Sunday Bloody Sunday

An Analysis of Representations of the Troubles in Northern Irish Curricula and Teaching Material and their Didactic Implications for Political Learning

Diplomarbeit

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Magisters der Geisteswissenschaft

an der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz am Institut für Geschichte.:

vorgelegt von

Moritz DEININGER

Begutachter: Univ.-Prof. Dr.phil Alois Ecker

Graz, 2019

Ehrenwörtliche Erklärung

Ich erkläre ehrenwörtlich, dass ich die vorliegende Diplomarbeit selbstständig und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Quellen verfasst und die den benutzten Quellen wörtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht habe.

Graz, September 2019 Moritz Deininger

“The road from mutual distrust to genuine cooperation is a rocky one.”

- Smith 2005: xv

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 3

1.1 Preliminary Theoretic Considerations and Methodological Approaches ...... 5

2. Historic Overview ...... 15

2.1 The Troubles ...... 35

2.2 Current Standstill ...... 62

2.3 Descriptions of the Conflict ...... 66

3. The History of Teaching History ...... 68

4. Analysis of History for CCEA GCSE ...... 71

4.1 Narrative Analysis ...... 72

4.2 Didactic Analysis ...... 85

4.3 Curricular Analysis ...... 95

5. Conclusion ...... 102

6. Bibliography ...... 109

6.1 Webliography ...... 111

7. Appendix ...... 113

1. Introduction The Northern Ireland conflict is often simply referred to as “the Troubles”. It becomes evident that the Troubles are of considerable significance when examining their impact on contemporary historical memories. Apart from (official) commemorations, parades, and countless exhibitions or scientific papers and books there exists an extensive artistic examination of the conflict. Numerous past and present artists addressed the Troubles in their songs; their genres and conveyed messages hereby often differed substantially. John Lennon or The Police, Paul and Linda McCartney, The Cranberries or U2 all of them sang about the conflict in Northern Ireland. The arguably most famous example for this is a song from the Irish Rock-band U2: “Sunday Bloody Sunday”. The chosen title o*f this paper should thus serve justice to the Troubles’ far-reaching influence, which manifests itself not only in political, and socio-economic realities but also in cultural terms.

The Troubles lasted for roughly three decades from the 1960s to 1998. Hence it is one of the most recent conflicts in Europe. Its temporal proximity proves to be a major factor as the majority of the Northern Irish population has witnessed the Troubles in one form or another, and thus naturally drew their personal conclusions from it. In terms of remembrance (culture) the Troubles’ recentness is of significance as every phase of this roughly 30-year conflict is well within the respective groups’ cultural memories (cf. Smith 2005: 41 ff.).

The following paper aims at providing an analysis of representations of the Troubles in teaching material and a schoolbook in relation to statutory provisions applicable to the Northern Ireland schooling sector. For this reason, a discursive examination of a GCSE- (General Certificate of Secondary Education – a state exam) schoolbook will be conducted. Thereby it aims at demonstrating how the conflict and its underlying narratives are presented to students. Additionally, it will be evaluated whether the schoolbook representations of the Troubles convey biased narratives from one of the ideological key factions in Northern Ireland. Special emphasis will be laid on how the former conflict parties portray the conflict and which historic episodes they use in order to maintain their account of the Northern Ireland conflict. Apart from the schoolbook analysis, it will be assessed how the GCSE Troubles are taught in class and whether the teaching is compatible with the mandatory curricular requirements, such as the EMU (Education for Mutual Understanding) or The Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order, which was passed by the Northern Ireland assembly in 2007. To sum up, representations of and teaching about the Northern Ireland conflict will be examined along didactic criteria. In addition, it will be investigated whether the schoolbook conveys partisan narratives that are

3 attributable to unionist or nationalist perspectives. Furthermore, the paper aims at assessing the compatibility of history instruction as suggested by the selected schoolbook with statutory curricular requirements.

The Chapter “Historic Overview” will present a concise summary of past episodes of Irish history in order to provide a holistic overview of central developments, processes and events that paved the way for the Northern Ireland conflict, and narrations thereon. Multiple key events – some dating back almost a full millennium – are at the core of current nationalist or unionist narratives. This chapter aims at illustrating how history is used to maintain present group identities and narratives of conflict, rather than merely summarising political, social and economic Irish history. By highlighting specific episodes of modern history and their consequences insights into the narratives of the respective social groups as well as their cultural practices will be gained. In addition to offering a concise summary of Irish history, this chapter attempts to deconstruct community narratives, Furthermore, it aims at highlighting the significant role historical memory and public history play in Northern Ireland; and why this is of great importance to contemporary political education and history instruction.

Subsequently the paper strives for providing a comprehensive overview of the course of the Troubles in subchapter 2.1. Here it will be attempted to name major factors in the escalatory circle of violence that held Northern Ireland in its grip for the better part of two decades. Socio- economic reasons and democratic participative tendencies within the society will be addressed additionally to political historic developments. However, apart from these factors use of violence from state as well paramilitary agents will be discussed and assessed.

Subchapter 2.2 – “Current Standstill” seeks to provide a compact analysis of the socio-political operations that determined life in Northern Ireland from the Belfast Agreement, which is more commonly referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, which was signed by royalist and republican conflict parties as well as most political parties in Northern Ireland and the British and Irish governments 1996, to the present day. Attention will be drawn in particular to the application of conflict-resolving measures agreed on by the former conflict parties, as well as the British and Irish governments in the Good Friday Agreement; and why they failed. However, also the most pressing issue of the Irish isle, including its potential and actual consequences will be discussed briefly: Brexit and its implications for the peace process.

A short section in this overview will be addressing the question of the conflict’s categorisation. Prescriptions from authors dealing with this subject matter will be analysed in order to establish whether the Northern Ireland conflict can legitimately be called a religious conflict as this 4 remains the public’s standard description of the conflict. Furthermore, the paper attempts to interpret the conflict’s causes in an interdisciplinary fashion; thereby mostly relying on socio- economic, participative and political explanatory patterns. Additionally, it will be aimed toward presenting contemporary community-narratives. Subsequently, in chapter four, it will be evaluated if and to which extent recent scientific findings and assessments thereof have entered the classroom and impacted on teaching realities, more on the methodology and theory this paper is based can be found chapter 1.1.

The chapter three – “The History of Teaching History” will attempt to provide a short outline of the causes that shaped modern teaching in Northern Ireland. Here, the question of how the segregated nature of the schooling sector came into being and its consequences will be addressed. The subchapter “Schooling in Sectarian Hands” will address the current Northern Irish education sector. The threefold analysis basing in History for CCEA GCSE can be found in chapter four. In the subsequent subchapter “Preliminary Theoretic Considerations and Methodological Approaches” the research questions as well as the selected methods and supporting theory will be discussed.

1.1 Preliminary Theoretic Considerations and Methodological Approaches Before commencing this paper, critical reflection about which methods were applicable for generating the required insights, in order to answer the thesis’ research questions, was necessary. It was opted to conduct an in-depth investigation of the schoolbook representations of the Northern Ireland conflict along several criteria: including an analysis along didactic, narrative and curricular viewpoints. By doing so the paper attempts to gain insights in how the Troubles are presented to Northern Irish youth. A subsequent analysis aims at demonstrating whether the schoolbook’s Troubles-related content meets the statutory curriculum requirements in Northern Ireland. Here, the term ‘contents’ encompasses not only the texts composed by the schoolbooks author, but also visual and textual sources as well as representations. Additionally, it will be assessed in which manner the schoolbook’s didactic elements cater for historic learning. The most prominently used method will be a discursive examination of the respective schoolbook texts. However, other aspects will be examined following an empiric approach, such as measuring the frequency certain agents appear throughout the texts, or which insights are deductible from the schoolbook’s use of sources and representations.

Naturally the question of which schoolbook would be analysed is an important one as this paper’s analysis is based on it. A major factor influencing the selection of the schoolbook was the age cohort to which the book should present history. As with the age of sixteen leaving

5 school becomes a legal option for British, and thus for Northern Irish teenagers it was opted to analyse a schoolbook which is used for the GCSE-level; an exam which is commonly taken by sixteen-year-olds in the United Kingdom. This consideration serves the fact that findings and appeals of this paper have a greater validity if they are applicable to more students. Thus, with regards to accessibility and availability it was opted for, a British schoolbook by Finbar Madden: History for CCEA GCSE, published by Hodder Education. The analysis will be conducted on a copy of the second revised edition that was published in 2014.

This book, rather self-explanatorily, caters for the syllabus requirements for the GCSE set by the Council for Curriculum, Examination and Assessment (CCEA). The CCEA is an education agency that – as they put it in their own words: “has [the] responsibility for the regulation of qualifications taken by learners” (Council for Curriculum, Examination and Assessment (Online), accessed 5 June 2019, http://ccea.org.uk/regulation/about). In other words, the CCEA is responsible for monitoring and implementing curricular requirements and performing nation- wide exams such as the GCSE.

In general, students in the United Kingdom take the GCSE when they are aged between fifteen and sixteen (Gill 2010: 5-6). The legal age limit for leaving school in the UK is sixteen, hence students prior to the GCSE-level are more likely to enrol in history classes, simply as they do not yet have the possibility to choose a traineeship or an apprenticeship instead of continuing their school career. A study conducted in 2017 states that 44.2% of British students took history as a GCSE-subject (Carrol & Gill 2017: 6). However, as the British school system is highly module-, and exam-centred this already underwhelming number drops substantially in the course of academic progress. When students advance to the A-Levels only 10.8% of young women take history. The figure decreases even more when looking at their male counterparts. Only 8.4% of them choose history (Ofsted 2015: 4) for their A-levels. As shown above the numbers of students opting for history in national exams decreases concurrently with the students’ academic progress.

However, unlike other education systems the British system provides an in-depth preparatory timespan in which pupils mostly study for certain previously elected subjects – the ones they will subsequently elect for their GCSE or A-Levels. As British students usually enrol in less subjects than their colleagues on the European mainland, they receive more history instruction per week or have more time to prepare for their history courses. Hence it is legit to assume that students, who selected history as one of their GCSE-subjects, are learners possessing a specific degree of historic factual knowledge which they can utilise. Hence the fact that only around

10% of British students take history in their A-Levels is slightly alleviated by the fact that these 10% receive advanced history instruction. In summary, History for CCEA GCSE is both a preparatory book for a curricular exam and is used by advanced learners.

The three research questions (a, b, c) can be found below. Subsequent to each research question will be an outline portraying why this question is significant in the context of political learning in Northern Ireland as well as the respective methodological approach used to answer them. In addition, theoretic considerations regarding the particular field(s) of research will be laid out. It will hence be pointed out which specific methods and supporting theoretical frameworks aim at answering the respective questions. Apart from this, the following section will also refer to the individual chapters, or subchapters in which the respective investigations take place. In summary, this section aims at explaining this thesis’ research questions along three meta- questions: Why – was this research question chosen? How – will this research question be answered? Where – within this paper will the respective investigations take place?

Research questions:

(a) Are partisan narratives apparent in the Troubles’ schoolbook representations?

The attempted response to research question (a) will be twofold: First, the paper attempts to explain and detect partisan (or ethno-nationalist) narratives throughout chapter two; i.e. Historic Overview. Second, the insights generated by this will be utilised to detect potential partisan narratives within History for CCEA GCSE. The paper will thus attempt to answer this research question throughout chapter two, and in the narrative analysis of chapter 4.1. Research question (a) refers to representations of Northern Irish history in the British schoolbook: History for CCEA GCSE. Schoolbooks perform a vital function as institutionalised carriers of public history – even more so in a post-conflict society. Smith notes that: “School texts, especially if commissioned or approved by those in power, are one of the most useful instruments of cultural hegemony.” (2005: 15) As such schoolbooks contribute considerably to historical memory (cf. Smith 2005: 32-7) they may alter the students’ perception of the past and present in one way or another. As previously stated, the methodology for answering this research question consists of a textual and didactic examination in a discursive and for the most part qualitative manner. The discursive analyses will lay focus on selected text sections and assignments of the respective schoolbooks. The sections’ applicability to examination depends on certain criteria; as the investigation of every written word in History for CCEA GCSE would undoubtedly extend beyond the scope of this paper. Aside from thematic applicability – Chapter 1: Germany c1918-

39, as well as Chapter 4: The Cold War 1945-91 will not be discussed – the contents have to meet at least one of the points, listed as selective criteria, below: i) Questionable representations of historic processes, events, or personalities; ii) Over-simplified representations of historic processes, events, or personalities; iii) Over-generalising representations of historic processes, events, or personalities; iv) Biased representations of historic processes, events, or personalities; and v) Maintaining and / or justifying master-narratives.

Given the complex nature of the cohesion of representative text/picture/source sections with the underlying narratives particular text segments, didactic tasks, or photographic material can fall in more than one category.

Along Smith’s previously presented line of argumentation ethno-nationalist narratives can act as agents of maintaining a narration of conflict in order to legitimise their position. A characteristic of these narrative is its exclusive support of one social group’s worldview with simultaneous denial of cultural space for the other community’s narrative. Smith attributes this “zero sum” (2005: 7) -understanding of the “other” to different understandings of history: “Some may even see them [ethno-nationalist programmes] as an important causal factor – arguing that the groupings have coalesced around their differing ideas about history and that, if a single history could be agreed upon according to “the facts,” the conflict would die down.” (2005: 7) It remains questionable whether century-long conflicts could be halted by this “simple” measure. However, this underlines the importance of an unbiased historiography as well as a neutral instruction in history and political education, which gives students an understanding of a deconstructivist approach toward community narratives. In this sense, a deconstructivist understanding entails awareness of the creation and operation modes of a social group’s guiding narratives.

How will this paper attempt to point out possible ethno-nationalist narratives in History for CCEA GCSE? The schoolbook’s applicable representations, including textual, visual and didactic contents will be subject to a narrative analysis. Additionally, omissions and presented narratives will be investigated. For the most part ethno-nationalist narratives function covertly, thus the schoolbook’s contents will be examined via a deconstructivist approach. It will be attempted to analyse the schoolbook’s contents according to their inherent meaning, both on their textual (respectively visual) level and on a meta-level. The latter is highly interesting as here numerous factors come into play – not only why contents are portrayed the way they are 8

– but also why certain events are omitted entirely. Along Smith’s assumption that a nation consists of a group of people forgetting the same thing (2005: 24-5) we have to critically reflect which contents are not appearing in the schoolbook – and if these contents or the lack thereof alter the narration in general. Hence, in addition to contents falling under one of the categories i) – v), omissions that serve to alter narratives will be examined. Furthermore, it will be assessed which narratives of conflict-genesis are offered by the schoolbook in question: Will economic, social and cultural reasons be named? In summary, schoolbooks contents which convey distorted, or ethno-nationalist narratives will be analysed. In addition to this, omissions that change the manner in which contents will be conveyed to the audience, i.e. the students will be pointed out. Finally, it will be attempted to assess the explanations, the book provides referring to the beginning of the conflict.

The paper attempts to demonstrate that the manner in which certain contents are portrayed and certain contents are omitted contribute to an overall picture which is rather favourable for stakeholders in London and especially Belfast. The theoretical framework for analysing these governance-justifying narratives and underlying power-relations is taken from Antonio Gramsci’s work. His concept of hegemony attempts to explain power relations via a cultural- scientific approach. (cf. Mayo 2016) Hegemony entails that governments will always strive for protection of their dominance. Mayo reflects upon the primary objective of an analysis along hegemonic viewpoints ought to be: “The corollary task is one of critique aimed at revealing that the ruling ideas did not emanate from universal or transcendental laws but are, rather, the products of human history as are the institutions and social structures they legitimize and foster […]” (Mayo 2016: xi) In other words he calls for an utter deconstructivist approach in order to illuminate and disassemble the functioning and legitimisation of not only master narratives or public history – which he categorises under the rubric “ruling ideas”, and associated therewith a society’s understanding of ethics and (a)social behaviour. By examining cultural hegemony in this manner, we may obtain “[…] a detailed analysis and thorough understanding of how the worldview of dominant social groups penetrates every sphere of society down to the capillary level and acquires universal validity even in the eyes of those who are subordinated by it.” (ibid.)

As previously stated, hegemonic ethno-nationalist narratives tend to seek for and assure universal validation in their respective fields of influence, this validation may even come from social classes that have been wronged by the entity transmitting the hegemony. As Ireland as a whole was under British dominion for centuries it appears suitable to assume that remnants of

9 the British empire’s master narrative still remain in a Northern Irish schoolbook, thus it will be attempted to search for elements of power-legitimising master narratives within History for CCEA GCSE by means of a narrative analysis.

In order to evaluate whether ethno-nationalist narratives influence History for CCEA GCSE, we have to define ethnic nationalism and notions of what community-narratives entail first. By definition ethno-nationalism can be seen as a social group’s struggle for economic and political participation within an entity. (Smith 2005: 17) Ethno-nationalism contains the element “ethnic” not only lexically but also in its ideological core. Members of an ethnic group believe in their shared ancestry and a shared set of norms and value systems that distinguishes them from the “other”. Smith argues that upholding of “group difference” is a major factor in maintaining a social group’s identity in post- and conflict societies. (2005: 23-5) Civic nationalism provides a rather different genre of nationalism as compared to nationalism based on ethnic characteristics. Here a feeling of belonging stems from a mutual acceptance of the system of governance and features thereof; e.g. constitution, parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech etc. In her analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict, Smith argues that it categorises as an identity conflict; within this category she differentiates between ethno-national and minority conflicts (cf. 2005: 7). The former strives to achieve autonomous statehood – be it by secession (examples for these forms of internal conflict being: Chechnya, Scotland, Transnistria, or Catalonia) or by attachment to another nation (examples being: Republika Srpska, Crimea, or along republican – in the context of Ireland denoting extreme nationalism (Smith 2005: 61) aspirations – Northern Ireland). Smith argues that minority conflicts, on the other hand: “do not involve the desire to create a new state but to include the struggle for various forms of cultural recognition along with their economic and political goals.” (2005: 6) Examples for minority conflicts are: The Native American Nations, the Kurdish group in Turkey, the Albanian community in North Macedonia, or the Serbian minority in Kosovo.

“In these scenarios [note: ethno-national conflicts], cultural and religious differences, as well as language or racial attributes, become markers for differentiating groups. These groups develop their own narratives, mythologies, and official histories. Memory becomes a significant proxy battlefield for the conflict. Arguments about which group inhabited the land first and numbers massacred by the other group in previous wars become not only tools for mobilizing but solidified elements in the people’s sense of social identity.” (– Smith 2005: 6-7) Smith points out that until recently research distinguished between ethnic groups and nations (2005: 23). While the former used to be “subject matter” of anthropologists, the latter was examined by political scientists. The dividing moment lying in the “greater politicization [of 10 nations]” (ibid.). Smith continues that: “Some scholars see ethnic groups as potential nations, having not yet developed sufficient group awareness or politicization to qualify as nations” (ibid.). To circumvent any notions of bias and prejudice against the ability or likelihood of one of the Northern Irish communities achieving statehood - it was opted to use the neutrally connotated term “social group”. This term, originating from sociology, will be used to indicate one of the ideological blocks of the Northern Irish society; i.e. supporters of nationalism or unionism. (Smith 2005: 43) At this place it needs to be highlighted that this paper does not aim at putting rigid classifications around groups of people by prescribing their political or social identities. In other words, just because somebody lives in Shankill Road (note author: traditionally a stronghold of unionism/loyalism in Belfast) they are not automatically a unionist. The terms nationalist or unionist thus refer solely to the electorate of the parties supporting these ideologies; with republican or loyalist denoting people more severe in their respective political viewpoints.

Furthermore, it is diametrical to this paper’s objectives to suggest that the political spectrum in Northern Ireland consists entirely of unionist and nationalist parties. Even though the combined nationalist-unionist electorate comprises the vast majority of council seats, the Northern Irish assembly and elected Westminster MPs. Throughout the decades, non-sectarian parties, such as the Green Party or the Alliance Party (cf. Collins 2008: 56) have existed and with varying political success provided the people of Northern Ireland with a less ideology-driven option. These parties, however, are frequently neglected not only in literature but also in the political discourse as they do not fit in the black-and-white narration of the Troubles, and, additionally, are legally disadvantaged within the power-sharing executive. More on the system of governance in Northern Ireland can be found throughout chapter two.

Furthermore, Smith argues that: “[…] history is critical to the creation of ethnic groups and nations, given that shared past experience, or the perception of shared past experience, is the strongest rationale for the existence of the group.” (2005: 13) History and a social group’s memory thereof are thus not only vital to the respective group’s “social cohesion [… and] system of ethics” (Smith 2005: 13), they are also important as agents of the group’s legitimation. This is true in particular for legitimising power relations; or as Smith puts it: “It has become a truism that history is an account of the past according to the winners’ point of view. What this really means is that those who attain power will tell their story in a way that legitimizes their power.” (2005: 15) She concludes that history thus can be instrumentalised by governments in order to justify and maintain their control. In order to break this power-

11 legitimising “cultural hegemony” (Smith 2005: 15) considerable effort is necessary. As members of the social group have already absorbed these narratives and consequential cultural practises and, additionally, share notions of their government’s official history. Altering narratives that are deeply woven into the fabrics of a community are thus not only challenging the society but also the individual. (Smith 2005: 13-4) However, at this point, it has to be emphasised that as these ethno-nationalist narratives were constructed hence, they can be modified.

To sum up, it will be attempted to identify ethno-nationalist narratives by a narrative analysis of the schoolbook History for CCEA GCSE. In order to be examined the respective contents have to indicate a flawed or distorted way of representing the past state of affairs. By pointing these narratives out it will be hoped to uncover possible power-legitimising structures that are woven into the examined master narratives. The theoretic framework in decoding these power relations builds on Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. The main aim of critical schoolbook investigation such as conducted below can be seen in attempting to contribute to awareness-raising toward language- and narrative-sensitivity. (Smith 2005: 7) As Smith states: “[the] problem of contentious, chauvinist history is crucial for post-conflict reconstruction and the prevention of future conflict.” (Smith 2005: 14)

(b) Which implications arise for political education through the manner history instruction as suggested by History for CCEA GCSE?

Findings aiming at answering research question (b) will be presenting in the didactic analysis in chapter 4.2. For answering research question (b) approaches of two scholars, which are coined around the concepts of remembering and learning, will be consulted. It will be attempted to embed these two concepts in prevailing contemporary classroom realities; and subsequently deduce insights for historical and political learning in Northern Ireland. Hence it will be attempted to answer this research question via a didactic evaluation. In order to address the second term “learning”, two specific concepts for historical learning of Peter Seixas will be called in. Cause and Consequence (cf. 2013: 74 ff.), as well as Significance (cf. 2013: 12 ff.), both excerpted from his “The Big Six Historical Thinking Concepts will be used to assess the didactic dimensions of the manner in which history is taught in Northern Ireland today and its implications on historical and political learning. Referring the second concept “remembering”, the analysis will draw on the work of Margaret E. Smith in order to establish a framework around the notion of remembering.

In order to explain the concept of remembering Margaret E. Smith’s approach to remembrance culture will be used. Smith states: “The past remains very much part the present in Northern Ireland.” (2005: 59) Despite manifold interpretations and scientific approaches toward the Troubles and their consequences – given the lively remembrance culture this sentence remains undoubtedly truthful. As the social groups in Northern Ireland, however, do not agree on a common history of the conflict(s), both sides maintain their account of what happened. These accounts utilise different epochs, different events, different calamities that have befallen their group in order to underline “their history” and resulting thereof, why only their history is the correct one. Reflecting on this, following question arises: Why do the wounds of injustices, or injustices that are only perceived as such by one social group take so long to heal? Smith attempts to answer this complex question by elaborating on her interdisciplinary concept of inherited trauma.

Inherited traumas are notions of past calamities that affected one’s group in the past. “An experience of catastrophe is carried psychologically from one generation to the next and, while memory of that event is likely to be maintained in the public arena through rhetorical history, the personal effect can be understood as separate and profound” (2005: 30). Smith’s concept of inherited trauma has the ambitious aim of explaining the highly emotive responses of members of a social group whose ethno-nationalist or master narratives are perceived as threatened with a historio-psychological approach. Her theory entails that chosen past traumas, be it the loss of statehood, massacred civilians, loss of a battle/territory etc., engrave themselves into ethno- nationalist narratives via historical memory. Historical memory works selectively, thus not every trauma will be present within a narrative; frequently they will also lie dormant. However, Smith argues that: “Mobilization by an elite can recharge historical memories, but this is only possible because some imprint from the past is already in place.” (2005: 31) The means of transport from one generation to another works via a process Smith named transgenerational transmission. (Smith 2005: 30-1)

As shown above social groups will pass on their narrations and interpretations of the past to the subsequent generation via transgenerational transmission. Smith calls the result of this process historical memory, which encompasses emotionally charged notions of the “true” history of a group and interpretative patters of the own group’s identity. (cf. Smith 2005: 30 ff.) That this historical memory is indeed rather ahistorical, as it functions based on emotions and mobilisation rather than objectivity and criticism needs no further clarification. As the conveyed narratives frequently focus on the traumas afflicted by the “other” they tend to be exceedingly

13 chauvinist. And here is exactly where education obliged to “rational objective criticism” (Smith 2005: 74) comes into play. Given the segregated nature of schooling, and the biased and mutually exclusive manner in which the Northern Irish communities’ remembrance cultures function institutionalised fact-based history is invaluable.

In the author’s firm opinion objective history instruction can and has to function as a counterbalance – not only, but especially – in post-conflict countries. However, how is objectivity measurable in this context and which parameters can be utilised in order to gain insights of a process as complex as (historic) learning? The answer is simple: we cannot. As concise data concerning historical and political learning of Northern Irish youth is lacking, the paper will use two distinct didactic concepts of Peter Seixas that address six factors that he insists attribute to historical learning. The first concept is called historical significance. This concept is coined around the question of ‘What is significant enough to remember it?’ (cf. Seixas 2013). The second concept that will be utilised in this paper is called cause and consequence. This concept explores the systemic nature of history, by attributing certain consequences to preceding events that have caused them. (ibid.) The didactic assessment, which will be conducted in chapter three, will attempt to analyse the schoolbook and deductible insights from it that concern learning according to these concepts.

(c) Does the examined British schoolbook fulfil the Northern Irish curricular requirements and pedagogical guidelines as stated in the EMU (and The Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007?)

School fulfils an important function as mediator between the scientific community and the public. Conveying scientific interpretations of the Troubles via teaching to the next generation. Schoolbook texts can be seen as the intersection between academia and schools’ everyday life. Therefore, they take an important position, which is well worth investigation. When focusing on teaching about the Northern Ireland conflict several questions arise. For example: How is teaching regulated in terms of conflict-sensitisation or awareness-raising about the “other”? What footprint have the Troubles left behind in terms of curricular requirements and to what degree will those requirements be addressed in history teaching? At this point one may ask why that much attention is paid on the curriculum. As education policies regulates teaching as the intersection of science, schooling and politics it is highly important. Curricula can also be regarded as the manifestation of the political discourse or consensus. What a society has not yet agreed upon – will not be taught in schools. Additionally, curricula in post-conflict societies

14 ought to have the high standard of attempting to ameliorate social atmosphere and counteract effects of prejudiced ethno-nationalist narrations.

In order to answer research question (c) current statutory curricular provisions in Northern Ireland will be consulted. The exploration will be conducted along two education policies in particular: “The Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007” and the “EMU (Education for Mutual Understanding)”. Key concepts toward historic and political learning and approaches toward interculturality from both statutory education programmes will be analysed referring to their compatibility with contemporary history instruction. The insights required in order to answer this research question will be delivered in chapter 4.3 Curricular Compatibility Analysis.

The Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007 – subsequently simply referred to as the Education Order and the EMU [note: Education for Mutual Understanding] both have statutory character – meaning their contents have to be embedded in Northern Irish teaching. (Smith 2005: 143-5) In chapter three it will be disclosed which requirements the curricula prescribe. Subsequently it will be attempted to assess to which degree history teaching meets these prescriptions.

As we are aware that there does not exist such a thing as “the teaching” this paper attempts to focus on teaching as a it would be prescribed by History for CCEA GCSE. Thus, this curricular compatibility analysis will draw on the thought experiment of a hypothetical teacher who conducts his lessons merely relying on the schoolbook for input. Curricular compatibility analysis in this experiment means a comparison of statutory provisions on education in Northern Ireland with didactic implications of teaching along History for CCEA GCSE.

2. Historic Overview The following chapter will provide a mostly chronological summary of the historic key events and socio-economic processes that shaped and to a degree continue to shape the Irish isle to this day. Additionally, certain cultural practises which have their roots in past events will be highlighted in order to indicate how vivid (Northern) Irish remembrance culture is. (cf. Smith 2005: 59-63) The question of how far back in time the provided summary shall reach was a difficult one; as this chapter strives to provide a brief but insightful outline of the history that led to the Troubles. More specifically the question arose whether this section of the paper would commence with the influx of Scottish and English settlers on the island; or whether the synopsis should date back considerably further until the Anglo-Norman invaders first attempted to

15 dominate the Gaelic populace. It was opted for both. The arrival of the Anglo-Normans marks the beginning of this chapter’s chronological narration. However, a more in-depth portrayal of the state of affairs will commence with the colonisation of Ulster by Protestant British families. This decision was taken deliberately according to Peter Seixas' concept of 'historical significance', which derives from his research in the field of history didactics. Seixas argues that if a topic will be taught in school it must be significant in a number of ways in order to enhance the pupils’ historical thinking (Seixas 2013: 3-10). Otherwise the topic does not meet his pedagogical-didactic requirements in context of teaching history.

In order to transfer his thoughts on this summarising chapter it was decided that the Scottish- English land seizure in the early 17th century had a considerable impact on the societal environment and the development of group identities of the different confessional communities, as well as their later cohabitation. Along Seixas' thought process, it appears legitimate to initiate the in-depth summary of this chapter with the establishment of the so-called Ulster plantations, as these developments changed the ethnic, denominational and socio-economic composition of Ulster. Especially as the two later conflict parties [note: nationalism, and unionism], including their prejudiced narratives toward the “other”, and their feeling of being wronged originate from this period. Thus, it can be argued that this period of colonising was one of the most essential factors that started the process leading to the deteriorating of Catholic-Protestant relations and lead to continuously erupting violence in the course of the subsequent two centuries later. Summing up, it will be attempted to provide a chronological outline of socio-economic and political processes that shaped the two Irish entities. Additionally, the most important key events of Irish history and their embedding into the historical memories of the respective social groups will be pointed out.

The Beginning of English Expansionism Throughout the last millennium numerous British rulers attempted to expand their area of influence to Ireland with varying success. Anglo-Normans first arrived in the second part of the 12th century during the reign of Henry II. Smith states that the populace, which the Anglo- Normans encountered there, were "intermingled Celts and Vikings who had invaded [Ireland] in the previous thousand years." (2005:41) According to Otto [the Anglo-Normans’] main motivation was a strategical one, namely being able to defend the western coast of the English kingdom and in order to block the potential gateway for invaders coming from the continent. (2005:11-12) This fear of foreign invasions would become true to the extent that foreign armies attempted to land in Ireland in order to destabilise English rule there. Examples of unsuccessful 16 landing operations on the Irish shores were the Spanish Armada, attempting to support Irish rebellion or French troops trying to join forces with Gaelic armies at the time of the Glorious Revolution and again later during the U.S. American War of Independence. (Otto 2005: 31)

Starting with the first Anglo-Norman invasion the English and later British monarchs frequently crossed the Irish channel and equally frequently clashed violently with the Gaelic lords and kings. Until Henry VIII, however, they were unable to expand English rule beyond modern day Dublin and its surroundings, the so-called Pale. (ibid.) Henry VIII. was the first English ruler who styled himself King of Ireland and sent a royal governor, under the title Lord Deputy to Dublin, thus claiming Ireland in its entirety. (ibid.) Nevertheless, aside from his rather obvious political and military interest in Ireland, it was another action taken by Henry VIII. which proved to be equally significant to Irish history; his breach with the Pope. Even though the Northern Ireland conflict cannot be described as a confessional conflict – denomination was and still is one of the main contributing factors for a sense of group identity of both communities. Hence Henry VIII.'s detaching from the pope and the Roman-Catholic Church and the establishment of the Protestant Churches of England and Ireland, prove to be of significance even half a millennium later.

However, even after massive military engagements English rule in Ireland was not stable at that time. During the reign of Elizabeth I., Henry VIII.'s daughter small uprisings (cf. Otto 2005: 12) in Ireland were the order of the day. In 1593, however, the discontent with the situation resulted in an open rebellion lead by Gaelic chieftains. This "9 Years' War" as denominated by the Irish, claimed more than 100.000 lives, devastated most of Ulster and ultimately caused the English to grasp legislative powers over Ireland in its entirety. (cf. Otto 2005:13) As a consequence numerous counts and members of the Gaelic nobility fled the island. British administration used this for a large-scale land reform in Ulster, (ibid.) as this province was the home to numerous clan chiefs threatening English rule. The crown confiscated the land often brutally, by expelling entire Catholic families who had worked the land and forcing them to migrate to the bleak western coast; an area called Connaught. From this time of early colonisation derives the Protestant parole "To Hell or to Connaught!" (Otto 2005: 21) This saying expresses the Protestant aspiration that Catholics are to leave Ulster for good, and if they did not comply the had to endure the consequences. The parole became bitter truth after Oliver Cromwell's declaration of the republic and his invasion of Ireland. Cromwell's professional army occupied Ireland, which for most parts had remained loyal to the crown and disowned nearly all Catholic landowners and forced them either into exile in Connaught or into slavery

17 in the West Indies. (ibid.) This period with Cromwell’s equally brutal and numerous massacres is still actively remembered in the nationalist narrative of victimhood. (cf. Smith: 62)

Cromwell’s Shadow and the beginning of the Penal Laws Around the 15th century the first of a series of discriminatory legislative against Catholics took effect – the Penal Laws. The rearrangement of ownership status of the now vacant farmland went hand in hand with the strategy of colonising Ulster. Once the Catholic landowners and tenants had disappeared the land was to be of redistributed to English and Scottish colonists. Smith describes the anticipated role of the newly arriving planters as following: "The settlers were required to be Protestant so that the plantations would reduce the hold of Catholicism in Ireland. They were expected to clear their estates completely of native Irish, build defensive works, bring in craftsmen, found schools, and build parish churches." (2005:42) The crown reckoned these settlers were more likely to remain loyal to the crown than the restless Gaelic populace had been. By politically creating a Protestant population majority London hoped to pacify the province of Ulster, which regularly had been the hotspot of Gaelic lords', as well as peasants' resistance to English rule. (cf. Otto 2005: 15)

50 Shades of Orange: The Glorious Revolution and Remembrance Culture The time of the Glorious Revolution is one of the most commemorated epochs in unionist and loyalist historical memory. This is illustrated by figure 1, which shows an Orange Order march that took place in Scotland in 2018. This particular march is of interest for two reasons. First, it was led by Arlene Foster, who currently heads the strongest political party in Northern Ireland – the DUP; thus, causing a great deal of controversy. Second, due to the march’s location outside of Northern Ireland. This stems from the fact that diaspora members of a social group bring their cultural practises along. Due to emigration from the British Isles during the times of colonialism unionist or loyalist cultural practises can be found in numerous former British colonies, ranging from Canada to Australia (cf. Britannica (2019) ‘Orange Order’ (Online) Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orange-Order [Accessed on 15th April 2019]).

(figure 1: Denominations in Northern Ireland: The National (2018) [Online] Available at: https://www.thenational.scot/news/16264902.twitter- reacts-to-arlene-fosters-decision-to-attend-orange- order-march/ [Accessed on June 12th 2019]).

In 1685, after Cromwell’s republican years, the British parliament reinstated the monarchy, declaring the Catholic James II. of house Stuart as their king (cf. Otto 2005: 31). His reign was short and characterised by constant confessional disputes within Great Britain and the leading class (ibid.). Ultimately, he lost his throne in the course of the Glorious Revolution. This is perhaps the liveliest manifestation of remembrance culture in Northern Ireland. As it is Northern Ireland, however, its underlying meaning is considerably varying to the two biggest social groups: For unionism remembering the Glorious Revolution and what it entails resembles a giant neighbourhood party, including marches, bands, and bonfires. The nationalist spectrum, on the other hand, tells this story rather differently: According to Smith the Glorious Revolution and unionist memory thereof amplify nationalists’ master narrative of being supressed, defeated, discriminated against and victimised by Protestants (cf. Smith 2005: 60-1). Supporters of nationalism will relive these inherited traumas every July when the marching season and unionist commemorative cultural practices are at a peak.

According to Otto growing inter-confessional caution, which stemmed – at least on the Catholic side – to a considerable degree from the discriminatory Penal Laws lead to frequent tensions and even mass killings on both sides (cf. Otto 2005: 18). Hence sectarian mistrust and ere already smouldering when the Glorious Revolution took place in 1688-99. The British monarch James II. – a Catholic – was expelled into French exile by a Protestant coalition of British nobility under the Dutch prince and James’ son-in-law William of Orange (Otto 2005: 21-3). The French government, at the outset of the 17th century involved in numerous wars against an anti-French coalition, among others consisting of the Netherlands, supported James’ claim and supported him militarily with expedition forces that landed in Ireland, which for the most part remained loyal to the Catholic throne-contestant (ibid.).

Along the British master narrative historiographers have called this dynastic caesura “glorious” as it was a coup mostly without bloodshed The Glorious Revolution was bloodless, however, only on the British isle. On the Irish isle the picture was a different one. After William consolidated his rule in Britain he and his forces landed in Ireland in 1690 several large-scale

19 military engagements were fought (cf. Otto 2005: 23). Here the strong Anglo-centric perspective numerous British historiographers adopted becomes evident. Massacres, victories, or even defeats of this period became important milestones in the respective historical memories (cf. Smith 2005: 28 ff.), thereby decisively shaping group identity and determining their commemorative cultural practises (cf. Smith 2005: 16 ff.). In numerous instances, their legacy is traceable to the present. The unionist fraternal order "Apprentice Boys of Derry" (cf. figure 1), for example, is one of the most prominent and common unionist cultural practises that traces its (ideological) origins back to the times of the Glorious Revolution.

The siege of (London-)Derry in Catholic forces under King James II. besieged the mostly Protestant city of (London-)Derry thirteen apprentice boys closed the city gates, preventing the Catholic army from sacking the city, even though the Protestant commander of the heavily- outnumbered defending troops was prepared to hand over the city. (Otto 2005: 23) This act of disobedience and its subsequent propagandistic overuse had a deep impact on the Anglican settlers' identity of feeling surrounded by enemies and on cultural practices of future generations. Researchers as well as the popular scientific community thus use the term "siege mentality" in order to describe the contemporary unionist and loyalist communities’ often rigid political views. (Otto 2005: 19)

Ulster Plantations and Settler Mentality At the beginning of the 18th century Ireland was completely conquered. British laws and the execution thereof were enforced throughout the island. The leading class was the so-called "Protestant Ascendancy". (Otto 2005: 24) They consisted of nobility and gentry and were members of the Church of Ireland, the official Anglican Church. Members of the Ascendancy held all political power in Ireland by controlling the parliament in Dublin. Simultaneous with the rise of the Ascendancy, came the almost complete exclusion of Catholics from economic and political life: They were banned from passive and from active voting, they were not allowed to own a horse or a weapon, neither was it possible for them to send their children to school. (Otto 2005: 26) Additionally, Cromwell's anti-Catholic confiscation policies further weakened the economic position of the native Irish. (Otto 2005: 24-25)

In terms of the construction of the identity of the Catholic Irish two past events are of outstanding historical significance. First, the installations of the Ulster plantations including the influx of Protestant settlers. Catholicism thus rose to the position of main marker of difference and thus identity:

“Settler colonialism began a process that denied dignity of one group by another, coalesced Protestant-Catholic difference, and encouraged the development of nationalist programs. A long accumulated history of confrontation has supplied a rich catalogue of narratives and symbols to characterize the conflict.” (Smith, 2005: 68)

Another main point of identity building was the call for Home Rule which will be the main demand of Catholic Irish in the 18th century. This development s of great importance for the historical memory of the nationalist community; as starting from this point in time it is actually legitimate to speak of a nationalist narrative (Smith 2005: 61). As this paper aims for maintaining an approximate chronological order more on this can be found below.

At the outset of the 18th century, not only the political control of the English was all-embracing, also their economic superiority was outstanding, and the enforcement of the harsh penal laws ensured Protestant dominance for generations to come. Otto notes that while only 5% of the farmland was still possessed by Catholics, the remaining 95% were owned by approximately 5.000 Anglican landowners. (2005: 25) Ironically, even after accumulating that much political potency and economic superiority Protestants still felt unsafe of their privileged position. Smith argues that the rigorous rejection of Westminster plans to abolish or soften up the penal laws from the Dublin parliament stems from the feeling of insecurity due to the Catholic population majority throughout the island; of course, with the exception of several Ulster counties. (2005: 42-43)

As a result of the British settlement policy, however, the tax revenues from the confiscated lands decreased substantially. (cf. Otto 2005: 13) According to Otto the reduced tax income is an indicator for a lack of willing emigrants from Great Britain. Until the 1620s approximately 20.000 colonists arrived and settled in Ulster. The majority of the settlers were Scottish tenants of Presbyterian denomination; they quickly took on a new cultural identity as Ulster-Scots, whereas the planters coming from England mostly preserved their English, respectively British identities. (cf. Otto 2005: 29) The figure of 20.000, however, was comparatively low, especially when regarding the expectations of the royal court. (cf. Otto 2005: 15) The number would only significantly augment due to a famine that occurred in Scotland. That famine would push many families in search for a new livelihood across the Irish Sea into Ulster, where they could work the land offered to them by the crown to tax-privileged rates (ibid.).

With a constantly rising number of Protestant settlers in Ulster the beginning of confessional conflict was imminent (Otto 2005: 18). Due to the economic and political inequalities of the Catholic Gaelic and the Protestant Anglo-Scottish communities the societal climate started to

21 deteriorate rapidly. Catholics were neither allowed to own land, to tenure land, nor to work for Protestants; it only became entirely legal for Catholics to purchase land after Westminster approved of a reform of legislation in 1782, abolishing the so-called penal laws. (cf. Otto 2005: 31) Numerous Catholics, especially those rich enough to hypothetically purchase land had felt disadvantaged by this legislation. Even with the gradual termination of these laws that discriminated against Catholics this long period of institutionalised discrimination continues to play an important role in the historical memory of the nationalist community (cf. Smith 2005: 61-2).

One of the three social groups was the English or Anglican community: They were members of the established Church of Ireland. In general, they were large-scale landowners or practised academic professions. The second Protestant community were coming from Scotland, unlike the Anglicans they belonged to Presbyterian Churches. Descendants of the Scottish settlers frequently worked as craftsmen or were employed in the linen industry or in the trade sector. In contrast to their Protestant companions from England they developed a strong group identity as "Ulster Scots". (Otto 2005: 29) The third group was the local Irish population. The vast majority of the Irish were Roman-Catholic. Generally speaking, they worked as small-scale tenants of land. More rarely Catholics were also found cultivating their own land, nevertheless the yields reaped from their properties were hardly able to compete with the ones from Protestant estates economically. This is in general due to the smaller sizes of land owned or leased by Catholics, if they happened to possess land at all. (Otto 2005: 29)

The Development of Modern Irish Identities In the course of time and especially during the era of rising ethno-nationalist feelings, however, the differences between Anglican and Ulster Scot faded. Instead, the Protestant community in its entirety adopted a colonial nationalist identity. (Otto 2005: 30) Otto argues that a starting point for this development can be seen in the time of the time of the US-American War of Independence. (ibid.) As British forces were for the most part being deployed in the Americas, the Protestant elites feared uprisings due to the lack of British military personnel stationed on the island. The Protestants thus had to raise their own militias in order to protect their vast possessions throughout Ireland. Otto defines the establishment of and payment for their own militia units as an identity-contributing momentum of the Protestant community’s self- perception. (2005: 30) These economic, social and political discriminations that would last for more than a century were among others a reason explaining Irish Catholics' poorer living conditions, limited access 22 to higher education and political participation as well as higher birth-rates that were societal characteristics of the Catholic community in Ulster until recently (Otto 2005: 29). The case of Ulster is of special interest for this paper, as Northern Ireland would be established on most of the territory of this historic region. Due to the early Protestant settlement policy and the creation of the Ulster plantations the ethnic and social composition of Ulster varies significantly from the rest of Ireland. Otto argues that in early to mid-18th century the society in Ulster was fragmented into three distinct parts differing in their social rank, accent, customs, clothes and most importantly in their confessions. (ibid.) In the course of time and especially during the era of rising ethno-nationalist feelings, however, the differences between Anglican and Ulster Scot faded. Instead, the Protestant community in its entirety adopted a colonial nationalist identity. (Otto 2005: 30) Otto argues that a starting point for this development can be seen in the time of the time of the US-American War of Independence. (ibid.) As British forces were for the most part being deployed in the Americas, the Protestant elites feared uprisings due to the lack of British military personnel stationed on the island. The Protestants thus had to raise their own militias in order to protect their vast possessions throughout Ireland. Otto defines the establishment of and payment for their own militia units as an identity-contributing momentum of the Protestant community’s self- perception. (2005: 30)

The Great Famine (Smith 2005: 44-45) The Great Hunger was a period that shaped the Irish collective memory persistently. Some in republican circles still suspect an ‘Irish genocide’ organised by the British. Smith notes about the agricultural circumstances preceding the potato rot that would cause mass starvation that “the Irish had become heavily dependent on the potato because growing enough potatoes to feed a family did not require very much land.” (2005: 44) When the blight appeared in 1845 and “rotted the roots and leaves of the potato plants” (ibid.) it was nothing exceptional, as such a rot had appeared before. The unusual and drastic extent of the famine can only be explained as the potato rot struck again the following year. (ibid.) However, not all parts of the island were affected equally by this famine. According to Smith the counties of Ulster suffered less than the southern counties, as the northern Protestants were mostly large-scale landowners, able to feed from their agricultural yields. (2005:44-45) Smith states that the consequences of the famine were dire: “[a]t least a million people out of a population of 8 million died in the famine, and a further 1.5 million emigrated. In a ten-year period, the population dropped 35 percent.” (2005:44).

The British government was and still is subject to strong criticism of the manner it dealt with the crisis. The experiences and suffering of the famine have shaped the narratives around Irish history to this day; hence this inherited trauma evidently continues to affect the nationalist narrative; it is probably one if not the biggest event that is categorised by Smith into narratives of victimhood (cf. Smith 2005: 62). Numerous past and present Irish nationalists claim that the government acted along a strategy of combatting the Irish overpopulation (some even speak of an Irish holocaust) by withholding much needed food. (Otto 2005: 41) These allegations, however, do not do justice to the relief efforts on the part of Great Britain, no matter how late, insufficient, or poorly organised they may have been. Smith assesses the British relief measures as following:

“Westminster contributed some seven million pounds in aid, or just under half of the total amount paid in famine relief. From one point of view it was the first time a European state had done as much to cope with a natural disaster; from another, it was a pitiful response, considering that the annual tax revenue of the United Kingdom at this time was about 53 million pounds, and the United Kingdom was the preeminent world power.” (- Smith 2005: 45)

It can be stated that the accusations suggesting that British authorities attempted to reduce Irish overpopulation via “Malthusian thinking” and according actions (Otto 2005: 41) are exaggerated. According to Otto the problem can rather be seen in the uneven distribution of land; with more than two thirds of farmland belonging to approximately 2,000 people (Otto 2005: 41). This economic discrimination, which stemmed from the Cromwell- and Penal Laws- era, lead to an inferior economic position of the (Catholic), which was to last for centuries. Apart from this the lack of cultivation area meant death to many thousands of micro-subsistence farmers and their families.

Another major point of criticism concerning the British authorities’ dealing with the famine derives from the implications their liberal labour policies had on the Irish market. As any other British colonial market, the Irish economy was strongly regulated by Westminster. (Smith 2005: 44) The objective of ensuring the largest possible revenues for UK entrepreneurs while simultaneously shielding its enormous domestic market can be characterised as a balancing act between commencing economic liberalism and a tough protectionist stance. (ibid.) However, unlike the still circulating allegations that Westminster deliberately starved a million Irish to death, it cannot be rebutted that the British policies contributed to the deterioration of the situation.

It has to be pointed out, at this point, that UK authorities were caught by the liberal zeitgeist. Numerous measures that initially aimed at aiding the starving masses proved ultimately futile. For instance, the lifting of trade tariffs on wheat and the subsequent import of grain from the Americas did nothing to facilitate the situation as distribution problems arose and the only real users of this measure were traders in the port cities. (Smith 2005: 44) Additionally the British authorities initially rejected giving out free food, as this clearly contradicted the liberal- economic maxim of a non-interventionist government policy, and more importantly it would provide goods to the populace without returning services. Thus, Westminster took steps towards “[institutionalising] public work projects that would employ people so that they could pay for food. Money to finance these public works projects was not sent to Ireland […] rather, relief works were to be financed in Ireland. This placed a level of pressure on the Irish economy that it was unable to bear.” (Smith 2005: 44)

Awakening of Irish Nationalism(s) The 19th century was a formative period to several, at parts contradicting identities. The nationalist and liberal waves coming from the mainland did not circumvent the British Isles. In combination with “the galvanising effects of the Great Famine” (Smith 2005: 44) they had a profound impact on the Irish political system. According to Smith the high death toll and the influences of these schools of thoughts contributed to the creation and growth of radical formations (ibid.). Cultural nationalists such as Douglas Hyde (the founder of the “Gaelic League”) and Padraig Pearse (founder and first headmaster of St. Enda’s School) sought to reassert a Celtic-Irish cultural identity through a revival of the Gaelic language, celebrating traditional sports and activities, and teaching a heroic and nationalist interpretation of Irish history (Hutchinson, 1987). An overlap between cultural and militant Irish nationalism was frequent. A good example for this is Pearse, who was to play an important role in the Easter Rising and nationalist memory thereof.

Evidence suggests that in the same period Anglican and Protestant communities developed a distinct colonial identity; resembling identities adopted by colonial administrative elites throughout the British Empire. The emergence of an Irish colonial identity was promoted by two factors. First, the Irish economy was in a seriously disadvantaged position compared to Great Britain. British administration interfered with the trade routes heading to and originating from Ireland as goods were only allowed to be exported from British ports. Belfast, however, had become one of the Empire’s largest ports and Ulster which used to be one of the poorest provinces of Ireland prospered as linen and shipbuilding industries grew. (Otto 2005: 36) 25

Anglican industrials demanded the opening of colonial markets to Irish entrepreneurs and direct access to Irish harbours. (Otto 2005: 37 ff.) By implication the Anglicans, who were the majority of large-scale employers and industrials, were affected the hardest by these trade barriers.

This economic burden was, however, not the only point of friction between the Anglican community and the “homeland”. In 1800/1801 the Act of Union was ratified and implemented by Westminster (White 2004: 7), dissolving Irish legislative structures and abolishing the Church of Ireland’s status as state church, thereby loosing revenues as Catholics had to pay a contribution to the Anglican state church regardless of their denomination (Otto 2005: 36). Instead of having a parliament in Dublin (note: the parliament was predominantly Anglican) Ireland was to send 100 representatives to the House of Commons and some 30 delegates into the House of Lords (Otto 2005: 36). A Scottish parliament research paper suggests, however, that the participation granted to Ireland was not representative. White states that “[…] Ireland, with almost one third of the new UK's population, was granted only 100 of the 658 seats” (White 2004:7). Concluding it can be stated that a lack of economic and political participation catered for friction between and British authorities’ Irish elites, which were keen on full participatory equality.

However, the Act of Union was not only a point of friction between the Anglican upper-class and Westminster, also the increasingly political-conscious nationalist block felt tricked by the British authorities. (cf. Smith 2005: 62) In their desire to promote and subsequently apply the Act of Union Westminster MPs assured the Catholic Irish that if the legislative proposal passed the vote, they would obtain the right participate in elections. However, after the act was passed London reneged on this guarantee; thereby sustainably losing the trust of the Catholic Irish community (ibid.).

Considering the above it appears as no surprise that major figures of Irish nationalism were Protestant. This variety of nationalism, however, was coined by a civic, rather than an identity- based nationalism. This type of nationalism was inspired by the state-understanding and the spirit of the French Revolution (Smith 2005: 43), in which notions of citizenship became prominent. Paradoxically – considering the later unfolding events – the (civic) nationalist Protestant community in Ulster was the keenest on inviting Catholics into their project. Smith suggests that elsewhere Protestants were less welcoming as they feared Catholics’ numerical superiority (ibid.). With the Irish political discourse focusing on Home Rule nationalism ultimately became ethnicity-based, away from more citizenship-based civic variety (ibid.).

According to Otto the first half of the 19th century, political and social fronts hardened and the currently used terminology gradually evolved: "Irish, Catholic, nationalist became synonyms". (Otto 2005: 34). Thus, civic nationalism comprising Catholics and Protestants was a short-lived project that gave way to more partisan conceptions.

The Stony Path to Home Rule In the late 18th and early 19th century Irish domestic politics were marked by the antagonistic struggle to provoke or avoid Home Rule; especially “the 1880s were a crucial turning point in Irish politics and in the development of the character of Irish nationalism.” (Smith 2005:45) According to Smith Irish nationalism, represented in the House of Commons by the IPP (Irish Parliamentary Party) sought to influence Westminster decision making for the benefit of Home Rule. (2005:43) This bill would entail an extended range of influence for a Dublin parliament, devolving numerous fields of responsibility such as jurisprudence, and most legislative powers from Westminster to Ireland. However, areas such as foreign policy and the defence agenda would still be administrated from London. (ibid.) Politically speaking Home Rule was thus a devolution of certain powers, much rather than a declaration of independence. From a constitutional perspective Dublin would have to recognise the British monarch as head of state and Ireland’s status as a Dominion among the nations in the British Empire.

On the other side, there exists the Anglican community, with most of their members strongly opposing the idea of Home Rule. According to Smith several developments have to be taken into account in order to explain the far-reaching unionist aversion to any form of Irish self- governance. Firstly, the old Anglican elites were losing their grip on political power, as the number of Irish voters increased substantially. Smith states: “Land reforms of 1879 had tripled the Irish electorate by giving tenant farmers the possibility to purchase their land and thus, as landowners, gain the vote.” (2005: 45) The fear of political marginalisation thus contributed to the divide between Ireland’s social groups.

Additionally, anti-Catholic unionists felt alienated by the active involvement of the Catholic Church in the nationalist strive for Home Rule. (ibid.) The Protestant groups were profoundly worried by the convergence of Catholic and nationalist interest. Hence, the division along ethnic and political lines that characterise Ireland until today was already tangible more than a hundred years ago. Before the beginning of the 19th century there was still a small number of prominent Protestant figures advocating a holistic civic nationalism or the “Catholic emancipation” (Smith 2005:45). However, as the Irish nationalism was increasingly perceived as an ethnic matter, 27

Protestant Irish nationalists became peripheral phenomena. They were remnants of a nationalism of civic character as had been promoted by Wolfe Tone several decades earlier. (Smith 2005:43)

With the political weakening of the House of Lords came a successive militarisation of unionism as a response to the growing likelihood of Home Rule. After a constitutional crisis, triggered by the House of Lords vetoing a House of Commons budgetary act new procedural strategies were implemented. (Otto 2005: 52 ff.) This was done in order to limit the area of influence of the House of Lords. From then on, the Upper House could only postpone legislation, which had been approved by the House of Commons, not block it as it used to be the case. If the MPs passed the same legislative proposal three times the Lords' veto became void. Starting in the 1910s the UUC (Ulster Unionist Council), an umbrella association comprising multi-faceted unionist organisations began to secretly purchase weapons from German arms manufacturers. Most noteworthy were the years preceding to World War I in which not only unionists but also nationalists imported large quantities of rifles and ammunition from Germany. (Otto 2005: 55)

In 1913 The UUC agreed on the establishment of an armed loyalist military force: the Ulster Voluntary Forces (UVF). The UVF would obtain their weapons from the arms delivery mentioned above. The unionist militarisation proved to be a significant problem for the British government as they were divided on the grounds whether loyalists could morally or technically be engaged by the British army. According to Otto this was underlined by the statement from the officer commanding the Dublin garrison that in the case of a nationalist-unionist civil war his forces would not take up arms against loyalist paramilitaries from the UVF. (2005: 56) The imminent threat of civil war was omnipresent. Even more after the Home Rule draft was approved by the House of Commons in May 1914 for the third time, thus circumventing the Lords' veto. (Otto 2005: 58) The fact that in mid-1914 numerous war correspondents gathered in Belfast hotels, expecting to report of the civil war that would certainly erupt soon illustrates how likely the outbreak of violence must have seemed. The beginning of the First World War, however, postponed the direct confrontation between Ulster Volunteer Forces and Irish- nationalist fighters. (ibid.)

Initially the war euphoria seemed to cover the deep divide between the political opponents in Ireland. The UVF eagerly declared they would contribute 35.000 soldiers to the British expedition corps, which were allowed to serve in their own division. The unionists' enthusiasm

28 would later prove to be a significant political asset in Westminster, as numerous British politicians of all parties were impressed by the high number of volunteers joining the British army, and later by the high number of casualties. (Otto 2005: 60) This form of patriotism displayed by the Protestants of Ireland was not surprisingly very well received in a time of exuberant nationalism. (Otto 2005: 60-1) Throughout Northern Ireland, the battle of the Somme still plays an important part in the unionist remembrance culture. Smith points out that to this day unionist and in particular loyalist organisations celebrate the UVF war effort and embed it in their annual marching season. (2005: 60-1) They are portraying symbolism from the First World War, especially medals and imagery from the 36th Ulster Division. Thus, attempting to simulate a continuity between UVF-WWI fighters and contemporary loyalist paramilitaries. (ibid.)

The UVF's Catholic counterpart, the Irish Volunteers, however, also assisted the British war efforts with a substantial number of troops. Although they were not allowed to form their own division, unlike the fighters coming from the UVF. This caused a lot of controversy in the Catholic ranks. Otto argues that British war administration felt uneasy with transferring too much commanding power to the (Catholic) Irish combatants, as they could apply that knowledge against the British armed forces in Ireland, once the war was over. Hence the British war cabinet avoided forming an all-Catholic Irish unit during World War I. (2005: 59) Unlike their Protestant brothers-in-arms the Catholic Irish war effort did not engrave itself into the community’s historical memory to such a profound extent. (Smith 2005: 61-2)

The number of volunteers, Protestant as well as Catholic, remained high throughout the first two years of the Great War. Estimates suggest that approximately 170.000 Irish soldiers served in the British armed forces until 1918. According to Otto this number contained almost half the male population of suitable age for military service. (2005: 59) Hence it is legit to argue that a vast proportion of the Irish had at least rudimentary military experience. Following World War I nationalists as well as unionists had thousands of trained soldiers in their ranks. This should not be forgotten when writing about the successive militarisation of Ireland and the subsequent outbreak of the civil war. In addition to the high number of potential soldiers and the deep mistrust between unionist and nationalist communities, both conflict parties had arsenals, well supplied with guns and ammunition at their disposals. These factors contributed to a considerable extent to the explosive atmosphere once the war was over.

Easter Rising – a Political Catalyst However, not all Irish Volunteer fighters shared their comrades' motivation to support the British cause. According to Otto, approximately 11.000 militants rejected the course of supporting the British, as they regarded it as a British and not an Irish issue. (2005: 59) A splinter group of the nationalist Irish Volunteers, consisting only of a fraction of the anti-British militants, were not inclined to wait until the end of the war to obtain Irish independence. Furthermore, these fighters were not content with the limited prospects Home Rule would offer them, in terms of political autonomy and economic autarky. With the aim of complete independence from the British Empire and the declaration of a republic, they staged a coup in Dublin in 1916. (Otto 2005: 61) The coup would become known as the Easter Rising and although it did not succeed, it would prove to be of major significance for the political development of Ireland.

Initially the general opinion in Ireland was highly critical of the coup, as almost every family had members serving in the British armed forces in Flanders at that time. In the aftermath of the coup, however, public opinion started to shift. This was mainly due to the firm stance the British authorities took after the incident; with military courts passing approximately 90 death verdicts, out of which 16 were enforced. (Otto 2005: 60) One of which was the previously mentioned nationalist Padraig Pearse. Prior to the insurgency he was head of the St. Enda’s School. Pearse rose to a figure of national martyrdom following the capture and execution of him and several of his former students of his who fought alongside him (O’Callaghan 2009: 3- 4). Pearse played and continues to play an important role in Irish cultural remembrance. According to Otto the dwindling number of British army volunteers was due this harsh treatment of the defeated and arrested republicans. Furthermore, the British lost additional backing from the Irish public after Westminster proposed introducing compulsory military service for Ireland (Otto 2005: 60-61).

According to Smith Padraig Pearse and James Connolly, another executed leader of the Easter Rising is highly important to the nationalist narrative of the Irish conflict and the nationalist self-conception. Pearse functions as the personification of the Easter Rising in nationalist narratives. As a martyr he plays a prominent role in nationalist remembrance of the Easter Rising. Smith insists that Pearse “[…] has in some accounts taken on the characteristics of a slain Christ figure.”(Smith 2005: 62) The symbolism of presenting Pearse as a Christ-like figure is highly advantageous for the leading nationalist community, as most (illiterate) people were

30 able to understand Catholic-saviour-imagery – unlike Connolly’s difficult Marxist interpretations of the conflict. James Connolly was the first to interpret the Irish conflict from a Marxist perspective, thereby not only declaring republicanism’s arch enemy for the 20th century - British imperialism – but also effectively predefining republicanism’s future ideological stance (cf. Smith, 2005: 62).

Government of Ireland Act 1920: Two States – One Island When the First World War drew to a conclusion it unveiled a drastically altered political situation in Ireland. As in the course of the war all elections were halted the difference between 1914 and 1918 became evident when Irish men and for the first time Irish women elected their local, regional and national representatives in 1918. The results were a shock to unionists. The centre-right IPP (Irish Parliamentary Party), which used to be the biggest political party in Ireland, was almost erased from the political map. The IPP had supported the British war efforts on the one hand and Home Rule on the other, two positions which were increasingly unpopular in Ireland. The first due to war weariness that had spread after four years of armed conflict and the latter partly due sympathies with the participants of the Easter Rising and rejection of the severe penalties for the insurgents. The place of the IPP was taken by a relatively young and radical party: Sinn Féin. In the 1918 Westminster general elections they won a landslide victory; winning 73 of the 105 electoral districts. (Otto 2005: 62) According to Otto Sinn Féin was the greatest beneficiary of the Easter Rising, even though they were not directly involved in the upheaval. They were, however, a melting pot for diverse republican, nationalist and radical groups.

Second biggest winner was the Irish Unionist Alliance under William Craig; winning 22 electoral districts. (Otto 2005: 62) As mentioned before the unionist position in Westminster was strong due to unionist military support; and to put it frankly: excessive patriotic feelings. Thus, the British government regarded the unionists cause with benevolence and were more willing than in 1914 to exempt Protestant majority areas from Home Rule. As the implementation of Home Rule was only delayed due to the outbreak of World War I, unionists were eager to bring about new legislation as soon as possible. Otherwise they would have to politically submit to a parliament in Dublin, mostly controlled by republican Sinn Féin. This thought was unbearable for unionists, thus pressing for reform. According to Smith the fear of Unionist demand for an alternate solution was met with the Government of Ireland Act in 1920. (Otto 2005: 64)

This law created the boundaries that divide Northern Ireland from the south up to this date. An indicator for this line was the estimated population majority of Protestants in the northeast of the island, not as frequently and falsely assumed the historical province of Ulster. The Government of Ireland Act defined six (Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, (London-)Derry and Tyrone) of the nine counties of Ulster as belonging to Northern Ireland. There was much controversy among unionists whether the remaining three ought to be included as well. However, it was opted for their exclusion; as this left Northern Ireland with a comfortable Protestant majority. (Otto 2005: 64-65) The majority of population was regarded as a prerequisite for a functioning Northern Irish state in unionist circles, as otherwise a constant threat of impending reunification was feared.

As previously stated, Sinn Féin gained numerous seats in the general elections. The representatives, however, intended to take their seats in Dublin rather than Westminster. Sinn Féin's MPs went to realise one of their key demands and simultaneously fulfil their main campaign promise by establishing the Dáil, which is the Gaelic term for the parliament in Dublin. Following the political uncertainty that arose from the republican MPs abstaining from taking their Westminster seats and establishing what the British side called an 'illegal' parliament, (Otto 2005: 64) an armed struggle commenced in 1919. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), consisting of numerous former Irish Volunteers who had rejected to fight for the empire in the Great War, started a military campaign against personnel and infrastructure of the Irish police forces, the so-called Royal Irish Constabulary and the infamous 'Black and Tans', an auxiliary police force, consisting mainly of World War I veterans. They were soon to be feared throughout Ireland due to their harsh acts of retaliation against civilians after IRA attacks. (Otto 2005: 63)

The 1920 council elections in Northern Ireland lead to the spreading of violence from south to north. Numerous councils in border areas or electoral districts with strong Catholic population were won by Sinn Féin. Most remarkably was the case of (London-)Derry, Northern Ireland's second biggest city in which elected republican councillors pledged allegiance to the Dáil in the south rather than the Stormont administration (Otto 2005: 65). This imminent danger of partial secession caused the unionist government to demand troops from the British in order to defend their territorial integrity. (ibid.) A questionable measure was soon implemented: The redrawing of electoral district. A practise that is known today as gerrymandering. Electorate districts’ lines were amended to the extent that the unionism had the majority of city councillors in predominantly nationalist (London-)Derry. From the outset of the 1920 turbulences the

32 violence had a strong sectarian character. The bloodshed in Northern Ireland ended relatively quickly, however, with the beginning of the Irish Civil War violence crossed the inner-Irish border once again.

Preceding the outbreak of the Irish Civil War was the aforementioned guerrilla-styled warfare the IRA raged against police and military forces under British command. This led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. (Otto 2005: 66) Core of the treaty was the creation of the Irish Free State, which would enjoy greater legislative freedoms than codified in the Government of Ireland Act a year before. The Free State, however, would be a British Dominion, thus accepting the British monarch as head of state and de jure remaining part of the British Empire. These factors contributed to a deep and far-reaching divide within the IRA and Sinn Féin. Anti-treaty republicans regarded the Anglo-Irish Treaty as betraying the cause they fought for. After much tension fighting between them and pro-treaty republicans broke out (ibid.).

The pro-treaty forces prevailed and the treaty rejecting republicans were exposed to drastic penalties from their former comrades who now began the state building process. (Otto 2005: 67) In 1922 the core element of the Anglo-Irish Treaty was realised by establishing the Irish Free State. As the British monarch was still the head of state and several other constitutional and electoral ties with Britain remained the independence was only nominal. Murphy argues that numerous political leaders of the Irish Free State had been involved in the Easter Rising of 1916 and in the subsequent clashes with British forces preceding the Anglo-Irish Treaty (cf. Murphy 2013: 3) Given the violent background of the Irish Free State’s emergence and the past of several of its leaders, it comes as no surprise that the diplomatic Anglo-Irish relations were distanced at best.

As an inner-Irish border was unacceptable to parts of the northern nationalist community they resisted to partition. This resulted in several laws that passed from the newly elected unionist government at Stormont castle. Most notably this was the Special Powers Act 1922. According to Collins this “gave the Northern government almost dictatorial powers including the right to intern […] suspected IRA men without trial” (2008: 4-5). Additionally, an auxiliary police force was to be put into service, the Ulster Special Constabulary. A part of this unit were the “B Specials” which was exclusively recruited from Protestants an soon gained a notorious reputation among Catholics due to their willingness to resort to violence (cf. McKittrick 2012: 386).

Consolidation of the Stormont System: “Years of Stability” versus “Institutionalised Discrimination” The subsequent period up to the end of World War II, as stormy and dramatic it may have been across the Irish channel, was relatively calm time for Ireland. McKittrick describes the scenario as following: “Although there were major economic changes over the decades, the basic elements of Unionist dominance, Catholic powerlessness and Westminster disregard survived relatively untouched even an event as cataclysmic as World War Two” (2012: 26). The most remarkable changes were probably due to the varying war effort of the Irish entities. Smith states that: “[…] during the Second World War [the Irish Free State] was neutral, further alienating Northern Protestants. In 1948 Ireland declared itself a republic and severed all constitutional ties with Britain.” (2005: 47) As deductible from this citation, unionists in Northern Ireland did not approve of the Irish Free State’s neutrality during World War II. According to a common unionist parole that is embedded deeply within the unionist, respectively loyalist narrative, this was perceived as the second treachery of the (Catholic) Irish against the United Kingdom – the first being 1916 Easter Rising during the First World War (cf. Smith 2005: 60).

However, the Free State did not only lose reputation within unionist grassroots, also leading unionist and more importantly British politicians changed their minds about the Irish south. Northern unionists won an ideological victory (McKittrick 2012: 69). Several prominent British politicians were not opposed to the idea of reunification before WWII. According to McKittrick Winston Churchill even offered Northern Ireland to the Free State if they joined the British war effort as part of the Allies (2012: 67). The notion of abandoning unionists in Ulster in a united Ireland against their will was thus perceived as unthinkable given their contribution to the war effort.

The two decades between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Troubles were characterised by a consolidation of the Stormont system and all it entailed: Institutionalised anti-Catholic discrimination. Paradoxically the period of 1945 up to the introduction of Direct Rule in 1972 is often referred to as “years of stability” in the literature corpus. Much rather this timespan ought to be regarded as the direct precursor to the Troubles as inequalities in participation and representation (i.e. Gerrymandering) and economic discrimination (i.e. allocation of council houses and employment) were not only ignored but even promoted by the unionist-controlled system of governance.

2.1 The Troubles The following section of this paper will deal with the eruption of violence in Northern Ireland. It will be tried to offer a description of the course of the Troubles. Furthermore, the main institutions, personalities and stake holders attempting to create or to resolve conflict. Additionally, this subchapter aims at explaining the connection between ethno-nationalist cultural practises and the sectarian violence, which frequently accompanied them; in particular the annual marching season in July for the unionist respectively loyalist block. Furthermore, political murals used as a source for propaganda will be examined.

NICRA and its Aims Since the end of World War II, the state of affairs in Northern Ireland remained almost unaltered. The unionist-controlled Stormont system had consolidated its absolute control of domestic politics, which the Stormont-system readily used to keep nationalist representation limited. (cf. Collins 2008: 40-2) By late summer of 1968, however, the situation in Northern Ireland became increasingly strained when the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association – or in short: NICRA, appeared on the stage. NICRA was an umbrella organisation of various interest groups of civic society as well as members from parties of both ideological blocks, even though unionists were far less represented than nationalists. McKittrick asserts that NICRA’s campaigns were “modelled on the tactics of the American civil rights movements, […] centring on marches and demonstrations” (McKittrick 2012: 382).

NICRA consisted mostly of groups that were pro-reunification, however, unlike previous nationalist advocacy groups neither the rhetoric nor the demands of NICRA centred around a united Ireland (cf. Collins 2008: 43). According to Collins NICRA’s key demands were: Abolition of the Special Powers Act and disbanding of the B Specials, fair allocation of council houses, ‘one man one vote’ and fair representation – i.e. the end of gerrymandering (cf. Collins 2008: 47 ff.). The emergence of the Northern Irish civil rights movement cannot be regarded isolated from other popular movements of the time. Most prominently the anti-war movements in the USA, student upheavals in major European cities such as Paris or Berlin, or the Soviet invasion into the ČSSR (cf. Smith 2005: 118). Smith argues that participation in NICRA marches were an important part of the new self-identity for a generation of better trained and politically conscious nationalists (ibid.). This process in parallel with the growth of the civil rights agitation put forward a fresh generation of young, political leaders in the nationalist community.

As previously stated, NICRA was important for the politicisation of the nationalist community and the emergence of a young generation of moderate nationalist politicians. These politicians were, for the first time since partition, more concerned with the poor housing conditions of Catholic families than whether they had an Irish or a British passport. Examples of this new type of political leaders who gave a voice to a previously muted class of population are Gerry Fitt, who won his constituency in West Belfast during the general election of 1966, thus becoming first nationalist MP in Westminster (cf. Collins 2008: 45), or John Hume, who gained a standing among nationalists during his campaign for the (London-)Derry university (Collins 2008: 40). Both of them were joint founders of the Social Democratic Labour Party – SDLP (Collins 2008: 56). The SDLP was to become the mouthpiece of the civil rights movement’s concerns and the main advocate of the nationalist block (ibid.).

Institutionalised Anti-Catholic Discrimination As mentioned above the civil rights marchers brought with themselves a catalogue of objectively regarded moderate demands, however, there is no such concept as objectivity in politics. Thus, unionism rejected these demands sharply (Collins 2008: 46), arguing that NICRA was a permeated by communist and republican elements, who sought to destroy Northern Ireland (ibid.). One of NICRA’s key demands was an end to discrimination in the allocation of council houses. This demand went hand in hand with another demand of NICRA: “One man, one vote”. This slogan stands for an equal participation in the electoral process. As the local Northern Irish councils could only be elected by owners of their own homes. Somebody who rents their home was not admitted to voting local elections. As Protestants were the more likely to own their home than Catholics due to their higher average income this discriminated parties on the nationalist spectrum as their main electorate consisted mostly of Catholics.

After World War II, the United Kingdom attempted to enhance the living conditions of its population by creating the Welfare State (Collins 2008: 24). According to Collins 95,000 new buildings were constructed (Collins 2008: 26). As the local councils were often responsible for allocating community houses to their future tenants, this became a highly politicised matter; as most local councils were controlled by unionists. Local councils frequently discriminated Catholic families by opting to give houses, for which Catholics had spent years on the waiting list to Protestants from outside the region (cf. Collins 2008: 46). One instance in Dungannon caused particular Catholic outrage: Young Catholic families were convinced by NICRA agitators to participate in squatting empty council housing. The Catholic families were evicted, 36 and the house was subsequently given to a young Protestant single woman. (cf. Collins 2008: 46 ff.).

Additionally, the councils were in power of allocating local jobs (cf. Collins 2008: 42) and drawing the electoral boundaries of their constituencies; this fraudulent strategy is called gerrymandering. Jobs in the civil services were continuously given to Protestants, and if Catholics were employed, they mostly did not exceed low rank occupation (ibid.). In terms of gerrymandering, it appears to no surprise that unionist councils drew them favourably to unionism (cf. Collins 2008: 40). As only a handful of local councils and none of the six county councils were nationalist this practise was widespread. Collins explains this electoral fraud as following: “In Derry […] in 1967 the Unionist party got 32 per cent of the vote but because of the way the wards [note: electoral constituency borders] were arranged, they got 60 per cent on the Corporation” (2008: 41). To sum up, by 1968 Stormont had established a well-working system that maintained unionist rule and simultaneously discriminated the Catholic community in terms of political participation, housing and employment.

Case Study: Civil Rights March in (London-)Derry As stated above NICRA used street-agitation in order to highlight these grievances. At one instance the organisation registered a march around (London-)Derry with the intended final stop being the main square in the city centre (cf. Collins 2008: 47 ff.). The march was, however, prohibited due to the Apprentice Boys of Londonderry’s rejection of the march’s route (cf. Collins 2008: 47 ff.). Collins argues that: “This set a pattern, repeated regularly over the next few years, in which a loyalist organisation could manipulate the police into banning a civil rights or nationalist demonstration” (Collins 2008: 47). This highly charged situation reveals an interesting and complex fight. A fight which is not only fought for participation and better housing quality. It is fought on a philosophical-ideological level; with the dominant group fending off something they perceive as an assault on the core of their identities – their historical memory – Catholics inside the city walls of (London-)derry? For unionism/loyalism this amounts to a profound insult regarding the “glorious defiance” of James II.’ Catholic forces during the Glorious Revolution and Protestants’ proud parole of “No Surrender”. Smith’s argumentation provides for an explanation of unionist reaction of the Apprentice Boys of Londonderry:

"The problem arises when partisans [note: supporters of ethno-nationalist agendas] challenge the other group’s narrative and replace it, or suppress it, with their own alternative narrative. When their own political project is 37

their primary concern, partisans are in danger of being unable to hear the genuine concerns articulated by the other group.” (- Smith 2005: 70)

Can one social group’s historical memory be more important than the right of the other group to express their perceived grievances? The answer to this issue in Northern Ireland in the 1960s was – Yes, as unionist/loyalist historical memory won the battle against nationalist freedom of assembly.

Unionism – from Battles to Bonfires Reflecting on the above, it becomes evident that democratic values and institutions were not capable of resisting growing intercommunal tensions. In a representative democracy the understanding of the past of one group should never outweigh the other group’s needs in the present. The following section will thus attempt to provide an overview of key ideological concepts within the respective ethno-nationalist narratives.

The Apprentice Boys of Londonderry is one of the biggest loyalist organisations in Northern Ireland, comparable in number only to the Orange Order (cf. McKittrick 2012: 382). Both organisations share a common ideology, and both allegedly trace back to the period of the Glorious Revolution. While this is not true in terms of temporality it is true in terms of imagery. The colour orange derives from William of Orange and the Apprentice Boys of Londonderry obtain their self-conception from the siege of (London-)Derry (cf. Smith 2005: 60). Both style themselves as loyal orders that in their self-perception uphold the Protestant culture of defending their homeland against an enemy who has the vast numerical superiority (cf. Smith 2005: 60 ff.). This prevailing feeling of being besieged in a hostile land is often referred to as the siege mentality; attempting to explain unionism’s and in particular loyalism’s irreconcilable stance toward political approximation to the “other”. This siege mentality in combination with an uncertainty about unionism’s standing in Westminster, as London has not continuously opted to take their side, and numerous inherited traumas led to a predominant sense of victimhood within the historical memory of unionism (ibid.).

Regarding the situation in the decades leading up the Troubles it may appear surprising that unionism as the clearly dominant social group in Northern Ireland had embraced the concept of victimhood in the core of their narrative. Victim-perpetrator-reversal, however, is a common practise in identity-based conflicts. Smith explains this phenomenon and the dangers it may entail as following: “[The strive for political recognition of the minority group] can lead the “dominant” group to characterize themselves as victims of the “oppressed” group. The political aim of empowerment can therefore feed an escalatory circle where each side […] believes its 38 own group’s survival depends on suppressing the other group’s narrative as well as the other groups entitlement to a say in the governing process” (Smith 2005: 70). Smith states that unionists – in their self-perception – see themselves as British: “They equate Britishness with a certain pride in the strengths of the British Empire and Commonwealth and with the rule of law, rational government and parliamentary democracy. Some unionist would say that the Catholic Church’s strong connection with the government of the Republic is precisely what British democracy rejects.” (Smith 2005: 60)

This paragraph will deal with the biggest series of events in Northern Irish remembrance culture – the so-called marching season. It is the biggest commemorative cultural practise in unionism and loyalism. On July 12th thousands of members of the loyal orders, local marching bands, their supporters and families gather in the streets for the annual parades and marches. They frequently lead through Catholic neighbourhoods thereby provoking violence as anti-Catholic, anti-nationalist and/or anti-Republican slogans are portrayed, songs are sung, and imagery is displayed” (cf. Smith 2005: 70). The preceding nights giant bonfires, consisting of timber and sometimes even rubber tyres are lit throughout Northern Ireland. This tradition is often organised by staunch loyalists and the bonfires frequently entail inflammatory imagery, as flags (in particular the Irish tricolour) and symbols of perceived political enemies are burnt. At times even death threats against nationalist and anti-sectarian politicians, mostly against politicians Sinn Féin and the SDLP, however, also against members of the Alliance Party, which is highly interesting as Alliance politicians do not promote a united Ireland and act rather trans-partisan (Express Online: “Message to EU?, 2017 [accessed on June 27, 2019]). Even worse, however, are the death wishes directed at entire segments of society (cf. figure 1), which can also be found on those sectarian cultural practises. Regarding figure 1, we can see a Cuban flag and various Irish tricolours. The Cuban flag has to be understood as an anti-communist statement, potentially referring to the political orientation of the IRA and nationalist parties. The Slogan K.A.T. is the most inflammatory symbol of this bonfire, as it means Kill All Taigs. According to the Collins dictionary “taig” being a condescending term for a person of Catholic faith (Collins dictionary Online: “taig” [accessed: June 27, 2019]). Hence this slogan, which is prominently displayed on the bonfire, resembles a call for genocide.

An interesting feature and paradox of these bonfires is the flexibility with which new enemy images can be incorporated into the cultural practise, but it is apparently much harder to delete or soften biased elements from them; e.g. loyalists were quick to burn Polish flags alongside the Irish tricolour after the European Union’s eastward enlargement in 2004 (BBC (2012):

“Poland flags burned on bonfires”, 2012 [accessed on June 27, 2019]). Another example of this is the rather frequent burning of EU-flags since the 2016 Brexit-referendum as loyalists, including their main political representation – the DUP (Democratic Ulster Party) – rank among the most hard- line brexiteers within the United Kingdom (Express Online: “Message to EU?, 2017 [accessed on June 27, 2019]).

[figure 1 – loyalist bonfire with inflammatory symbolism and Irish/Cuban flags]

Commemorative cultural practises such as the marching season, including the bonfires at 11th night and parades the following day are important for a group’s social cohesion and maintenance of their group identities. As stated previously, inherited traumas affect historical memory, which in turn is in an interdependence with cultural practises, in particular commemorative cultural practises. (cf. Smith 2005: 13 ff.) These cultural practises take a remarkable position within a group’s identity. Furthermore, they play a key part in the creation of social boundaries, as the other group will not participate in the commemorative cultural events (cf. 2005: 22). This helps the social group to maintain their community narrative, i.e. their account of what “really” happened. However, who maintains these aforementioned cultural practises: loyalists or unionists; and how can one differentiate between these related ideologies? In an interview the English scholar Connal Par states that the most traceable and simultaneously evident difference between unionism and loyalism is class: “loyalism is more hard line in its associations than unionism […] [T]he main difference between unionism and loyalism is class difference. Loyalists are working-class, whereas unionists are middle-class” (The Conversation Online: Par, Connal, 2018: 2min:30sec-3min, [accessed April 30, 2019]).

Nationalist – 800 Years of Oppression and Victimisation As the section above aims at presenting the unionist, respectively loyalist narratives and self- perceptions, the part below seeks to provide a complementary framework for their political counterparts. When analysing the nationalist and republican narratives it swiftly becomes evident that they too regard themselves as victims of the oppressing group. The question of who this oppressor is varies. Before partition the British were perceived as the sole enemy, after

40 partition and especially in the course of the Troubles, however, nationalists and republicans regarded unionism with increasing hostility. (cf. Smith 2005: 61 ff.)

The relationship between republicanism and nationalism is similar to the relationship between loyalism and unionism. Republicanism is more radical in its views and opinions on politics and in the question of how a united Ireland ought to be achieved. While nationalism would usually adhere to constitutional boundaries and the use of the word rather than the sword, it took republicanism much longer to embrace this peaceful approach (McKittrick 2012: 186). Similar to the unionist narrative nationalist perceive themselves as the victimised group. What differentiates their narratives is how their own victimhood is explained. As stated previously, since the attempted coup in 1916, which became known as the Easter Rising republicanism was increasingly adopting a Marxist understanding of the roots of the conflict. This strong influence of Marxist theory, deriving from Wolfe Thone, consolidated the conception that British imperialism was the nemesis of Irish unity and autonomy (cf. Smith 2005: 61-3). “Nationalist identify with the native Irish who experienced the coming of the Normans from England in 1169 as a colonizing event. They see the continued British presence as a series of acts of oppression, in which Britain attempted to wipe out the Catholic faith” (Smith, 2005: 61). The IRA in particular likes to style itself in the fashion of David fighting against the British Goliath for 800 years to defend Ireland against their aggression and expansionism. Murphy describes the nationalist historical memory as following

“Many of the men and women who fought in and helped to sustain these conflicts saw themselves as part of a much longer struggle that dated far back, before 1916, to the twelfth century and arrival of the first Anglo- Normans who began to carve out Irish fiefdoms for themselves in the name of King Henry II of England. The story of the “long struggle” for Irish independence is popular in nationalist narratives of Irish history. It is a teleological construct that lumps medieval Celtic kings, sixteenth century earls, seventeenth century generals, eighteenth century radicals, and nineteenth and twentieth century rebels together into a common thread of resistance to British governance. This is a narrative that did not end with the creation of the Irish Free State and continues to influence Irish Republican Army members seeking to bring Northern Ireland into the Republic.” (- Murphy 2013: 3)

Smith offers another summary of the self-perception of nationalist or republican fight against British rule. The citation below refers to the nationalist assumptions against the British authorities. Smith notes:

“That the root cause of the Northern Ireland conflict lies in Great Britain is axiomatic to most nationalists in the region. Britain is responsible for 41

encouraging Protestant settlements in the first place and […] is believed to have to have encouraged separate aspirations of the Protestant community in the nineteenth century as part of a “divide and rule” policy […] Britain is considered responsible for Ireland’s economic underdevelopment as well as for a policy of cultural and political oppression. […] between 1920 and 1972, Britain pursued a laissez-faire policy in Northern Ireland that allowed the unionist oligarchy to discriminate against the Catholic minority.” ( Smith 2005: 62)

As becoming visible here, the list of actual and alleged shortcomings of the British is long. All these points, however, factual or not contribute to the nationalist sentiment of having been a British victim. This phenomenon of double victimhood in which both social groups find themselves in a state of victimhood allegedly caused by the other side is a characteristic of the Northern Ireland conflict. Another peculiarity about the prevailing ethno-nationalist narratives in Northern Ireland is the double-minority sentiment of both predominant social groups: Northern nationalist being the minority in their entity, and unionists as the minority in Ireland as a whole (cf. Smith 2005: 70).

To sum up, historical memory and cultural practises are mutually depended on each other (Smith 2005: 13 ff.). The performance of these ritualistic cultural practises is important for maintaining the identity and cohesion of a social group. While these ritualised cultural practises can be highly dynamic, i.e. in the inclusion of new enemy stereotypes, challenges of these rituals are frequently perceived as a direct assault on the respective social group’s historical memory, thus threatening their identity (cf. Smith 2005: 14-6). Ethno-nationalist narratives act strongly selective, not every event, development that had significance in a social group’s history is thus represented in the group’s narration. In the case of Northern Ireland both ideological blocks are victims of the other in their narration, thereby rejecting any credibility of the other community’s narrative. These processes are maintaining conflict.

Perpetrators of Violence The part below will attempt to offer a brief overview of the various agents committing violence. On the republican side the main group perpetrating armed attacks was the Irish Republican Army. The IRA, however, split as a reaction to the commence of the Troubles. A radical wing inclined to resort to violence broke off the “Official IRA”, forming the “Provisional IRA” (cf. Collins 2008: 54). The Provisional IRA, or more commonly referred to as the “Provisionals” were not keen to participate to follow the “Official IRA’s” plans of introducing change via negotiations and politics (cf. McKittrick 2012: 67–69). Another smaller republican armed

42 organisation was the Irish National Liberation Army – or in short INLA (McKittrick 2012: 154).

Loyalist paramilitaries consisted mostly of two armed forces: The UDA and the UVF. The former’s full name was Ulster Defence Association. According to McKittrick it was the largest loyalist paramilitary organisation (2012: 385). The second loyalist paramilitary group was the so-called Ulster Volunteer Force (McKittrick 2012: 386). The UVF took their name as a homage to the Protestant Ulstermen fighting for the United Kingdom in the First World War; thereby underlining the importance of the First World War – for the historical memory of loyalist circles.

When the violence started to take off in earnest in late 1969 the paramilitary organisations had different levels of readiness for this occasion. McKittrick argues that the high death toll, as well as the damage or destruction of property from the Catholic community exemplify that the IRA in Northern Ireland was not organised at the time the violence broke out in August 1969. This led to the embarrassing new acronym for IRA: I Ran Away. (cf. McKittrick 2012: 78 ff.). This Provisionals attempted to reverse the distrust of the Catholic community in the IRA by becoming increasingly aggressive. Collins states that republican paramilitaries indeed registered growth in numbers and support due to this radicalisation from within republicanism but also due to increasing levels of indifferent loyalist violence. (cf. Collins 2008: 54-5)

A first major setback for Catholic-British relationship came with the imposition of the Falls Curfew in the beginning of July 1970. The Falls are a mostly nationalist area within West Belfast. The area was cut off from the outside world for two days. In this 48-hour period the British army conducted house-to-house raids searching for IRA members, arms and ammunition. McKittrick argues that some 337 people arrested, and numerous firearms were confiscated (cf. McKittrick 2012: 72). Overall the operation was a disaster, however, as the Catholics who initially welcomed the use of the British military personnel in Northern Ireland, as they regarded them as less biased than the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and in particular the B-Specials (cf. McKittrick 2012: 74 ff.).

Numerous regions which were particularly affected by sectarian violence were likely to have high levels of poverty. According to McKittrick it is scarcely a coincidence that some of the areas which were to feature prominently in the Troubles, such as North and West Belfast and (London-)Derry city, were among those where poor housing and high unemployment persisted (cf. McKittrick 2012: 79). It appears legitimate to argue that conflict was and is increased by local socio-economic circumstances and poor living conditions. 43

Internment without Trial After the curfew in the Falls rendered the nationalist and republican parts of society very much agitated, it also increased the ranks of not only their members but also their supporters. Another at least equally powerful increase in anti-Stormont mood of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland came with the introduction of internment without trial in 1971 (McKittrick 2012: 84 ff.); this gave British authorities to intern terror suspects without any form of legal background and detain them. As this tactic was at least for the time being used solely against nationalists and republicans the reputation of the authorities worsened considerably in the eyes of the Catholic community.

The mood among nationalists and of course in particular among supports of republicanism was thus one of communal outrage against a measure they viewed as the essence of injustice. In physical terms many Catholic working-class areas of Belfast were for months afterwards convulsed by gun battles and killings on the streets, while thousands of homes were being searched by the army. In 1971 more than 170 people were killed; a further 2,600 were injured and 17,000 homes were searched. [...] To the outside world internment might be seen as a response to IRA violence, but many Catholics in areas such as West Belfast regarded IRA activity as a response to violence from the authorities (cf. McKittrick 2012: 81). Brian Faulkner, the last Northern Irish Prime Minister before the introduction of direct rule was highly criticised for applying internment without trial only on nationalists (cf. Collins 2008: 59). 1970 (Murphy 2013: 78-80)

Sunday Bloody Sunday There is probably no date which is as iconic and as intrinsically connected to the Troubles as January 30, 1972. It was the day Bloody Sunday happened (Collins 2008: 62). Collins states that a British general who wished to end the existence of no-go-areas in (London-)Derry. Whether this was the reason why British paratroopers opened fire on unnamed civilians, who participated in an illegal anti-internment rally, cannot be stated with certainty. Fact is a regiment of British soldiers killed 13 people and wounded 13 more (ibid.) as they shot indiscriminately into the crowd. No other event in the course of the Trouble gained a comparable amount of notorious publicity and attention. The entire world witnessed how Great Britain – a former global power – shot dead unarmed civilians. This proved to be a catastrophe for the British administration, not only in terms of public relations but also in terms of inter-communal relations in Northern Ireland.

Direct Rue By 1972 Westminster and the UK government had increased pressure on Stormont to such an extent that the Stormont ministers resigned in unison, rendering Northern Ireland without an executive. The British government did not want to proceed with the old Stormont system and said system itself was incapable of reforming itself to a genuine democracy (cf. McKittrick 2012: 91ff.). It was thus decided to administer Northern Ireland via direct rule from London (cf. Collins 2008: 64ff.). To achieve this, an institution was set up that would be tasked with governing instead the old Stormont system: The Northern Ireland Office (cf. McKittrick 2012: 382). Its appointed head was the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The secretary was responsible directly to the parliament of the United Kingdom and had “a seat in the British cabinet” (ibid.).

Reactions toward London’s decision to introduce direct rule were mixed. Unionist reactions to the implementation of direct rule were consistently negative as Stormont and its regime gave unionism a feeling of security, this perceived security came at a high prize, however, with unionist cabinets continuously failing to calm the situation by long overdue reforms. Unionist umbrella organisations declared a general strike that paralysed Northern Ireland for two days. This attempt to force London into re-devolving governance to Belfast remained futile. (cf. McKittrick 2012: 93-4). The views of supporters of nationalism and republicanism on direct rule, in contrast were overwhelmingly positive. McKittrick argues that Stormont’s poor handling of the continuous crises for the past four years had alienated not only the politicised nationalist circles but the entire Catholic community from the state and its institutions (cf. McKittrick 2012: 94-7). The Catholic community saw direct rule thus as a measure that could potentially improve their situation and cater for a democracy in which they could participate equally. Moderates from the nationalist political spectrum “like the SDLP rejoiced in the end of Unionist rule and hoped for peace and power-sharing” (ibid.)

In late November 1972 William Whitelaw, who was appointed as the first Secretary for Northern Ireland (cf. Collins 2008: 67), released a document discussing the future of Northern Ireland. According to Collins it stated that the UK government would not hinder an Irish reunification if the majority of the population declared their intention to do so in a democratic election (ibid.). This was a milestone as no leading British politician before had put unity in prospect. This had of course serious repercussions within unionism, as it rejected any notions of Irish unity. Collins writes about the effects of the introduction of direct rule for the Ulster Unionist Party: “The once mighty UUP suffered badly from direct rule: It lost members with

45 moderates going to the Alliance Party on one side and hard-liners to Vanguard o the DUP on the other” (Collins 2008: 66).

By 1973 the British government released a document entitled 'Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals'. The paper stated that Northern Ireland was to remain part of the United Kingdom (McKittrick 2012: 79); this was sought of as a reaffirmation to unionists as they often feared being abandoned by London. However, the document incorporated several key demands of the Catholic community as well. Proportional representation, for instance, should be reintroduced, as this had been one of the civil rights movement’s main demands at the dawn of the Troubles. Furthermore, a new power sharing system ought to replace the abolished Stormont system. Its major aim being the reincorporation of Catholics into the government and the civil services. By establishing new north-south connections Dublin should be brought into the boat, thus reassuring the Catholics that their civic rights would be granted.

Sunningdale – a solution without takers Another essential point of the document was the installation of the "Council of Ireland". The three parties involved, Ireland, Northern Ireland and Britain came together at the Conference of Sunningdale to decide how the council was to appear and how to function. Another main objective of the conference was to clarify the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, as well as to enhance security cooperation between the two Irish entities. Even after not being able to find consensus on these main points it was a strong political gesture as the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the negotiating table. Nonetheless, the council would later be installed, consisting of seven southern and seven northern ministers, as well as 30 members from the parliament in Dublin and 30 members from the assembly in Belfast. (McKittrick 2014: 110-1) However, the paper made it also very clear that Westminster had a keen interest on "keeping control over sensitive matters such as security, the legal system, emergency powers and elections." (McKittrick 2012: 106) This document would become a milestone for unionism as some accepted it as a basis for future talks. Many others, however, rejected it as it seemed unacceptable to them. The Vanguard Party under William Craig split away from the Ulster Unionist Party as an imminent consequence of the paper. Unionism's divisions became feasible in the 1973 local elections when from the 78 seats in total 27 went to Unionist candidates rejecting the proposals, and only 22 seats were won by unionists accepting them. (McKittrick 2012: 107)

Ireland and the UK Join the EC At the beginning of 1973 the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic became members of the European Economic Community (EEC); a development which over time had a major effect on Anglo-Irish relations. Disparity in wealth of the two countries had added to the historical distance of between coloniser and colonised, with Irish dependence on British trade reinforcing this. (McKittrick 2012: 104) Smith points out: “When it joined the European Community in 1973, Ireland was categorised with the poorest of the European economies. European money was therefore pumped into the Irish economy in the subsequent quarter century, and by the mid- 1990s Ireland’s had become the fastest growing economy in Europe.” (2005: 47)

The Hungerstrikes In the beginning of the 1980s republican prisoners started two hungerstrikes (McKittrick 2012: 156) in the so-called Maze, which used to be the Long Kesh prison (McKittrick 2012: 159). “The prisoners demanded to be treated differently from inmates jailed for criminal as opposed to paramilitary offences” (ibid.). The inmates demanded their “political” or “special status” back, which had been granted to them in 1972 by the Northern Ireland secretary Whitelaw. According to McKittrick the prison resembled WWII prisoners-of-war camps in that “prisoners were divided into compounds by organisation, basically run[ning] their own lives.” (McKittrick 2012: 160) Additionally, the prisoners were not to answer to orders given by their wards, but from “their ‘OC’, or Officer Commanding” (ibid.). McKittrick on the preferential treatment of the loyalist and republican inmates: “They wore their own clothes, were not forced to work, and were allowed additional visits and parcels. (ibid.). The preferential treatment of paramilitary inmates ended in 1976 and soon triggered a circle of violence within in- and outside of the Maze. The IRA commenced a campaign of deliberately killing prison wards and personnel. Between 1976 and 1980 this strategy, which in turn radicalised prison wards and increased cases of abuse and torture of inmates, left 19 prison employees dead (cf. McKittrick 2012: 160). The most famous hunger striker was Bobby Sands. He was an IRA supporter and won a by-election in Fermanagh-South Tyrone thereby becoming MP (cf. McKittrick 2012: 167).

Margaret Thatcher became British Prime Minister in 1979, thus inheriting the Northern Ireland conflict, which she addressed with the same resolution as other political projects of hers. Due to this she is iconised by some and demonised by others. Thatcher would not allow any concessions to the IRA and INLA hunger strikers as republican violence proceeded outside the

Maze. “The fact that the IRA violence continued, including the killing of a young mother in Londonderry, merely hardened the characteristic Thatcher resolve. She observed that ‘if Mr Sands persisted in his wish to commit suicide, that was his choice” (McKittrick 2012: 166). Thatcher’s hard stance on the hunger strikers left eleven republican prisoners dead before they called off the hungerstrike (cf. Collins 2008: 94 ff.). In 1984 Thatcher closely escaped death, when the IRA tried to kill her in a bomb attack. The medial propaganda battle turned the hungerstrike into a fight good versus evil – who was good and who was bad, was of course depending on the respective media (McKittrick 2012: 167).

The death by hunger of Bobby Sands carved itself into nationalist historical memory. This inherited trauma is not only passed on to the subsequent generations by narration but also via a cultural practise that is characteristic of either ideological block in Northern Ireland: Political Murals (cf. figure 1).

(figure 1: Mural of Bobby Sands, who died in a hungerstrike, outside Sinn Féin’s headquarters: Alamy (2019): Bobby Sands Mural. [Online] Available at: https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-wall- mural-depicting-bobby-sands-on-the-side- of-the-sinn-fin-office-137673860.html [Accessed on April 20th 2019]).

Anglo-Irish Agreement – A Stepping Stone for Further Talks After the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 nationalist parties in Northern Ireland reacted differently this advance. The SDLP openly welcomed the move of the British authorities, acknowledging its political and societal scope, as for the first time it seemed that nationalist interest was put before unionist demands. Sinn Féin on the other hand was not so quick to react positively towards this movement. According to McKittrick the party leadership still suspected a concealed British imperialist agenda behind the paper. But as the party's inflexibility started to affect their vote, decreasing from "102,000 votes in 1983 but only 76,000 two years later" (2012: 215) Sinn Féin was forced to shift perspectives, if they did not want to risk their [established [...] solid foothold in electoral politics." (2012: 215) Hence they began to regard the Anglo-Irish Agreement as what it was, a turning point in political relations between Ireland and the United Kingdom, in which London acted much more agile than it used to.

As previously shown republicanism and in particular its democratic branch Sinn Féin changed their views on the treaty between the UK and Ireland. However, instead of embracing politics and diplomacy genuinely, republicanism rather followed a double strategy of putting military and political pressure on the United Kingdom. Their political agenda, namely Sinn Féin's constitutional republican approach was accompanied by a drastic increase in weaponry and other military equipment. Received by the IRA from shipments from Libya’s dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Who, in arming the IRA, saw an opportunity to harm the British after Anglo-Libyan relations deteriorated in the mid-1980s. McKittrick states the IRA's arsenal became "so large that it converted them into one of the world's best-equipped underground organisations" (McKittrick 2012: 198).

As was discovered in the early 1990s the political heads of the SDLP and Sinn Féin, John Hume and Gerry Adams had a long tradition of secret meetings and exchange of position papers. (cf. McKittrick 2012: 215ff) This created a medial outcry as Hume was suspected of having broken the unwritten law of excluding parties that glorify violence from public discourse. However, not only the SDLP but numerous other institutions and agencies, such as the Catholic church, both the Irish and even the British governments, as well as the MI5 had for a long time, but intermittently been in contact with Sinn Féin and the IRA. (McKittrick 2012: 216-18) McKittrick states that both the SDLP, much earlier and Sinn Féin later came to terms with the idea that "[t]he historic mission of nationalism [...] was to convince Unionism that its concerns could be accommodated in a new agreed Ireland." (McKittrick 2012: 217)

Republican and Loyalist Violence Continues The IRA used their new arms to inflict heavy casualties on RUC members and to expand their military attacks on British military bases in the United Kingdom as well as in West Germany. (McKittrick 2012: 199) However, their Libyan arms connection was revealed when a French naval customs vessel intercepted a Libyan freighter off its coast. The ship was loaded with armoury, only then the Irish and British authorities discovered the extent of republican rearmament. According to McKittrick the amount and quality of the arms alarmed especially the Irish security forces, as they faced the risk of being potentially "outgunned" by the IRA. (2012: 200)

A major public relations setback for republicanism and especially its main political representative, Sinn Féin, arose with the Enniskillen bombings. IRA members placed a bomb in a community hall in Fermanagh county hall. It detonated on Remembrance Day when the

49 building was full of people who gathered there for a Protestant service. The blast killed 11 civilians and carved itself into Northern Irish collective memory while simultaneously "represent[ing] a hammer blow to the IRA's support and Sinn Féin's prospect for political expansions" (McKittrick 2012: 200 ff.) The attack on Enniskillen was solely directed against Protestant civilians and is regarded as one of militant republicanism's worst defeats, even though no IRA fighters lost their lives. {McKittrick 2012 #1I: 200 ff}

Especially towards the later stages of the Troubles, namely in the late 1980s and early 1990s, republican and loyalist killing strategies varied substantially. The IRA leadership always had pointed out that civilian casualties were so to say inevitable 'collateral damage', however, they continued and even intensified the attacks on Protestant civilian contractors performing maintenance work on British army bases in Northern Ireland. McKittrick argues that the UDA (Ulster Defence Association) and others on the other hand "always harboured the ambition to kill active republicans, [however] they rarely managed to do so." (2012: 204) Hence loyalist paramilitaries targeted mostly Catholic men and youth "chosen at random or because they were convenient targets" (ibid.).

In contrast to loyalist paramilitaries, the IRA was constantly in the search of new possible targets that would undermine British rule in Ireland, be it due to loss of lives of British soldiers, severe financial damage or by gaining the upper hand in the propaganda war which was fought in news stations all around the world. In 1992 the IRA discovered a powerful new method to inflict damage to the British authorities. The militant republicans placed massive bombs in the financial district in London. The first one detonated below the Baltic Exchange, causing three civilian fatalities, but what caused more publicity and uproar was the immense financial implications of the bombing. In this new attempt of forcing the government of the United Kingdom to leave Ireland, the IRA caused damage worth more than POUND 700mio. Shortly afterward the IRA detonated a second bomb at Bishopsgate, causing damage that was even more expensive than the Baltic Exchange bombings. According to McKittrick each of these detonations caused more financial implications than all the 10.000 bombs combined that had detonated in Northern Ireland to that point (McKittrick 2012: 211)

Throughout the IRA bombing campaign of the early 1990s peace talks in Northern Ireland continued. The objectives and expectations of the political stakeholders involved, however, varied significantly. Bellow a brief overview of the political agendas will be provided. The stance of the Secretary of Northern Ireland Sir Patrick Mayhem and thus the British government's stance was clear: talks could only be held with constitutional parties, seeking a

50 peaceful resolution to the Troubles, without further bloodshed. In this sense McKittrick argues that "[t]he British government's approach continued to be that it hoped for an agreement among constitutional parties with the purpose of isolating the republican and loyalist extremists." (2012: 213) Therefore "Sinn Féin [was] again excluded because of its identification with the IRA." (McKittrick 2012: 212) This meant that on the one side of the negotiating table were the unionist parties and on the other the only moderate nationalist and given their electorate, mostly catholic party - the SDLP.

From the beginning of the talks the parties' aims were as clear, as contradictory to one another. The unionists were still keen on abolishing or at least weakening the Anglo-Irish Agreement, as it transferred too much political influence on the Irish government for unionist liking. McKittrick argues that the unionist party members were, however, under no circumstances united in their approach concerning these negotiations: "Some Unionist politicians wanted a strong new devolved government re-established in Belfast, though others preferred to aim for closer links with Westminster, accompanied by a less powerful Belfast assembly." (2012: 213) These approaches may contradict it each other superficially, however, both aspire towards a common goal - the strengthening of Protestant influence in and securing a lasting future of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. A matter, however, all unionists had in common was their shared dislike of the "Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, which since 1937 had laid legal claim to Northern Ireland." (McKittrick 2012: 212-13)

On the other hand, there was the Irish government and the SDLP, both their positions stood in strong contrast to unionist demands. They were hoping "to protect the Anglo-Irish Agreement and if possible, develop stronger north-south and Anglo-Irish links." (McKittrick 2012: 213) As can be deduced from their key claims the political fronts were rigid. The Irish and SDLP claims can be regarded as the opposite of unionist desire. While the latter attempted to secure a state entity which was to be ruled by Protestants, and thus their parties, their interlocutors strived for a provision in which unionist were side-lined in the policy making process by Dublin, London or even the European Union. To the shock of unionist politicians, a SDLP proposal "advocated a direct role for both Dublin and Europe in running Northern Ireland." (McKittrick 2012: 213) As stated above, this innovative approach, however, found no political tailwind from the Protestant block and thus vanished into some drawer. Despite the talks concluding with no feasible outcome, the negotiating process itself was productive and proved that all constitutional parties, as well as Dublin and London were interested in a solution to the Troubles. (McKittrick 2012: 212-213)

The Downing Street Declaration In the course of their numerous secret meetings Sinn Féin and IRA figurehead Gerry Adams and SDLP-chairman John Hume worked on joint declaration aimed at highlighting the unifying, rather than the dividing positions of Dublin and London, in order to enhance their political cooperation. The draft declaration would lay the foundation for the Downing Street Declaration which would be unveiled by the British and Irish prime ministers more than two years later. At the beginning, however, there was a great deal of secrecy required as neither the British, nor the Irish public ought to come to know of the links between authorities and Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams. (McKittrick 2012: The first draft of the nationalists' paper was constructed around two key concepts, namely the principles of self-determination and consent, in order to create an agreement nationalists as well as loyalists could support. As McKittrick puts it their "intention was to find common ground in everyone's ideological positions, and to reconcile what had always appeared irreconcilable." (2012: 218) He continues: "It thus combined, at least in theory, what republicans sought with the Unionist demand that the majority opinion should prevail within Northern Ireland." (McKittrick 2012: 219)

This draft was edited uncountable times in cooperation with their secret contacts in Dublin and Westminster. During the editing and covert negotiating period the goodwill of London towards the declaration dwindled, as Gerry Adams was portrayed carrying the coffin of an IRA bomber, whose prematurely exploded device killed nine civilians and himself. (McKittrick 2012: 225) This terrible IRA attack triggered an extensive feeling of isolation of former supporters towards the republican extremists and a far-reaching cycle of killings and retaliation killings. The momentum got out of control to such an extent that it left 23 people dead within a week and turn October 1993 into the bloodiest month in more a decade. McKittrick counts that "the death toll was the highest of any month since 1976." (2012: 223)

Ironically enough these acts of sectarian hate and violence caused a rethinking of the British government and work on the declaration was again prioritised. (McKittrick 2012: 227) When the Downing Street Declaration was presented by John Major, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Albert Reynolds, his Irish counterpart in December 1993 many republicans were rather uncertain about its actual content. McKittrick argues that the declaration incorporated numerous "references to many of the elements contained in the drafts worked on by Hume and Adams, but most of the points the republicans had wished to see were very much diluted." (2012: 229-30) Especially one passage catered for nationalist uncertainty over the document: "The British government agree that it is the people of the island of Ireland alone, by

52 agreement between two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish." (McKittrick 2012: 229)

In any case the Downing Street Declaration was regarded as a decisive political victory for John Major, as he managed to set forth the future outlines for a potential Irish unity without antagonising the unionist public, nor their MPs which he needed in support of his thin Tory majority in Westminster. (McKittrick 2012: 230) As another consequence of the Downing Street Declaration a ceasefire of the IRA has to be mentioned. Even though the cessation was only of a momentary nature, it marked a period in time in which for decades peace seemed within reach. Even though neither a great number of republicans, nor loyalists knew what they were to think of this unilateral agreement to lay down arms. (McKittrick 2012: 228)

Inter-Communal Tensions Remain Not all Protestants, let alone unionists, however, were convinced of the sincerity of the IRA's ceasefire. Ian Paisley, a Protestant clergyman and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) had always been known for his fiery rhetoric and eloquent demagogic way of speech. Despite his long tradition of adding fuel to the inter-communitarian fire, he was to play one of the most prominent roles in the later stages of the Northern Irish peace process. But back in the 1990s he openly questioned the motives of the militant republicans asking party members:

"Are we going to agree to our partnership with the IRA men of blood who have slain our loved ones, destroyed our country, burned our churches, tortured our people and now demand that we should become slaves in a country fit only for nuns' men and monk's women to live in? We cannot bow the knee to these traitors in Whitehall, nor to those offspring of the Vatican who walk the corrupted corridors of power." (- McKittrick 2012: 235)

This portrays perfectly well how deeply embedded the mistrust between the communities was and how the religious component of the conflict could be used for one's political advantage. Furthermore, it indicates how accessible this fear was to inflammatory rhetoric and indeed how simple to exploit it (McKittrick 2012: 234). Figure 1 illustrates the continuing visual as well as spatial separation of the social groups. It shows the so-called ‘Peace Walls’ or ‘Peace Lines’ that still can be seen throughout Northern Ireland. They were constructed in order to mutually “protect” one community from the other in the course of the Troubles, effectively segregating numerous nationalist and unionist neighbourhoods from each other.

(figure 1: Northern Ireland Foundation (2019): Peace Walls [Online] Available at: https://northernireland.foundation/projects/ sharedfuture/peace-walls/ [Accessed on March 17th 2019]).

In the aftermath of the Downing Street Declaration, a political stalemate between the British government and the republicans ensued. The main point of controversy being the question of decommissioning of IRA arms, leading to a British government that was highly reluctant to approach Sinn Féin. According to McKittrick the Northern Ireland Secretary Patrick Mayhew "insisted [... on] 'the actual decommission of some arms as a tangible confidence-building measure' " (2012: 239). While the IRA position stood in sharp contrast to this demand. They felt that they had only agreed on the ceasefire in order to create space for political discussions in order to reach a peace treaty. McKittrick states the IRA's stance was that "they had not been beaten and had not surrendered and therefore did not contemplate any arms handover, regarding this as an act of capitulation." (2012: 239) Another reason of the Irish Republican Army's reluctance of handing over their guns was, according to McKittrick "historic baggage". He argues that the "modern IRA had sprung from the vicious ghetto fighting of 1969, when the previous republican leadership was bitterly accused of leaving Catholic areas unarmed and undefended against loyalist incursions" (2012: 239). In their opinion the decommissioning of their weaponry should be a gradual process, paralleled by, and not preceding to negotiations. Both parties incorporated their point of views into their political agendas to such an extent that they brought the peace process to a standstill. However, other involved governments were much quicker to embrace the newly found spirit of peace in the republican movement. Most notably Ireland, with their Taoiseach (Prime Minister) John Reynalds installing a 'Forum for Peace and Reconciliation' in which nationalist politicians from north and south of the border could exchange their ideas. However, it is understandable that Ireland was more trusting than the United Kingdom, given that most of the attacks in the course of the 25-yearlong Troubles were directed against British military and also civil personnel. As the opinions of the Irish Taoiseach and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom started to vary significantly in their perception of the sincerity of the IRA's motives behind the armistice an increasing alienation of the two neighbouring countries could be observed. (McKittrick 2012: 236) 54

Not only European powers paid close attention to the Northern Ireland question and its political progress, with the election of Bill Clinton as President of the United States the world hegemon took an active role in the peace process. While the UK government maintained its rigid position of regarding a partial decommissioning of IRA arms as a prerequisite for potential political talks with the republicans of Sinn Féin, the Clinton administration rushed ahead and lifted the long- standing visa ban on Gerry Adams in February 1994. This ban previously had prevented the IRA leader from travelling to the United States of America. (McKittrick 2012: 230) This proved to be a major propaganda victory for him and the republican movement. McKittrick argues that Adams "was given a celebrity, being fêted like a movie star throughout New York, appearing on the most prestigious television shows and meeting many of the most influential people." (2012: 230) These moves forward were, however, not welcomed at all in London and as it was the case with Anglo-Irish relations, Anglo-American relations too deteriorated during that period of time. Creating a minor diplomatic crisis between the two NATO-allies. (McKittrick 2012: 230)

The Ceasefire The IRA ceasefire had a surprising consequence to it, namely that the UVF and the UDA, the largest loyalist paramilitary organisations followed the path of the IRA and declared a ceasefire. The loyalists, however, even surpassed the IRA in that they included an "unexpected note of apology, offering 'the loved ones of all innocent victims over the past 25 years abject and true remorse.'" (McKittrick 2012: 234) McKittrick states that

"[t]he sight of previously violent loyalists embracing the peace progress with such enthusiasm gave the peace process a huge boost, for many had assumed the loyalist groups would continue to pose an active threat. Instead they became at many points a force for moderation, eager for dialogue and presenting a very different approach from that of mainstream Unionist politicians." (- McKittrick 2012: 235)

The groups of the UVF and the UDA remained intact, however, they established political wings, similar to Sinn Féin. Most remarkably the Progressive Unionist party which arose out of the Ulster Volunteer Force. (McKittrick 2012: 234) This marked a true milestone in the history of the Troubles, as for the first time since the escalation of violence in the 1970s both belligerents renounced arms and put forward the prospect of a peaceful and diplomacy-based problem solution. (McKittrick 2012: 234)

A significant event took place in the town of Drumcree during the traditional unionist/loyalist marching season in 1996. As in the year before an Orange Order parade was to be marched 55 through Catholic districts, causing heavy protests from Catholic residents. Both years the RUC, attempting to retain peace, blocked the parade from entering the Catholic districts. As in the year before, however, the RUC had to step back and allow the marchers through after lengthy loyalist protests. The difference between the 1995 and 1996 Drumcree confrontation was the latter's unexpected scope. McKittrick states that:

"thousands of supporters [of the parade] joined them [...] and some loyalist protesters engaged in vitriolic abuse of the police. The protests were not confined to Drumcree, developing into one of the most destabilising episodes of the Troubles. Loyalist staged hundreds of roadblocks and erected barricades over much of Northern Ireland, bringing life in whole areas to a standstill. Some towns were completely cut off and there was widespread intimidation of police officers and their families." (- McKittrick 2012: 246)

This turbulent chapter indicates well how deep the trenches between the two communities had become and how difficult the handling of these issues was for the RUC. Despite the police initially attempting to block the parade from entering the Catholic neighbourhoods, they subsequently had to withdraw, thus giving in to loyalist, respectively Protestant demand. Furthermore, the police were given the task of removing the Catholic residents from their homes, as a precautionary exercise in order to avoid sectarian violence. (McKittrick 2012: 246- 47) Along with this development intercommunal tensions rose high throughout Northern Ireland with one man being killed and streams of demonstrators from both communities rallying on the streets. Contemporary commentators calling the events "a Bosnia style situation" or "Northern Ireland's Chernobyl, with almost a melt-down in community relations"; and the head of the RUC defending his forces' actions " 'We were on the brink of an all-out civil war. Letting the march through was bad but the alternative was a thousand times worse' " (McKittrick 2012: 247). An important conclusion that can be drawn from this experience was, however, that loyalist militias mostly refrained from joining the turmoil. According to McKittrick this indicated that loyalists were still keen on a continuation of the peace process, even though major unionist political figures, such as the new Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) leader David Trimble and loyalist DUP chairman Ian Paisley were personally involved in the incident. They symbolically marched side by side in the parade after police admitted the marchers through the previously blocked street. According to McKittrick an in general hardened political stance from unionism can be observed in the time following the IRA breaking the previously announced ceasefire. This led voters to endorse parties which were calling for more drastic approaches within

56 unionism and loyalism, such as the DUP or the radical wing of the UUP (McKittrick 2012: 236).

The overall public opinion in that time was highly divided, mainly along community lines according the IRA relaunching their military campaign. The unionist, respectively loyalist narrative was one of deep mistrust of the IRA and their actions in total. According to McKittrick it was widely believed in unionist circles that the IRA had abused the peace process to the benefit of the republicans. Their unwillingness to put their weapons out of use strongly indicating towards their will to continue on the path of violence. In marked contrast to this belief stood the nationalist notion of the British government striving to trick the Irish Republican Army into decommission, in order to weaken their negotiating position. (2012: 243- 44) As becomes evident from these two stances mistrust, wariness and a lack of confidence towards the other community characterises the zeitgeist of this era. (McKittrick 2012: 247-48)

A milestone for the development of the peace process that would ultimately put the Troubles on ice was the UK parliament election of 1997. McKittrick summarises the importance of it as following:

"The May general elections transformed the peace process, with the departure of John Major and the arrival in Downing Street of Tony Blair. The statistics of the election, together with those from council elections in the same month, provided unmistakable evidence of a significant shift in the power balance between unionism and nationalism.” (- McKittrick 2012: 250-51)

The Catholic community of Northern Ireland, from which the lion’s share of the nationalist electorate stems from, were clearly on the move, making dramatic political advances in tandem with their social, economic and numerical growth (cf. McKittrick 2012: 251). The changing statistics meant that, since Northern Ireland's history and politics had from the very start been based on the number game, its very fabric changed too. [...] The combined SDLP-Sinn Féin vote, which in 1983 had totalled 240,000, rose to almost 320,000" (cf. McKittrick 2012: 250- 51). The citation above highlights another point of importance to an understanding of the beginning and the solution of the Troubles namely the demographic approximation of the two social groups (McKittrick 2005: 142). A major accelerator of the peace negotiations was Tony Blair's election as UK Prime Minister. He delivered a much-required momentum to the continuation the peace talks by establishing direct contacts with Sinn Féin. A move his predecessor John Major had always been keen to

57 avoid, while Major nonetheless had no moral reservations of meeting with representatives of loyalist parties. (McKittrick 2012: 251-52) Republicanism celebrated Westminster's change of heart, while unionists "drew comfort from [Blair's] statement that 'none of us in this hall today, even the youngest, is likely to see Northern Ireland as anything but a part of the United Kingdom.' " (McKittrick 2012: 252) London managed thus to reconcile with republicanism, while simultaneously reassuring the unionists of the constitutional status quo of Northern Ireland.

The Good Friday Agreement – “Sunningdale for Slow Learners” Blair's agreeing to renewed contacts with Sinn Féin was different to Major's approach, however, the joint British-Irish declaration that "IRA decommissioning was not a precondition for Sinn Féin entry to talks" (McKittrick 2012: 252) was an absolute deviation from the political course of his predecessor. Furthermore, the Irish Taoiseach and the British Prime Ministers stated that Sinn Féin would be allowed to participate actively in the peace negotiations six weeks after the IRA had laid down their arms. This prospect of political participation contributed to the IRA declaring a second ceasefire in July 1997. This, however, implied that Ian Paisley's DUP withdrew from the talks and Trimble, as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party was under considerable strain from his party's roots. Trimble decided to remain part of the negotiating table and established working relations with the SDLP, as well as the Irish government; not, however, with Sinn Féin. (McKittrick 2012: 252-54) As major parties from both the unionist and nationalist hemisphere, as well as representatives of the Irish and British governments were brought together, a lasting settlement of the Troubles was finally in reach, even though several violent outbreaks from dissident loyalist or republican extremists disrupted the process. Eventually, however, these lengthy and complex negotiations accumulated in what would be become known as the Belfast Agreement or more commonly referred to as the Good Friday Agreement.

The Good Friday Agreement consisted of two interrelated documents. First a party-crossing accord from the main political parties in Northern Ireland, namely UUP, SDLP and Sinn Féin. Paisley's DUP did not sign it as they had left the talks due to Sinn Féin's participation in the negotiations. The second part of the agreement was an Anglo-Irish treaty that highly drew upon the previously established bilateral consensus in the 1973 Sunningdale Conference. (McKittrick 2012: 256) This clarifies that the Irish dimension, in form of strong north-south links, still was of critical importance to an ongoing peace process, as the Irish government was perceived by many in the Catholic community as the only protective power able to sustainably cater for their 58 political and legal needs. (McKittrick 2012: 256) In addition, the GFA proved to be a well- planed agreement as numerous interest groups participated in its development. Zelizer notes that women groups, active in the 1990s were actively involved in the GFA with their demands and remarks being applied. “The agreement ultimately included references to achieving women’s full political participation, provisions for the support of integrated education and mixed housing, and recognition of the rights of victims in the conflict” (Zelizer 2012: 74). Furthermore it becomes evident that the Good Friday Agreement was something unprecedented not in terms of a bilateral agreement, as Ireland and the UK had been cooperating on issues concerning Northern Ireland before (cf. Sunningdale); never before, however, have representatives of nationalist and unionist parties, and delegates of the Anglo-Irish cabinets met, negotiated and co-signed an accord outlining the future of governance in Northern Ireland and the resolution of the Troubles.

The devolution of power from Westminster to Belfast announced in the Good Friday Agreement and codified in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was based on unionist-nationalist power-sharing according to an arithmetic formula. The newly established executive of Northern Ireland was to be jointly led by a First Minister, who would according to the distribution of votes be a unionist and the Deputy First Minister thus being a nationalist. McKittrick remarks that "[t]his was in effect a joint post requiring the two to agree on important decisions." (2012: 257) The executive was to be elected by the 108 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The respective unionist and nationalist parties hence were comprising the new Northern Ireland government. The executive body would thus be comprised of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister along with up to 10 ministers. The determination of which party would receive how many minister posts would be calculated in accordance to the previously mentioned formula, thus intending to reduce future points of friction between unionist and nationalist politicians. (McKittrick 2012: 256-57).

An important step of the devolution of legislative powers from Westminster back to Stormont, was the establishment of the Legislative Assembly. The parliament which was to be the legislating instance for Northern Ireland would be bestowed with "full power over areas such as education, health and agriculture [...]. London would retain responsibility for matters such as defence and law and order, though it promised to consider devolving security powers at a later stage." (McKittrick 2012: 256-57) The Belfast Assembly was to be elected through a voting system that belongs to the category of proportional voting systems. Thus, fulfilling the ancient demand of the Human Rights movement starting in the 1960s. Initially consisting of

108 members, it later was reduced to 90 members. "The number of MLAs [Members of the Legislative Assembly] has been cut in order to reduce the cost of politics" (BBC Online: “MPs vote to delay”, 2017 [accessed on April 4, 2019]).

Something that is apparent from taking the contents of the Good Friday Agreement into account are their thematic similarities with the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement. Two topics that are addressed numerous times throughout the document are consent and self-determination; these two key concepts have been thoroughly discussed at said conference almost a quarter century earlier in Sunningdale (McKittrick 2012: 256-7). Former Deputy First Minister, Seamus Mallon, thus coined the term “Sunningdale for slow learners” when talking about the GFA (cf. Smith 2002: 7). The significance of consent is of great importance to unionism as it states that Protestant consensus is a prerequisite for a United Ireland or even for the respective referendum. While the underlying importance of the concept of self-determination mainly applies for nationalist voices. As it takes the concept once defined by Woodrow Wilson, US President at the end of World War I that every people ought to live in the nation of their choosing. Nationalist desire to reunite with the Irish south is put in correlation with the demand for Protestant consent concerning such a far-reaching decision. The Northern Ireland Secretary has the final say concerning Irish reunification, he or she is to schedule a referendum should they perceive that there is popular demand for such an inquiry within the population of Northern Ireland.

According to commentators of the Good Friday Agreement the anchoring of consent and self- determination as cornerstones of the peace deal do not only cater for the momentary needs for peace, rather they can be seen as a "tacit double protection [meaning] that all protections of rights afforded to nationalists would also be available to Unionists in a future divided Ireland." (McKittrick 2012: 257-58) It is arguable whether the participating unionists already had Protestant interest after a hypothetical reunification in mind, however, potentially they had the shifting demographics that were mentioned above in mind. In any case strict anti- discriminatory legislation as stated in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 guaranteed equal rights to members of both communities. Numerous laws and legally binding documents attempt to ensure that discrimination of one community will not occur in the form it once had. Equality legislation, in particular as codified in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, "makes it an offence to discriminate on the grounds of religion, and leads to the requirement, for example, for employers to maintain monitoring information on the religion of their employees." (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 2011: 13)

However, aside of diplomats’ jubilant mood in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement Smith points out that unionist and nationalist motives for singing it were diametrically opposing:

“The phrase Peace Process was the essential linguistic tool for camouflaging irreconcilable Unionist and Nationalist objectives. Unionists concentrated on the peace aspect of the Peace Process as an end to violence and a settled, water-tight and finalized agreement that [...] has consolidated the Northern Irish state and Partition. [...] SDLP and especially Sinn Fein highlight the - process- part of the Peace Process, a staging post in a still incomplete journey, the final destination being a united Ireland. Thus more about the process than about the peace (or process and peace together) because for them, true, lasting peace will come only with unification” (- Smith 2002: 8- 9).

A major step, which made the Good Friday Agreement possible, was the willingness of Irish government to alter the Irish constitution. As mentioned above several articles thereof stated the republic's claims over the entirety of the Irish isle. McKittrick argues that the Good Friday Agreement "provided for a rewriting of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution to remove what Unionists regarded as the objectionable claim of territory of Northern Ireland." (2012: 256) The said articles had been some of unionism's most bitterly fought enemies throughout decades as numerous unionists feared that Ireland and the UK were to agree on the lawfulness of the Irish claim. To some extent pacified by these concessions’ unionists demonstrated a bolstered readiness to accept terms usually strongly criticised in the unionist and in particular loyalist narratives. By removing Articles 2 and 3 from the Irish constitution the unionist/loyalist narration “that the [Irish] Republic is inciting the conflict” (Smith 2005: 63) became groundless. Among the unionists' most notable admissions was the acceptance of an amplified Irish dimension which in return brought many republicans on the boat. According to the Northern Ireland Act a stronger north-south axis was to be institutionalised through a newly established body; the so-called North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC). In this council the respective Irish ministers met with their Northern Irish counterparts to discuss common policy and agree on joint legislation in the appropriate fields and subsequently execute the laws bilaterally. (1998: Part V NSMC, BIC, BIIC, etc.: Sections 52, 52A and 53) Aside from deeper north-south links the Good Friday Agreement allowed for a more powerful Anglo-Irish dimension, it comprised two committees. First, the British-Irish Council (BIC) and secondly the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC). (Northern Ireland Act 1998: Part V NSMC, BIC, BIIC, etc.: Sections 52, 52A and 53) These institutions were to cater for permanently good Anglo- Irish relations on the one hand and enhanced cooperation in terms of potential future Northern Irish crises on the other (McKittrick 2012: 251 ff.).

2.2 Current Standstill After having put forward a description of the Trouble’s diplomatic solution above, this section will attempt to provide a brief summary of the current political landscape in Northern Ireland. The situation is characterised by a DUP – Sinn Féin executive paralysis which lead a renewed imposition of direct rule. A short outline of this current stalemate will be followed by a short discussion of Brexit and its menacing implications for (Northern) Ireland and the peace process that has been materialised since the Good Friday Agreement.

Direct rule had been ended with the signing of the GFA and the thereof resulting establishing of the Northern Ireland Assembly. As codified in the formula of the Belfast Agreement the job of the First Minister was to go to the UUP, as the strongest voice of unionism and the SDLP as the nationalist counterpart holding the position of the Deputy First Minister. These two offices were to head the newly founded Norther Irish executive. In the late 1990s and early 2000s the parties on the peripheries on the political spectrum, i.e. Sinn Féin and its loyalist counterpart the DUP became increasingly stronger (McKittrick 2012: 300 ff.).

Former Political Peripheries on the Rise Republican and loyalist parties won the place of nationalist and unionist parties in the early 2000s. Sinn Féin overtook the SDLP, and the DUP became strongest party in the Northern Irish Assembly, leaving the UUP “in mortal decline” (McKittrick 2012: 301). Another highly interesting point becomes visible when comparing unionist and nationalist voter turnout. “The 2010 Westminster election showed how close the differential had become, as the unionist parties took 44 per cent of the vote while major nationalist groupings collected 42 per cent” (McKittrick 2012: 302). Arguably the most significant reason for this, is the altered composition of society. Comparing the applicable censuses of 1971 and 2001 a change in demography becomes evident. While the percentage of the Northern Irish, who declared Roman-Catholic their denomination in 1971 amounted to 31.4%, (Northern Ireland General Register Office 1972: Table 1) the census conducted in 2011 indicates a sharp rise in said number. The census carried out by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency found that 40.3% (2011: 7) of the total population in Northern Ireland declared themselves Roman-Catholic in 2001, with the number slightly ascending to 40.5% in 2011 (2011: 8). This demographic advance of the Catholic community went hand in hand with a steadily rising number of Catholics employed in senior posts in the civil services, as well as in the educational sector. McKittrick stating that "[w]ithin academia Catholic representation rose steadily in the universities, among both staff and students." (2012: 302) 62

Simultaneously the 2011 census found the number of people with Protestant denominations decreasing dropping 45.6% in 2001 (2011: 7) to 42.3% in 2011. (2011: 8) This figure consists of the main Protestant denominations, being the Presbyterian church, the Church of Ireland and the Methodist church, as well as all other smaller evangelical churches. This pattern of demographic dynamics, with Catholics increasing and Protestants decreasing in numbers remains the same to this day. According to Otto this development is based on the birth-rate of the Catholic community which is considerably higher than the Protestant one (2005: 142). This evidence indicating confessional allegiance, however, shall not be mistaken as an explanation of the political presence or future in Northern Ireland. For this the ability of parties to mobilise their electorate and the parties’ campaigns or contents are at least as significant as the voters’ denominations.

Considering the above, is legit to argue that the favourable political momentum was equally important to the altered demographic structure for the gain in votes for the SDLP and Sinn Féin. As it appears highly unlikely, however, that significant parts of the Protestant community voted for the SDLP, let alone Sinn Féin the only reason nationalist, as well as republican parties could experience such a high turnout at elections, is if a considerable number of Catholics are present in the constituency. However, it is equally important that the respective Catholic minority is mobilised by the parties to cast their vote. As the combined nationalist-republican electorate showed the Catholic community was successfully convinced that real changes and a share of executive power was in reach for their community.

Sinn Féin – DUP Power-Sharing Between 2002 and 2007 direct rule was reintroduced due to unionist-nationalist tensions (2012: 272 ff.). After having overtaken the SDLP and the UUP, the former nemeses entered into the power-sharing executive as the strongest parties of their respective social groups. It is remarkable the at times hard-line loyalist DUP and Sinn Féin as the former political arm of the IRA could break their divide and form a coalition in 2008. McKittrick states that the notorious Ian Paisley “dismissed the often vicious battles of the past with two short sentences: ‘That was yesterday. Today is today’” (2012: 303). Naturally, the problematic topics concerning the peace process did not end with the DUP-Sinn Féin agreement on power sharing. Several responsibilities were yet to be designated to one or the other party, first and foremost the nomination of the minister of justice caused a dull atmosphere between the two parties. As the ministry of justice included the hotly contested area of policing neither party wanted to withdraw their claim to it. According to McKittrick, however, the DUP and Sinn Féin were 63 after a five month break in talks able agree on a solution, acceptable to unionists, as well as to nationalists. The accord consisted of neither party nominating the minister for justice, "who would instead be elected on a cross-community vote. This meant that the Alliance Party won a department, despite lacking the assembly numbers for the Ulster Unionists [UUP] and SDLP" (2012: 284).

This inter-party agreement is remarkable because of two developments. First because it indicates towards the functioning of the recently established executive framework in Northern Ireland. This means that one the one hand power-sharing between the two biggest community parties is actually able to find solutions to existing problems, and on the other hand it indicates that this dual-party government can have a future. Preceding to this, numerous critics were highly doubtful of the new Stormont government possessing the qualities necessary for consensus. Secondly and equally important, this ability to reach political consensus within Northern Ireland is a strong indicator for the will of the major political players in the constituency to continue peaceful cooperation. For decades it was the norm that intercommunal accords could only be reached if London and/or Dublin were actively involved in breaking the political stalemate, for instance in the Sunningdale Agreement. For a long time, the standstill deriving from a lack of trust or the unwillingness to talk to representatives of the other community had been characteristics of Northern Irish politics.

An important moment underlining this newly found trust between the communities came with the killings of two British soldiers by renegade IRA-members in the summer of 2009. The First (DUP) and Deputy First Minister (Sinn Féin) stood in front of castle Stormont, which had for a long time been the symbol of repression to republicanism as well as nationalism and condemned the murders jointly. The Deputy First Minister Martin McGuiness was an IRA figurehead throughout its active time and took over Sinn Féin leadership from Adams in early 2007, declaring the murderers were: " 'traitors to the island of Ireland' " (McKittrick 2012: 284). As not many within the militant republican movement had a voice carrying that much authority as McGuiness' it became evident that mainstream IRA had turned its focus on conducting politics by the means of the word and not by the gun.

Breakdown of Power-Sharing In 2017, after the so-called “Renewable Heat Incentive”-scandal surrounding Arlene Foster, who was DUP leader and First Minister at the time, Sinn Féin left the power-sharing executive in protest (Guardian Online: “Cash-for-ash”, 2018 [accessed on June 28, 2019]). Since then

64 direct rule was reintroduced and the power-sharing executive has remained suspended since. Among other reasons additional conflicts about the nature of Brexit and its implications on Northern Ireland the strongly pro-Brexit DUP and Sinn Féin have yet not reached an accord for a renewed power-sharing executive. Sinn Féin is against Brexit, as this would impede borderless travel and trade with the European Union member Ireland (BBC Online: “What is”, 2018 [accessed on June 28, 2019]).

Brexit – Threat to the Peace Process As previously stated, loyalist and republican paramilitaries agreed to a ceasefire and subsequently put their arms out of commission. However, this did not imply that violence entirely seized. Extremists from both loyalist and republican peripheries still carried out small- scale bombings or raids. From the experiences in the 2000s and 2010s it is in any case quite legitimate to assume that violence would never rise to the levels of the 1970s or 1980s (McKittrick 2012: 290). The recent killing of a young journalist by renegade republicans highlighted just how fragile the peace in Northern Ireland is. According to a letter of confession the perpetrators are radicalised supporters of radical republicanism. The BBC states that this was not the first time dissident republicans became active in 2019: “The group blamed for killing Lyra McKee is known as the New IRA and was behind a bomb attack outside the city's courthouse at the start of the year” (BBC Online: “Lyra McKee: ‘New IRA’ admits killing”, 2019 [accessed on June 28, 2019]).

It is legit to assume that the renewed agitation from extremist republicans comes hand in hand with a deterioration of intercommunal relations due to Brexit. To what extent, however, can Brexit impede the peace process as codified in the Good Friday Agreement? As Northern Ireland came to European-wide attention as it proves to be one of the most enduring points of friction in negotiations between London and Brussels. The European Union calls for the implementation of a so-called “backstop” in their attempt to find a suitable measure to ensure no hard-border between the Irish entities would emerge (BBC Online: “Power-sharing talks”, 2019 [accessed on June 28, 2019]). “The backstop is the insurance policy designed to ensure the Irish border remains open in the event that the UK leaves the EU without securing an all- encompassing deal” (ibid.).

Given there would be a visible and feasible border, between the Northern Ireland and the Republic as a consequence of a no-deal Brexit, this could serve as a reminder to militant republicans in the north that they are not citizens of Ireland. In the worst-case scenario this

65 could encourage them to take on arms again (The Conversation Online: Par, Connal, 2018: 6min:35sec-7min:15sec, [accessed April 30, 2019]). Additionally, the imagery of Brexit negotiations is harmful to the peace process, as the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom appear on different sides of the negotiations table, after having in the past engaged in common reconciliatory approach to the Northern Ireland issue. The two protective powers of nationalism and unionism are thus perceived as enemies again (The Conversation Online: Par, Connal, 2018: 7min:45sec-9min:20sec, [accessed April 30, 2019]).

2.3 Descriptions of the Conflict This last part of chapter two will attempt to provide an examination of the Northern Ireland conflict and its prescribed nature. Recent findings of the scientific community will be compared to public belief. This section will in particular analyse the commonly adopted perspective that the Troubles were a religious conflict by means of an interdisciplinary approach. Insights that are gained by this comparison will be utilised for the didactic analysis in chapter three.

From a rational scientific standpoint, the Troubles are not a religious conflict. Confession was neither the trigger for various agents resorting to violence, neither were denominational interests a key drive for the sectarian confrontation. This, however, shall not imply that Catholic or Protestant Churches had no part to play in the conflict. In the Northern Irish society religion functions as an identity marker separating two otherwise hardly distinguishable social groups (cf. Smith 2005: 64). Thereby reasserting and reassuring them of the otherness of the respective group. Confession is thus used as an identity marker, which in turn functions as a means of creating social boundaries. McGarry and O’Leary explain this complex phenomenon as following:

„A common intellectual failing has been the conversion of the ‘markers’ which distinguish the two groups with distinct national identities into factors that are claimed to have crucial explanatory content in their own right. Typically religion and/or a range of other cultural differences are said to explain the conflict […].” (- McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 357)

As shown above religious or cultural differences do not explain the conflict. However, public discourse frequently exploits this notion as the binary image that is thereby created is highly charged by the opposing historical memories of nationalism and unionism. Thus, artificially prolonging the conflict’s roots to the 17th century. McGarry and O’Leary continue

“The fundamental failing of this perspective is that it forgets that ethnic groups can maintain themselves and continue to fight with each other even

in the face of significant acculturation – whether that acculturation is occasioned by secularism, linguistic homogenization, or other cultural dilutions. Acculturation, the sharing of culture, does not necessarily lead to assimilation, a sharing of identity; either in Northern Ireland, or elsewhere.” (- McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 357)

Another more frequent description of the conflict stresses the dimension of ethnicity. However, also this approach that appears much more well-founded than religion needs clarification and a theoretical framework. Ethnicity goes hand in hand with ethno-nationalist narratives. Thus, the conveyed narrative can be a highly simplifying one. Smith argues: “To most people who have not thought a great deal on the matter, it is utterly counterintuitive to suppose that states’ “national” identities do not grow directly from ethnic origins” (Smith 2005: 23). Guest provides a suitable systemic description of ethnic conflict. His observations on conflict and ethnicity are based on a sociological approach. Guest argues:

“[ethnicity] can be activated when power relationships undergo negotiation in a community or a nation. Then people call on shared ideas of ethnicity to rally others to participate in their causes, whether those causes involve ensuring self-protection, building alliances, constructing economic networks, or establishing a country. Ethnicity can also be activated by charismatic entrepreneurs of ethnicity [in order to] fight for political, economic, or military power against real or perceived enemies” (2017: 244).

Guest classifies identity (or ethnicity) entrepreneurs as following:

“[They are] political, military, and religious leaders [who] promote a worldview through the lens of ethnicity. They use war, propaganda, and state power to mobilize people against those whom they perceive as a danger. Ethnicity may not actually be the problem. Rather, the struggle for wealth and power uses the convenient narrative of ethnic difference to galvanize a population into collective action. Once the wedge of ethnic difference has been driven into a population and used to achieve power, it can be self- perpetuating and extremely difficult to stop.” (- Guest 2017: 245)

Smith argues that the Northern Ireland conflict is an identity-conflict, which comprises the opposing historical memories as main source of identity. This source of identity is simultaneously the main source of conflict, as the narrative of “other” is rejected. Historical memory, identity and maintaining conflict stand thus in an interdependent relationship with each other. Smith remarks:

“Historical memories operate in a number of ways in ethnic conflicts. First, they assist group definition by supplying a “story” that gives cohesion to the group. Second, they supply groups with negative material about each other that strengthens each group’s self-definition. Third, once a conflict is 67

underway, historical material is drawn upon by both sides to articulate grievances. Because exacerbate conflict, they also, as a consequence, harden group identity and thus perpetuate conflict. Many identity-based conflicts demonstrate a cycle of this kind” (- Smith 2005: xiii).

To sum up, there are several descriptions of conflict that (partially) apply to the description of the Troubles. The conflict and its causes can be described using identity, ethnicity or opposing narratives. There are, however, some strand of explanation of the conflict’s origins, such as religion, that can be wholeheartedly dismissed.

3. The History of Teaching History The subsequent chapter aims at providing a brief outline of the Irish school sector from past to present in order to comprehend the challenges it faces today. The formative period of the education system, commencing with the beginnings of mass schooling in 1830 (cf. Gallagher 2017: 194) and the diverging systems after partition, will be addressed as well as its implications for moulding the future of the Northern Irish school system. The impact of these Irish educational policies on early schooling is still tangible today more than a century later. Additionally, focus will be laid on the manner in which history teaching was regarded by the respective policy makers.

The strong sectarian nature of the past and present school systems of Ireland was not initially planned. Gallagher points out that beginning in 1830 British authorities devised a plan “to establish a national education system of schools throughout the island of Ireland. […] The intention was that a common school system would operate across the island and that pupils from all denominations could and should attend all schools.” (2017: 194) School curricula were not designed to include religion classes “but clergy would have guaranteed access to all schools to provide instruction for children of their faith community” (ibid.). However, it quickly became evident that the churches promoted a sectarian school system, so that by “[19th] century’s end the national system was, for all practical purposes, denominational and contained separate schools for Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians and Methodists” (ibid.). One point that becomes evident here, is that state authorities would and could not put a halt to segregating tendencies of denominational agents; gradually transforming the school system’s national character into a confessional one. This confessional takeover is responsible for the common unionist notion that the Catholic Church interfered heavily with the school system (cf. Smith 2005: 60). As stated above it is true that churches took control over “their” schools. It is, however, not provable that Catholics did so to a greater extent than their Protestant peers. According to Gallagher unionist 68 criticism stems from the sheer “virtue of numbers” (ibid.) of Catholics. This means in effect that the “Catholic Church was the most powerful player in the politics of education” (ibid.) plainly as most Irish were Catholic.

Partition in the early 1920s, however, became a turning point in Irish education politics. North and south of the inner-Irish border policy makers opted for different approaches on teaching; in particular on the question of contents, who should administer schools, and the governments’ political agendas on schooling. In the Irish Free State, the already chosen path was continued. Gallagher argues that in the “newly independent Ireland, the Catholic Church moved quickly to confirm its position as the leading organization of civil society and cemented its control of education” (2017: 194-5). On an ideological level, however, no stone was left untouched. Free State stakeholders quickly implemented education reforms and amended the history curriculum to the extent that “the Irish dimension […] was reinforced” (ibid.). “Nationalising” history instruction is a common tool, found frequently after caesura in governance – for instance by looking at the Western Balkans numerous examples of this become evident. Gallagher argues that as far as the case of the Free State is concerned these steps aimed at the “promotion of national pride and patriotism” (2017: 194) ensuring the (future) population would feel Irish, rather than British. Summarising, while the Catholic Church retained power over “their” schools in the south, Free State policy makers implemented “modern” nationalist curricula after partition.

Northern Irish politicians’ views on school administration and instrumentalisation of history instruction were dissimilar. However, one thing north and south had in common was their shared aim of teaching differently in their polities. But while Dublin tried to focus on its Irishness or rather its “Unbritishness”, Belfast with its “new Unionist controlled parliament was determined to put distance between itself and the rest of the island” (Gallagher 2017: 195). In terms of education structures, a reform programme was to make the Northern Irish system more comparable to the contemporary English system (cf. Akenson 1973: 64). Gallagher on the reforms: “Essentially this involved schools coming under the control of local authorities and diminishing the role of denominational interests” (2017: 192). Initially Stormont ministers even saw a potential chance of “the participation of Catholics and win their loyalty to the new political arrangements. (Gallagher 2017: 192-93)

However, due to conflicts between government negotiators and the Catholic Church, which soon arose, those unionist aspirations were shattered. So that “[…] by the mid-1930s Northern Ireland had two parallel school systems, one for Protestants and one for Catholics, the former

69 fully-funded by the state, the latterly only partially so” (Gallagher 2017: 193). Stormont reforms were thus only partially implemented in Catholic schools and even in Protestant schools they mostly failed to deliver on a reduced sectarian grip (ibid.). This setback combined with anticipated and actual ethnic tensions brought Northern Irish politicians to embrace a completely contrasting approach on teaching history, namely not teaching it at all. Fitzgerald explains the situation as following: “[T]he predominant official view was that, in a divided society, teaching history in a non-partisan way was not possible, and may even be divisive, so it was preferable not to teach history at all” (1991: 171). As becoming apparent here, north and south decided on varying approaches to history instruction: While Dublin’s objective was to implement an Irish-centred history curriculum in order to “educate” their citizens, policy makers in Belfast finally concluded that teaching history in schools comes with a credible risk for social peace, which is not worth taking.

As Northern Irish policy makers did not meet the expectations of the civic-religious community concerning the subject history, civic actors became active in various fields. Fitzpatrick states that Catholic and Protestant non-governmental associations organised the publishing of history textbooks promoting their own narratives. Their strong religious affiliation is evident from their names: (Catholic) Christian Brothers and their counterpart the (Protestant) Church Society (1991: 171). Stormont’s political attempt of avoiding the society’s politicisation due to avoiding history instruction altogether did not function. This policy backfired as civic players entered the pedagogical vacuum created by Stormont’s absence. It becomes apparent that inactivity of state actors can only procrastinate but not prevent civic engagement with a subject matter. The civic/sectarian community took on the role as history mediator as the state left it vacant. Without sufficient official supervision they were able to create what Stormont initially intended to prevent: a deregulated space in which exclusive sectarian myths and beliefs could flow and eventually be conveyed to the next generation; and all of that among the legitimising umbrella of school instruction.

Schooling System in Sectarian Hands As stated above a sectarian school system developed in Northern Ireland after partition. This still has a considerable impact on schooling realities today as the segregate nature continues to prevail in primary and secondary schools. What is alarming is that not only students are split along sectarian lines – also teachers are. Gallagher states that in “1994 […] 85 per cent of teachers in Protestant schools were from the Protestant community […] by contrast, 98% of teachers in Catholic schools were from the Catholic community” (Gallagher 2017: 192 ff.). 70

However, it is not only in schools that teachers and students are separated. Also teacher training happens predominantly segregated along denominational lines. Most teacher that will teach at a Catholic school attending other universities than their peers with Protestant backgrounds (Smith 2005: 91). Given the above, it becomes comprehensible how deep and encompassing the social divide within Northern Ireland is.

The segregation of youths along sectarian lines brings a whole range of difficulties in terms of peaceful and frictionless cohabitation of the social groups. According to Gallagher a problem with this arises as important part of one’s identity is formed during school years (cf. Gallagher 2017: 195-6). As Northern Irish youth frequently do not get a chance to bond with their peers from the respective other social group during their school years, the “others” are often omitted from one’s identity. As shown above the separate school system entails problems in terms of social peace and stability. Denomination, however, is, not the only segregating factor deciding on the pupils’ educational career. Gallagher notes that “secondary schools in Northern Ireland continue to operate on the basis of academic selection, with academically selective grammar schools and non-selective secondary schools” Gallagher 2017:191).

4. Analysis of History for CCEA GCSE The subsequent section will aim at analysing History for CCEA GCSE along viewpoints based on depicted narratives, didactic quality and curricular compatibility. History for CCEA GCSE is a practise book for the GCSE-exams. It is highly examination- orientated, with its layout, and chapters not being cohesive. This means that the schoolbook does not attempt to portray a narration bound by chronology or thematic category. What sticks out when regarding the cover of History for CCEA GCSE is the prominent and luminous positioning of Adolf Hitler. Doubtlessly this would have catered for much criticism if the book was to be published in the germanophone world.

Finbar Madden (2014): History for CCEA GCSE. 2nd edn, rev. London: Hodder Education.

Chapter Structure

Two chapters of History for CCEA GCSE will be analysed due to their thematic relation with the Northern Ireland conflict; namely: “Chapter 2 Peace, War and Neutrality: Britain, Northern

Ireland and Ireland 1932-49” (cf. Madden 2014: 57-100), and “Chapter 3 Changing Relationships: Britain, Northern, Ireland and Ireland c1965-85” (cf. Madden 2014: 101-44).

4.1 Narrative Analysis As stated previously the applicable chapters will be examined in order to detect unionist or nationalist narratives. As stated previously close attention has to be paid on the fact that remnants of ethno-nationalist narratives are eliminated from schoolbooks, in particular from those used in post-conflict societies (cf. Smith 2005: 14 ff.). This is important as ethno- nationalist narratives functions via an emotive appeal to the students’ respective historical memories. As put forward previously, challenges of said memories, for instance by deconstructivist questioning of an inherited trauma or a cultural practise, can result in utter rejection of the teaching content in order to maintain their identity. Smith describes this phenomenon concerning the respective historical memory of a social group as following: “People’s sense of self is profoundly rooted in a particular view of events, and they will feel deeply threatened if someone tries to make them see these events differently” (Smith 2005: 30). Dealing with partisan narratives is a delicate process, it calls for sensitivity and experience on part of the teacher. However, generally speaking university education of teaching staff does not cover this field. Additional conflict- and identity- sensitivity training courses for teachers would thus be much needed.

Narratives are selective, partisan narratives are highly selective. This is the reason why special focus has to be put on the representation of former conflicts in the respective areas. Schoolbooks can alter the representation of a conflict simply by not covering a thematic field. Naturally, it is evident that omissions in the sense of a didactic reduction are indispensable as no book could contain “the” history of a country, let alone “the” history of the human species. Despite that it has to be pointed out that not every omission is admissible; they never have to distort the account of events, which the scientific community agreed upon. Parts of History for CCEA GCSE that are favourable to or influenced by partisan narratives will be question following a deconstructivist approach. The respective texts will be elected according to the categories presented in chapter one.

Hints of Hegemony With the commence of chapter two “Peace, War and Neutrality: Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland 1932-49” the author attempts to portray the situation in Ireland throughout the timespan of World War One and Two- Thematically this chapter ranges from the struggle for Home Rule,

72 the partition of the island, Ireland’s gradual path from Free State to a republic, and subsequently highlighting the situation out of which sectarian violence was to erupt. While Madden (mostly) refrains from favouring on side over the other too overtly, he creates a narrative in which the background of the Troubles – to which it ought to provide a basis of explanation as it is dealt with in the subsequent chapter – remains ominous. Additionally, History for CCEA GCSE appears to be conveying a narrative that is uncritical of unionist – or to a lesser extent British – shortcomings.

However, Madden’s argumentation lacks historic depth and appears to focus on irrelevant perspectives at times. According to his book the conflict’s roots do not go beyond the Special Powers Act of 1922 (2014:101). This notion is far from any scientific consensus and does not even deserve the label ‘semi-historic’. No mention is made of commonly acknowledged reference points that would provide a pattern of interpretation for i) identity creation processes within Ireland – such as the Anglo-Norman colonisation (Smith 2005:41) or the foundation of the Ulster plantations; including the influx of Anglo-Scottish settlers (Otto 2005:42); or ii) the position of social and economic deprivation of Gaelic-Irish communities and vice versa the Anglo-Irish status of privilege – e.g. the implementation of the Penal Laws and land distribution among Anglican aristocracy. (Otto 2005:24-25)

Madden misses to address any of the events above, thus obstructing process-orientated historic learning. Another implication of omitting these events is that he does not offer different approaches of how the conflict evolved to students; instead, his texts along with the presented work assignments instruct the pupils merely toward reproducing the hegemonic Britain-centred master narrative. Major notions of socioeconomic inequality as well as political discrimination which were historically grown and conditioned are left blank this way. Addressing these issues would allow the students to incorporate these various interconnected concepts into their understanding of how some of the roots of current conflicts can be retraced over and modified by multiple centuries. By neglecting to mention these historic events and processes the didactic concept of cause and consequence as postulated by Peter Seixas is adversely affected in particular. By presenting the roots of the Troubles as a result of 1920s Stormont’s anti-Catholic legislation significant parts of historic understanding vanish, namely the competence of identifying processes and events that shaped aspects of the past and comprehending the importance of their consequences for processes which condition the present. This complex structure of historic learning cannot succeed if the portrayed conflict trigger(s) float in

73 historiographic vacuum. Concluding, the lack of historic reference going beyond the 19th century complicates historic learning as the cause(s) of the conflict are left obscure.

Considering the chapter’s initiating sentence another field of investigation unfolds: “Between 1801 and 1920 Ireland was ruled by Britain from Westminster.” (Madden 2014:57) One may ask why this statement is of any significance? In order to answer this, we have to raise several other questions in advance: (i) Why is 1801 used as a date of reference (and what does this entail)? (ii) Why are no earlier dates of British rule mentioned? Ad (i): Ireland was not reigned from Britain beginning in 1801, it had been under British control for much longer. In 1800 the Act of Union was passed in Westminster and came into effect a year later; thus 1801. The end date is also interesting as 1920 is the year in which the Government of Ireland Act was passed by Westminster. However, it would be outright false to claim that the United Kingdom had no say in Irish affairs after this date, as it only devolved certain areas of legislation to the two newly established parliaments in Dublin and Belfast. On the message’s surface level this is however, the message which Madden conveys.

By using these dates Madden represents a specific narrative and arguably follows a deliberate logic. Regarding the latter question (ii) we have to state that the author had numerous potential and plausible dates at his disposal which would categorise the duration of British control over Ireland. So why did Madden not briefly refer to the arrival of the Anglo-Normans (Smith 2005:11-12), Henry VIII.’s installation of a royal governor (Otto 2005:31) or Cromwell’s military campaign and subsequent land distribution in Ireland (Otto 2005:41) when outlining British dominion over the island? All of the above would ‘qualify’ as milestones in determining the political and diplomatic inter-insular relationships. However, they have one thing in common which the author obviously does not want to depict: violence and/or oppression. Madden writes in the Empire’s historiographic tradition and continues reproducing its master narrative in his schoolbook; thus, transmitting it to the next generation.

Following it will be argued that the initiating date Madden sets for British rule over Ireland is chosen deliberately. On the surface ‘1801’ implies democratic values and rule of law – as is the date of the Act of Union – and laws are inevitably associated with democracy by the modern reader. It draws a picture of a country being able to send its representatives to the British House of Commons, while obscuring that Irish representatives were a) underrepresented in proportion to the general population (White 2004:7). and b) almost exclusively of Anglican descent. Madden does not disclose that Britain had politically ruled Ireland long before 1801; instead he decides to portray British-Irish relations in in a more benevolent light. His statements justify

British rule as it tells a narrative in which British rule is associated with civic values and democratic discourse; which is unarguably a more attractive and favourable towards the UK than stating that rulers, such as Cromwell perpetrated crimes against humanity in Ireland or that Irish farmers were dispossessed of their land in accordance to the Penal Laws – long before 1801. To sum up, here Madden writes in the British master narrative which puts British ‘constitutionalism’ and thus Westminster legislation above preceding political processes. This omission of the six centuries of Anglo-Irish interaction distorts the schoolbook’s narration, rendering its narrative pro-British. By doing so he (re-)produces a narrative that justifies – or at least does not criticise British rule and maintains the narrative of the “Good-Empire”.

The image many UK citizens still foster of the times when the British Empire encompassed one third of the planet a predominantly positive one; thus, the author’s standpoints is not a curiosity within the British society. According to a survey (sample = 1741 UK adults) conducted by YouGov, [Online] http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_ uploads/document/6quatmbimd/Internal_Results_140725_ Commonwealth_Empire-W.pdf; accessed 10th March 2019] an online data acquisition company the majority of British respondents felt rather proud than ashamed about Great Britain’s imperialist past. The answering patterns remained similar when the subjects were asked about the Empire’s consequences for subjugated areas. While only 15% feel that British dominion caused harm, more than triple of that number is of the opinion that former colonies profited from being subjugated by Britain. While public opinion in Britain, as in any other state, is prone to glorify aspects of their nation’s past it is unlikely that first world state leaders express their opinions according to said statistic. In 2004, during an official visit of African Commonwealth countries, former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared: "We should celebrate much of our past rather than apologise for it.” (https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-334208/Its-time- celebrate-Empire-says-Brown.html; accessed:10th December 2018) With this highly criticised statement the Labour politician referred to remembrance culture in the context of British soldiers who fell in the colonies. Given this social, cultural and political displacement of history the narrative offered by Madden becomes more comprehensible as well as representative of certain quite irrational portions of British mentality.

Next Madden continues to portray the situation prefacing, World War I, the Easter Rising and the outbreak of the Anglo-Irish War. He portrays this period with a sequence of simplifications which focuses on the genesis of the IRA; mostly describing it as a transfer from radical Irish Volunteer forces. “In January 1919 the Irish Republican Army (IRA) began what became known as the Anglo-Irish War against the British forces in Ireland. The IRA had been formed by those members of the Irish Volunteers who had refused to go off and fight in the First World War.” (Madden 2014:57) In general, these simplifications are admissible as they are a means of didactic reduction and thus, facilitate dense knowledge portions have to be conveyed. On the other hand, his phrasing clearly indicates who he thinks is responsible for the outburst of violence. Once more the British perspective appears to be prevalent, bestowing a hegemonic notion on Madden’s writing. By rephrasing this section would read more balanced; thus, reducing the phrase’s brisance.

Subsequently Madden focuses on the issue of partition, which came into effect by the Government of Ireland Act and the path to the Irish Free State. As highlighted in the paragraphs above Madden tells a narrative in which British rule is hardly challenged or criticised; instead he positively emphasises UK’s compliance to civic and democratic values. Furthermore, he describes London’s Ireland policy in favourable terms while simultaneously stressing its defensive character: “While fighting this war the British government began the search for a political solution that it hoped would be acceptable to all sides.” (2014: 58) These and other phrases leave the reader with the notion of British victimhood and passivity and vice versa of Irish aggression and agitation, which is a common conception within unionism (cf. Smith 2005: 60). At another point Madden states:

“The Government of Ireland Act delighted Unionists, ensuring as it did that they would have control over their own affairs (Source A). They lost no time in holding elections for their new Parliament, winning 40 of the available 52 seats” (- Madden 2014:60).

This phrasing is worrisome as the pronouns and possessive pronouns in the phrases ‘they would have control over their own affairs’ as well as in ‘their new Parliament’ refer directly to the noun ‘unionists’. In other words, it is suggested that the Northern Ireland parliament has always been supposed to cater the needs of only one group – namely unionists. This stands in sharp contrast to what the modern perception of democracy and its institutions. History classes ought to enable students to understand the world around them; including past and present processes

76 that shape(d) it. According to the principles of citizenship education history classes, furthermore, ought to convey and foster a pluralistic understanding of politics and society. A “democracy” in which all legislative and executive powers remain with the majority; and which in numerous cases worked against the minority, is only a democracy in name. It can be stated that Madden reproduces a narration about democracy which lacks sensibility on a textual level and misses to elaborate on the state of Northern Irish democracy. In summary, this segment can be read in the spirit of Gramsci as a continuation of a British master narrative.

Here the author missed an important opportunity to underline the close interconnectedness between the era of Stormont-sanctioned discrimination and the Troubles. Even though these developments occurred some forty years apart the influence the former exerts on the latter is substantial. In this early Stormont period (late 1920s – 1940s), which is paradoxically enough for this comparison referred to in the analysed schoolbook as years of stability and peace, when in reality a system of institutionalised politico-economic discrimination against the social minority was established. This system comprised various operations that ensured a lasting one- party dominance (allocation of positions, gerrymandering, etc.). Furthermore, authorities deliberately accepted the absolute political isolation as well as social marginalisation of a third of the new state’s inhabitants in order to secure their position of power. The physical violence and civic unrest resulting from this isolation, which was not only of political but also of socio- geographic nature, proved to be an unexpected backlash for the authorities. They were unable to contain it with force; diplomacy, however, achieved a breakthrough. The subsequent solution brought the establishment of a power-sharing executive in which both of Northern Ireland’s prominent social groups govern the country jointly. A broad spectrum of learning objectives appears here in terms of exploiting these processes didactically. This case study would cater for historic learning in accordance with two concepts of Peter Seixas and will be presented as good- practise examples below. First, comparing the Stormont system with the current DUP-Sinn Féin executive along the concept of “Continuity and Change” would provide valuable insights. According to assignment format and preliminary considerations these insights could shed light on possibilities of minority participation, sharing of political power in multi-ethnic entities or measures in order to avoid political isolation of a social group. Secondly, analysing and evaluating the previously mentioned Stormont system of institutionalised discrimination from the point of Seixas’ “Cause and Consequence” would bring several advantages. For instance, the link between denying civil rights and social space to minorities and a subsequent radicalisation can be thematised. Another thematic field that could be established would be how

77 the Stormont system amplified the sense of isolation and resentment of the nationalist political spectrum toward the state.

Wordings according to which the parliament in Belfast ‘belonged’ to unionists can also be found in another section. After a text which treats the separation of the island and the holding of elections in Northern Ireland comes a questionable segment with a text of a historian, titled ‘Source A’. It is questionable because his text switches from third person narrating voice to first person narration. This break in narrative structure derives from an in-text quote: “Therefore they [unionists] saw safety in ‘Having a parliament of our own, for we believe that once a parliament is … working well … we should fear no one and […] be in position of absolute security.’ (Madden 2014:60) First, it is not obvious to students and teachers where the second quote comes from or whether it is a verbalisation of general unionist attitude. Second, it generates an evocative sentiment via its menacing diction. This makes it clear to the readers that the ‘fear’ originates from the others; i.e. non-unionists. Third, Source A together with the preceding sections clearly tell a unionist-centred narration of how a “parliament of our own” (ibid.) can provide them with stability and security. Another example of similarly emotive language would be: “As a result, Unionists were convinced that Nationalists wanted to destroy Ireland.” (ibid.) Again a feeling of threat is articulated by the author and associated to the nationalist cause by the reader. One issue arising from the usage of emotionally charged language is that the associative processes within the readers’ brain are naturally not evident to the educator. The outcome of their conclusions may alter considerably from what the educator/schoolbook factually intended to convey.

Another instance in which a hegemonical pattern comes to light is in a section which addresses the so-called Economic War. In this episode of Anglo-Irish relations, the two countries imposed tariffs on imports from one another. It is dealt with on two and a half pages (Madden 2014:64- 66), which certainly more space than partition, Easter Rising or comparable events were given. Along these pages, a hegemonic narrative comes to light, which omits certain historic processes that would ensure an in-depth understanding of the respective subject. An instance for this, is the omission of critical arguments that would question British acquisition of Irish soil, which had reached its peak after the Cromwell-area and were institutionalised during the times of the Penalty Laws, (cf. see above). This delicate period is not mentioned in the British schoolbook. The period(s) that followed, i.e. early Irish nationalism, economic and political exclusion of vast parts of the island’s population is “discussed” within following sentence: “Land reform was one of the biggest issues in Irish history in the nineteenth century.” (Madden 2014:64) It is

78 followed by a list of how Westminster enabled Irish small-scale farmers to purchase their farmland from its owners, mostly members of the Protestant Ascendancy. “To make this happen, the British government had loaned tenants the funds. Each year the farmers paid back part of these loans, in payments known as land annuities, worth an estimated £5m per year. Between 1922 and 1932 the Irish government collected the money and sent it to London.” (Madden 2014:64) Given that land purchasers also paid these annuities between 1870 and 1922, which is omitted, British authorities profited from this tax for around 62 year. As past economic and social discrimination still are a strong point of Irish cultural identity and the profound feeling of having been wronged by Britain in the present, its omission impedes historic learning along the concept of cause and consequence’ (Seixas 2013: 110 ff.); as by omitting the cause of a process its consequence is incomprehensible to students.

What is more striking, however, is that Madden’s narration entangles itself in considerable contradictions within these pages. Initially Madden states that the Free State government stopped paying land annuities to London. These payments were used as a means of compensation for the financial loss of (Anglican) landowners after peasants were allowed to purchase the soil which they had been cultivating (Otto 2005: 63 ff.). After Dublin halted these transfers Westminster imposed punitive tariffs, thus commencing the ‘Economic War’.

“Britain, angry that de Valera’s government refused to pay monies that the previous government had paid, responded to Dublin’s actions by imposing a duties of 20 per cent on Free State imports” (- Madden 2014:64).

However, this statement is reversed in a didactic assignment later: “Did de Valera make mistake in starting the economic war?” (Madden 2014:66) Even though the “British government had abolished land annuities for Northern Ireland’s farmers” (Madden 2014:64) the Free State’s attempt to rid its budget of this fiscal burden appears insolent. One searches in vain for references to the global economic crisis of the late 1920s and their aftermath – omitting important global occurrences that stand in direct relations to his subject matters is an unfortunately coherent feature of Madden’s schoolbook. In another task section Madden openly and rather suggestively questions Dublin’s policies: “Did the changes introduced by de Valera during 1932-6 make any real difference to life in the Irish Free State?” (2014:63) The wording here already tempts the reader to negate the question. To sum up, this inconsistency of thought in this section can be read as either semi-biased accusations against the Free State’s government or simply as bad editing.

While Madden presents sectarian violence relatively unbiased in this chapter his depiction of the social atmosphere surrounding it lacks depth. The outbreak of violence following the installation of the Northern Irish state is portrayed in neutral terms: “The doubts and suspicions that were being experienced by both sides were increased by high levels of sectarian violence.” (Madden 2014:60) However, the manner in which the schoolbook presents socio-economic backgrounds, which are crucial for an understanding of the conflict is insufficient. For instance, Madden paraphrases the early Stormont’s system of institutionalised discrimination as following: “[…] discrepancies in how those council houses were allocated meant that not all benefited equally.” (2014: 95) With this phrasing he trivialises the inner-unionist nepotism when it came to the distribution of houses and jobs in the civil service. Along this quite unprecise formulation the reader could also assume that the Anglican part of the Northern Irish society was the victim of this discrimination. Furthermore, omitting other factors of Stormont discrimination, which contributed considerably to the nationalist alienation with the state and its structures. By doing so the author impedes Seixas’ principle of cause and consequence as the socio-economic aspects of the conflict are obscured.

A prominent position within the schoolbook have O’Neill’s attempts to reform national legislation, and here especially concerning economic growth. Political relations between north and south are, however, barley discussed; different to what the subchapter’s title would suggest. The only instances in which the Republic is mentioned is in the context of a state meeting of Ireland’s president with O’Neill (which is not followed by a didactic follow-up); and more prominently the articles II and III of the Irish constitution. These articles “laid claim to all of the island.” (Madden 2014:102) This is certainly correct, even though further contextualisation would unquestionably be required in order to enhance historic learning. Beneath the surface however, this statement is in accordance with the old confrontational narrative of Northern Ireland versus the Republic. Simultaneously it recites the ancient narrative of unionist concern toward north-south relations, which had always been utilised to suppress any kind of diplomatic rapprochement between the Irish entities. Once again this draws a binary picture of the Northern Ireland question.

This binary view becomes evident in numerous sections of the schoolbook and is not limited to highlighting political opposites in constitutional affairs. Also, the general public is frequently subject to ‘over- politicisation. This term refers to a problematic categorisation of the population into two contrasting political blocks. Communities with a majority of Protestant denominations were labelled as ‘unionist’, while those areas with Catholic majorities were vice versa called

‘nationalist’. Even though it deserves mention that Madden did not categorise the population along religious lines, i.e. ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’. This fragmentation into two distinct and opposing groups may well promote an outdated black-and-white perspective on the conflict, not however, an understanding of the conflict’s complex nature, or the multi-layered interactions of civic and public stakeholders during the Troubles.

An example of Madden’s over- politicisation can be found in a section dealing with economy and unemployment in Northern Ireland in the 1960s. It states that “[s]everal companies refused government grants to open factories west of the River Bann” and concluded that “[…] was because the majority of the population in the west was Nationalist.” (2014: 103) Firstly, it has to be emphasised that this statement is politically, as well as sociologically questionable. Secondly, the didactic value of this section is meagre at best. During the 1960s general elections for the UK parliament, as well as Northern Ireland parliament elections show that unionist politicians repeatedly won seats in several electoral constituencies in ‘western’ counties such as Fermanagh and Tyrone. It has to be pointed out, however, that the results stemming from these elections are only partially representative due to frequently applied Stormont tactic of gerrymandering. From a sociological viewpoint it appears highly arguable whether your denomination, because that is the defining feature of ‘unionist’ or ‘nationalist’ for Madden, can depict your entire social group. The performed generalisation of west is ‘nationalist’, while east is ‘unionist’ may safe space in the schoolbook, however it obstructs historic learning and understanding cause and consequence of the prevailing tensions by drawing a grossly simplified picture of the Troubles. Figure 1, based on the census carried out in 2011, illustrates the denominational distribution in Northern Ireland. Here, the colour red indicates the percentage of people having been brought up as Protestants, while the shades of blue represent the percentage of the population that has been raised in Catholic tradition.

(figure 1: Denominations in Northern Ireland: Factcheck NI (2019) [Online] Available at: https://factcheckni.org/blog /communal-counting-the-northernireland-census/ [Accessed on June 12th 2019].)

However, upon closer examination this section displays not only political and sociological inconsistencies but also a defective knowledge transfer. In the same paragraph Madden estimates the differing rates of unemployment within Northern Ireland. The figure for the western counties of ”12.5 per cent” (2014: 103) differed significantly from the Northern Ireland average of “7 and 8 per cent” (ibid.). Instead of utilising these figures in order to establish a meaningful context about the distribution of jobs and wealth within the Northern Ireland, they are simply used to end a listing of economic policies the O’Neill administration implemented. Statistics undoubtedly capture that the social groups within Northern Ireland possessed different levels of wealth and purchasing power. These sections could have been used in a learning-orientated way to demonstrate that these differences were jointly responsible for the outburst of violence. As areas with predominantly Catholic population wanted to increase their level of wealth, while the so- called unionist community were eager to maintain theirs. However, Madden misses this opportunity. His book consistently neglects the socio-economic dimensions and their consequences on the Troubles. Furthermore, this generalisation is not admissible as it obstructs historic learning. In general Madden continues the ancient narrative of a two-party conflict, with simply interchanging the terms ‘Catholic’ with ‘nationalist’, and ‘Protestant’ with ‘unionist’. The image this evokes is one of confrontation, not one of reconciliation; as so often in this book. It has been shown that Madden’s claim does not withstand an interdisciplinary examination. In conclusion, this section of Madden’s book is highly questionable at best and frankly lacks didactic value.

Terrence O’Neill – the friendly face of unionism This previously analysed section was extracted from a column listing “Success and Failure” (Madden 2014:103) of the O’Neill administration reform attempts. Its focus being in particular the administration’s economic policies. However, these policies are only portrayed in a rather descriptive fashion, namely by stating which airport or motorway was to be built, or which 82 industrial sectors were to be granted government funds. Without background information or explanations on how these measures affected the people of Northern Ireland the potential insights these lists provide the readers with are limited. Another point of focus which becomes evident when screening History for CCEA GCSE, is Terence O’Neill himself.

While there is scarcely to no reference of Terrence O’Neill’s predecessors (James Craig, John Miller Andrews, Basil Brooke) throughout the chapters, O’Neill and his administration is overrepresented. However, it is never O’Neill’s administration that is mentioned, it is always him personally. Accordingly, the story that is written, is one of one great man changing, or at least attempting to change the destiny of his country. While this ‘great leader’-narrative is undoubtedly easier to reproduce than analysing complex socio-economic and political explanation models of the conflict, it should, however, not be the core of historic learning in the 21st century. Additionally, it would appear that the emphasis on the clearly more tolerant O’Neill should distract the readers focus from his, at times very biased and bigot predecessors as well as his successor. Numerous measures implemented, or laws passed by their administrations contributed substantially to fragmentating the communities and to the deepening divide between the social groups. For decades the Stormont system (mis)used political practices, for instance redrawing the borders of electoral districts, passing legislation which tended to criminalise one community, e.g. the Special Power Act of 1922 or discrimination in housing and public employment allocation in order to secure the largest possible extent of political and economic advantages for their unionist electorate. This resulted in alienation from and resentment against the state and its institutions by the Irish community.

Upon closer examination, Madden pursues a specific logic with focusing on O’Neill, which can be explained by Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. By explicitly emphasising O’Neill’s (the administrational apparatus remains abstract) inclusive policies he implicitly obscures decades of rigid discriminatory Stormont governance, which was paving the way for the Troubles. Thus, Madden writes in the tradition of hegemonic narratives; justifying Stormont rule over Northern Ireland, similar to the British master narratives aiming at justifying British rule over Ireland during preceding centuries. Along Gramsci’s concept of hegemony these narratives convey a transfiguring historical understanding; by explicitly as well as implicitly legitimising prevailing power relations between social groups. Furthermore, it can be seen as a means of maintaining dominating narratives and justifying the distribution of power deriving therefrom (Mayo 2016: xi ff.). This notion of a hegemonic narrative is applicable to History for CCEA GCSE in the sense that Madden tells a narration in which former British and recent

83 unionist political domination in (Northern) Ireland are either not treated critically or omitted altogether. Terrence O’Neill’s over-representation and the accompanying beneficial perspective toward the Stormont system can thus be regarded as another tool – similar to omission of critical developments – of maintaining a hegemonic narrative

Regarding the above Madden’s characterisation of Terence O’Neill the book’s texts frequently evoke the sentiment of the unionist-controlled Stormont being a just and impartial state. Madden puts a great deal of emphasis on O’Neill’s reform plans, which never exceeded the planning phase. Thereby justifying unionist domination and preceding anti-Catholic discrimination. In relation to this, calls for civil rights appear exaggerated vice versa. To support this power-justifying notion Madden portrays O’Neill as a person with dual heritage, as someone “with both Gaelic and planter ancestry” (Madden 2014:103); implying that under his premiership Stormont catered equally for the needs of all social groups. While it is certainly true that O’Neill himself wanted to include the Catholic community to a greater extent in state affairs in order to promote their identification with the state, this did not apply for his Ulster Unionist Party (cf. McKittrick 2012: 43 ff.). Actual reforms, i.e. “one man – one vote” or repeal of additional votes for entrepreneurs (cf. McKittrick 2012: 37 ff.) were implemented only when the conflict intensified and pressure from London increased to stop anti-Catholic discrimination (cf. McKittrick 2012: 91 ff.).

Binary Presentation The issue arising from rigidly placing the population into two opposing sections is obvious: It conveys an over-simplified picture of the Northern Ireland conflict. Either you are unionist/loyalist or nationalist/republican; people occupying the spaces in-between these ideological blocks are marginalised as their opinions and perspectives do not apply to the portrayed development of the Troubles. The presented point of view, deriving from a logic of didactic reduction, implies to students that there was a socio-political situation prevailing whose moto was: ‘either-or’, in other words ‘they against us’. This approach maintains a specific conflict narration in which intercommunal approximation is impeded as every step toward the other group is interpreted as weakness. This conflictual narrative is not only embedded in a group’s historical memory it also sustains it. (cf. Smith 2005: 68). The book, however, misses to address actors which acted across intercommunal divides, such as the Alliance Party. To sum up, categorising the population into a binary scheme maintains a conflict-centred narrative and has thus to be avoided in order to break biased community narratives and encourage reconciliation within the post-conflict society. Additionally, the binary representation of the 84 political parties and segments of the population lead to a diminished understanding of the pluralist nature of the Northern Irish society during and after the Troubles.

Representations of Diplomacy At other instances History for CCEA GCSE reads itself almost obviously against the negotiated treaties, such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In the book’s section on said bilateral treaty, the opposing English Tory politician has his say: “The involvement of a foreign power [note: Ireland] in a consultative role in the administration of the province will prolong, and not diminish, Ulster’s agony” (Madden 2014: 143). The question arises why Madden assumes this statement of Ian Gown has sufficient significance to incorporate it in his book. Additionally, Gerry Adams (Sinn Féin) and Ian Paisley (DUP), and an Irish politician are cited in equally critical terms (cf. Madden 2014: 142-3.). Only John Hume, a politician of the SDLP is in favour of the agreement (ibid.). Regarding the presentation of citations and their contents it appears highly suggestive toward students.

4.2 Didactic Analysis Before commencing the didactic assessment of Finbar Madden’s History for CCEA GCSE two of Peter Seixas’ concepts on historical learning will be introduced. With the concepts of historical significance as well as cause and consequence it will be attempted to assess the didactic implications that would arise by teaching according to History for CCEA GCSE. In this investigation it will be assumed that the teacher exclusively builds their lessons on the book. The first concept of historical significance implicates that an event or development in the past must be of sufficiently meaningful in order to teach it. Seixas suggests that: “educators have [to make] choices about what is significant enough to teach” (2013: 14). But as we know from realities in classrooms all around the world it is not (only) the teacher deciding on their lessons’ contents. Curricular requirements and the structure of the respectively used schoolbooks influence the selection of contents.

Criteria for establishing historical significance are the eventual results of a development or an event. Seixas postulated the question: “Did it result in change?” (2013: 16 ff.) in order to determine this. A second criterion is the revealing nature of an event or a development. Revelation here has the meaning of uncovering truths about the living environments of certain group in a time (Seixas 2013: 19). Historical significance is thus a construct that is created by people living in the present looking back into the past. Seixas concludes that as every narrative is constructed it is legitimate to assume that every narrative has a specific objective (2013: 20

85 ff.). This paper aims at evaluating whether narratives in History for CCEA GCSE follow a partisan agenda.

Cause and consequence as formulated by Seixas will be the second concept used attempting to describe historical and political learning. As with his concept of historical significance, here too change is an important factor. He notes that “Change is driven by multiple causes, and results in multiple consequences. (2013: 110). A multi-causal and multi-consequential approach is thus required in order to describe an event/process/development/personality holistically. Additionally, he states that: “The causes that lead to a particular historical event vary in their influence, with some being more important than others” (ibid.). This is of utmost importance as not only historians take out the “ranking” of an event’s importance. Social groups will draw upon material from the past that supports their narration; convinced that it is “the true history.” Thus, the schoolbook as an institutionalised source for teaching history has to be impartial and aim at presenting an account of history based on facts and objectivity. This is important as both schoolbooks and history classes ought to function as a counterbalance to partisan narratives that students may be exposed to outside the classroom. According to Gallagher these partisan notions of history are didactically difficult to deal with.

“‘What children already know’, however, is heavily contextualized, and this also has to be taken into account: popular accounts of history which they may have acquired in their community are not simply 'stories' of the past, but in a context of a divided society they resonate with political priorities” (– Gallagher 2017: 199).

Using cause and consequence will thus aim at analysing how representations of the Troubles shape pupils’ perception of this recent epoch. It will be evaluated how the conflictual developments leading up to and the political responses attempting to resolve are portrayed to the students. The schoolbook frequently hints at causes, and subsequently fails to uncover their consequences. It will be attempted to show how these omissions complicate historical learning and make political learning almost impossible. This proves to be problematic as with advancing age teenagers feel a strong affiliation to their social groups and their respective historical memories. Gallagher points out “that as pupils get older their articulation of historical issues becomes more partisan, suggesting that external influences become more important in informing their sense of the past” (Gallagher 2017: 201). Taking this into account it is legitimate to assume that similar to the ‘critical period’ in language acquisition (a period of time that roughly coincides with puberty – after which, no performative language skills can be developed

86 if no competent input was received beforehand) there exists a likewise critical period for the acquisition of historical thinking.

Counteracting the creation of such partisan narratives and their transmission form one pupil to the other is a sensitive task. Barton and McCully describe the situation as following:

“In many classrooms, history is presented in a chronological format that addresses events relevant to the current political situation, but students have little opportunity to engage directly the relationship between past and present. […] As students study elements of the national past, many of them incorporate those elements into an increasingly politicized historical perspective. Their experiences with the required curriculum, then, may actually supply raw material for the partisan narratives that their study of history is meant to counteract. More directly addressing connections between past and present might help students develop the alternative, contextualized, and evidence-based views that form the rationale for history education’ (– Barton and McCully, 2005: 108).

The in-class processes portrayed above are highly complex and demand sensitivity toward concepts and theories of conflict as well as historical memories. Additionally, preparations for the occurrence of partisan narratives, for instance didactic prearrangements, e.g. methods attempting to deconstruct the partisan utterances via role play, or perspective-taking tasks would be desirable. In general, teachers ought to receive enhanced training on how to cope with partisan narratives and chauvinist perspectives on history of their students. This would be crucial especially in post-conflict societies

Analysis of Sources, Representations and Photographic Material The following part will analyse which sources and representations occur in History for CCEA GCSE and how they are labelled. The schoolbook includes visual and textual representations and sources. Visual elements such as portraits, political caricatures or photographic material are not labelled as sources; this designation is only attributed to textual sources and representations. However, a differentiation between these two terms is missing, as Madden offers no distinction between source on the one hand and representation on the other in his schoolbook.

Sources and Representations:

The following list will provide a summary of textual sources and representations in History for CCEA GCSE. The chart indicates six categories, each of which numbers how often members the denounced entities get a chance to speak (cf. Table: “Sources”). In the list ‘Table: “Sources”’, figure 1 refers to sources and representations within “Chapter 2 Peace, War and Neutrality: Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland 1932-49”; with figure 2 referring to “Chapter 3 Changing Relationships: Britain, Northern, Ireland and Ireland c1965-8”.

The chart contains textual sources and representations, unlike Madden this chart, however, differentiates between sources and representations. The categories are i) unionist (including loyalist), ii) British, iii) nationalist (including republican), iv) Irish, v) other sources, and vi) historians. Categories i) to v) are textual sources from politicians of the respective groups, while category vi) are textual representations of historians. All categories apart from some entries in category v) other sources are highlighted in a greenish box labelled as “Source” (cf. Appendix for an example) in the schoolbook. The entries of category v) without said label are photographs of historic texts (cf. Madden 2014: 58, 78, 88). As such they qualify as textual source and are thus included in this chart.

Examining this table, it can be seen that personalities with a unionist or British background are much likelier to come to their say than nationalists or Irish politicians. The combined number of sources of category i) and ii) is 30. While the combined number of sources coming from nationalist and Irish politicians is 16. British and unionist voices are thus almost twice as frequently read by students than nationalist or Irish commentaries. This observation integrates itself well into the overall picture of a schoolbook that often presents critical contents in a light which is favourable to the cabinets in Belfast or London.

Another issue that becomes visible is that the number of actual sources is only marginally higher than textual representations. The combined number of textual sources, namely the total value of the entries in categories i) to v) is 58, with the textual representations in category vi) adding 88 up to 52. History for CCEA GCSE thus uses texts from historians almost as frequently as opinions of contemporary witnesses. Throughout the two analysed chapters it appears that Madden uses the textual representations from historians rather as a means of underlining and verifying his own historic account instead of instructing students to examine these texts. Thus, missing the opportunity to use them in order to enhance critical analyses of sources.

With History for CCEA GCSE’s failure to distinguish between sources and representations the difference between these terms becomes distorted. A quote of Margret Thatcher on the hunger strikers, a historian’s remark on unemployment in Belfast written in the 1990s or an excerpt of an IRA declaration look indistinguishable from each other. All the sources and representations, with three exceptions from category v), look alike in their green highlighted box. This does not cater for an understanding of students that sources are originating from the past and thus represent “windows to the past”. Representations on the other hand are attempts of people living at a later date to construct a history by the means of what they know – and what they know comes from sources. This understanding of the dependence of representations on sources cannot be transmitted by the way History for CCEA GCSE presents its contents to students. Another implication of Madden’s lack of highlighting the difference between sources and representations is the flawed depiction of textual sources. Only three textual sources are depicted in their historic appearance, namely the proclamation of the Irish Republic during the 1916 Easter Rising (cf. Madden 2014: 58), an evacuation note in Belfast (cf. Madden 2014: 78) and an Irish newspaper article (cf. Madden 2014: 88). By doing so the students’ ability to categorise the sources or representations temporarily; an utterance of a unionist politician in the 1950s has the same layout and feature the same colours as an historian’s statement which is 20 years old.

This functions as a transition to the next point of criticism. The secondary literature presented in History for CCEA GCSE is old. The publishing date of the “sources”, i.e. texts of historians, that Madden draws upon is in average between twenty or thirty years ago. The “youngest” book that is cited in History for CCEA GCSE is “The Politics of War and Peace” by Paul Nixon published in 2001, an impressive 18 years ago. The majority of the works cited by Madden were usually published between 1980 and 1995. By refraining from incorporating recent work of the scientific community he simultaneously refrains from using their recent findings. As the field of conflict research is a particularly dynamic area History for CCEA GCSE does not fulfil its inherent mediating role between academia and the public.

Photographic material:

The photographic material used in History for CCEA GCSE displays a pattern of overrepresenting unionist politicians. Below a list of depicted personalities or situations can be found (cf. Table: Photos). Their depictions will be categorised in six sections; namely i) unionist (including loyalist), ii) British, iii) nationalist (including republican), iv) Irish, v) supra-sectarian or vi) civilians. The categories v) supra-sectarian and vi) civilians refer to photographs which are not assignable to categories i) – iv). Category v) depicts for instance politicians from trans-sectarian parties, such as the Alliance Party. Category vi) portrays everyday people. Figure 1 and 2 only includes photographs; caricatures or portraits will not be listed. In case a photograph portrays multiple people falling into the same category, they will only be counted once. In case a photograph depicts multiple people falling into different categories each represented category will receive one entry. Figure 1 refers to “Chapter 2 Peace, War and Neutrality: Britain, Northern Ireland and Ireland 1932-49”. Figure 2 refers to “Chapter 3 Changing Relationships: Britain, Northern, Ireland and Ireland c1965-8”.

Regarding the table containing figures 1 and 2 it becomes evident that the photographic material used in the second and third chapter of History for CCEA GCSE feature more photos with unionist and British than nationalist or Irish motifs. In addition, it stands out that supra-sectarian as well as civilian motifs are underrepresented. What is particularly striking about the pictures falling under categories v) and vi) is that the photos feature only one kind of depiction. Additionally, these categories are the fewest in their appearance in the case of category v) supra- sectarian, both pictures are group shots at the 1974 Sunningdale conference (cf. Madden 2014: 131,133), in which Oliver Napier, an Alliance politician is present. In terms of visibility bestowed on the actors via the photographs, the existence of the Alliance Party is thus almost omitted.

Another interesting element comes to light when looking at category vi) civilians. All three depictions of this category involve people standing in debris after an occurrence of violent

90 conflict (cf. Madden 2014: 73,117,127). In one case a lone woman (cf. Madden 2014: 117) walks through the aftermath of a combat with rubble, a burned out car and the damaged façade of a brick house being visible in the background. The other two depictions of civilians are similar to this. On the one hand representation of this kind serve to illustrate the extent of destruction, on the other, however, civilians are portrayed as passive victims to violence by such a depiction. Regarding the above, it is legitimate to argue that Madden’s choice of photographic material underlines the black-and-white narrative about the troubles; with nationalists (and the Irish republic) on the one side and unionists and the British administration on the other. Actors that are not insertable into this scheme are marginalised.

Appeals to Patriotism

A rather curious element of History for CCEA GCSE is that unionist politicians are often mentioned with their military ranks or other rather neglectable side information. Madden writes about “Captain” Terence O’Neill (cf. 2014: 104) or “Major” James Chichester Clark (2014:115). No such references can be found referring to politicians of the nationalist block. It appears as if Madden attempted thus to appeal to sentiments of British patriotism by underlining the military ranks of these unionist politicians. The narration of these “outstanding men” is highlighted by lack of representations of ordinary people, as shown above. Another instance for such a peculiar contribution centres about Lord Hunt: “Who had the distinction of leading the first British team to climb Mount Everest” (2014:119). Whether Lord Hunt indeed led this expedition or whether Sherpas – in addition to carrying all the gear and equipment – guided the way, remains a mystery, although an historically insignificant one.

Hinting at the Cause, but Omitting the Consequence In terms of political learning, it is indispensable to thematise the recent past in history classes. As the recent past influences contemporary political processes immediately and also influences the ideological self-perception of political parties and agents throughout an entity. It is not a Northern Irish phenomenon that teaching about the most recent past is avoided. Slater notices that: “Many history syllabuses […] ended at a comfortable distance from the present, keeping at arm’s length sensitive or embarrassingly controversial issues.” (1995: 111) History for CCEA GCSE, however takes this to the next level by leaving the last 34 years blank. The narrative of History for CCEA GCSE ends with the unionist strikes against the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which remained futile. As an example of how this operation impedes cause and consequence of political learning the last text of the analysed chapters will be provided below:

“Source C: Historian Sabine Wichert writing in her book Northern Ireland since 1945 (1991). ‘The Unionist … protest gradually modifies its demands from scrapping the agreement to suspending it, after which, they said, they would be willing to talk to the SDLP about devolution and power sharing” (- as cited in Madden 2014: 145).

This clearly violates both principles of historical learning that this didactic assessment is based on: Historical significance as well as cause and consequence. The establishing of historical significance is not ensured as “Educators have [to make] choices about what is significant enough to teach” (Seixas 2013: 14). If this issue has to be addressed truthfully every educator tasked with teaching the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict would – at least – have to teach until the 1998 signing of the Good Friday Agreement. This is due to the fact that only after the GFA power was devolved to Stormont and the successive decommissioning of paramilitary weaponry. However, also cause and consequence, not only as described by Peter Seixas, but also as stated in the Education Order, is completely distorted. Given the quotation above is the last statement covered by the hypothetical teacher – how should the students make sense of an article in the Belfast Telegraph stating that Sinn Féin and the DUP have again failed to agree on a renewed power-sharing executive? The only mention of political players in this last chapter are the UUP (Ulster Unionist Party) and the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour Party). Establishing reference to the current political system of Northern Ireland, in which these parties have not been the dominant force representing their respective social group in more than a decade, is thus severely aggravated for students.

The chart below aims at establishing a framework of reference for omission-centred learning obstacles. The chart attempts to highlight several instances in which these omissions resulted in a diminished understanding of the public discourse on a currently discussed topic related to post-1985 developments. In order to ensure political as well as historic learning students have to be given a chance to learn about their political system’s most recent past. This is clearly violated by teaching as it is encouraged by History for CCEA GCSE. This represents a considerable handicap to political as well as historic learning. Students are not left utterly unprepared for the political discourse in Northern Ireland as it centres around questions and contents that are left blank. By refraining from thematising the last 34 years in his schoolbook, Madden aggregates students’ possibilities of orientating themselves in the political landscape surrounding them.

Taking a look at the figure below it becomes evident that numerous topics that are currently discussed in Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, or even globally are not thematised by History for CCEA GCSE. The centre of public discourse in Northern Ireland today is political unrest; which is caused in particular by the pending process of Brexit. An issue arises here: How can a no-deal Brexit can be compatible with the Irish dimension as stated, codified and expanded in the diplomatic milestones that were left ominous; i.e. the Downing Street Declaration in 1993 and in particular the Good Friday Agreement five years later? If the Irish dimension was never thematised in history classes students will have greater difficulties in understanding its importance for the nationalist spectrum.

Omission of … … results in a diminished understanding of the public discourse on … Downing Street Declaration 1993 Irish dimension Devolution Sinn Féin – DUP power-sharing executive Good Friday Agreement 1998 Breakdown of power-sharing executive Reintroduction of direct rule The Irish dimension (cf. Downing Street Brexit and its implications for peace Declarations and GFA) & UK and Ireland Backstop joining the European Community Ceasefire of paramilitaries Renewed activity of radical renegades

The most far-reaching impediment to political learning is the omission of the Good Friday Agreement as it effectively restored Northern Irish governance by means of a prescribed unionist-nationalist power-sharing formula, and a conformation and deepening of the Irish dimension. In addition to that the GFA is regarded by most scholars and observers as the end of the Northern Ireland conflict and the beginning of an agreed transformation of the military conflict into a political discussion. Both these factors, which are key to an understanding of the Trouble’s resolution are not thematised. Thus, History for CCEA GCSE omits not only the consequence but also the cause of these developments; thereby complicating students’ understanding of past political processes that shape the present.

However, omission of the GFA results not only in a diminished understanding of the treaty’s direct consequences it also impedes students’ sense of political orientation in the entire sphere of Northern Irish politics. In short: The GFA resulted in the devolution of powers to Stormont;

93 this autonomous governance was suspended several times until the DUP and Sinn Féin agreed on forming a power-sharing coalition; this coalition broke due to friction between the parties and resulted in the reintroduction of direct rule from Westminster; DUP-Sinn Féin conflict becomes aggravated by their different standpoints on Brexit – which in turn is a danger to the entire peace process due to the implicated threat of a hard border between the Irish entities. This complex chain of multiple causes having multiple consequences is difficult to comprehend even with extensive background knowledge on the course of the conflict and the operating principles of Anglo-Irish diplomacy. As this sort of knowledge is, frankly speaking, not conveyed by the examined schoolbook it is made almost impossible to students to fully participate in the public discourse on these key events shaping modern (Northern) Irish, or British politics.

As History for CCEA GCSE also misses to thematise Irish and British accession to the European Community in 1973 it diminishes pupils’ prospects to understand the current political landscape even further. Unlike the Downing Street Declaration or the Good Friday Agreement Anglo accession happened well before 1985 Madden could have covered this important event with ease. The Anglo-Irish accession to the EC was important as both countries negotiated with Northern Irish political parties one year later at Sunningdale. This conference resulted in the first power-sharing executive, which, however, only lasted for several months before breaking. Unlike the UK’s and Ireland’s accession the conference at Sunningdale is thoroughly covered by History for CCEA GCSE with Madden granting it and the unionist/loyalist strike that ultimately ended power-sharing, six pages in total (cf. Madden 2014: 129-35). This manner of representation is characteristic for Madden’s Anglo-centred worldview, as his schoolbook frequently fails to embed developments on the British Isles into a global context. Thus, notions of a global understanding of historic processes are left in didactic vacuum. History for CCEA GCSE thereby distorts the establishing of historical significance and impedes students’ capability of applying competences acquired while learning about specific thematic areas on other regions of the world, in a manner that would enable them to think historically and globally. Instances for that are the omission of the fact that simultaneous to the rise of (Ethno-) Irish nationalism, nationalisms were on the move throughout mainland Europe (cf. Madden 2014: 59 ff.). Likewise, he missed to interconnect the French and US-American revolution to calls for Irish Home Rule (cf. Madden 2014: 57).

The End or the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985? With the start of the last sub-chapter “The Search for a Solution” (2014: 129-146) Madden introduces a new thematic focus to the reader. While the previous chapter portrays the 94

‘escalation’ of the conflict, as the self-explanatory title – “Escalation of Political and Civil Unrest” (Madden 2014: 117-128) – suggests, the new chapter outlines the (attempted) solution finding process to end the Troubles. The previous conflict-centred narrative changes to a narration of political and diplomatic progress; focusing on standpoints of various political stakeholders, from the Sunningdale conference, to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. This bilateral contract is simultaneously the last episode of the Troubles which is dealt with in this schoolbook.

This is a rather questionable choice, as the Troubles were politically speaking far from being resolved in 1985. No mention is made of subsequent miles stones of the peace process, for example the Downing Street Declaration, which was signed eight years later in1993 (cf. Collins 2008: 106). As stated previously the most blatant omission is, however, The Good Friday Agreement which drew heavily on the consensus reached in the Sunningdale Conference and the already not thematised Downing Street Declaration. Concluding, it can be stated that choosing the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 as the end of History for CCEA GCSE’s chapter three is not comprehensible, especially as the second revised edition, which was subject of this analysis, was published in 2014 - 29 years later.

“Many history syllabuses […] ended at a comfortable distance from the present, keeping at arm’s length sensitive or embarrassingly controversial issues” (– Slater 1995: 111).

4.3 Curricular Analysis Description: This part of the analysis will attempt to assess whether teaching as encouraged by History for CCEA GCSE is compatible with Northern Irish statutory curricular requirements. In order to do so this section will first provide an overview of curricular provisions in terms of compulsory thematisation of contents and prescribed pedagogical approaches, such as the Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) or The Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007 (The Education Oder). Subsequently, it will be attempted to assess whether History for CCEA GCSE meets the specified criteria by means of a curricular compatibility analysis.

Statutory Curricular Provisions: The Education Order and EMU When assessing the EMU and The Education Order, the impact the Troubles had on curricula and syllabi becomes clearly visible. As stated above stakeholders attempted to change educational segregation along denominational lines frequently. Furthermore, numerous

95 measures were implemented, and various bodies set up, which aimed at bridging the intercommunal divide – however, most of these measures have yet failed to impact on the segregated classroom realities in a sustainable manner.

The Education Order The following section attempts to highlight which contents or approaches toward teaching history and in particular teaching politics are prescribed by the Education Order. This curriculum places history along with geography into the category: “Environment and Society consists of the subjects History and Geography” (2007: 44 ff.). Below the contents and prescribed objectives applicable to key stage 4 [note: the corresponding level to the analysed schoolbook] can be found. The minimum content for “Personal Development and Mutual Understanding” is set out below.

“Developing pupils’ Knowledge, Understanding and Skills: Pupils should have opportunities to: investigate the past and its impact on our world today through an understanding of different perspectives and interpretations; cause and effect; continuity and change; progression and regression; and by developing: the enquiry skills to undertake historical investigations; critical thinking skills to evaluate a range of evidence and appreciate different interpretations; creative thinking skills in their approach to solving problems and making decisions;” (2007: 46)

This section of the Education Order contains the competences and skills that students ought to acquire from history instruction. Perspective-taking which ought to enable pupils to understand the other side of the conflict is explicitly desired; as: “Pupils should have opportunities to […] understanding of different perspectives and interpretations […] evaluate a range of evidence and appreciate different interpretations” (ibid.) Additionally, it becomes evident that Northern Irish policy makers are familiar with Peter Seixas work, as his concept of “cause and consequence” becomes slightly altered to “cause and effect” and in this form enters the curriculum. However, it is apparent that these competences are as complex as they are specific and thus require an extensive amount of effort in order to sustainably affect students’ cognitive capacities and behaviour patterns.

According to the “Objective 1 – Developing pupils as Individuals […] Pupils should have opportunities to: […] Explore how history has affected their personal identity, culture and lifestyle. Personal Understanding” (ibid.).

“Pupils should have opportunities to: […] Investigate how history has been selectively interpreted to create stereotypical perceptions and to justify views and actions. Mutual Understanding” (ibid.).

This learning objective clearly indicates toward an ambitious aim, namely questioning the ethno-nationalist narratives most students are exposed to in their respective communities. The part of the curriculum is rather clear in that teachers ought to convey skills that assist students in understanding and questioning their identity in the contemporary world surrounding them.

Under the categorisation of “Objective 2: Developing pupils as Contributors to Society” the Education Oder summarises following important points:

“Pupils should have opportunities to: Investigate the impact of significant events/ideas of the 20th century on the world. Cultural Understanding. Investigate the long and short term causes and consequences of the partition of Ireland and how it has influenced Northern Ireland today including key events and turning points. Citizenship Investigate the impact of significant events/ideas of the 20th century on the world. Cultural Understanding Critically investigate and evaluate the power of the media in their representation of a significant historical event or individual. Media Awareness“ (Education Order 2007: 46).

As shown above the “minimum content” that ought to be covered in history instruction is indeed rather extensive. In addition to its large extent it is also highly complex, for both students and teachers, in terms of the competences necessary in order to fulfil its requirements.

EMU Contrary contrast to the Education Order the EMU functions as a syllabus prescribing content as well as pedagogical approach aiming at increasing contact between the groups and promoting social contact and integration (cf. Smith 1996: 4 ff.). Smith states that “in the case of EMU the analysis suggests that an improvement in relations between different cultural groups can be brought about by concentrating on human relations and increased inter group contact” (Smith 1996: 9). The objectives of EMU have thus to be understood in the light of a political act of volition to increase intercommunal contact in order to decrease tensions resulting from a lack thereof. Below the four columns of EMU will be stated. Subsequently further information on the objectives two to three will be given. The four columns comprising EMU are:

“Objective 1: Fostering respect for self and others;

Objective 2: Understanding conflict;

Objective 3: Appreciating interdependence;

Objective 4: Understanding cultural traditions” (Smith 1996: 11).

Add Objective 2) “Interdependence: Pupils should have opportunities to develop knowledge, appreciation and understanding of interdependence, continuity and change in social and cultural processes as they relate to families, local communities and the wider world” (Smith 1996: 13- 4).

Add Objective 3) “Cultural Traditions: Pupils should have opportunities to develop an informed awareness of the similarities and differences between the cultural traditions which influence people who live in Northern Ireland, and of the international and transnational influences on contemporary culture” (Smith 1996: 14-5).

Add Objective 4) “Understanding conflict: Pupils should have opportunities to develop knowledge and understanding of conflict in a variety of contexts and how to respond to it positively and creatively. […] They should be encouraged to develop […] respect for human rights, sensitivity to the views, traditions and values of others and an appreciation of diversity and pluralism” (Smith 1996: 15).

Curricular Compatibility Analysis As shown in the previous subchapter a broad range of pedagogical requirements and didactic demands to history teaching in Northern Ireland exists. The EMU and the Education Order prescribe the acquisition of distinct competences in the field of historic and political learning, such as the ability to make an informed decision. Other prescriptions are much vaguer in their name and in the manner in which they ought to be taught. The most prominent example for this would be the term mutual understanding. Mutual understanding entails that two communities comprehend each other. To implement this thought in regard to societal reconciliation in the classroom realities is complex. Specific methods such as perspective-taking or approaches to teaching based on multi-causality can enable students to acquire these sets of skills. The question remains, however, who helps the teachers to implement these curricular prescriptions?

As stated in the introduction the examined lessons will be taught by a hypothetical teacher, whose lessons are entirely constructed on History for CCEA GCSE and does not include sources, didactic material etc. aside of the portrayed schoolbook. According to the set of criteria listed in chapter 1 History for CCEA GCSE will be analysed. In the course of the subsequent evaluation it will be highlighted whether the schoolbook meets the pedagogical and didactic requirements stipulated in the EMU and the Education Oder. The section outlining the curricular compatibility of statutory provisions on education in Northern Ireland with didactic realities in the classroom can be found below.

It is at times rather difficult to decide whether History for CCEA GCSE meets the requirements of the EMU or The Education Oder as the prescriptions in the syllabi or pedagogical provisions are not consistently precise. However, it can be deduced that both statutory texts place great attention on “Mutual Understanding” - in other words the students’ ability of understanding the other side. The inclusion of this approach is highly sensible given Northern Ireland sectarian past and present. Which methods have to be portrayed in History for CCEA GCSE, however, in order to meet this requirement of mutual understanding? Mutual understanding implies empathy – empathy is the ability to assume what the other is feeling/thinking/requiring etc and to act accordingly.

Consequently, the question arises which methods can cater for enhanced social competences? Most likely methods that involve the students personally and interactively in class rather than teacher-centred classes. The methods thus have to be interacted and the contents conveyed by them have to require the students to adopt a new perspective in order to experience an understanding of the other. Apt methods for this could be a role-play with characters from different communities, ages, genders, social classes etc. The role-play could also aim at staging a diplomatic conference in which students adopt roles as leaders of political and civic life- Provided the students are equipped with sufficient background knowledge, they could encounter why the peace process was such a rocky one and that all sides had to make compromises. Another form that could enable students to take on another perspective is via the methods of creative writing. The students would slip into a writer during the Troubles. They would be tasked with writing a letter, or a newspaper article in which they demand restraint from loyalist and republican paramilitaries or the RUC and the British army. These or similar methods could have been used. None of them have been used by History for CCEA GCSE. Overall there was no method within the book’s didactic segments encouraging interactive, student-centred approaches toward learning. The most prominently cited method in the analysed schoolbook is the “drawing of a spider diagram” (cf. Madden 2014). Generally speaking, there are few instances where didactic tasks in History for CCEA GCSE request more than reproductive skills form the students. However, this is not sufficient in terms of promoting social competences that could facilitate mutual understanding.

Taking this into account we can also answer whether Madden’s schoolbook meets the Education Order’s requirement of “understanding of different perspectives and interpretations […and] appreciate different interpretations” (2007: 46) with a no. Again, as there is no method which facilitates perspective-taking to students they will most likely not question their own

99 pre-existing beliefs of the Troubles and thus refrain from adopting a new-perspective; as we previously put forth that this could entail a great psychological or cognitive burden.

A very interesting and equally complex field of didactic requirements is stated in the Education Order. Namely that history classes ought to enable students to “investigate how history has been selectively interpreted to create stereotypical perceptions and to justify views and actions” (ibid.). Firstly, this is complex process that requires advanced historical understanding and thinking and last but not least competence in criticism of sources. The requirements as stated in this passage would entail that partisan narratives were to be discussed, and along a deconstructivist approach deciphered in order to detect which historic events and developments were and are utilised in order to maintain a certain social group’s historical memory. As stated above however, rather reproduces those partisan narratives than questions them. In addition, the ability to critically reflect on sources is not given by teaching as proposed in the examined book; as a comprehension of what historic sources and representations are is distorted and actually impeded by History for CCEA GCSE. Hence, the book does not meet the provision of “media awareness” as formulated in the Education Order (2007: 46).

When regarding EMU’s requirements concerning “Cultural traditions” i.e. that students “develop an informed awareness of the similarities and differences between the cultural traditions which influence people who live in Northern Ireland” (Smith 1996: 14-5) it becomes evident that Madden completely excluded the distinct cultural practises of the social groups in Northern Ireland. No mention is made of the annual marching season central to unionist historical memory; neither does he include nationalist cultural practises. Thus, History for CCEA GCSE clearly fails to comply with this objective three as stated in EMU.

Looking at objective four of EMU “Understanding conflict” the decision whether History for CCEA GCSE meets the requirements is not that easily made. Madden does provide a brief summary of indiscriminating Stormont practises at the beginning of chapter two (cf. Madden 2014: 101), including the abolishing of proportional representation, gerrymandering, inequalities in the voting system and the allocation of council houses, etc. However, the socio- economic dimensions that were jointly responsible for the outbreak of violence remain unthematised subsequently. Rather History for CCEA GCSE portrays the Troubles as a sequence of violence that sparked further violence, strongly drawing on the political and military dimensions of the conflict. The factors of identity, cultural recognition or political participation central to current research to Northern Ireland conflict are not represented –which

100 is hardly surprising as Madden fails to include recently published work on the development of the Troubles.

In terms of political learning the contents of History for CCEA GCSE do not meet the requirements of the Education Order. It prescribes several didactic principles that ought to be considered by history instruction: “[…] continuity and change; progression and regression […]” (2007: 46). As previously stated, History for CCEA GCSE frequently aggravates political learning by distorts to the principles of cause and consequence. As previously proven, there are numerous omissions that dilute political learning. This is detrimental to the acquisition of political competences. Successful political learning entails that the students acquire competences that make them competent and informed members of a society who are able to participate in political decision making. Additionally, the competences acquired from political learning should render students capable of forming an informed political decision (cf. Education Order 2007: 46-7), i.e. enabling a student to decide which party within the Northern Irish political spectrum represents their beliefs the most. The omission of the recent past can only be assessed highly critical as youths in their opinion-forming period are susceptible ethnicity- based narrations. Without political education and the competences, it delivers the ability to come to an unbiased well-informed political judgement is thus severely impeded.

The Self-Contradicting Curricula… The 1985-endpoint of History for CCEA GCSE was previously heavily criticised. If taking the citation below, referring to the applicable curriculum into account, however, it becomes evident that this is failure is not to be blamed on the author Finbar Madden. The ending of chapter three of History for CCEA GCSE is accordance with the contents prescribed by the curriculum.

More bizarrely, for students aged 14-16 years who opted to study history, the curriculum for Northern Ireland history comprised two options which involved the study of Northern Ireland from 1939 to 1965, or the period from 1965 to 1985. This was bizarre to the extent that the options played directly into the community narratives and there is anecdotal evidence that choices followed: the 1939-65 period offered a positive image of Northern Ireland’s wartime role and post-war economic growth, which might be considered more attractive to a Protestant narrative, whereas the period 1965-85 includes the growth of the Civil Rights Movement, the outbreak of violence and the collapse of the old parliamentary arrangements which had sustained Protestant power for generations, all of which might be seen as more conducive to a Catholic reading of history. It was also possible for schools to opt to teach history through an examination syllabus provided by one of the English Examination Boards, rather than the Northern Ireland

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examination board, and thereby avoid dealing with Irish history of any kind. (– Gallagher 2017: 198)

Gallagher notes that a prescriptive curriculum can have positive effects such as the removal of the “burden of responsibility from teachers and legitimises engagement with difficult issues which many might prefer to avoid” (Gallagher 2017: 208). He continues, that this will, however, “only be effective if the prescribed curriculum directly engages with these issues” (ibid.) Otherwise the curricular prescriptions "might institutionalise avoidance” (ibid.), as it proved to be the case in Northern Ireland.

Reluctance to the Past Keeping the above in mind it becomes obvious that the curriculum actually avoids thematising any contents subsequent the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985; thereby in fact violating numerous principles stated in both, the Education Order and EMU. The most overtly violated principle being “Understanding of the conflict” (cf. Smith 1996: 15). As shown above a holistic understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict cannot be achieved if the diplomatic breakthrough that effectively resolved it, is omitted: The Good Friday Agreement. By determining the contents in said manner “teachers [are allowed to] avoid discussion of contemporary controversies” (Gallagher 2017: 198). The essential questions of ‘What is a schoolbook and what is its purpose?’ is answered by Slater as following: “A book specifically written for school use to support a particular course or syllabus” (Slater 1995: 88). Given the curricular requirements History for CCEA GCSE does not live up to this modest description. Thereby leading political learning to absurdity and effectively diminishing the role history instruction can play in ameliorating intercommunal relations (cf. Gallagher 2017: 200). Concluding this chapter, it has to be stated that curriculum reform in Northern Ireland is indispensable if future Northern Irish students are to successfully achieve political and historic learning.

5. Conclusion As previously shown representations of the Northern Ireland conflict in the schoolbook History for CCEA GCSE were analysed according to various criteria. The applicable criteria were introduced in chapter one along with three research questions. The methodology necessary for answering each research question was stated in combination with preliminary theoretic considerations surrounding their dimensions of significance were also presented in the subchapter 1.1.

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A concise summary of the developments leading up the Northern Ireland conflict was provided by chapter two, Historic Overview. In addition to highlighting processes of political history that have shaped partisan historical memories – via intergenerational transmission – it was also attempted to offer an explanation for this remembrance cultural phenomenon by building upon conflict theories as stipulated by Margaret E. Smith (cf. Smith 2005). It was demonstrated how vividly partisan narratives manifest themselves in ethno-nationalist commemorative cultural practises. The paper aimed at highlighting how the frequent reoccurrence of inherited traumas in partisan cultural practises shaped

Subchapter 2.1, “The Troubles”, as well as subchapter 2.2, “Descriptions of the Conflict” analysed the Northern Ireland conflict. While the previous aimed at providing an outline of the course of the conflict by drawing on an interdisciplinary approach, which encompasses political scientific, socio-economic, and sociological elements. Furthermore, the chapter the “Historic Overview” including its subchapters demonstrated that Troubles cannot be explained in a comprehensive manner solely relying on political history. Thus, this paper attempts to utilise an interdisciplinary approach in order to assess the multiple causes that were jointly responsible for the outbreak of the Northern Ireland conflict, such as the Catholic minority’s socio- economic struggle for resources, or Stormont’s attempts to supress their cultural recognition or political participation.

The last subchapter of the “Historic Overview” namely “Descriptions of the Conflict” portrays various conflict descriptions applicable to the Northern Ireland conflict. This section suggested that there are several possible theoretical approaches of describing conflict based on different concepts; such as ethnicity as an agent of mobilising social groups and thus preparing them to use force to defend “their” territory, resources, system of governance etc. (cf. Guest 2017). Another possibility of description of conflict is portrayed by Smith’s explanation of partisan identity constructs of a social group. The latter may result in violence when notions of the group’s past – i.e. their historical memory – appear threatened (cf. Smith 2005). Notions that portray the Troubles as a religious conflict can be rejected, as religion only serves as an identity- marker in the societal composition of Northern Ireland.

A brief outline of the development of the schooling sector in Ireland is shown in chapter three. It was demonstrated how partition affected the emergence of a schooling system that was segregated along denominational divides. Furthermore, controversies around teaching history in the newly established Northern Irish state were addressed briefly. In addition, it has been proven that these divides still remain, and that confessional affiliation of a child still strongly

103 influences the choice of which school they will attend. The education sector, however, is not only segregated for pupils, also not their teachers will come mostly from their respective social group. In addition to the above it was presented that also teacher students attend segregated universities. (cf. Gallagher 2017). This chapter puts forward that Northern Irish population remains strongly divided on almost every level. Mutual approximation of the social groups is aggravated by the segregated school system as most students are denied a chance to bond with peers outside their social group. This, by implication, leads to a lack of counterbalance to biased partisan narratives about the “other” as youngsters are not able to gather positive first-hand experiences during their school career. The lack of integrated schools thus resembles a fertile ground for further bias.

Chapter four – “Analysis of History for CCEA GCSE” – represents the centrepiece of this examination. It was conducted following a threefold approach; it contained a narrative, a didactic and a curricular analysis. The GCSE-level schoolbook was analysed in compliance to the three research questions that were formulated in chapter one. The paragraphs below will aim at explaining how the research questions (a), (b) and (c) were answered, and which respective method was used for this purpose.

Narrative Analysis

Research question (a) “Are partisan narratives apparent in the Troubles’ schoolbook representations?” was answered utilising a narrative analysis.

It was demonstrated that even though partisan narratives were not openly reproduced in History for CCEA GCSE, it contains elements that portray cultural hegemonic traits. These were mostly detected in passages that dealt with the Stormont system or British rule over Ireland. Several times the schoolbook mentions historic trivia about British or unionist characters, which may appeal to notions of patriotism. History for CCEA GCSE frequently portrayed features that rendered the broader picture into a perspective that can be described as uncritical of Stormont’s shortcomings. The schoolbook did so by over-representing certain actors that appear favourable to unionism, such as Terrence O’Neill or by omitting

Furthermore, History for CCEA GCSE depicts the conflict for the most time in a rather linear fashion. A great amount of attention is laid on (para)military and political developments, while other dimensions that could explain the conflict form another perspective were mostly omitted. There is no sufficient mention of differentiated causes for conflict in History for CCEA GCSE. The schoolbook hardly makes any mention of the socio-economic, participative or cultural dimensions of the conflict’s genesis. The link between low living standards or poverty and high 104 levels of violence is not stressed in the Madden’s schoolbook. According to McKittrick (cf. 2012: 79) there are indictors that socio-economic factors played a vital role in where and how drastic violence broke out. These factors are not taken into account by Madden, thus only offering “half the truth” to the students.

As previously stated, narratives in History for CCEA GCSE always highlight the political or ideological struggle of the Northern Ireland conflict, leaving the economic dimensions obscure. In addition to this failure of providing a multi-causal explanation of the conflict Madden unveils a highly Anglo-centric perspective in his books, as he continuously refrains from embedding political, social or economic developments into the European, let alone a global context. Madden’s choice of representations, sources, and his emphasis on certain contents make it legitimate to argue that History for CCEA GCSE was written in a neo-historicist fashion. It focuses heavily on the stories of great men, who engaged in far-reaching politics, or perpetrated atrocious crimes, simultaneously omitting the life of the other 99% that lived in Ireland between 1932 and 1985.

Didactic Analysis

By means of a didactic analysis it was attempted to answer research question (b) ”Which implications arise for political education through the manner history instruction as suggested by History for CCEA GCSE?”

In general History for CCEA GCSE does not encourage teaching in a way that promotes historical and political learning. The schoolbook frequently violates the didactic principles of cause and consequence or historical significance (cf. Seixas 2013). By frequently omitting causes and diluting consequences the book impedes the acquisition of competences that would help students to orientate in the political landscapes surrounding them. How can students be expected to understand “consequences” – when they are not provided with “causes”? In other words, by omitting the recent past – from this date the last 34 years – students receive no political education that enables them to participate in their communities, make informed judgements of contemporary political processes and ideas, and to deconstruct common partisan arguments from the respective ideological groups.

The school system, with political education, which his intrinsically involved in history teaching cater for shedding light on thematic areas that would cater for a political orientation of students. It has to be emphasised what an important role perspective-taking method play for the ability to comprehend topics from a viewpoint that is different to one’s own. History for CCEA GCSE misses to suggest interactive student-centred methods, such as role-play or creative writing in 105 its didactic assignments. The Troubles, as depicted by History for CCEA GCSE, read themselves as a solely ethnic conflict. Economic deprivation and/or political exclusion of one group may cater for a more understandable reasons tensions arose to students from a unionist background than repeating “united Ireland”. Vice versa teachers may find it easier to give students with Irish nationalist sentiments an understanding of unionist fear of losing their identities, if they receive more information about the Ulster plantations; with Anglo-Scottish settlers coming to an unknown land, establishing their homes there and creating new identities. (e.g. Ulster-Scots) A history focusing on people rather than wars can promote perspective- taking.

In general, didactic elements never require analytical or evaluative competences from the students; the only field of competence that are necessary for answering the didactic tasks is reproduction. By turning the page and finding the required passage the students will be able to answer every task within History for CCEA GCSE. By refraining from including tasks that require students to think analytically or pass a value judgement their ability to participate as a competent and informed member in a democracy becomes severely impeded.

Curricular Analysis

By means of a curricular compatibility analysis chapter 4.3 attempted to answer research question (c) “Does the examined British schoolbook fulfil the Northern Irish curricular requirements and pedagogical guidelines as stated in the EMU and The Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007?”.

General competences required in the field of history sciences are frequently not conveyed or even diluted by History for CCEA GCSE. The prescription of “media analysis” (cf. Education Order 2007) is not fulfilled by teaching as suggested by History for CCEA GCSE. Criticism of sources, which is a necessity for forming an independent judgement, is impeded as History for CCEA GCSE fails to offer a distinction between historic sources and historic representations. As a consequence, historic and political learning is aggravated as the competence of examining various sources in order to pass value judgements about their origins and credibility is not taught. Students ought to learn how to question a source, or a representation. Does it display features of partisan narratives and if yes what is their objective; e.g. maintaining a partisan account of the past, or rejecting the “other’s” partisan-narrative, etc. As this is not covered by History for CCEA GCSE it fails to comply with the curricular provisions of mutual understanding (cf. Education Order 2007). The Education Order states that students ought to: “investigate how history has been selectively interpreted to create stereotypical perceptions and 106 to justify views and actions” Education Order 2007: 46). Being capable of this is important as it provides students with the possibility to deconstruct prejudice and partisan narratives. This is essential for societal reconciliation and conflict-avoidance as members of a social group who possess this skillset are less likely to be mobilised by partisan arguments as they understand their constructed nature.

As previously shown, methods and didactic assignments that would provide students with the necessary competences and comply with the curricular provisions are not included in History for CCEA GCSE. Madden’ choice of contents does not portray the Troubles in a way that meets the didactic and pedagogical requirements of EMU and the Education Order. As the methods used by the schoolbook, however, are inapt it decreases the level of historic learning students can actually deduce from History for CCEA GCSE. Aside from factual knowledge, which the youngsters could also receive from Wikipedia, teaching as suggested by History for CCEA GCSE will not lead to an increase in historic and political learning, clearly not fulfilling curricular prescriptions such as cultural understanding or investigating (cf. Smith 1996

As shown above History for CCEA GCSE does not include developments or events psot-1985. This is highly detrimental to students’ understanding of current political processes in Northern Ireland. This issue, however, can be translated, however, to a much greater context – if a society accepts that their recent past and recent politics are not thematised by public education, how can this society expect that youths will leave this institution well informed and sufficiently competent to make and understand far-reaching political decisions? At this point it has to be emphasised again: History and political education ought to prepare students for the political realities and aim to make them capable of creating informed judgements on contemporary politics,

Given the above is, however, that the curriculum contradicts itself in terms of pedagogical and content prescriptions with the specified timeframe that ought to be taught. the specified timeframes for teaching history referring to Northern Ireland are i) 1932 to 1949, or ii) 1965 to 1985 (cf. Madden 2014: vi-ii). As Gallagher pointed out each of these periods can be read in accordance to partisan narratives. As i) can be highly appealing to students from a unionist background (cf. Gallagher 2017: 197) as the war effort of Northern Ireland becomes emphasised. The second time frame ii) can, however, be read from a nationalist narrative (ibid.), as it underlines the institutional discrimination of the Stormont system and thus applies to the nationalist notion of victimhood.

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In conclusion, the contemporary Northern Irish education system is thus more inclined to maintain rather than break the cycle of intercommunal tension, or at least maintain popular partisan narrations. This also encouraged by teachers’ reluctance to teach the immediate past. As this is the ending point of this paper, it will now articulate two last aspirations for the future of schooling in Northern Ireland. First, implementing a curriculum reform which allows the presence to enter the classroom. It has to be emphasised that this analysis should be read as an appeal to curriculum makers for reform, much rather than only directing criticism toward the schoolbook author. Secondly, it would be great importance that teacher education at Northern Irish universities becomes integrated and specialised. Specialised in the sense that the pedagogical implications of working with sensitive material in a post-conflict society become thematised. Potentially this would reduce the pressure from obstacles that currently hinder Northern Irish history teachers from dealing with their recent past and thus decreasing their reluctance to teach sensitive material. Integrated university courses would furthermore be significant as teacher act not only as mediators between academia and the public, but also as multiplicators. Thus, positive intercommunal experiences at universities could have an impact on the picture of the “other” in their respective teaching. Naturally, more integrated schools would also be highly desirable but given current realities that seems unlikely.

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6. Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Finbar Madden (2014): History for CCEA GCSE. 2nd edn, rev. London: Hodder Education.

Education for Mutual Understanding:

Smith, A. (1999): Education and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. [Online] Coleraine: Ulster University. Available from: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/education/docs/smith99.htm [Accessed 11th March 2019].

Smith, A. and Robinson, A. (1996): Education for Mutual Understanding: The Initial Statutory Years. University of Ulster: Coleraine.

The Education Order:

Northern Ireland Assembly (2007): The Education (Curriculum Minimum Content) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007. [Online] Available from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisr/2007/46/contents/made [Accessed 15th February 2019].

Secondary Sources:

Akenson, D.H. (1973). Education and enmity: The control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950. London: David and Charles.

Barton, K. C. & McCully, A. W. (2005). ‘History, identity and the school history curriculum in Northern Ireland: An empirical study of secondary students’ ideas and perspectives. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 37(1), pp. 85-116.

Carroll, M. & Gill, T. (2017): Uptake of GCSE subjects 2016. Statistics Report Series No. 114., Cambridge: Cambridge Assessment.

Cooper, J. (2017): The politics of diplomacy. US presidents and the Northern Ireland conflict, 1967-1998. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

De Puig, L. M., Rapporteur (1996): History and the Learning of History in Europe: Report of the Committee on Culture Education. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 109

Fitzpatrick, D. (1991). ‘The futility of history: A failed experiment in Irish Education.’ In Brady, C. (Ed.) Ideology and the Historians: Historical Studies XVII (pp168-183). Dublin: Lilliput Press. pp. 168-183.

Gallagher, A. (2017): ‘Addressing conflict and tolerance through the curriculum.’ In: M. Bellino, & J. Williams (Eds.), (Re)Constructing Memory: School Textbooks, Identity, and the Pedagogies and Politics of Imagining Community. 1 ed., Vol. 3, pp. 191-208. [9] Netherlands: Sense Publishers.

Gallagher, T. (2004). Education in Divided Societies. London: Palgrave/MacMillan.

Gill, T. (2010): How old are GCSE candidates? Statistics Report Series No. 20. Cambridge: Cambridge Assessment.

Gramsci, Antonio (1947): Collected Works. L’Opera di Antonio Gramsci. Turin: Einaud. Guest, J. (2017): Cultural anthropology: a toolkit for a global age. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Mayo, Peter (2016): Hegemony and Education under Neoliberalism. Insights from Gramsci. London: Taylor & Francis.

McKittrick, D.; McVea, D. (2012): Making sense of the Troubles. A history of the Northern Ireland conflict. Rev. ed. London: Viking. McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary (1995): ‘Five Fallacies: Northern Ireland and the Liabilities of Liberalism.’ In: Ethnic and Racial Studies. 1st ed. [8].

McGarry, J., and O’Leary, B. (1995): Explaining Northern Ireland. Oxford: Blackwell.

Murphy, Adam C. (2013): Perpetuating National Mythos? Portrayals of Eigtheenth Century Ireland in Tweentieth Century Irish Secondary School Textbooks. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University. O’Callaghan, John (2009): Teaching Irish independence: History in Irish schools, 1922-1972. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Otto, Frank (2005): Der Nordirlandkonflikt. Ursprung, Verlauf, Perspektiven. München: Beck (Beck'sche Reihe, 1636). Smith, A. and Robinson, A. (1996): Education for Mutual Understanding: The Initial Statutory Years. University of Ulster: Coleraine.

Smith, J. (2002): Making the Peace in Ireland. London: Routledge.

Seixas, Peter (2013): The big six: historical thinking concepts. Toronto: Nelson Education. 110

Smith, M. E. (2005): Reckoning with the past. Teaching history in Northern Ireland. Lanham: Lexington Books. The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills - Ofsted. (2015): A-level subject take-up. Numbers and proportions of girls and boys studying A-level subjects in England. Manchester: Ofsted.

White, Isobel (2004): Research Paper 04/12. The Scottish Parliament (Constituencies) Bill. Edinburgh: Scottish Parliament.

Zelizer, C. (2012): Integrated Peacebuilding: Innovative Approaches to Transforming Conflict. London: Routledge.

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BBC (2019): Lyra McKee: ‘New IRA’ admits killing. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-48018615 [Accessed on June 28th 2019].

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The Conversation (2019): Par, Connal, 2018: 2min:30sec-3min. [Online] Available at: https://theconversation.com/the-good-friday-agreement-in-northern-ireland-at-20-the-anthill- podcast-94610 [Accessed on April 30th, 2019].

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111 https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/827656/EU-flag-up-in-flames-Eleventh-Night-bonfires- Northern-Ireland-brexit-theresa-may-dup [Accessed on June 19th 2019].

Factcheck NI (2019): Communal counting: The Northern Ireland census. . [Online] Available at: https://factcheckni.org/blog/communal-counting-the-northern-ireland-census/ [Accessed on June 12th 2019].

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Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (2017): Background to the religion and ‘religion brought up in’ questions in the census, and their analysis in 2001 and 2011. rev.ed. [Online] Available at: https://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/background-to-the-religion-and- religion-brought-up-in-questions-in-the-census-and-their-analysis-in-2001-and-2011.pdf [Accessed on February 14th 2019].

Northern Ireland Assembly (1998): The Northern Ireland Act 1998. [Online] Available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/47/contents: [Accessed on June 12th 2019]. Smith, A. (1999): Education and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. [Online] Coleraine: Ulster University. Available from: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/education/docs/smith99.htm [Accessed on 11th March 2019].

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7. Appendix Figure: Denominations in Northern Ireland

Factcheck NI (2019): Communal counting: The Northern Ireland census. [Online] Available at: https://factcheckni.org/blog/communal-counting-the- northern-ireland-census/ [Accessed on June 12th 2019].

Figure: Peace Walls

Northern Ireland Foundation (2019): Peace Walls. [Online] Available at: https://northernireland. foundation/projects/ sharedfuture/peace-walls/ [Accessed on March 17th 2019]).

Figure: Orange Order March

Britannica (2019): Orange Order. [Online] Available at: https://www.thenational.scot/news/ 16264902.twitter-reacts-to-arlene-fosters- decision-to-attend-orange-order-march/ [Accessed on 15th April 2019].

Figure: Bobby Sands Mural outside the Sinn Féin HQs

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Alamy (2019): Bobby Sands Mural. [Online] Available at: https://www.alamy.com/stock- photo-wall-mural-depicting-bobby-sands-on-the-side-of-the-sinn-fin-office-137673860.html [Accessed on April 20th 2019].

Figure: YouGov Survey

YouGov (2014): The British Empire is ‘something to be proud of’. [Online] Available at: http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/doc ument/6quatmbimd/Internal_Results_140725_Commonwealth_ Empire-W.pdf [Accessed on 10th March 2019].

Figure: Youth Screaming at British Soldier

Pinterest (2019): Youth Screaming at British Soldier. [Online] Available at: https://www.pinterest.at/pin/44233799462347 8907/?lp=true [Accessed on 4th February 2019].

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