Disinformation and Elections to the European Parliament Annegret Bendiek and Matthias Schulze
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NO. 16 MARCH 2019 Introduction Disinformation and Elections to the European Parliament Annegret Bendiek and Matthias Schulze Elections to the European Parliament (EP) will take place in May 2019. Politicians and experts fear that the election process might be disrupted by disinformation cam- paigns and cyber attacks. In December 2018, the European Commission presented an action plan against disinformation. It provided 5 million euros for raising awareness amongst voters and policymakers about manipulation, and for increasing the cyber security of electoral systems and processes. The strategy relies on voluntary and non- binding approaches by Internet companies to fight disinformation. To protect the integrity of elections in the medium term, independent research into technical, legal and market-regulating reforms must be boosted. The objective should be to preserve the functionality of democracies and elections in the age of digitalisation. The next European elections will be held in are extremely significant for the strategic EU member states from 23 to 26 May 2019. orientation of European integration. A suc- Since right-wing nationalist and Euro-sceptic cess for EU opponents could push the EU movements have gained in strength, there to the very limits of its capacity to act, for is already talk of a “defining election” that example through further exit demands could decisively influence the future ori- along the lines of Brexit, or a blockade of entation of the EU. Euro-sceptic parties the complex decision-making process. The already account for almost one-third of elections not only decide the renewal of the parliamentarians, a proportion that might EP, but also the inauguration of the new EU rise following the elections. Commission for the 2019–2024 parliamen- EP elections have thus far been seen as tary term. The EP influences the appoint- “second-rank elections” and therefore as a ment of the Commissioners and can force good opportunity by the electorate to teach the entire Commission to resign with a two- the respective member state’s government thirds majority and realign the Multiannual a lesson. This attitude fails to appreciate the Financial Framework. mobilisation potential of the current debate on the pros and cons of European integra- tion, the influence of third parties, and the growing importance of the EP. The elections Challenges false information, since even true state- ments taken out of context can be misused The EU’s structure and functions are not for suggestive conclusions. Disinformation easy to understand. European issues are campaigns can be short-term, for example unfamiliar to many, and it is relatively to influence an election result, or long- simple to spread false information about term, for instance to undermine confidence the EU. Considering the upcoming election, in the EU. Attempts can thus be made to the European Commissioner for the Secu- discredit individual politicians so as to pre- rity Union, Sir Julian King, urged member vent them from being re-elected. For exam- states to “take seriously the threat to demo- ple, “negative campaigning” can uncover cratic processes and institutions posed by alleged scandals or make accusations of cor- cyber attacks and disinformation” and to ruption. During the last presidential elec- draw up “national prevention plans” to pre- tion campaign in the USA, automated com- vent “state and non-state actors from under- puter programmes known as Twitter bots, mining our democratic systems and using probably of Russian origin, spread predomi- them as weapons against us”. This specifi- nantly negative reports about Hillary Clin- cally includes disinformation campaigns ton and relatively positive reports about and cyber attacks on the electronic electoral Donald Trump. In the medium term, this infrastructure, which can affect the con- promotes social division and the polarisa- fidentiality, availability and integrity of the tion of public discourse. electoral process. The negotiation of political interests in Disinformation already appears to have social discourses is the key element – but had an impact in Europe: researchers at also the Achilles heel – of democracies. Edinburgh University identified over 400 Tactics such as disseminating dubious false accounts on social networks, operated claims (“muddying the waters”) or constantly by so-called trolls based in St Petersburg, repeating large volumes of false information which were used to influence the Brexit or conspiracy theories (“firehose of false- referendum. Security and defence policy hood”) are used to undermine political cer- defines disinformation and cyber attacks tainties and dissolve a socially shared con- as elements of hybrid threats, i.e. covert cept of truth. One example was the reaction actions by third parties aimed at destabilis- to the downing of a Malaysian passenger ing Europe or the EU system. The term plane in July 2014: on social networks, “hybrid threats” usually refers to a form of there were attempts to discredit the investi- warfare that remains below the threshold of gation report which found that the Russian using military force. This ambiguity gener- armed forces had caused the catastrophe. ally complicates a military response accord- ing to international humanitarian law. IT-Enabled Disinformation Disinformation Campaigns A distinction must be made between digital and IT-enabled disinformation: digital dis- Disinformation is not a new phenomenon. information encompasses the entire range In security research it is regarded as “black” of digital mechanisms for disseminating propaganda, since it seeks to influence pub- information. IT-enabled disinformation, on lic opinion from the shadows. It uses the the other hand, includes hacking incidents same means as modern public relations (PR) or cyber attacks that compromise IT secu- and advertising campaigns. rity, namely confidentiality, availability and In contrast to PR, however, disinfor- integrity of data or systems. The technical mation wants to destabilise the pillars of hack is only one of many means by which democracy by attacking parties, elected the confidentiality of information can be politicians or the EU as a political system. violated, for example by stealing sensitive Disinformation does not necessarily mean information from the accounts of politi- SWP Comment 16 March 2019 2 cians, parties or officials and then publish- hidden, a self-referential “echo chamber” ing it with harmful intent (doxing). Well- can develop. In online forums that bring known examples are the publication of together only like-minded users, the latter’s e-mails from the US Democratic National perceptions tend to be strengthened be- Committee (DNC) on the WikiLeaks plat- cause they do not experience any contra- form in 2016 and from the Emmanuel diction. Macron campaign team in 2017. Disinformation has a particularly polaris- The restriction of the availability of tech- ing effect on already politicised groups with nical systems via cyber attacks can facilitate strong ideological stances. These can be de- disinformation campaigns as well. Espe- liberately targeted with conspiracy theories cially in authoritarian regimes, websites of that fit their worldview. One example is the opposition politicians, parties and services campaign against alleged rape by asylum such as Twitter and Facebook are deliber- seekers, the so called Lisa case of 2016. Dur- ately paralysed shortly before elections ing the 2016 US election campaign, there by “distributed denial of service” attacks, were incidents where supporters of the meaning the deliberate overload of the right-wing Alternative Right movement and server concerned. Similarly, the digital left-wing groups were separately invited via voting infrastructure with its voting com- Facebook to take part in the same demon- puters and counting systems can be dis- stration, in the hope of provoking a violent rupted and manipulated. escalation. Conspiracy theories and disinformation Digital Disinformation can quickly be shared worldwide over social networks. This can be accomplished using Digital disinformation has the advantage a mix of automated accounts (“social bots”), of having low costs while having a high im- hybrid accounts (partly human, partly auto- pact: with few resources, a global audience mated) and so-called troll armies or 50-cent can be reached with customised disinfor- armies. Such “armies” consist of state actors mation through digital technologies. Digital or privately organised commentators who disinformation employs the legitimate systematically disseminate certain narra- means of the advertising industry to target tives in social media or on news sites. Often users based on their individual behaviour volunteers also unknowingly spread dis- profiles (so-called “targeted ads” and information (“unwitting agents”). In the “micro-targeting”). 2016 US election campaign, US citizens Social networks such as Facebook were spread Kremlin propaganda without know- not developed for the purpose of democratic ing its source. But traditional media cover- discourse, but to analyse and categorise age is also involved, as it increasingly takes their users’ interests and behaviour, and up trending topics from social networks. sell this information to third parties for If these contain disinformation, and the advertising purposes. According to their media carries them unreflectively, they re- behaviour patterns, users will be shown inforce the narratives or false reports. Dis- content that other users of