5 WHY MUST THERE BE AN OMNISCIENT IN JAINISM?

Sin Fujinaga

1. It is a well-known fact that the Jains deny the existence of God as a creator of this universe while the Hindus admit such existence. According to Jainism this universe has no beginning and no end, so no being has created it. On the other hand, the Jains are very eager to establish the existence of an omniscient person. Such a person is denied in the Hindu tradition. The Jain saviors or tirthaÅkaras are sometimes called bhagavan, a Lord. This word does not indicate a creator but rather means a respected person with all-pervading knowledge. Generally speaking, the omniscience of the tirthaÅkaras is such that they grasp each and every thing of the universe not only in the present time, but in the past and the future also. The view on the omniscience of tirthaÅkaras, however, is not ubiquitous in the Jaina tradition. Kundakunda remarks, “From the practical point of view an omniscient Lord perceives and knows all, while from the real point of view he perceives and knows his own soul.”1 Buddhism, another non-Hindu school of Indian philosophy, maintains that the founder Buddha is omniscient. In the Pali canon, the Buddha is sometimes described with the word savvaññu or sabbavid, both of which mean omniscient.2 But he is also said to recognize only the religious truth of dharma, more precisely, the four noble truths, caturaryasatya. This means that the omniscient Buddha does not need to know details of matters such as the number of insects in this world. Opposed to these two traditions, the Hindu schools do not admit any kind of omniscient person. Especially the MimaÅsakas fiercely attack the notion of omniscience because for them the (non-personal) Vedas are the ultimate authority on things in this universe. In the history of Indian philosophy, these three schools, that is, the Jains, the Buddhists, and the MimaÅsakas attack each other and proclaim their own views on omniscience. Historically speaking, a Jain philosopher, Samantabhadra who must have lived in the sixth century of CE, is the first person who tried to establish the existence of an omniscient person by using the method of inference (anumana).3 From the MimaÅsaka side, Kumarila attacked Samantabhadra’s position in his Flokavartika, while the famous Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti

107 SIN FUJINAGA also criticized the notion of an omniscient person proclaimed by the Jain philosopher in his Pramajavarttika.4 Most of the books or papers which deal with Jain epistemology discuss omniscience at some length following the line of K. B. Pathak (1892, 1931) who must have been the first modern scholar to investigate the topic of omniscience in Jainism. Pathak showed that Kumarila attacked not only the Jain notion of omniscience but also that of the Buddhists. E. A. Solomon (1962) deals with omniscience not only in Jain literature but also in Hindu literature and Buddhist canons. Jaini (1974/2001) also discusses the omniscience of Mahavira and the Buddha. Singh (1974) is the only book in English whose main topic is omniscience in Jainism. But he does not refer to the reason why there must be an omniscient in Jainism. The second volume of Jain (1994) contains some discussion on the omniscient in Jainism as well as Buddhism. However, even in this book, we cannot find any argument about the necessity of the all-knowing person. Readers of this volume will find that Olle Qvarnström discusses how the Jain philosopher Haribhadra attacked Kumarila’s notion of omniscience.5 In this chapter we shall see how the Jains tried to show the possibility of an all-knowing person, and we shall discuss why the Jains are so eager to establish the omniscience of the savior on the basis of some Prakrit and Sanskrit treatises such as the Rajaprasejiya, and AptamimaÅsa. 2. Before discussing the attempts to prove the existence of the omniscience in Jainism, we shall have a brief view at Jain epistemology. The Jains admit the two kinds of valid method of knowledge (pramaja): pratyaksa and paroksa. The former means direct cognition or perception and the latter includes indirect or infer- ence, scripture. In Jain epistemology the term pratyaksa refers to the omniscience also because it grasps objects directly. It is also important to realize that in early times perception was categorized as a part of paroksa while later Jain philosophers considered it as direct cognition. Samantabhadra uses the word pratyaksa in two meanings: direct cognition including omniscience as well as perception.6 The Jain philosopher Samantabhadra tried to prove the existence of an omniscient person in his main work AptamimaÅsa, which means the examination of the reliable person. He first shows the possibility of complete annihilation of karmic matter:

In some person there must be a total destruction of the spiritual deficiencies and of the physical veilings (that act as the cause of these deficiencies), for there must be a case where such destruction is most complete of all; this is just as by an employment of appropriate means it is possible to make in a physical substance a total destruction of the extraneous as well as organic impurities which it had happened to accumulate.7

It must be noted in this verse that Samantabhadra does not discuss the possibility of destruction of all the karmas but rather of those that hinder the power of ecognition (ghatikarma).

108 WHY MUST THERE BE AN OMNISCIENT IN JAINISM?

In the next verse, he shows the possibility of the existence of an omniscient person by the following syllogism: “The objects that are minute, concealed or distant must be amenable to somebody’s perception, because they are amenable to inferential knowledge, similar to fire etc.”8 What Samantabhadra intends in this verse seems to be as follows: we can infer the existence of fire on a remote mountain by seeing smoke from that mountain. At the same time, this fire is directly perceived by someone else, that is a person at that spot. This assumption can be applied to any object that we cannot see directly; a germ on the skin, a pebble in someone’s fist and so on. A germ is not perceived directly by us, but by inference we know that it exists somewhere: by perceiving pus from the wound we can know that there are germs while someone can perceive it directly through a microscope. A pebble in someone’s fist is perceptible for that person and the other person can infer the existence of it by perceiving the special form of the fist. It must be also admitted, for Samantabhadra, that all things in the universe are objects of inference. Thus, they are objects of perception, that is perceived by someone. This means that there must be somebody who can recognize all things. This is the omniscient person. To formulate this argument:

Whatever exists in this universe must be object of perception (pratijña). Because (whatever exists in this universe must be object of inference. And incomplete all) the object of inference must be perceived by someone (hetu). Like fire on a remote mountain (drstanta).

In the strict sense, however, Samantabhadra’s argument does not establish the existence of an omniscient person. First, we must realize that all the things in this universe can be divided into two groups: that which can be perceived directly and that which cannot be perceived directly. Samantabhadra suggests only that some person may perceive that which we cannot perceive. Moreover, the person who per- ceives the fire is not always the same person who can perceive other things directly. It should be noticed here that this argument does not match Samantabhadra’s final purpose. He intends to demonstrate that only the tirthaÅkara is omniscient and not persons of other schools such as the Buddha in Buddhism. Therefore, Samantabhadra tries to prove his view by two sets of inference again:

And such an omniscient person are you alone (because your) utterance is neither in conflict with logic nor with the scripture. For the proof of such an absence of the conflict, it is circumstance that your thoughts are never contradicted with what is well established.9

In the first syllogism Samantabhadra proclaims that only the Jain tirthaÅkara is omniscient, he who has destroyed all hindrances and recognizes all the things in this universe. The reason for this is that he preaches in accordance with logic and the scriptures. The second syllogism shows why there is no conflict between

109 SIN FUJINAGA the preachings and logic or the scriptures. It is so, because what he preaches is not denied by what is commonly admitted as authentic. With these verses, Samantabhadra has posited that only a Jain tirthaÅkara can be possessed of omniscient knowledge in the sense of knowing all the things in the universe not only in the present but even in the past as well as in the future.10 As we have seen, his attempts were not successful because he only shows that all the things are objects of inference as well as those of perception but does not show that one and the same person can perceive all the objects. Even then it remains true that he introduced the method of inference into the discussion on the omniscience. Samantabhadra must be the first person to do so not only in Jainism but also in Indian philosophy because, to our knowledge, before him no one tried to establish the existence or non-existence of the all-knowing person. Most Jain philosophers after Samantabhadra, both Fvetambaras and Digambaras, adopt the argument which Samantabhadra showed in his AptamimaÅsa, for example, Akalakka (c.720–760 CE). In establishing the existence of the kevalin he fundamentally follows Samantabhadra. To enforce the latter’s arguments the former shows some concrete instances such as perfect knowledge of an astronomer. But what is new and more important is that he introduces the concept of sunifcita- asambhavad-badhaka-pramaja (SABP) as a reason to establish the existence of omniscience. The Sanskrit notion SABP means the well-known fact that “we have no valid methods of knowing to deny the existence of omniscience.”11 Hemacandra (1088/9–1173), another philosophical giant of the Jain tradition, combines the traditional idea of sarvajña with that of Samantabhadra and Akalakka when he discusses the concept of omniscience in his PramajamimaÅsa. According to him: “That which is independent and supreme (i.e. omniscience) is the manifestation of the nature of atman when all the veiling karmas are completely annihilated.”12 In this definition of omniscience Hemacandra clearly mentions the relationship between omniscience and karma. When one destroys the veiling karmas completely, then the soul will have its innate nature in which omniscience is included. To prove the existence of omniscience, Hemacandra proposes two reasons: The possibility of the final end of the progressive development of knowledge, and the non-existence of any methods to deny it.13 Here Hemacandra follows the line directed by Samantabhadra and Akalakka. But, he has elaborated the arguments on the existence of omniscience by checking SABP one by one.14 Besides these three philosophers, many other Jain philosophers have attempted to prove the existence of omniscience. Vadidevasuri (1087–1170) in the Fvetambara tradition and Dharmabhusaja (c.1358–1418) in the Digambara tradition are good examples of such philosophers.15 From Samantabhadra onwards, the history of Jain epistemology is, in a sense, the history of establishing the possibility of omniscience. Other schools in Indian philosophy were never concerned with this topic more avidly than the Jains.

110 WHY MUST THERE BE AN OMNISCIENT IN JAINISM?

Now, a question arises: why are the Jain philosophers so eager to establish the existence of the omniscient person who knows each and everything in this universe? Their enthusiasm, in my understanding, must have a close relationship with the concept of bhavya or the possibility of emancipation. 3. Though the concept of bhavya occurs, as Prof. P. S. Jaini points out,16 even in the Jain agamas, we shall focus on how Samantabhadra discusses this topic in relation with the idea of omniscience. The tenth chapter of AptamimaÅsa deals with the way to liberation or moksa. First Samantabhadra criticizes his opponent’s position:

If you maintain that the bondage necessarily results from even slight ignorance, then no one would not be omniscient because of infinite number of objects to be known. On the other hand, if you say that we can reach moksa even with slight knowledge, even then there must be the contradicted state (i.e., bondage) which resulted from massive ignorance.17

In verse 98, Samantabhadra expresses his own position on this topic.

Ignorance causes a person to be bound when he or she is suffering from delusion. But, ignorance does not do so if the person is free from delusion. Moreover, one may reach moksa with slight knowledge if there is no influence of delusion. But, it is not so in the case of a person under its effect.18

This means that to reach moksa we need not destroy all the karmas but what we have to do is to demolish mohaniya karmas. As Shah (1999: 87) clearly mentions, this opinion does not go with traditional Jain understanding of the relation between karma and moksa. In the traditional Jain theory, moksa means total annihilation of karma. A person with a slight knowledge has not yet destroyed his/ her karma completely. Thus he / she must remain in saÅsara. The Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti attacks this theory proposed by Samantabhadra.19 One may ask: why do we have different experiences such as attachments in this world? Are those experiences predestinated by a supreme God?20 To this Samantabhadra answers:

Occurrence of attachment and others is of various types owing to the variety of bondage by karma. And karma or bondage by karma occurs to jiva because of jiva’s own reasons.21

Here, Samantabhadra clearly mentions the cause of our experiences and its variety. Someone may have attachment to something while another shows indif- ference to mundane matters or affairs. Such different attitudes originate from the different kinds of bondage which are caused by karmas. In its turn, karmas arise

111 SIN FUJINAGA due to a jiva itself. A certain karma occurs because of a certain modification which occurred in a jiva previously. There is a cause–effect relation in one and the same jiva. Fundamentally, any foreign causes which may affect one’s conditions cannot be supposed in Samantabhadra’s theory. Now moksa itself, according to this theory, can be regarded as a result and naturally must have its cause. Then what is the fundamental or first cause of moksa? Samantabhadra explains:

For you, Mahavira, there are two types of jivas: pure ones and impure ones. These two capacities, purity and impurity, are just as cookability and non-cookability of beans. For their manifestation, purity has its beginning while impurity is beginningless. This nature of purity or impurity is not in the scope of logic.22

According to this statement, Mahavira teaches us that jivas can be classified into two categories: fuddhi or pure ones and afuddhi or impure ones. Here, the words fuddhi and afuddhi are synonyms for bhavya and abhavya respectively. ‘The pure ones’ are those who have the ability to reach the final liberation, and ‘the impure ones’ are those who are destined to remain in this mundane world forever. In other words, not all the jivas can reach moksa.23 Samantabhadra compares these capac- ities of the soul with those of beans: some of them become soft and edible when they are stewed but others remain hard even when we stew them for a long time. It is interesting to point out the fact that we cannot distinguish an edible bean from a non edible one by their appearance. At first, all the beans look the same to us, they must be hard before they are boiled. Once they are boiled, some beans will show their own nature and become soft while the others remain hard as before. In the same manner, we cannot know whether a person has the capacity to obtain moksa or not. Having undertaken austerities or tapas which heats us up, to someone its own nature will appear and he or she will be liberated. But, the oth- ers will stay in the chain of reincarnations and remain in this world to suffer pain. Things which remain in the same condition are beginningless while things which newly occur have a beginning. Therefore, Samantabhadra says “sady-anadi tayor vyakti (Their manifestation, purity has its beginning while impurity is beginningless).” The most important point in Samantabhadra’s remarks mentioned above is that the purity or impurity of a person cannot be known through inference (atarka-gocara). No ordinary person is capable to tell that such and such person will be liberated in the future, and the others will not. One cannot know the possibility of liberation of a certain person even through inference. We cannot recognize by perception what cannot be inferred.24 This implies that the hallmark of liberation cannot be perceived. Then who can realize liberation? One possible answer to this question is this: only the omniscient person does. This omniscient one, however, must be that person who knows each and everything in this universe. The Buddha who, as mentioned earlier, realizes only the religious

112 WHY MUST THERE BE AN OMNISCIENT IN JAINISM? matters or dharmas would not tell us about our liberation in the future. Only the Jain omniscient who realizes all the matter in this world can do so. 4. As mentioned earlier, even in the Fvetambara agamas the topic of the omniscience is often referred to. Among many references we find notions similar to Samantabhadra argument. The Rayapasejiya, the second upakga in Fvetambara agamas, mainly consists of the dialogue between a Jain monk Kesi and a materialist king Paesi. The former belongs to a school derived from Parfvanatha25 and the latter is converted to Jainism at the end of the dialogue. First, the king Paesi denies the existence of a soul or jiva, but through the elevated explanation of Kesi, the king inclines to the view that a soul exists and that it is different from a body or matter. Even then the king asks the monk to show the soul in real form like a fruit which we can see. To this, Kesi replies; “Oh, king Paesi, we, persons with imperfect knowledge, cannot realize nor perceive things in the categories at all.”26 The ten categories are (1) principle of motion, (2) principle of stop, (3) space (4) a soul separated from the body, (5) atom, (6) voice, (7) smell, (8) wind, (9) if a person can be a jina or not, (10) if a person is able to annihilate all the miseries or not.27 The last two alternatives refer to the possibility of one’s emancipation or moksa because a Jina will destroy all the karmas and the one who annihilates all the miseries or pains can reach the state of moksa. In these passages the monk Kesi clearly mentions that we ordinary human beings cannot realize whether a person will get final beatitude or not. Then who does know it? Kesi continues; “Indeed, an araha or Jina to whom the supreme knowledge and vision have occurred and who is omniscient can clearly realize and perceive these things.”28 This means that the omniscient Jina or tirthaÅkara can recognize whether a person can attain the emancipation or moksa. Thus in the Fvetambara tradition too the omniscient person or tirthaÅkara is regarded as the only one that can tell who has the possibility of moksa or not. The Rayapasejiya sutta in which the earlier discussion happens belongs to a new stratum in the history of Fvetambara agamas.29 Even then it must have reached the present form before the sixth century. With these facts it will be concluded that at least in the sixth century Fvetambara Jains were of the opinion that only the omniscient one can know whether a certain person can reach moksa or not. 5. The final goal of all religious activities, at least in traditional Indian thoughts, is to reach moksa. The Jains, however, maintain that only the way showed by the Jain saviors can lead us to the final goal. We cannot reach the goal by performing sacrifice as some Hindu schools proclaim. On the way to the goal we must perform various kinds of austerities by fasting and so on. But, such austerities do not take everyone to moksa. As we have seen earlier, according to Jainism we cannot realize ourselves whether we have the possibility of moksa or not. If there is nothing to assure us of the possibility, then we do feel uneasy about pursuing our way. With the existence of a supreme being this uneasiness can be dispelled. Such a supreme being need not tell us of the possibilities of moksa and cannot know only religious matter, but must recognize everything in

113 SIN FUJINAGA this universe including the possibilities of all the jivas. Thus, we can concentrate on wending our way to the final goal.

Notes 1 Jajadi passadi savvaÅ vavaharajeja kevali bhavagavaÅ / kevalajaji jajadi passadi jiyameja appajaÅ // (Niyamasara v. 158). 2 See, for example, Jataka p. 77. 3 The earliest mentioning of omniscience in Jain literature must be that found in Aya I, 3, 4. Post-canonical philosophers such as Kundakunda, and Umasvati also refer to this topic. But they did not establish that fact by means of inference. After Samantabhadra, as we will see, many Jain philosophers discussed the existence of an omniscient person. 4 Pathak (1892) has established that Samantabhadra was prior to Kumarila. Dharmakirti’s attack on Samantabhadra’s philosophy is discussed in Fujinaga 2000. The historical priority of Kumarila to Dharmakirti is not clearly established. It is also extremely probable that these three philosophers were contemporary with each other. 5 See his essay “The Jain-MimaÅsa Debate on Omniscience” in this volume. 6 See Fujinaga 1999. 7 AM 4: dosavarajayor hanir nihfesa’sty atifayanat / kvacid yatha svahetubhyo bahirantarmalaksayah // English translation is based on Shah (1999: 3). 8 AM 5abc: suksmantaritadurarthah pratyaksah kasyacid yatha / anumeyatvato ‘gnyadir ...// English translation is based on Shah (1999: 4). 9 AM 6: sa tvam evasi nirdoso yuktifastravirodhivak / avirudho yad istaÅ te prasiddhena na badhyate // English translation is based on Shah (1999: 4). The Sanskrit text clearly shows that “you” in this verse refers to a single person. According to the Jain doctrine, however, there must be more than one omniscient person, at least 24 tirthaÅkaras. Thus, in a sense, Samantabhadra’s argument in this verse does not go with traditional doctrine of Jainism. It also must be noted that the two syllogisms in this verse have no example (drstanta). 10 Thus the Buddha cannot be an omniscient. 11 The topic of SABP has not been discussed thoroughly so far in spite of its importance in the history of Jaina epistemology. It is, however, too wide and deep to argue here, so we shall deal with this topic on another occasion. 12 PM S. XV: tat sarvathavarajvilaye cetanasya svarupavirbhavo mukhyaÅ kevalaÅ. 13 Cf. PM S. XVI, XVII: prajñatifayavifrantyadisiddhes tatsiddhih. badhakabhavac ca. 14 For the details of Hemacandra’s discussion on SABP, see PM §§ 59–63. 15 Vadideva discusses omniscience in his Pramajanayatattvaloka II-24–27 and auto-commentary on them while §§ 21–27 of Nyayadipika show Dharmabhusaja’s position on omniscience. 16 Jaini (1977/ 2000: 95–109). 17 AM 96: ajñanaccet dhurvo bandho jñeyanantyan na kevali / jñanastokad vimoksaf ced ajñanad bahuto ‘nyatha // See also Shah (1999: 84). 18 AM 98: ajñanan mohino bandho najñanad vitamohatah / jñanastokac moksah syad amohan mohino ‘nyatha // See also Shah (1999: 85). 19 For the attack of Dharmakirti on Samantabhadra’s position, see Fujinaga (2000). 20 Cf. Astasahasri on AM 99 (p. 267). 21 AM. 99abc: kamadiprabhavaf citrah karmabandhanurupatah / tac ca karma svahetubhyo ...// Shah (1999: 85) understands that the word sva refers to karma. Cf. AM 4 in which the phrase svahetubhyas occurs in. 22 AM. 99d–100: te fuddhyafuddhitah // fuddhyafuddhi punahfakti te pakyapakyafaktivat/ sadyanadi tayor vyakti svabhavo ‘tarkagocarah // 23 Vrtti of Vasunandin on AM 99: ata eva na sarvesaÅ moksah.

114 WHY MUST THERE BE AN OMNISCIENT IN JAINISM?

24 In this context inference represents the whole paroksa. 25 Kesi is called pasavvaccijjo (Rayapasejiya sutta 7, p. 5) and refers to himself as aÅhaÅ samajajaÅ niggaÅthajaÅ . . . (do. 20, p. 18). 26 Rayapasejiya sutta 30 (p. 33). eva khalu Paesi! dasatthajaiÅ chaumatthe majusse sabbhavejaÅ na jajai na pasai. 27 do. (p. 34). 9) ayaÅ jije bhavissai va no bhavissai, 10) ayaÅ savvadukkhajaÅ antaÅ karissai va no va. See also Sthanakgasutra, p. 337. 28 do. eyaji ceva uppannanajadaÅsa jadhare arahajije kevali savvabhavejaÅ jajai pasai. 29 For the position of the Rayapasejiya sutta in the Jain agamas, see Dixit (1971: 4).

Bibliography

Primary sources and abbreviations AM AptamimaÅsa of Samantabhadra with vrtti of Vasunandin, ed. by G. Jain. Benares (Sanatana Jaina Granthamala 7) 1914. Astasahasri, of Vidyanada on Astafati of Akalakka, ed. by BaÅsidhar. Sholapur (Gandhi Nathararaji Jaina Granthamala) 1914. Astafati, of Akalakka, see Asasahasri. Aya Acarakgasutram and Sutrakrtakgasutram, ed. by Sagarananda, re-ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya. Delhi etc. (Lala Sundarlal Jain Agamagranthamala Vol. I) 1978. The Jataka together with its commentary, ed. by V. Fausbøll. Vol. I. Oxford (Pali Text Society) 1990. MimaÅsaFlokavarttika, of Kumarila, ed. by D. D. Shastri. Varanasi (Prachyabharati Series 10) 1978. Niyamasara, of Kundakunda, ed. and tr. by U. Jain. Lucknow (The Sacred Books of the Jainas Vol. IX) 1931. Nyayadipika, of Dharmabhusaja, ed. by D. Jain. Delhi (Virasevamandira Granthamala no. 4) 1968. PM PramajamimaÅsa, of Hemacandra, ed. by Sukhlal Sakghavi et al. Ahmedabad– Calcutta (Sikghi Jaina Granthmala 9) 1939. Pramajanayatattvaloka, of Vadidevasuri with auto-commentary Syadvadaratnakara, ed. by Motilal. Poona 1926–1930. [Reprinted: Bharatiya Buk Darprefan, Dilli 1988.] Pramajavarttika, of Dharmakirti, ed. by Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi (Baudha Bharati Series 3) 1968. Rayapasejiyasutta, ed. by R. C. Tripathi. Ahmedabad 1936. Sthanakgasutram and Samavayakga Sutram, ed. by Sagarananda, re-ed. by Muni Jambuvijaya. Delhi etc. (Lala Sundarlal Jain Agamagranthamala Vol. II) 1985.

Secondary sources Bollée, Willem, 2002, The Story of Paesi (Paesi-kahajayaÅ). Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag (Beiträge zur Kenntnis südasiatischer Sprachen und Literaturen 8). Dixit, K. K., 1971, Jaina Ontology. Ahmedabad: C. D. Institute (Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 31). Fujinaga, S., 1999, “Samantabhadra’s Epistemology: Combining Jaina Ideas with the Ideas of Other Schools,” in N. K. Wagle and O. Qvarnström, eds, Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic, Rituals and Symbols. Toronto (University of Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies) pp. 131–137.

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Fujinaga, S., 2000, “Determining Which Jaina Philosopher was the Object of Dharmakirti’s Criticisms,” in Philosophy East and West. Vol. 50, No. 3. pp. 378–385. Jain, P. K., 1994, Bharatiya Darfan meÅ Sarvajñavad. Delhi. Jaini, P. S., 1974, “On the Sarvajñatva (Omniscience) of Mahavira and the Buddha,” in L. Cousins, ed., Buddhist Studies in Honor of I. B. Horner, Dordrecht (Reidel). [reprinted in Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies. Delhi (Motilal Banarsidass) 2001. pp. 97–121]. —— 1977, “Bhavyatva and Abhavyatva: A Jaina Doctrine of ‘Predestination’,” in Mahavira and His Teachings (2,500 Nirvaja Anniversary Volume), Bombay. [reprinted in Collected Papers on Jaina Studies. Delhi (Motilal Banarsidass) 2000. pp. 95–109]. Pathak, B. K., 1892, “The Position of Kumarila in Digambara Jaina Literature,” in The Transactions of the Ninth International Oriental Congress. pp. 186–214. —— 1931, “Kumalira’s Verses Attacking the Jain and Buddhist Notions of an Omniscient being,” in Annal of Bhandarkar Oriental Institute Vol. XII, No. 2. pp. 123–130. Shah, N. J., 1999, Samantabhadra’s AptamimaÅsa Critique of an Authority, along with English Translation, Introduction, Notes and Akalakka’s Sanskrit Commentary Astafati. Ahmedabad (Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamala 7). Singh, R. J., 1974, The Jaina Concept of Omniscience. Ahmedabad (L. D. Series 43). Solomon, E. A., 1962, “The Problem of Omniscience (Sarvajña),” in The Adyar Library Bulletin Vol. XXVI, No. 1–2. pp. 36–77.

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