Humanitarian assistance in a (pre)-conflict

A contextual analysis - 2013

Final report May 2013

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 1

Samuel Hall. is a non-politicized research and consulting company with headquarters in , Afghanistan. We specialise in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, monitoring and evaluation and impact assessments for governmental, non-governmental and international organisations. Our teams of field practitioners, academic experts and local interviewers have years of experience leading research in Afghanistan. We use our expertise to balance needs of beneficiaries with the requirements of development actors. This has enabled us to acquire a firm grasp of the political and socio- cultural context in the country; design data collection methods and statistical analyses for monitoring, evaluating, and planning sustainable programmes and to apply cross- disciplinary knowledge in providing integrated solutions for efficient and effective interventions.

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Samuel Hall Consulting. “Humanitarian assistance in a pre-conflict Afghanistan? A contextual analysis 2013”

This publication was prepared with the support of the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) and implemented by Samuel Hall. The views and analysis contained in the publication therefore do not necessarily represent UNWFP’s views.

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Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 2

Table of Contents

Assessing the Afghan context in 2013 ...... 4 Macro-analysis: the withdrawal and its consequences ...... 8 Meso-analysis: fighting hunger in displacement ...... 16 Micro-analyses: the regional patchwork ...... 20 Conclusions...... 31

Samuel Hall Consulting Qala-e-Fatullah, Street 4 Kabul, AFGHANISTAN Contact us at: [email protected] Visit us at: samuelhall.org

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 3

Assessing the Afghan context in 2013

“Now, cryin' won't help you, prayin' won't do you no good, When the levee breaks, mama, you got to move”.

Led Zeppelin

A pre-conflict environment? international facilities. Insurgent groups have clearly continued to expand their presence As much as both the International Security and demonstrate their reach across the Assistance Force (ISAF) and its local country – including in areas previously governmental counterparts are officially considered stable. Likewise, “the assumption claiming that the war is coming to an end in that the removal of the bulk of international Afghanistan, there is compelling evidence that forces will remove the casus belli and thus lead the Afghan conflict is only entering another to swift improvements in the security situation stage. is also likely to prove illusory”1. The pace of the insurgency will increase as international In mid-2011 the United States and several troops pull back and key military enablers other troop-contributing nations announced (such as air power, medical equipment, air the beginning of a progressive withdrawal of support, troop transport, and intelligence their troops from the (ISAF), with December services) are progressively albeit drastically 2014 as a timeline for a province-by-province reduced. handover to the Afghan security forces. The United States currently has about 66,000 Economic and social time bombs troops deployed in Afghanistan. NATO and other coalition nations have about 37,000 At the Tokyo conference, in July 2012, troops. President Obama has announced that governments, including Australia, Denmark, 34,000 United States troops will be removed France, and the UK, agreed on long-term by February 2014. In early march 2013, NATO commitment to development and state- defence ministers issued a statement on the building efforts; however, major donors to military assistance mission in Afghanistan Afghanistan failed to provide clear after the alliance’s combat role expires. The commitments on levels of funding. In draft proposal for possible NATO post-2014 particular, and considering the Afghan operations in Afghanistan envisions a force of government’s limited domestic revenues, up to 9,500 American troops and up to 6,000 there is still no indication on the financial more from other coalition nations, according mechanisms that will support the burdening to alliance officials, who stressed that no final funding of the Afghan National Security Forces decisions had been made. In official (ANSF) both in terms of equipment and comments, NATO’s secretary general said the salaries. It will necessarily depend on external session included serious discussion on assistance way beyond 2014, which cannot be “preparing a new and different NATO-led guaranteed in today’s context; there is mission after 2014 to train, advise and assist therefore a clear risk of State bankruptcy, on Afghan Security Forces.” Meanwhile, the the medium-run, which would of course United States will probably keep supporting directly affect the level of the already endemic Afghanistan economically and militarily for corruption as well as the provision of basic years to come with spending that is estimated services to the population. to be $4 billion a year. A closer look at the available national figures But the optimistic assessment of the local tends to confirm this fear: of the 34.4 million capacity to control and subdue armed opposition groups continues to be challenged by a series of attacks on Government installations, targeted assassinations, and 1 Barbara J Stapleton, Beating a Retreat, AAN high-profile attacks against prominent Thematic Report, January 2012.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 4 inhabitants2, it is estimated that 36% of the labour markets will heavily suffer from the population live below the poverty line3. Per deteriorating economic environment. capita gross national income for 2010/11 is estimated at US$466 (UN Data country profile, 1) Economic scenario: A key explanatory while the World Bank's estimate is US$410). parameter to the Afghan socio-economic The international financial crisis, and the development over the past ten years and related US fiscal deficit in particular, have to its likely collapse over the next decade deeply reshaped the funding and operating is the central place occupied by the assumptions informing transition strategies in services sector in urban areas. The graph Afghanistan 4 . Furthermore, the anticipated below shows that agriculture has been socio-economic shock associated with the declining as a proportion of Afghanistan’s ISAF’s withdrawal makes the sustainability of GDP in relative terms since 2002. As of Afghan public expenditure a source of 2011, over half of Afghanistan’s GDP was concern. derived from ‘services’ (telecoms, IT, transportation, retail trade, etc.), which Despite perceived and manifest inefficiencies, has been steadily increasing since 2002. the official development assistance from the Industry, by comparison, has remained international community does contribute, comparatively static as a proportion of even indirectly, to the livelihoods of low- GDP. However, the growth of the services income groups, as more than 70% of the GDP sector is largely due to the presence of is currently funded by external assistance5. As international aid organizations, NGOs and such, both the income of the Afghan NATO forces. government and the precarious economic equilibrium of the country are directly Contribution to GDP by Sector (Sources: World Bank 2011 – Samuel Hall 2012) dependent on donors’ contribution and the 60% country could thus suffer a severe economic downturn in a context of significant aid 50% cutbacks. 40% The direct consequence of aid cutbacks will be twofold: on the national economy as a whole, 30% and more specifically on the services sector, which has been a key driver to the local 20% (urban) economy since 2001; on youth 10% migration to neighbouring countries, as urban 0%

2 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011: Agriculture Industry Services http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. 3 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008: Thus in absolute terms, as the second http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. graph below shows, agriculture generates 4 It should also be noted that the recent scandals considerably more revenue in 2011 than it involving local financial institutions have strongly did in 2002. Looking ahead, it is likely that contributed to dissuade donors’ community: a the economy will revert to low-income- recent USAID inspector general report on the Kabul country status in the coming years, with an Bank scandal estimated that fraudulent loans agriculture-based economy. This raises diverted $850 million to bank insiders (including serious concerns for stability and security close members of the Presidential and Vice- 6 Presidential families), while only $70 million have in Afghanistan . The country is thus so far been recovered. expected to have little economic 5 The most recent figures released by the World generation capacity by 2014, with the Bank and the Afghan Ministry of Finance indicate that the total amount of aid for 2010/2011 amounted to approximately US$15.7 billion, which 6 Dr. Ashraf Ghani, ‘‘Preparing for Transition: A represents more than 70% of the overall GDP. See Policy Note on Development,’’ policy memo sent to “Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014”, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Majority Staff, The World Bank, November 2011. May 12, 2011.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 5

exception of uncertain mineral resources7 populations, there is clearly a second time and a still flourishing illegal narcotics bomb: a social one, directly related to trade8. internal and cross-border migration phenomena. In the first six months of 2012 In a nutshell, and according to the alone, an estimated 500,000 people had International Monetary Fund (IMF): “Fiscal been displaced from their homes, with sustainability — defined as domestic over 100,000 new conflict-induced revenues covering operating expenditures internally displaced persons (IDPs). As — is becoming a more distant goal, likely shown in the recent NRC IDP Protection to be reached only after 2032”. Afghanistan Study, if most of these IDPs (57%) reported will therefore continue to rely on donor having left their province of origin for support and promises, even for non- security reasons, a significant percentage security operating spending. However, in of respondents (17%) said that they had today’s environment environment, the migrated for economic reasons – as shown widespread tax evasion abetted by in the chart below9. government officials, the increasing theft of customs revenues by provincial Primary factor in the choice of destination for IDPs governors and a clearly softening (Sources: NRC, JIPS, and Samuel Hall 2012) economic growth are not only the causes 5% but also the symptoms of current and 10% future economic turmoil.

Contribution to GDP by Sector (Sources: World Bank 2011 – Samuel Hall 2012) 11% 200000 180000

160000 57% 140000

120000 17% 100000 80000 Million of Afs of Million 60000 Better security situation 40000 Better economic / job opportunities Geographic proximity 20000 Other 0 Presence of relatives / friends

Furthermore, another phenomenon may soon threaten the long-term. Today, 4 Agriculture Industry Services million Afghan refugees continue to reside in Iran and Pakistan. An estimated 4.5

million refugees have returned with the 2) Social scenario: If we now focus on the assistance of the United Nations High direct consequences of a deteriorating Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), political and economic context on local many of them requiring further assistance to re-establish their lives and livelihoods10. 7 See the recent Samuel Hall Consulting report for However, return and reintegration may the ILO: Afghanistan: Time to Move to Sustainable not be seen as priorities in today’s Jobs (May 2012), p.19. 8 environment, as: 1) in the medium run, a Unaccounted for in official statistics and larger in massive emigration phenomenon to size than the formal agricultural sector, the illegal opium sector accounted for an estimated additional 9% of GDP in 2011, according to the 9 NRC, Samuel Hall, and JIPS, Challenges of IDP United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: the total Protection: Research study on protection of farm-gate value of opium production accounted for internally displaced persons in Afghanistan US$ 1,407 million in 2011 (Afghanistan Opium (December 2013). Survey, UNODC, 2011). 10

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 6

Pakistan and Iran can be expected (from agencies and programmes operating in the both urban and rural areas) if the security country alongside the UN Assistance Mission situation does get worse; 2) likewise, in in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the decade of the medium- to long-run, the worsening transformation from 2015 to 2024 will require economic environment may lead a a significant paradigm shift. For a key actor significant proportion of the 400,000 youth like WFP, rather than the disappearance of its who join the labour market every year to operational perimeter, such a dramatic migrate to the neighbouring Iran and contextual change opens interesting Pakistan; in urban centres, which will be opportunities to (re)build its image as an more impacted by the collapse of the independent and neutral actor11. services sector, a massive emigration of the most educated and skilled youth may The objective of this paper is to provide soon be a reality. information that enables WFP to make responsible, safe, and sound planning and Analysing an evolving context decision making in an increasingly volatile operating environment. The first section As such, UN humanitarian and development draws a macro-level picture of the Afghan agencies’ strategies, planning and decision- political context, to better elaborate on a making need to be sensitive to a drastically series of likely scenarios that may occur up new field of analysis and operation: i) in a until 2016. The second section fine-tunes this worsening political and security context, analysis at the provincial scale, by assessing where formal counterparts tend to be less and the regional security situation and testing the less representative and credible; ii) in an hypothesis of a national atomisation. The economic environment marked by significant conclusive section will outline how these cutbacks from most international donors and scenarios can affect WFP’s implementation of serious risks of State bankruptcy; iii) in a assistance and provide recommendations as to rapidly changing humanitarian landscape, how WFP can best prepare for the next where old (conflict, droughts and floods) and Afghan historical turning point. new (IDPs and informal settlements) critical situations have now become chronic. As the UN has been present in Afghanistan for more than 40 years, with at the moment 28 UN

11 See Samuel Hall Consulting, Redefining Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, A Contextual Analysis, Kabul, July 2011.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 7

Macro-analysis: the withdrawal and its consequences

Gilles DORRONSORO for Samuel Hall

From 2001 onwards, the western coalition has the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is, more than been digging itself deeper and deeper into an ever, a sanctuary for transnational jihadist inextricable situation. The withdrawal of the groups. The price paid is manifestly west, scheduled to be completed in 2014, disproportionate to initial estimates - the marks the logical conclusion of an unwinnable United States alone has spent $700 billion in war, the longest war in the history of the direct costs (and at least twice as much in United States. Regardless of any future indirect costs), there have been over three developments, the coalition has already failed thousand death, anti-West sentiment has because its goals - elusive to begin with - will risen spectacularly in Afghanistan (and not be met. Afghanistan has never been beyond), and the credibility of NATO has been further from being a democracy, State badly dented. Building has been a resounding failure, and

The conjunction of three crises

The choice of as leader was one Parliament stems particularly from the imposed by the United States contrary to the electoral system, which favours multiple will of the Loya Jirga in 2002, the majority of candidates. Faced with these individualities, whom wanted the king to return. Security parties are incapable of weighing in effectively. services then used physical pressure to get the members to change their votes. Karzai satisfied On the other hand, the functioning of the different criteria, such as links to American Executive is highly fragmented and centralised conservatives and ethnicity (Pashtun). The with continual clashes between the Afghan political system from 2001 onwards has counsellors surrounding Karzai (some of been characterised by one executive, the whom are in the pay of foreign powers). The Presidency, which divides, weakens and President, even if he is allowed only two five- prevents the mobilisation of any actors who year terms, has considerable power, especially could potentially contest it. The result has the ability to nominate, virtually unchecked, been twofold : the absence of an effective thousands of persons, among whom are the counterbalance, notably political parties, and governors of provinces. Karzai has, thus, the weakening of State institutions – created networks of influence- "the President Parliament and local administrations.12 and his entourage have consistently sought to use senior subnational appointments and On the one hand, instead of allowing itself to patronage, in ways that have undermined a be contested or entering into negotiations, more formalised form of institution building, which may legitimise its power, the Presidency while paying lip service to the policies that is systematically joining up with opponents, their practices are undermining". The Uluswals discrediting opponents and preventing the or governors of districts are often simply formation of groups which could promote, if displaced when they no longer satisfy: either not this presidency, at least the existing through public pressure, (more or less regime. The chaotic functioning of the spontaneous, in the form of protests), or 13 through direct political destitutions. 12 Christine Noelle-Karimi (2002). “The Loya Jirga – An Effective Political Tool? A Historical Overview.” In: Noelle-Karimi, Christine, Conrad Schetter and 13 Martine van Bijlert, Between Discipline and Reinhard Schlangenweit (eds.), Afghanistan – A Discretion. Policies surrounding Senior Subnational Country Without a State? (pp. 37-52). Appointements, AREU, 2009 page 3.

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In 2013 and 2014, the Afghan regime will be, political élite may say to their diplomatic almost simultaneously, hit by three crises: an contacts in Kabul, they are preparing for a economic crisis resulting from the reduction in common exile, as can be seen by the rush for Western spending, an institutional crisis with foreign passports, families sent to Dubai and the end of President Karzai's term and, finally, the massive sums of money sent out of the a security crisis with the anticipated rise of the country. , from the summer of 2013 onwards. If at first the battle between the insurrection First of all, the reduction in Western spending and the coalition appears unequal, the in parallel with the withdrawal creates an Afghanistan war has illuminated the major economic crisis, even as the increase in flaws in the way the Western armies function- funding promised by the State Department notably the limited human and material has never materialised. The financing by resources of the coalition, the inertia of their USAID has also begun to wind down and it is practices and the poor intelligence gathering. clear that the United States and their allies are In fact, the war has cruelly exposed the not particularly enthusiastic about financing asymmetry between the means of the United the Afghan regime, partly because of the States and those of its NATO partners. Far widespread corruption. However, the impact from leading to an Atlantic or even European of this reduction in civil aid on the population collaboration, the Afghanistan war has must be considered in context given that this weakened the western alliance. This explains aid has largely been captured by Western why the United States, let down by its allies, businesses and elites associated with the reverted discreetly to a form of unilateralism. regime. Additionally, a large part of this aid The military decline of the Europeans and has been spent on Kabul or been their inability to coordinate among concentrated to a large extent in the most themselves has turned NATO in an essentially disputed provinces. The economic impact of American machine. the withdrawal will be felt first because of the spending is associated with the presence of The coalition has gradually increased the the troops, especially on infrastructure. number of soldiers in Afghanistan, culminating Consequently, the end of wartime-economy in a figure of 150 000 men in 2011- more than will probably bring about an increase in drug the number of Soviet soldiers in the 1980s. production, but this will not be enough to But this increase wasn't accompanied by any offset wartime spending. proportionate rethinking of strategies. Different strategic approaches were tried, Secondly, the political system is no longer notably counter-insurrection, inspired by the seen as a legitimate one by the people. The European colonial wars, and counter- end of President Karzai's second term will not terrorism, chiefly the targeted elimination of result in elections because security conditions the insurrections cadres. But the coalition do not allow for electoral process in a large came up against two obstacles. On the one number of the rural zones. A Loya Jirga (a hand, the insurrection had the support of council of notables) is probably the only Pakistan, particularly in offering a sanctuary, foreseeable solution, but the legitimacy of a which allowed the core leadership to survive president chosen in this way is likely to be American operations. On the other hand, contested. The Parliament elections the next Western troops largely remain enclosed in year will face the same hurdles, without the their bases, unable to forge ties with the possibility of assembling a Loya Jirga. And in people or understand the local issues. As a addition, the political élite show absolutely no result, the Taliban have kept up its activities in capacity for collective action that could the zones targeted by the coalition, especially safeguard the system in place. The rapid the South, while continuing to expand their decline of housing prices in Kabul is evidence presence across the country. The resilience of that the outlook is negative and that the most the Taliban is all the more problematic given common attitude is one of backing out. There that the Afghan State is not ready to replace are widespread plans for exit. Whatever the the coalition. The Taliban

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We must face one fact: the Taliban are a doubt the future of the third generator14. political movement. This has been denied for a long time or, when admitted, the The question (and this could appear consequences haven't been clarified. The provocative) is: do the Taliban carry out State Taliban have a reasonable degree of Building and especially, how do they do it? I centralisation, a national strategy and, far will briefly describe the components of state from being resistant to modernity, when it building from the point of view of the comes to technology, have learnt to adapt to insurrection, then I shall highlight its logic: the coalition warfare. It is, thus, important to the importance of government functions, question many elements of the standard notably the judiciary, recovery of descriptions of the Taliban: calling them a development programmes and governmental movement "external" to Afghan society; institutions. describing them as a collection of local movements with no national strategy; The Taliban have benefited from two things: reconstructing the motives of the militants the absence of any investment in the legal as local and non-political; and, finally, system (and a lesser extent, in the police) and making the Taliban a Pashtun nationalist in the local administrations. Sometimes, to movement. avoid a coalition offensive, the insurgents accept the formal presence of the Stat while, In their own way, the Taliban are in fact, controlling the people. In other reconstructing a State parallel to Kabul and instances, the Taliban can take over districts if this increases in significance as they progress the Uluswal refuses to cooperate or if they through the country. Without much in the think they can hold the district in the long way of financial means, the insurrection run. When an administrator is a local, the considers government functions to be of Taliban brings pressure to bear on his family. central importance, notably the legal system Police officers are systematically targeted and the monitoring of State or NGO (until they come to an agreement with the programmes. In developing their system of insurrection). administrating the people, the Taliban have had two advantages: the disinterest shown by What are the Taliban's public policies? The Kabul for the judiciary and local legal system is given top priority. administrations and the fact that the Taliban judges are Oulemas and as a result, enjoy a The Taliban have extremely limited material certain prestige, all the more so since they means, which leads them to adopt two are not corrupt. Given the circumstances, the indirect strategies: controlling existing level of organisation seen in the Taliban's administrations and using NGOs. First of all, judiciary is remarkable. Economically, the the results are weak and one can already see Taliban essentially live of external resources. a regression as the governments loses control Taxes, essentially the ushr (the tax on the over the rural areas. Taliban pressure, or harvest) are usually very modest and are pressure from other local groups, makes the primarily a means of political control. In this functioning of schools difficult. It is also sense, the Taliban do not seek to control the difficult to find women teachers ready to shift economic system for reasons that are both into these rural areas. Secondly, apart from practical and ideological. They tax opium and the control of State institutions in the rural cross-border shipments, and notably benefit milieu, the Taliban use NGOs. This is from international aid program: one of the reminiscent of Afghan commanders in the most famous examples remains the Kajaki 1980s largely delegating, in a way, the dam, where a large part of the money spent administration of the people to western on the rehabilitation of the two major NGOs, who constructed clinics and financed hydroelectric power dams of Helmand schools. In the same way, the Taliban hope to provinces went to the Taleban – while more gain politically from these actions, while recent reports suggest that budgetary cuts to retaining ideological control and, above all, USAID development programmes will put in sparing themselves the difficulty of doing this

14 Boone, Jon, “US cuts put British-backed Afghan hydropower project in doubt” The Guardian, December 12, 2011. when they need to concentrate all their retaining ideological control and, above all, resources on the military. sparing themselves the difficulty of doing this when they need to concentrate all 1) First of all, the results are weak and as one their resources on the military. can already see a regression, as the governments loses control over the rural The Taliban are currently in a dominant areas. Taliban pressure, or pressure from position across more than a third of the other local groups, makes the functioning country and threaten most of the important of schools difficult. It is also difficult to find roads. The Pakistani sanctuary allows them to women teachers ready to shift into these maintain a constant pressure on the Afghan rural areas.15 regions along the Pakistani border. In many districts (more than a quarter of the 400 2) Secondly, apart from the control of State Afghan districts), the Taliban have limited governments in the rural milieu, the government presence to the district capital Taliban use NGOs. This is reminiscent of and lead the people themselves. Afghan commanders in the 1980s largely delegating, in a way, the administration of the people to western NGOs, who constructed clinics and financed schools. In

the same way, the Taliban hope to gain politically from these actions, while

15 Marit Glad, “Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation,” CARE/Ministry of Education/World Bank, November 2009. See also “Menaces sur l’éducation des filles” at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/24/us- afghanistan-girls-idUSTRE71N1OW20110224 and UNAMA Human Rights, Afghanistan Annual Reports on Civilians in Armed Conflict.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 11

The scenarios: peace or breakdown

Prolonging the civil war safest means of stabilising the Afghan regime. But this remains improbable for several Many scenarios are beginning to take shape reasons. First of all, the enormous security for the post-2014 period. In the first scenario, cost Pakistan would face, with the significant the military growth of the Taliban at the risk of an offensive alliance between the district level will allow them to progressively Taliban and Pakistani jihadist groups. Given isolate the cities, causing the defection of the the highly unstable conditions at the frontier urban élite. This will benefit the insurrection and the inability of the State to regain its and cause the collapse of the current régime. footing following military operations, the Jalalabad, in particular, is very vulnerable consequences would be serious and would given its connections: the Kabul-Jalalabad- necessitate a stronger military presence on Peshawar road is already threatened by the the western border, while Pakistan's priority is insurrection. If this city falls, it will, in all its border with . Also, relations between probability, lead to the collapse of the current the United States and Pakistan have broken regime. This scenario, unlikely for two or three down significantly in the last few years years yet, will be a replay of the Taliban's first because of different incidents (most recently taking of Kabul in 1996. A second scenario is the bombardment of the border areas and the that of the collapse of the current regime raid against bin Laden). Finally, the Pakistani caused by the tensions within the regime army is convinced, rightly or wrongly, that itself. The strong presence of the Hezb-i islami India is on the offensive in Afghanistan and is (legal branch) close to the President, as well as supporting anti-Taliban and Baloch-separatist the politicisation of the army, creates a groups. Indian politics are interpreted by foreseeable scenario of a coup d’état and a Pakistan to be a strategic threat and, period of anarchy. This scenario is not whatever the truth in these perceptions, the fundamentally inconsistent with the first one result is stronger than ever support for the and takes one back to the fall off the insurrection.17 Najibullah regime in 1992.16 A final scenario: the creation of a sanctuary in Though the mechanism that will bring about the north has often been discussed, even at the collapse of the current regime seems the time of the end of the Soviet occupation. inexorable, some changes could stabilise the Indeed, some American commentators hope situation for a few years. A change in Pakistani that a division of Afghanistan is the way out. politics, internal divisions in the Taliban and a For example, Ambassador Blackwell proposes new president - these three elements, a division of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, as eventually cumulated, could change the story. the State is an artificial creation. In practice, As I see it, these changes are not very likely this means ethnic cleansing on a large scale and their taking place assumes certain (the Pashtun population in the North) and the unforeseeable events (for example; a major end of the Afghan army. The army would then political crisis in Pakistan, the death of Mullah be totally dominated by the Tajiks (notably Omar). the Panjshiris) and the Uzbeks - something that is already beginning to happen. « We A change in Pakistani politics has been would offer the Afghan Taliban an agreement proclaimed for the past ten years, without in which neither side seeks to enlarge its ever coming to a pass and this is why the territory — if the Taliban stopped supporting surge was unable to succeed. In fact, the terrorism, a proposal that they would almost opposite was seen: the Pakistani military certainly reject. We would then make it clear never stopped supporting the Taliban and the that we would rely heavily on U.S. air power Hezb-i islami and became an increasingly and special forces to target any Al Qaeda base difficult "ally" for the United States. A reverse in Afghanistan, as well as Afghan Taliban in Pakistani politics will effectively deal a hard even a mortal blow, to the Taliban and is the 17 The Agreement on Cooperation between India and Afghanistan, signed on 4th October 2011, covers different areas among which is security. 16 A Force In Fragments: Reconstituting The , Asia Report N°190 – 12 May 2010.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 12 leaders who aided them. We would also Finally, the most probable scenario is the target Afghan Taliban encroachments across collapse of the Afghan regime in a few years, the de facto partition lines and terrorist following a period of progressive weakening. sanctuaries along the Pakistan border. Though The alternative scenario is one where the careful analysis is needed, this might mean a insurrection is contained with an indefinitely longtime residual U.S. military force in prolonged civil war, with no prospect of Afghanistan of about 40,000 to 50,000 troops. strengthening the current central We would enlist Tajiks, Uzbeks, and government. Rather than searching for a way supportive Pashtun in this endeavor, as well to arbitrate between these two scenarios, it is as our NATO allies, Russia, India, Iran, perhaps important to recognise that after 2014, the China, Central Asian nations and, one hopes, coalition will be in no position to have a the U.N. Security Council.» The consequences decisive say in the path the Afghan regime of such a polity would be disastrous. The most takes. In addition, it isn't clear whether the dangerous of these would be the prolongation of a civil war will be more destabilisation of Pakistan, as the Afghanistan- favourable to western interests than the Pakistan border would effectively disappear, insurrection, coming to power at a time when with consequences for Baluchistan. Even from the absence of an interlocutor makes the a Western or Indian perspective, this situation situation most vulnerable. In such conditions, is not favourable. The worst possible outcome how can one define a strategy that would is the loss of control over the border-regions, articulate means and objectives? which would form a sanctuary for all jihadist groups.18 Negotiating the peace?

The question is important because, a The only coherent response, at least in theory, politically united north would find it easier to in the face of the reconstruction of a bring about pressure on Karzai and eventually sanctuary for jihadist groups, is an agreement determine the course of political change in with the Taliban, in order to detach them from the capital, including negotiations with the transnational jihadist groups and, one way or insurrections. Given the rapidity of the another, associate them with the Afghan withdrawal and the end of Karzai's term in State. Indeed, the coalition can no longer 2014, there is very little time left in which to defeat the Taliban, which will remain a bring about the unification of the north. From political and military power in Afghanistan for a military perspective the situation, as we the foreseeable future. If the alliance between have seen, is relatively stable this year. the Taliban and jihadist groups is, effectively, However, the government does not have the not negotiable, the United States will find means to dislodge the insurrection from those itself with a military instrument that is inept areas in which it has taken root. Far from and without any evident solution in the face looking like a stable zone, the North is of the recreation of a sanctuary on the politically fragmented. Those parties, which Afghanistan-Pakistan border. have been dominant in the past, such as the Jamiat-i islami, the Jumbesh and the Hezb-i Additionally, after 2014, the negotiations will wahdat, have different leanings or have largely slip away from the coalition. And so, internal schisms. In addition, these political the last chance the coalition has to weigh in a parties do not have their own structure and manner favourable to American interests is in are essentially parasites on the State, with the the autumn of 2013, if the regime in place has setting up of powerful men who monopolise shown itself able to resist pressure from the power at the provincial level and benefit insurrection. From this perspective, the ability (mostly economically). In particular, they do of the ANSF to hold on in the East will be a not have the independent military structure of decisive element. Also, American leverage on the ANA to resist a Taliban offensive. Pakistan and the Afghan parties, limited to begin with, will diminish rapidly. Regional actors, the patrons of Afghan groups, will play a central, and probably negative, role in the new phase of the civil war. It is particularly 18 Robert D. Blackwill, A de facto partition for difficult to see how Pakistan and India will find Afghanistan, Politico July 7, 2010, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=AACE middle ground over Afghanistan. Thus, the E164-18FE-70B2-A8E30566E50DFB3A United States must begin to consider the

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 13 situation that will follow the fall of the Afghan relations with Western countries. regime and the rise to power of the Taliban. Negotiations, if they happen one day, are The transformation of the defeat of the West quite likely to be between the Taliban in Kabul into a political and strategic advantage to and Western countries. Consequently, the Pakistan is by no means obvious. The Pakistani United States' addition of the group Haqqani policy on Afghanistan has allowed it, once to the list of terrorist movements is again, to become a key interlocutor in the counterproductive. It will have scant current war. However, this success has led to a immediate practical results and, above all, this considerable aggravation of Pakistan' internal risks the creation of additional blocks in the situation, without leading to any new regional future with the whole Taliban movement. The developments that are clearly advantageous. most dangerous situation is one where the Taliban comes into power in association with The withdrawal of the West will result in the international jihadist groups, and the Taliban having more flexibility in comparison (re)construction of a State that will be a pariah to Pakistan, which runs the risk of losing on the international scene. Finally, the use of control over its ally, just as it lost control over drones and nights raids, from 2014 onwards, the mujahedeen groups in the 1990s, and lost must be limited to transnational jihadist control over the Taliban when they took Kabul groups to send out the clear message that the in 1996. For the moment, the United States' United States is not targeting the Taliban refusal to negotiate its retreat and to push for except in cases where the Taliban collaborates the constitution of a government of national with jihadist groups that pose a direct threat unity in Kabul heightens the risk of a military to Western countries. victory for the Taliban followed by the isolation of Afghanistan on the international From the 1980s onwards, external powers scene. In this hypothesis, Pakistani interests have maintained the civil war in Afghanistan will suffer because Islamabad will find itself in by supporting Afghan parties that they the same situation as during the 1990s. In the thought they could use as relays. Thus, case of an agreement, the Taliban could get regional competition between India and closer to the West or to China, at least on the Pakistan, or between Saudi Arabia and Iran economic front. At the same time, Pakistan complicates the search for a solution to the will see its own influence diminishing. conflict. Competition between India and Pakistan today, finds expression over the For the Pakistani army, as for most of the Afghanistan issue, rather than Kashmir. regional observers and powers, the coalition can no longer defeat the Taliban and the The position of Pakistan is ambiguous: withdrawal is just a question of time. But this including Afghanistan in its zone of influence military success does not result, ipso facto, in commits it to a long-term policy, which, in the strategic gains for Pakistan. Pakistan wishes, 1990s, relied on the Taliban movement. ideally, to participate directly in the Unable to convince the Taliban to hand over negotiations that will define the future bin Laden, the Pakistani government was balance in Afghanistan, as in the Bonn forced to collaborate with the United States, Agreement of 2001. In the 1980s, Pakistan was following 9/11, fearing economic or even the representative of the Mujahedeen parties military reprisals. All the same, the Pakistani who were never invited to directly participate Intelligence Service maintained their links with in negotiations. Today, Islamabad wants to the Taliban, counting on the withdrawal of the represent the Taliban in the process that could United States from Afghanistan within the be set up. The idea would be for Pakistan to next few years. Here, the sanctuary offered by establish its allies, the Taliban and maybe the Pakistan plays a central role as it permitted Hezb-i islami in a government of national unity the Taliban cadres to freely regroup after the and eliminate any Indian influence from this defeat in 2001. All attempts, to date, made by process. the West to gain control of the border areas, through Pakistan, and thus close down this In this context, what are the chances of the sanctuary, have failed. The expectation of a Doha process succeeding? The Doha process Taliban victory in Islamabad will probably got off to a bad start and its chances of strengthen Pakistani support to the Taliban, success are weak. Effectively, Karzai's strategy with the risk of a further deterioration of was to gain the Taliban's recognition of his

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 14 government in exchange for setting up a consensus with the legal opposition. And even Taliban representation in Doha (plus other if the opposition is weak from a military point confidence-building measures). The Karzai of view, it is necessary that it supports the government comes back to the idea of rallying negotiations to ensure a non-violent the Taliban to the system in place - something transition, which does not result in political which appears difficult given the unfavourable fragmentation, as happened in the 1990s. In military forces in Kabul as well as the breaking the case of the contrary, there is no assurance down of the system in place. The Taliban do that the army (where the legal opposition has not seem to be in any hurry to take the plunge support) will stay united. Additionally, a tête- and are particularly waiting to see what will à-tête between Karzai and the Taliban will be the extent of foreign military presence, result in Pakistan's gaining a stronger with the question of immunity being as yet influence, with Pakistan able to support the undecided. At this stage, it is difficult to see Taliban and act against Karzai. The United the Taliban agreeing to recognise Karzai's States will not check this as their interests, government without significant linked notably to the withdrawal and CT, will compensation. In addition, the Chantilly lead them to spare Pakistan (at least for the process offers to recognise the Taliban next two years). without them having to commit themselves on the status of the Kabul regime. From this In addition, the Unites States is in a position of perspective, there is a degree of connivance retreat comparable to the retreat from Iraq. between the Taliban and the opposition in the The number of troops remaining in North against the Doha process. Afghanistan will be low (8,000 to 15,000) and uniquely for CT purposes. Internal constraints A negotiation between the Afghan in the American diplomacy make it unlikely government and the Taliban places Pakistan in that the United States will be majorly involved a central role and does not guarantee a in any diplomatic process at this stage.

Conclusion: time to move to pragmatic strategies

What are the consequences of the current and will no longer be in a dominant position in the future political changes for humanitarian rural areas. Thus, UN agencies must negotiate agencies (such as the UN)? Due to the their presence with the armed opposition or anticipated, rapid breakdown of structures, the local powers. From this point of view, the and questions about neutrality, which are unfavourable developments in the province of becoming increasingly urgent, International Badakhshan reveal how, strictly speaking, Organisations can no longer participate in there are no more pro-government regions in state building by taking priority over NGOs in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the coalition – the use of governmental counterparts (at both with no agreement, for the moment, on provincial and national levels). Western military presence after 2014 – points to the likelihood of a security crisis, which will The question of neutrality makes it necessary necessitate WFP rapidly repositioning itself. to consider a situation where the government

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 15

Meso-analysis: fighting hunger in displacement

Nassim MAJIDI for Samuel Hall

Humanitarian developments since 2011, and to become a vehicle for poverty alleviation for now in the wake of transition in 2013, confirm IDPs in urban areas. what we had stipulated then 19 : increasing Covering IDPs’ emergency food needs numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing conflict and natural disasters, 600,000 IDPs in Afghanistan – these latest increasing pressures on urban centres, and estimates show an overwhelming majority of increasing vulnerability and poverty levels conflict-induced displacement, well over half a among IDPs, should be at the forefront of million according to UNHCR 20 . This is an WFP’s strategic orientation. Fortunately, fresh increase of over 150,000 IDPs in 1 year, data and analysis from research studies pointing to a growing humanitarian crisis conducted by Samuel Hall since 2011 highlight facing the country – and to the need for WFP findings of utmost important for assessing to focus on emergency assistance and relief poverty levels, and hence, for WFP to assess operations, in the first place, rehabilitation its target population: returning refugees are and recovery, second. not the most multi-dimensionally poor households, instead IDPs are the most “IDPs who were displaced in 2012 report the vulnerable. Within this group, data same nutritional deficiencies as those disaggregated by age, gender and diversity displaced 10 years ago”21. The 2012 report on mainstreaming shows a particular vulnerable The Challenges of IDP Protection showed that category being the elderly and children, whether in prolonged or recent displacement, women and girls. IDPs showed vulnerabilities across the board and are exposed to multiple protection risks. Accrued in 2013 are the tense political Indeed, among their top three priorities are challenges facing Afghanistan, with a context employment, food and water, and housing. As of transition, elections, and security such, basic food needs remain the top priority management; a context of disaster relief and concern of IDPs living in urban and rural areas. accrued emergency situations, on the The majority of IDP households spend over humanitarian spectrum, and economic three quarters of their income on food, with insecurity on the development front. As a over half spending above 90% of their income result, Afghans are more than ever on the on food. Over a third of respondents had not move – to new destinations outside of the eaten for several days prior to being surveyed. country (India, Middle East, Gulf countries), and for those who are the most vulnerable, Over 30% of IDPs report borrowing money at increased internal displacement. How can least six times in the previous year to buy WFP adjust to an increasingly mobile Afghan food. Indebtedness is a common practice in context? How can WFP help fight hunger in Afghanistan – however, even for national displacement? standards, borrowing recurrently money for basic subsistence needs is a sign of From relief to recovery: Stepping up WFP vulnerability and a continued poverty trap. support to IDPs in Afghanistan WFP has a role to play in ensuring that nutritional standards are met, and helping to Our research shows two key humanitarian diversify limited resources by providing priorities for WFP: covering IDPs’ emergency alternatives to indebtedness for food food needs and the ability of food assistance consumption.

20 UNHCR (2013) Conflict-induced internal displacement – monthly update, UNHCR 19 Samuel Hall (2011). Redefining humanitarian Afghanistan, April 2013 assistance in Afghanistan – A Context Analysis, for 21 NRC/IDMC/JIPS/Samuel Hall (2012). The the World Food Programme, Afghanistan. Challenges of IDP Protection in Afghanistan.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 16

Two fifths have received emergency food and High preferences for a combination of cash water indicating an insufficient coverage of and in-kind, as well as strong motivations to food assistance to reach the displaced in participate in cash-for-work and cash-for- secure locations where the research was training activities are some of the main carried out. As such, the lack of humanitarian findings of the study. Female respondents, access or insecurity cannot be blamed for the specifically, were increasingly in favor of this insufficient coverage. These are all areas that balance, while men showed a greater interest can be accessed – as such, it can be inferred in full cash assistance. This is partly due to that the overall nationwide reach of WFP to gendered differences and women’s higher IDPs is even lower than the two fifths capacity to control in-kind items over cash. As mentioned in this study. The question of a result, this justifies the continued WFP’s geographic coverage to cover the needs distribution of food in the KIS for immediate of IDPs nationwide is therefore a priority basic needs while cash grants can allow operational concern. There is undoubtedly a households to address other urgent needs great margin of improvement of WFP’s work in (repayment of debts, health) or invest their safe and accessible locations given the resources in a longer-term perspective geographic presence of WFP in Afghanistan, (human capital) to step out of acute and unmatched by other humanitarian actors. emergency needs in urban settings. WFP’s role can therefore be key in helping IDPs in urban settings break the cycle of indebtedness and Linking food to cash assistance for poverty eventually attain higher living standards and alleviation in urban areas secure livelihoods. The objective is to use food for relief, and to allow families to step forward In a 2013 DRC/Samuel Hall study on Cash to recovery if their basic food needs are based assistance for IDPs in the Kabul informal covered through external assistance. settlements (KIS), findings shows that over 80% of respondents had received food Relevance of WFP at a time of increasing assistance in the KIS sites. Qualitative data internal displacement showed that external food assistance was decisive in helping IDP households sustain In Redefining humanitarian assistance in their food needs, with distribution of food Afghanistan, a context analysis led two years items being their primary source of food. ago, we advocated for a stronger urban Assistance was particularly crucial in times of programming approach to be developed by shock, notably during the winter, when WFP, in order to adapt a new displacement sources of income are scarcer due to the profile that had accentuated pressures on seasonal nature of employment opportunities urban areas. Since 2011, Samuel Hall in the KIS areas. researchers have continued collecting data on the situation of the displaced in urban The focus priorities of IDP households in settings. Some of this data, presented above, urban settings are on acute needs, along with emphasizes the relevance and potential preferences for food and cash as constant impact that WFP assistance can have in needs across seasons.. Preferences for diminishing acute poverty for the displaced in training and job placement increase outside of urban settings, and in helping to ease tensions winter – showing the emergency situation in between them and local communities. which IDPs find themselves through the greater part of the year. When asked whether Leveraging the political acceptability of food they preferred receiving full cash assistance or aid in urban areas a combination of both food and cash, IDP respondents opted for the second option. This The relevance of WFP in assistance to IDPs in underlines the fact that food remains a urban areas is more than ever relevant. Urban constant need that incomes are unable to areas represent areas where families suffer meet, and that cash is perceived as an from food insecurity due to higher prices, loss appropriate way to satisfy other urgent needs of livelihood strategies and of social support (notably health needs). The top preferences networks. A common trend is the ratio of ‘too for assistance remain first food, second cash, many mouths to feed vs. not enough hands to third fuel. work’. This is especially true since women in

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 17 displacement are increasingly seen as a burden: whereas they often work on What this showed, overall, was a better agricultural lands in rural areas, their situation of returnees compared to IDPs and economic opportunities are limited in urban non-migrants. Indeed, returnee beneficiaries – areas and hence their income generating value who benefited from UNHCR’s repatriation diminishes in the eyes of their husbands and program, shelter assistance and subsequent heads of households. assistance – are better off than those who have not been targeted with the same amount The greater political acceptability of food aid of external assistance. As such, WFP can help in urban areas compared to other address this imbalance and help other rehabilitation and recovery activities places categories of displaced and non-migrant WFP in a key role to lead such assistance with populations reach higher food standards. UNHCR. The Government of Afghanistan is now developing its first National IDP Policy – The recommendation is not to target all an important step forward in recognizing and displaced and all migrant or returnee addressing the needs of IDPs nationwide. populations but to target, first, IDPs – in both However, in many locations, return is still seen rural and urban settings, with a specific and as the only durable solution worth greater coverage urban programming – implementing, partly due to absorption second vulnerable communities, identified not capacities and land issues. As a result, by their migration status but by an appropriate authorities do not do not favor infrastructural food security mapping. With return numbers or longer term projects, and are instead more decreasing, and with multi-dimensional open to interventions by humanitarian actors poverty analyses showing that returnees fare like WFP. Increasing WFP coverage in what are better than non-returning refugees, IDPs or secure, accessible areas will be a priority at a local populations, WFP can now increase its time of Transition and increasing acute needs. emergency food aid to those most vulnerable, given the existing evidence available. Outside of urban areas, our research shows that stakeholders provide a mapping of food Coordination & Partnership Strategy insecure provinces and districts; yet early warning systems and social safety nets for IDPs This brings us to the critical question of in food insecure and disaster-prone areas are coordination and joint assessments. Who can lacking, and require a dual displacement WFP partner with to target IDPs in need of prevention and harm mitigation policy. food assistance?

Mapping food insecurity In a context of increasing emergency needs in displacement, WFP will have to rely on Overall and unequivocally, the specialized actors whose mandates cover IDPs recommendation is for WFP to focus on IDPs in Afghanistan, namely: UNHCR (conflict- first, then other vulnerable populations. In a induced IDPs), IOM (natural disaster induced recent UNHCR shelter evaluation study22, the IDPs), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC, a data showed that respondents (a mix of leading actor on protection assessments and returnees, IDP and non-migrant households) programming for the displaced) and the spent an average of 690 AFS per month on Danish Refugee Council. food, over one third could not satisfy their food needs and over 40% never ate meat Beyond these partnerships with international during the week. This showed not only a organization, WFP will need to rely on local problem of lack of food but also of food NGOs and implementing partners with the quality. In this overall food-deprived scenario, capacity to: i) differentiate IDPs from rural- IDPs fared worse than the rest, followed by urban migrants and other migrant non-migrant households and returnee populations, to properly select the most populations. vulnerable IDPs nationwide, a challenging task of identification and selection, and ii) carry out proper protection and needs assessments to 22 Samuel Hall / University of Maastricht (2013), further target those with acute food needs. A Evaluation of the UNHCR Shelter Assistance Programme 2009-2011, commissioned by UNHCR thorough mapping of local NGOs and of their Afghanistan, forthcoming. capacities on displacement and on protection

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 18 will be required to identify those NGOs international and local organizations, as the directly ready for implementation and those in government has not yet proven to be, in need of additional capacity building, under the Afghanistan, a reliable partner on internal umbrella of specialized agencies. displacement – although developments on the national policy front show positive initiatives On such a sensitive topic, however, as IDP food at the central level. needs, the most dependable partners will be

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 19

Micro-analyses: the regional patchwork

Antonio GIUSTOZZI for Samuel Hall

Afghanistan is a highly varied political Carrying out such a survey is complicated by environment, with regions and provinces the fact that information available is very differing radically each other in terms of social uneven, with a few provinces attracting most and political structures. Moreover, the central attention. Some remote provinces like Ghor, government in Kabul continues to command or Daikundi almost never feature in the press limited influence in the provinces. In order to or in analytical reports. The author of this draw a picture of political developments in report was helped by having carried two in Afghanistan, therefore, looking exclusively at depth surveys of Afghan regions in 2012 and Kabul risks being deeply misleading. This by several other research projects involving paper surveys all of Afghanistan regions one extensive interviewing in different parts of by one in order to assess the wider political Afghanistan. Whatever public domain landscape. There is intrinsic value in assessing information was available was also used. the man trends in each region; in addition the questions it tries to answer are: The regional division adopted for this project is the UN one, with the exception of the  Are there common trends among all , which has been extended to these disparate regions, so different incorporate Hazara-populated districts of from each other in their political neighbouring provinces. There are sometimes make up? of course linkages between regions; when this is analytically relevant it is of course discussed  Can we draw general conclusions in the text below. from observing the regions one by one?

Overview of the regional landscape

The five provinces of the north (Faryab, Sar-i often with the support of the central Pul, Balkh, Jowzjan, Samangan) can be divided government.23 into two sub-regions, the Uzbek-dominated north-west and the Tajik-dominated Balkh Dostum’s long-time rival for influence and province. The two dominant personalities in power in the north, Atta Mohammed, was as the north are Gen. Dostum and governor Atta. of early 2013 the longest serving provincial The former suffered from a rather long period governor in the whole of Afghanistan, despite of decline in his influence in 2006-11, due to not being in the best of terms with president an internal conflict to his organisation, Karzai and his circle of advisers. Atta has full Junbesh-i Milli, and to the loss of external control over Balkh province, with just a few support. In 2012 however he appeared to be Hazara businessmen and politicians daring to recovering, thanks to some funding accruing challenge him in order to obtain some access to him again, both from wealthy Afghan to land and contracts. Atta also tried to supporters and from foreign countries. expand his influence over the other northern Dostum’s influence was mostly concentrated provinces, not without success even if he had among the Uzbek population of the north, to compete not just with resource-stretched with little impact on other ethnic groups as of Dostum, but also with the central government 2012. However, even among the Uzbeks a and Vice-president Fahim, all trying to number of individuals and small networks were trying to challenge Dostum’s influence 23 particularly in his native Jowzjan province, Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The resilient oligopoly’, Kabul : AREU, 2012.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 20 establish or consolidate patronage networks thanks to flourishing trade with Central Asia; it throughout the north. The central government is also enjoying a construction boom. There is too weak to even impose his own choice of are signs of slow down however, as governors in the north and usually content entrepreneurs worry about the consequences with trying to co-opt those who develop issues of Western disengagement. A slowing with their former political masters, such as economy would have major social and governor Sa’i of Jowzjan. Kabul also has little political consequences as much labour control over the police, mostly staffed by currently employed in Mazar would be loyalists of Jamiat-i Islami, who have released into the villages.26 connections with Atta, or less often loyalists of Gen. Dostum. Only the Afghan National Army can be said to be to a degree aligned with the central government, even if many of its officers are if not from the north, from the north-east and from the Kabul region. 24

The killing in 2012 of Ahmad Khan, the strongman of Samangan, created a vacuum in a province once aligned with Dostum. Ahmad Khan had broken up with Dostum years before his death and had been wavering between Kabul and Atta, in effect trying to assert his autonomy. His killing was a reminder that since 2008 a fourth important player (after Dostum, Atta and Kabul) had emerged in the north: the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban have demonstrated a considerable degree of resilience in the face of a superior enemy and have established an influence over some marginalised sectors of the population. However, the Taliban of the north are negatively affected by internal conflict involving rival networks and centres of command – Peshawar and Quetta compete for influence in this region.

On the whole, the existence of two major patronage networks (Atta’s and Dostum’s) has contributed to maintain some kind of order in the region to a greater extent than elsewhere. There is however a growing process of The North East rearmament of the networks of militia commanders, mostly through incorporation in With the killings of Prof. Rabbani, of Gen. the Local Police; although the Local Police is Daud and of Mutalleb Beg in 2011-12, the effective in fighting the Taliban, its weak north-east (, Baghlan, Takhar and discipline is beginning to compromise security 25 Badakhshan) has been deprived of all the local in the villages. figures who could mobilise local networks around them. The result is extreme political The economy of the northern region is largely fragmentation, with Uzbek and Tajik networks driven by the fast development of Mazar-i once linked to the leaders mentioned above Sharif, which absorbs labour from all around now wandering in search of new patrons. The the region. Mazar is now a major trading hub, actors trying to fill the vacuum are predominantly external to the north-east: 24 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The resilient oligopoly’, Kabul : AREU, 2012. 25 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The resilient oligopoly’, Kabul 26 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The resilient oligopoly’, Kabul: : AREU, 2012. AREU, 2012.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 21

Vice-president Fahim, Balkh governor Atta, disrupt the highways connecting Afghanistan Gen. Dostum, Hizb-i Islami and the Taliban. to Central Asia and more concerned to Among the local actors making some effort to preserve force, build it up and exploit establish their influence was Salauddin opportunities as they will arise. Contrary to Rabbani, son of the late president, but with the north, Peshawar has largely replaced little impact yet.27 Quetta as a control centre in the north-east, even if some residual Quetta influence is felt As of early 2013 none of these actors had in Kunduz.29 been able yet to establish anything close to predominant influence over the region, although Fahim could be said to be the most The Central region influential among them. Interestingly President Karzai, previously keen to have The region surrounding Kabul (Kabul province, influence in a region which was a stronghold Kapisa, Parwan, Logar and Wardak) has always of his Jamiat-i Islami rivals within the ruling been split between Kapisa and Parwan being coalition, by late 2012 seemed to have given under control of Jamiat-i Islami and Logar and up establishing direct influence over the Wardak being initially tentatively run by local north-east, perhaps in an attempt to appease allies of Jamiat. By 2007-8 the Taliban were Jamiat-i Islami and convince it to endorse spreading to Logar and Wardak as well as to Karzai’s nominee for the 2014 presidential the southern (Pashtun populated) districts of elections.28 Kapisa, without facing much resistance by these weak and discredited allies of Jamiat. The political fragmentation of the north-east Since Wardak and Logar are crossed by translates into a high degree of security important highways, ISAF and Kabul have issues; the worst affected provinces are taken care to secure at least those parts of Kunduz, Badakhshan and Baghlan, where these provinces where the highway runs. some Jamiati networks have increasingly gone Wardak is also home to several influential rogue and indulged in open criminal ministers and government officials, first and behaviour; banditism has also proliferated and foremost Minister of Education Faruq Wardak old rivalries over drug smuggling routes and then former Minister of defence Rahim remain alive. The north-east also lacks a major Wardak. Faruq has been relying on Hizb-i city like Mazar to act as a driver of economic Islami networks, strong in the province, to growth; Kunduz has grown dramatically since exercise influence, but in fact despite a major 2001 but is still less than a regional capital. As investment of human resources the hold of a result the regional economy is lagging the central government always remained behind the rest of the country and levels of weak. With the withdrawal of US troops from unemployment are high. This so far has the province in 2012, the Afghan security favoured recruitment into the Afghan security forces have also withdrawn from many of the forces, but could also favour recruitment into outposts which had been established in the the insurgency. The Taliban are past their villages, allowing the Taliban to reclaim 2009-10 peak of power in Kunduz and ground. In the Pashtun districts, the real Baghlan, where their positions in the flat areas context for influence and control is in fact surrounding the provincial capitals have been between Hizb-i Islami and Taliban, with other taken back by the government forces. The actors remaining marginal.30 Taliban reorganised and moved to more rugged areas in the districts, abandoning the Wardak also has a large Hazara population, earlier insurrectional tactics and turning to which is divided from its Pashtun neighbours guerrilla warfare. They are less worried to by a conflict over land and pastures, which could easily degenerate after 2014 (for the

27 Interviews with notables and political cadres from north-eastern Afghanistan, summer and 29 Interviews with notables and political cadres autumn 2012. from north-eastern Afghanistan, summer and 28 Interviews with notables and political cadres autumn 2012; interviews with Taliban from north-eastern Afghanistan, summer and commanders, autumn 2012. autumn 2012; personal communication with 30 Interviews with Taliban cadres and commanders diplomats and officials of international in Wardak, January 2013; interviews with organizations, autumn 212 and winter 2012-13. government officials in Wardak, January 2013.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 22 politics of the Hazara districts, see section on mixed population and are contested areas.33 Hazarajat). Parwan, parts of Kabul and The Taliban of the central region as a whole northern Kapisa are home to important are largely Peshawar-controlled; the southern networks of local strongmen, mostly linked to networks present in the region are largely Jamiat-i Islami and predominantly with dependent on Peshewar as well for supplies.34 Fahim’s faction within that, even if Atta Mohammed of Balkh has been seen to The economy of the region is of course connect with some of the Parwani networks dominated by Kabul, which has also pulled recently. Despite belonging to a single party in most local leaderships away from the principle, these networks are often bitter provinces towards the capital. The result has rivals to each other, particularly in Parwan, been a weakening of Kabul’s influence over where they compete over the protection the region, as absentee leaderships rapidly business and smuggling routes. Until recently lose legitimacy. Apart from absorbing these networks have at least been able to workforce, Kabul has had a limited impact on work together in keeping the Taliban out of the neighbouring areas; in fact even some most of the province. In 2011-12, however, districts of Kabul province, like Khaki Jabbar, evidence has been emerging that some of have hardly been affected by economic these networks started collaborating with development after 2001.35 Taliban or Hizb-i Islami, either for commercial reasons (smuggling of weapons) or in order to The Hazarajat region (Bamian, Daikundi, some hedge their bets faced with an uncertain post- parts of Wardak, , Parwan, Ghor, Sar-i NATO withdrawal future.31 Pul and Samangan) is lacking a unified leadership, despite its ethnic homogeneity. Logar is also very fragmented politically, with The old leadership of Hizb-i Wahdat is no major leader being able to claim significant discredited because of its internal infighting influence there. The Taliban are free to roam and never ending splits and because of its around and recruit even among the local Tajik failure to redistribute much patronage to the population and the only local networks which local population. The new generation of might potentially counter-balance them are Hazaras is split between a majority which is Hizb-i Islami ones.32 fairly secular and has little respect for the old clerical leadership and a minority of madrasa Kabul province is a good example of the educated youth which is predominantly political fragmentation of the region: Tajik conservative. The social-reformist impulse of networks linked to Jamiat-i Islami control the original Khomeinist36 clerical leadership of Istalif, Kalakan, Mir Batcha Kot and Qarabagh. the party is therefore losing its social base. Khak-i Jabbar remains isolated and not even The centre of gravity of Hazarajat moves more penetrated by the Taliban due to the and more towards Kabul, where the Hazara resistance of its Pashtun tribal leaders, while population grows all the time thanks to Musayi, Sarobi, Chaharasyab and Bagrami are migration and where the Hazara intelligentsia all heavily infiltrated by the Taliban. Paghman is mostly concentrated. In fact all Hazara is the stronghold of Prof. Sayyaf and his leaders tend to resettle in Kabul, the centre of Dawat-i Islami, an important ally of President Karzai, while Shakardara and Deh Sabz have a 33 Personal communication with Afghan journalist from Kabul province, April 2012; personal 31 Interviews with Afghan police officers, April and communication with Afghan intellectual from September 2012; interview with Parwan notable, Paghman, April 2012. October 2011; Chris Sands, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban 34 Communication with Taliban sources in fear grips once peaceful Parwan province’, Global Peshawar, July 2012. Post, 1 November 2012. 35 Personal communication with Afghan journalist 32 Personal communication with Logar intellectual, from Kabul province, April 2012; personal October 2011; Fazelminallah Qazizai and Chris communication with Afghan intellectual from Sands, ‘Afghanistan: Another province goes to the Paghman, April 2012. Taliban’, Global Post, 26 November 2012 36 From the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini – (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/region khomeinism can be broadly defined as a political s/asia-pacific/afghanistan/121120/afghanistan- ideology that focuses not on issues of scripture and logar-taliban-withdrawal); Abdul Maqsud Azizi, theology but on the immediate political, social, and ‘Taleban Justice Dominant in Logar Province’, IWPR economic grievances of workers and the middle Afghanistan Recovery Report, 2 August 2012. class.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 23 power, a fact which has contributed to he spends most time in Kabul where he serves weaken their legitimacy among the village as minister of water and power, and recently population. The dispersed character of the hit the headlines with his stated intention of population has made it difficult to redistribute mobilising his former networks of fighters into patronage, which therefore tends to end in an ‘army’ to oppose the spread of the Taliban the hands of urban Hazara communities in in the region. While Ismail Khan’s colleagues Kabul, Mazar and Herat.37 in the north have been able to use the Local Police to mobilise armed forces under a Vice president Khalili faces retirement soon as façade of legality, Ismail Khan’s influence over he will not be part of the presidential ticket in the police has been eroded over the years by the 2014 elections; moreover he is in bad efforts by the central government to bring in health and not very popular. Of the old more people aligned with Kabul. The influence leadership of Wahdat, Haji Mohaqqeq is the of Ismail Khan is now largely limited to Herat most active one and he retains some following province and has shrunk there as well, in part in Mazar and Kabul, but not much elsewhere. due to Ismail Khan’s reluctance to continue Significantly, there has been little or no sign of redistributing patronage on the same scale Hazara mobilisation in 2012 despite Taliban after his sacking as provincial governor in forays in Bamian and other parts of Hazarajat. 2004. Among the Pashtun population of Herat Mohaqqeq and Khalili compete to feed their Mawlawi Khodaidad is Ismail Khan’s main separate patronage networks; they also face rival; the ethnicisation of politics makes it the competition of smaller networks like more difficult than in the past for Ismail Khan, Harakat-i Islami (competing with Mohaqqeq in a Tajik to buy support among Pashtuns.39 Balkh primarily), Insejam-i Milli and a few others. None of these is very influential If Herat’s politics is a three-way rivalry however, as highlighted in the 2009 when the between Ismail Khan, Khodaidad and the majority of elected Hazara members of Taliban, who have been spreading to the parliament were independent ones, often self- districts, Farah and Badghis are now made businessmen. Despite the lack of a predominantly under Taliban control or deeply rooted leadership and some influence. In Badghis, even Aimaqs once competition among networks, Hazarajat aligned with the anti-Taliban oppositions have remains mostly free of banditism and is the been making deals with them, or have been most secure region of the country. In part it recruited into their ranks. Little is left of the could be due to the fact that the region is so old Jamiati networks there, abandoned poor that even criminal networks cannot because of their marginality by all the main sustain themselves, but it might also be that players in Jamiat, including Ismail Khan.40 In the weakness and near extinction of the Farah, Ismail Khan’s influence in the western politicised patronage networks which part of the province has similarly decayed due dominate most of Afghanistan has removed to lack of investment. The two main surviving one of the main sources of criminal networks in the province are the local Taliban, behaviour.38 who are well connected into the Noorzai tribe, and a Barakzai network connected into Kandahar and Kabul. The Noorzai are a much The Western region more numerous than the Barakzais or the Tajks in Farah, so the Taliban have an edge The western region (Herat, Badghis, Farah, even if by no means all Noorzai communities Nimruz and Ghor) was once dominated by the are actively involved with the Taliban.41 towering figure of Ismail Khan, the ‘Emir’ of the region. Ismail Khan is still around, even if 39 Graham Bowley, ‘Freewheeling Afghan City Fearful of U.S. Pullout’, The New York Times, 18 November 2012; Graham Bowley, ‘Afghan 37 Personal communication with Hazara intellectual, Warlord’s Call to Arms Rattles Officials’, The New October 2011; York Times, 12 November 2012. 38 Interviews with Hazara notables and 40 Interviews with Taliban commanders and cadres businessmen in Mazar-i Sharif, July 2012; personal in Badghis, spring 2011; personal communication communication with Hazara intellectual in Kabul, with foreign diplomat, Kabul, April 2012. October 2011; Ghanizada, ‘Bamyan governor warns 41 Interviews with members of parliament from over fragile state of security’, Khaama Press, 3 Farah, 2010; personal communication with official September 2011. of international organisation, Kabul, July 2012.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 24

Nimruz province is a special case in that it The Eastern region remains under the influence of strongman Karim Barahui, who is directly connected with The eastern region (Kunar, Nuristan, Karzai. Although the Taliban have been Nangarhar and Laghman) rotates around the making some inroads, the status quo suits all city of Jallalabad. Similarly to the other main players in the province: smuggling operations cities of Afghanistan, Jallalabad has been in this province bordering Iran and Pakistan attracting cheap labour and elites alike away produce enough revenue to buy most from the districts, without stimulating much 42 government officials. development there. The city benefits from flourishing trade between Pakistan and Ghor province has always been very Afghanistan, although is has suffered when fragmented due to the insular character of its the border was closed during the US-Pakistani valley communities; in the early post-2001 dispute over the killing of Pakistani years Ismail Khan had established a patron paramilitaries in 2011.46 Jallalabad is closely client relationship with some of them and so connected culturally, politically and did Fahim, but their resources have mostly economically to Peshwar. Even the eastern been redirected elsewhere. Local strongmen Taliban are fully controlled by the Peshawar associated with a different valley community Shura of the Taliban; the presence of Pakistani each have been competing for a couple of jihadist groups is also felt in this region more smuggling routes (drugs east-west and than anywhere else, particularly in the border weapons south-north) and for official areas. 47 appointments, being increasingly ignored in Kabul. This has allowed the Taliban to The governor of Nangarhar, Gul Agha Shirzai, gradually penetrate parts of the province, that has invested much of his personal resources in they had had difficulties controlling even in the city and for the first few years of his 43 the 1990s. In this regard, the Taliban of appointment he even managed to reach out western Afghanistan in general are to the villages with promises of distribution of predominantly loyal to various Quetta patronage. On that basis he successfully networks, although Peshawar’s influence is banned the growing of opium poppies from 44 beginning to be felt in this region as well. the province, but the lack of follow up on his many promises have left him isolated. His bad The economic power of Herat has lost some of health (he suffered at least two strokes) its lustre in recent years, as the pace of contributed to weaken his hold on the economic development declined after Ismail districts. Being a native of Kandahar, Gul Agha Khan stopped investing in the city and after was only able to assert his influence thanks to the opening of an alternative trading route the discredit in which local strongmen had with Iran in Nimruz. The local Chamber of fallen. The main local network is that of the Commerce estimates that the rate of growth Arsala family, which was weakened in 2002 by 45 has gone from 20% to 10% a year. The the murder of its leader, Haji Qadir. His impact of Herat’s growth has always limited in successors Haji Zahir (his son) and Haji Din the rest of the region, mostly taking the shape Mohammed (his brother) did not have the of pulling cheap labour from the districts. charisma and the leadership stature of Qadir and preferred to accumulate resources rather than redistribute them. That allowed Gul Agha to marginalise them in 2005-11, but in 2011

46 Samuel Rubenfeld, ‘US Finds Graft by Favored 42 Fabrizio Foschini, ‘Bad Lieutenants in Nimruz’, Afghan Governor’, Wall Street Journal, 5 AAN Blog, 23 August 2011. November 2012; Joshua Partlow and Greg Jaffe , 43 Jerome Starkey, ‘The province that Nato forgot’, ‘U.S. military runs into Afghan tribal politics after The Times, 17 August 2011. deal with Pashtuns’, Washington Post, 10 May 44 Communication with Taliban sources in 2010; Fazelminallah Qazizai and Chris Sands, Peshawar, July 2012. ‘Afghanistan transition: One city is a ticking time 45 Graham Bowley, ‘Freewheeling Afghan City bomb’, Global Post, 16 January 2013. Fearful of U.S. Pullout’, The New York Times, 18 47 Communication with Taliban sources in November 2012. Peshawar, July 2012.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 25 they started making a comeback following Gul variety of pro-government Pashtun strongmen Agha’s weakening influence.48 remain active, but their influence has been declining in recent years as the Taliban have The other main local network centered on strengthened their presence; the only two Hazrat Ali, a Pashai strongman whose bought networks active throughout the province are influence over Pashtun communities but has at present Hizb-i Islami and the Taliban, who been losing influence as his military power compete for the allegiance of Salafi networks, was no longer unmatched. A third network of which are very strong in the province.52 Hizb-i Islami commanders was marginalised in 2002-3 by the Arsala and Hazrat Ali. Hizb-i Islami is now increasingly investing in the The South East insurgency in Nangarhar. A fourth network, centered around Haji Zaman and bringing Because of its geography, the south-east together former royalist circles, has (Paktia, Khost, Paktika and Ghazni) is a disintegrated after the exile and then murder particularly weakly integrated region. Khost of Zaman, contributing to open opportunities has become quite a large city but it gravitates 49 for the Taliban to penetrate Nangarhar. towards Pakistan rather than towards the rest of the south-east, separated as it is by a Not even the Arsala have now the influence of mountain range. As a result Khost’s fast their golden 2002-5 era in Nangarhar; their development has had little impact on the turf in western Nangahar is where the south-east as a whole. The south-east is a insurgents are strongest, in fact. The poorest highly tribal region, where most social and section of the rural population is growing up political actors are tribally based. The tribes of poppies again, often encouraged by the the south-east are quite acephalous in the 50 Taliban. way they are organised and thus there are no big players in the south-east, except for the Compared to Nangarhar, the other provinces tribes themselves where they have some of the east are marginal. Thinly populated internal coherence – chiefly in parts of Paktia. Nuristan is now mostly controlled by the Well-known actors like Padcha Khan Zadran Taliban, with government garrisons under really have influence at the level of one or two siege in the district and provincial centres. In districts only and even that as a result of Laghman there is still a three way competition patronage resources they have been able to between strong Hizb-i Islami networks in the mobilise in one way or another. The tribal north, pro-Jamiati networks among the Tajik communities of Khost are often so and Pashai population, and Taliban networks fragmented that nobody can influence them; largely overlapping with the Hizbi ones. The the same is true of Ghazni and in part of killing of deputy NDS chief Laghmani in 2009 Paktia.53 appears to have damaged the pro-Karzai Pashtun networks in this province, which are Over the years, in part as the result of the 51 no longer significant players. In Kunar a emergence of newly wealthy individuals among the ranks of the tribes (contractors,

48 returnees, businessmen who made fortunes in Interviews with Taliban cadres and commanders the Gulf), tribal cohesion has been weakening in Nangarhar, October 2012; communication with in Paktia too. This has facilitated the Afghan journalist from Nangarhar, October 2011; interviews with Afghan notables from Nangarhar, penetration of insurgents, mostly Taliban, in October 2011. the region. Until 2007-8 the insurgents’ ability 49 Interviews with Taliban cadres and commanders to operate was restricted and they did not in Nangarhar, October 2012; communication with effectively control much of the region. Their Afghan journalist from Nangarhar, October 2011; presence on the ground is much greater now interviews with Afghan notables from Nangarhar, than it was then. Tribal leaderships and the October 2011. 50 Personal communication with foreign analyst, September 2012; David Mansfield, ‘All bets are 52 Interviews with Taliban commanders and local off!’, Kabul : AREU, 2013. notables, Kunar, autumn 2011; personal 51 Interviews with Taliban cadres in Laghman, communication with Adam Baczko, returning from autumn 2011; Nick Schifrin and Aleem Agha, ‘Fears Kunar, April 2012. of Violence in Afghan Takeover’, ABC News, 19 July 53 Interviews with Taliban commanders and Afghan 2011. notables in Paktia, autumn 2011.

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 26 educated class actively resist Taliban influence Mullah Naqib nor Ahmad Wali have been in the region, but they lack unity and cannot effectively replaced, the former because all act cohesively. A number of Kabul-connected the potential successors have been actors are able to build from time to time assassinated. In Jan Mohammed’s place, patronage based networks, which allow for instead, one of his associates has emerged as some small scale collective action. For the dominant player on the pro-government example, the mid-2012 anti-Taliban uprising in side in Uruzgan, Matiullah Khan. Sher Ghazni was in part organised by networks Mohammed Akhundzada has seen his connected to Asadullah Khalid, currently NDS influence diminish after being removed from chief, and Hizb-i Islami. Hizb-i Islami networks the governorship of Helmand in 2005 and are also influential in parts of Paktia and having faced persistent British opposition Khost.54 since then. His reaction has been to link up with the Taliban; one of his lieutenants, It is worth noting that the Taliban in the Ibrahim, now leads one of the Taliban’s south-east are particularly cohesive due to the networks in the south. Gul Agha Shirzai’s strong predominance of a single network in brothers have picked up some of his influence Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the Haqqanis. in Kandahar, but they lack his charisma. Some Ghazni however is split between different players have tried to fill the power vacuum, Taliban networks, often at odds with each among them the most noteworthy being Col. other. The Haqqanis are now integral part of Razziq, currently Chief of Police in Kandahar. the Peshawar Shura, but in Ghazni the The overall result of all these changes has be influence of some of Quetta’s networks is felt. the weakening of pro-government networks in the south.55 However, the central government’s influence The South is greater now in the south than it was when the old strongmen were roaming around The four provinces of the south (Kandahar, without threat, despite the fact that there has Helmand, Zabul, Uruzgan) have long been been little institution building in the south and characterised by the strong local roots of the that state organisations remain quite Taliban insurgency. To date, the Taliban’s dysfunctional there. How can this be Quetta Shura dominates the regional Taliban, explained? In part with the massive military even if it is badly divided internally. To oppose build-up by both ISAF and Afghan security the Taliban there was mainly a network of forces in Helmand and Kandahar, but in fact as allies of President Karzai, each having his own the draw down of ISAF troops was well under provincial or regional-level network: Gul Agha way in 2012, the Taliban failed to reclaim Shirzai and Ahmad Wali Karzai primarily in much ground in these two provinces. The Kandahar, Sher Mohammed Akhundzada in explanation seems to lay in internal divisions Helmand and Jan Mohammed in Uruzgan. to the Taliban in Quetta, with different Taliban Other influential networks, more uneasily networks sparring over the relationship with connected with Kabul, were Mullah Naqib’s in the other main centre of the Taliban in Kandahar, Abdur Rahman’s in Helmand and Peshawar and over leadership in Quetta. The several smaller ones in each of these two main factions, alliances of networks led provinces. respectively by Akhtar Mansur and Abdul Qayyum Zakir, are deeply divided and do not Over the years the infighting among networks, cooperate on the ground, a fact which has likely been decisive in allowing Kabul to retain the activities of the Taliban and social and 56 economic shifts have considerably modified control over many districts. this picture. Ahmad Wali, Mullah Naqib and 55 Jan Mohammed are dead, while Gul Agha Interviews with Taliban commanders and local Shirzai has long been posted to Nangarhar as notables in Helmand, spring and summer 2012; governor and has lost influence. Neither interviews with Taliban commanders in Kandahar, November-December 2012; interview with Kandahar tribal notable, April 2012; Dexter Filkins, 54 Interviews with Taliban commanders and cadres, ‘With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire’, The government officials and local notables in Ghazni, New York Times, 5 June 2010; Matthieu Aikins, ‘Our October 2012; Emal Habib, The Andar Uprising – Man in Kandahar’, The Atlantic, November 2011. Co-opted, divided and stuck in a dilemma, Guest 56 Neil Shea, ‘In Kandahar City, U.S. and Afghan Blog on AAN website, posted: 30-10-2012. forces try to make the most of a recent calm’, Stars

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The reduced intensity of the conflict has benefited the local economy; bazars even in the districts have expanded as violence declines and foreign contingents have been spending money to stabilise the situation. Kandahar city has been partially rebounding, not least because of the improved provision of electricity, which has allowed workshops and small factories to reopen. Lashkargah has also developed into an urban centre of significant proportions, protected by improved security. The main driver of the southern economy remains the drugs economy, but Taliban control over it has been reduced because of the government bringing high cultivation areas back under its control.57

and Stripes, 17 November 2011; Sami Yusufzai, ‘Afghanistan: Will the Taliban Destroy Itself?’, The Daily Beast, 17 December 2012; communication with Taliban cadres in Peshawar and Quetta, November 2012. 57 Susan Sachs, ‘Thriving housing development generates hope for all of Kandahar’, The Globe And Mail, 13 August 2012; Michael Buchanan, ‘Afghanistan: The '$1m houses' of Lashkar Gah’, BBC News, 18 July 2011.

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Conclusion: the downward spiral

Although much has changed in Afghanistan relying after 2001 on alliances with strongmen after 2001, the structures of power in the and networks to exercise influence in the regions have not changed much in nature over provinces, this trend of political fragmentation the last 11 years. What has changed are the does not really favour the central personalities involved. Political charisma is an government. The insurgents, for their part, essential ingredient of any system built have been getting stronger in the east, held patrimonially, along a net of personal steady in the south-east and more recently relations. Charisma is also in short supply, so have been reclaiming ground in the central that replacing successful leaders with others region, but are still much weaker in the south equally capable of mobilising support is far than they were in early 2010 and are still from easy. From about 2007, the Afghan below their 2010 peak in the north and north- conflict has increasingly drifted towards east. Much of Afghanistan is dominated by targeted assassinations as the key tool to either individual strongmen or networks of weaken the adversary. Both the insurgents strongmen; in some case tribes are able to and the government supported by ISAF have function as political actors. This has not indulged in this practice, with a fair degree of changed from 2002; what has changed is the success in both cases. The result has been a weakening or disintegration of the upper layer downward spiral of weakening control of both of regional leaders, who could mobilise leaderships over their followers, with negative coalitions of strongmen in one direction or the implications for the future viability of the other. The implications of this are several. The Afghan state. first one is that handling local crises might be more difficult after 2014, as it will be more Although the overall picture varies from difficult to find powerful intermediaries (or region to region, there is higher political ‘interfaces’) between Kabul and the provinces. fragmentation today in Afghanistan than there ever was after 2001. Political groups like The second one is that there is growing Jamiat-i Islami are now more seriously split political fluidity in the regions, with constant into rival patronage networks than ever; none re-alignments between factions of small local of the leaders has more then superficial strongmen and sometimes whole local influence over most of the networks networks. Junbesh for example has lost many associated with him. Other large such local strongmen over the years, but even organisations, like Junbesh–i Milli of Gen. Jamiat suffered losses. Some of these have Dostum, are also divided internally, in this joined the Taliban, particularly in remote case between reformers and supporters of areas, while the majority has just realigned Dostum. The targeting policy of the Taliban among factions linked to Kabul in one way or has contributed to eliminating several regional the other. Such realignments are only likely to leaders, who had some capacity to bring intensify once the withdrawal of foreign disparate networks together. Social change troops nears completion. The implication is and the disruption caused by the war have that the political landscape of Afghanistan weakened even the most cohesive tribes. could change very quickly already in 2014-15; There are few exceptions to this trend of the availability of patronage to buy support fragmentation. Hizb-i Islami networks have and perceptions of strength and weakness will been reconnecting nationwide, thanks to the be decisive factors in determining who gains existence of a political leadership of the party the upper hand. in Kabul and to underground connections with the insurgent wing of the party, still led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Even the Taliban, after major efforts to overcome the fragmentation of the movement in 2009-12, are again badly split into rival factions.

Because the central government has little strength of its own and has always been

Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 29

Map 1: main actors in Afghanistan’s power games

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Recommendations

Samuel Hall

The international coalition and the Afghan important not to be perceived as government can no longer defeat the Taliban, partnering with civil-military players and which will progressively increase their role as their objectives. This includes thoroughly a prominent political and military interlocutor inspecting the background and in Afghanistan. As stated by Gilles Dorronsoro, partnerships of potential partnering NGOs, “the United States' refusal to negotiate its checking their sources of funding and local retreat and to push for the constitution of a activity frameworks. government of national unity in Kabul heightens the risk of a military victory for the 2. Phasing out from partnerships with Taliban followed by the isolation of implementing governmental partners – In Afghanistan on the international scene”. What 2009, the underlying assumption of the are the consequences of this political game PRRO 200063 (launched in April 2010) was reshuffling for UN humanitarian agencies like that “a linear path towards improved WFP? governance and a state-owned development agenda was achievable if As WFP is currently conducting a number of linked to high levels of international processes to evaluate and adapt its engagement”60. In 2012, 65% of PRRO programme to the rapidly evolving Afghan activities were implemented by the context58, it is probably also time to clearly set Government of Afghanistan, with varying the tone of the organisation’s future strategic capacity and success. However, in today’s commitment. context, governmental counterparts do not generally offer enough operational and 1. Reaffirming WFP’s political neutrality and financial guarantees: 1) the issues of impartial assistance – As ISAF moves out capacity, corruption, and food diversion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams should carefully be considered; 2) the (PRTs), there will be fewer international question of WFP’s political neutrality, in a players and thus UN agencies will become worsening security situation should also be more visible and will need to be clearly raised; 3) last, the absence of any distinguished from the politicized actors. accountability or transparency, on the UN “humanitarian” agencies are being part government side, should also lead to a of an integrated mission, and as such their greater deal of scepticism. As such, WFP activities contribute to UNAMA’s mandate, can no longer participate in state building which is to support a government by taking priority over NGOs in the use of challenged by an armed opposition59. It is

more than ever time to draw a clear line of 60 neutrality – and to let all partners and Jon Bennett, Julia Betts, Julian Gayfer, Hatty Dinsmore, “WFP Country Portfolio Evaluation 2012” parties know that such a line has been - Draft report (IOD PARC for the WFP Office of drawn. Following the same logic, it is Evaluation, July 2012). At the 2010 Kabul Conference, the Afghan government presented its priorities in the form of 22 broad National Priority 58 APRRO budget revision will be developed by Programs (NPPs) that were endorsed by donors. In September 2012, a Country Strategy document will the context of a continued decline in aid, be prepared in early 2013 and a new PRRO will be maintaining even the appearance of progress in the operational from 2014. Afghan government’s National Priority Programmes 59 A recent study by CARE/World Bank draws a could be problematic. The commitment made by similar link, demonstrating that schools constructed international partners to progressively channel 50% by PRTs, or even visited by PRT representatives, are of development assistance through the Afghan at increased risk of attack by anti-governmental budget and to align 80% of aid to Government forces (Glad, Marit (2009) Knowledge on Fire: priority programmes remains a key issue, as Attacks on Education in Afghanistan, Risks and governmental agencies do not currently have the Measures for Successful Mitigation. CARE/World necessary financial and operational capacity to Bank, p. 42). execute funding of this level.

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governmental counterparts (at both emergency response through both provincial and national levels). national and localized partnerships.

3. Progressively increasing the urban 6. Developing a responsible partnership programming component – In Redefining with National NGOs (NNGOs) – It is an humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, a inevitable solution to rely on NNGOs, due context analysis led two years ago, we to the context that is increasingly advocated for a stronger urban unfavourable to international actors, but it programming approach to be developed by is also a necessary step, in order to build WFP, in order to adapt a new displacement partnerships that can potentially lead to profile that had accentuated pressures on sustainable outcomes and to a hand-over urban areas. Since 2011, Samuel Hall of activities to Afghan counterparts. This researchers have continued collecting data comes with its own set of challenges: the on the situation of the displaced in urban inability to monitor, or the need for settings. This data emphasizes the remote monitoring with NNGOs. In these relevance and potential impact that WFP regards: 1) clear conditional clauses, assistance can have in diminishing acute penalty systems, and contract conditions poverty for the displaced in urban settings, shall be set into place; 2) strong and in helping to ease tensions between independent M&E systems and quality them and local communities. In a context control measures shall be developed in of economic crisis that tends to strongly parallel (as remote monitoring has not affect urban areas (highly dependent on a proven successful on the long run in the collapsing service sector), this issue has Afghan context); 3) the technical capacity, now become a social and political time- and the financial and human resources of bomb, which may soon lead to a major these actors. humanitarian crisis in the suburban settings of all the major Afghan cities. 7. Negotiating with armed opposition and local powers – Despite what Antonio 4. Taking more coordinating responsibilities Giustozzi calls a “trend of fragmentation”, between UN, INGOs, NNGOs and insurgents, for their part, have been governmental counterparts – If the getting systematically stronger in most mandate of WFP in Afghanistan is mostly rural areas. WFP should therefore consider humanitarian (emergency response), the a situation where the government would organisation shall also play a more no longer be in a dominant position in the coordinating role to make sure that the rural areas. Thus, UN agencies must actions undertaken by governmental negotiate their presence with the armed counterparts, other UN agencies, INGOs, opposition or the local powers. A key and local NGOs are conducive to efficient, lesson learned from past successful pragmatic, and accountable humanitarian negotiation processes with armed groups solutions. in Afghanistan is probably that local communities have to be involved from day 5. Systematising partnerships with one, so that they can take the ownership international NGOs (implementation and of WFP’s initiatives and play their role as a M&E) – Through 2012 and 2014, the local mediator. proportion of partnerships with international NGOs should be strongly 8. Developing alternative flexible and increased (in both absolute and relative decentralized approach – WFP terms) to guarantee a better Afghanistan’s strategy should be adapted accountability of WFP programmes. The to help its partners meet their reduced scope of technical and humanitarian timelines and provide operational activities with governmental vulnerable communities with adequate counterparts will have to be transferred to instruments (especially in unsafe and responsibilities undertaken by INGOs as a remote areas). In a context where necessary substitute. It is also timeliness is the key, it is crucial to recommended to minimize over-reliance decentralize some aspects of the decision- on single partnerships, maximize access making process, especially when it comes and geographic coverage, and strengthen to emergency situations, to reduce the

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existing bureaucratic hassles and allow WFP provincial offices to immediately 10. Increasing WFP’s accountability and coordinate with local partners (INGOs or transparency through a multi-facetted NNGOs). M&E approach – Monitoring should be triangulated by involving CDCs 9. Enhancing the capacity of WFP staff, (community-based monitoring, which has international and local partners – WFP proven successful in infrastructure staff and partners are not always programmes), international and local sufficiently equipped with the tools to NGOs, independent M&E teams as well as analyse a rapidly evolving environment WFP M&E field officers. In an increasingly and optimize their operational partnership volatile context where impartiality, with WFP. It is equally imperative that neutrality and independence are more while WFP builds the knowledge and than ever at the centre of humanitarian competencies of its own personnel by work, WFP needs to ensure that it keeps sharing programme objectives. Indirectly, these trademarks and ensures a proper WFP could also include a mandatory clause visibility of its actions with the in its multi-year contracts with communities. This will allow for International NGOs with regards to the sustainability of WFP’s presence in capacity building of local NGOs: on the country. longer-run, WFP and its International partners could: i) handover some of their missions to local actors; ii) have access to remote or unsafe areas.

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Contributors

Gilles DORRONSORO, a visiting scholar at Kalashnikov and laptop: the Neo-Taliban the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on insurgency, 2002-7 (Columbia University Afghanistan and Turkey. His research focuses Press) and Empires of mud: war and warlords on political development in Afghanistan, in Afghanistan (Columbia University Press). particularly the role of the International He also edited Decoding the New Taliban Security Assistance Force, the steps for a (Columbia University Press, 2009), featuring viable government in Kabul, and the contributions by specialists from different conditions necessary for withdrawal backgrounds. He is currently researching scenarios. He is the co-founder and editor of issues of governance in Afghanistan, from a South Asian Multidisciplinary Academic wide-ranging perspective that includes the Journal (samaj.org) and the European role of army, police, sub-national Journal of Turkish Studies (ejts.org). He is the governance and intelligence systems. In author of Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 2013, Antonio Giustozzi has also co-authored 1979 to the Present (Columbia University (with Mohammed Isaqzadeh) Policing Press, 2005), and La révolution afghane, des Afghanistan - the first comprehensive and communistes aux Taleban (Karthala convincing account of how para-military Publishers 2000), and numerous papers and policing in Afghanistan really works. articles on Afghanistan. His last contributions include: “Waiting for the Taliban in Nassim MAJIDI is a Ph.D. candidate at the Afghanistan” (Carnegie Endowment, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, Sciences September 2012). More recently, Gilles Po, and co-founder and director of Samuel Dorronsoro has also started working on the Hall Consulting, Kabul, Afghanistan. She Syrian conflict and its political impact on the directs Samuel Hall’s migration department Middle-East region. and has worked on publications for UNHCR, ILO, IOM, NRC, DRC and the World Bank on Dr. Antonio GIUSTOZZI is an independent migration and displacement research, at the researcher associated with the Crisis States field and policy levels. Nassim holds a Research Centre (LSE). He is the author of Master’s degree from Sciences Po Paris in several articles and papers on Afghanistan, International Affairs and Development as well as of three books, War, politics and studies and a B.A. in Government from society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992 Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. (Georgetown University Press), Koran,

Photography credits: All pictures by Lally SNOW (http://lalagesnow.com) except the cover picture (Ibrahim RAMAZANI).

Samuel Hall Consulting Qala-e-Fatullah, Street 4 Kabul, AFGHANISTAN Contact us at: [email protected] Visit us at: samuelhall.org

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