The Geopolitics of Great Power Intervention, 1815-2015
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‘For the Happiness of the World’: The Geopolitics of Great Power Intervention, 1815-2015 by Christopher David LaRoche A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Christopher David LaRoche 2019 For the Happiness of the World’: The Geopolitics of Great Power Intervention, 1815-2015 Christopher David LaRoche Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto 2019 Abstract Why do great powers sometimes invest significant resources in efforts to secure approval from other great powers for their interventions, but other times do not? This dissertation argues that explicit or implicit agreements between great powers called geopolitical bargains have shaped great power intervention by delineating where they can acceptably intervene. When a great power intervenes in an area that a geopolitical bargain delimits as its own area of preponderance—its sphere of influence—it need not worry about making its intervention acceptable to its peers, and it can tailor its intervention coalition to closely meet its military needs. When it intervenes outside of its sphere, the great power must resort to other methods to legitimize its actions, such as formal multilateralism and legal approval. I trace the effects of geopolitical bargains across three periods of great power peace: the Concert of Europe, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era. ii Acknowledgments Gustav Mahler said “a symphony must be like the world… It must embrace everything.” Anyone who has heard a Mahler symphony will know this is dangerous advice for a doctoral student already predisposed to excess. The list of people who helped stop me from making a Mahler symphony out of this dissertation is long, but must start with my committee: Steven Bernstein, Seva Gunitsky, and Todd Hall; and the internal and external readers, Matthew Hoffmann and Brian Bow, respectively. I am supremely indebted to their efforts, advice, compassion, timeliness, and collective wisdom. I must also thank Lilach Gilady and Emmanuel Adler, who helped me formulate the ideas here in their early stages. Professors who did not have a direct hand in this dissertation but who I must thank for their encouragement and tolerance are Aisha Ahmad, Ronnie Beiner, Nancy Bertoldi, Ryan Balot, Rebecca Kingston, Peggy Kohn, Frank Harvey, Paul Evans, Yuen Pau Woo, Steven Kimber, Denis Stairs, Clifford Orwin—to whom I owe an education—and Jerome Davis, who set me on this path. Many thanks also to the staff of the University of Alberta’s China Institute, especially Gordon Houlden and Jia Wang, whose hospitality allowed me to edit this dissertation into its current form. A strength of the Toronto doctoral program is the great number of colleagues who surround you in what is ultimately a lonely undertaking. Here I must thank Jonas Schwab-Plug for his limitless intellectual and personal friendship (and Emma Schwab-Plug for her equally limitless patience). I am also especially indebted in similar terms to Scott Dodds, Anthony Sealey, Maïka Sondarjée, and my coauthors, Joseph Mackay and Simon Frankel Pratt. Vive mes amis de l’ABC. Other colleagues and friends to whom I am indebted:, Lincoln and Lindsay Rathnam, Beesan Sarrouh, Jordan Guthrie, , Clifford Smith, Seth Jaffe, Kiran Banerjee, Alena Drieschova, Joelle Dumouchel, Sophie Flemig, Emma Planinc, Jamie Levin, Yao Wen, David Polansky, Lama Mourad, Taylor Putnam, Cameron Cotton-O’Brien, Andrew Gross, Larissa Atkison, Rachael Desborough, Andy Paras, Erin Hannah, Alanna Krolikowski, Kristin Pue, Nathaniel Gilmour, Igor Shoikhedbrod, Sophie Borwein, Ann Staver, Ajay Parasram, Michael Millerman, Zak Black, Timothy Berk, and everyone at the North Korea Research Group. Carthago delenda est. iii Friends outside of academia who also contributed to this dissertation, sometimes simply by having the good sense to not ask about it, are David Henry, Li Dong, Mate and Aron Bojti, Jessica McDiarmid, Brian Walker, Bennett Tansey, Heather Black, Mary-Catherine Charters, Natalie Fehéregyházi, Kathleen Cook, Maleika Mohamed, and many others over the years. A very special thanks to all my former students who have kept in touch—you have made this worth it. Last, I am most deeply indebted to my family in Halifax, Nova Scotia—Nadine, Patrick, Lois, and Robert LaRoche—the LaRoches—for all their support, matériel et moral, as Metternich would have it. iv Table of Contents Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................ v Chapter 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 The argument: geopolitical bargains ................................................................................... 3 1.2 Implications of the argument .............................................................................................. 5 1.3 Plan of the dissertation ........................................................................................................ 9 Chapter 2 Geopolitical Bargains and Military Intervention ......................................................... 13 2.1 The Problem of Great Power Intervention ........................................................................ 13 2.2 Geopolitical bargains ........................................................................................................ 19 2.3 Geopolitical bargains: a taxonomy ................................................................................... 26 2.3.1 Geopolitical bargains in miniature: the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact ............ 33 2.4 Methodology and research design .................................................................................... 36 2.4.1 Alternative arguments and interactive effects ....................................................... 39 2.4.2 Case selection ........................................................................................................ 41 2.4.3 Athens and Melos ................................................................................................. 45 2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 47 Chapter 3 The Concert of Europe ................................................................................................. 50 3.1 Existing accounts of the Concert spheres ......................................................................... 56 3.2 The Concert bargain .......................................................................................................... 59 3.2.1 Mapping the spheres ............................................................................................. 63 3.2.2 Intervention purpose during the Concert .............................................................. 67 3.2.3 Assurance strategies .............................................................................................. 69 3.3 Intervention in the Concert ............................................................................................... 72 3.3.1 Collective intervention in a de jure sphere: Austria in Naples, 1821 ................... 73 3.3.2 Semi-collective intervention in no one’s sphere I: France in Spain, 1823 ........... 79 v 3.3.3 Unilateral interventions in a de jure sphere: Britain in Portugal, 1826, 1834 & 1847 ....................................................................................................................... 87 3.3.4 Collective intervention in no one’s sphere: the Allies in Belgium, 1831-33 ........ 96 3.3.5 Unilateral intervention in a de jure sphere: Russia in Poland, 1831 ................... 103 3.3.6 Unilateral intervention in a de jure sphere: Austria in Central Italy, 1831-32 ... 111 3.3.7 Intervention in a de jure sphere: the Eastern Courts in Kraków, 1846 ............... 116 3.3.8 Intervention in a de jure sphere: Austria in Italy, 1848 ...................................... 122 3.3.9 Intervention in a contested sphere: Russia and the Allies in the Ottoman Empire, 1827-1853 ............................................................................................. 124 3.4 Case comparisons and competing explanations .............................................................. 138 3.4.1 Limited revision: France and Russia as Concert spoilers ................................... 139 3.4.2 Austria’s Allied supplication in Naples and French contention in the Papal Estates ................................................................................................................. 143 3.4.3 French semi-grouping in Spain ........................................................................... 152 3.4.4 British multilateralism in Portugal ...................................................................... 154 3.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 157 Chapter 4 The Cold War ............................................................................................................. 159 4.1 Existing accounts of the Cold War spheres .................................................................... 163 4.2 The Cold War bargain