actively seeking support from other development partners, including ADB to further expand access to WSS. Support from JICA for technical training for operators at some of the waterworks was appreciated by provincial staff. However, financial sustainability still remained a question for the majority of the waterworks and support from the government’s internal resources was not forthcoming in response to their needs. G.G.G. Technical Assistance
119. The project design was based on technical assistance approved in October 1996 for preparing an urban development project to meet the demand for basic urban services. 46 The consultants submitted the final report in January 1998. According to the staff at the waterworks and the WWTP, the project design team’s visit to the project sites was too short and lacked due consultation with relevant stakeholders. This contributed to design shortcomings, resulting in cost overruns and implementation delays, which adversely affected project performance. The evaluation rates the technical assistance less than successful .
45 Footnote 2, para. 52. 46 Footnote 6, para. 2.
CHAPTER 555 Issues, Lessons, and Follow--- Up Actions
120. This chapter highlights key issues facing Cambodia’s urban WSS subsector and lessons derived from the project design, implementation, and completion, and recommends follow-up actions for ADB. A.A.A. Issues
121. Water sssupply supply and sssanitation sanitation disconnect. The project design envisaged water supply and wastewater treatment not to be connected and hence six provincial towns received support for water supply and Sihanoukville for the WWTP. While the intervention model appeared simplistic, it did not address the necessary symbiotic relationship between water supply and wastewater treatment and sanitation. Due to a lack of in-house expertise in either of the two executing agencies, one of the key components on community health awareness did not receive adequate attention. As a result, there was a wide gap between knowledge and practice. Except for the practice of hand washing after going to the toilet, which was more prevalent in the project area, the awareness and practices pertaining to health and hygiene were not markedly different in project and non-project areas. This calls for engagement of NGOs in this endeavor.
122. Evaluation noted that the institutional link to address health outcomes through the provision of safe drinking water and sanitation was weak. Urban administration was functionally divided between two line ministries, which had corresponding departments in the provincial and municipal governments. MIME was in charge of water supply in provinces and municipalities other than Phnom Penh, and the MPWT was responsible for all other public works in provincial towns, including sanitation and wastewater. All budgeting and investment decisions were made at the central ministries in Phnom Penh. A coordinating mechanism at the central level between the two ministries is needed in addressing the problem.
123. Governance structurestructure.... The provincial offices of the line ministries were essentially their executing arms, but the provincial governments had very little decision- making power for urban infrastructure investments. Neither O&M funding nor technical backup support from MIME and the MPWT were forthcoming when needed.
124. The project design duly recognized the constraints in the urban sector, in terms of lack of financial and human resources and weak institutional capacities. This was to be addressed by strengthening project management. It assumed that over time the waterworks would gain financial and administrative autonomy to ensure with needed reforms. However, since the government did not adopt suggested reforms, the institutional arrangement provided little authority and limited incentives for the provincial and municipal governments to expand their financial revenues, undertake O&M responsibilities, or improve the quality of urban services. Part D of the project, among other things, was to review the local government structure and develop a legal
32 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
and administrative model for local government with fully decentralized authority for urban development and management. The Part D study was completed in June 2002, but the recommendations were not implemented due to lack of government support. The target of developing a new legal and administrative government model was therefore not achieved. The older, inefficient model is still in use. There is a need to address the institutional disconnect between water supply and sanitation.. In addition, there is also a need to develop a master plan for each urban center with an aim to tackle water supply, wastewater management, and sanitation challenges based on an integrated approach.
125. Cost recovery. Administrative and legal reforms envisaged under the project could have provided a feasible cost recovery framework, initially for O&M and later for capital replacement costs. However, the government opted not to implement the reform measures. Overall, the financial status of two of the six waterworks and the WWTP was weak. Only one of the six provincial towns (Pursat) has adjusted the water tariff. Under current arrangements, the project remains less viable overall, unless cross- subsidization from other sectors and/or tariff reform is accepted. With improved services, however, certain segments of the population were willing to absorb a modest increase in water and wastewater tariffs. There is a need to institute tariff reform measures to promote full cost recovery and ensure the long-term sustainability of the waterworks and the WWTP.
126. Sustainability of the physical infrastructure. The low quality of works and equipment were affecting the sustainability of the waterworks. The piecemeal reactive maintenance and repairs were ineffective and were adding costs over time. There was a need for a detailed asset evaluation at each waterworks to determine a capital replacement plan. Likewise, the overwhelming wastewater discharge from Cambrew was overloading the Sihanoukville sewerage system. A sewerage master plan for Sihanoukville, with sewage management options for residential, commercial, and industrial development would have been helpful. While NRW reduction had been achieved, it was largely due to replacement of faulty water meters and more diligent water meter reading and billing. Active leakage control had not been practiced.
127. Arsenic in water supply. In a 2009 United Nation’s Children Fund report, arsenic contamination was reported in Kampong Thom and Kampong Cham, among other provinces. 47 Other than groundwater, surface water of the Mekong, Bassac and Tonle Sap rivers were also suspected of arsenic contamination. The project had not addressed this. In the future, this needs to be addressed.
128. TechnologyTechnology. Floc formation was less than satisfactory with flocculation and clarification. Where used, clarification tanks were undersized and unable to render sufficient clarification. Pre-chlorination was practiced as a routine at all waterworks with flocculation and clarification. Only elevated water towers had lightning protection. Other buildings, equipment and power generators had no such provision, which made the equipment and machinery vulnerable to damage. This needs to be addressed.
129. The Sihanoukville WWTP desperately required desludging but the design was not conducive for desludging and sludge drying. Furthermore, wastewater generation from Cambrew was overloading the sewerage and treatment system. Unless some form of upgrade was carried out, effluent discharge would continue to deteriorate. This
47 UNICEF. 2009. Arsenic in Cambodia. http://www.unicef.org/cambodia/As_Mitigation_ in_Cambodia_2009. pdf Issues, Lessons, and Recommendations 33
evaluation noted that expansion using current technology would require too much land. However, adopting a different treatment process for the extension, to optimize land use, would have required a new O&M team with different skill sets. This highlights the need to identify new innovative technologies and treatment processes that optimize land use for future WWTP expansion.
B.B.B. Lessons
130. A lack of in-depth investigations during project preparatory technical assistance, particularly during preparation of the detailed design, has had a significant impact on the finished products. More time should have been given for project design, particularly since the project involved scattered locations and an inconvenient transport system. Furthermore, ensuring ownership of the investment through adequate consultation with local stakeholders is vital to sustainable outcomes.
131. Proper due diligence is required while assessing institutional capacity at the executing and implementing agencies. Training needs should be adequately assessed and established for all groups of stakeholders. Practical refresher training opportunities, both technical and managerial, are needed for applying relevant knowledge and achieving greater efficiency in operations. Basic training in procurement, contract administration, and construction management should be provided to personnel of the executing and implementing agencies and waterworks, and site staff appointed by the consultant.
132. More rigorous efforts should be made in ensuring that the quantity and quality of consultants deployed by consulting firms is adequate for specialized tasks. Consultants’ performance should be critically assessed during and after the project by executing agencies and ADB, and appropriate action taken to ensure that consulting services are available for the right purpose, at the right time, and in the right forms.
133. While recognizing the affordability issue associated with water supply and sewerage connection for the poorer households, an equitable tariff structure based on quantity and purpose of use is needed to ensure sustainability of infrastructure and project benefits over the project’s economic life.
C.C.C. FollowFollow----upup Actions
134. The sector situation in Cambodia has changed considerably since 2007, and particularly in the past 2 years or so. ADB re-engaged in the urban water supply sector after discussions with the Ministry of Economy and Finance in 2012, and has been actively working with MIME (now Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts since the beginning of 2014). A PPTA was prepared in 2013/2014 and the Urban Water Supply Project was approved in December 2014 covering nine towns (new works in Stung Treng and Siem Reap plus rehabilitation and improvement works in seven towns—five of which were included in the project evaluated). 48 A subsequent loan is planned for 2017 to expand coverage in the five towns where only rehabilitation is provided), PPTA to be processed in early 2015 will consider sector reform and improved links to wastewater projects. Close coordination is being established with JICA, the French Agency for Development (Agence Française de Développement), and the World Bank.
48 ADB. 2014. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Urban Water Supply Project. Manila.
34 Cambodia: Provincial Towns Improvement Project
135. The government has committed to making all provincial waterworks financially autonomous by 2018 and this is being driven by Ministry of Industry and Handicrafts' new management which is focusing on the following main areas: (i) improving the financial and operational efficiency of the provincial waterworks, (ii) tariff reform, (iii) increasing piped supply coverage, and (iv) improving water quality.
136. The evaluation recommends three key follow up actions to be taken by ADB: (i) ADB, in partnership with other active development partners, should support the assessment of the water situation and the preparation of urban WSS master plans for all provincial towns, including those supported under this project. With the rapid pace of urbanization, urban WSS infrastructure will continue to experience increasing demand pressure and even at full capacity will not be able to cope with rising demand. The master plan should be holistic and integrate water supply, sanitation, wastewater management, and solid waste management. (ii) ADB should suggest the specific actions listed in Appendix 5 to the government to ensure continuation of current project benefits and scaling up of these benefits to wider areas, with support from development partners active in Cambodia, if required. (iii) ADB is planning a sector reform CDTA to support areas not covered by JICA and to assist with sector reform and capacity development at central level, enhancing its regulatory function. ADB should consider two TA projects to strengthen WSS initiatives in Cambodia: (a) The first TA should focus on capacity development of provincial town urban WSS initiatives. The project may include, among other things, a detailed asset evaluation at each waterworks to determine what equipment should be repaired and what should be replaced; and a capital replacement plan to ensure the smooth supply of water to consumers, with due consideration for sufficient fund allocation from MIME or via support by other agencies. The project should also include: support for further NRW reduction through active leakage detection and control, based on more advanced training in this effort organized by the PPWSA for staff at waterworks; support for improved consumer awareness in water conservation to reduce high per capita consumption, to be offered by the PPWSA; organization of a series of refresher courses every 6 months in O&M for waterworks operators following a training needs assessment by the PPWSA; translation into Khmer of the O&M manual for each waterworks; establishment of a structured framework for sharing mutual experience across waterworks to better promote project sustainability; and initiation of a water resource study for each river source for Battambang, Kampong Thom, and Pursat on the longer term availability of raw water. (b) The second TA project should support the preparation of a sewerage master plan for all provincial towns, including one for Sihanoukville, and study options for managing sewage from existing and projected residential and commercial developments. For example, in Sihanoukville, the coverage could be expanded to include other potential industrial growth factors in addition to Cambrew. Given the tourism Issues, Lessons, and Recommendations 35
development potential and industrial development in and around the municipality, the government may explore an alternate model. Considering the low household connection rate to the sewerage system, the current model is not sustainable and hence innovative mechanisms, including regulatory measures, will have to be designed and implemented to expand connections. Furthermore, cost effective methods should be explored to address pond desludging without adversely impacting the environment.
Appendixes
APPENDIX 11:: PROJECT FRAMEWORK
Project Targets Monitoring Mechanisms Assumptions/Risks Design Original Supplemen Original Supplemen Supplemen PPER Summary LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Original Loan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Comment I. Sector Goal Improve the Cleaner urban No change No change Central and No change No Political stability No change Continued quality of life in environment, local change political the project better health, government stability towns more statistics and productive reports time, higher income, and less medical expenses Political stability No change No change Promote More No change No change Government No change No Confidence of No change No change economic and investment in statistics, change foreign and social the project studies or domestic development in towns, higher reports of investors the project employment bilateral and towns rate, higher multilateral fiscal agencies and revenues, and NGOs more social development programs Further No change No change improvement in legal and policy environment II. Project Objectives Improve urban Complete Complete Same as that Project No change No Continued No change No change Project services and project project in the progress change improvement in components environment in components components supplementa reports, loan governance, completed in the project by 2005 by 2005 ry loan review improvement in 2007. The towns in a benefiting benefiting missions, capacities of water sustainable about about monitoring concerned component manner and 500,000 350,000 and institutions benefiting contribute to people, people, evaluation about 148,000 poverty generate generate indicators, people. reduction adequate adequate and PCR Generally O&M funds O&M funds generating funds for daily O&M but not geared for full cost recovery
38
Project Targets Monitoring Mechanisms Assumptions/Risks Appendix Design Original Supplemen Original Supplemen Supplemen PPER Summary LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Original Loan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Comment Assist the Improve Re source Same as that Project No change No Timely legal and No change Legal and government in resource mobilization in the progress change institutional institutional 1 developing policy mobilization by local original loan reports, loan actions by the actions by and institutional of the local governments review government, the reforms to governments; improved; missions, effective government decentralize develop institutional and PCR enforcement of are timely, urban functions institutional capacities local revenue enforcement to local capacities for for local collections of local governments local urban urban revenue development development collections is and and effective management managemen t developed Ill.Ill.Ill. Components/ Outputs Improve the Upgrade river River intakes, Same as that Project No change No Timely No change Recruitment Riv er intakes, provincial water intakes, treatment in the progress change recruitment of of treatment supply treatment plants, and original loan report, loan consultants by consultants plants, and plants, and distribution review the project by the distribution reticulation networks missions, executing project networks networks; constructed and PCR agencies executing constructed or provide O&M or upgraded; agencies is upgraded; training, spare O&M timely O&M training, parts, and training, spare parts, maintenance spare parts, and equipment; and maintenance construct maintenance equipment office and equipment provided; office laboratories provided; and (350,000 office and laboratories beneficiaries) laboratories constructed; constructed; and 24-hour and 24-hour safe water safe water supply to about supply to 141,000 about beneficiaries 270,000 provided beneficiaries provided Improve Install Interceptor Same as that Project No change No Available No change Counterpart Interceptor and wastewater interceptor and in the progress change counterpart funds sewerage management in and sewerage sewerage original loan report, loan funds available network Sihanoukville network, and network review installed, and a construct a installed, missions, sewage sewage and a and PCR treatment plant treatment sewage with a capacity
Project Targets Monitoring Mechanisms Assumptions/Risks Design Original Supplemen Original Supplemen Supplemen PPER Summary LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Original Loan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Comment plant with a trea tment of 5,700 m 3/d ay capacity of plant with a constructed, 5,700 m 3/day capacity of serving about and serving 5,700 1,326 150,000 m3/day connections beneficiaries constructed, (about 7,000 serving beneficiaries about 3,300 and one connections brewery) (80,000 beneficiaries)
Not in original In 2006 – Not in PCR Not in Tourism Not in Same as above Same as Same as Statistics not loan 2020, about original loan Statistical PCR above above referred to, but 2.8 million Report Year Sihanoukville is foreign Book, now a buzzing tourists are Ministry of tourism town expected to Tourism; PCR attracting a arrive, stay large number an average of tourists and of 3.5 days, providing and spend business and $76.5 per job day per opportunities head; about to the locals 2.7 million and floating local tourists population are expected to benefit from clean beaches Implement the Conduct Environment Same as that Project No change No Same as above Same as Same as Environmental CSHAP environmental al sanitation in the progress change above above sanitation sanitation education original loan reports, loan education education and conducted review conducted and install low- and low cost missions, low cost cost latrines latrines or and PCR latrines or Project Framework or tertiary tertiary tertiary sewers sewers for the sewers installed in urban poor installed in Battambang, with the Battambang, Kampong assistance of Kampong Cham, and NGOs in Cham, and Sihanoukville Battambang, Sihanoukville (reported in Kampong (3,500 PCR to be for 39
40
Project Targets Monitoring Mechanisms Assumptions/Risks Appendix Design Original Supplemen Original Supplemen Supplemen PPER Summary LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Original Loan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Comment Cham, and households) 1,503
Sihanoukville households and 1 (1,500 75 public households) locations and schools) Improve local Expand The Same as that Project Project Same as Continued No change Government Revenue governance and revenue municipality in the progress progress that in government remains sources of resource sources of of original loan reports, loan reports, loan the willingness to willing to provincial and mobilization provincial and Sihanoukville review review supplem implement and implement municipal municipal able to missions, missions, entary enforce the and enforce governments governments manage the and local and PCR loan revenue the revenue are able to to be able to sewage government expansion expansion cover daily at least cover treatment budgets recommendatio recommenda O&M expenses, O&M systems with ns tions but not for expenses; increasing major develop core cost recovery equipment skills for repairs and urban replacements management in selected project towns Provide project Engineering No change Assistance Project No change No Consultants No change No chan ge Quality of implementation design, provided in progress change recruited early in engineering assistance construction engineering reports, loan accordance with design, supervision, design, review the appraisal construction community construction missions, schedule supervision, development, supervision, and PCR and training local community unsatisfactory governance, development municipal , local finance, governance, accounting municipal and auditing, finance, and training accounting and auditing, and training
IV. Activities V. Inputs VI. Cost Original Supplemen PPER Original Supplementary PPER LoanLoanLoan tary Loan PCRPCRPCR Comment LoanLoanLoan LoanLoanLoan PCRPCRPCR Comment General Select No change No change Consulting $4.36 $4.59 million Incorrect consultants services million figures were Establish No change No change Engineering $3.14 $3.12 million included in the project office design and million project and accounts construction frameworks in supervision the For Physical Engineering No change No change CSHAP $0.34 $0.27 million supplementary Construction design million loan document. Pre - No change No change Local $0.56 $0.60 million The same qualification governance million figures as in the and resource original loan mobilization were copied Bidding No change No change TV and radio $0.32 $0.60 million into the project campaigns million frameworks in Awarding No change No change Civil works $18.93 $24.63 million the PCR contracts million Construction No change No change Water supply $12.05 $0.27 million supervision million Commissionin No change No change Sewage $6.45 $14.75 million g inspection treatment million and training Same as Reporting No change No change CSHAP $0.43 $9.61 million that in million the For CSHAP Develop No change No change Equipment $1.16 $0.36 million original detailed million loan program Engage an Engage Same as Equipment for $0.20 No NGO program that in the local million breakdown facilitator original governance loan and resource mobilization Community No change No change Other $0.96 No development equipment million breakdown Education No change No change Incremental $1.30 $0.40 million campaign administration million and training Project design No change No change Physical Not $1.34 million and costing contingencies provided Project Framework Contract No change No change Price Not $1.81 million preparation contingencies provided and awarding Construction No change No change Interest $0.57 $1.45 million supervision during million construction Commissionin No change No change Total: $26.32 $34.56 million 41
42
g inspection million Appendix Reporting No change No change For Local Situation No change No change Governance assessment
and Resource 1 Mobilization Recommendat No change No change
ion Implementati No change No change
on Training No change No change Reporting No change No change CSHAP = Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program, NGO = nongovernment organization, O&M = operation and maintenance, PCR = project completion report, PPER = project performance evaluation report. Sources: ADB. 1999. Report and Recommendation of the President to the B oard of Directors: Proposed Loan to the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial Towns Improvement Project, Manila; ADB. 2003. Report and Recommendation of the President to the B oard of Directors: Proposed Supplementary Loan to t he Kingdom of Cambodia for the Provincial Towns Improv ement Project . Manila; ADB. 2008. Completion Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Pr oject in Cambodia. Manila; and evaluation team’s assessment.
APPENDIX 2: PROJECT COSTS AT APPRAISAL, REAPPRAISAL , AND COMPLETION ($ million)
At Appraisal At Reappraisal At Completion Evaluation Remarks Foreign Local TotalTotalTotal Foreign Local TotalTotalTotal Foreign Local TotalTotalTotal (Deviation from Component EEExchangeExchange CCCurrencyCurrencyurrencyurrency CostCostCost Exchange Currency CostCostCost Exchange Currency CostCostCost Reappraisal) (%) A. Base Cost Part A: Community Sanitation and Health Awareness Program Community sanitation improvement international consultant 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 No international consultant appointed Domestic consultants 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.22 0.22 120 Sanitation facilities 0.00 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.36 0.36 0.03 0.22 0.25 Less spent (31 ) TV and radio campaign 0.02 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.00 0.10 0.10 Less spent (63 ) Subtotal 0.190.190.19 0.710.710.71 0.900.900.90 0.190.190.19 0.710.710.71 0.900.900.90 0.030.030.03 0.540.540.54 0.570.570.57 (((373737 ))) Part B: Water Supply Battambang 2.36 0.68 3.04 2.92 0.89 3.81 3.00 1.05 4.05 6 Kampong Cham 1.32 0.30 1.62 1.46 0.36 1.82 1.77 0.62 2.38 31 Kampong Thom 0.99 0.22 1.21 1.63 0.38 2.01 1.60 0.56 2.16 6 Kampot 1.11 0.35 1.46 1.97 0.63 2.60 1.78 0.99 2.77 7 Pursat 1.45 0.39 1.84 1.94 0.53 2.47 2.05 0.71 2.76 12 Svay Rieng 1.24 0.34 1.58 1.55 0.50 2.05 1.44 0.80 2.24 4 Subtotal 8.478.478.47 2.282.282.28 10.7510.7510.75 11.4711.4711.47 3.293.293.29 14.7614.7614.76 11.6411.6411.64 4.734.734.73 16.3716.3716.37 111111 Part C: Wastewater Management Land 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.34 11.34 Substantial land cost was unforeseen at reappraisal Sewerage system 3.17 2.39 5.56 5.50 4.11 9.61 7.83 3.34 11.17 16 Subtotal 3.173.173.17 2.392.392.39 5.565.565.56 5.505.505.50 4.114.114.11 9.619.619.61 7.837.837.83 14.6814.6814.68 22.5122.5122.51 134134134 Part D: Local Governance and Resources Mobilization Subtotal 0.690.690.69 0.060.060.06 0.750.750.75 0.540.540.54 0.060.060.06 0.600.600.60 0.000.000.00 0.040.040.04 0.040.040.04 (((939393 ))) Part E: Implementation Assistance Consulting services 2.08 0.40 2.48 2.29 0.83 3.12 3.87 0.04 3.91 4 Equipment 0.20 0.07 0.27 0.35 0.05 0.40 0.83 0.03 0.86 115 Incremental administration 0.23 0.80 1.03 0.30 0.98 1.28 0.20 1.13 1.33 4 Training 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.10 67 Subtotal 2.512.512.51 1.331.331.33 3.843.843.84 2.942.942.94 1.921.921.92 4.864.864.86 4.904.904.90 1.311.311.31 6.216.216.21 262626 Total Base Cost 15.0315.0315.03 6.776.776.77 21.8021.8021.80 20.6420.6420.64 10.0910.0910.09 30.7330.7330.73 24.3924.3924.39 21.3021.3021.30 45.6945.6945.69 494949 B.B.B. Contingencies Physical contingencies 1.53 0.68 2.21 1.21 0.61 1.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 Price contingencies 1.22 0.53 1.75 1.15 0.30 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 C.C.C. Interest during Construction 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.46 0.00 0.46 (19 ) TotalTotalTotal 15.0315.0315.03 6.776.776.77 21.8021.8021.80 20.6420.6420.64 10.0910.0910.09 30.7330.7330.73 24.3924.3924.39 21.3021.3021.30 46.1546.1546.15 () = negative number. Source: ADB. 2008. Completion Report: Provincial Towns Improvement Project in Cambodia. Manila.
Appendix 333:3: Economic and Financial Analysis
1. This appendix provides details on economic and financial analysis of the waterworks in project towns. Whenever possible, updated data have been applied. Results are presented in tables A3.1 and A3.2. Data sheets for the computation of economic internal rate of return (EIRR) and financial internal rate of return (FIRR) are in Supplementary Appendix D.
A.A.A. Approach to Evaluation
2. Economic analysis was undertaken for Part B (water supply) during appraisal in 1999, reevaluated in 2003 due to significant cost increases, and then carried out again for preparing the supplementary loan. The project completion report adopted the same methodology and recalculated the EIRR and FIRR for each of the six subprojects on a standalone basis. The methodology followed Asian Development Bank (ADB) guidelines for financial and economic analysis, as well as its framework for appraising urban development projects.
3. Based on updated project data collected from the six waterworks for their operations for 2008– 2012 the project performance evaluation team repeated the financial and economic analysis using the same model for a direct apple-to-apple comparison. Data collected from the waterworks and used in the evaluation include water sales, water tariffs, revenues, and operating costs. The operating costs include expenses for personnel, electricity, chemicals, administration, and other operating expenses. Electricity expenses include the costs of electricity or diesel directly required for the production of water. Expenses for electricity and chemicals are assumed to increase in direct proportion to the increase in the volume of water produced, plus an annual inflation factor.
4. Similar assumptions adopted in the previous analyses are again employed, such as (i) the project life is 30 years (till 2031) with no salvage value thereafter; (ii) the economic opportunity cost of capital is 2%; (iii) the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 5%. Income statements and cash flows are projected to assess the future financial performance.
B.B.B. Economic Analysis
5. The economic costs of capital works were previously computed from the actual disbursements for the project with the following adjustments: (i) taxes, duties, and subsidies were excluded; (ii) tradable input was valued at the domestic price numeraire using a shadow exchange rate factor of 1.11; and (iii) unskilled labor was subjected to a shadow price of (65%) of the market price to reflect the level of underemployment of unskilled labor in Cambodia. These have been adopted in the evaluation.
6. The EIRRs of the six subprojects were previously all assessed to be above 12%, though there had been a reducing trend since appraisal as a result of construction cost overrun. This trend of reducing EIRR continues, with the exception of Kampong Cham, which had improved since project completion. The lower EIRRs were primarily because of increasing operating costs and fixed low water tariff (other than Pursat) since 2007.
7. The EIRRs of Battambang (9.2%) and Svay Rieng (10.8%), were well below 12%. Kampot, at 11.8%, was marginally lower than the standard opportunity cost of capital of 12%. While Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Pursat were higher than 12%, their EIRRs were very much lower than originally anticipated. The economic performance of the six waterworks was unsatisfactory. Pursat at 13.8% was the best performer among the six waterworks, largely due to an increase in the water tariff in 2010 to KR1,600/m 3, the highest among the six towns.
Economic and Financial Analysis 45
Table A3A3A3.1:A3 .1: Economic Internal Rates of Return of Provincial WaterworWaterworksWaterwor ksksks EIRR (%) Project Town Appraisal Reappraisal Project Completion Performance Evaluation Battambang 15.6 17.1 13.3 9.2 Kampong Cham 34.6 22.7 16.1 12.4 Kampong Thom 16.6 15.5 12.1 12.9 Kampot 25.0 23.9 13.8 11.8 Pursat 20.2 15.4 14.9 13.8 Svay Rieng 15.9 14.7 12.3 10.8 EIRR = economic internal rate of return. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
C.C.C. Financial Analysis
8. Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Pursat, and Svay Rieng were found to be financially viable with FIRRs ranging from 5.9% to 6.7%, higher than the WACC of 5%. Battambang and Kampot were found to be unviable. Battambang at -2.8% is particularly poor, due mainly to its increasing operating costs in recent years. An urgent increase in water tariffs is called for across all the project towns.
Table A3A3A3.2:A3 .2: Financial Internal Rates of Return of Provincial WaterworksWaterworks FIRR (%) Project Town Appraisal Reappraisal Appraisal Performance Evaluation Battambang 6.6 6.7 5.4 (2.8 ) Kampong Cham 9.5 7.8 6.7 6.6 Kampong Thom 4.4 7.9 5.4 6.0 Kampot 4.5 3.3 7.5 3.9 Pursat 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.9 Svay Rieng 4.2 6.0 5.3 6.7 () = negative number, FIRR = financial internal rate of return. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
Appendix 444:4: A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and NonbenNonbeneficiarieseficiaries
1. The Independent Evaluation Department (IED) conducted a sample survey of household heads using semi-structured questionnaire to understand knowledge, attitude, and practice associated with hygiene, as well as willingness to pay for safe water supply and sanitation services in the provincial towns of Battambang, Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, and Sihanoukville. The first part of the survey covered hygienic practices, which included activities associated with water, sanitation, and surrounding environment. The second part of the survey sought respondents’ views on their willingness to pay and their perceptions on the affordability of connecting to piped water supply and sanitation services. The survey was conducted during April–May 2013 with randomly selected respondent household members of both project supported and non-project supported areas. The survey focused on water supply in the first three towns and wastewater management in Sihanoukville.
A.A.A. Methodological Approach
2. The methodological approach involved a three-step process. First, with the stated objectives in mind, the evaluation team comprising technical and survey specialists designed a questionnaire for the survey. The questionnaire was pre-tested in an urban area of Battambang with six respondents. Based on the feedback, the survey instrument was revised, finalized, and translated into Khmer. Secondly, the survey was administered by local Khmer speaking enumerators in the selected towns. Thirdly, the collected data was verified and entered into an Excel® database. Data verification was done on hard copies to ensure consistency and completeness and the team applied a double entry method to ensure accuracy of data. Some inconsistencies were detected in the process and clear outliers were omitted from the analysis. Thirdly, the team undertook a descriptive data analysis, the results of which are presented in this appendix.
B.B.B. Sampling Method and Sample Size
3. The project supported towns varied substantially from each other. However, given time and resource constraints, the team decided to cover an equal number of respondents from each of the four towns (n=112 per town) and these respondents were randomly selected for interviews. For the non- coverage service areas (treated as a comparison group), the prime consideration was potential expansion of water supply distribution and the wastewater collection network in the future. These areas were located in a suburb of the town (inside the town territory and the surrounding communes). A roughly equal number of respondents from respective non-coverage areas comprised the comparison group. In total, 896 respondents (224 per town) participated in the survey. The sample size distribution of the respondents appears in Table A4.1.
Table A4A4A4.1:A4 .1: Sample Size Distribution of Survey RespondentsRespondents NNNumberNumber of Respondents Not Connected to Connected to the the District/ Project Project Provinces TownTownTown Infrastructure Infrastructure TotalTotalTotal Battambang Battambang 87 52 139 (water supply ) Sangke 25 35 60 Banan 0 10 10 Thma Koul 0 15 15 Subtotal 112112112 112112112 224224224 Kampong Cham Kampong Cham 112 31 143 (water supply ) Kampong Siem 0 81 81 Subtotal 112112112 112112112 224224224 Svay Rieng Svay Rieng 112 90 202 (water supply ) Svay Chrum 0 8 8 Svay Teab 0 10 10
A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 47
NNNumberNumber of Respondents Not Connected to Connected to the the District/ Project Project Provinces TownTownTown Infrastructure Infrastructure TotalTotalTotal Svay Toea 0 4 4 Subtotal 112112112 112112112 224224224 Sihanoukville Sihanoukville 112 112 224 (wastewater treatment) Subtotal 112112112 112112112 224224224 Grand total 448448448 448448448 896896896 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
C.C.C. Characteristics of Respondents
4. The selected socioeconomic characteristics of the project and non-project respondents are summarized in Table A4.2. About two-thirds of the respondents were female in both groups. The majority of the respondents belonged to the mature age group (35–64 years), while elderly respondents comprised a small proportion. Project supported respondents had more years of education than those from non-project areas. However, as the majority of respondents had lived through the Pol Pot regime, they received relatively few years of education—10.6% did not have any schooling, 55.2% had primary education or lower, 19.2% had completed lower secondary school, 9.4% had completed upper secondary school, and 5.6% had studied beyond high school.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...2222:: Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Survey Respondents Connected to Not connected to Project Project Infrastructure, % Infrastructure, % Attributes (n = 476) (n = 420) TotalTotalTotal Gender Male 33.6 33.6 33.6 Female 66.4 66.4 66.4 Age Group (Year) 18 -34 25.6 21.4 23.7 35 -64 64.1 73.1 68.3 65 and over 10.3 5.5 8.0 Education LeveLeveLeve l None 6.5 15.2 10.6 Primary (not completed) 28.8 44.0 35.9 Primary ( completed ) 20.4 18.1 19.3 Lower Secondary ( completed ) 22.1 16.0 19.2 Upper Secondary school (completed ) 12.6 5.7 9.4 Beyond high school 9.7 1.0 5.6 Annual Income ($) <1,500 5.2 14.5 9.6 1,501 -3000 14.5 27.4 20.5 3,001 -4,500 17.4 19.3 18.3 4,501 -6,000 15.1 10.2 12.8 over 6,000 47.7 28.6 38.7 Annual Expenditure ($) <1,500 9.9 26.2 22.2 1,501 -3000 35.9 42.4 39.0 3,001 -4,500 29.2 12.4 21.3 4,501 -6,000 13.9 5.2 9.8 over 6,000 11.1 3.8 7.7 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
5. About one in five respondents (20%) in the project areas and over two-fifths (42%) of households in the non-project areas had an annual income of $3,000 or less. About 48% of project respondents had a household income above $6,000, in contrast to only 29% in the non-project areas. It
48 Appendix 4
is fair to say that the distribution of respondents from the project areas is skewed towards the higher income group, while those from the non-project areas tended to be relatively evenly distributed across income bands. Likewise, 45% of project and 69% of non-project respondent households incurred an annual expenditure of up to $3,000. In general, however, the income and expenditure data tended to be underestimated because of difficulties associated with recall, lack of written records, and reluctance to report for fear of taxation by the authorities. Hence, caution should be exercised in interpreting the data.
D.D.D. Access to Water
6. The waterworks were located in the center of the provincial towns. Hence, the piped water service was available only within the town jurisdiction. A summary of waterworks services is presented in Table A4.3. In 2013, Battambang and Sangkae districts connected 9,919 households to the water supply, covering only 18.6% of the province’s households. Population coverage with piped water access stood at 73% in Kampong Cham and 21% in Svay Rieng. In the three towns with project support, population coverage in 2013 remained at only 25%.
7. In all, 672 people were interviewed from the three provinces. Of the respondents, 50% were in the service area, while 50% were in the non-service area. Almost all (97%) of the respondents in the service area were connected to the water supply, of which 52% used only tap water for their daily activities, while 48% of them also used alternative water sources—mainly bottled water, rain water, and well water (Table A4.4). The respondents gave various reasons for not using solely tap water and these included interest in reducing water charges, water unavailability in their proximity, and use of harvested rain water during the rainy season. On the other hand, the households living in the non- water supply service area used a variety of water sources depending on the availability of the water in their area. Six alternative water sources were observed in the study area, of which private ground water (dug wells and boreholes) was the dominant source, in particular in Svay Rieng and Kampong Cham. Most of the households throughout preferred to boil water before drinking.
E.E.E. Source of Drinking Water
8. About three-quarters of the households with access to public water supply depended mainly on tap water for drinking (74%), 22.0% used bottle water, and 4% used either rain water or private ground water (Table A4.5). Bottled water consumption was associated with suspicion about the water quality supplied by waterworks. The respondents who consumed bottled water preferred to boil tap water before consumption but opted to use bottled water due to time constraints.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...3333:: Summary of Current WaterworkWaterworkssss Services in Sample Survey Districts and Towns Monthly District/ Network Length Number ofofof Population Connection FeeFeeFee Water Tariff Provinces Town Household aaa Population aaa (m) Connections Served (KR) (KR) Battambang Battambang 50,110 266,706 245,823 9,919 49,595 600,000 1,500 Sangke Kampong Cham Kampong Cham 8,496 41,468 80,347 5,714 30,284 440,000 900 -1,500 Svay Rieng Svay Rieng 9,329 45,020 45,050 1,867 9,355 200,000 1,200 Total 67,935 353,194 371,220 17,500 89,234 KR = Khmer real, m = meter. a Source: Commune Database , 2011.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...4444:: Water Source of ResidentResidentssss in the Sample Study Provinces (Number of Households) Connected to Water Supply Not Connected to Water Supply One Multi --- Multi --- Water Water Water Source Sources One Water Source Sources Subtotal More Provincial More than Private River/ than 2
Water 2 Water Water Rain Ground Bottled Stream/ Pond/ Water A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonben Provinces Supply Sources Seller Water Water Water Canal Reservoir Others Sources Subtotal Total Battambang 39 73 112 1 1 5 1 4 8 2 90 112 224 Kampong 77 35 112 22 0 67 0 0 0 9 14 112 224 Cham Svay Rieng 58 54 112 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 33 112 224 TotalTotalTotal 174174174 162162162 336336336 232323 111 151151151 111 444 888 111111 137137137 336 672 (%) 51.851.851.8 48.248.248.2 100.100.100. 000 6.86.86.8 0.30.30.3 44.944.944.9 0.30.30.3 1.21.21.2 2.42.42.4 3.33.33.3 40.840.840.8 100.0100.0100.0 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...5555:: Sources of Drinking Water for ResidentResidentssss in the Sample Study Area (Number of Households) Connected to Water Supply Not Connected to Water Supply Provincial Private Private River/ Water Rain Ground Bottled Water Rain Ground Bottled Stream/ Pond/ Provinces Supply Water Water Water Subtotal Seller Water Water Water Canal Reservoir Others Subtotal Total Battambang 70 9 0 33 797979 9 37 14 26 10 14 2 112 191 Kampong Cham 87 1 0 24 888888 31 1 68 2 0 0 10 112 200 Svay Rieng 92 2 1 17 959595 0 4 100 8 0 0 0 112 207
TotalTotalTotal 249249249 121212 111 747474 262262262 404040 424242 182182182 363636 101010 141414 121212 26 288 eficiaries (%) 74.174.174.1 3.63.63.6 0.30.30.3 22.022.022.0 100.0100.0100.0 11.911.911.9 12.512.512.5 54.254.254.2 10.710.710.7 3.03.03.0 4.24.24.2 3.63.63.6 100.0100.0100.0 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013. 49
50 Appendix 4
9. The households without access to the piped water supply used a variety of water sources, including private groundwater (54.2%), rain water (12.5%), water sellers (11.9%), bottled water (10.7%), and other water sources (10.7%). Private groundwater from wells was the main source of water for drinking, in particular in Kampong Cham and Svay Rieng, while rain water and bottled water were preferred in Battambang. These different choices were because of the availability of the groundwater in two of the studied sites (Kampong Cham and Svay Rieng are located near a big river) and the socioeconomic status of the households (Battambang had more respondents with a higher income than the other two provinces).
10. The majority of households did not have problems getting water into their house as they connected to either the provincial water supply, direct purchase from water sellers, used an electric pump for groundwater extraction, or used other services provided directly to the house. Male and female household heads were mainly responsible for getting daily water. However, 28.0% of the households with no access to piped water supply faced difficulties such as back strain, having to travel some distance from home to the water source, the high cost of water collected, heat stroke, time constraints, safety issues in collecting water, and others (Table A4.6).
Table A4A4A4.6:A4 .6: Difficulties Encountered in Getting Water for Daily Use in AreaAreassss without Access to Piped Water (Number of Households) Back Heat Total Total Provinces Distance TimeTimeTime CostCostCost Safety Strain Stroke Other Count Sample Battambang 13 2 5 0 12 3 5 40 33 Kampong Cham 10 4 11 2 23 4 2 56 39 Svay Rieng 0 1 2 0 11 1 8 23 22 Total 232323 777 181818 222 464646 888 151515 119119119 949494 % 24.524.524.5 7.47.47.4 19.119.119.1 2.12.12.1 48.948.948.9 8.58.58.5 16.016.016.0 100.0 Note: Multiple response was allowed for this question. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
F.F.F. Knowledge, AttitudeAttitude,,,, and Practice Associated with Safe Drinking Water
11. Overall at least 96.4% of the household respondents knew what safe drinking water is; 3.6% lacked knowledge about it. More than 96.7% of the households with access to piped water supply had safe drinking water for their daily consumption, 0.9% of them complained about tap water quality (visible particles), and 2.4% of them did not know whether they had safe drinking water. However, all of them used clean boiled water (without any sedimentation) for their daily consumption (Table 10).
12. For the households without access to the piped water supply, the majority reported that they had safe drinking water (78.6%), but 16.7% of them did not have access to safe drinking water and 4.8% of them did not know whether they had safe drinking water. The level of understanding of residents about safe drinking water was somewhat limited, in particular in the outskirts of towns. On the other hand, it was clear that the household respondents in both service and non-service areas were well aware of the need to make water safe before drinking it (98.1%)—by boiling it, letting it stand and settle, adding chlorine, using commercial water filters, or other means of purification. Water boiling and use of commercial water filters were practiced in all study areas.
13. The practices for storing drinking water were very similar across the study areas. Of interviewed households, 98.7% stored their drinking water in various containers; while the remaining households (1.3%) stored water in roof tanks or cisterns (mainly those households with no access to the piped water supply). Tapped containers, including containers connected to taps, appeared to be the most popular option (50.7%), as these were a common container for water filter devices. Containers with a wide mouth, including cooking pots, cool boxes, and water buckets, were the second most popular
A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 51
(34.7%); while containers with narrow mouths, such as water bottles, were almost as popular (33.9%). At least 98.8% of water containers were covered with hard covers and kept up off the ground. Drinking cups were the main tool used to take water out of the containers, while pouring from narrow-necked containers (mostly directly drinking from water bottles) was the second most common practice. This was followed by pouring from the tap. Table A4.7 shows the methods used for getting water out of the containers.
14. The survey findings suggest that respondent households overall had sound knowledge about safe drinking water and they had a positive attitude towards keeping water safe for drinking. The majority of them also took the best available measures to keep water safe for drinking. However, the level of understanding varied across widely across the seven provincial towns and hence effective health and sanitation awareness campaign is needed.
G.G.G. Access to Sanitation
15. The survey data as a whole provided an insight into sanitation practices in the study area. However, the analysis of topics related to the wastewater treatment system in Sihanoukville was given particular attention, as it was a component of the project that required assessment.
16. Availability of toilettoiletssss. A relatively high percentage of the survey households had toilets in their household premises (88%). Sharing toilets with other households was not common, as only 0.4% had this arrangement. Households used their own resources in most cases (96%) for toilet construction. About 86% of households had a flush toilet with septic tank or pit and 13% had a flush toilet connected to the sewer system. Pit latrine and flush toilets with an open drain were not common (less than 1%). According to key informants, pit latrines were less practical in the study area.
17. On the other hand, 12.1% of households had no access to a toilet at all. The problem of affordability was cited as the main reason (11.4%), followed by lack of space (0.3%), no water connection (0.2%), and other reasons (0.1%). Those who could not afford a flush toilet relied on pit latrines.
H.H.H. Wastewater
18. Wastewater from the toilet (black water), and from the kitchen and bathing (grey) were discharged by various means depending on the availability of facilities in the house. Since almost all households used a septic tank, pit latrine and/or sewer system, black water discharge was not seen as a major problem. However, discharge of grey water into the ground, into ponds, and into open channels appeared neither sanitary nor environmentally acceptable (Table A4.8).
19. The majority of respondents (71%) believed that prevailing discharge methods were acceptable, while 27% thought that it would make the local environment unsafe. Only a handful (2%) did not have an opinion. Based on field observation, respondents did not understand well the basic impacts of improper wastewater discharge (both black and grey). They had a feeling that when wastewater was not seen, it was safe. As wastewater was discharged without any treatment by storing in soak away pits or discharging it into the ground, ponds, or open channels, there is the potential for contamination of both surface and ground water (waterborne diseases). There is also the risk of other unsanitary outcomes, such as food chain contamination, fly breeding, etc.
52
Appendix 4 Table A4A4A4.A4 ...7777:: Methods of Getting Drinking Water out of Containers (% Respondents) Battambang Kampong Cham Svay Rieng Overall
Not Not Not Not Connected Connected Connected to Connected to Connected to Connected to Connected to to Water Connected to to Water Method Used Water Supply Water Supply Water Supply Water Supply Water Supply Supply Water Supply Supply Drinking cup 60.7 72.3 60.7 79.5 63.4 78.6 61.6 76.8 Long-handled scoop 15.2 17.9 1.8 17.9 0.9 5.4 6.0 13.7 Tap attached to container 29.5 17.0 43.8 12.5 31.3 8.0 34.8 12.5 Pour from narrow neck container 39.3 34.8 39.3 34.8 41.1 47.3 39.9 39.0 n (sample) 162162162 159159159 163163163 162162162 153153153 156156156 478478478 477477477 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...8888:: Wastewater Discharge Method in Survey Areas (Number of Respondents) Battambang Kampong Cham Svay Rieng Sihanoukville Overall Connected Not Connected Not Connected Not Connected Not Connected Not Wastewater to connected to connected to connected to Connected to Connected Discharge Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Method Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Soak away pit 1 85 1 69 0 55 0 43 2 252 Surface seepage 0 105 1 106 5 95 1 43 7 349 Water course pond 0 4 0 10 0 11 4 2 4 27 Open channel 1 7 0 1 1 5 0 9 2 22 Other 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 15 0 17 Connected to sewer 20 36 51 107 214 TotalTotalTotal 222222 202202202 383838 186186186 575757 167167167 112112112 112112112 229229229 667667667 % 9.8 90.2 17.0 83.0 25.4 74.6 50.0 50.0 25.5 74.5 Source: Independent Evaluation Department Survey data, 2013.
A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 53
20. In Sihanoukville, with the availability of the sanitation facility, all households connected to the sewer system discharged their wastewater (black water) either directly or indirectly (from the outlet of the septic tank) into the collection network. Whereas, the households without access to the sewer system used septic tanks or pits to store wastewater and kept it for infiltration or desludging once the tank was full. The grey water resulting from kitchen and bathroom use were discharged in various ways, based on local practices and the availability of facilities.
I.I.I. Solid Waste Management
21. More than half of the respondents reported that they managed their garbage by burning (62.5%). Other methods of disposal included depositing for collection (33.1%), dumping on empty plots nearby the house (1.8%), dumping at a designated place (1%), burying (1%), scattering (0.2%), and other means (0.3%). None of the household respondents mentioned that they gave rubbish to their animals or composted their garbage. This finding implies a need to educate local communities on good sanitation practices.
J.J.J. Hygiene and Health
22. Frequency of changing clothes. Personal cleanliness behavior of project and non-project respondents turned out to be similar. All respondents stated that they bathe daily. This was not surprising due to the hot and humid weather. In addition to bathing, 22% of the respondents changed their clothes daily, 18.0% brushed their teeth daily, 13% washed their hands daily, and 2% trimmed their nails regularly. Details appear in Table A4.9.
23. Hand washingwashing. All household respondents were aware of the importance of washing hands, in particular, before eating and after contacting fecal matter (Table A4.9). Almost all of the respondents (98%) stated that they washed their hands with soap or detergent. Other prevailing practices include washing with just water, ash or crushed coal, sand, and other materials. After washing, they used multiple ways to dry their hands. More than three-quarters of respondents dried their hands with a clean towel (77.1%); other methods included drying with other clothes (36.5%), with tissue paper (6.8%), on their shirt or trousers (3.8%), and air drying (0.1%). Hand washing commonly practiced before eating and after using the toilet.
24. The majority of respondents had a relatively good understanding of the negative consequences of drinking unclean water (Table A4.10). Diarrhea and cholera were the two main diseases mentioned during interviews. However, a number of respondents (about 100 out of 896) were not aware that drinking unclean water can cause influenza, skin diseases, coughs, sore throat, appendicitis, stomach diseases, and other minor problems. This means that the community needs further health and sanitation education to fill the gap.
54
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...9999:: Hygienic Practices Adopted by Respondents Appendix 4 (% Respondents) Battambang Kampong Cham Svay Rieng Sihanoukville Overall Connected Not Connected Not Connected Not Connected Not Connected Not
to Connected to Connected to Connected to Connected to Connected Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Method Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply A. General Cleaning aaa Changing clothes daily 24.1 19.6 26.8 15.2 35.7 36.5 10.7 7.1 23.5 20.5 Brushing teeth daily 16.1 11.6 25.9 16.1 19.6 20.5 16.4 17.9 19.3 16.4 Nails trimmed 6.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.0 2.7 1.4 0.0 2.1 1.2 Washing hands 22.3 12.5 7.3 13.4 13.4 18.9 8.6 4.8 12.6 12.9 Clean with soap 36.0 24.1 6.3 0.9 8.9 1.8 17.1 17.9 9.5 10.7 Other 0.9 n (sample(sample)))) 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 140140140 848484 0.20.20.2 0.00.00.0 n (responses) 193193193 189189189 187187187 164164164 200200200 202202202 216216216 124124124 476476476 420420420 B. Hand WWWashingWashing Practices Before eating 99.1 99.1 100.0 100.0 99.1 100.0 97.9 100.0 98.9 99.8 After using the toilet 37.5 33.0 48.2 17.0 53.6 41.1 27.1 28.6 40.8 30.0 Before cooking 36.6 18.5 21.4 18.8 22.3 23.2 14.3 20.2 23.1 20.2 Before going to bed 4.5 14.3 5.4 7.1 4.5 3.6 7.9 13.1 5.1 9.3 Other time 48.2 31.3 25.0 26.4 34.8 27.7 35.0 23.8 5.7 27.6 n (sample) 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 140140140 848484 476476476 420420420 n (responses) 253253253 220220220 224224224 190190190 240240240 219219219 256256256 156156156 973973973 785785785 a All take a bath daily. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...10101010:: Knowledge about the Consequences of an Unsanitary Environment and Drinking Unclean WaterWater (%) Battambang Kampong Cham Svay Rieng Sihanoukville Overall Connected Not Connected Not Connected Connected Not Connected Not to Connected to Connected to Not Connected to Connected to Connected Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Water to Water Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply A. Self ---reflection observations Look s bad 34.8 20.5 21.4 20.5 12.5 22.3 16.4 11.9 21.0 19.3 Make s family member s sick 88.4 76.8 78.6 74.1 71.4 76.8 60.0 77.4 73.7 76.2 Spread s diseases 16.1 33.0 23.2 13.4 26.8 24.1 26.4 14.3 23.3 21.7 Foul odor 30.4 25.0 45.5 29.5 42.9 36.6 57.1 54.8 44.7 35.2 Insect growth 19.6 29.5 17.9 19.6 23.2 20.5 15.7 13.1 18.9 21.2 Rat infestation 1.4 0.0 0.6 0.2 Others 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.4 0.0 0.8 0.2 n (sample) 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 140140140 848484 476476476 420420420 n (responses) 213213213 208208208 210210210 176176176 199199199 203203203 250250250 144144144 872872872 731731731 B. Problems Caused by Drinking Unclean Water Common diarrhea 92.0 92.9 93.7 94.6 94.6 93.8 97.1 91.7 95.4 93.3 Malaria 5.4 10.7 1.8 8.9 2.7 8.9 3.6 4.8 3.4 8.6
Scabies 3.6 4.5 3.6 1.8 0.0 3.6 0.0 1.2 1.7 2.9 A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonben Cholera 31.3 11.6 9.0 3.6 14.3 13.4 10.7 10.7 16.2 9.8 Others 37.5 48.2 26.8 22.3 35.7 32.1 21.4 25.0 29.8 32.4 Don't know 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.2 0.2 1.0 n (sample) 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 112112112 140140140 848484 476476476 420420420 n (responses) 191191191 188188188 156156156 149149149 165165165 171171171 186186186 113113113 698698698 621621621 Note: Multiple response was allowed for this question. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
eficiaries
⃒
55
56 Appendix 4
25. Public healthhealth.1 About 12.9% of the surveyed households suffered from one of the above diseases (5.2% were households with access to the piped water supply and 7.7% were households without), while 87.1% had no health problems (Table A4.11). Out of the 12.9% of households who suffered from health problems, 10.5% were due to common diarrhea, 0.1% was due to scabies and 2.3% were due to other diseases, of which about half were not related waterborne diseases. It was also seen that the households with access to the sewer system suffered less from these diseases compared with those households with no access. This meant that the sewer system was helping to reduce disease occurrence and improve public health in the area (Table A4.11). Of preventive measures to control primary diseases, keeping the surrounding environment clean and drinking clean water were the most widely accepted practices (Table A4.12).
Table A4.11: Suffering Experienced With and Without Water Supply and Sewer Connection Connected to Water Supply Not Connected to Water Supply Suffer from Not suffer Suffer from Not suffer TotalTotalTotal disease from disease disease from disease Connected to sewer system 17 183 1 34 235 (1.90) (20.4) (0.00) (3.8) (26.23) Not connected to sewer system 30 246 68 317 661 (3.34) (27.46) (7.59) (35.38) (73.77) Total 474747 429429429 696969 351351351 896896896 (5.24) (47.88) (7.70) (39.18) (100.00) Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage values of the total. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...12121212:: Disease Preventive Measures Considered by the SurSurveyvey Respondents (%) Kampong SvaySvaySvay Battambang ChamChamCham Rieng Sihanoukville Overall Keep surrounding environment clean 75.4 80.8 81.7 87.1 81.1 Drinking clean water 75.9 85.7 82.1 79.0 80.7 Washing hands before meal 23.2 16.5 17.0 9.4 16.5 Washing hands after defecation 1.8 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.9 Bathing regularly 13.8 31.7 30.8 24.6 25.2 Washing clothes daily 10.7 14.3 20.1 10.3 13.8 Others 29.0 23.6 17.0 24.1 23.4 n (sample) 224224224 224224224 224224224 224224224 896896896 n (responses) 515515515 566566566 561561561 525525525 2,167 Note: Multiple response was allowed for this question. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
26. Sanitation and hygiene educationeducation. About 73% of respondents did not know any health and hygiene education took place in their communities; while 27% had heard about such a program and 58% of them had attended at least one session. Only two respondents recalled attending a training offered under an Asian Development Bank project, but they appeared unsure about the Provincial Towns Improvement Project. One of the two respondents recalled attending training on reproductive health (certainly not associated with the subject project). While a small percentage of the respondents attended some health and hygiene education, 34.6% of the respondents had seen some kind of health and hygiene leaflets produced by nongovernment organizations or government entities. Once again, it was not possible to associate these leaflets with project output.
1 Survey data on incidence of diarrhea was found to be unreliable and, hence, the study used data available from the Demographic Health Survey reported in Table 11 of the main report.
A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 57
K.K.K. Willingness to Pay and Affordability of Water and Sanitation Services
1.1.1. Water supply
27. Nearly two-thirds of respondents living in the non-project service areas expressed a willingness to access piped water (64.3%) while 35.7% of them did not want to be connected, although the water supply service would be available in their area (Table A4.13). This was largely because they had reliable alternative water sources for their daily use, and/or they could not afford to pay for a water connection and monthly water fees.
Table A.A.4444....13131313:: Respondents’ Willingness to Connect to the Town Water Supply (Number of Respondents) Service Area NonNonNon-Non ---serviceservice Area NotNotNot NotNotNot Connected Connected Subtotal Connected Connected Subtotal Total Battambang 112 4 116 75 33 108108108 224224224 Kampong Cham 112 5 117 71 36 107107107 224224224 Svay Rieng 112 2 114 63 47 110110110 224224224 TotalTotalTotal 336336336 111111 347347347 209209209 116116116 325325325 672672672 100.100.100. 100.100.100. PercentPercentageageageage of subtotal 96.896.896.8 3.23.23.2 000 64.364.364.3 35.735.735.7 000 PercentPercentageageageage of total sample (%) 50.050.050.0 1.61.61.6 51.651.651.6 31.131.131.1 17.317.317.3 48.448.448.4 100.0100.0100.0 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
28. The survey findings suggested that the respondents were aware of the water connection fees and were willing to connect (Table A4.14). However, more than half of them responded that they could not afford to pay the current water connection fee, which was KR600,000 in Battambang, KR440,000 in Kampong Cham, and KR420,000 in Svay Rieng (Table 9). According to respondents, they were only willing to pay up to KR200,000 (about US$50).
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...14141414:: Reasons Associated with Respondents' NonNon----willingnesswillingness to Connect to Water Supply (Number of Respondents) Battambang Kampong Cham Svay Rieng Coverage NonNonNon --- Coverage NonNonNon --- Coverage NonNonNon --- Service Coverage Service Coverage Service Coverage AreaAreaArea AreaAreaArea AreaAreaArea AreaAreaArea AreaAreaArea AreaAreaArea TotalTotalTotal %%% Connection is expensive 3 11 2 6 2 6 303030 21.3 Cannot afford 2 15 3 15 1 28 646464 43.5 Others 1 12 2 16 0 16 474747 35.2 Total coun ttt 666 383838 777 373737 333 505050 141141141 100100100 Total sample (not 444 333333 555 363636 222 474747 127127127 willing to connect) Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
29. Similarly, households were also aware of water consumption fees and they were willing to pay them. As the socioeconomic status of households living on the outskirts of towns was low, they were mostly willing to spend KR2,500–20,000 per month for about 2–16 m 3 of water per month. However, this amount of water might not be sufficient for the households’ daily consumption, as each household has an average of five members. Ninety-five percent of the households willing to connect to the water supply confirmed that they could afford to pay for their water consumption fee.
30. To gain further insight into respondents’ perspectives on water tariffs, a question on whether they were willing to pay if the water tariff was increased was asked to the households with access to the piped water supply and those willing to connect to the system. More than half of the respondents were willing to pay a higher water rate (64.0%) while 36.0% of the respondents did not agree with an increase of water tariffs. Table A4.15 shows the perspectives of the respondents on the possibility of
58 Appendix 4
increasing water tariffs. Households in non-project service areas who purchased from the vendors paid on average KR 2,000 to KR4,500 per month depending on their need and availability of alternate source to meet partial water requirement. This was largely limited to drinking water.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...15151515:: Affordability of Water TariffTariffssss Reported by Survey Respondents (%) (n = 127) Battambang Kampong Cham Svay Rieng Overall Connected Connected Willing Connected Connected to Water Willing to to Water to to Water Willing to to Water Willing to TariffTariffTariff increase by: Supply Connect Supply Connect Supply Connect Supply Connect No increase 33.0 37.3 41.1 28.2 39.3 34.9 37.837.837.8 33.533.533.5 <5% 13.4 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.9 3.2 5.45.45.4 1.11.11.1 5% 18.8 18.7 23.2 25.4 17.9 23.8 20.020.020.0 22.622.622.6 10% 22.3 13.3 17.0 18.3 20.5 17.5 19.919.919.9 16.316.316.3 15% 1.8 5.3 1.8 1.4 5.4 11.1 3.03.03.0 5.75.75.7 20% 0.9 6.7 2.7 4.2 1.8 0.0 1.81.81.8 3.83.83.8 >25% 8.9 18.7 11.6 21.1 8.0 6.3 9.59.59.5 15.815.815.8 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
2.2.2. Wastewater
31. The Sihanoukville Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) covered 16.2 ha, with a network of 65.739 km of sewers, encompassing a 221.5-ha service area. It targeted 3,344 connections for residents in three communes in addition to Cambrew. Table A4.16 summarizes its performance.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...16161616:: Status of the Wastewater Treatment Plant in Sihanoukville Connection Monthly Number of TotalTotalTotal Sewer LineLineLine Number of Population FeeFeeFee FeeFeeFee Sihanoukville Households aaa Population aaa (km) Connections Served (KR) (KR) Commune 1 3,358 15,667 65.74 63 315 ≥ 400,000 ≥ 3,500 Commune 2 2,015 9,883 0.00 406 2,030 ≥ 400,000 ≥ 3,500 Commune 4 5,236 24,017 0.00 865 4,325 ≥ 400,000 ≥ 3,500 Commune 3 4,226 20,466 0.00 0 0 0 0 TotalTotalTotal 14,835 70,033 65.7465.7465.74 1,3341,3341,334 6,6706,6706,670 a Commune Database, 2011. Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
32. The survey covered 224 household respondents (66% in project and 34% in non-project areas). About 76% of the households under the project coverage area had been connected to the sewer system, while 24% were not connected. About 70% of the respondents in the non-project area expressed a willingness to connect to the sewer system, if the system was to expand its service area. Of those not willing to connect to the system, the greatest number opined that their households did not produce much wastewater, followed by problems with the affordability of the connection. Some households could not connect because their locations were below sewer lines. A handful of respondents depended on rain water drainage.
33. The respondents in Sihanoukville were well aware of the sewerage connection fee. All of them were willing to pay a connection fee, but the amount they could afford (KR10,000–20,000) was far lower than the current connection fee (the basic fee was KR400,000). Table A4.17 shows the range that households would be willing to pay for a connection. About 72% were willing to incur up to KR100,000, while less than 4% were willing to go beyond the current fee.
A Sample Survey of Project Beneficiaries and Nonbeneficiaries 59
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...17171717:: Wastewater Connection Affordability in SihanoukviSihanoukvillelle (Non-service Areas) Range Percentage (KR) Frequency (%) Less than 100,000 39 72.2 100,000–200,000 11 20.4 200,001–400,000 2 3.7 400,001–600,000 2 3.7 Total 545454 100.0 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
34. All respondents (connected and willing to connect to the system) were willing to pay for the connection. More than half of them were willing to pay a basic fee of about KR3,500 (57.0% of the cost), about 6.1% were willing to pay less than the basic fee, and about 37.0% were willing to pay higher than the basic fee. This finding showed the potential for wastewater system expansion. However, incentives might need to be introduced in order to encourage residents to connect to the system. Furthermore, about two-thirds of the respondents with access to the sewer system and a willingness to connect were willing to pay a higher rate (64.5%) while 35.5% of respondents were not willing to do so. The distribution of households who were willing to pay a higher rate is presented in Table A4.18. The results imply awareness is there and a two-pronged strategy may be needed to promote sewer connection by cross-subsidizing the connection costs using revenue from connections to businesses and industries, and demonstrating health benefits through mass awareness program.
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...18181818:: Willingness to Pay High Wastewater Collection and Treatment Fees Service AAAreaArearearea NonNonNon-Non ---serviceservice AAAreaArearearea (Connected) (Willing to Connect) Total Increment RRRangeRangeangeange Number % Number % Number % No increase 40 67.8 19 32.2 59 35.5 Increase ≤ 5% 7 63.6 4 36.4 11 6%-10% 18 56.3 14 43.8 32 11%-15% 16 76.2 5 23.8 21 16%-20% 9 81.8 2 18.2 11 > 20% 22 68.8 10 31.3 32 Subtotal 72 69.3 35 32.7 107 64.5 Total 112112112 545454 166166166 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
3.3.3. Solid Waste
35. The solid waste collection service was similar to that of the water supply and wastewater services, in that it was available only in the urban area, in particular limited to the more densely populated areas. This was mainly because the densely populated areas were more profitable than scarcely populated areas on the outskirts of town. From the 896 interviewed households, 51.2% of them were in the service area; while 48.8% were in the non-service area. The majority of the households living in the service area had been using the solid waste collection service, except in Svay Rieng. Table A4.19 presents the households’ willingness to use this waste collection service.
60 Appendix 4
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...19191919:: Household Willingness to Use the Waste Collection Service (Number of Respondents)
Service Area NonNonNon-Non ---serviceservice AreaAreaArea Grand YesYesYes NoNoNo Subtotal YesYesYes NoNoNo Subtotal Total Battambang 70 50 120 31 73 104 224 Kampong Cham 73 31 104 20 100 120 224 Svay Rieng 36 52 88 26 110 136 224 Sihanoukville 119 28 147 45 32 77 224 Total 298298298 161161161 459459459 122122122 315315315 437437437 896896896 Percent ageageage of total (%) 64.964.964.9 35.135.135.1 100.0 27.927.927.9 72.172.172.1 100.0 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
36. About three-quarters of the respondents in the non-service area were not willing to use the solid waste collection service even if the service would be available in their area. The reasons for such unwillingness included a general belief that they did not produce much waste. Another reason cited was that they have enough space to individually dispose their household waste, and some households believed that there would be no benefit from using the collection service (Table A4.20).
Table A4A4A4.A4 ...20202020:: Reasons for Unwillingness to Use the Waste CollectionCollection Service (Number of Respondents) Total Service Do not Have SSSampleSample Fee is SSSeeSee any Not MMMuchMuch SSSpaceSpace to Total (Not Willing EEExpensiveExpensive BBBenefitBenefit WWWasteWasteasteaste DDDisposeDispose Others Count to Use) Battambang 3 85 1 44 17 150150150 123 Kampong Cham 4 0 87 63 14 168168168 131 Svay Rieng 4 0 106 94 7 211211211 162 Sihanoukville 2 0 39 19 11 717171 60 Total 131313 858585 233233233 220220220 494949 600600600 476476476 Source: Independent Evaluation Department survey data, 2013.
37. The household respondents were well aware of the waste collection fee. All households having applied for the service paid the monthly fee to the service provider. No household paid less than KR3,000 but the majority of them paid in the range of KR3,000–8,000 (85.2%). Similarly, all households willing to apply for the service were also willing to pay for the waste collection fee if the collection service would be available in their area. However, about 14.8% of those households were willing to pay less than KR3,000, 71.3% were willing to pay in the range of KR3,000–8,000, and 13.9% of them were willing to pay higher than KR8,000.
L.L.L. Conclusions
38. The survey findings imply that efforts are needed in ensuring consumers are getting not only clean, but also safe water which could potentially reduce water costs to the households. Since an overwhelming majority of consumers are consuming boiled water, this may not be necessary if they are convinced that they can drink safely from the running taps. In the areas covered by water supply, mass awareness is needed towards sustainable water use. As such, per capita consumption is quite high and potentially it may be due to low cost of water. A combination of awareness campaign and tariff increases may be needed. In some urban pockets where affordability is an issue, provision of community taps could be considered along with limited cross-subsidization. Mass awareness is needed towards sanitary practices in addition to hand washing before meals and after using toilets so that other undesirable health outcomes can be restricted. Wherever possible, provincial authorities need to look into wastewater treatment.
APPENDIX 555: 5: SUGGESTED LIST OF ACTIONS FOR THE GOVEGOVERNMENTRNMENT OF CAMBODIA
The findings of this evaluation suggest that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) can encourage the government of Cambodia to take a number of actions with the aim of improving the performance of the waterworks and wastewater treatment plant. Some actions are straightforward, while others may require the government to seek external assistance. Some of the actions suggested can be adopted in the newly approved project and those in the pipeline. These are: (i) Regular water quality sampling and testing should be carried out in all waterworks with the objective of trouble shooting and process optimization. (ii) A water treatment chemist experienced in jar tests should be commissioned to optimize pH adjustment of raw water and coagulant type and dose for Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, and Pursat. (iii) The continuous pre-chlorination operation should be changed to slug dosing to minimize trihalomethane (THM) formation at Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, and Pursat waterworks. (iv) Backwash filters at Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, and Pursat should be changed more frequently to achieve a better polishing effect on the clarified water. (v) A cost differential analysis should be undertaken between the electricity tariff and diesel costs, taking into consideration the reliability and other risk factors and switching to power based on reliable supply and cost considerations at Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, and Pursat. (vi) The water supply tariffs should be reviewed considering the cost of water production and supply, and also affordability and willingness to pay, in order to institute a provision for periodic tariff adjustments as a basis for full cost recovery. Kampong Cham’s scheme to offer subsidized connection to “very poor” and “poor” households should be reviewed to see if a similar scheme can be replicated in other towns, with due consideration for a proper identification of eligible poor households. Its experience in offering subsidized connection fees to poor households should be shared with other waterworks. (vii) Battambang’s combined water and wastewater billing system should be reviewed to see how a wider application can be replicated across Cambodia. Battambang waterworks’ experience in implementing combined water and wastewater billing should be shared with other waterworks. (viii) The recommendation put forward in the 2002 study on administrative and legal reform should be revisited and an updated set of measures developed and adopted. (ix) Improvements in project supported waterworks could be achieved by: (a) retrofitting the undersized clarification tanks to convert them into the lamellar type, with parallel plates or tubes to increase clarification efficiency for Battambang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, and Pursat; (b) increasing the treated water storage capacity at Battambang, Kampong Cham, and Kampong Thom; (c) installing earthing at all waterworks buildings and structures to offer the necessary lightning protection; and (d) thickening and dewatering clarifier sludge and filter backwash generated from the treatment processes for managed disposal, instead of discharging them back into the nearby river without any treatment. (x) Kampot waterworks should: (a) discuss with the upstream hydropower plant operator to agree on the minimum release of water;
62 Appendix 5
(b) commission a study to see if the reservoir can directly supply water to Kampot without the need for intake pumping, as raw water pumping consumes about 40% of the energy at Kampot waterworks; (c) commission a study to see if there are any impacts of the hydropower reservoir development on the raw water quality; and (d) lay a new supply pipe to replace the leaking old asbestos cement (AC) pipe that is serving the 200 households between the waterworks and the intake. (xi) In Kampong Cham: (a) existing wells should be deepened or new deeper wells added, such that a more reliable water supply can be assured during dry seasons; (b) one more pump should be provided at each of the two dug wells; (c) the raw water source and treatment process for the proposed Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) waterworks should be reviewed. (d) instead of extracting raw water directly from Mekong River, consideration should be given to the use of dug wells that can provide natural filtration. (xii) Pursat waterworks should: (a) carry out de-silting of the river local to its intake every 3–6 months to ensure proper operation of the intake and minimize grit intrusion into the intake pumping station; and (b) expand coverage to meet the expected increase in water demand. (xiii) Svay Rieng waterworks should: (a) review the process to decide if biological or physical removal of dissolved iron is more efficient and easier to operate; (b) undertake regular water quality sampling and testing, including iron and manganese concentrations with the objective of trouble shooting and process optimization; and (c) provide one more pump at each of the three tube wells. (xiv) Kampong Thom should look into the feasibility of making the connection to the power grid, such that it may have an option of either using the grid supply or generating its own electricity. (xv) The capacity of the wastewater management unit in Sihanoukville needs strengthening to monitor the quantity and quality of discharge at Cambrew and other industrial plants.