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Humanitarian Assistance in a (Pre)-Conflict Afghanistan

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Humanitarian Assistance in a (Pre)-Conflict Afghanistan Humanitarian assistance in a (pre)-conflict Afghanistan A contextual analysis - 2013 Final report May 2013 Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 1 Samuel Hall. is a non-politicized research and consulting company with headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan. We specialise in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, monitoring and evaluation and impact assessments for governmental, non-governmental and international organisations. Our teams of field practitioners, academic experts and local interviewers have years of experience leading research in Afghanistan. We use our expertise to balance needs of beneficiaries with the requirements of development actors. This has enabled us to acquire a firm grasp of the political and socio- cultural context in the country; design data collection methods and statistical analyses for monitoring, evaluating, and planning sustainable programmes and to apply cross- disciplinary knowledge in providing integrated solutions for efficient and effective interventions. Visit us at http://www.samuelhall.org This report should be cited using the following reference: Samuel Hall Consulting. “Humanitarian assistance in a pre-conflict Afghanistan? A contextual analysis 2013” This publication was prepared with the support of the United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP) and implemented by Samuel Hall. The views and analysis contained in the publication therefore do not necessarily represent UNWFP’s views. Samuel Hall encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission to reproduce portions of the work promptly. For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to [email protected]. Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 2 Table of Contents Assessing the Afghan context in 2013 ....................................... 4 Macro-analysis: the withdrawal and its consequences ............. 8 Meso-analysis: fighting hunger in displacement ..................... 16 Micro-analyses: the regional patchwork ................................. 20 Conclusions.............................................................................. 31 Samuel Hall Consulting Qala-e-Fatullah, Street 4 Kabul, AFGHANISTAN Contact us at: [email protected] Visit us at: samuelhall.org Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 3 Assessing the Afghan context in 2013 “Now, cryin' won't help you, prayin' won't do you no good, When the levee breaks, mama, you got to move”. Led Zeppelin A pre-conflict environment? international facilities. Insurgent groups have clearly continued to expand their presence As much as both the International Security and demonstrate their reach across the Assistance Force (ISAF) and its local country – including in areas previously governmental counterparts are officially considered stable. Likewise, “the assumption claiming that the war is coming to an end in that the removal of the bulk of international Afghanistan, there is compelling evidence that forces will remove the casus belli and thus lead the Afghan conflict is only entering another to swift improvements in the security situation stage. is also likely to prove illusory”1. The pace of the insurgency will increase as international In mid-2011 the United States and several troops pull back and key military enablers other troop-contributing nations announced (such as air power, medical equipment, air the beginning of a progressive withdrawal of support, troop transport, and intelligence their troops from the (ISAF), with December services) are progressively albeit drastically 2014 as a timeline for a province-by-province reduced. handover to the Afghan security forces. The United States currently has about 66,000 Economic and social time bombs troops deployed in Afghanistan. NATO and other coalition nations have about 37,000 At the Tokyo conference, in July 2012, troops. President Obama has announced that governments, including Australia, Denmark, 34,000 United States troops will be removed France, and the UK, agreed on long-term by February 2014. In early march 2013, NATO commitment to development and state- defence ministers issued a statement on the building efforts; however, major donors to military assistance mission in Afghanistan Afghanistan failed to provide clear after the alliance’s combat role expires. The commitments on levels of funding. In draft proposal for possible NATO post-2014 particular, and considering the Afghan operations in Afghanistan envisions a force of government’s limited domestic revenues, up to 9,500 American troops and up to 6,000 there is still no indication on the financial more from other coalition nations, according mechanisms that will support the burdening to alliance officials, who stressed that no final funding of the Afghan National Security Forces decisions had been made. In official (ANSF) both in terms of equipment and comments, NATO’s secretary general said the salaries. It will necessarily depend on external session included serious discussion on assistance way beyond 2014, which cannot be “preparing a new and different NATO-led guaranteed in today’s context; there is mission after 2014 to train, advise and assist therefore a clear risk of State bankruptcy, on Afghan Security Forces.” Meanwhile, the the medium-run, which would of course United States will probably keep supporting directly affect the level of the already endemic Afghanistan economically and militarily for corruption as well as the provision of basic years to come with spending that is estimated services to the population. to be $4 billion a year. A closer look at the available national figures But the optimistic assessment of the local tends to confirm this fear: of the 34.4 million capacity to control and subdue armed opposition groups continues to be challenged by a series of attacks on Government installations, targeted assassinations, and 1 Barbara J Stapleton, Beating a Retreat, AAN high-profile attacks against prominent Thematic Report, January 2012. Humanitarian Assistance In A (Pre-)Conflict Afghanistan 4 inhabitants2, it is estimated that 36% of the labour markets will heavily suffer from the population live below the poverty line3. Per deteriorating economic environment. capita gross national income for 2010/11 is estimated at US$466 (UN Data country profile, 1) Economic scenario: A key explanatory while the World Bank's estimate is US$410). parameter to the Afghan socio-economic The international financial crisis, and the development over the past ten years and related US fiscal deficit in particular, have to its likely collapse over the next decade deeply reshaped the funding and operating is the central place occupied by the assumptions informing transition strategies in services sector in urban areas. The graph Afghanistan 4 . Furthermore, the anticipated below shows that agriculture has been socio-economic shock associated with the declining as a proportion of Afghanistan’s ISAF’s withdrawal makes the sustainability of GDP in relative terms since 2002. As of Afghan public expenditure a source of 2011, over half of Afghanistan’s GDP was concern. derived from ‘services’ (telecoms, IT, transportation, retail trade, etc.), which Despite perceived and manifest inefficiencies, has been steadily increasing since 2002. the official development assistance from the Industry, by comparison, has remained international community does contribute, comparatively static as a proportion of even indirectly, to the livelihoods of low- GDP. However, the growth of the services income groups, as more than 70% of the GDP sector is largely due to the presence of is currently funded by external assistance5. As international aid organizations, NGOs and such, both the income of the Afghan NATO forces. government and the precarious economic equilibrium of the country are directly Contribution to GDP by Sector (Sources: World Bank 2011 – Samuel Hall 2012) dependent on donors’ contribution and the 60% country could thus suffer a severe economic downturn in a context of significant aid 50% cutbacks. 40% The direct consequence of aid cutbacks will be twofold: on the national economy as a whole, 30% and more specifically on the services sector, which has been a key driver to the local 20% (urban) economy since 2001; on youth 10% migration to neighbouring countries, as urban 0% 2 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2011: Agriculture Industry Services http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. 3 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008: Thus in absolute terms, as the second http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. graph below shows, agriculture generates 4 It should also be noted that the recent scandals considerably more revenue in 2011 than it involving local financial institutions have strongly did in 2002. Looking ahead, it is likely that contributed to dissuade donors’ community: a the economy will revert to low-income- recent USAID inspector general report on the Kabul country status in the coming years, with an Bank scandal estimated that fraudulent loans agriculture-based economy. This raises diverted $850 million to bank insiders (including serious concerns for stability and security close members of the Presidential and Vice- 6 Presidential families), while only $70 million have in Afghanistan . The country is thus so far been recovered. expected to have little economic 5 The most recent figures released by the World generation capacity by 2014, with the Bank and the Afghan
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