IN the AFTERMATH of WAR US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST CAUS
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IN THE AFTERMATH OF WAR US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following JUST CAUS o ~or~ Tao Atlantic Ocean ,`. ~ ° " ,. Lake r uamn lapo v ~ ~ Gollo de los take Canes 1\ Bapno"` Mosquitos 3 e n 0 ~ a * P9nvrn9 rr {" "~ Q Pun o ae arara Toro 0 G 8 Bey of Panama o\ n EIValla ~i .. rar.Co~radc;r . La c4Pobn ~~Psnonoml `\~~ '~\\~'"s David g u a s Padiiga C fl 1 r I (~ U I ~ACriiP E~aau Pat.\ In!eaamencan n [)E LAS PERLAS 9h,yar Sar.r ~. a °. aviza _ - h Santiago Ch. 2J "~, eP ? Gulf of Panama Dar* e n ^ ~ f Herrero J " ~TaClaa \ L r V Santo S\11 Lckiantoa ~CoiDa ,1 ~w"~ J \__ Pacific Ocean Richard H. Shultz, Jr. ISBN 1-58566-058-2 First Printing August 1993 5 Second Printing May 1996 Third Printing June 1998 Fourth Printing December 2000 Disclaimer This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The views ex- pressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the UnitedStates government. This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release. Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . Vii PREFACE . ix INTRODUCTION . xi Notes . xiv 1 THE USE OF FORCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR . 1 Notes . 3 2 PANAMA 1989: THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRAETORIAN RULE . 5 Origins ofPraetorianism . 5 The 1968 Coup and the Emergence of Omar Torrijos . 6 Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force . 8 Notes . 11 3 CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR RESTORATION . 15 Genesis ofIntervention . 16 Planning Challenges and Obstructions . 17 Blind Logic: A Reappraisal . 23 Notes . 24 4 JUST CAUSE AND THE BREAKDOWN OF BLIND LOGIC . 27 Notes . 31 5 THE MILITARY SUPPORT GROUP . 33 Origins of the Military Support Group . 33 Personnel and Structure . 34 Military Support Group Tasking and the Panama Strategy . 39 Notes . 43 i~ Chapter Page 6 ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION . 45 Creating a Panamanian Security Force . 45 Infrastructure Reconstruction and Nation-Building . : . 55 Psychological Operations . 57 Military Support Group Liaison with the Panamanian Government . 61 Interagency Coordination . 63 Notes . 64 7 LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RELEVANCE . 67 . Notes . 73 iv Foreword In a more benign post-cold war international system, where no threat approaches that of the former Soviet Union, the rationale for the use of US military power cannot be based solely on the national interest. It ill have to reflect concern with and support for such issues as self-determination, democratization, human rights, and economic development. The United States must have a postconflict reconstruction assistance policy that contributes to a positive consolidation of the situation and that promotes developments seen as contributing to stability and positive change. The use of force without a policy for the postconflict situation will be politically precarious. Additionally, in this new international security environment the employment of armed forces in missions outside of or short of war has become increasingly impor- tant and frequent. Several indicators suggest that these operations will continue to grow in prominence on the US national security agenda. What do these nontradi- tional operations encompass? The two that have received the most attention to date are peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. Very recently, a third, peace enforcement, has been added to the list. However, peacekeeping and peace enforcement only focus on the violence or com- bat that is taking place. Neither addresses the complex issue of what takes place after the termination ofhostilities. Following peacekeeping and peace enforcement is another nontraditional use of the military: postconflict/postcrisis reconstruction as- sistance missions. In the future, the US is likely to find itself involved in the after- math of crisis and conflict situations where it may or may not have been one of the initial belligerents but is part of a bilateral or multilateral effort to resolve the problem and assist in the reconstruction . Professor Shultz addresses the need for a postconflict policy that takes into ac- count all of these considerations . This study is an important contribution to policy analysis and planning. It should be read by civilian and military planners alike. About the Author Dr Richard H. Shultz, Jr., is director of the International Security Studies Pro- gram and associate professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr Shultz frequently lectures at US military academies and war colleges. He has been a research associate at the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence and a consultant to various US government agencies con- cerned with national security affairs. He has been a nonresident fellow ofthe Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, and a recipient of an Earhart Foundation Research Fellowship and a United States Institute of Peace Research Fellowship. During 1988-89 he was a secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow and a member of the Strategy Department of the Naval War College. Dr Shultz is the author of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices and Regional Comparisons (1988), and has coauthored or edited 12 other books, including Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (1984); The Future ofAir Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (1991); The United States Army: Challenges and Missions for the 1990s (1991); U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources (1990); Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (1984); and Lessons from an Unconven- tional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts (1981). His articles have appeared in numerous professional journals, including The Annals of the American `Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Sur- vival, Conflict, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, World Affairs, Strategic Review, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of International Affairs, Polity, Western Political Quarterly, and The Journal ofPolitics. vit Preface Post-conflict policy has only recently been considered by the defense community. However, in Panama in 1989-90, the United States was programmatically and struc- turally ill-equipped for the situation that followed the fighting. Missing was an integrated and interagency strategy to support short-term conflict resolution and long-term reconstruction. This study represents an attempt to preclude such a shortfall in the future. It presents a detailed assessment of contingency planning for and execution of the postconflict reconstruction policy implemented by the Department of Defense in Panama following Operation Just Cause. Hopefully, it will provide a framework for analysis and planning that will be of value to those who prepare for the use of military capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction operations, whether this follows interventions, as in Panama, or is a part of the aftermath of US involvement in peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. Each of these situations will require close attention to the situation following conflict. I would like to thank several individuals for their assistance in this study. First, from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Dr Alberto Coll, Dr Chris Lamb, and Col Dennis Barlow provided invaluable assistance and encouragement . Many doors were opened due to their backing. Throughout the study, I quote numerous officials who were involved in various aspects of the Panama policy following Just Cause. I would like to thank each for taking time from busy professional schedules to sit for long interviews with me. While the number is too large to note each of these officials, a special debt of gratitude is owed to Col Jack Pryor. These interviews were transcribed by Mrs Freda Kilgallen and edited by Mr Harald Breitenstein. Their professionalism in addressing each of these tasks was truly outstanding. The same is true of Mrs Roberta Breen, who prepared the manuscript for publication . Finally, I want to thank Col Ed Mann, chief, Doctrine Research Division, Airpower Research Institute, who encouraged me to publish the study with the Air University Press and Mr =,,Preston Bryant, who provided outstanding editorial assistance. Introduction What factors led to the decision to use force in Panama? President George Bush listed four reasons: to protect American citizens abroad, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties.1 For Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Colin Powell, six criteria had to be satisfied: Was there sufficient provocation? Powell thought yes. Has the PDF [Panamanian Defense Force] changed and gone out of control? Again yes. Would Blue Spoon [the military plan for intervention] resolve the problem? Yes. Would the plan minimize damage and casualties? Yes. Would it bring democracy? Yes. And public and press reaction? Probably positive.2 These statements coincide with four guidelines for using force in the aftermath of the cold war detailed in chapter 1. First, there was an identifiable threat to US interests on three counts. The killing of a US Marine officer on 16 December 1989 and the physical abuse of a Navy lieutenant and his wife had put Americans at risk. Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) appeared to be going out of control. By extension, this situation was seen as threatening the Panama Canal. PDF violence might put the canal at risk. Finally, there was Noriega's involvement in international drug trade, an increasingly important US national security issue. However, the decision to intervene entailed more than the defense of US interests . It included the normative objective of supporting democratization in Panama. Noriega's nullification of the presidential election results of May 1989, and his use of "dignity battalions" to assault the winners, was a major setback for US policy in Panama and in the region.