april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Saudi Arabia Moves to

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Saudi Arabia Moves to Maintain Maintain Regime Stability Regime Stability By Toby Craig Jones By Toby Craig Jones

Reports 4 Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Reaction to Revolution in the Middle East By Nelly Lahoud 7 How the Arab Spring Could Embolden Extremists By Philip Mudd 9 Are Islamist Extremists Fighting Among Libya’s Rebels? By Alison Pargeter 13 Bahrain: Crushing a Challenge to the Royal Family By Caryle Murphy 16 JI Operative Umar Patek Arrested in Pakistan By Zachary Abuza 18 The Implications of Colonel Imam’s Murder in Pakistan By Rahimullah Yusufzai Saudi King Abdullah has taken a number of steps to maintain regime stability in the kingdom. - Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images 20 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity audi arabia has not come Although it has been beset with the 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts through the recent unrest threat of militancy and terrorism, most

sweeping the Middle East notably from al-Qa`ida in the Arabian unchanged. The kingdom has yet Peninsula (AQAP), Saudi Arabia’s Sto see the kind of popular uprisings that political order has not been imperiled brought down regimes in Tunisia and seriously in recent years. Where Egypt and that are threatening autocrats dissidents elsewhere have been calling in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. Yet for the overthrow of authoritarian leaders in Riyadh are deeply concerned governments, those calling for change about regional political developments About the CTC Sentinel in Saudi Arabia are more interested in and what it might mean for stability accommodation than revolution. Many of The Combating Terrorism Center is an at home. In an effort to preempt and the kingdom’s subjects have long called independent educational and research counter any potential challenges to their for political reform, but what most seem institution based in the Department of Social power, Saudi Arabia’s rulers are taking to prefer is a top-down reform process in Sciences at the United States Military Academy, a number of measures to head off a which the al-Saud ruling family open the West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses possible demonstration effect. It is likely political system to more participation, the Center’s global network of scholars and that these measures, a combination of but remain in place. Few desire to practitioners to understand and confront inducement and coercion, will hold off see the potential chaos that would contemporary threats posed by terrorism and domestic critics for now. The regime may result from a political vacuum, which other forms of political violence. also, however, be delaying the inevitable, might threaten the country’s ability to a moment when the kingdom’s rigid generate oil wealth. As of now, there The views expressed in this report are those of leadership will have to engage seriously are no indications that Saudi Arabia the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, with its own people on matters of is set to face the kind of youth-driven the Department of the Army, or any other agency governance, participation, and political popular mobilization that has rocked of the U.S. Government. opportunity. regimes elsewhere. This does not mean

1 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 the possibility should be dismissed organization or party dedicated to threatening statements by regime altogether. Saudi Arabia shares similar reform, mostly because formal political officials, produced the desired effect. social and demographic characteristics organizations are banned in Saudi With the exception of small protests of its vulnerable neighbors. The ranks of Arabia; reformers are forced into loose in predominantly Shi`a communities the unemployed youth—many of whom alliances and mostly rely on letter in the Eastern Province, would-be are bored, angry or both—are large and writing and petitions to press their protesters stayed home in Riyadh and might become restive. The potential for cause. With the exception of key figures elsewhere, and the Day of Rage ended their mobilization is hard to gauge, but such as Abdullah al-Hamad, who has without major incident. it is more than a theoretical possibility. gone further than most in calling for the creation of a constitutional monarchy, The depth of Saudi disquiet was further With the world’s largest crude oil reformers have preferred to keep a low demonstrated when it sent at least reserves, developments in Saudi Arabia public profile. Since their numbers are 1,000 of its military personnel into that threaten oil output could adversely hard to measure and because the most neighboring Bahrain to help crush affect the global economic recovery. prominent reformers have advanced This article reviews the calls for reform their agenda quietly, it is difficult to in Saudi Arabia, assesses the regime’s determine how much support they “Given the importance response, and identifies the special command in the kingdom. A wide range of the oil-rich Eastern circumstances in the Shi`a-populated of Saudi citizens claim to support the Eastern Province. idea of reform generally, but this does Province to both Saudi not necessarily equate to support for Arabia and the global Calls for Reform any particular figure or platform. Even though there is a reservoir of economy, the regime frustration with the country’s ruling The Regime Response is playing a risky elites, especially among the youth, Even though the reformers have what most Saudis aspire to see is the carefully calculated their tone and game. Greater levels of creation of a more even-handed system limited their demands, the country’s in which citizens have a greater share rulers have not only avoided dealing mobilization or efforts in decision-making and in which oil seriously with the substance of their to coordinate militancy wealth is distributed more equitably. position, but have responded as though Calls abound for an end to princely they are more sinister. Recent measures against the regime would corruption and excessive royal family undertaken by the al-Saud monarchy almost certainly include privilege, greater transparency in the in response to renewed calls for reform management of the economy, and a underscore the regime’s anxiety and efforts to upend oil real commitment to governance. Other demonstrate its unwillingness to share production.” demands are even more basic, such as power, its disinterest in engaging the call for greater rights for women, in political introspection or dealing an end to restrictions on free speech, seriously with thoughtful critics. By and for the government to stamp out closing off the possibility of change the pro-democracy movement there. discrimination and intolerance. Calls altogether, the government might The kingdom has consistently claimed for change have also been driven ultimately exaggerate the appeal of Iranian involvement in Bahrain and by frustrations with the state of the more confrontational options for those used the specter of sectarian politics as kingdom’s economy. Unemployment is alienated with the present order. Indeed, its justification for intervention. Equally officially at 10%, although estimates by imposing obstacles to political important, however, were worries that range as high as 25%, figures that do transformation and by punishing Saudis—Shi`a and Sunni alike—might not include women. While women can advocates for change, the kingdom’s be inspired by events so close to the work in the kingdom, there are severe rulers are running the longer term kingdom’s shores. restrictions on their ability to do so. risk of turning reformers, and those who support the calls for reform, into At home, the only political concession There is little that is radical about the revolutionaries. offered to those calling for reform reform movement in Saudi Arabia. is an empty one. In late March, the It consists primarily of intellectuals, Riyadh’s current anxieties stem directly government announced that it would academics, religious scholars and elite from the dramatic events that have hold elections for mostly powerless activists who have, for the most part, shaken the region in recent months. The municipal councils in September 2011. carefully avoided direct criticism of monarchy’s unease manifested most The elections were originally scheduled the royal family and have not called for clearly in mid-March 2011. In response to be held in 2009, but were postponed their ouster. Support for reform also to calls by Saudi activists on Facebook indefinitely for unclear reasons. The cuts across religious and class divides, and other social media outlets for a “Day announcement that they will go forward including Sunni Islamists, national of Rage” in Saudi Arabia on March 11, now (although women will still not be secularists (although they avoid the authorities intensified the presence of allowed to vote) is a cynical gesture on label), Shi`a and women. Support for the police and security across the country the part of a regime deeply disinterested reform position is spread geographically. to foreclose the possibility of protests. in meaningful change. Yet there is no centrally coordinated The massive show of force, along with

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In addition to projection of force and the In fact, it appears that not even the The Troubles in the Eastern Province explicit threat of violence, the regime kingdom’s leaders believe the massive One area of the country where the also promised a series of economic financial reform program will be national strategy has so far failed to measures aimed to address the social sufficient in deflecting calls for change. compel quiescence is in the oil-rich roots of frustration. On March 18, Instead, Riyadh is dusting off an old Eastern Province. Flush with oil, the Saudi King Abdullah promised an playbook to ensure docility. Along with Eastern Province is also home to large ambitious multibillion dollar package a renewed commitment to security and Shi`a communities. In early March, of reforms, including a loan program, the threat of violence, Saudi leaders Shi`a citizens took to the streets in housing subsidies, assistance for the have sought to strengthen ties with relatively small numbers (hundreds unemployed, a jobs creation initiative, religious elites and institutions. In the rather than thousands) demanding and assorted other forms of material March 18 aid package, the government redress of mostly local issues, including support. announced billions of dollars in support for the religious police, Islamic schools, “It is unlikely that large Economic inducements have long been and the clergy more generally. While the “bread and butter” of Saudi politics the clergy have always been important numbers of Shi`a will and a significant source of the ruling to the ruling family, they have also often radicalize any time soon. al-Saud family’s legitimacy. Since the been kept at some distance and only middle of the 20th century, the political allowed influence when convenient. The Much depends, however, order has been based on an implicit move to empower them now is designed on how the Saudi regime understanding between rulers and to undercut the potential appeal of ruled that oil wealth would be widely reformers, to strengthen the country’s responds to the larger issue redistributed.1 The recently announced most conservative social and political of reform and how it deals multibillion dollar aid program elements, and to use them to lend represents more of the same. Yet it religious legitimacy to the government’s with ongoing protests in is far from clear that the calculations position.2 the Eastern Province.” that have driven the redistribution The resort to religion and clerics to enforce both an austere moral order and “The resort to religion political authoritarianism is fraught the release of political prisoners. More and clerics to enforce with uncertainty. It is a strategy the recently, the Shi`a demonstrations have Saudis have attempted before and one continued and their aims have broadened, both an austere moral that has generated troubling political including demands for reform and order and political consequences in the past. In response demonstrations of support for Bahrain’s to challenges to their power in the late opposition, which is largely Shi`a. authoritarianism is fraught 1970s, leaders in Riyadh also turned with uncertainty.” to the clergy to help them shore up Saudi Shi`a have a history of political power, a decision that led in part to activism and confrontational politics. the generation and institutionalization Long oppressed and discriminated of Islamic radicalism. In the decades against, tens of thousands took to the of oil wealth in the past will satisfy that followed, religious dissent and streets in November 1979 demanding the demands of Saudi reformers in radicalism spread globally, the specter the overthrow of the al-Saud ruling the future. Historically, the terms of of which remains threatening today. family. Yet the era of revolutionary Saudi Arabia’s political contract have Shi`a radicalism has long since passed. been that in exchange for a share in the It might be tempting to interpret Saudi Even the militant network Hizb Allah in energy spoils, the country’s citizens are Arabia’s current political gambit— the Hijaz, which enjoyed small support expected to remain politically quiescent. its steps to buy off dissent as well in Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s and Riyadh’s attempt to buy off reformers as measures to turn back the clock 1990s, has remained quiet in recent years. and challenges to the existing order and avoid dealing earnestly with the Instead, as has been the case with other with more of the same may help ease the challenge of reform—as indications reform-minded communities, Saudi Shi`a burdens of economic duress for many of strength. Thus far, the strategy has have preferred to call for top-down reform Saudis, but it does little to address the succeeded in keeping widespread public as a means to deal with the specific issues specifically political appeals made by protest at bay. Yet this is only a measure facing them. many citizens. of short-term success and stability. It is far from clear that Saudis will be It is unlikely that large numbers of satisfied with palliative and compulsive Shi`a will radicalize any time soon. measures on offer from Riyadh. Much depends, however, on how the Saudi regime deals with the larger issue of reform and how it responds to ongoing protests in the Eastern 2 For one example, see the following article: “Saudi Province. The regime has responded to 1 Wealth is redistributed through a combination of jobs, Prints 1.5 Million Copies of Anti-Demo Edict,” Reuters, some Shi`a demands by releasing local social services, and other welfare programs. March 29, 2011. political prisoners. Yet the government

3 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 has also become increasingly sectarian Ayman al-Zawahiri’s The first statement was most likely at home and in the region, accusing taped before protestors took to the Shi`a generally of maintaining loyalties Reaction to Revolution in streets of Tunisia. It was a routine to Iran. The saber-rattling with Iran the Middle East discussion of what al-Zawahiri believed and the charges of disloyalty threaten to be the secular and oppressive regime to alienate Saudi Shi`a and could drive By Nelly Lahoud in Egypt. This oppression, he asserted, them to embrace radicalism. That is a result of the historical events that possibility remains a distant one for since protests erupted in the Middle saw Western encroachments on Egypt, now. Nevertheless, given the importance East and North Africa, al-Qa`ida beginning in the 18th century with of the oil-rich Eastern Province to both second-in-command Ayman al- Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, then with Saudi Arabia and the global economy, Zawahiri has released a series of five the British occupation in the 19th and the regime is playing a risky game. statements, four in the form of audio early 20th centuries and in recent times Greater levels of mobilization or efforts recordings and the fifth as a video.1 All the United States’ indirect rule through to coordinate militancy against the five share the same title: “Missive of its agents the “pharaohs” who have regime would almost certainly include Hope and Joy to our People in Egypt.”2 oppressed the Egyptians to advance efforts to upend oil production. Only the last three, however, responded their interests and those of the United to the protests that have thus far toppled States. Conclusion the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt. To Saudi Arabia’s rulers have date, al-Zawahiri’s “Missive” is the The subjects tackled in the second demonstrated that they feel a sense of most comprehensive response to the statement are more specific and provide urgency, but their political instincts are events in the Middle East by a leading evidence of the time period when al- taking them in the wrong direction. The jihadist figure. Zawahiri is likely to have taped it. reformers are right that the existing Since he discussed the New Year’s Eve system is deeply dysfunctional, This article presents analytical bombing of a church in Alexandria, anachronistic, and no longer in touch observations of the five statements, Egypt, and also remarked on the with the interests and desires of the arguing that al-Zawahiri’s discourse is protests that ensued, it is likely that it vast majority of Saudi citizens. It is evolving to meet the challenges of the was taped in the first half of January hard to see how resorting to a well-worn unfolding events in the Middle East. 2011. In addition to the church bombing, political strategy will restore confidence His discourse, however, suffers from the events that most preoccupied him in an ailing system or ensure that there profound tensions pertaining to jihadist are attacks that resulted in Muslim will not be future and perhaps more identity and specifically to the role casualties carried out by groups confrontational challenges to regime the jihadists can play in the changing espousing jihadist ideology and the power. The kingdom’s leaders have political landscape. possibility of the secession of southern yet to learn the most important lesson Sudan. His discussion of Sudan is coming from Cairo, Tunis, Sana`a and Statements 1-2 largely historical; he did not discuss the Manama: although Arab authoritarian Ayman al-Zawahiri’s first two referendum that was scheduled to start regimes have proven durable in the statements did not respond to the mass on January 9 and last until January 15. past, they are no longer invulnerable to protests in Tunisia and Egypt. The the demands and pressures of their own jihadist websites that released them Concerning attacks against Muslims, people. did al-Zawahiri a disservice by not al-Zawahiri echoed other jihadist withholding the first two until the third leaders by highlighting the sanctity Dr. Toby Craig Jones is assistant professor became available. Although the title is of Muslim lives, and proceeded to of Middle East history at Rutgers generic—the “hope and joy” presumably dissociate al-Qa`ida from attacks that University. He is the author of Desert referred to his optimism that the involve shedding Muslim blood.3 He Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged jihadists are on their destined path to must have been responding to a series Modern Saudi Arabia and an editor at victory—the title nevertheless gave the of attacks targeting mosques and Middle East Report. impression that the first two statements public places in Pakistan, the latest a were in response to the events in Egypt. suicide bombing that killed more than Accordingly, initial media reports 55 worshippers in the Dara Adam Khel unfairly criticized him as being out of area. It coincided with another attack on touch with Egyptian reality. a mosque in Peshawar, which resulted in additional Muslim casualties.4 Al- Zawahiri stressed that al-Qa`ida has no involvement in such attacks and therefore reflects the lack of control the

1 This article is the outcome of conversations with Ab- dullah Warius and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi. The author 3 `Atiyyat Allah, to whom he refers, had written a trea- is grateful for their input and for assisting in gathering tise in response to the attacks in the marketplace in Pe- some of the article’s sources. shawar in 2009. His treatise can be accessed on Minbar 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Missive of Hope and Joy to our al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad at www.tawhed.ws/c?i=166. People in Egypt,” statements 1-5, 2011, available at www. 4 “Attack on Mosque in North-West Pakistan ‘Kills 55,’” jihadology.net. BBC, November 5, 2010.

4 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 jihadist leadership can exercise over the Although he justified the resentment, he was keen to convince his listeners broader jihadist theater: he did not condone the bombing of that they are all fighting the same enemy: the church. Instead, he warned fellow “your jihadi brethren are confronting Notwithstanding the truth or Muslims that not all Christians are alongside you the same enemy, America falsehood of attributing these collaborators. Some Christians, he and its Western allies, those who set operations to the mujahidin, my reminded them, “reject the Crusader- up [tyrants] like Husni Mubarak, Zein brethren and I in Qa`idat al-Jihad Jewish occupation of the Arab and al-Abidin b. Ali, Ali Abdallah Saleh, declare to God our innocence from Muslim world…[they] are proud of their Abdallah b. Hussein and their ilk to having any involvement in these Arab origin and of the Prophet of Islam, rule over you.”7 operations. Indeed we disapprove believing him to be one of the greatest of such attacks whether they are figures in Arab and human history.” The strength of al-Zawahiri’s carried out by jihadists or others. statements 3-5 is the way in which It is noteworthy that al-Zawahiri he clearly articulated what one may A considerable portion of the second ignored the protests in Tunisia. Even describe as the “original sin” that some statement is devoted to protests in if al-Zawahiri had taped his second Western powers have committed and Egypt, yet to the demonstrations statement before January 14 when the which have resulted in some of the that erupted in the first half of Tunisian president resigned, protestors January following the bombing of the had already taken to the streets on “Just as the international church in Alexandria. Al-Zawahiri December 19, 2010. Did he, like some is categorical that al-Qa`ida was analysts, consider events in Tunisia community has been not behind the bombing. He did, to be an exceptional aberration and caught by surprise by the however, justify the resentment that not worthy of his attention? It seems he believes many Muslims in Egypt likely. Indeed, while he applauded events in the Middle East feel as a result of the Coptic Church’s the people’s uprisings in statements and is struggling to come numerous transgressions. Among the 3-5, in the second statement he was transgressions he highlighted are the in full jihadist mode. For example, he to terms with a clear and Coptic Pope Shenouda’s support of remarked that the technological gap consistent strategy to the now-deposed Egyptian President between the West and the Muslim world Hosni Mubarak in the previous is insurmountable and the solution he address the new reality, it presidential election and of the Coptic proposed is not through revolutions, is not surprising that the but through 9/11-style attacks. “While “Ironically, the jihadist we cannot produce weapons that match jihadists have also been [the sophistication] of those produced caught off-guard.” narrative enjoyed greater by the Crusader-West, we are capable credibility under the of disrupting its complex industrial and economic system,” he explained. autocratic regimes that “That is why it is necessary for the dramas that inflict the modern Middle they have devoted their jihadists to come up with new ways [to East. In making his case, al-Zawahiri disrupt the West’s progress]. Among was not short of examples. Focusing on lives to oust through such innovative ways is the courageous the U.S. legacy in Egypt, he cautioned jihad.” utilization of airplanes as a weapon, the people of Egypt not to be deceived like the blessed raids in New York, by the current U.S. support of their Washington and Pennsylvania.” cause. He reminded them that:

Bishop Bishoy’s remarks in which he Statements 3-5 [America] that is [now] weeping questioned the authenticity of certain A different texture emerges in over the safety of journalists in Qur’anic verses. Bishoy is quoted in statements 3-5. The mujahidun no Egypt [is the same America] that the media to have said that Muslims longer hold a virtual monopoly on being bombed the offices of al-Jazira in are guests in Egypt, a report that al- the Muslim world’s drivers of genuine Kabul and Baghdad…America that Zawahiri is keen to record in the minds change and salvation. Al-Zawahiri is [now] weeping over the victims of his listeners.5 He further blamed saluted different actors: the “free and of torture in Egypt is [the same Mubarak, the regime apparatus, al- the noble people” who have made their America] that resorts to torture Azhar University and U.S. support of presence felt on the Arab world stage.6 in the prisons of Guantanamo, the Coptic Church, which together, He recognized that these actors are not Bagram and Abu Ghurayb and in he believes, fueled resentment among one and the same with the jihadists, but its secret prisons in Egypt, Jordan, Muslims and ultimately led some to act Morocco, Poland and on board on their inflamed feelings. of its ships and airplanes…this 6 Al-Zawahiri has used these terms before to designate is the truth of the international jihadists or people to whom he was appealing to rise up legal system…it is the law that against the political order, but in the statements under 5 “Egypt Pope Apologizes over Bishop’s Anti-Islam Re- review these terms designate actors distinct from the ji- marks,” Associated Press, September 26, 2010. hadists. See al-Zawahiri, statement 3. 7 Al-Zawahiri, statement 4.

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[enshrines] the domination of positive law. It is noteworthy that al- what is to become of the self-professed the arrogant (mustakbirin) [of the Zawahiri was keen to stress that his call jihadists if, to use their parlance, God’s earth] over the disinherited for an Islamic government should not be Word does not reign supreme and yet (mustad`afin). America that weeps misconstrued as a call for his supporters they are not called upon to take up jihad over the [deficit] of democracy to resort to violent confrontations to to establish His Law? It will no doubt [in the Middle East] is [the same achieve their ends. For now, jihad is not pain al-Zawahiri to learn that `Abboud America] that refuses to recognize on his agenda for Egypt or Tunisia, but the [elected] government of he is hoping or betting that the “original “What al-Zawahiri Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank. sin” of the United States and its allies is America is the last [entity] that is min al-kaba’ir, or much too grievous, to be is failing to realize is allowed to speak of [the virtues of] forgiven by the people of Egypt and the that the new era is one democracy and human rights.8 rest of the Arab world. of contestation and Beyond highlighting what he deemed Al-Zawahiri is also pleading with compromises—not to be the hypocrisy of the United States the Arab people not to turn inward and its allies, al-Zawahiri warned the following the revolutions—to lend of steadfastness and people of Egypt of the likelihood that support, including military support, to principled rigid positions the fruits of their revolution may be the Libyans who are currently enduring squandered if they do not institute an Mu`ammar Qadhafi’s bombing onto which he wants to Islamic government premised on the campaign. He chastised the Arab hold.” principle of consultation (nizam islami armies for not defending the Libyans, shuri). Perhaps sensing that the United asking whether “their role is limited to States is not alarmed by the possibility oppressing the people.” In the event that that the Muslim Brotherhood could NATO forces enter Libya, al-Zawahiri al-Zumar of the Egyptian Islamic potentially win an election in Egypt, he called on Muslims of the region to rise up Group (al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya) and and fight against “Qadhafi mercenaries a former military intelligence colonel “Al-Zawahiri is also and those of the Crusader-NATO.”10 in the Egyptian army implicated in the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat— pleading with the Arab Al-Zawahiri: Evolution and Confusion? whom al-Zawahiri congratulated on his people not to turn inward Just as the international community has release from prison—has embraced the been caught by surprise by the events electoral process.12 In an interview with following the revolutions— in the Middle East and is struggling to the New York Times, al-Zumar declared to lend support, including come to terms with a clear and consistent that “the ballot boxes will decide who strategy to address the new reality, it is will win at the end of the day.”13 military support, to the not surprising that the jihadists have also been caught off-guard. Ironically, This is not to suggest that there is no Libyans who are currently the jihadist narrative enjoyed greater longer a role for the jihadists in al- enduring Mu`ammar credibility under the autocratic regimes Zawahiri’s mind. The jihadists are still that they have devoted their lives to present in his discourse, but they do not Qadhafi’s bombing oust through jihad. Al-Zawahiri’s feature as the drivers of the revolutions. campaign.” response reveals a combination of Instead, they continue to achieve their evolution and confusion: his discourse virtual victories in Afghanistan now that is evolving in the sense that his typical the United States declared that it will jihadist rhetoric is vague at best, but withdraw its troops.14 This is also not to warned Egyptians that the United States confused in that he does not have a suggest that some jihadists may not act does not care as to whether the regime clear vision of the role the jihadists on their own against the guidance of al- is democratic, despotic or even Islamic will play in the changing climate. He Zawahiri; just as he and other jihadist (similar to Saudi Arabia) so long as calls on the imprisoned and recently leaders cannot stop the indiscriminate the regime serves U.S. interests. What released jihadist leaders who recanted killings of Muslims in Pakistan and the United States will never accept, their jihadist principles under duress elsewhere, it is not certain that their he asserted, is an Islamic government by the Mubarak regime to recant their nuanced and confused guidance is going that serves the interests of the umma, recantations, but it is not clear what to be observed by jihadist enthusiasts. rejects the occupation of Muslim lands, he wants them to call for. How are counters the ambitions of Israel and in they expected to define the role of which its rulers are accountable before the jihadists in the Middle East? Can God and their people.9 More specifically, they cooperate with the secularists and he called for the abrogation of the therefore violate the terms of wala’ and terms, see Nelly Lahoud, “The Strengths and Weakness- 11 constitution and establishing in its place bara’ they espouse? More precisely, es of Jihadist Ideology,” CTC Sentinel 3:10 (2010). an Islamic system of government free of 12 Al-Zawahiri, statement 5. 10 Ibid. 13 Neil MacFarquhar, “Religious Radicals’ Turn to De- 8 Ibid., statement 5. 11 Wala’ is to associate with God’s friends and bara’ is to mocracy Alarms Egypt,” New York Times, April 1, 2011. 9 Ibid. dissociate from God’s enemies. For a discussion of these 14 Al-Zawahiri, statement 5.

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What al-Zawahiri is failing to affiliates in Yemen and North Africa realize is that the new era is one of How the Arab Spring Could lauding the revolutionaries almost contestation and compromises—not Embolden Extremists certainly represent the defense of al- of steadfastness and principled rigid Qa`idists who see no other option: positions onto which he wants to hold. By Philip Mudd despite their animosity toward the Thus, the actors who play by the rules Muslim Brotherhood and their disdain of compromises are more likely to turmoil in north africa and the for elections, they have little choice but advance their agenda through creating broader Middle East has raised to support popular uprisings. new, even if challenging, possibilities. questions about what sparked What is perhaps ironic about al- spontaneous mass uprisings of people These revolutions might defang the Zawahiri’s “Missive” series is that who, after years of autocrats, now message of violent extremism in some of the political points he raised suddenly demand a voice in their own the short-term. Over the long-term, would make for a powerful election countries. Months into the unrest, however, ensuring that these youth do speech that would resonate with some other questions are also emerging, such not again live with political leadership Arabs who are reluctantly accepting as whether transitions will progress that is weak or, worse, kleptocratic may the current U.S. support. One has smoothly and which players might turn out to be the factor in whether al- to ponder whether al-Zawahiri has emerge as the political leadership in Qa`ida loses ground in what has been any regrets that he has ruled his role these new democracies. Meanwhile, the key recruiting area of North Africa out of the nouveau regime by his own another concern lingers in the and the Arabian Gulf. The currents outright dismissal of positive law, a background: after a decade of fighting of unrest that could revivify a pool principled rejection that prevents him a global counterterrorism campaign, of violent extremism in North Africa from running for office. do these transitions, and the disarray run deep, starting with the returnees they bring, mean setbacks in the slow from Afghanistan who helped fuel the Nelly Lahoud is Associate Professor at progress against violent extremists? war in Algeria in the 1990s and the the Combating Terrorism Center in the The answers are different across the rise of Egyptian Islamic Jihad through Department of Social Sciences at West region. Commentary on these questions the same decade. The relatively high Point. too often mixes governments that lack representation of North Africans who legitimacy and have lower-than-average went to fight in Iraq a decade later economies (Yemen, Syria, Egypt, among suggests that these pools can still be others) with Gulf monarchies, where tapped. traditional leaders benefit from greater legitimacy and, of course, oil wealth. The Paradox of Increased Political Debate The euphoria over the toppling of In North Africa, during the short-term, reviled leaders masks the reality that the renaissance of politics probably is prospective jihadist recruits are part confounding an al-Qa`ida leadership of societies that probably are too that depended on corrupt presidents- optimistic that these democratic and for-life to recruit disaffected youth. economic transitions will occur quickly. Al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman Looking at some of the indicators in key al-Zawahiri’s recent statement about North African countries, the economic Libya reflects this discomfort; while al- malaise that forms the backdrop to the Zawahiri supports the revolutionaries, communities that might again become at the same time he exhorts Libyans recruiting grounds cannot be cured by to attack the very NATO forces who any quick political fix. The jumbled intervened at the request of the same view that political revolutions and oppositionists. Al-Qa`ida’s struggle openness will somehow result in a better to find a clear voice and present a economic life could lead to disillusion in distinct future for these youth is losing a few years if these pools of youth suffer ground as a result of the twin prongs of from a hangover effect after revolution, local Islamists’ participation in these growing convinced that democracy still revolutions and the likelihood that means they face little prospect of good youth who might have pursued the al- jobs or vibrant growth; worse, that the Qa`ida route before are now seeing parties and leaders who replaced despots the prospect that their voice will be are themselves corrupt. Instability in the heard through elections, not terrorism. region, coupled with the disarray among Furthermore, the fight at home—coupled security services that have resulted in with the prospect of participating in increased crime, further adds to the elections—probably seems like a far likelihood that these countries will face more achievable objective for youth an uncertain economic future. Economic than signing up for a distant jihadist performance this year will no doubt fight in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere. suffer as a result of the revolutions, and Recent statements by al-Qa`ida and its potential investors will look not only

7 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 for what new governments say about years absorbing the message that attacks their dictatorial predecessors—might foreign investment, but also for whether against the “far enemy”—the United drive more extremism in coming years, more criminality worsens country States and its allies—were theologically when young revolutionaries come to risk. To be sure, predicting whether defensible. More recently, some security realize that democracy is no panacea. disaffected youth will turn violent service experts are growing convinced Paradoxically, the likely unease in the against domestic parties or instead that today’s cases more involve United States and elsewhere about resuscitate international jihadists is individuals from poorer economic Islamists in government might undercut guesswork, but the environment in backgrounds: their motivations might the chance to improve the prospects of which violent extremists could recruit relate to their perception that they will governments that have taken the wind would certainly be more attractive for never see success in their societies, them than it is today. and jihadism gives them a framework “This economic problem— within which they can justify violence. Increased political debate, seen by many Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, in other the likelihood that new in the West as a long-term stabilizer, words, is a jihadist most motivated by leaders who are seen as the might also fuel violence. The blooming of ideology; youth involved in major plots political parties could serve as another in Britain, however, are more likely embodiment of revolution factor that opens ethnic and religious to be angry youth from poorer ethnic face greater obstacles fissures that turn violent. Sectarian neighborhoods who persuade each attacks stemming from confessional other, over short periods of time, that to economic growth politics in some countries might also the simple jihadism they understand than their dictatorial provide an opening for extremist groups justifies terrorist bombings. such as al-Qa`ida. Sunni states with predecessors—might relatively open democratic processes— Gaps in GDP per capita between the drive more extremism in Lebanon and Iraq, for example—elect Gulf states and North Africa, Syria, candidates from parties that define and Yemen highlight this point: per coming years, when young themselves by religion and campaign on capita numbers in Bahrain, Oman, and revolutionaries come to sectarianism. Polling data shows that Saudi Arabia far outstrip the figures public support is high for a prominent for North Africa, although Libya is realize that democracy is role for religion in politics elsewhere midway between the poorest and the no panacea.” in the region; religion is guaranteed to Gulf. Morocco, meanwhile, is near the play a role in North African politics bottom, once again underscoring the as well. role of a respected king who has some legitimacy in the population and who out of the sails of violent jihadists who The West will have a clear opportunity responded to unrest in his country might side with al-Qa`ida. Recruitment to influence these potential recruiting with careful restraint. Weak economic opportunities for al-Qa`ida and its grounds in North Africa and the Middle indicators in monarchies are uncertain affiliates are likely to decline in the East. The United States will face indicators of the potential for unrest, near-term without the excuses of decisions about whether to acknowledge but autocratic leadership that has lost secular, non-representative regimes the staying power of Islamist parties legitimacy, such as in Syria, has proven as recruiting bait. Yet in a few years, by providing the same, or even more, a better indicator of which regimes poor economic performance might aid to Egypt, along with trade benefits might be at risk. Yemen, the hotbed of lead again to questions among youth that no doubt will be on the new extremism and violence on the Arabian about whether democracy is offering an government’s wish list. With the overly Peninsula, provides a clear example of attractive option. high expectations that revolution the economic problem across the region. will go hand-in-hand with economic Almost half the Yemeni population is This is not to suggest that these improvements, emerging parties will under the age of 15. Moreover, a recent conditions are universal across the Arab be looking for any opportunity to win article in the Yemen Times prior to the world. Western media are too quickly investment and expand export markets. recent unrest identifies the future to equating developments in Yemen and Yet domestic politics in the United States which those under 15 can look forward: Libya with developments in Bahrain will spark questions about whether fully 49% of the population above them, and elsewhere in the Gulf. Whether the Egypt’s aid package and more trade are aged 15-29, are neither students nor in parallel movements pressing for change acceptable if the new government has a the workforce. Although the catalyst in Gulf shaykhdoms will grow more significant Islamist presence. for protests might have been fueled frustrated is unclear, but the disparities by economics, tribal rivalries, and a between North Africa and the wealthier Lack of Opportunities Can Fuel Extremism harsh security response, the broader countries of the Arabian Peninsula might Economic improvements and job environment was created by President offer some explanation for why the street opportunities are critical for limiting Ali Abdullah Salih. protests are less revolutionary than extremism. Early in the decade of the what Egypt, Tunisia, and now Yemen expanded fight against al-Qa`ida, many This economic problem—the likelihood and Libya are experiencing. Bahrain’s of the violent extremists in the fight were that new leaders who are seen as the obvious demographic differences—its motivated primarily by ideology. Often embodiment of revolution face greater Shi`a majority—along with a leadership middle class, they might have spent obstacles to economic growth than that lacks some of the decades-long

8 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 authority of some of its neighbors might have surprised security forces, Are Islamist Extremists helps explain why it has witnessed and the breadth of the movement, more significant unrest. Presidents- coupled with the sympathies for its Fighting Among Libya’s for-life lack the legitimacy of the Gulf participants from within the military, Rebels? states, and they are rightly critiqued for might have canceled out the opportunity corruption: they all rank low on ratings to preempt opposition activity. By Alison Pargeter from Transparency International, and the Gulf countries typically fare better. There are also lessons learned for as the crisis in Libya continues, the those countries still watching the international media and some Western Beyond this clear distinction between revolutionary movements from the policymakers have speculated about legitimacy and the economics of the outside. Morocco’s king rules in the dangers of an al-Qa`ida presence Gulf monarchies as opposed to the a country that lacks the economic in the country. Stark warnings have presidents-for-life autocracies is the benefits of the Gulf but benefits from been issued about the West’s support divide between what protesters are his standing. He played this to his for opposition forces that include some asking for: revolution in autocracies, advantage in the recent unrest, careful militants who fought against Western reform in monarchies. The “Arab with deploying force and judicious when forces in Iraq. No less forceful on this spring” is not at all monolithic, with confronted with requests for reform. His topic has been the Mu`ammar Qadhafi revolutionary demands across the approach might work, offering another regime itself, which since the crisis non-monarchies (calls for the ouster of explanation for how monarchies might started has been at pains to dismiss the leadership) contrasting with demands for prevail. uprising as the work of al-Qa`ida. The reform elsewhere, including in Bahrain. regime went as far as to claim that an Radical change and overthrow is seen Conclusion Islamic emirate had been established in as the solution in the former, but not in Al-Qa`ida’s decline in recent years has the eastern city of Derna that was run by the latter. Again, the language of those been striking, with the group facing former associates of Usama bin Ladin. pressing for reform reflects the greater devastating strikes against leadership legitimacy of governments in the Gulf, in its Pakistani heartland and declining Such allegations on the part of who depend more on tribal connections support among populations that the regime are clearly propaganda and respect from subjects and less on increasingly question its tactics efforts aimed at scaring not only simple control by the pervasive security and killings of innocent Muslims. the international community, but forces. Omani Sultan Qaboos might have The series of Arab revolutions offer also those in western Libya about been in power for 40 years, longer than yet another check for the al-Qa`ida what might come next if Qadhafi is Qadhafi, Mubarak, Assad, or Salih, but ideologues who must be uncomfortable overthrown.1 Indeed, the uprisings no one would say that the length of his with the potential influence of the in the east were non-ideological in tenure has undermined his legitimacy, Muslim Brotherhood and the likelihood nature. Like the protests in Tunisia and even after the protests in Oman turned of elections that will be steps toward Egypt, they drew a broad cross-section violent.1 democratic processes that al-Qa`ida of the population united by a shared opposes. Yet there are more chapters in desire to oust a dictator who has ruled If unrest does surge quickly, the greater this campaign against terrorism, and them with an iron fist for the past four penetration of the internet—with Twitter the future holds potential that the very decades.2 Moreover, the rebels’ Interim and Facebook—across the Gulf might revolutions that brought democracy Transitional National Council’s (ITNC) offer organizers a platform to mobilize, might also lead to instability. If “Vision for the Future of Libya” that but it also offers security services an economic performance slumps or was issued on March 29 promotes a civil opportunity to follow mass movements corruption reigns, al-Qa`ida and liberal democratic state.3 and position police preemptively, other extremists, including political particularly when demonstrations are demagogues, might again win favor. small and scattered. Internet access Al-Qa`ida has benefited from a long around the Gulf is high, often higher view of history; the West typically than in North Africa, and internet usage does not. 1 There has always been a distinct sense of regional is dramatically increasing year by year. identity in Libya. It was only united as a single country The internet is viewed as a new engine Philip Mudd is Senior Global Adviser, at the time of independence in 1951. The division has tra- for unrest; forgotten is the fact that it Oxford Analytica. He was the senior ditionally been between the main population centers in is also an easily accessible opportunity intelligence adviser at the Federal Bureau the west (Tripolitania) and the east (Cyrenaica). The west for security services to watch not only of Investigation until his departure in has a reputation of being more cosmopolitan and open broad mood shifts, but also tactical March 2010, and he was Deputy Director of than its eastern counterpart, while the east is known as a planning among otherwise disorganized the Counterterrorist Center at the Central bastion of conservatism. The east has also tended to look movements that lack clear leadership. Intelligence Agency until his assignment to eastwards to Egypt, not least because many of the tribes The rapidity of the Egyptian uprising the FBI in August 2005. there spread across into Egypt’s western deserts. 2 The protests comprised a cross-section of the Libyan 1 To see some of the steps taken by Sultan Qaboos in re- public and included professionals and ordinary Libyans, sponse to unrest, see Sara Hamdan, “Oman Offers Some particularly drawn from the youth. Lessons to a Region Embroiled in Protest,” New York 3 For more details, see the ITNC website at http://nt- Times, April 6, 2011. clibya.org/english/libya/.

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Nevertheless, this concern should not of these freed prisoners, who numbered taken by the LIFG’s leadership.6 Many be disregarded completely. Eastern more than 400, returned to their homes had spent long harsh years in prison; Libya has traditionally been the in the east. having had time to mature, they came primary center of the country’s Islamist to the conclusion that violence was not opposition currents and where cells of This deradicalization initiative was the way forward. As such, the regime young Islamist militants are located. It in part a publicity stunt, aimed at successfully neutralized what was left is also where scores of young Libyan bolstering Saif al-Islam’s credibility in of the movement. men left to join the jihad in Iraq. Given the West, as well as in eastern Libya. The that the regime is still struggling for prisoners, for example, were not simply It is not yet clear whether these former survival and that Libya looks unlikely released once they agreed to renounce LIFG prisoners are once again operating to return to any sort of normality soon, violence, but instead the regime insisted as a group on the side of the rebels. the issue of Islamism in a future Libyan the group issue a high-profile set of There is little evidence to suggest that scenario cannot be dismissed. A more doctrinal revisions that were widely this is the case. Some LIFG elements sober and nuanced look at the various have, however, established their own Islamist forces operating in the east, new movement. Two days before the however, demonstrates that the picture “Given the dearth of well- Libyan protests began, a group of is far less black and white than it first trained personnel and former LIFG members based mainly in might appear. the United Kingdom announced that the amateur nature of the they had established the Libyan Islamic The Militants rebel forces, individuals Movement for Change. The group, whose Libya’s Islamist scene currently politburo remains in London, has made comprises a mixed group of actors. with combat experience it abundantly clear that it wishes to Given the Qadhafi regime’s complete are clearly a precious asset participate in the political process and intolerance to any form of political there is every possibility that it will do activity outside of that sanctioned by to the opposition. These so once the situation inside the country the state, the country’s Islamists have former LIFG elements are develops. The degree to which this been in no position in recent years to group has shifted its ideological agenda organize themselves into structured fighting alongside other was demonstrated by a statement issued movements or groups.4 The bulk of rebels and have shown in February where it called for foreign those associated with Islamic extremism intervention to help remove Qadhafi in Libya are former members of the no indication to separate from power, despite the fact that it was Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), themselves or to try to “aware of the sensitivity of this call and a movement that was established in the desire of our people not to see any the camps of Afghanistan in 1990 that claim the revolution as foreign interference on Libyan soil.”7 It sought to overthrow the “Pharaoh their own.” is not yet clear whether the group has Qadhafi.” The group was discovered by any following inside Libya itself. If it the regime in 1995 and was subsequently does, it is clear that those involved are crushed, forcing those members who seeking to assert themselves politically escaped capture to flee, turning the publicized in the region and beyond. rather than militarily. LIFG primarily into a movement in The regime put enormous pressure on exile. In 2007, however, Qadhafi’s son the prisoners to agree to the revisions. On an individual basis, it is a certainty Saif al-Islam entered into a regime- It brought the families of some LIFG that some former LIFG members are supported dialogue with the leadership members into the prison as a means of fighting with the rebels. One former of the LIFG who were in prison in persuading them, and the government LIFG fighter, Khalid al-Tagdi, was Tripoli. After protracted negotiations, also used bribery, offering to provide killed on March 2 in Brega while fighting the LIFG agreed to renounce violence, their families with cars and other perks against regime forces.8 Similarly, in and in August 2009 they issued a set of if they signed up to the revisions.5 Saif mid-April, another senior LIFG military revisions in which they declared that al-Islam made the most of the publicity commander, Abdelmonem Mukhtar, it was not legitimate to take up arms opportunities after the releases, inviting known as Ourwa, was killed after he was against the state. In return, they were foreign journalists to Libya to cover the ambushed by Qadhafi forces on the road freed from prison in a series of mass issue and more importantly bringing between Ajdabiya and Brega. Mukhtar clemencies, the last of which occurred Salafist shaykhs, such as Shaykh had been imprisoned in Iran until the just two days before the current uprising Salman al-Awda, to Libya where end of 2010 and returned to Libya when and included some key figures such as they, along with the LIFG leadership, the uprisings began where he was made the LIFG’s first amir, Muftah Mabrouk publicly lauded the revisions. Despite al-Wadi as well as the brother of senior the publicity aspect, it does appear 6 Personal interview, senior LIFG member released al-Qa`ida operative Abu Yahya al-Libi, that the majority of prisoners were from prison, Tripoli, Libya, June 2010. Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad Qaid. Most convinced about the ideological shift 7 “Libya: Islamists Call on Air Force to Bomb Gaddafi,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 23, 2011. 4 This is particularly true following the crackdowns at 8 Noman Benotman and James Brandon, “Briefing Pa- the end of the mid-1990s when the regime crushed an 5 Personal interview, Libyan human rights activist, per: The Jihadist Threat in Libya,” Quilliam Foundation, Islamist rebellion. Tripoli, Libya, June 2010. March 24, 2011.

10 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 commander of the 160-strong Omar al- In fact, according to sources in Tripoli, against occupying troops in a Muslim Mukhtar rebel battalion. there were indications that a handful country is a legitimate cause. It is for had resorted to their old ways following this reason that the Libyan state media Given the dearth of well-trained their release.12 While the revision always described the insurgency in Iraq personnel and the amateur nature of the process was led by the LIFG, there were as the “resistance” and regularly lauded rebel forces, individuals with combat elements from other militant groups, U.S. military casualties. One cannot experience are clearly a precious asset such as the Islamic Martyrs Brigade, conclude that all the young men in Libya to the opposition. These former LIFG making it impossible to ascertain how who fought in Iraq were motivated by elements are fighting alongside other many released militants truly believed al-Qa`ida or shared its desire to target rebels and have shown no indication to in renouncing violence. Were they the “far enemy.” Indeed, some may separate themselves or to try to claim simply coerced into agreeing with the simply have ended up being recruited the revolution as their own. As Anis revisions to secure their release from by al-Qa`ida once in Iraq. Sharif, a member of the Libyan Islamic prison? Moreover, as late as June 2010 there were still hardcore elements in It is also true that elements with links the Abu Slim prison who rejected the to al-Qa`ida may have helped facilitate “It is true that Libyans, revisions. The regime was still trying networks sending young men to Iraq. predominantly from the to convince them, using a carrot and The current rebel military coordinator stick approach and regularly bringing in Derna, Abdelkarim al-Hasadi, for east, have been willing released LIFG leaders back into the example, has openly admitted that he to sacrifice themselves prison, to continue the dialogue.13 recruited 25 young men in Derna to join It is not clear whether any of these the Iraqi jihad, some of whom are now in Iraq. This should not individuals were freed in the regime’s fighting on the front lines in Ajdabiya.15 be confused, however, final tranche of releases that it Al-Hasadi, a history teacher, had sanctioned just prior to the uprising fought in Afghanistan but was captured with membership of or in a desperate attempt to placate the by U.S. forces in 2002 and handed even support for the east. It seems, however, that these over to Libya where he continued to be more militant elements are not yet monitored by the security services. He transnational aims and acting as any organized group and as was imprisoned twice, once following a aspirations of al-Qa`ida.” such their influence remains limited for shoot-out with the regime where he was the time being. detained from 2004-2007 and again in 2008 for 45 days for “conspiring to Jihad in Iraq and Jihad in Libya overthrow the regime.” Nevertheless, Movement for Change’s politburo, Many observers have correctly pointed al-Hasadi, who was a senior member of rightly observed, “it is the revolution of to the fact that young Libyans have the LIFG, maintains that he was always the Libyan people. It is not the revolution made up a disproportionately high against the attacks of 9/11 and, like so of political parties, or organisations, or number of recruits to the Iraqi jihad.14 many militants in Afghanistan at the Islamists or fundamentalists.”9 It seems It is true that Libyans, predominantly time, rejected the attack. He declared, that these former militants are aware from the east, have been willing to “I am with fighting people on the that what they had dreamed of for so sacrifice themselves in Iraq. This battlefield, not with killing civilians in many years, namely rising up against should not be confused, however, with any place.”16 This approach is entirely the regime, was ultimately achieved membership of or even support for the consistent with that taken by the LIFG. by ordinary Libyans who, like their transnational aims and aspirations counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt, had of al-Qa`ida. Going to fight against In fact, it should be remembered that no ideological affiliation.10 an occupying force in a Muslim land the LIFG always had a specifically is very different from supporting Bin nationalist agenda. Aside from a small There is also the concern that released Ladin’s global ambitions or even taking rump group in the tribal areas of LIFG members could be planning to up arms against one’s own government. Pakistan led by Abu Laith al-Libi (who resume extremist militancy in the Even more “moderate” Islamist groups was killed in January 2008) that allied future. Certain elements within the such as the Muslim Brotherhood are itself with al-Qa`ida when the rest of Libyan security services who were also explicit that fighting to defend a the group entered into dialogue with the largely hostile to the deradicalization Muslim land when it is under attack regime, the LIFG was never comfortable initiative were anxious that some of from foreign forces is a religious duty. with Bin Ladin’s more globalized those released would create trouble.11 In fact, there is widespread feeling agenda and always focused its efforts across the Arab world that fighting on toppling Qadhafi. During a series 9 “Libyan Islamist to Al-Sharq al-Awsat: The Libyan of meetings in April and May 2000, People’s Revolution is not that of political parties or or- Tripoli, Libya, June 2010. the LIFG asked Bin Ladin to stop using ganisations or fundamentalists,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, Feb- 12 Ibid. Afghanistan as a base from which to ruary 21, 2011. 13 Personal interview, senior LIFG member released 10 This was evidenced by the slogans of those demon- from prison, Tripoli, Libya, June 2010. 15 “Noi ribelli, islamici e tolleranti,” Il Sole 24 Ore, March strating, which simply called for an end to the Qadhafi 14 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaida’s Foreign 22, 2011. regime. Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West 16 See www.al-watan.com/viewnews.aspx?d=20110321 11 Personal interview, Libyan human rights activist, Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008) &cat=report2&pge=3.

11 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 launch attacks against the United States continued to arrest and imprison young Future Challenges and tried to convince him that he should Libyans suspected of militancy.21 It is difficult to predict whether more not violate the laws or policies of the militant elements will assert themselves Taliban, under whose protection they There have also been reports during the in Libya in the longer term. Much will were all living, by launching attacks past few years of a handful of Libyans depend on how the situation develops that risked bringing retribution.17 who have traveled to Algeria to train on the ground. This is particularly Despite assertions by Ayman al- with al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb true in relation to the international Zawahiri in 2007 that the LIFG had (AQIM), although these reports are community’s role. Islamist elements in joined al-Qa`ida’s ranks, the group unconfirmed. AQIM has sought to Libya are uneasy about foreign military never joined Bin Ladin’s organization, capitalize on the situation in Libya. If intervention although they seem to preferring to give loyalty to Mullah websites purporting to be AQIM are to accept it, viewing it as a necessary Omar of the Taliban.18 As former LIFG be believed, its leader Abu Mus`ab `Abd veteran Noman Benotman declared, al-Wadud has called for jihad in Libya “It is difficult to predict “We refused right from the beginning to not only against Qadhafi, but also against be absorbed into this group because that the West, especially the United States whether more militant would make us lose our ability to move “as the foreign military intervention is freely and independently in Libya.”19 As a new crusader war.”22 Yet at this stage elements will assert such, the LIFG has always clung to its in the battle such comments are clearly themselves in Libya in independence and nationalist agenda. out of tune with the feeling inside Libya and are more likely to alienate rather the longer term. Much A Role for Al-Qa`ida? than attract young Libyans, including will depend on how the Of course, there are likely to be those of a militant bent. Similarly, individual militant elements or small other jihadist elements have misread situation develops on the groups of militants in Libya who are the situation and the degree to which ground.” open to the terrorist ideology of al- Libyans of all persuasions are united in Qa`ida. The regime was anxious about the fight against Qadhafi. One jihadist the presence of such elements. Sources forum declared this month that Libyan jihadists should choose an amir and evil. This would change, however, if distinguish themselves from the “people foreign ground troops are deployed. “There has been no of al-Jahiliya (pre-Islamic ignorance) The presence of foreign forces on indication of any desire by and the worshippers of democracy” by Libyan soil would give those with a fighting under a clear Islamic banner.23 more militant agenda a focus, and Libyan Islamist militants to It advised them to “acquire and store they may try to turn their attention to separate themselves from weapons in safe places that are only fighting against a foreign presence. known to people you trust and who are on As Abdelkarim al-Hasadi declared, the other rebel forces, and the straight path. Never hand over your “We don’t want the West to come to they are subsumed in the weapons to anyone from the People’s us. We need weapons and to impose a Committees or Military Committees or no-fly zone so military forces will be greater struggle against the Civilians Committees (bodies set up by balanced. If there are foreign forces on Qadhafi regime.” the opposition).”24 Given the desperate Libyan soil we will fight them before situation of those on the front lines, such we will fight Qadhafi.”25 Although the advice is likely unwelcome. So far, there LIFG was explicit in the revisions that has been no indication of any desire by it was wrong to take up arms against in Tripoli argue that one reason why Libyan Islamist militants to separate the state, there was no condemnation of the Qadhafi regime was so keen to themselves from the other rebel forces, fighting jihad against a foreign invader enter into dialogue with the LIFG was and they are subsumed in the greater on Muslim soil. A Western presence because it was becoming increasingly struggle against the Qadhafi regime. would likely create sufficient discontent concerned about the younger generation among the population into which these in the east in particular, some of whom elements could tap. Moreover, it would appeared to be adopting more militant likely attract militants from other parts ideas (although not necessarily those of the world who would see it as their of al-Qa`ida).20 While it was engaging duty to protect Libyans from “crusader in dialogue with the LIFG, the regime forces.”

17 Camille Tawille, Al-Qa’ida wa Akhawatia (London: Saqi Books, 2007). 21 Ibid. 18 For details on this dispute, see Alison Pargeter, “LIFG 22 For details, see www.benbadis.org/vb/showthread. Revisions Unlikely to Reduce Jihadist Violence,” CTC php?s=b3cc5692c833943cc3c2fc3b634cb2f0&p=18976# Sentinel 2:10 (2009). post18976. 19 Tawille. 23 For details, see www.bahrainarabia.com/showthread. 20 Personal interview, Libyan human rights activist, php?p=186585. 25 For details, see www.al-watan.com/viewnews.aspx?d Tripoli, Libya, June 2010. 24 Ibid. =20110321&cat=report2&pge=3.

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Furthermore, if the current stalemate Project, declares, “People are the Bahrain: Crushing a drags on, which looks increasingly source of authority. The state’s religion likely, or if the transition process is Islam and the principle of Islamic Challenge to the Royal post-Qadhafi results in chaos, then it Sharia is the source of its legislation.”26 Family is possible that militant forces could Crucially, the document also calls for a try to organize and assert themselves decentralized Libya. While this group By Caryle Murphy in their own local areas. These forces currently has a limited following, these would have a popular base of support scholars are already well respected on february 14, 2011, protestors in given that they have some sympathy and as such they have the potential to Bahrain marched in the streets with in the east. They will, however, be up become a stronger force in the east in the goal of obtaining greater political against far more influential players particular. The shaykhs’ more explicit freedoms. The protest movement came such as tribal shaykhs who carry more call for a state based upon Islamic law is in the wake of similar demonstrations weight, particularly in the east, which likely to go down well with some parts throughout the Middle East and North has remained far more tribal in nature of the population. Africa, which brought down the than the west. The danger could be if governments in Tunisia and Egypt. In certain tribes, feeling that they have not Nevertheless, the power of these Bahrain, however, the ruling al-Khalifa been properly compensated in the post- Islamist forces should not be family greeted the protesters with force. Qadhafi era, choose to ally themselves exaggerated. Despite the conservative In mid-March, Bahraini King Hamad with militant elements, although this and religious nature of the east, the bin Isa al-Khalifa called in Saudi appears to be an unlikely prospect. revolution is non-ideological in nature. troops, declared emergency law and While there may be some public launched a fierce crackdown on pro- These militants would also have to sympathy for these Islamist figures, reform protestors. With these steps, the compete with other Islamist players. there appears to be limited public “Falcons,” as royal family hardliners Non-violent Salafist currents have been appetite for an Islamist alternative. As are known in Bahrain, are firmly in quietly growing in Libya, especially such, although militant groups may try control. among the youth, as they have elsewhere to make their presence felt and may find in the region. It is likely that free from space in which to operate, particularly if Since the crackdown began, the restrictions of the Qadhafi regime, the international military intervention approximately 20 people have been such currents will expand and flourish. escalates, their role should not be killed and more than 400 arrested, In addition, there is another group that overstated. including doctors, nurses and has emerged in the east that is likely journalists.1 Hundreds more, some of to be far more significant than the Alison Pargeter is a Middle East and North them teachers, have been fired from jihadist elements. This group comprises Africa analyst who also specializes in issues their jobs for supporting the protest a handful of Islamic scholars led by related to political Islam and radicalization. movement.2 The editor of the main Dr. Ali al-Salabi, who was brought in She has conducted numerous research opposition paper was removed, while by Saif al-Islam to negotiate the LIFG projects on these topics and has published the home of a female opposition figure prisoner dialogue. Other members widely on these issues. Her books include was firebombed twice.3 Military trials, include Shaykh Salim Abdelsalam al- The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam on which the press is forbidden to Sheikhi, who returned to Libya from the in Europe (I.B. Tauris and Pennsylvania report, are underway or starting soon. United Kingdom during the uprisings, University Press, 2008) and The Muslim The emergency law’s ban on public and Shaykh Ismail Mohamed al- Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition gatherings and imprisonment of many Kraetly as well as other members of the (Saqi, 2010). opposition leaders also means that party traditional religious establishment in politics are moribund—a major change Libya who have been getting bolder in for a small island of around 570,000 their challenges to the regime in recent citizens that had a remarkably diverse months. This group broadly follows the and vibrant political scene. ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, although the exact nature of its links to Besides Sunni religiously-oriented the movement is not clear. parties that supported the ruling al- Khalifa family, there was a wide range While this group initially declared of opposition groups representing that supporting the Western military intervention was “tantamount to 1 “Bahrain: State of Fear Prevails With Arbitrary Deten- treason,” it has publicly given its support tions, Pre-Dawn Raids,” Human Rights Watch, April to the ITNC and its political vision for a 7, 2011; “Two Shiite Activists Die in Bahraini Custody,” civil state. It has, however, been overtly Agence France-Presse, April 10, 2011; Kristen Chick, critical of the council in the Arab media “Amid Unrest Bahrain Companies Fire Hundreds of Shi- and more importantly it has issued its ites,” Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 2011. Some of this own alternative political vision that information was also based on personal interviews with is more explicit than that of the ITNC the fired editor and victim of firebombing, April 2011. about the role of Islam in the state. 26 For details, see www.libya-alyoum.com/news/index. 2 Ibid. The document, the National Charter php?id=21&textid=3654. 3 Ibid.

13 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 secular liberals, former communists, In the beginning, the protests had no the first protests, but obviously wanted pro-democracy Islamists and visible leadership, although one of the to take advantage of the enthusiasm revolutionaries seeking the monarchy’s first politicians to arrive on the scene they were generating, especially after overthrow. Unfortunately, this political was Abdul Wahab Hussain, the leader of government security forces stormed scene reflected Bahrain’s sectarian the radical Shi`a Wafa’ Islamic Society.6 sleeping protesters in Pearl Roundabout divide. The al-Khalifa dynasty, which Youth activists soon formed the on February 17, leaving four dead. This dominates all top government jobs and “February 14 Youth Group” to provide action only increased the number of the island’s finances, is Sunni, yet 60- some direction to the protesters, who demonstrators. Protesting the night-time 70% of Bahrain’s population is Shi`a. were asking for a greater voice in the raid and deaths (three other protesters political system, the release of political were killed in separate incidents), In addition to their exclusion from prisoners and an end to discrimination Wefaq’s 18 delegates quit parliament.10 the halls of power, the Shi`a complain The government then withdrew its of discrimination when seeking “For Saudi Arabia, Bahrain forces, allowing the protesters to government jobs, particularly in the is a red line. It believes reoccupy Pearl Roundabout. Crown security forces. They deeply resent Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, the government’s long-time policy that concessions to the regarded as head of the ruling family’s of recruiting foreign Sunnis—many tiny, dovish faction known to Bahrainis of whom do not speak Arabic—to fill Shi`a opposition would as “Pigeons,” offered dialogue with the positions in the police and military. put the island on the road opposition.11 Often these foreign recruits are given citizenship to swell the Sunni portion to having a Shi`a-majority Wefaq responded ambivalently to the of the population. As a result of these government.” offer. Although willing to dialogue, it grievances, Shi`a Bahrainis have always was mindful that, given street anger been more politicized than their Sunni about the seven deaths, radical Shi`a peers, and opposition parties are mostly parties would batter Wefaq’s image Shi`a.4 against the Shi`a. According to Jane if it agreed to talk before it received Kinninmont, an expert on Bahrain at significant concessions.12 In alliance For the United States, Bahrain has Chatham House, “February 14” was “a with other smaller parties, Wefaq set strategic importance far beyond its tiny loose coalition of groups [with] different tough conditions for a dialogue: an size. It is home to the headquarters of agendas and objectives.”7 At one point, elected constituent assembly should the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, a vital force the protesters’ central staging ground write a new constitution and the long- ensuring that the Gulf’s oil shipping at Manama’s Pearl Roundabout had time prime minister should resign.13 lanes are not compromised. The fleet about 35 different groups, some of them also reminds Iran that the United States in tents, proselytizing to the crowds, Meanwhile, as part of its new is standing with its Arab Gulf allies. For according to one visitor to the site.8 conciliatory approach, the government Washington, any political crisis or long- pardoned the leader of the more radical term unrest in Bahrain that adversely The single largest political party in al-Haq Movement,14 Hasan Mushaima, impacts the fleet’s operations would be Bahrain, the moderate Wefaq Islamic 9 a threat to U.S. interests in the region. National Society, had no role organizing the most notable are Wa’ad (National Democratic Action Society), a party of mainly middle-class, secular liberal The Protests 6 Ibid. The Wafa’ Islamic Society is one of three radical professionals, who are both Sunni and Shi`a; the party Bahrain’s youth-led protest movement Shi`a organizations that want to overturn the monarchy is led by Ibrahim Sharif, a Sunni Muslim. Another We- began on February 14—four days after and refuse to participate in electoral politics. None of faq partner is the Democratic Progressive Tribune, com- a similar movement forced Egyptian them are officially registered as “societies,” the official prised mainly of former communists and trade unionists. President Hosni Mubarak from power. term for political parties in Bahrain, and operate semi- For details, see the following article, which relied on U.S. The first rallies were in response to clandestinely. In addition to Wafa’, they include the Bah- Embassy cables published by Wikileaks: Guardian, Feb- calls for demonstrations on Facebook. rain Freedom Movement, headed by London-based exile ruary 15, 2011. Some Bahrainis believe that the Said al-Shehabi, and the al-Haq Movement for Liberties 10 “Major Shia Party Withdraws from Bahrain Govern- Facebook page, where initial demands and Democracy, led by Hasan Mushaima. ment,” Irish Times, February 18, 2011. had an Islamist flavor such as a ban on 7 Personal interview, Jane Kinninmont, April 7, 2011. 11 “Bahrain’s Crown Prince Calls for ‘Dialogue’ After alcohol, was created by militant Islamist 8 Personal interview, Abdulnabi Salman, Manama, Bah- Bloody Protests,” USA Today, February 18, 2011. Bahrainis living outside the country. rain, March 27, 2011. 12 Personal interview, Abdulnabi Salman, Manama, These demands later disappeared from 9 Formed in 2001 and led by Shaykh Ali Salman, Wefaq Bahrain, March 26, 2011. the page after the daily protests began is the most popular party among the Shi`a underclass. 13 These were the demands of the radical al-Haq Move- attracting huge crowds of people from Mainstream and moderate, it would like to see Bahrain ment for years. For details, see Guardian, February 15, 5 across the political spectrum. become a genuine constitutional monarchy, rather than 2011. the “pretend” one it is now. After initially rejecting elec- 14 The al-Haq Movement for Liberties and Democracy is toral politics because it views the current system as un- the largest and most influential of the three radical Shi`a 4 Personal interview, Bahraini university professor, Ma- fair, Wefaq participated in the 2006 elections. In the last organizations that want to overturn the monarchy and nama, Bahrain, March 25, 2011. election of 2010, it became the largest parliamentary bloc, refuse to participate in electoral politics. Its leader Hasan 5 Personal interview, Bahraini novelist Fareed Rama- winning 18 of the lower house’s 40 seats. Wefaq works Mushaima broke away from Wefaq, which he helped dan, Manama, Bahrain, March 25, 2011. closely with several smaller opposition parties. Among found, in 2005. Al-Haq has demanded a new constitu-

14 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 opening the way for his return from leader Abdul Wahab Hussain.19 whatsoever. Lots of fake reports and exile to Bahrain where he was acclaimed This was a direct challenge to the planted stories in GCC state-controlled in Pearl Roundabout on February 26.15 government’s burnished self-image media, but nothing of substance.”23 as a safe business and investment hub On March 8, the three hard line Shi`a for the Gulf. Nevertheless, the crown Although a minority of Bahraini Shi`a groups announced they had formed the prince made a last ditch effort to draw have Iranian ancestry, most are of Arab “Coalition for a Bahraini Republic” to Wefaq and other opposition groups descent. They look not to Persian Iran, oust the monarchy and, as al-Haq leader into dialogue without pre-conditions but to Arab Iraq for religious leadership, Mushaima told reporters, establish “a on March 13. He listed seven topics for particularly to Grand Ayatollah Ali al- democratic republican system.”16 This discussion, including the naturalization Sistani in Najaf.24 That did not stop marked a turning point in the protest of foreigners, and agreed to put any Iran, which sees itself as leader of the movement because it raised Sunni fears agreement to a referendum.20 world’s Shi`a, from using the Bahraini to new heights. Since the government government crackdown and Saudi troop had long maintained that al-Haq has The game, however, was already over. arrival in its propaganda war against ties to Iran, most Bahraini Sunnis His father, the king, was on the phone Sunni regimes, portraying these events believed that Mushaima was advocating with Saudi Arabia, asking Riyadh for a as evidence of Sunni perfidy against an Islamic republic.17 The radical demonstration of support for Bahrain’s Shi`a. Although the Saudis were camped parties also encouraged the youth ruling family. The Saudi government for the most part on Bahraini military camped out at Pearl Roundabout not was eager to oblige, and 1,200 members bases and rarely interacted with the to dialogue with the government, and of the Saudi National Guard crossed public, the Iranian press carried organized provocative street actions, the causeway the next day on March exaggerated reports of alleged crimes by including a march on a royal palace. 14, along with 500 policemen from the Saudi troops against civilians. Iranian Wefaq and moderate allied parties United Arab Emirates—a force described President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denounced that march, fearing it would in Bahraini and Saudi media as sent by called on Riyadh to withdraw its forces, incite government retaliation. Some in the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council adding that “the Saudis did an ugly thing the “February 14” youth group urged (GCC). Emergency law was declared on to deploy troops” and “the Bahraini protesters not to join the march; another March 15, and Bahraini security forces government also did an ugly work to faction allied to the radical Shi`a parties raided Pearl Roundabout the next day. kill its own people.”25 A day later, 200 told reporters they supported it.18 Iranian parliamentarians condemned Riyadh and Tehran Compete for Influence in the “frightening crimes” of “un- The government’s patience finally Bahrain Islamic” Saudi troops in Bahrain. Iran’s cracked on March 13 when, in a pre- As has been its practice for years, the hypocrisy, given the brutal suppression dawn move, protesting youths erected Bahraini government accused Iran and of its own anti-government protesters, barricades on the access road into the Lebanese movement Hizb Allah was not lost on the Gulf’s Sunni Muslim Manama’s financial district. One source of fomenting the country’s unrest and leaders.26 The GCC, incited as well by said that the barricades were deployed having ties to militant Shi`a parties in Kuwait’s discovery of what it called by 350 men organized by Wafa’ party Bahrain. King Hamad clearly had Iran an Iranian spy ring, expressed deep in mind when he told Saudi and Bahraini concern “over the continuing Iranian military officers on March 20 that “an intervention in the internal matters of tion written by an elected assembly and the resignation external plot has been fomented for 20 GCC countries by conspiring against 27 of Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, who to 30 years until the ground was ripe for their national security.’’ 21 is widely seen as head of the “Falcons,” and has been in subversive designs.” He added, “I here his job for 40 years. In 2008, U.S. officials reported that announce the failure of the fomented Elsewhere in the Arab world, Shi`a 22 many Bahrainis believed that al-Haq was responsible for subversive plot.” nerves were set on edge. In Shi`a- “inspiring many of the small gangs of Shi`a youth who majority Iraq, marches were organized throw stones and Molotov cocktails at police almost ev- Yet journalists covering the protests and in support of Shi`a in Bahrain, and ery weekend.” In 2010, Mushaima, who was then living experts on Bahrain did not see evidence Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Britain, was among 25 people charged with belonging of Iranian instigation. Asked if he had warned that the Saudi and Emirati to a terrorist network. Although al-Haq has fewer sup- seen Iranian or Hizb Allah involvement “intervention” raised sectarian porters than Wefaq, its followers are generally consid- with the Shi`a opposition, Christopher tensions. “It has become a Shiite- ered more vocal and more active on the street. Much of M. Davidson, a scholar of the Gulf this information is based on personal interview, Bahraini at Durham University, wrote, “None 23 Personal correspondence, Christopher M. Davidson, university professor, Manama, Bahrain, March 24, 2011. April 7, 2011. Also see Guardian, February 15, 2011. 19 Personal interview, Bahraini journalist, Manama, 24 Personal interview, Bahraini novelist Fareed Rama- 15 “Bahrain’s Protesters Struggle to Define Goals,” As- Bahrain, March 23, 2011. dan, Manama, Bahrain, March 25, 2011. Also see Lau- sociated Press, March 2, 2011. 20 The other topics were: a parliament with full powers; rence Louër, “The Limits of Iranian Influence Among 16 “Hardline Shi’ite Groups Demand Republic in Bah- a representative government; fair constituencies; com- Gulf Shi`a,” CTC Sentinel 2:5 (2009). rain,” Reuters, March 8, 2011. bating financial and administrative corruption; public 25 “Iran Wants Saudi Troops Out of Bahrain,” Associ- 17 Personal interview, university professor, Manama, properties; and addressing sectarian tensions. ated Press, April 5, 2011. Bahrain, March 24, 2011. 21 “HM Visits Peninsula Shield Command,” Bahrain 26 “Iran MPs Condemn Saudi ‘Crimes’ in Bahrain,” 18 “Bahrain’s Youth Movement Not to Join March,” Reu- News Agency, March 20, 2011. Agence France-Presse, April 6, 2011. ters, March 10, 2011. 22 Ibid. 27 “Iran Wants Saudi Troops Out of Bahrain.”

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Sunni issue with the entrance of forces of civil disobedience will intensify, from Sunni Arab countries,” al-Maliki possibly backed by some guerilla JI Operative Umar Patek said. “This has become like a Sunni warfare,” wrote Davidson. This will not Arrested in Pakistan mobilisation against the Shiites,” which be good news for Wefaq. “As violence “may have a snowball effect,” he added. spreads, Wefaq’s support may decline By Zachary Abuza “The region could be drawn into a as increasing numbers of young men sectarian war.”28 turn to more militant groups and on january 25, 2011, Pakistani parties, including al-Wafa, that are seen authorities arrested Umar Patek, a For Saudi Arabia, Bahrain is a red as offering a more concrete solution,” senior member of the Indonesia-based line. It believes that concessions to Davidson predicted.31 terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya the Shi`a opposition would put the (JI). Patek has been the target of an island on the road to having a Shi`a- Indeed, during a recent interview at international manhunt for nearly 10 majority government. From the Saudi Wefaq’s headquarters in Manama, years and carried a $1 million bounty perspective, not only would that open Shaykh Salman called for an outside for his role in the October 2002 Bali the door to Iranian influence in Bahrain party to mediate between the bombings that left 202 people dead.1 He as it has done in Iraq, but it also might government and the opposition to was wounded in a firefight before his embolden the kingdom’s Shi`a minority get past what he called the “very capture in a town north of Rawalpindi. to more aggressively seek redress for deep distrust between government its grievances. For several weeks, Shi`a and people.” Despite the crackdown, His arrest in Pakistan should shed light youth in the Saudi town of Qatif and he added, the party is striving to stick on the state of JI and provide insights surrounding villages held brief, peaceful to its peaceful policies and “prevent into the group’s future orientation, marches every Friday demanding that confrontation of our people with strategy and tactics, as well as offer Saudi troops withdraw from Bahrain. security people.” Yet “as the crisis is further clues about the relationship sustained,” he said, “doors open that between Southeast Asian and South Unfortunately for Bahrain, it has nobody can control.”32 Asian terrorist organizations. become prime turf in the increasingly razor-sharp competition between For now, the long-term outlook seems Profile of Umar Patek Riyadh and Tehran, as well as between bleak in Bahrain. The government has Umar Patek, who also went by the Sunni and Shi`a in the wider Arab shut down the moderate Wa’ad Party and aliases Umar Arab and Umar Kecil, is world. “This is what we are trying is threatening to take legal action against, like many senior JI leaders, a Javanese to prevent,” said Wefaq party leader and possibly ban, Wefaq. This would of Yemeni-extraction. He was born Shaykh Salman. “And this is one main leave the government with virtually in Central Java in 1970. Patek, along reason for rejecting the engagement of no credible interlocutor in opposition with Dulmatin (also known as Joko the Saudi troops—so there will be no ranks. While the current crackdown has Pitoyo), trained in al-Qa`ida camps in excuse for Iran or others to engage in brought quiet to Bahrain’s streets and Afghanistan in the mid-1990s before this situation because we are against given the government a greater sense of returning to Indonesia. In addition to any interference, especially military, in security, without popular support from being close friends, they were brothers- Bahrain by any regional powers.”29 Yet the majority of its people, that security in-law as Dulmatin married Patek’s given the Riyadh-Tehran rivalry, Saudi may ultimately prove ephemeral. sister. According to Nasir bin Abbas, troops are unlikely to depart soon. As the former head of JI’s Mantiqi III Bahrain’s defense force chief of staff Caryle Murphy is an independent journalist region, Umar Patek was dispatched said, they “will remain in Bahrain as based in Riyadh. She is the author of Passion to Mindanao in 1995 to succeed him long as there is a constant external for Islam. in running JI’s training with the Moro threat against the security and stability Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).2 By of the Arabian GCC member states.”30 1998, a full-scale training facility for JI members, known as Camp Hudaibiyah, More significant for the people of had opened. Bahrain will be the repercussions of the government’s harsh and unrelenting Patek is thought to have returned to repression of its Shi`a majority. “With Indonesia around 1999-2000 following the window on dialogue now closed the fall of President Suharto when and no support from the international many JI leaders, including Abu Bakar community, the opposition will become Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar, returned increasingly militant and a campaign from exile. It is not known the degree of Patek’s involvement in the sectarian 28 “Iraq: Bahrain Tensions Could Ignite Sectarian War,” conflicts that erupted in 1998-2001. Agence France-Presse, March 26, 2011. Patek and Dulmatin were the deputy 29 Personal interview, Shaykh Ali Salman, Manama, Bahrain, March 25, 2011. 31 Personal correspondence, Christopher M. Davidson, 1 “Pakistan Nabs Bali Bombing Mastermind,” Daily 30 BDF Chief of Staff Shaykh Daij bin Salman al-Khalifa, April 7, 2011. Times, March 31, 2011. interview with Muqbil al-Saeri, Asharq al-Awsat, April 6, 32 Personal interview, Shaykh Ali Salman, Manama, 2 “Interrogation of Mohammad Nasir bin Abbas,” Indo- 2011. Bahrain, March 25, 2011. nesian National Police, April 18, 2003.

16 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 field commanders for the 2002 Bali Yet JI was hobbled by the arrests of some At some point, Umar Patek left bombing, and played key roles in the 450 of its members and deep divisions in Indonesia with a real passport in planning of the operation and the actual the organization over tactics. The year someone else’s name and traveled to construction of the bombs. 2006 marked the first time since 2002 Pakistan via Thailand.12 It has not been that JI could not launch any attacks. One revealed whether it was before or after He and his compatriot Dulmatin fled group under the leadership of Noordin the February 2010 raid, but he most to the southern Philippines in early Mohamed Top rebranded themselves likely fled as a result of the Indonesian 2003 following the Bali bombing.3 as al-Qa`ida in the Malay Archipelago police’s follow-up operations. According to Dulmatin’s wife, they were (AQMA) and tried to perpetrate attacks given sanctuary with the MILF until against Western targets in 2007- The Implications of Patek’s Arrest sometime in 2004 when their presence 2008.8 Another wing—what is often It is premature to analyze what Patek’s referred to as “mainstream JI”—under arrest will mean for JI, but it is clearly the leadership of Abu Rusdan believed another setback for the terrorist group. “His capture is also a blow that attacking Western venues and soft Indonesian interrogators, who still for JI in that there are few targets had been counterproductive have not met with Patek, are most and resulted in mass arrests, and thus concerned with any attacks that are first generation leaders still articulated a strategy based on sectarian still in the planning stages. Yet there at large.” attacks in Indonesia’s outer islands, is a low likelihood of any imminent Sulawesi and the Malukus in particular, attacks by JI. Its last major terrorist creating pure Islamist communities and attack came in July 2009, with the emanating outward. The problem was twin suicide bombings of two five- jeopardized the MILF’s peace talks with that Noordin was killed in September star hotels in Jakarta. The raid on the the government.4 The two were forced 2009, while Abu Rusdan was never Acehnese training camp in February out of the MILF’s territory and sought able to rekindle large-scale sectarian 2010 and the subsequent arrests clearly refuge with the Abu Sayyaf Group conflicts. set the organization back. Nearly 120 (ASG) in Sulu in early 2005, where they remained until sometime in 2008- At some point in the 2008-2009 period, “Until JI is able to regroup 2009.5 In the Philippines, the two were Dulmatin slipped back into Indonesia.9 implicated in a string of bombings. In part, it was to fill a leadership void, around a single figure but more importantly it was to reorient with a clearly espoused Despite their physical isolation, Patek the group’s tactics and to re-unify the maintained active communications in two wings. Umar Patek followed soon strategy, low level attacks 2003-2005 with Abdullah Sunata, a afterwards in early 2010.10 Clearly, the by small splinter groups leader of a Central Javanese cell and a leaders of the camp were out to discredit former head of the Ambon branch of Abu Rusdan and released a vicious and autonomous cells will the JI-linked civil society organization online video attack about his lack of become the norm.” KOMPAK. On Patek’s orders, Sunata leadership.11 dispatched Indonesian militants to Mindanao for training.6 Indonesian In February 2010, elite counterterrorism counterterrorism officials broke up police raided a training camp in a remote militants were arrested or killed in that Sunata’s cell in June and July 2005, region of Aceh. The camp was run by counterterrorism operation. While the arresting 17 people in total. Sunata al-Qa`ida in Aceh under the leadership actual size of JI is unknown, it has never admitted that he “was tasked by Patek of Abdullah Sunata and Dulmatin, who been a large organization operationally, to solicit funds for terror attacks in the sought to train members for Mumbai- although its support network is thought Philippines and recruit suicide bombers style paramilitary attacks rather than to be several thousand people. The in Indonesia to be sent to central occasional bombings of public venues. neutralization of 120 individuals, as Mindanao.”7 Through Sunata’s cell, The raid on the camp and follow-up well as the arrest of Abu Bakar Bashir Patek had a limited role in organizing operations led to the arrests of more whose organization Jamaah Ansharut the September 9, 2004 bombing of the than 100 individuals and the killings of Tauhid (JAT) was an important source Australian Embassy in Jakarta. 13 more, including Dulmatin in Jakarta of funding, was a devastating loss for in March 2010. the group as it was actively trying to rebuild. 3 Eva C. Komandjaja, “Police Search for Two JI Members in Philippines,” Jakarta Post, August 16, 2005. 8 Niniek Karmini and Chris Brummitt, “Indonesian While Pakistani authorities have not 4 “Interrogation of Istiada Bte Oemar Sovie,” Philippine Militants Recruit Fighters in Video,” Associated Press, officially stated where or with whom he National Police, November 7-9, 2006. March 16, 2010. was arrested, local media reports have 5 Ibid. 9 Sara Schonhardt, “Indonesia Says Killed Leading shed some light on these questions. Police 6 A three-man cell was arrested in the Philippines in Militant Dulmatin,” Christian Science Monitor, March 10, found Patek after following a known al- December 2004 and a two-man cell was arrested in Ma- 2010. Qa`ida operative, Tahir Shezad, to the laysia in June 2005. For details, see Associated Press, 10 “Police Detect Terrorist Suspects Umar Patek, Heru September 9, 2005. Kuncoro,” Jakarta Post, March 27, 2010. 12 Bagus B. T. Saragih, “Umar Patek Allegedly Left via 7 Ibid. 11 Karmini and Brummitt. Jakarta, Bangkok: Police,” Jakarta Post, March 30, 2011.

17 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 town of Abbottabad, roughly 50 miles current Indonesian anti-terrorism law north of the administrative capital of was enacted in 2003, following the The Implications of Colonel Rawalpindi where Patek and his wife Bali bombing, and cannot be applied Imam’s Murder in Pakistan had been provided shelter.13 Shezad retroactively. Indonesian commentators was arrested in late January with two are already sounding the alarm over By Rahimullah Yusufzai French nationals, one of Moroccan a long drawn-out legal case against descent, the other of Pakistani. The him.16 Pakistan has made it clear that on february 19, 2011, Tehrik-i-Taliban group was en route to North Waziristan it would rather not turn Patek over to Pakistan (TTP) released a videotaped Agency where they were seeking refuge the Central Intelligence Agency, part of execution of Colonel Imam, a retired and hoped to join with the Taliban.14 the broader fallout between the ISI and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence their American counterpart following (ISI) operative.1 Colonel Imam, whose It is unclear whether Patek’s the incarceration of a CIA contractor. real name was Sultan Amir Tarar, motivations were simply to seek refuge wielded significant influence over in the Federally Administered Tribal Until JI is able to regroup around a Islamist fighters in Afghanistan and Areas (FATA), or whether he sought to single figure with a clearly espoused Pakistan during the war against set up a new training facility for JI, as strategy, low level attacks by small the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He attempts to train in Southeast Asia— splinter groups and autonomous cells trained large numbers of Afghan in MILF camps and in remote camps will become the norm. While this is fighters battling Soviet forces, in Indonesia—have not panned out. good for Indonesian security in that and befriended scores of mujahidin Moreover, beyond the need to regroup it is unlikely that any of these groups leaders and commanders, including and train a new generation of militants, will have the capabilities or resources Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin JI always wanted to be linked to the to perpetrate large-scale attacks, it Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Massoud and broader Salafi-jihadist movement, also means that they will continue Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, as well rather than being simply a parochial undetected for longer. This may already as the founder of the Afghan Taliban Indonesian organization. JI, in its be occurring. In March 2011, four letter movement, Mullah Omar. During the various incarnations and re-brandings, bombs were sent to legislators, NGO 1980s, Colonel Imam escorted several has always turned outward to develop activists and a musician who were U.S. and Western leaders—including its own capabilities. If so, Patek is the outspoken in their defense of Indonesia’s the then-deputy director of the CIA, natural person for this task as he has secular traditions and constitutional Robert Gates, and Congressman experience in Pakistan and Afghanistan framework.17 On April 21, Indonesian Charlie Wilson—during their visits to and has been in charge of JI’s training police defused a large, 150-kilogram the Afghan mujahidin. Yet despite his in the past. bomb that was placed near a gas line in legendary status in Pakistan, Colonel front of a church in Jakarta; 20 people Imam was shot in the face by a Taliban His capture is also a blow for JI in that were quickly arrested. gunman as TTP chief Hakimullah there are few first generation leaders Mehsud supervised the execution. still at large. The most important would As seen with these latest attacks, be another Javanese of Yemeni descent, terrorism in the near future will likely The kidnapping and subsequent Zulkarnaen, but it is not even clear be perpetrated by smaller, more diffuse murder of Colonel Imam is indication whether he is in Indonesia. groups, without any real centralized of the generational gap among Islamist command and control. militants in South Asia. In the previous Indonesia sent a team to Pakistan to decade, Colonel Imam would have been conduct forensic and DNA testing Dr. Zachary Abuza is Professor at the welcomed and honored by Islamist and to arrange Patek’s extradition, National War College. His book on militants in the border region. Today, although they still have been unable to the insurgency in southern Thailand, however, TTP militants considered him interrogate him.15 While Pakistan has Conspiracy of Silence, was published by an enemy, and saw his status merely as said that it would eventually return him U.S. Institute of Peace Press in 2009. The a tool to bargain for a ransom and the to Indonesia, other Pakistani authorities opinions here are the author’s and do not release of imprisoned TTP fighters. announced their preliminary intention necessarily reflect those of the National to indict and try him there first. There is War College, National Defense University, This article identifies the sequence of no bilateral extradition treaty between the Department of Defense, or any other events that led to the murder of Colonel the two countries, although Pakistan government organization. Imam, while also explaining what his has rendered Indonesian citizens in death reveals about the evolution of the the past. Indonesian authorities have TTP. expressed concern about the strength of the legal case against him. The

13 “Militant’s Road Ends in Pakistan,” Dawn, April 15, 2011. 14 “French Pair Seized by Pakistan Police on Bali Trail,” 16 “Editorial: Agonizing Over Umar Patek,” Jakarta Post, 1 “Taliban Release Video of Killing of Col Imam,” Express Dawn, April 15, 2011. April 8, 2011. Tribune, February 19, 2011; “Pakistani Taliban Claim 15 “Intelligence Agency Yet to Meet Umar Patek in Paki- 17 “Bomb Explodes in Indonesia, No Injuries Reported,” Shooting Colonel Imam Dead,” Associated Press, Febru- stan,” Jakarta Post, April 14, 2011. Deutsche Press Agency, March 18, 2011. ary 19, 2011.

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The Kidnapping the Taliban and the United States. None his driver, Rustam Khan. The “Asian In March 2010, Colonel Imam, former of these assertions can be confirmed, Tigers” initially demanded $10 million ISI operative Khalid Khwaja, British and the dominant view, which is shared for Qureshi’s release, although the documentary maker Asad Qureshi, and by this author, is that the former ISI ransom amount was reportedly less their local driver Rustam Khan were operatives were in the region to assist than that.10 kidnapped in North Waziristan Agency in the documentary, and that they of the Federally Administered Tribal miscalculated their standing among the With Khwaja dead and Qureshi and his Areas (FATA).2 Colonel Imam and militants.6 They also likely thought that driver released, differences emerged Khwaja accompanied Qureshi to help their plans to make a documentary on among the militants—who were still the filmmaker create a documentary on drone strikes with the help of Pakistan- holding Colonel Imam. The differences the impact of drone strikes on civilians. born, British journalist Asad Qureshi led to violence when another militant The two former ISI operatives hoped would endear them to the militants, who leader, Sabir Mehsud, killed Usman to use their old contacts and goodwill have been arguing that the missiles kill Punjabi and five of his men. Although in the region to gain access to North a disproportionate number of civilians. Waziristan, the stronghold of local and foreign militants.3 Their decision to Regardless of their true intentions, “The execution may have travel to North Waziristan seems ill- the mission did not go according to placed a wedge between advised, as both former operatives had plan. A previously unknown group publicly criticized the Pakistani Taliban called the Asian Tigers took credit for the TTP and other Islamist in media statements—claiming that the kidnappings, but it later became militants, particularly the the Pakistani Taliban were working as clear that the group’s name was simply part of a foreign agenda to destabilize an alias to conceal the cell members’ Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan. Indeed, after the kidnapping, identities. It eventually emerged that Haqqani network.” the Punjabi Taliban—jihadists who left Kashmir-focused militant groups “The kidnapping and and joined the TTP—were involved subsequent murder of in the kidnapping operation. Usman it is likely that TTP leader Hakimullah Punjabi, or Mohammad Omar as he Mehsud was aware of the kidnapping Colonel Imam is indication identified himself when contacting the operation, Usman’s murder angered of the generational gap media, became the link between the Hakimullah, who sent his men to militants holding the four men and the kidnap and execute Sabir Mehsud and among Islamist militants in outside world.7 Usman Punjabi was members of his militia, taking custody South Asia.” also reportedly the man who invited the of Colonel Imam.11 Hakimullah appeared unsuspecting former ISI operatives to to have intervened once the situation North Waziristan. The group actually deteriorated after the two militant holding the four men was led by leaders, who were partners, turned on one of the kidnappers defended the Abdullah Mansoor, who had split from each other over disputes. action by saying that Colonel Imam the anti-Shi`a militant group Lashkar- and Khwaja had called the Pakistani i-Jhangvi and aligned with the splinter Once Hakimullah gained custody of Taliban terrorists: “It is wrong of them faction, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi al-Alami.8 Colonel Imam, it became clear that to describe us as terrorists. We too are conditions for his release only became fighting jihad.”4 Khalid Khwaja was the first to be more stringent. Hakimullah wanted executed. On April 30, 2010, a month the release of a number of his men Others, however, argued that Colonel after the kidnapping, his body was found from Pakistani jails, in addition to the Imam and Khwaja went to North dumped in a stream in Karamkot village payment of a massive ransom. Although Waziristan on a peace mission to near Mir Ali in North Waziristan. A the demands were never made public, reconcile the militants with Pakistan’s note was attached to his body, stating the media reported that the TTP security establishment.5 These analysts that Khwaja was an agent of the ISI demanded Rs 50 million ($590,000) and reported that the former ISI operatives and CIA.9 After the killing of Khwaja, the release of an unidentified number of were trying to alert the TTP leadership the militants received a hefty ransom jailed militants.12 about the presence of pro-India for the release of Asad Qureshi and elements in their ranks and wanted to open a line of communication between 6 Asad Munir, “The Death of Colonel Imam,” Express Tribune, January 26, 2011; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The 2 “Former ISI Operatives Kidnapped in North Wa- Kidnapped,” The News International, April 27, 2010. ziristan,” The Nation, March 27, 2010; Syed Saleem 7 Personal interview, Usman Punjabi, Winter 2010; 10 Mir; “Col Imam is Still in Taliban Custody,” Express Shahzad, “Colonel Imam Abducted in North Waziristan,” Shahzad; Amir Mir, “Kashmiri Behind Khwaja’s Mur- Tribune, February 15, 2011. Asia Times Online, April 28, 2010. der,” The News International, May 1, 2010. 11 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Kidnapped Ex-ISI Official, Brit- 3 Personal interview, Khalid Khwaja, March 2010. 8 Amir Mir, “Imam was Killed Last Month for Spying,” ish Journalist Likely to be Released Soon,” The News In- 4 Personal interview, Usman Punjabi, Winter 2010. The News International, February 21, 2011. ternational, May 7, 2010. 5 Hamid Mir, “What Was the Last Mission of Khalid Kh- 9 Zahir Shah, “Hakimullah in TTP Video of Colonel 12 “Taliban Release Video of Killing of Col Imam,” Ex- waja?” The News International, May 2, 2010; Shahzad. Imam’s Killing,” Dawn, February 19, 2011. press Tribune, February 19, 2011.

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Colonel Imam’s family tried to pool to attacking government interests, money to pay the ransom. At one and Islamabad is still struggling to Recent Highlights in point, hopes for a deal emerged.13 For respond. Terrorist Activity that reason, his execution was sudden and shocking for all those trying to Nevertheless, there has been some March 1, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida negotiate; the talks with the TTP had fallout for the overall Taliban operative Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, a not yet broken down at the time of movement in the wake of Colonel Saudi national and former detainee at the execution. Even Afghan Taliban Imam’s death. The execution may have Guantanamo Bay, released a 10-minute commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, other placed a wedge between the TTP and audio message offering his views on Afghan mujahidin leaders as well as other Islamist militants, particularly the fall of the Tunisian government Pakistani religious scholars failed to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani in January 2011. Al-Rubaysh said that convince Hakimullah to release the network. Jihadist leaders who used to he was “happy” with the fall from former ISI operative.14 In the filmed operate with Colonel Imam during the power of Tunisian President Zine execution, which appears to have anti-Soviet jihad were clearly unhappy al-Abidine Ben Ali, but he warned occurred in late January, Hakimullah is with the TTP and Hakimullah Mehsud, another “tyrant” would take his place clearly visible, supervising the murder. privately criticizing him for executing if Tunisians do not create a state based Hakimullah’s presence in the video also the former ISI operative.17 In fact, some on Shari`a (Islamic law). Al-Rubaysh dispelled rumors of his own death.15 significant doubts have arisen about is believed to be based in Yemen. Hakimullah’s agenda after the incident. – ABC News, March 1 In the videotape, Hakimullah accused Although the Afghan Taliban and Colonel Imam of a litany of offenses. Haqqani network have refrained from March 1, 2011 (UNITED STATES): U.S. Hakimullah appeared convinced that publicly condemning Hakimullah for Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Colonel Imam had specifically traveled killing the former operative, they are that the revolutions in Tunisia and to North Waziristan to spy on the TTP unlikely to trust him in the future. Egypt “are an extraordinary setback and provide intelligence for Pakistan for al Qaeda.” The revolutions show Army strikes as well as U.S. drone Rahimullah Yusufzai is a senior “the lie to al Qaeda’s claims that the attacks. In the eyes of Hakimullah Pakistani journalist and political and only way to get rid of authoritarian and the TTP, both Khalid Khwaja and security analyst presently working as governments is through extremist Colonel Imam were spies, and their Resident Editor of the English daily The violence,” Gates said. According to CBS punishment was death. Their role as News International in Peshawar. He News, “Gates said that the revolutions spies does not seem likely, as both has been reporting on Afghanistan and were also ‘a major setback for Iran’ retired military officers were critical Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province because the restraint of the Egyptian of Pakistan’s alliance with the United (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal and other militaries ‘contrasts vividly’ States and unhappy at Islamabad’s Areas (FATA), and Baluchistan since with Iran’s typically violent response decision to break with the Afghan the early 1980s. to anti-government protests.” – CBS Taliban after 9/11. Additionally, if they News, March 1 truly were spies, one would suspect that the military would have made March 1, 2011 (YEMEN): Prominent more of an effort to save them. The Yemeni cleric Abdul Majid al-Zindani TTP also seemed to have miscalculated joined protestors in Yemen calling for the importance of the two former ISI the removal of President Ali Abdullah operatives, and as a result drafted Salih. Al-Zindani, a radical cleric demands that Pakistan’s government who was once a mentor to Usama bin and military were unwilling to meet.16 Ladin, told demonstrators that “an Islamic state is coming [to Yemen].” Implications He said that Salih “came to power by The killings of Khalid Khwaja and force, and stayed in power by force, Colonel Imam reveal the evolution of and the only way to get rid of him is jihadist groups in Pakistan. While in through the force of the people.” – New the past these groups had ties to the York Times, March 1 Pakistani state, the government and security apparatus have lost control March 1, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani over many of the Islamist fighters Taliban militants killed four local operating in the border region. Pakistani tribesmen in North Waziristan Taliban militants remain committed Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The militants accused the tribesmen of spying for the United 13 Yusufzai, “Kidnapped Ex-ISI Official, British Journal- States. – AFP, March 1 ist Likely to be Released Soon.” 17 Although Taliban leaders will not go on the record 14 This information is based on the author’s confidential criticizing Hakimullah Mehsud, many prominent Tali- sources. ban leaders told this author that the TTP is hurting their 15 Shah. cause. They argue that Pakistani citizens are less likely to 16 Munir. support the mujahidin due to the brutality of the TTP.

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March 1, 2011 (PHILIPPINES): March 3, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A bomb suspicion of having links to Taimour Philippine authorities arrested a exploded in Hangu District of Khyber Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, who blew suspected Abu Sayyaf Group member Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing three himself up in Stockholm on December who was involved in the kidnapping police officers and four civilians. The 11, 2010. Al-Khaledi was arrested in of ABS-CBN reporter Ces Drilon. The bomb was targeted at a police vehicle. the Whiteinch area of Glasgow under suspect, Sali Said, was apprehended – AP, March 3 the Terrorism Act. – Sky News, March in Sulu Province. – ABS-CBN, March 2 8; Telegraph, March 8; The Local, March 11; March 4, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A bomb Guardian, March 14 March 2, 2011 (GERMANY): A destroyed two oil tankers near the gunman opened fire on U.S. airmen Torkham border crossing in Khyber March 8, 2011 (PAKISTAN): The in Frankfurt, killing two American Agency of the Federally Administered Pakistani Taliban detonated a car soldiers. The suspect, Arid Uka, is a Tribal Areas. The oil tankers were bomb at a fuel station in Faisalabad, Muslim, Kosovo Albanian. As reported bound for NATO forces in neighboring Punjab Province, killing at least 24 by CBS News and the Associated Press, Afghanistan. – Dawn, March 4 people. The attack appeared to target “Uka, a devout Muslim nicknamed the regional offices of Pakistan’s main Abu Reyann, reportedly yelled ‘God March 4, 2011 (GAZA STRIP): Hamas intelligence agency, the Inter-Services is great’ in Arabic as he boarded and security forces arrested a commander Intelligence (ISI) directorate. The opened fire on a bus loaded with U.S. of an al-Qa`ida-linked group in Gaza militants may have hoped to create airmen Wednesday on their way from on February 28. The commander, an explosion large enough to destroy their base in England to serve in Hesham al-Sa’eedni, is believed to be surrounding government buildings. Afghanistan.” – CBS News, March 3 an Egyptian citizen and a member of – Denver Post, March 8; Los Angeles Times, March the group Tawhid and Jihad. According 9; CNN, March 8 March 2, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen to Reuters, “Hamas, which has in the assassinated the only Christian past denied any al Qaeda presence in March 9, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide member of Pakistan’s cabinet, Minority Gaza, has been trying to keep other bomber attacked a funeral near Affairs Minister Shahbaz Bhatti, in Islamist groups in check following a Peshawar, killing at least 36 people. Islamabad. According to the Los Angeles devastating Israeli military offensive The funeral was for a relative of a pro- Times, “Bhatti, a Roman Catholic, was in 2009.” – Reuters, March 4 government, ethnic Pashtun tribal an outspoken critic of Pakistan’s elder. The elder, Hakeem Khan, had blasphemy law, which makes it a March 6, 2011 (YEMEN): Suspected raised a tribal militia (lashkar) to fight crime to utter any derogatory remarks al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula the Taliban. It was not clear whether or insult in any way the prophet (AQAP) gunmen killed four Yemeni the elder was killed in the explosion. Muhammad, the Koran or Islam.” – Los soldiers in Marib Province. The – Reuters, March 9 Angeles Times, March 3 soldiers, members of the elite Republican Guard, were ambushed, March 10, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): March 3, 2011 (UNITED STATES): and the militants managed to escape A suicide bomber on a motorcycle Two New Jersey men pleaded guilty after the attack. – Christian Science Monitor, assassinated the police chief for to conspiring to link up with the al- March 6 Kunduz Province. Four other people Shabab terrorist group in Somalia. were also killed in the attack. – Daily The men, Mohamed Hamoud Alessa March 7, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S. Times, March 12 and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, Defense Secretary Robert Gates told admitted that “they had engaged in reporters that the United States is March 11, 2011 (YEMEN): A Yemeni combat simulation in New Jersey by “well positioned” to begin withdrawing security official said that suspected using paintball guns and computer some U.S. troops from Afghanistan gunmen from al-Qa`ida in the Arabian software,” according to the New in July. He also said, however, that a Peninsula killed four Yemeni security Jersey Star-Ledger. “They also said they substantial U.S. military force would personnel in Hadramawt Province. purchased hydration systems and remain in the country. “As I have said – AFP, March 11 tactical clothing and other equipment time and again, we are not leaving in preparation for joining the militant Afghanistan this summer,” Gates said. March 12, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A group.” The men, however, did not – New York Times, March 7 roadside bomb killed four civilians in have actual contacts with anyone in Kandahar Province. – AFP, March 13 Somalia and were infiltrated by an March 7, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The undercover U.S. law enforcement U.S. military announced that 900 March 12, 2011 (IRAQ): Militants agent. – Star-Ledger, March 4 Taliban leaders have been captured ambushed and killed seven Iraqi or killed in the past 10 months in soldiers in Mosul, Ninawa Province. March 3, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide Afghanistan. – USA Today, March 7 According to the New York Times, “The bomber blew himself up in a bank in soldiers, unarmed and wearing Haditha, Anbar Province, killing nine March 8, 2011 (SCOTLAND): Police civilian clothes, were riding in a Kia people. Three policemen were among arrested Ezedden Khalid Ahmed al- minibus when two sedans pulled up the dead. – AFP, March 3 Khaledi, a 30-year-old foreign national and blocked their path. Four gunmen of Kuwaiti origin, in Glasgow on carrying automatic rifles jumped out

21 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 of the cars, opened fire and then sped March 14, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A March 20, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Taliban off down a dirt road.” – New York Times, Taliban suicide bomber dressed as commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur warned March 12 an army recruit detonated explosives Pakistani authorities that if U.S. drone among a crowd of people outside an strikes in North Waziristan Agency March 12, 2011 (SOMALIA): Burundi Afghan military recruiting center in did not come to a halt, he would end announced that it is sending 1,000 Kunduz. At least 36 people, including his peace deal with the government. more troops to the African Union five children, were killed by the – Dawn, March 20 peacekeeping force in Somalia. explosion. – New York Times, March 14 – Reuters, March 12 March 21, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A March 14, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide Taliban representative ordered cell March 13, 2011 (IRAQ): A sticky bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle phone companies in Helmand Province bomb attached to a car killed an off- attacked an Iraqi Army base in Diyala to turn off their networks “from tonight duty policeman near Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing at least nine soldiers. and until further notice.” According Province. – Reuters, March 13 – BBC, March 14 to Agence France-Presse, “He gave no reason for the move, but Taliban March 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A March 15, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A militants regularly demand that U.S. aerial drone fired missiles on a bomb ripped through the office of a mobile phone companies switch off vehicle carrying militants near Wana school headmaster on the outskirts of their networks, threatening to destroy in South Waziristan Agency of the Jalalabad city in Nangarhar Province, antennae if they fail to comply. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas. killing the man. The Taliban denied insurgents fear that NATO-led forces The militants, however, reportedly responsibility. – AFP, March 15 can track them through phone signals escaped the strike. – AFP, March 12 and the order often comes at nightfall, March 17, 2011 (EGYPT): Egypt’s when coalition operations against the March 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A governing military council released Taliban are most common.” By March U.S. aerial drone killed at least six Muhammad al-Zawahiri, the brother 23, all mobile telephone networks in suspected militants near Miran Shah of al-Qa`ida second-in-command Helmand were switched off. – AFP, in North Waziristan Agency of the Ayman al-Zawahiri, from prison. March 21; BBC, March 23 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Muhammad had been in prison for a – Voice of America, March 13 decade on charges of conspiracy to March 21, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Taliban overthrow the government. He was militants killed four tribesmen after March 13, 2011 (SOMALIA): According extradited to Egypt in 2000 from accusing them of spying for the United to the Washington Post, “About 50 the United Arab Emirates. As stated States in North Waziristan Agency of African Union peacekeepers based by the New York Times, Muhammad al- the Federally Administered Tribal in Somalia have died in clashes with Zawahiri “is the latest high-profile Areas. – Dawn, March 21 militants linked to al-Qaeda over the Islamist to be freed. Last Friday, the past two weeks, suggesting a dramatic government released Abboud and March 21, 2011 (MALI): Al-Qa`ida escalation in the fight for the Somali Tareq al-Zomor, two Islamic Jihad in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is capital of Mogadishu.” Analysts leaders imprisoned in connection with demanding at least 90 million euros believe that the 8,000-member the 1981 assassination of President for the release of four French hostages peacekeeping force is the main factor Anwar el-Sadat.” On March 19, just held since September 2010. AQIM also preventing the al-Shabab terrorist two days later, authorities re-arrested reportedly wants a number of AQIM and insurgent group from defeating Muhammad al-Zawahiri. – New York prisoners released, including some Somalia’s transitional government. Times, March 17 held in France. – AFP, March 21 – Washington Post, March 13 March 17, 2011 (LIBYA): The United March 22, 2011 (SPAIN): A Spanish March 14, 2011 (GERMANY): German Nations Security Council agreed to court cleared Mohamed Omar Dehbi, prosecutors formally charged Rami establish a “no-fly zone” over Libya. a U.S. citizen of Algerian origin, of Makanesi with membership in a – New York Times, March 17 charges that he transferred funds to terrorist organization. Makanesi, an al-Qa`ida cell. The judge said that a 25-year-old German-Syrian, was March 18, 2011 (UNITED KINGDOM): there was no evidence linking Dehbi to arrested by Pakistani security A British judge sentenced Rajib Karim terrorism funding. – Wall Street Journal, services in June 2010 and extradited to to 30 years in jail for plotting to kill March 22 Germany in August 2010. Authorities hundreds of people by blowing up an allege that he trained and fought with airplane bound for the United States. March 22, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Karim, a 31-year-old from Bangladesh, German, French, British and U.S. Prosecutors believe that Makanesi worked for British Airways and was in diplomats cited evidence of Iran planned to return to Germany to contact with Yemeni-American cleric supplying rockets to the Taliban raise money for al-Qa`ida, as well Anwar al-`Awlaqi. – AP, March 18 in Afghanistan. A British official as be available for other terrorist said, “Detailed technical analysis operations. – AP, March 14 together with the circumstances of the seizure leave us in no doubt that the

22 april 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 4 weaponry recovered [in Afghanistan] March 26, 2011 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed in what was one of the bloodiest days came from Iran, despite the fact that an off-duty Iraqi Army lieutenant near in Iraq this year.” The whole incident they were crudely doctored to make his home in Mosul, Ninawa Province. lasted more than four hours. On April it look as though they originated in a - Reuters, March 26 2, the Islamic State of Iraq took credit country represented on this council.” for the operation. – BBC, March 30; AFP, – Bloomberg, March 22 March 27, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): March 30; Reuters, April 2 At least one Taliban suicide bomber March 23, 2011 (IRAQ): A roadside killed more than 20 people at a road March 29, 2011 (IRAQ): A roadside bomb wounded two policemen in construction base in Paktika Province. bomb targeted a police patrol in the Ramadi, Anbar Province. - Reuters, – New York Times, March 28 northwestern Baghdad district of March 23 Kadhimiya, wounding five people. March 28, 2011 (IRAQ): A roadside - Reuters, March 30 March 23, 2011 (IRAQ): A bomb bomb wounded a police captain in attached to a car killed a driver working Mosul, Ninawa Province. - Reuters, March 29, 2011 (LIBYA): U.S. Admiral for the Iraqi Electricity Ministry in March 29 James Stavridis, the NATO supreme Baghdad’s Hurriya district. - Reuters, allied commander in Europe, said that March 23 March 28, 2011 (IRAQ): Gunmen intelligence reports on the leaders of killed four people at a goldsmith shop the Libyan opposition show “flickers” March 23, 2011 (ISRAEL): A bomb in Baghdad. - Reuters, March 28 of al-Qa`ida, but not enough to exploded near two buses in Jerusalem, indicate a serious terrorist presence. wounding at least 20 people. – Haaretz, March 28, 2011 (IRAQ): A roadside – Wall Street Journal, March 29 March 23 bomb targeted Mohammed al-Shemari, one of Baghdad’s deputy governors. March 30, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida March 23, 2011 (SYRIA): Syrian He was not injured, although three in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) police shot and killed at least 15 anti- civilians were wounded. - Reuters, March released the fifth issue of its English- government protestors in Daraa. – AP, 28 language online magazine Inspire. In an March 23 article titled “The Tsunami of Change,” March 29, 2011 (CANADA): Canadian Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al- March 24, 2011 (UNITED STATES): authorities arrested Mohamed Hassan `Awlaqi rejected suggestions that the The U.S. State Department designated Hersi just before he was to board an revolutions sweeping across the Arab Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri as a airplane in Toronto bound for North world will weaken al-Qa`ida: “The terrorist with links to al-Qa`ida in the Africa. Police allege that Hersi, a outcome doesn’t have to be an Islamic Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Asiri Canadian citizen, was headed to government for us to consider what has been identified as AQAP’s chief Somalia to join the terrorist group al- is occurring to be a step in the right bomb-maker, and he is suspected Shabab. – Reuters, March 31 direction. Whatever the outcome is, of creating the explosive device our mujahideen brothers in Tunisia, that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab March 29, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Egypt, Libya and the rest of the Muslim attempted to use on a U.S.-bound The Taliban took control of Waygal world will get a chance to breathe again airliner in December 2009. – Fox News, district in Nuristan Province. Afghan after three decades of suffocation.” March 24 authorities “confirmed the police He offered a series of rebuttals to had fled their barracks and district statements made by Western analysts, March 25, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants government buildings in town of such as: “Peter Bergen believes that Al attacked a convoy of vehicles carrying Waygal…leaving the Taliban in what Qaeda is viewing the events with glee members of an anti-Taliban Shi`a tribe he [police commander] said was and despair. Glee yes, but not despair. in Kurram Agency of the Federally temporary control of the district.” The mujahideen around the world are Administered Tribal Areas, killing – New York Times, March 30 going through a moment of elation and eight people. – Reuters, March 25 I wonder whether the West is aware of March 29, 2011 (IRAQ): Approximately the upsurge of mujahideen activity.” March 26, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): eight militants attacked a local – Christian Science Monitor, March 30 Taliban fighters kidnapped 40 men, government building in Tikrit, Salah who may have been either police al-Din Province, killing 58 people. March 30, 2011 (PAKISTAN/ officers or police job applicants, in According to the BBC, “Gunmen INDONESIA): Pakistani authorities Kunar Province. – New York Times, March wearing military uniforms over announced the arrest of Umar Patek, 28 explosives belts blew up a car outside one of Indonesia’s top terrorism the council headquarters to create a suspects. Patek, a member of Jemaah March 26, 2011 (IRAQ): Gunmen diversion. Then they charged into the Islamiya, is wanted for his role in the using silencers killed a police colonel building and shot more than a dozen 2002 Bali bombing. Although Patek in Ramadi, Anbar Province. - Reuters, people, including three lawmakers was captured in Pakistan earlier in March 27 who were killed by a single gunshot 2011, this was the first announcement to the head. The standoff ended only that he was in custody. – BBC, March 30 when the attackers blew themselves up

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March 30, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A CTC Sentinel Staff suicide bomber on a motorcycle killed six people by a police checkpoint near Editor-in-Chief Swabi town east of Peshawar. The Erich Marquardt explosion occurred just minutes before Senior Editor, CTC the arrival of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the leader of Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam- Editorial Board Fazlur. Rehman is considered a hard COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. line Islamist leader and an outspoken Department Head critic of the United States. – AFP, March Department of Social Sciences (West Point) 30

COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. March 31, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A Deputy Department Head suicide bomber attacked a police Department of Social Sciences (West Point) van in Charsadda, killing at least 12 people. It appears that it was an LTC Reid Sawyer attempted assassination of Maulana Director, CTC Fazlur Rehman, the leader of Jamiat- i-Ulama-i-Islam-Fazlur. It was the Christopher Heffelfinger second suspected assassination FBI Fellow, CTC attempt against Rehman in two days. After the attack, Rehman’s political party blamed the Central Intelligence Agency and “Blackwater” for the assassination attempt. – Los Angeles Contact Times, April 1; Christian Science Monitor, March Combating Terrorism Center 31 U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/

* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383

support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1553.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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