Public Land Leasing in Hong Kong: Flexibility and Rigidity in Allocating the Surplus Land Value
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PUBLIC LAND LEASING IN HONG KONG: FLEXIBILITY AND RIGIDITY IN ALLOCATING THE SURPLUS LAND VALUE by YU HUNG HONG B.S., Northeastern University (1987) M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1989) Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in Partial Fulfillment to the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology May 1995 Yu Hung Hong, 1995. All rights reserved. The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. Signature of Author Yu Hung Hong Department of Urban Studies and Planning May 1995 Certified by Karen R. Polenske Professor of Regional Political Economy and Planning Dissertation Supervisor Accepted by Karen R. Polenske Chairperson, Ph.D. Committee MASSACHUSE-rsSm Department of Urban Studies and Planning MASAum INSTITUTE JUL 111995 PUBLIC LAND LEASING IN HONG KONG: FLEXIBILITY AND RIGIDITY IN ALLOCATING THE SURPLUS LAND VALUE by Yu Hung Hong Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in May 1995 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Urban and Regional Studies ABSTRACT In this study, I examined the viability of four mechanisms of land-value capture under the public land-leasing systems, using Hong Kong as a case. Because the State is the landowner under a leasehold system, it can capture the land value through four ways: (1) at the initial establishment of land contracts, (2) by the collection of an annual land rent, (3) during lease renewals, and (4) through modifications of lease conditions. Although I found that the Hong Kong government raised a large amount of revenues for infrastructure investment by leasing public land, not all four mechanisms work equally well. From my case studies, I found that the government captured 39 percent of the increased land value occurring between 1970 and 1991 from land sites leased in the 1970s. This captured value, which the government collected mainly from the initial auctions, financed an average of 55 percent of the average annual infrastructure expenditures in Hong Kong between 1970 and 1991. In trying to capture the land value during lease renewals and modifications, the government encountered political resistance from lessees and difficulties in negotiating and enforcing lease agreements. The findings from my study may have important implications on land policy making in countries where officials are experimenting with leasehold systems. Debates on the property-rights arrangements of land in some former socialist countries and the People's Republic of China focus on whether the State should adopt a freehold or a public leasehold system. One key issue is related to the capturing of the future increases in land value by the State to finance public infrastructure investment. If capturing land value after the initial establishment of leases is politically untenable, officials should plan their land supply carefully. A rapid disposition of land when its value is low may impede the possibility for the government to recoup the increased land value in the future. Moreover, I develop a framework that may guide policy makers to investigate whether or not they should adopt the Hong Kong leasehold system. The framework is composed of two parts. The first part is for identifying the potential problems of land leasing and is based on the concept of transaction costs instigated by Coase, Williamson, North, and other scholars. The second part is an extension of Hirschman's exit-voice concept to analyze how the government and lessees can use - 3- different strategies--exit, voice, persuasion, and coercion--to revise the existing rules to minimize transaction costs. In applying this framework to the Hong Kong case, I found that neither law nor the polity played a dominant role in minimizing transaction costs of land leasing in Hong Kong. Instead, the diverse outcomes of land-value capture depended upon the interplay of the parties' strategies chosen according to varying contexts. More importantly, I found that it was through persuasive actions, rather than coercion, in the form of a wise land policy that the government gained its legitimacy of being the landowner. Dissertation Supervisor: Karen R. Polenske Title: Professor of Regional Political Economy and Planning Department of Urban Studies and Planning Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dissertation Reader: William A. Doebele Title: Frank Backus Williams Professor of Urban Planning and Design Harvard University Dissertation Reader: Dr. Omar M. Razzaz Title: Real Estate Reform Specialist The World Bank ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study could not have been possible without the support of many individuals and organizations. First, I am deeply in debt to my three mentors who guided me through the process. I thank Dr. Karen R. Polenske, Professor of Regional Political Economy and Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), for her encouragement in pursuing the topic. In fact, she is the originator of the idea that I should examine the Hong Kong public leasehold system from a "property-rights" perspective. Her insight on the theoretical implications of the Hong Kong land-tenure arrangements showed me the tremendous potential contributions of my research to the literature on property rights. Moreover, Karen has provided me with moral support throughout my years at MIT. Her confidence in my ability to finish this study has made what seems to be impossible actually happen. Professor William A. Doebele of Harvard University also contributed significantly in shaping the direction of the study. He helped me to narrow a huge research topic into a manageable project and identified key issues related to land policy at each stage of my research. I have benefited greatly from his knowledge about the Coasian ideas and urban land management. Dr. Omar M. Razzaz, who is working at the World Bank and will become an assistant professor at MIT, provided major guidance on familiarizing myself with the literature on property rights. His teaching and research on issues of property rights have an important influence on my intellectual thinking on the Hong Kong land- leasing system. All three distinguished teachers have shown great patience and provided valuable comments on earlier drafts of this study. This study would read differently if the influences of any one of them were absent. Certainly, any error found in this study is my responsibility. Second, I want to express my appreciation to people whom I interviewed in Hong Kong. Specifically, I thank William Wai-Chuen Shui, Principal Assistant Secretary of the Planning, Environment, and Lands Branch, for his help in organizing interviews for me with key Hong Kong government officials including: Francis H.K. Ng, Government Land Agency; Karen P. Y. Chan, Government Estate Surveyor; - 5- Chun-Woon Cheung, Senior Land Executive; and Sing Lau, Senior Town Planner. Throughout the process, William Shui and I have nurtured a friendship that, I believe, will last a life time. I also thank other government officials, private developers, and scholars for their time and generosity in sharing with me their knowledge about the Hong Kong leasehold system. Unable to list all of them here, I give special thanks to: Barnabas H.K. Chung, Chief Building Surveyor of the Buildings Department; Ronnie C. Chan, Chairman of the Hang Lung Development Co., Ltd.; Trevor Farnworth, Property advisor of the Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.; Si Ming Li, Senior Lecturer of the Hong Kong Baptist College; Tunney F. Lee, Professor of Architecture at the Chinese University of Hong Kong; Kenneth T. W. Pang, Land Registrar of the Land Registry of Hong Kong; Anthony Gar-On Yeh, Assistant Director and Reader at the Center of Urban Planning and Environmental Management at the University of Hong Kong; and Stephen M. W. Yip, Director of Land Administration at the Hung Lung Real Estate Agencies Ltd. Third, I am very grateful for the financial support provided by two organizations. First, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation/Center for International Studies at MIT awarded me a summer grant to conduct a preliminary field research in Hong Kong in 1992. Second, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy gave me a one-year research contract to do detailed case studies in Hong Kong between 1993 and 1994. Needless to say, I take full responsibility for the statements, findings, and conclusions expressed in this study, which do not reflect the views of these sponsoring agencies. Fourth, I benefited tremendously from many people who read parts of this study. Drs. Robert Einsweiler and Rosalind Greenstein of the Lincoln Institute read the earlier drafts of a report to the Lincoln Institute and suggested important changes. I have incorporated parts of the report in this study. Anuradha Joshi, Xiangming Li, and Ricardo Miranda also provided critical comments on some chapters. I am very grateful for their effort and time. -6- Finally, I want to dedicate this study to my family. There is no word that can describe my gratitude to my family, especially my wife. My wife left behind her career and normal life in Boston and went to Hong Kong with me for seven months when I conducted my field research. My daughter, Wai Lam, has never complained about the lack of attention from her father. Without their love and understanding, this part-time father and husband would never have been able to finish this project. I also thank my brother, Patrick, and his staff for their assistance in providing me with office space and equipment when I conducted my field research in Hong Kong. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................... 2 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .......................................... 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................... 7 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURE .................................. 11 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................. 12 Issues of Land-Value Capture ................................ 14 Public Leasehold Systems .................................... 18 Theoretical Framework ..................................... 19 Research M ethodology ....................................