The Canadian Decision to Enter World War II: a Case Study of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process
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University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor Electronic Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers 1-1-1971 The Canadian decision to enter World War II: A case study of the foreign policy decision-making process. David Bickford University of Windsor Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd Recommended Citation Bickford, David, "The Canadian decision to enter World War II: A case study of the foreign policy decision- making process." (1971). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 6664. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/6664 This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email ([email protected]) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208. THE CANADIAN DECISION TO ENTER WORLD WAR II: A CASE STUDY OF THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR BY DAVID BICKFORD, B.A. THE UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR, 1971 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 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ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Canadian decision-making process and the pressures thrust upon the policy-makers in the Canadian government before and during the crucial period in September, 1939 when Canada declared war on Germany, The first two chapters of the thesis examine the pol itical situation and the pressures exerted upon the Canad ian government in the inter-war period, and the government response to these insistent demands. This section is de signed to construct the political environment, both external and internal, upon which the decision to go to war was based. The next chapter deals with the political institutions which comprised the Executive, Legislature and Bureaucracy as well as their powers and methods of functioning in 1939. The major decision-makers and their political platforms and interests are discussed within the context of this instit utional framework. Chapter k deals with the decision itself, and is sub divided into two major sections. The first of these deals with Canada's external relations in the September 1 to 10 period, and includes discussion on the Canadian responses to external stiüiuli in that period, the week of "active Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. neutrality" from September 3 to 10, and the interactions between Canada and Great Britain on the diplomatic, mil itary-strategic and cultural levels. The second section of this chapter is an analysis of the Special Session of Parliament; the pro and anti-war arguments, the role of the Cabinet in the decision, and the results of the Session in regards to national unity and immediate war aims. The conclusion examines the effects of the declaration of war on Canada. A description of the challenges to the Federal Government from Quebec and Ontario, the conscription crises of 19^2 and 19^^ and Canada's contribution to the allied war effort are described in this chapter. The chap ter closes with an examination of Canadian-American and Anglo-Canadian relations in the war years. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPROVED : Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE After this particular topic was suggested by my advisor some time ago, initial research immediately showed that such a study offered great potential. First of all, this was the first major decision made by an independent Can adian government for which original documentation is avail able in any quantity. Documents from the Public Archives for 1939 have emerged from under the thirty year clause and have been made available for research purposes. A second point of interest about this particular study is that it has not been adequately researched as have the pre-war and wartime periods of Canadian politics and international relations. Books on the pre-war period discuss the political situation up to the 1939 decision, but do not discuss the decision itself. Works on World War II start at the 1939 decision to go to war, but do not analyse that decision in any depth. My particular study is an attempt to bridge this void. In conclusion, I wish to express appreciation to the Canadian Archivist and his Staff for their help in pro viding access to the W.L.M.King Papers from the pre-war years as well as to related documents. The National Library in Ottawa was also of great assistance in allowing me the use of their facilities. I thank my advisor Dr. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 w.c. Soderlund for his encouragement and sound critical advice so often delivered, but so often needed, and to Mr. R.G. Krause and Mr. R.G. Hoskins for their practical and valuable assistance which was most gratefully received. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................. 1 Chapter 1. The Environment in which the decision was made: The External Situation............................ 6 Collective Security and the League of Nations Japan, Germany and the U.S.S.R, Canada and the United States Canada and Great Britain 2. The Environment in which the decision was made: The Internal Situation............................ 30 The Political Structure The Depression Isolationism and Regionalism Political Parties, Interest Groups and Public opinion 3 . The Political System: Structures and Decision-makers..................... 60 The Executive The Legislature- The Bureaucracy 4. The Decision: September 1 to 10, 1939.............. 97 A. External Relations and Public Reaction External Stimuli "Active Neutrality" Anglo-Canadian interaction B. Analysis of the Special Session of Parliament 5* Conclusion......................................... 128 Appendix................... ............................... 1^3 Bibliography................................................ 1^6 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION In order to discuss the Canadian decision to enter World War II in some depth, it is first necessary to ex amine the background to the decision, both to put this res olution in perspective, and in the belief that decisions are not made in a vaccum, but are dependent upon past ex periences. I have attempted to make a clear-cut distinction be tween the external and Internal components of this environ ment under the assumption that external pressures can be separated from those of the internal political system and may influence government decisions to follow policies that might not otherwise have been considered. Foreign policy, of course, is not made in a vacuum. What the internal political structure might dictate may not be possible due to the pressures exerted from outside the system. This con cept is perhaps best illustrated by Michael Brecher, whose general structural differentiation of variables into ex ternal and internal components has been loosely applied in the first section of this thesis. The specific variables used in the Brecher research model, especially in the ex ternal field, apply more closely to a post-war power anal ysis with emphasis placed upon bloc interactions and the relations between the super-powers, and are therefore not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as relevant to a pre-war situation. Thus, in this decision these variables have not been used extensively, although the general framework has been used, (Appendix A) Karl Deutsch also uses this differentiation between external and internal variables