THE TANSLEY LECTURE in Defence of Political Staff
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2012 Tansley Lecture THE TANSLEY LECTURE In Defence of Political Staff Presented by Ian Brodie Former Executive Director, Conservative Party of Canada; Former Chief of Staff to Stephen Harper; Former Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Western Ontario and Author of “Friends of the Court” April 19, 2012 Conexus Arts Centre Regina, Saskatchewan www.schoolofpublicpolicy.sk.ca WWW.SCHOOLOFPUBLICPOLICY.SK.CA COPYRIGHT 2012 © JOHNSON-SHOYAMA GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY COPYRIGHT NOTICE All rights reserved. The Tansley Lecture Series is a publica on of the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy (JSGS). This work may not be reproduced without prior wri en permission from the publisher. Extracts from this publica on may be reproduced provided that JSGS is acknowledged as the source. The views expressed in this report are not necessarily the views of JSGS. Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy University of Regina Campus 110 - 2 Research Drive Regina, Saskatchewan Canada S4S 0A2 Phone: (306) 585-5460 Fax: (306) 585-5461 Email: [email protected] ISSN 1915-643X ISBN 978-0-7731-0713-7 The Tansley Lecture Series is presented by the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy and is sponsored by the Canada Research Chair program. IN DEFENCE OF POLITICAL STAFF Presented by Ian Brodie Former Executive Director, Conservative Party of Canada; Former Chief of Staff to Stephen Harper; Former Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo and Author of “Friends of the Court” IN DEFENCE OF POLITICAL STAFF Presented by Ian Brodie INTRODUCTION I would like to thank the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy for off ering me the opportunity to deliver the annual Tansley Lecture. It is a true honour to be associated with Donald Tansley, a renowned public servant both in Saskatchewan and in O awa. If the longevity of someone’s policy achievements is a measure of the importance of his or her life’s work, then Tansley ranks as one of the very best ever to have plied the trade of public servant in Canada. There must be something in Saskatchewan’s soil, or maybe the water, that has produced so many fi ne public policy prac oners and scholars. Now, I have never given a lecture of this sort before, and I fi nd it especially in mida ng to deliver one at a school of public policy. Despite having earned three degrees in poli cal science and all the years of study involved, I never actually took a course in public policy. I have no formal training. I cannot say I deliberately avoided studying public policy. I guess I should have taken a course or two. The graduates of the program here will be immeasurably be er equipped than I was to go into government; if that is the direc on they decided to take. I hope my status as a rank amateur does not hobble my contribu on tonight. POLITICIANS, CIVIL SERVANTS AND POLITICAL AIDES I only had one formal introduc on to public policy before I became Prime Minister Harper’s chief of staff , and that was from watching the superbly cra ed BBC documentary, Yes, Minister. It looks at life inside IAN BRODIE | 1 the very top of a li le known part of the Bri sh government called the Department of Administra ve Services. It focuses almost en rely on the working rela onship between the minister, Right Honourable Jim Hacker and his permanent secretary, Sir Humphrey Appleby. When I fi rst saw the show, I thought it was one of those great Bri sh comedies. But soon a er Mr. Harper was sworn in as prime minister, I was telling a joke about the show in a group of public servants and one veteran deputy minister was quite upset. He told me that the show was not at all funny, and let me know that in O awa, Yes, Minister is seen as a documentary, which made me admire the show even more. Those Bri sh documentarians are very droll! Hacker was a very well-meaning man. He becomes the minister with a dual democra c mandate: fi rst, he was elected to Parliament, and then he was named by the prime minister to serve in Cabinet and preside over the department. Along the way, he acquired many fi ne ideas he would like to implement in his department. But when it comes to running the department, Sir Humphrey always seemed to hold the upper hand in his dealings with the minister. There are several reasons for this. First of all, Hacker was new to government and Sir Humphrey was a veteran civil servant. Sir Humphrey knew his way around government. Secondly, Hacker did not really know anything about his department, whereas Sir Humphrey knew a great deal, and even when he did not know something about the department he controlled the fl ow of informa on to the minister. Thirdly, Sir Humphrey, not the minister, controlled the future career paths of the public servants working in the department. So everyone on staff had a direct interest in pleasing the permanent secretary rather than the minister. Fourthly, Sir Humphrey was very close to the cabinet secretary, the prime minister’s top civil servant, so he had his own channel to the prime minister and most days it func oned be er than Hacker’s. And fi nally, of course, Sir Humphrey took a fi rst at Cambridge, whereas poor Hacker fi nished with a third from the London School of Economics. Now, the minister did have one assistant to help him do his job, and IAN BRODIE | 2 that was his private secretary, Bernard Woolley. Bernard was wise to the wily ways of Sir Humphrey. He understood the odd habits and tradi ons of the civil service and he was terribly sympathe c to Hacker’s more altruis c eff orts on behalf of the Bri sh people and the public interest. Bernard was a considerable asset to his minister, but when push comes to shove, in a true confl ict of wills between the minister and the permanent secretary, Bernard was also a civil servant and Sir Humphrey was quick to remind Bernard that he, Sir Humphrey, prepared Bernard’s annual performance evalua on for civil service progression. So while Bernard is a considerable asset to his minister, there were limits to his value. You have to have a certain sympathy for the minister’s plight. He was in an almost impossible posi on. Dispatched by his prime minister to oversee a department he knew nothing about, only to fi nd he was outnumbered, outmaneuvered and regularly outsmarted by the loyal civil servants for whom he answered to Parliament. The viewer was led to wonder, and this is surely the lesson the documentarians wished to convey, whether the civil servants are working for the minister or is it actually the other way around? The series never really confronts the fact that Hacker is the one with the democra c mandate. That presumably should ma er in a country that calls itself democra c. It is true that if Hacker were smarter, he would probably be able to even the odds and ensure his democra c mandate wins the day more o en. But in a democracy, the most skilled ci zens are not always elected to Parliament and the best and brightest do not always end up on the government benches. As Sir John A. Macdonald is reported to have said, in response to cri cism of the quality of his Cabinet, if you want a be er Cabinet, send me be er wood. In our parliamentary system, the prime minister selects his ministers from among those elected to the government caucus and even the very best of those members faces a very diffi cult job when they become ministers. I have no doubt that the Department of Administra ve Services would be be er administered if le solely to the preroga ve of Sir Humphrey IAN BRODIE | 3 and his staff . In fact, the Bri sh and Canadian governments alike would probably be be er administered if career public servants were le to run them unburdened by ministers at all. A er all, public servants are recruited on something akin to the merit principle. They are trained experts and promoted on merit. There is great appeal in the bureaucra c ideal. But even if all career offi cials were philosopher kings, government by bureaucrats is not terribly democra c and we know not all bureaucrats are philosopher kings, even the ones with a good fi rst from Cambridge. The ques on then I would like you to consider tonight is whether Yes, Minister would have looked a bit diff erent, and quite a lot less alarming for democrats, if Hacker had had some good poli cal aides. I say aides in the plural; it is no use having just one. A er all, remember the fate of Hacker’s one poli cal advisor, Mr. Weisel. He got stuck in some terrible offi ce miles from the Minister and eventually ended up being appointed to the QUANGO that supervises the appointments to other QUANGOs, a sort of Bri sh equivalent of the late Public Appointments Commission. THE INDICTMENT AGAINST POLITICAL AIDES Ministers in the Government of Canada have poli cal aides or poli cal staff ers. They are employees whose salaries and benefi ts are paid from government revenues, but who are not part of the regular public service. They are hired and fi red by the minister, or the prime minister, and are permi ed to be explicitly poli cal.