Twenty Years' Evolution of North Korean Migration, 1994-2014: a Human Security Perspective

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5-2015 Twenty years' evolution of North Korean migration, 1994-2014: A human security perspective Jiyoung SONG Singapore Management University, [email protected] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.82

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Citation SONG, Jiyoung.(2015). Twenty years' evolution of North Korean migration, 1994-2014: A human security perspective. Asia and the Pacific oP licy Studies, 2(2), 399-415. Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1770

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Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 399–415 doi: 10.1002/app5.82 Original Article

Twenty Years’ Evolution of North Korean Migration, 1994–2014: A Human Security Perspective

Jiyoung Song*

Abstract 1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, there have been Over the past two decades, there have been notable changes in North Korean migration: notable changes in North Korean migration: from forced migration to trafficking in women, from forced migration in search of freedom to from heroic underground railways to people economic or environmental refugees, caused by smuggling by Christian missionaries. The famine and natural disasters, from trafficking in migration has taken mixed forms of asylum women to undocumented sex work in Karaoke seeking, human trafficking, undocumented bars, or from heroic underground railways to labour migration and people smuggling. The people smuggling by Christian missionaries. paper follows the footsteps of North Korean When the author first began her research on migrants from China through Southeast Asia to North Korean asylum seekers in China in 1999, South Korea, and from there to the United many North Koreans fell squarely under the Kingdom, to see the dynamic correlation category of victims of the politically repressive between human (in)security and irregular regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of migration. It analyses how individual Korea (DPRK), its human rights violations, migrant’s agency interacts with other key closed economy, the series of natural disasters, actors in the migration system and eventually and subsequent famine and malnutrition. The brings about emerging patterns of four distinc- motivations of their defection were mixed: tive forms of irregular migration in a macro political, social, economic and environmental. level. It uses human security as its conceptual Fifteen years later, the author’s team inter- framework that is a people-centred, rather than viewed dozens of North Koreans who were state- or national security-centric approach to living in the United Kingdom, as British citi- irregular migration. zens or permanent residents who are no longer categorised as victims but rather autonomous Key words: North Korea, migration, human agents of their own who navigate the best places trafficking, people smuggling, human security to live not just for their own survival but also for reproduction. The article first outlines the journey of North Korean migrants from China to investigate the initial forms and motivations of North Korean irregular migration and to identify the main human security concerns in these pecu- * School of Social Sciences, Singapore Manage- liar forms of mixed migration. Second, in ment University, Singapore, 178903, Singapore. Southeast Asia, it focuses on the consequences Corresponding author: Jiyoung Song, email and human cost of diverse geopolitical envi- Ͻ[email protected]Ͼ. ronments to which North Korean migrants are

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. 400 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2015 exposed and adapt to, guided by brokers and national Covenant on Economic, Social and missionaries. Affected people’s (Kempadoo Cultural Rights (ICESCR) Articles 2–3, 10, et al. 2005) vulnerability and potential human 13–4; Convention on the Elimination of All rights violations are the subject of inquiry. Forms of Discrimination Against Women Third, in South Korea, North Koreans’ legal (CEDAW); Convention of the Rights of the and social identities and why their dual nation- Child (CRC); Convention against Torture ality drives secondary migration to the Western and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading world will be analysed. Finally, the article Treatment or Punishment (CAT); and other introduces some of the challenges North International Labour Organisation (ILO) Korean asylum seekers and refugees face in conventions on forced labour or child labour) the United Kingdom based on a series of inter- • Community Security: the right to cultural life; views conducted in 2012–2014. to preserve cultural practices, values or heri- The conceptual framework of this article is tage from sectarian violence or not to be human security, a people-centred, rather than discriminated against on the basis of race, state- or national security-centric, perspective ethnicity, nationality or religion (UDHR that helps us understand the non-linearity of Article 27; ICCPR Article 27; ICESCR migration patterns. Before the article moves Article 15; International Convention on the into the empirical analysis, the human security Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi- framework will be explained below. nation (CERD); and International Conven- tion on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 2. Human Security: Securitisation of Families (MWC)) Human Rights • Political Security: the rights to freedom of assembly, political participation; not to be Human security, a concept endorsed by the discriminated against based on political United Nations Development Programme opinion; to vote, to stand for election, to have (UNDP) and theorised upon by a few scholars free and fair elections, to freedom of international relations, has slowly gained of speech, to form and maintain political currency in public discourse but is still not organisations, or to organise social move- widely accepted in the academic circle. ments (UDHR Articles 2, 20–21; ICCPR Mahbub ul Haq, Pakistani economist and Articles 21–22, 25) author of the Human Development Report, • Economic Security: the rights to basic categorised the seven pillars of human security income, to social security, work, rest, to par- in 1994, which, I argue, are all within the ticipate in trade unions (UDHR Article 22–4; realm of international human rights as follows: ICESCRArticles 6–9; and other ILO conven- • Personal Security: the right to life, liberty tions on minimum wage, etc.) and security; not to be discriminated against • Food Security: the rights to an adequate stan- on the basis of race, ethnicity, language, reli- dard of living, to freedom from hunger, to gion, sex, political opinion or social origin, access to basic food (ICESCR Articles 11) birth, disability, gender, sexual orientation; to • Heath Security: the rights to a decent stan- freedom from violence, torture, slavery, dard of living, to health, to protection from exploitation, arbitrary arrest, or summary infectious or chronic diseases and to access execution; to recognition before the law, health services (UDHR Article 25; ICESCR fair trial, privacy, family, property, identity/ Articles 12) nationality, movement and residence, gender • Environment Security: the rights to an equality, freedom of thought and education adequate standard of living, clothing, (Universal Declaration of Human Rights housing, a clean environment, especially (UDHR) Articles 1–19, 26; International water and air, and to be protected from man- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights made environmental disasters (ICESCR (ICCPR) Articles 2–3, 6–20, 23–4, 26; Inter- Articles 11)

The UN Commission on Human Security, realities of human insecurities, many irregular established in 2001, has been renamed to the migrants self-organise to survive. Complex Human Security Unit under the Office of the networks of key actors, each with his/her own Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in 2004. interests, facilitate irregular migration. Its activities are meagre, not because of the lack For this study of North Korean irregular of utility in the concept of human security but migrants in four different locations and migra- because of the institutional overlaps on its tory regimes, primary sources of in-depth redundant mandates within the UN system. To interviews and focus-group discussions as well name a few, the UNDP has broad mandates on as secondary data from non-governmental human development, the UN Office of the High organisations (NGOs) are used to generate and Commissioner for Human Rights on human validate stories of migration. The author has rights, The UN High Commissioner for Refu- interviewed North Koreans in China and South gees on armed conflicts/human security and Korea since 1999. In 2012–2014, she gathered refugees, the UN Education, Scientific and Cul- additional data from 85 new sources of North tural Organisation on cultural security, the UN Koreans who became South Koreans and Office of Drugs and Crime on personal security asylum seekers or refugees in the United and transnational crimes, the International Kingdom, focusing on new arrivals in Seoul Organisation for Migration on human security and the United Kingdom since 2004. Among and migrants, and the International Labour them, the main target interviewees were five Organisation on economic security and labour former and current brokers/smugglers/guides rights. who ‘helped’ migrate North Koreans from one Since the 1994 UNDP Report, the notions of location to another and who could reveal the personal, cultural or environmental security detailed migratory routes and main attractors have emerged and the state-centric national for migration. defence security concepts have been chal- lenged by many scholars (Thomas 1987; 3. ‘Bare Life’ in China Wiberg 1992; Buzan 1993; Jones 1995; Wæver 1995; Baldwin 1997; Krause & Williams 1997; No official data is available on how many Poku & Graham 1998). Many East Asian elites North Koreans live in the Republic of China are receptive to the idea of human security. The (PRC). In the early 2000s, the PRC govern- Japanese government, the Chinese Premier Zhu ment’s estimation is around 10,000–50,000; Rongji and the ASEAN Secretary-General the ROK at 30,000–50,000; the US State Surin Pitsuwan endorsed human security as a Department at 75,000–125,000; the United comprehensive security concept (on the Asian Nations High Commissioner for Refugees conception of human security, see Alagappa (UNHCR) at 50,000–100,000; and NGOs at 1988; Matsumae & Chen 1995; Tow et al. 2000; 100,000–300,000 (Lee 2001–2002, 2004; Thiparat 2001; Bajpai 2003). Lohman 1996; Seymour 2005). Human security is a more appropriate con- The lives of North Korean irregular ceptual framework to understand the causes migrants in China can be aptly captured by and motivations of irregular migration and also Giogio Agamben’s (1998) concept of ‘bare a concept that captures the urgency of extra- life’, a life that is not ‘simply set outside the legal and extra-political measures through law and made indifferent to it but is rather international cooperation and the paramount abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threat- importance of detrimental human costs. ened on the threshold in which life and law, Human security is also complex in that one set outside and inside, become indistinguishable’. of mixed human insecurities become the cause Judith Butler (2004) further expands and of one irregular migrant’s motivation to leave concretises Agamben’s idea by proposing that and, because of the act of leaving and the we need to see ‘how this power functions dif- irregular status of migrants, it creates another ferently, to target and manage certain popula- set of human insecurities. In spite of harsh tions, to de-realize the humanity of subjects

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 402 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2015 who might potentially belong to community to work, basic food, health care or clean envi- bound by commonly recognised laws’. ronment. They live in secret shelters and hide Agamben (1998) defines those with ‘bare life’ from the authorities. The only way they are the ones without either being granted residen- provided with food and shelter is through local tial status or being deported homo sacer Chinese, underground Christian missionaries (sacred man) as they ‘may be killed and yet not or aid workers whose acts are considered illegal sacrificed’, which succinctly describes the in China. North Koreans are therefore victims lives of North Koreans in China. of the two repressive regimes of the DPRK and North Koreans leave their homes for mixed the PRC. reasons and, as a result of their irregular migra- The PRC authority presents an erratic and tion, the situation North Koreans face in China inconsistent policy towards North Korean is grim. Both push and pull factors of famine migrants in China. It does not recognise North and political repression in the North and Koreans as refugees and prioritises the bilateral food, employment, relative freedom and infor- agreement with North Korea over its interna- mation in China set the exogenous environ- tional obligation of non-refoulement under the ments for their irregular migration. The North 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Korean authority does not allow freedom of Refugees (hereafter Refugee Convention) to movement and sporadically restricts cross- which it is a party. At the same time, it remains border movements. The system itself creates silent on the status of North Korean wives migrants with irregular status. Many women, of Chinese citizens. Although some North who make up 75 per cent of North Koreans Koreans fall squarely under the definitions of who arrived in the ROK since 2006, are victims refugees or trafficking victims, described in the of forced marriages or sexual exploitation in Refugee Convention or the 2000 Protocol to China (Human Rights Watch 2002, Good Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Friends 2004, Anti-Slavery International 2005, Persons, especially Women and Children Seymour 2005, Davis 2006, International (hereafter Palermo Protocol), the work of the Crisis Group 2006, Congressional Research UNHCR in Beijing is limited. Only a handful Service 2007, Human Rights Watch 2008, of cases were solved through the office by HumanTrafficking.org 2008, Lagon 2008, quietly sending North Koreans to neigh- Butler 2009, Committee for Human Rights in bouring countries for humanitarian reasons North Korea 2009, North Korea Now 2010, (Congressional Research Service 2007, p. 11). Park et al. 2010, United States Department of It is largely Christian missionaries who ‘save’ State 2010, Coalition Against Trafficking in North Koreans and smuggle them to China’s Women 2011, Kim 2011).As soon as they leave southern neighbouring countries. North Korea, their illegal status in China makes The so-called ‘Seoul Train in the Under- them highly vulnerable to physical abuse or ground Railway’ (see below Map 1) has been sexual exploitation, putting their personal secu- in full operation across China and Southeast rity under great danger. North Koreans as a Asian countries since the mid-2000s single ethnic community are targeted because (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 14). of the bilateral agreement between the PRC and Through various financial and physical means, the DPRK that allows the Chinese authorities to North Koreans are assisted by their family repatriate North Koreans back to where they members and church networks who hire local face severe persecution. Chinese, Chinese-Korean or even North Their precarious legal status leads to another Korean brokers. They explore different migra- set of threats to North Koreans’ political and tory routes to move North Koreans to the economic securities. North Koreans cannot southern borders of China. They can only do participate in any civic activities including the so by breaking the PRC’s domestic laws (Kim birth registration of their half-Chinese children 2010). The PRC authority sees these miss- and earn basic income to survive. Their ionaries and NGOs as political or sectarian, restricted movements do not allow them access anti-communist, anti-DPRK, and ‘Christian

Map 1 Seoul Train in the Underground Railway

fundamentalist[s]’ (Seymour 2005, p. 19). out of human trafficking and people smuggling Churches are closely involved in smuggling whereas evangelicals have their mission to North Korean asylum seekers in the name spread religious beliefs to North Koreans. of God’s humanitarianism (Committee for NGOs have humanitarian principles to provide Human Rights in North Korea 2008). them with food and shelter. Chosonjok, NGO workers, Christian missionaries, local Korean-Chinese, sharing the hard-time revolu- Korean-Chinese and brokers have all played tionary history with North Koreans, have altru- significant roles in building highly resilient ism towards North Koreans as well as growing and secretive underground networks around material interests. North Korean asylum seekers. Their roles are The role of ‘guides’ as facilitators who almost automatically self-organised in a sys- create networks, interactions and feedback tematic manner. While NGOs publish advo- loops increases the non-linearity of these cacy reports in various languages to the migratory movements. Brokers transform the international public (Good Friends, the Inter- nature and patterns of North Korean migration national Crisis Group, Anti-Slavery, Human from human trafficking into people smuggling Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the and asylum seeking. Some North Koreans US Committee on Human Rights in North became brokers themselves. P was a former Korea all produced similar style reports), mis- broker in China who used to smuggle North sionaries offer shelter, raise funds to pay Koreans out of the country into the hands of brokers who will devise, test-try and establish their families in the South. He is also one of escape routes. The fate of North Koreans in the first comers to the United Kingdom. He China is in the hands of various private actors made his own way to South Korea briefly with and their interests. Brokers seek financial gain his family and decided to re-migrate to the

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 404 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2015

United Kingdom in 2008 to settle as a North Table 1 Diplomatic Relations between the two Korean refugee, hiding the fact that he had Koreas and Southeast Asia acquired South Korean citizenship already. Country DPRK ROK The brokering networks are highly organised; Brunei 07/01/1999 01/01/1984 their roles become varied and specialised like Cambodia 28/02/1964 30/10/1997 Adam Smith’s pin factories. The networks of Indonesia 16/04/1964 18/09/1973 ‘guides’ are so multinational and well funded Laos 24/06/1974 25/10/1995 by Korean missionaries that one North Korean Malaysia 02/07/1973 26/02/1960 from Pyongsong, 20 km northeast of Pyong- Burma/Myanmar 16/05/1975 16/05/1975 Philippines 12/07/2000 03/03/1949 yang, spent only a few days escaping North Singapore 08/11/1975 07/08/1975 Korea through China, Cambodia and Thailand Thailand 08/05/1975 01/10/1958 ‘without having one step in dirt, all in wheels’ Vietnam 30/01/1950 22/12/1992 (Interview with C, a North Korean from Note: The red shading means countries having longer Pyongsong, North Korea, August 2013, New diplomatic relations with the DPRK; the blue shading Malden, UK). means countries having longer diplomatic relations with What is clear in the North Korean migrants’ the ROK. journey in China is that they satisfy the refugee criteria under international law. However, pro- North Korean citizens to irregular migrants tection is denied based on the Chinese priority and to asylum seekers for the enemy state, on sovereignty, other geopolitical concerns South Korea, is an adaptive learning process. over the potential mass exodus and bilateral Each country of illegal entry in Southeast relations with the DPRK. North Koreans, Asia has a distinctive ‘dependence path’ of therefore, become subject to human trafficking Cold War history, diplomatic relations and and vulnerable to other abuses such as undocu- material interests with each Korea since the end mented labour migrants. of the Second WorldWar (see Table 1 below for formal diplomatic relations). Variouspost-Cold 4. ‘Smuggled Refugees’ in Southeast Asia War factors and current defence ties affect the transit country’s decision to recognise North Southeast Asian countries offer generally Korean irregular migrants. Trade, investment transit states only for the North Koreans. None and developmental aid are becoming more and of these countries recognise and accept North more important factor for this decision Koreans as refugees. The geopolitical environ- (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) ments do not guarantee the protection of North 2005). Humanitarian principles, the media and Koreans. In spite of its illegality, people smug- international criticism appeal to the conscience gling is the only viable option for them to of political elite and civil society that shape the survive. Approximately 75–90 per cent of country’s political and normative identities. North Koreans are reported to transit through Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were the Southeast Asia en route to South Korea. DPRK’s allies during the Cold War. Over the The government-funded Korea Institute for past decade, however, the ROK has invested in National Unification (KINU) states that development projects in the region and many 75 per cent of North Koreans who entered South Koreans opened their businesses and fac- South Korea in 2008 were from Southeast Asia tories there. (KINU 2009). In 2012, this figure went up to Given this unpredictable environment, mis- 90 per cent. However, no exact numbers were sionaries and brokers navigate safer countries released. The situation is more complex than to transit. The following paragraphs are the that in China, with added state authorities author’s annotated interviews with locally with respective interests and identities that are based missionaries and brokers.1 Cambodia is not always predictable. Missionaries, NGO 1. Interviews were conducted in May–June 2013 in workers and brokers still play important roles. Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai in Thailand during For North Koreans, the transformation from the author’s own fieldwork research and through telephone

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Song: North Korean Migration, 1994–2014 405 one of the two countries in Southeast Asia that where the number was from. In many news are party to the Refugee Convention. However, reports concerning North Korean defectors, the it does not accept North Koreans as refugees. sources are unidentified and therefore unverifi- Cambodia is used only after transiting Laos as able and unreliable. In 2009, the total number of it is not geographically adjacent to China. North Koreans who arrived in South Korea was Burma/Myanmar, although bordering with 2,929 (Ministry of Unification 2015). As the China, is also geographically challenging number went up, the Laotian authority raised because of the rough mountain landscape the fees from US$200 to US$400 per head if a along the borders. It is also not safe because North Korean wishes to seek refuge in Laos there are civil conflicts at the margins of (interview with two missionaries, C and K, Burma/Myanmar and the military govern- based in Laos in July 2013 via telephone). If a ment’s ceasefire agreements with local rebel migrant only wants to transit through Laos to groups are still being negotiated. According to other countries, the fees are only US$50. Thai- an NGO report in 2006, the Burmese authori- land is often used as North Koreans’ last transit ties, however, did not prevent North Koreans point before South Korea as it does not deport from entering the ROK Embassy in Yangon North Koreans to North Korea for humanitarian (International Crisis Group 2006, p. 23). reasons. The Thai authority imposes a fine of In July 2004, Vietnam, one of the Cold-War THB 2,000–6,000 (approximately US$187) or allies of North Korea, decided to send 468 10–30 days imprisonment in a local prison for North Korean asylum seekers via a chartered illegal entry. These figures are suggested by a Korean airline to South Korea. On this deci- Bangkok-based South Korean missionary who sion, the Vietnamese government publicly has been helping North Koreans smuggled in stated that it would comply with ‘Vietnamese from China. In contrast, at the Chiang Rai laws, international law and practices in immigration court, cited in the 2006 report of humanitarian spirit’ (Ministry of Foreign the International Crisis Group, declared the Affairs of Vietnam 2004). This episode created penalty for illegal entry to be US$53 or 5 days diplomatic tensions with the DPRK, which in jail (2006, p. 22). recalled its ambassador to Pyongyang. The The roles of international law and interna- Vietnam route has not been much used since tional organisations have been questioned this incident, at least publicly. (Chan & Schloenhardt 2007) and they are of Laos, being the most commonly used route little help in smuggling cases. Laos and Thai- before Thailand, charges ‘fines’ or ‘diplomatic land are not parties to the 1951 Refugee Con- fees’ for releasing North Korean border- vention, and therefore are under no obligations crossers (International Crisis Group 2006, p. to offer asylum for North Koreans. PRC and 21). A number of sources identified that China- Cambodia are parties but they do not fully Laos-Thailand route has been the most popular comply with international humanitarian or one among brokers (an interview with P in human rights principles. The UNHCR itself London in July 2013 confirmed this route). defines North Korean asylum seekers in China According to Chu Song Ha, a former North and Thailand as ‘persons of concern’, not refu- Korean and now South Korean journalist of gees (UNHCR 2015). In 2006, the then High DongA Daily, around 800 North Koreans Commissioner António Guterres, on his visit to reportedly transited through Laos to South Thailand, even understated that the situation Korea in 2009. Chu, however, did not identify was not ‘dramatic, compared to other parts of the world’ at a press conference in Bangkok and emails. Other journalistic and NGO reports are also (Kyodo News 2006). The International Crisis consolidated for further information. As stated in the intro- Group (2006, p. 21), on the other hand, identi- duction, personal accounts from missionaries, brokers and fies North Koreans in Thailand as ‘smuggled North Koreans are often not reliable, which is the biggest obstacle for this research. To overcome this difficulty, the migrants’. author uses multiple sources of information from different The illegality of their movements deters locations. many from human rights approaches to North

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 406 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2015

Korean migrants. I would like to highlight that 5. Fungible Identities: North or South the forms of North Korean irregular migration Korean? is highly mixed: there are trafficked refugees or trafficked undocumented labourers in China Myron Weiner (1994, p. 11) identifies the and smuggled refugees in Thailand or Laos. threats refugees may pose to a hosting society: The term, ‘smuggled refugees’, indicates that (i) in worsening relations between sending and they are not refugees defined by international receiving countries; (ii) as a political threat or law but become refugees when they are suc- security risk to the regime of the host country; cessfully smuggled (Song 2013). When they (iii) as a cultural threat; (iv) causing socio- reach Bangkok through smuggling, they can economic problems; and (v) when the host finally seek protection and refuge by the ROK society uses refugees as an instrument of threat government or a third country. One needs to against the country of origin. All of these note that North Koreans are not refugees under matter to South Korea from a state-centric the ROK laws. ROK does not recognise the view. There is a loophole in the system where DPRK as a separate state (and vice versa) North Korean secret agents can infiltrate although they have been separate UN member through ‘smuggled refugee’ routes from states since 1991. The ROK also claims the Southeast Asia and it is an existential threat to entire Korean peninsula as its sovereign terri- national security. The mass acceptance of tory. According to this constitutional interpre- North Koreans has been a politically driven tation, therefore, North Koreans are also South policy that was designed to undermine and Koreans whom the ROK government should challenge the North Korean regime and to protect. North Korea, of course, denies this grow anti-DPRK factions in South Korea. It is argument and insists that those North Koreans also a hugely expensive policy for both North are illegal border-crossers and subsequently Koreans and South Korean taxpayers as the kidnapped by South Korean missionaries and former have to pay brokers the ‘defection fees’ some covert intelligence officers sent from and the latter’s tax goes to the settlement pro- Seoul, and therefore should be returned to the grammes for North Koreans. The cost for one country of origin. North Korean defector to arrive in South North Koreans flee from basic personal, Korea, gathered from the online newspapers political, economic, food, health and environ- and personal interviews, is between KRW ment insecurities back home. They are not pro- 2.5 million to 10 million (approximately tected by China as China is not a party to the US$2,000–8,000). If 25,000 North Koreans 1951 Refugee Convention. They are buck- (as of December 2013, 26,124 North Korean passed by Laos, tolerated by Thailand, and left residents in South Korea) needed on average in the hands of brokers and Christian mission- US$3,500, for example, this amounts to aries until the former reach the ROK embassies US$87.5 million. Receiving a large number of in Southeast Asia. These private actors who see refugees comes with costs, not just financially themselves as heroes are in fact outlaws or but politically as well. human traffickers from the transit countries’ or In 2006–2011, the number of North Koreans the DPRK’s point of view. One former North entering South Korea has been more than Korean broker notes that ‘I consider myself a 2,000 annually. The total number of North hero who has saved many lives. I cannot be a Koreans living in South Korea is 25,329 as of good citizen and abide by laws when these laws 2012 (see Figure 1) (Ministry of Unification). are made by bad guys’. Although the major This figure is marginal, given South Korea’s roles in smuggling are played by brokers, North 50 million population or even North Korea’s Koreans themselves develop personal agency 25 million (World Bank 2014). Despite the along their perilous journeys through China and small number, national security concerns grew Southeast Asia through interactions with other among South Koreans as there were several private actors and adapting their endogenous ‘spy’ cases. According to South Korea’s con- survival skills to new environments. servative right-wing newspaper, Choson Ilbo

(2010), two North Korean spies infiltrated crisis, while trying to adapt to the new envi- South Korea through Thailand in 2010. They ronment in South Korea (Yoon & Lim 2007). attempted to assassinate Hwang Jang Yup, the Many expressed that they had faced numerous highest ranking North Korean defector who difficulties in adjusting to the highly competi- fled to the ROK through the Philippines in tive capitalist society. Their settlement ben- 1997. Another well-publicised case is the con- efits are enough to get by but not enough to victed female spy, Won Chong Hwa, who was enter the mainstream South Korean society. believed to have orders from the North to Their foreign language and computer skills seduce military officers who then could leak are far below that of average South Koreans. information about the South’s military defence Many experience discrimination against their systems (Shin Dong A 2014). origin in schools and workplaces. The sensa- However, this national security perspective tional spy cases can result in arbitrary search misrepresents the general North Korean com- and arrest of any suspected North Koreans. munity in South Korea. The forementioned Some North Koreans in South Korea do not few spy cases are exceptional and most North have access to basic income because of inad- Korean residents are ordinary working class equate support for North Koreans who lack people. They acquire South Korean citizenship basic vocational skills. Those who receive after the screening investigation by the ROK subsistence benefits is still high at 35 per cent National Intelligence Service and the resettle- in 2013, but down from 63.5 per cent in 2007 ment programme by the Ministry of Unifica- (Ministry of Unification 2015). They also tion for 3 months. North Koreans become suffer from post-traumatic symptoms affected South Koreans but cannot fully integrate into by their perilous journeys in China and the society. Many North Koreans, including Southeast Asia (Jeon et al. 2013). In August those I interviewed in London and Seoul, say 2013, surprising statistics were released from they went through identify confusion, if not the Ministry of Unification. Among approxi-

Figure 1 Annual Arrivals of North Koreans in South Korea

~'98 ~'01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14

Male 831 565 510 474 626 424 515 573 608 662 591 795 404 369 304 Female 116 478 632 811 1,272 960 1,513 1,981 2,195 2,252 1,811 1,911 1,098 1,145 1,092 Total 947 1,043 1,142 1,285 1,898 1,384 2,028 2,554 2,803 2,914 2,402 2,706 1,502 1,514 1,396 3500

3000

2500

2000 Female 1500 Male 1000

500

'03 '04 '11 '12 '02 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '13 '14 ~'98 ~'01

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 408 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2015 mately 25,000 North Korean residents in who acquired South Korean citizenship, they South Korea, there are 26 suicides, 583 suffer from greater economic insecurity and deaths, 51 emigrants and 796 missing feel discriminated against by their fellow South (Yonhap News 2013b). South Korea is known Koreans. With the absence of a peace treaty as the highest suicide rate among all member after the 1953 Korean War, both South and states of the Organisation for Economic North Koreans are insecure about their personal Co-operation and Development at 31.2 in and political securities. This has been invisible every 100,000 in 2012. Among North hindrance to peace and security in the Korean Koreans, it is 124, four times higher than peninsula whether Koreans feel it or not. South Koreans. The politics of jealousy and competition for 6. Re-Migration to the West resources begin as the number of North Koreans grows in South Korea. Settlement When the numbers of North Korean asylum fees, free public housing, and incentives for seekers in the United Kingdom in 2006–2008 education and employment provided for were released, many North Korea watchers, North Koreans have created tensions between including myself, were deeply puzzled. It North Koreans and other working-class South amounted to 602 asylum applications in 2007. Koreans or low-income chosonjok labour Considering that the direct routes from North migrants. Negative images of North Korean Korea to the United Kingdom were neither feature in the main news media about their easily accessible nor comprehensible, the alleged violent behaviour, fraud, laziness, high author’s immediate suspicion was either that dependency and gender bias (Yonhap News they were not North Koreans or that they came 2013a). At the same time, many North Koreans from South Korea. It did not take long to find become disillusioned about South Korea. out that many of those North Korean refugees Many I interviewed in 2012–2014 expressed had not come directly from North Korea but that all they wanted was ‘not to be identified a transited through various countries in EastAsia, person from North Korea’. including China, Thailand, Laos and South North Koreans in South Korea are not refu- Korea through interviews with members of the gees due to the special inter-Korean relations. Korean community in the United Kingdom, The Korean War did not end with a peace mainly in New Malden, the biggest Korean treaty but with an armistice. Technically, the community in Europe. For many South two Koreas are still at war; neither side has Koreans and especially the government of the won the war yet. The official title given to Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), it North Koreans in South Korea has been was embarrassing to learn that the majority of changed over the past decades. Until late the North Koreans, who claimed their refugee 1980s, they were named ‘returnees to submit’ status in the United Kingdom, had already (kuisuncha). Later, they were called ‘North settled and resided in South Korea. More Korean defectors’ (talbukcha), ‘North Korean alarmingly, perhaps for the UK authorities, a defectors-residents’ (bukhan yital chumin)or half of the granted North Korean refugees were ‘new settlers’ (setomin): North Korean resi- reported to be chosonjok (Korean-Chinese), not dents in South Korea call South Koreans North Korean (Radio Free Asia 2012). The ‘bontomin’, which means original settlers. Institute for Peace and Unification Studies North Koreans become South Koreans with reported that 258 out of 415 North Korean North Korea as their origin of birth, having asylum applicants in the United Kingdom in distinctive identity from other South Koreans, 2007 were suspected to be Chinese nationals which creates inclusion and exclusion as well (Song 2012). as new motivations to re-migrate to another Over the past decade, the United Kingdom country. and Canada have been the two most popular Although most human security conditions destination countries for North Koreans. have significantly improved for North Koreans Table 2 shows that there was a stark increase in

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd ulse yCafr colo ulcPlc tTeAsrla ainlUiest n ie ulsigAi t Ltd Pty Asia Publishing Wiley and University National Australian The at Policy Public of School Crawford by published

Table 2 North Korean Asylum Applications and Refugee Status Determination in the UK

Positive 409 1994–2014 Migration, Korean North Song: Total persons Persons assisted Persons decisions Positive decisions Total persons RSD procedure pending at by UNHCR applied (convention (Complementary Otherwise Total pending at Year level description start of year at start of year during year status) protection status) Rejected closed decisions end of year 2012 Administrative review 44 7 7 23 2012 First instance 15 30 9 15 24 17 2011 Administrative review 20 10 9 4 23 2011 First instance 28 8 (12.5%) 4 44 (68.8%) 8 64 2010 First instance 54 1 (0.6%) 6 141 (80.1%) 28 176 2010 Repeat/reopened application 4 2 2

05TeAuthor. The 2015 © 2009 First instance 56 3 (2.8%) 1 60 (56.6%) 42 106 2008 First instance 273 279 (64.3%) 10 77 (17.7%) 68 434 2007 First instance 602 204 (79.4%) 19 19 (7.4%) 15 257 2006 First instance 61 20 (46.5%) 11 8 (18.6%) 4 43 2005 First instance 42 4 12 12 5 33 2004 First instance 27 6 11 36 13 66 2003 First instance 15 1 1 saadtePcﬁ oiyStudies Policy Paciﬁc the and Asia Total 1212 551 74 423 188 1236

Source: UNHCR, Statistical Online Population Database at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a013eb06.html, modified by the author. 410 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2015 the number of North Korean applicants who push-pull factors is the facilitating factor by sought refuge in the United Kingdom from 61 social networks, formed in the rehabilitation in 2006 to 602 in 2007. The number dropped to centre, called Hanawon under the ROK Min- 56 in 2009. At the same time, the rejection rate istry of Unification. During the 3-month resi- increased from the lowest 7.4 per cent in 2007 dential programme, North Koreans share to 80.1 per cent in 2010. information about living in South Korea and When granted the refugee status, North possible secondary migration destinations. Koreans were allocated council housing in They compare benefits systems and recent major cities of the United Kingdom. However, success rates. Many parents choose English- many of them relocated to New Malden, the speaking countries for their children’s educa- biggest Korea Town in Europe where they tion. The United Kingdom meets all of these could work and use social networks of other conditions. Koreans, both from North and South Korea. There is a danger that the topic of North They formed the UK North Korean Residents Korean refugees may be focused on the illegal- Society in New Malden in May 2008 and have ity of their movements (Radio Free Asia 2014). actively involved various political events The causes and motivations of their 20 years of regarding North Korea. Most North Koreans irregular migration should receive adequate who came to the United Kingdom had already attention from a human security perspective. settled in South Korea and become South North Koreans left their homes due to personal, Korean citizens who could then travel to the political, economic, food, health and environ- United Kingdom, visa-free for 6 months. mental insecurities since the beginning of mul- Guided by the information circulated within tiple natural disasters, followed by famine and families and social networks, they sought malnutrition in the 1990s. Many in China were refuge and subsequently were granted refugee trafficked. Some were ‘saved’ by missionaries. status. Some have already acquired permanent Others smuggled. As of 2012, 25,329 North resident status in the United Kingdom.2 Koreans live in South Korea (Ministry of Uni- This phenomenon is not unique to North fication 2013). Many feel the harsh reality of Korean asylum seeking. Similar patterns of difficult social integration and discrimination behaviour have been labelled as ‘bogus’ refu- based on their place of birth, especially for the gees in the migration literature (Neumayer second generation of North Koreans who were 2005; Diez 2011; Zimmermann 2011; born and raised in South Korea. The perception Stefanova 2014; Stewart & Mulvey 2014). The about North Koreans in South Korea is double main reasons for their secondary migration edged. On the one hand, they are seen as help- identified during my interviews were social less victims of the repressive regime under the discrimination in South Korea (push factor) Kim family and therefore in need of help and and children’s education in more developed assistance, which is often unilaterally evaluated English-speaking Western countries with gen- and implemented. On the other, the settlement erous welfare packages (pull factors). A female benefits and affirmative actions under the Law North Korean in her 40s says: ‘it’s ok to be on the Protection and Settlement for North discriminated against here because there are Korean Defectors is often seen as excessive by many second-class or third-class citizens like ordinary working-class South Koreans.3 those black people. But, in South Korea, I couldn’t bear the second-class citizen treat- 3. In a series of fieldwork interviews with South Korean ments from fellow Koreans. It’s so humiliat- researchers working on North Korea at Dongkuk Univer- ing’. What is more important than the linear sity, Seoul National University and the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) in May 2014, a number of 2. In July–August 2012 and again in July–August 2013, them raised concerns about the growing social conflicts the author visited New Malden and Kingston upon between North Korean residents and lower-middle class Thames where North Korean residents have formed a South Koreans. There are many ‘North Koreans only’ community and interviewed North Koreans, both asylum social or educational services that South Koreans cannot seekers and residents. enjoy. For example, Y, a PhD student from a middle-

North Koreans have figured out a loophole There are also the inherent structural Cold in the UK refugee system which has allowed War problems still lingering in the Korean many Korean-Chinese and, to a larger extent, peninsula. The 1950–1953 Korean War did not North Korean residents in South Korea to end. It paused with an armistice and, therefore, receive refugee status with faked identities.4 two Koreas are still at war and Koreans, both There is a long waiting time before a decision in North and South, have live in prolonged is made whether or not to accept a refugee. armed conflict for more than 60 years. This is Young South Korean passport holders with a fundamental threat to human security for North Korean parents go to visa-free countries everyone living in the Korean peninsula. for South Koreans, and claim refuge. While While it may be a legal issue to determine a the final decisions are being processed, they person’s refugee status, the dual nationality are offered housing and language services. argument is at odds with the temporary nature Some take this as an English language training of the truce that was signed by both Koreas and experience. Even though the refugee applica- the UN, headed by the United States. North tions are rejected, they gain free English lan- Koreans who fled North Korea to live in South guage education offered by refugee services.5 Korea realise the only way to be safer and There is no system in place to check the appli- secure from these prolonged armed conflicts is cants’ age if they do not present any verifiable to flee to another country. IDs. Those who claim to be underaged or North Korean secondary migrants to the elderly may receive additional protection and United Kingdom have diverse backgrounds, benefits from host governments. Of course, motivations, migratory experiences or local this does not represent the North Korean com- adaptation, having to go through in China, munities in the United Kingdom or Canada. Southeast Asian countries and South Korea. However, a significant portion of the commu- There is a varying degree in each migrant’s nities show this trend and behaviour based on exposure to personal, community, political, the author’s own interviews and other ongoing economic, food, health and environmental research projects on the topic.6 insecurities. The refugee decision should be based on the person’s individual life events income family saw an advertisement about free English and accessible resources, not a person’s language lessons in the campus. She called the organiser nationality or the immediate sending country’s and heard that the programme was open for North Koreans protection standards. For example, a North only and she was not qualified. The North Koreans, Korean woman in her 50s lodged a refugee however, according to her, all received government schol- arships and had their college education almost for free. claim to join her elder brother and his family Some North Koreans ‘disappear’ to the United Kingdom who had successfully settled in the United or Canada and come back with good English, she said. Kingdom as refugees (Interview with P in 4. The author’s own confidential interviews in London in London in July 2013). She had no means of 2012–2014 verify that there are at least dozens of Korean- survival in South Korea; no skills that are Chinese who were granted refugee status from the UK government. required in modern high-tech South Korea 5. Interview with C, a North Korean resident in her early and no friends or families to rely on. Her 20s who went to Canada to claim refuge for this reason in brother hired a broker to escape her from November 2012. Her application was rejected and she North Korea, through China, Laos and Cam- returned to South Korea in April 2013. According to her, bodia, to South Korea. She stayed in South there were five to six others who were all North Korean youth with South Korean passports in the same shelter she Korea only for a few months only to stayed, operated by first-comer North Koreans. re-migrate to join her brother in the United 6. The KINU has been sending their teams to investigate the issue since 2010. The Institute for Peace and Unifica- tion Studies of Seoul National University published a which is not available to public view as of June 2014. An report in 2012 on North Korean diaspora. A team from ambitious anthropological PhD research that includes Yonsei University has written an internal confidential live-in experience with North Korean refugees in New report on North Korean refugee claims in major Western Malden by Chung Soo Min from the University of Oxford countries for the Ministry of Unification in 2012 or 2013, has been ongoing since 2010.

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 412 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2015

Kingdom. Her application was rejected in behaviour is not planned in advance but con- April 2013 and she faced removal. stituted through interactions with others during their long migratory journeys. Such migratory 7. Conclusion patterns are non-linear and unpredictable as we do not know when, where and how feed- This study adds a human security perspective back loops and networks are created to lead to to the existing literature on North Korean a next migration destination. migration in particular and irregular migration What we learn from this dynamic migration in general. What can be inferred from the process is that the role of non-state actors is current case study is that irregular migration, among the most critical factor while state i.e. trafficking in persons, undocumented actors are merely responsive or retroactive. labour migration, asylum seeking and people NGOs and Christian missionaries’ involve- smuggling, takes a mixed form and it is best ment in smuggling, such as paying for brokers understood by looking at both the migrants’ and bribing security officers, raises some exogenous human security conditions and serious moral questions. They strengthen inner motivations. What has turned out to be illegal smuggling networks across China and most important is their interactions with other Southeast Asia while leaving the majority of key agents in the system such as missionaries North Koreans who cannot hire brokers in a and brokers. In China, many women were ini- more vulnerable condition. They undermine tially trafficked. Some become undocumented global anti-corruption movements for the sake labour migrants while others move on to of saving North Koreans (or achieving their neighbouring countries by paying brokers. In religious mission), underestimate complex Southeast Asia, if their assisted smuggling is geopolitical contexts in the region, and ironi- successful, they become refugees. In South cally contribute to sustaining the North Korean Korea, North Koreans are officially accepted economy by remittance. as South Koreans. The main argument for this article is that the Another aspect that can be drawn from this main driver of irregular migration is the quest to study is that the nature of irregular migrants improve human security (see Table 3). This evolves over time through their journeys. In hypothesis can be applied to other irregular case of North Korean migrants, they develop migration cases. North Koreans move from less from helpless victims to independent agents secure and less democratic countries (the through their accumulated experiences and DPRK and the PRC) to more secure ones (the interactions with other actors under the chang- ROK or the United Kingdom). South Korea ing geo-political structure and regional envi- protects basic human security in terms of food, ronments over the past two decades. In the first health and environment. However, it still has instance, North Koreans are victims of repres- many challenging issues such as discriminatory sive undemocratic regimes that do not respect policies and practices regarding basic income the right to freedom of movement or to seek Table 3 Human Security and North Korean refuge under international law. They learn to Migration make full use of all the available resources they have in China and Southeast Asia from DPRK PRC SEA ROK UK missionaries. To varying degrees, each indi- Personal vidual North Korean operates with basic sur- Community vival instinct to protect his or her human Political Economic security and enhances this through learning, Food sharing and adaptation. North Koreans keep Health moving across fragile borders with fungible Environment identities. They can act the part of refugee in 0 1.5 0.5 5.5 6.5 freer and more secure countries like the United The blue shading means secure (1); the yellow shading Kingdom or Canada. This self-organising means medium (0.5); the red shadings means insecure (0).

© 2015 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd Song: North Korean Migration, 1994–2014 413 and socio-political freedom based on national Korean Women in China. Anti-Slavery, origin or birth. The ROK policy of inducing London. North Koreans (to flee to South Korea) and its Bajpai K (2003) The Idea of Human Security. unrealistic territorial definition in the state’s International Studies 40, 195–228. constitution result from the prolonged armed Baldwin DA (1997) The Concept of Security. conflict on the Korean peninsula. The United Review of International Studies 23, 5–26. Kingdom is a democratic welfare state that Butler J (2004) Precarious Life: The Powers of better protects personal and economic securi- Mourning and Violence. Verso, London. ties. Not everyone survives in these complex Butler K (2009) North Korean Bride Traffick- evolutionary processes. Only those with strong ing: When Escape Becomes Bondage, self-organising and adaptive skills do. Many viewed April 2015 Ͻhttp://www.christian must have vanished along the way.As ofAugust headlines.com/articles/north-korean-bride 2013, around 26,000 North Koreans live in -trafficking-when-escape-becomes-bondage South Korea and at least 796 are missing and -11603283.htmlϾ. believed to be overseas claiming refuge. To call Buzan B (1993) Societal Security. In: Wæver this natural selection might sound politically O, Buzan B, Kelstrup M, Lemaitre P (eds) irresponsible; however, for the survival and Identity, Migration and the New Security reproduction of North Koreans, their continu- Agenda in Europe, pp. 41–58. Pinter, ous search for new migration destinations is a London. natural phenomenon. Survival and adaptation Chan E, Schloenhardt A (2007) North Korean are basic instincts of the North Korean migrants Refugees and International Refugee Law. that are not much different from those observed International Journal of Refugee Law 19, in the natural world. What policy makers and 215–45. migration experts should be reminded of is that Coalition Against Trafficking In Women humans are purposeful beings with con- (2011) China and Hong Kong, viewed April sciences, and that irregular migration, regard- 2015 Ͻhttp://www.humantrafficking.org/ less of its illegality, must be approached from a countries/chinaϾ. human security perspective, not a state-centric Committee For Human Rights In North one. Korea (2008) Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenge of North Korea. DLA March 2015. Piper. The author would like to thank the generous Committee For Human Rights In North Korea support and funding from the Singapore (2009) Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Ministry of Education and the Singapore Women Fleeing North Korea to China. Management University (Funding No: Washington, D.C. 14-C242-SMU-006). Congressional Research Service (2007) North Korean Refugees in China and Human References Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options. Washington, D.C. Agamben G (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Davis K (2006) Brides, Bruises and the Power and Bare Life. Stanford University Border: The Trafficking of North Korean Press, California. Women into China. SAIS Review of Interna- Alagappa M (1988) Comprehensive Security: tional Affairs 26, 131–41. Interpretations in ASEAN Countries. In: Diez IG (2011) Asylum Interviews as Interro- Scalapino RA et al. (eds) Asian Security gations to Unmask Bogusrefugees: The Issues: Regional and Global, pp. 57–8. Uni- Case of Belgian Asylum Agencies. Journal versity of California, Institute of East Asian of Applied Linguistics and Professional Studies, Berkeley. Practice 8, 23–47. Anti-Slavery International (2005) An Absence Good Friends (2004) Human Rights in of Choice: The Sexual Exploitation of North North Korea and the Food Crisis: A

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