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Royal Navy Warrant Officer Ranks
Royal Navy Warrant Officer Ranks anisodactylousStewart coils unconcernedly. Rodolfo impersonalizing Cletus subducts contemptibly unbelievably. and defining Lee is atypically.empurpled and assumes transcriptively as Some records database is the database of the full command secretariat, royal warrant officer Then promoted for sailing, royal navy artificer. Navy Officer Ranks Warrant Officer CWO2 CWO3 CWO4 CWO5 These positions involve an application of technical and leadership skills versus primarily. When necessary for royal rank of ranks, conduct of whom were ranked as equivalents to prevent concealment by seniority those of. To warrant officers themselves in navy officer qualified senior commanders. The rank in front of warrants to gain experience and! The recorded and transcribed interviews help plan create a fuller understanding of so past. Royal navy ranks based establishment or royal marines. Marshals of the Royal Air and remain defend the active list for life, example so continue to use her rank. He replace the one area actually subvert the commands to the Marines. How brave I wonder the records covered in its guide? Four stars on each shoulder boards in a small arms and royals forming an! Courts martial records range from detailed records of proceedings to slaughter the briefest details. RNAS ratings had service numbers with an F prefix. RFA and MFA vessels had civilian crews, so some information on tracing these individuals can understand found off our aim guide outline the Mercantile Marine which the today World War. Each rank officers ranks ordered aloft on royal warrant officer ranks structure of! Please feel free to distinguish them to see that have masters pay. -
Continuity / Change: Rethinking Options for Trident Replacement
CONTINUITY / CHANGE: RETHINKING OPTIONS FOR TRIDENT REPLACEMENT DR. NICK RITCHIE Dr. Nick Ritchie Department of Peace Studies BRADFORD DISARMAMENT RESEARCH CENTRE University of Bradford April 2009 DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES : UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD : JUNE 2010 About this report This report is part of a series of publications under the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre’s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability. To find out more please visit www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/trident.html. Briefing 1: Trident: The Deal Isn’t Done – Serious Questions Remain Unanswered, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing1.html Briefing 2: Trident: What is it For? – Challenging the Relevance of British Nuclear Weapons, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing2.html. Briefing 3: Trident and British Identity: Letting go of British Nuclear Weapons, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing3.html. Briefing 4: A Regime on the Edge? How Replacing Trident Undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing4.html. Briefing 5: Stepping Down the Nuclear Ladder: Options for Trident on a Path to Zero, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing5.html. About the author Dr. Nick Ritchie is a Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. He is lead researcher on the Nuclear-Armed Britain programme. He previously worked for six years as a researcher at the Oxford Research Group on global security issues, in particular nuclear proliferation, arms control and disarmament. -
Seeschlachten Im Atlantik (Zusammenfassung)
Seeschlachten im Atlantik (Zusammenfassung) U-Boot-Krieg (aus Wikipedia) 07_48/U 995 vom Typ VII C/41, der meistgebauten U-Boot-Klasse im Zweiten Weltkrieg Als U-Boot-Krieg (auch "Unterseebootkrieg") werden Kampfhandlungen zur See bezeichnet, bei denen U-Boote eingesetzt werden, um feindliche Kriegs- und Frachtschiffe zu versenken. Die Bezeichnung "uneingeschränkter U-Boot-Krieg" wird verwendet, wenn Schiffe ohne vorherige Warnung angegriffen werden. Der Einsatz von U-Booten wandelte sich im Laufe der Zeit vom taktischen Blockadebrecher zum strategischen Blockademittel im Rahmen eines Handelskrieges. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg änderte sich die grundsätzliche Einsatzdoktrin durch die Entwicklung von Raketen tragenden Atom- U-Booten, die als Träger von Kernwaffen eine permanente Bedrohung über den maritimen Bereich hinaus darstellen. Im Gegensatz zum Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg fand hier keine völkerrechtliche Weiterentwicklung zum Einsatz von U-Booten statt. Der Begriff wird besonders auf den Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg bezogen. Hierbei sind auch völkerrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen von Bedeutung. Anfänge Während des Amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges wurden 1864 mehrere handgetriebene U-Boote gebaut. Am 17. Februar 1864 versenkte die C.S.S. H. L. Hunley durch eine Sprengladung das Kriegsschiff USS Housatonic der Nordstaaten. Es gab 5 Tote auf dem versenkten Schiff. Die Hunley gilt somit als erstes U-Boot der Welt, das ein anderes Schiff zerstört hat. Das U-Boot wurde allerdings bei dem Angriff auf die Housatonic durch die Detonation schwer beschädigt und sank, wobei auch seine achtköpfige Besatzung getötet wurde. Auftrag der Hunley war die Brechung der Blockade des Südstaatenhafens Charleston durch die Nordstaaten. Erster Weltkrieg Die technische Entwicklung der U-Boote bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges beschreibt ein Boot, das durch Dampf-, Benzin-, Diesel- oder Petroleummaschinen über Wasser und durch batteriegetriebene Elektromotoren unter Wasser angetrieben wurde. -
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA BOO KK Class 2019-4 15
BBIIOOGGRRAAPPHHIICCAALL DDAATTAA BBOOOOKK Class 2019-4 15 Jul - 16 Aug 2019 National Defense University NDU PRESIDENT Vice Admiral Fritz Roegge, USN 16th President Vice Admiral Fritz Roegge is an honors graduate of the University of Minnesota with a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering and was commissioned through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program. He earned a Master of Science in Engineering Management from the Catholic University of America and a Master of Arts with highest distinction in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He was a fellow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Seminar XXI program. VADM Fritz Roegge, NDU President (Photo His sea tours include USS Whale (SSN 638), USS by NDU AV) Florida (SSBN 728) (Blue), USS Key West (SSN 722) and command of USS Connecticut (SSN 22). His major command tour was as commodore of Submarine Squadron 22 with additional duty as commanding officer, Naval Support Activity La Maddalena, Italy. Ashore, he has served on the staffs of both the Atlantic and the Pacific Submarine Force commanders, on the staff of the director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, on the Navy staff in the Assessments Division (N81) and the Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13), in the Secretary of the Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs at the U. S, House of Representatives, as the head of the Submarine and Nuclear Power Distribution Division (PERS 42) at the Navy Personnel Command, and as an assistant deputy director on the Joint Staff in both the Strategy and Policy (J5) and the Regional Operations (J33) Directorates. -
Rationalizing the Royal Navy in Late Seventeenth-Century England
The Ingenious Mr Dummer: Rationalizing the Royal Navy in Late Seventeenth-Century England Celina Fox In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Royal Navy constituted by far the greatest enterprise in the country. Naval operations in and around the royal dockyards dwarfed civilian industries on account of the capital investment required, running costs incurred and logistical problems encountered. Like most state services, the Navy was not famed as a model of efficiency and innovation. Its day-to-day running was in the hands of the Navy Board, while a small Admiralty Board secretariat dealt with discipline and strategy. The Navy Board was responsible for the industrial organization of the Navy including the six royal dockyards; the design, construction and repair of ships; and the supply of naval stores. In practice its systems more or less worked, although they were heavily dependent on personal relationships and there were endless opportunities for confusion, delay and corruption. The Surveyor of the Navy, invariably a former shipwright and supposedly responsible for the construction and maintenance of all the ships and dockyards, should have acted as a coordinator but rarely did so. The labour force worked mainly on day rates and so had no incentive to be efficient, although a certain esprit de corps could be relied upon in emergencies.1 It was long assumed that an English shipwright of the period learnt his art of building and repairing ships primarily through practical training and experience gained on an apprenticeship, in contrast to French naval architects whose education was grounded on science, above all, mathematics. -
Service Lists for the Army, Navy and Air Force
SOCIAL SCIENCES COLLECTION GUIDES OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS www.bl.uk/subjects/national-and-international-government-publications Service lists for the Army, Navy and Air Force INTRODUCTION This guide is the result of merging two separate checklists. The checklist of Army Lists (British Army lists 1642- : a chronological handlist) is undated and without attribution of authorship. It is believed to have been compiled around 1980 as a collaborative effort by the staff at that time of what was then the Official Publications Library (OPL) of the British Library; the identity of the actual compiler is unknown. The checklist of Navy Lists (Navy lists : a chronological handlist of lists of ships and officers of the Royal Navy since ca 1640) is better documented. It was compiled in 1986 by Joy Tilley, a graduate library trainee, as a project for her work experience training under the supervision of Richard Cheffins who edited the result. No attempt has been made to further edit the original checklists except to update a few pressmarks, to clarify some minor points of uncertainty, to expand somewhat on the current Army and Navy lists and to add a section on Air Force lists. The item numbering of Army Lists has been discontinued but otherwise the inconsistencies of style and layout between, and even within, the two main lists have been left to stand but these should not hinder the use of this guide. The original Navy checklist had a brief introduction which has been incorporated into this one; the Army checklist had none. Both had brief 'further reading' lists which have been combined as the penultimate section of this guide. -
Use of Simulation for Training in the U.S. Navy Surface Force
Use of Simulation for Training in the U.S. Navy Surface Force Roland J. Yardley • Harry J. Thie • John F. Schank • Jolene Galegher • Jessie L. Riposo Prepared for the United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution unlimited R NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Navy. The research was conducted in RAND’s National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands, and the defense agencies under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Use of simulation for training in the U.S. Navy surface force / Roland J. Yardley ... [et al.]. p. cm. “MR-1770.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-3481-2 (pbk. : alk paper) 1. Naval education—United States—Simulation methods. 2. Sailors—Training of—United States. I. Yardley, Roland J. VA11.U84 2003 359.5'078—dc22 2003022269 Cover photograph: United States Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 1st Class Michael W. Pendergrass (www.news.navy.mil) RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover design by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2003 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2003 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. -
Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne US Navy
Oral History Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne U.S. Navy (Retired) Conducted by David F. Winkler, Ph.D. Naval Historical Foundation 16 July 1998 26 August 1998 Naval Historical Foundation Washington, DC 2000 Introduction I first contacted Vice Admiral Bayne in 1996, it was in relation to another series of interviews I had intended to conduct with Secretary of the Navy Fred Korth. Bayne had served as Korth’s Executive Assistant and thus could provide an overview of the issues. He invited me to Irvington and was gracious with his time, providing me with good background material. At that time it became obvious that Bayne would be a good interview subject, however, he politely declined. Unfortunately, Korth fell ill and subsequently passed away so the planned interviews were never conducted. However, Bayne had a change of heart and agreed to a biographical interview that included the period that he served as Korth’s EA. Besides serving as a SecNav EA, Vice Admiral Bayne’s career is significant as he served in the Submarine Service during a period of transformation from WWII diesel boats to a force including nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. In his interviews, Bayne details a career serving as a junior officer on a Fleet Boat in the Western Pacific battling the Japanese Empire to command of a missile boat flotilla in the Mediterranean Sea in the late 1960s. In addition, he served in several political-military posts, with his most important being Commander, Middle East Force. As COMIDEASTFOR, Bayne negotiated with the Bahraini government for an American naval shore presence there that continues to the present. -
Title 32 National Defense Parts 700 to 799
Title 32 National Defense Parts 700 to 799 Revised as of July 1, 2017 Containing a codification of documents of general applicability and future effect As of July 1, 2017 Published by the Office of the Federal Register National Archives and Records Administration as a Special Edition of the Federal Register VerDate Sep<11>2014 11:36 Aug 29, 2017 Jkt 241135 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 8091 Sfmt 8091 Y:\SGML\241135.XXX 241135 U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL EDITION NOTICE Legal Status and Use of Seals and Logos The seal of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) authenticates the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as the official codification of Federal regulations established under the Federal Register Act. Under the provisions of 44 U.S.C. 1507, the contents of the CFR, a special edition of the Federal Register, shall be judicially noticed. The CFR is prima facie evidence of the origi- nal documents published in the Federal Register (44 U.S.C. 1510). It is prohibited to use NARA’s official seal and the stylized Code of Federal Regulations logo on any republication of this material without the express, written permission of the Archivist of the United States or the Archivist’s designee. Any person using NARA’s official seals and logos in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of 36 CFR part 1200 is subject to the penalties specified in 18 U.S.C. 506, 701, and 1017. Use of ISBN Prefix This is the Official U.S. Government edition of this publication and is herein identified to certify its authenticity. -
Of Deaths in Service of Royal Naval Medical, Dental, Queen Alexandra's Royal Naval Nursing Service and Sick Berth Staff
Index of Deaths in Service of Royal Naval Medical, Dental, Queen Alexandra’s Royal Naval Nursing Service and Sick Berth Staff World War II Researched and collated by Eric C Birbeck MVO and Peter J Derby - Haslar Heritage Group. Ranks and Rate abbreviations can be found at the end of this document Name Rank / Off No 1 Date Ship, (Pennant No), Type, Reason for loss and other comrades lost and Rate burial / memorial details (where known). Abel CA SBA SR8625 02/10/1942 HMS Tamar. Hong Kong Naval Base. Drowned, POW (along with many other medical shipmates) onboard SS Lisbon Maru sunk by US Submarine Grouper. 2 Panel 71, Column 2, Plymouth Naval Memorial, Devon, UK. 1 Officers’ official numbers are not shown as they were not recorded on the original documents researched. Where found, notes on awards and medals have been added. 2 Lisbon Maru was a Japanese freighter which was used as a troopship and prisoner-of-war transport between China and Japan. When she was sunk by USS Grouper (SS- 214) on 1 October 1942, she was carrying, in addition to Japanese Army personnel, almost 2,000 British prisoners of war captured after the fall of Hong Kong in December Name Rank / Off No 1 Date Ship, (Pennant No), Type, Reason for loss and other comrades lost and Rate burial / memorial details (where known). Abraham J LSBA M54850 11/03/1942 HMS Naiad (93). Dido-class destroyer. Sunk by U-565 south of Crete. Panel 71, Column 2, Plymouth Naval Memorial, Devon, UK. Abrahams TH LSBA M49905 26/02/1942 HMS Sultan. -
The Royal Navy Purser and Accounting and Governance, 1731 – 1808
Minding their Ps and Qs; the Royal Navy purser and accounting and governance, 1731 – 1808 Karen Mcbride, University of Portsmouth Abstract This paper explores the accounting regulations imposed on sea officers, particularly the purser, on board Royal Navy ships between 1731 and 1808. This was a period in which the Royal Navy grew to become one of the largest enterprises in Europe with operations throughout the world. The governance, control and accountability practices imposed upon pursers are analysed. The Regulations for accounting records to be kept by pursers indicate that accounting changed very little in the analysis period, until 1808, when it became substantially more detailed. Drawing on institutional theory, it is argued that this was due to external pressures for increased governance following the impeachment of Melville (First Lord of the Admiralty), public spending administrative and accounting reforms and political disapproval of ‘offices of profit’. The paper provides important insights to the development of accounting, governance, audit and accountability within the Royal Navy, and enhances understanding of the historically unique role of pursers. 0 Key words: accounting, governance, accountability, control, audit, Institutional Theory, Purser, Royal Navy 1 Introduction This paperi contributes to a broader understanding of accounting and governance reforms in the Royal Navy (hereafter the Navy) by examining the “Regulations and Instructions relating to His Majesty’s Service at Sea” (hereafter Regulations) issued to sea officersii. Particular attention is applied to our analysis of the Regulations pertaining to pursers. The intent is to provide a critical explanation of when and why those Regulations changed and to set them in a historical context. -
THE Navy UNDER CHARLES I 1625-40
THE NAvY UNDER CHARLES I 1625-40 ANDREW DEREK THRUSH University College Ph.D. Dissertation C ABSTRACT This study is primarily concerned with how the Caroline Navy was run, both in theory and in practice. Previous assessments of early Stuart naval administration have generally been superficial and unsympathetic in tone, but this new work, in shedding fresh light on a variety of themes, attempts to offer a more detailed and balanced view of the quality of administration in the 1620s and 1630s. Starting with an examination of the Navy's senior executive, the thesis broadens out into a discussion of the role of the Navy Board and the manner in which the yards were administered. Here it is argued that the yards were a good deal better regulated than has sometimes been appreciated. It is also suggested that the Navy's ability to reform its own administration has been understated. In the second part of the thesis, two chapters are devoted to the question of finance, in which both financial procedures and management are discussed. In the final section, the Navy's ability to man, victual and prepare its ships for sea is scrutinised. Detailed consideration is also given to the Ordnance Office, which was responsible for gunning and munitioning the Navy's ships. In these later chapters considerable space is devoted to administrative deficiencies which persistently dogged the Navy, but the author argues that institutional factors, such as underfunding, were often to blame rather than mismanagement, a theme which is echoed in the final conclusion. -2- PREFACE In the process of writing this thesis I have incurred many debts of gratitude.