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Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Strategic Assessment

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Democracy, Human Rights and Governance Strategic Assessment DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 2014 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Tetra Tech ARD. This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development by Tetra Tech ARD, through a Task Order under the Analytical Services III Indefinite Quantity Contract Task Order No. AID-OAA-TO-12-00016. This report was prepared by: Tetra Tech ARD Tetra Tech ARD Contact: 159 Bank Street, Suite 300 Kelly Kimball, Project Manager Burlington, Vermont 05401 USA Tel: (802) 495-0599 Telephone: (802) 495-0282 Email: [email protected] Fax: (802) 658-4247 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK SEPTEMBER 2014 DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... i ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................ ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ iii I.0 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Purpose of a Democracy, Human Resources, and Governance Assessment ........... 1 1.2 When to Do an Assessment ........................................................................................ 2 1.3 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 2 1.4 Process, Timing, and Level of Effort ........................................................................... 5 1.5 USAID’s DRG Strategy ............................................................................................... 5 2.0 STEP 1: DEFINING THE DRG CHALLENGE ...................................................................... 7 2.1 Contextual Factors ...................................................................................................... 7 2.2 Five Key Elements of Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance ......................... 9 2.2.1 Consensus ..................................................................................................... 9 2.2.2 Inclusion ....................................................................................................... 12 2.2.3 Competition and Political Accountability ...................................................... 15 2.2.4 Rule of Law and Human Rights ................................................................... 18 2.2.5 Government Responsiveness and Effectiveness ........................................ 23 2.3 Summary ................................................................................................................... 25 3.0 STEP 2: ANALYZING KEY ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS (POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS) ...................................................................................................... 26 3.1 Stakeholder Analysis ................................................................................................. 26 3.1.1 Stakeholder Interests ................................................................................... 27 3.1.2 Stakeholder Resources ................................................................................ 28 3.1.3 Stakeholder Strategies ................................................................................. 28 3.1.4 Stakeholder Institutional Arenas .................................................................. 29 3.2 Discussion of Key Actors and Institutions ................................................................. 29 3.2.1 The Executive............................................................................................... 29 3.2.2 The Legislature............................................................................................. 30 3.2.3 The Judiciary and Legal Professionals ........................................................ 32 3.2.4 National Human Rights Institutions .............................................................. 34 3.2.5 Security Services ......................................................................................... 35 3.2.6 Local Government ........................................................................................ 36 3.2.7 Political Parties and Electoral Institutions .................................................... 38 3.2.8 Civil Society .................................................................................................. 40 3.2.9 Media ............................................................................................................ 42 3.2.10 Private Sector ............................................................................................... 45 3.2.11 Key Population Groups ................................................................................ 46 3.2.12 Non-state Armed Actors ............................................................................... 47 3.2.13 International and Global Actors .................................................................... 48 3.3 Evaluating Conclusions of Step 2 ............................................................................. 48 4.0 STEP 3: CONSIDERING USAID’S OPERATIONAL AND PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENT .................................................................................................................. 50 5.0 STEP 4: OUTLINING THE PROPOSED DRG STRATEGY ............................................... 53 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................ 56 ANNEX A: GUIDANCE TO MISSIONS ON DRG ASSESSMENTS ............................................. 57 DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK i ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADS Automated Directives System CSO Civil Society Organization DO Development Objective DRG Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance DRG Center Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance GBV Gender-Based Violence HDI Human Development Index ICT Information Communication Technology IGD Inclusive Growth Diagnostic LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex NAP National Action Plan NGO Non-governmental Organization NHRI National Human Rights Institution PEA Political Economy Analysis SAF Strategic Assessment Framework UNDP United Nations Development Program UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples USAID United States Agency for International Development ii DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Strategic Assessment Framework provides a structure for conducting a political analysis of a country; develops a strategy to advance democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG); and helps inform integrated development approaches. At its core, this assessment is a political economy analysis (PEA)1 of the DRG sector—how and why is political power acquired, maintained, exercised, and contested? Who benefits? Who does not? Can the U.S Government play a role in trying to change the power dynamics? If yes, how? Most importantly, how can the advocates for democracy, human rights, and good governance achieve greater success confronting the key challenges in their country with assistance from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)? Honing in on the key challenges and opportunities of democracy, human rights, and governance provides a realistic analysis of actors, formal and informal institutions, opportunities for reform, and USAID’s operational environment. This strategic assessment framework (SAF) will guide resources to the DRG areas where they will have the greatest impact, thereby increasing the effectiveness and sustainability of DRG programs. This framework also will guide USAID Missions, which are ultimately responsible for developing and submitting strategic plans for program funds over which they have responsibility and authority. The document may also be useful to other parts of the U.S. Government, including U.S. embassies, the State Department, and the National Security Staff, as well as to other donors, although it primarily focuses on USAID policies and procedures. The framework is divided into four parts to assist practitioners as they think through the main DRG challenges in a country and how to address them: An analysis of the challenges relating to democracy, human rights, and governance in a country [Step 1]; A political economy analysis of actors and institutions that are likely to support or resist democratic reforms, protection and promotion of human rights, and improvements in governance [Step 2]; Consideration of the U.S. Government’s and USAID’s interests and resources, as well as their comparative advantage vis-à-vis other stakeholders and donors [Step 3]; and Strategic and programmatic recommendations [Step 4]. The four steps do not necessarily occur sequentially in the assessment process. Once the core challenge has been diagnosed, Step 2 and Step 3 primarily serve as analytical filters to gain a better understanding
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