june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents AQAP’s Growing Security

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 AQAP’s Growing Security Threat to Threat to Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia By Caryle Murphy By Caryle Murphy

Reports 4 Assessing AQI’s Resilience After April’s Leadership Decapitations By Myriam Benraad 8 The Return of Moqtada al-Sadr and the Revival of the Mahdi Army By Babak Rahimi 11 Indoctrinating Children: The Making of Pakistan’s Suicide Bombers By Kalsoom Lakhani 13 The Third Way: A Paradigm for Influence in the Marketplace of Ideas By Scott Helfstein 18 Still Fighting for Revolution: Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists By George Kassimeris

20 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Prince Nayif reviews security units after AQAP’s threat to kidnap Saudi princes and Christians. - Photo by Hamad Olayan/AFP/Getty Images

n march 2010, a Saudi security The episode is a useful indicator of where sweep netted 113 alleged al-Qa`ida the battle between Saudi Arabia and its in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) extremist opposition stands. During sympathizers. Among them was the past seven years, the government IHayla al-Qusayir, an AQAP operative has largely uprooted the clandestine al- held in high esteem by her fellow Qa`ida network that burst into public militants due to her knowledge of Islam, view with spectacular suicide bombings enthusiasm for fighting Saudi security at three residential Riyadh compounds forces, and for allegedly sending more in May 2003. Al-Qa`ida’s subsequent 1 About the CTC Sentinel than $293,000 to AQAP. Her importance defeat in Saudi Arabia was due to several The Combating Terrorism Center is an to AQAP was highlighted when the factors, including public disgust at its independent educational and research terrorist group’s deputy leader, former violence. Just as important to its defeat, institution based in the Department of Social Guantanamo Bay detainee Said al-Shihri, however, was the government’s double- Sciences at the United States Military Academy, threatened to kidnap Saudi princes and pronged response to the threat. Riyadh West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses Christian residents of Saudi Arabia to launched a tough, well-funded security the Center’s global network of scholars and use in a prisoner swap for al-Qusayir’s and police offensive against the al-Qa`ida 2 practitioners to understand and confront release. network in the country, and at the same contemporary threats posed by terrorism and time developed a multifaceted, long-term other forms of political violence. ideological campaign against what Saudi officials identified as “deviant” Islamic ideas.3 The views expressed in this report are those of 1 Personal interview, Saudi security official, Riyadh, Saudi the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Arabia, June 2010. the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 2 Said al-Shihri issued the threat on an audiotape aired on 3 Personal interview, Saudi security official, Riyadh, Saudi al-Arabiya television on June 3, 2010. Arabia, June 2010.

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Despite al-Qa`ida’s failure in Saudi Qa`ida network and its contemporary fundraising on behalf of AQAP is not Arabia, other al-Qa`ida operatives namesake, AQAP. Raised by her disputed by the group, which noted formed AQAP in neighboring Yemen. brother after the death of her father, al- her contribution in this regard when AQAP has now developed into a Qusayir’s first marriage was to Shaykh responding to her detention. serious threat to Saudi Arabia, plotting Abdul Karim al-Humaid, an eccentric attacks and infiltrating militants cleric opposed to modern amenities At the time of her arrest, al-Qusayir into the kingdom. In August 2009, an such as electricity and cars.7 was allegedly involved in supporting AQAP operative nearly succeeded in two, six-man cells of suicide bombers assassinating Saudi Prince Muhammad Al-Qusayir, who is approximately supplied and directed by AQAP.12 Her bin Nayif, the country’s counterterrorism 40-years-old, divorced al-Humaid and precise role is unclear, but “she was chief and a deputy interior minister.4 then “got the man who filled her life” part of the plot.”13 Today, AQAP is In October 2009, two AQAP members when she married al-Qa`ida militant threatening to kidnap Saudi princes wearing explosive vests were killed in Mohammed Sulaiman al-Wakil.8 and Christians in the kingdom to effect a shootout with Saudi police at a traffic After al-Wakil was killed in a Riyadh al-Qusayir’s release. To assess whether stop.5 Two months later, an AQAP shootout with police in December 2004, AQAP can deliver on its threats, it is recruit, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, necessary to examine al-Qa`ida’s recent attempted to blow up a Northwest history in Saudi Arabia. Airlines flight over Detroit. Most “Hayla al-Qusayir recently, in April 2010 the British was a bridge between Success, then Defeat ambassador to Yemen escaped injury Al-Qa`ida stormed onto the Saudi when a suicide bomber threw himself in the old, decimated al- landscape with high-profile attacks in front of the diplomat’s convoy in Sana`a; Qa`ida network and its 2003 and 2004 at a time when Saudi AQAP claimed responsibility, describing security was totally unprepared. As Britain as “America’s closest ally in its contemporary namesake, stated by analyst Thomas Hegghammer war on Islam.”6 AQAP.” in February 2010, al-Qa`ida’s early successes stemmed from This article examines AQAP’s growing threat to Saudi Arabia. It first explains a momentary discrepancy between the importance of Hayla al-Qusayir’s his widow “hated every policeman from the very high organizational arrest before reviewing how the Saudi that moment,” a Saudi security official capability of returnees from government has responded to the al- explained. “She wanted revenge… Afghanistan, and the weakness of Qa`ida challenge. so any work that hurt the police, she the Saudi intelligence apparatus. was satisfied to do.”9 Al-Qusayir, who That gap has since been closed. A Widow’s Revenge has one daughter, “took advantage of Today, country-wide, organized Until her arrest in Burayda, the heartland her situation as a woman,” the official political activism of any kind is of the kingdom’s ultraconservative added, to hide al-Qa`ida militants. more difficult than ever before.14 strain of Islam, Hayla al-Qusayir was “Because she was knowledgeable about a bridge between the old, decimated al- religion,” he explained, “she could While it is clearly more difficult, it is convince women to give money.”10 not impossible. Continued al-Qa`ida 4 Asma Alsharif, “Saudi Royal Survives Attack Claimed activity in Saudi Arabia is illustrated by Qaeda,” Reuters, August 28, 2009. At informal gatherings, al-Qusayir was by al-Qusayir’s support to al-Qa`ida— 5 One of the men killed was Yousef Mohammed al-Shihri, able to persuade women to part with which went undetected for years—and a former Guantanamo Bay detainee whose sister, Wafa, is cash and jewelry after telling them that by Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin married to AQAP deputy, Said al-Shihri. Wafa was mar- their donations would be used to help Abdul Aziz’s recent announcement ried twice before, once to an al-Qa`ida extremist killed poor children in other Muslim countries. that his security forces had foiled by police in 2005. She has joined her current husband In all, the official charged, she sent 1.1 220 “criminal attempts” by alleged in Yemen, where she reportedly is appealing to Saudi million Saudi riyals (approximately females to join AQAP’s ranks, according to Saudi press $293,000) to AQAP contacts in Yemen da, Recruited Women.” 11 reports. There have also been reports that al-Qusayir and Afghanistan. Al-Qusayir’s 12 Personal interview, Saudi security official, Riyadh, helped Wafa flee Saudi Arabia with her three children so Saudi Arabia, June 2010. she could join her husband, who went to Yemen in 2008. 7 Shaykh Abdul Karim al-Humaid has been jailed for 13 Ibid. Asharq al-Awsat reported that two suicide vests For details, see Abdullah al-Oraifij, “Wanted Saudi Mili- several years because of his extremist sympathies. De- found in a car transporting two AQAP members, who tants Seen in Marib Region,” Saudi Gazette, June 15, 2010; tails were derived from al-Arabiya television on June 3, were killed in a shootout with Saudi police in October Mshari al-Zaydi, “Al Qaeda’s Women in Saudi Arabia,” 2010, in addition to personal interview, Saudi security 2009, “were destined for” al-Qusayir and that she had Asharq al-Awsat, June 6, 2010; Abdullah al-Oraifij, “Haila official, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, June 2010. “reportedly recruited two suicide bombers for an at- Al-Qusayyer Funded Al-Qaeda, Recruited Women,” 8 This information was derived from a Saudi security of- tack.” It also said that she had sheltered two youths in Saudi Gazette, June 5, 2010; “Distraught Saudi Father ficial who described al-Qusayir’s­ background on condi- an abandoned house for at least 20 days. For details, see Disowns ‘Stupid Son,’” Arab News, June 8, 2010. tion he was not named. “90 Minutes with Mrs. Al Qaeda,” Asharq al-Awsat, June 6 Mohammed Sudam, “Suicide Bomber Targets British 9 Personal interview, Saudi security official, Riyadh, 7, 2010. Ambassador in Yemen,” Reuters, April 26, 2010; “Al- Saudi Arabia, June 2010. 14 Thomas Hegghammer, The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Qaida Group Claims April Attack in Yemen,” Associated 10 Ibid. Arabia (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, Press, May 12, 2010. 11 Ibid.; Al-Oraifij, “Haila Al Qusayyer Funded Al-Qae- 2010).

2 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 extremists.15 Moreover, thousands of The best-known component of this 2010, Muslim scholars from around the suspected sympathizers and militants campaign is the prisoner rehabilitation world will gather in Medina to discuss have been arrested since 2003, and the program run by the Interior Ministry takfir, the practice of declaring a Muslim number still in detention has not been for detained extremists. It has drawn an apostate, which extremists use to disclosed. In 2008, the government praise from foreign counterterrorism justify killing their foes.20 The Ministry announced that it would put on trial officials for its innovative approach to of Education has also deleted some around 1,000 suspects for terrorism- confronting a problematic ideology, or controversial passages from religious related charges. The only follow-up in this case theology. Using religious textbooks seen as promoting intolerance to that announcement was in mid-2009 reeducation and financial incentives, toward non-Muslims.21 the program appears to have persuaded “AQAP will attempt to scores of former militants to give up The government has established stricter their old ways and start a new life. banking regulations on money transfers deliver on its kidnapping There have, however, been relapses— and warned people to give their threat to demonstrate one of the most significant “graduates” charitable donations only to officially- who returned to violence is Said al- sanctioned organizations, moves aimed its effectiveness. Targets Shihri himself. Even Saudi officials at preventing the kind of informal are abundant. There caution that the program’s long-term money collecting done by al-Qusayir.22 effectiveness remains to be seen.18 In late April, the country’s most senior are thousands of Saudi religious clerics issued a fatwa explicitly princes, and with 50,000 Outside prison walls, the government denouncing terrorism funding.23 has attempted to mobilize all aspects American and 30,000 of Saudi society—schools, mosques, In Saudi Arabia’s battle against British residents in the media and family—in a nationwide vigil militants, counterterrorism officials against extremist thinking. Parents are have also used psychological weapons. kingdom, there are also repeatedly reminded by clerics, security A few days after al-Shihri declared many Christians.” officials and social workers to supervise AQAP’s recent kidnapping plans, his what their children read on the internet father gave interviews to the local and with whom they associate. press in which he disowned his son for “shaming and humiliating my family, when the government stated that 323 Additionally, the Saudi Gazette reported tribe and nation.”24 He added: “I wished defendants had been convicted in secret in April 2010 that the Ministry of I could kill him with my own hands.”25 proceedings and given prison sentences Education is planning seminars Saudi columnists have contributed as ranging from a few months to 30 years.16 for high school students to discuss well, calling attention to the fact that “intellectual security” and the “dangers it was AQAP, not security officials, Alongside the security hammer, the of deviant thought.”19 Universities have that broadcast al-Qusayir’s name and government launched a wide-ranging been provided large budgets to hold thus brought shame on her family—a ideological campaign to delegitimize al- academic conferences on terrorism significant issue in Saudi society. Qa`ida’s ideology, often called Salafi- and “deviant” trends. In September jihadism by those outside the kingdom The ideological campaign has had an but regarded by Saudi officials simply 18 In a June 19 press briefing on the ministry’s rehabilita- impact. Saudis appear more willing 26 as “deviant.” According to Interior tion program, Interior Ministry officials said that of the to openly criticize extremist ideas. Ministry spokesman General Mansur 120 Saudis returned from Guantanamo, 109 completed It is certainly true that the burst of al-Turki, “That is the real solution: the program. Eight returned before the program was enthusiasm for al-Qa`ida among some to counter the ideology. If we do not set up, while three are still in the program. Of the 109 Saudis after 9/11 has evaporated, succeed in [this], we will not succeed in graduates, 11 went to Yemen and rejoined al-Qa`ida. Of 17 defeating terrorism.” those 11, one returned and surrendered to Saudi authori- 20 Personal interview, Ibrahim al-Maiman, assistant ties, while two others were killed in the October 2009 professor in Islamic prudence, Al Imam Mohammed bin shootout with Saudi police. Nine other graduates were Saud University and principal organizer of Takfir Con- re-arrested for breaking conditions of their release, not ference, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 3, 2010. 15 Muhammad Humaidan, “Saudi Arabia Foils 220 Ter- for rejoining al-Qa`ida. Of those nine, some are still jailed 21 This has been widely reported. See, for example, Kelly ror Acts,” Arab News, June 7, 2010. The prince was re- and others released under tighter conditions. These fig- McEvers, “Angry Teachers and Empty Libraries,” Slate, ferring to a time period of several years, dating to 2003. ures amount to a relapse rate of 18% for Guantanamo September 9, 2009. In October 2008, Prince Nayif asserted that 160 “terror- returnees. The rehabilitation program has had 180 other 22 Caryle Murphy, “Saudi Slows Terrorism’s Money ist operations” had been foiled, which means that plots graduates, mostly Saudis caught trying to join the Iraqi Taps,” The National [Abu Dhabi], November 2, 2009. continue. It is not known if the aborted incidents were insurgency and militants who have completed prison 23 Turki al-Saheil, “Asharq al Awsat Talks to Senior Ule- planned by resident remnants of al-Qa`ida’s old net- sentences. When all 300 graduates are considered, the ma Council Secretary General Dr. Fahd al Majid,” Asharq work, or by AQAP infiltrators from Yemen. program’s overall relapse rate is 9.5%, the officials said. al-Awsat, May 23, 2010. 16 “Saudi Arabia Convicts 323 Terror Suspects,” press Hardcore jailed militants who hold fast to extremist 24 “Distraught Saudi Father Disowns ‘Stupid Son.’” release, Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington, D.C., July views during prison counseling sessions are not eligible 25 Ibid. 14, 2009. for the program. 26 This is an observation made by many Saudis and evi- 17 Personal interview, General Mansur al-Turki, Ri- 19 Saeed al-Bahis, “Program to Save Pupils from Deviant dent in personal conversations with them over two years, yadh, Saudi Arabia, June 2010. Ideology,” Saudi Gazette, April 10, 2010. as well as from reading the Saudi press.

3 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 although this is more a result of al- AQAP will attempt to deliver on its Assessing AQI’s Resilience Qa`ida’s extreme violence than the kidnapping threat to demonstrate its government’s assault on its ideology.27 effectiveness. Targets are abundant. After April’s Leadership There are thousands of Saudi princes, Decapitations Yet not everyone is complying as and with 50,000 American and 30,000 wholeheartedly as the government British residents in the kingdom, there By Myriam Benraad would like. Interior Minister Prince Nayif are also many Christians. has occasionally complained that some in april 2010, the leaders of al-Qa`ida in imams at the country’s 50,000 mosques AQAP’s “ambition is evident,” said one Iraq (AQI) and the Islamic State of Iraq are not doing enough to counter extremist Saudi-based diplomat. “It’s immensely (ISI) were killed in a joint U.S.-Iraqi thinking.28 Most importantly, there is serious. The challenge for the Saudis raid. Abu Ayyub al-Masri (also known still the internet, where one can easily now is to ensure that its capability as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) and Abu find violent Islamist thought. Although to operate inside the kingdom is very `Umar al-Baghdadi died in Tharthar, many extremist forums and websites low.”32 That will not be easy considering Salah al-Din Province, marking a major are blocked by the government, most the porous nature of the remote, setback for al-Qa`ida.1 On June 2, U.S. technologically-savvy Saudi teenagers mountainous Saudi-Yemen border and Admiral Michael Mullen declared that can find a way around the censors. the inability of the Yemeni government, AQI had been “devastated” by the distracted by other concerns such as the killings.2 In a related statement, the Present Danger southern secessionist movement and a U.S. commander in Iraq, General Ray AQAP is now a major security threat failing economy, to engage AQAP more Odierno, announced that Iraqi and to Saudi Arabia, having proved its aggressively. U.S. forces had captured or killed 34 of determination to continue its jihad the 42 known AQI leaders, in what he against the kingdom and its allies, Interior Ministry spokesman al-Turki described as “the most significant blow principally the United States and said that while al-Qa`ida is no longer to Al-Qaeda in Iraq since the beginning the United Kingdom. The group’s “capable of waging a war” as it was in of the insurgency.”3 latest threat came in al-Shihri’s audio 2003, “the threat now is that it could recording aired by the Saudi-owned be capable of planning and carrying out In recent years, AQI’s capacities have satellite television channel, al-Arabiya. any atrocity—targeting oil facilities, been considerably weakened. The death In it, al-Shihri called for “kidnapping residential compounds or targeting an of its founding leader Abu Mus`ab al- princes, senior officials, and ministers official as they are threatening...This is Zarqawi in June 2006 was the first to exchange them for this Al Qaeda their danger.” crucial blow to the jihadist organization, lady who had been assuming the task of followed by the U.S. “surge” in 2007 recruiting women and collecting funds.”29 “We never say we’ve destroyed Al and the mobilization of armed Sunni Addressing al-Qusayir directly, al-Shihri Qaeda and that we’re okay,” al-Turki Arab tribes against its fighters. All added that “your mujahidin brothers… added. “We say we have good control on of these successes deprived AQI from were hurt by what has happened to our security situation. But this doesn’t its main bases of support. According you.”30 He then urged AQAP’s followers mean that anything [won’t] happen. to official Multinational Force-Iraq in the kingdom to “persist in gathering We’re fully prepared for that.”33 (MNF-I) statistics, high-profile attacks information, inciting the Muslims, are now at their lowest levels since the collecting money, and forming practical Caryle Murphy is an independent journalist conflict began in 2003, and there has cells to kidnap the Christians and the based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A former been a significant decrease in casualties princes of Al Saud.”31 reporter for the Washington Post, she among U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces was awarded the 1990 Pulitzer Prize for (ISF) and civilians.4 International Reporting. She is the author of Passion For Islam. Yet despite its recent setbacks, AQI will remain a viable organization for 27 This assessment is the author’s personal observation, the foreseeable future. In a process that which is consistent with the research of Hegghammer. continued under the leadership of Abu 28 Prince Nayif was quoted as saying in 2008, “Frankly Ayyub al-Masri, the terrorist group speaking, I would like to say that the imams of mosques, with the exception of the two holy mosques, have not 1 Abu Ayyub al-Masri was an Egyptian and the head of played their desired role (in the fight against extrem- al-Qa`ida in Iraq. Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, an Iraqi, was ism).” For details, see “Imams Fail in Their Desired Role: the head of the Islamic State of Iraq, largely considered Naif,” Arab News, October 17, 2008. In the months since an AQI front group. then, Nayif has repeatedly stressed the important role of 2 Robert Burns, “Top US Officer: Al-Qaida in Iraq ‘Dev- mosque imams in combating deviant thinking. See “In- astated,’” Associated Press, June 6, 2010. tellectual Security: Naif briefed on Role of Khateebs,” 3 “Al Qaeda in Iraq ‘Broken,’ Odierno Says,” United Saudi Gazette, May 10, 2010. Press International, June 7, 2010; “Odierno: Iraq Moves 29 Said al-Shihri issued the threat on an audiotape aired 32 Personal interview, Saudi diplomat, Riyadh, Saudi Toward Stability, US Drawdown on Track,” Voice of on al-Arabiya television on June 3, 2010. Arabia, June 2010. America, June 4, 2010. 30 Ibid. 33 Personal interview, General Mansur al-Turki, Ri- 4 “Attacks in Iraq Down, Al-Qaeda Arrests Up: US Gen- 31 Ibid. yadh, Saudi Arabia, June 2010. eral,” Agence France-Presse, June 4, 2010.

4 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 has become increasingly indigenous, the next government.7 In a subsequent security gains.11 AQI’s activities raise and thus more able to incorporate and declaration, U.S. Vice President Joe questions about the actual effects of the exploit local grievances. Indeed, the Biden echoed al-Maliki’s announcement recent leadership decapitations and the latest parliamentary elections held by calling the leaders’ deaths a durability of Iraq’s stabilization process on March 7, 2010 and the ensuing “potentially devastating blow” to AQI, after the March 2010 elections that were political deadlock seem to have given adding that the operation demonstrated supposed to reintegrate Sunni Arabs new impetus to the radical group and “the improved security strength and into the political scene and contribute hardened its resolve to disrupt Iraq’s capacity of Iraqi security forces.”8 to rebuilding a national pact.12 transition to peace and stability. The recent wave of AQI-claimed terrorist In addition to the security progress A number of factors account for AQI’s attacks and the group’s appointment of achieved in recent years and a decrease resilience to date. First, the dramatic new leaders5 are ugly reminders of the in violence, the deaths of Abu Ayyub drawdown of U.S. combat troops from network’s resilience.6 al-Masri and Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, Iraqi cities in June 2009 increased along with the elimination and capture AQI’s ability to maneuver by creating This article addresses the factors likely of many other ISI figures,9 are obvious security voids. With the scheduled explaining AQI’s continued ability signs of enhanced intelligence and withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops to renew and reinvigorate its ranks cooperation between Iraqi and U.S. from Iraq by September 1, 2010, this despite important human losses and forces. More importantly, it highlights trend could escalate.13 The ISF have key operational setbacks. First, it their better understanding of AQI’s received training and assistance and shows how the jihadist organization strategy, network and recruitment can be credited with key security has built on the U.S. military drawdown methods. Yet it is not the first time achievements in recent months, but of 2009, Iraq’s current political crisis, that AQI has been nearly “destroyed.”10 they remain exposed to the complex and the country’s overall fragile As illustrated by the spectacular dynamics of violence that characterize economic context. Second, it explores attacks that killed hundreds of Iraqi the Iraqi conflict. In addition, the U.S. the impact of Iraq’s indigenous Salafist civilians in May and early June 2010, withdrawal will not fundamentally alter legacy on AQI’s ability to regenerate in particular the series of bombings AQI’s “occupation narrative,” as the cadre. Finally, it argues that while the and shootings that left 119 dead and Iraqi government has already become leadership losses will not end AQI’s more than 350 injured on May 10, AQI the group’s primary target with online attacks, there are a number of policy retains resolve and confidence in its propaganda depicting Iraqi armed forces actions that could more effectively ability to operate in Iraq and roll-back as the new “occupiers.”14 Illustrative of counter the group. this shift was the series of attacks that AQI carried out at the beginning of June Present Factors Behind AQI’s Resilience 7 Tim Arango, “Top Qaeda Leaders in Iraq Reported against Iraqi police patrols and soldiers The loss of AQI’s top high-ranking Killed in Raid,” New York Times, April 19, 2010; Aamer in different Sunni areas.15 Leaders of leaders was triumphantly announced by Madhani, “Leader Deaths in Iraq Seen as a Huge Blow to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on al-Qaeda,” USA Today, April 20, 2010. 11 Alexander Mayer, “Al Qaeda in Iraq: Last Stand, or April 19, 2010, in an attempt to affirm 8 “Deaths of Top Al Qaeda Leaders a ‘Potentially Devas- Sign of Resilience?” The Long War Journal, May 12, 2010. his ability to restore security to Iraq tating Blow,’” Associated Press, April 19, 2010. 12 Since 2003, the exclusion of Sunni Arabs from Iraq’s and establish his legitimacy to form 9 Other recently killed or captured ISI leaders include: political scene has been a key point of contention. Despite Abu Ahmad al-Afri, AQI’s “economic security amir” their high participation in the March 7, 2010 elections, killed on March 23; Khedr Abd Ghanem Khedr Dawan, many Sunni Arabs are angry by al-Maliki’s willingness 5 Iraqi-born “Abu Suleiman” replaced Abu Ayyub al- the ISI’s “finance minister” killed on March 25; Bashar to use the Justice and Accountability Commission and the Masri as the ISI’s “war minister,” yet was not formally Khalaf Husyan Ali al-Jubburi, Mosul’s amir killed on Iraqi judiciary to marginalize his opponents and disqual- identified as AQI’s new head. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al- March 24; Abbas Najem Abdallah al-Jawari (also known ify elected Sunni Arab backers from Iyad Allawi’s coali- Husseini al-Qurashi was appointed as the ISI’s new amir. as Abu Abdallah) and Muhammad Nuri Matar Yassin al- tion, in particular by accusing them of ties to the Ba`ath Abu Abdallah al-Husseini al-Qurashi was appointed as Abadi, two top leaders of the ISI in Baghdad who were Party. See “Iraq Panel Bars 52 Election Candidates, May Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s deputy. For details, see Mi- arrested in May; and Ahmad Ali Abbas Dahir al-Ubayd, Alter Results,” Associated Press, April 27, 2010. chael Christie, “Iraq’s Qaeda Names New ‘War Minis- known as Abu Suhaib and responsible for military, kid- 13 Approximately 50,000 military personnel will re- ter,’ Vows Attacks,” Reuters, May 14, 2010; “Al Qaeda’s napping and bribery operations in the northern prov- main in Iraq after September 1 for training and other non- Iraq Network Replaces Slain Leaders,” Reuters, May 16, inces. For details, see Ernesto Londoño, “Iraq Reports combat roles. For details, see David Alexander, “Qaeda 2010. Also see AQI’s successive communiqués featured Arrest of al-Qaeda Mastermind of ‘09 Bombings,” Wash- in Iraq Struggling After Leadership Blow: U.S.,” Reuters, on www.alfaloja1.info and www.muslm.net. ington Post, April 23, 2010; Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Forces Kill June 4, 2010. 6 Since the May 10, 2010 coordinated bombings and al Qaeda’s Top Military Commander in the North,” The 14 AQI’s radical narrative has inspired smaller insur- shootings launched by AQI in reaction to the loss of its Long War Journal, April 20, 2010; “Iraqi Forces Capture gent groups such as the Salafist “Abu Bakr al-Siddiq senior leadership, other terrorist operations have oc- Two Senior al Qaeda Leaders in Mosul,” The Long War Army,” led by Abu Muhammad al-Iraqi and which has curred. One of the more recent and spectacular attacks Journal, April 7, 2010; “Iraqi Forces Strike Blow to al carried out suicide attacks against the Iraqi government. occurred in June against Iraq’s Central Bank in Baghdad Qaeda in Iraq’s Northern Leadership Cadre,” The Long According to some, the most radical factions of the al- that killed 18 and wounded 55 and was formally claimed War Journal, April 2, 2010; “Iraqi Forces Kill al-Qaeda Siddiq Army have already merged with the ISI. See Rafid by AQI. For details, see “Qaeda in Iraq Claims Deadly Leader in Mosul,” Aswat al-Iraq, March 25, 2010. Fadhil Ali, “The Succession Question: The Islamic State Central Bank Raid,” Associated Press, June 17, 2010; 10 For example, similar confidence was displayed by the of Iraq Searches for New Leaders,” Terrorism Monitor “Al-Qaeda’s Iraq Network Says Behind Bank Attack,” United States and Iraq after the killing of Abu Mus`ab 8:18 (2010). Reuters, June 17, 2010. al-Zarqawi, AQI’s former leader, in 2006. 15 “Five Killed in Iraq Attacks,” Agence France-Presse,

5 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 the “awakening” movement as well AQI-led operations.23 For instance, Moreover, by nourishing widespread as moderate Sunni imams have also following his arrest by Iraqi and U.S. corruption and bribery, a stumbling been targeted lately, such as in Anbar forces on March 11, 2010, AQI’s former Iraqi economy could boost AQI’s Province where security incidents have top military commander in Baghdad, additional recruitment of unemployed multiplied.16 Manaf Abd al-Rahim al-Rawi, explained young men or mere opportunists to in an interview how despite being held undertake paid attacks. In this respect, Second, Iraq’s current political crisis in U.S. detention between 2004 and reported shortages of foreign funds and serves AQI’s agenda. Al-Maliki’s 2007, he joined AQI only one year after increasing financial difficulties have repeated attempts to marginalize his caused AQI to increasingly rely on mafia opponent Iyad Allawi and disqualify “Many of the young Sunni tactics such as racketeering of local Sunni Arab candidates from his cross- populations, oil theft and smuggling or ethnic and cross-confessional “Iraqiyya” Arab men who took up other illegal enterprises as alternative list have revived sectarian tensions.17 arms in 2003 to fight U.S. sources of income.27 This has been Sunni Arabs, who massively supported the case in Mosul where persistent secular Shi`a candidate Allawi during troops and later joined the insecurity and political feuds have the last electoral campaign, feel ranks of AQI are known created a perfect environment for AQI to relatively deprived of their victory.18 ransom local merchants and civilians to While most reject AQI’s radical message, as indigenous Salafists purchase arms and pay bribes to recruit some could radicalize (or re-radicalize) who radicalized before the operatives, facilitators and accomplices if their grievances and requests for at various levels.28 Other Iraqi official greater political participation are not United States even entered reports also shed light on regular addressed. Moreover, statements by Iraq.” instances of bribes paid to Iraqi police, Shi`a leader Moqtada al-Sadr that he security officers and prison guards to may revive his feared Mahdi Army release AQI members, thereby allowing could drive sections of the Sunni Arab them to operate again.29 population into the arms of AQI or his release and became one of the main other related groups.19 Sunni Arab protagonists in the two deadly bombings Iraq’s Deeper Salafist Legacy youth remain particularly exposed to against Iraq’s ministries of Foreign Affairs Besides these current factors, AQI’s the radical group’s narrative. and Finance on August 19, 2009.24 resilience can also be understood in reference to more structural Other factors accounting for AQI’s Present economic hardship further developments that have marked pre- resilience include the release of worsens matters. In 2009, the Iraqi 2003 Iraqi history. The development of thousands of Iraqi detainees since government reduced its defense the local Iraqi Salafist trend, along with 2009, some of whom are acknowledged budget considerably due to declining other socio-political dynamics inherited to have made contact with AQI during oil revenues, with important freezes from the 1990s, explain the continuing their incarceration.20 Until recently, in the hiring of police and military violence in Iraq and the resiliency of U.S. and Iraqi security forces contended officers. While Iraq’s new budget, AQI. Many of the young Sunni Arab that previous releases were conducted in approved in February, allocates $380 men who took up arms in 2003 to fight an orderly manner and that recidivism million to the security sector compared U.S. troops and later joined the ranks of rates were low.21 Reliable sources from to $270 million in 2009, a broader AQI are known as indigenous Salafists Iraqi ministries, however, suggest breakdown of the projected spending who radicalized before the United States the opposite.22 A number of released in 2010 shows how Iraqi security even entered Iraq.30 With the number of detainees have returned to the armed forces, despite improvements in the struggle and have been involved in capability to lead counterterrorism budget shortfalls, a hiring freeze, and a need for special- operations, still suffer from relatively ized training, currently has just over half the personnel June 15, 2010. insufficient resources and facilities, it is authorized. INCTF also lacks sufficient means for 25 16 Waleed Ibrahim, “Police Targeted in Iraq Attacks, 11 which constrains their expansion. The resourcing the organization.” For more details, see “Mea- People Dead,” Reuters, June 7, 2010; Sinan Salaheddin, Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Force suring Stability and Security in Iraq,” U.S. Department “Iraq: Bomb Kills Sunni Militia Leader Near Baghdad,” (INCTF), for instance, continues to lack of Defense Official Report to Congress, December 2009, Associated Press, June 16, 2010. adequate financial means necessary to p. 43. 26 17 Ned Parker, “Iraq’s Election Adds to Sectarian Di- hire qualified personnel. 27 Greg Bruno, “Al-Qaeda’s Financial Pressures,” Coun- vide,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 2010. cil on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2010. 18 Lara Jakes, “Iraq Court Disqualifies Dozens of - Can 23 Ibid. 28 See the extremely informative article by Saad al- didates, Could Change Vote Outcome,” Huffington Post, 24 Jomana Karadsheh, “Al Qaeda Commander: How I Mosuli, “Al-Qaeda Turns to Mafia Tactics,” Institute for April 26, 2010. Planned Iraq Attacks,” CNN, May 20, 2010. War and Peace Reporting, June 11, 2010. 19 “Al-Sadr Call for Reviving Mahdi Army to Keep Se- 25 “Breakdown of Iraq’s 2010 Budget,” Iraq Business 29 Myriam Benraad, “Down But Not Out: Al-Qaeda’s curity, Official Maliki Advisor Rejects,” AK News, April News, April 5, 2010. Iraq Comeback,” Foreign Policy, December 2, 2009; Myr- 25, 2010. 26 According to the U.S. Defense Department’s report iam Benraad, “Iraq’s Enduring al-Qaeda Challenge,” The 20 Myriam Benraad, “Prisons in Iraq: A New Generation to Congress in December 2009, “The INCTF is a highly Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 18, of Jihadists?” CTC Sentinel 2:12 (2009). capable force that contributes significantly to the COIN 2009. 21 Ibid. effort. Manning, however, remains low. INCTF has a 30 Some local Iraqi Salafists are said to have participated 22 Ibid. projected steady-state end strength of 9,200 but, due to in the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s, such as late Iraqi in-

6 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 foreign fighters in the country dropping community at the expense of Sunni It is clear that AQI will continue to and AQI gradually “Iraqifying,” these Arabs helped Salafists advocate their launch operations in Iraq despite its local radicals appear to have become the ideology and led angered individuals serious cadre losses. Most of the latest bulk of the organization.31 to join AQI, including soldiers and arrests of ISI members tend to confirm officials disenfranchised by the de- that the group has now primarily The rise and spread of politicized Ba`athification process and the Iraqi become a local phenomenon. Although Salafism throughout the final decades Army’s dismantlement.34 a minority among the armed opposition, of the Ba`ath regime, especially among AQI has already shown striking ability Iraq’s Sunni Arab youth—the “embargo It is believed that prior to 2003, Abu to adapt to evolving environments generation”—had several causes, such `Umar al-Baghdadi, the ISI’s late amir and could be a more durable obstacle as the Iran-Iraq war, the collapse of and allegedly a pseudonym for Hamid to Iraq’s reconstruction than many the Iraqi state following its military Dawud Muhammad Khalil al-Zawi, was predict.37 There is no longer a distinct defeat in Kuwait and the overall an Iraqi security officer from Haditha hierarchy within the group, which impoverishment and destruction of who joined the hard line Salafist operates mainly through independent Iraqi society during those years.32 To movement during the 1990s.35 Following cells.38 date, little analysis has been dedicated the U.S.-led intervention, he quickly to this phenomenon, partly because became convinced that offensive jihad Perpetuating its stated priorities, the of the belief that the Ba`ath Party would be the ultimate solution to end ISI’s new leadership has announced had succeeded in eradicating Sunni foreign occupation and that an Islamic the launch of new terrorist campaigns Islamism, but also due to Iraq’s long government should be established in against Iraq’s military and police forces. closure to foreign observers. Iraq. Before his death, al-Baghdadi had An ISI statement warned that the group become a key component of AQI’s broad will deliver “a long gloomy night and After a relatively clandestine existence “Iraqification.” dark days colored in blood” to Iraq.39 It due to Saddam Hussein’s harsh is likely that AQI/ISI will target Shi`a repression, the fall of the Ba`ath Required Policy Steps communities to re-ignite sectarian regime removed all the constraints Developments in the past three months violence, which is all the more credible to the free expression of this local have shown that AQI is weakened and in light of Iraq’s current political Salafist trend.33 Other developments that the ISF is benefiting from increased impasse. In a four-page statement reinforced its spread, such as the training and experience. Previous posted on an Islamist forum confirming presence of Western forces after 2003 security gains and the elimination of the deaths of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi, and the related promotion of Western AQI’s top leaders in April, however, the ISI vowed that it was continuing the political and cultural values that have not prevented new attacks. The fight and committing to “what [its] two exacerbated radical views. On the other recent deadly wave of violence against leaders stood for” and will “transform end, the empowerment of the Shi`a Iraqi financial institutions—a double their blood into light and fire.”40 suicide bombing outside a government surgent and Falluja native `Umar Hadid, whose Salafist bank that killed 27 people on June 20 tack,” Reuters, June 17, 2010; Liz Sly and Usama Redha, fervor brought him to combat U.S. forces, and potentially and the attack against Iraq’s Central “Twin Suicide Blasts Outside Baghdad Bank Kill 27,” Los al-Baghdadi himself, who is reported to have left Iraq Bank in Baghdad on June 14—shows Angeles Times, June 21, 2010. between 1985 and 1991. This information is based on an how AQI uses the security void created 37 Iraqi and U.S. officials estimate that AQI now only interview conducted by the author with a security official by the U.S. withdrawal and the ongoing represents a few thousand fighters. This figure, however, 36 in 2008. See also “Two Locals Were Core of Fallujah In- political crisis to stage new attacks. does not include facilitators, who are much more dif- surgency,” Associated Press, November 24, 2004; Han- ficult to identify, as well as accomplices and other sym- nah Allam, “Fallujah’s Real Boss: Omar the Electrician,” pathizers who are likely to become more active if Iraq’s Knight Ridder Newspapers, November 22, 2004. 34 Not all Iraqi Salafists were attracted to AQI, as evi- political and economic situation deteriorates in the com- 31 AQI’s May 16, 2010 communiqué announcing the denced by the tense ideological and operational divides ing months. See Yochi J. Dreazen, “Allies Kill Two Chiefs appointment of the two new ISI leaders, Abu Bakr al- that opposed the radical organization to other Iraqi insur- of Iraqi al Qaeda,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2010; Baghdadi and Abu Abdallah al-Baghdadi, depicts them gent groups in 2007, such as the Islamic Army in Iraq. “Petraeus: Al-Qaeda’s Iraq Tactics Shifting,” Reuters, as “pious Muslims” with “deep knowledge of theology Those who joined AQI were often among the most disen- December 13, 2009. and jihad.” franchised and either appealed to its irredentist rejection 38 Several intelligence officials interviewed by the author 32 The author researched this phenomenon in the frame- of the foreign presence—in the case of suicide bombers, suggest that AQI primarily operates as a loose network work of her doctoral dissertation and conducted inter- for instance—or searching for a source of income in the composed of decentralized cells, some of which cooper- views with several Iraqi Salafists, some of whom with case of purely opportunistic operatives. ate with one another while others act independently. For close ties to radical insurgent groups and familiar with 35 According to Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman Mu- concurring analysis, see “Top Two Leaders of Al Qaeda AQI’s structure and methods. These subjects confirmed hammad al-Askari, Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi was a po- in Iraq Killed,” Reuters, April 19, 2010. the pre-2003 radicalization process and the current pre- lice brigadier general in the 1990s and became an active 39 “Bombers Attack Soccer Game in North Iraq, 8 Dead,” ponderance of Iraqi fighters and facilitators within AQI. Salafist at that time. He was first captured and detained Reuters, May 14, 2010. 33 For instance, well-known Salafist imam Mahdi Ah- by U.S. forces in 2006 and apparently managed to con- 40 The communiqué stated: “After a long journey filled mad al-Sumaydai took exile in the 1990s under grow- ceal his role in insurgent attacks to be released only after with sacrifices and fighting falsehood and its representa- ing pressure of Saddam Hussein and returned to Iraq in seven months. On the issue of detainee releases and their tives, two knights have dismounted to join the group of 2003. He then became one of the most influential figures connection with AQI’s comeback, see Benraad, “Prisons martyrs…We announce that the Muslim nation has lost supporting the insurgency and was arrested several in Iraq: A New Generation of Jihadists?” two of the leaders of jihad, and two of its men, who are times by U.S. forces. 36 “Al-Qaida in Iraq Claims Deadly Central Bank At- only known as heroes on the path of jihad.”

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Defeating AQI requires defining a The Return of Moqtada al- Sadr’s recent call for the restoration of strategy combining both targeted JAM is largely in response to weeks of actions with a more systemic approach. Sadr and the Revival of the Sunni attacks on Shi`a urban centers in First, the United States should continue Mahdi Army Baghdad and in the southern provinces. to assist and train the ISF to improve As al-Sadr called on his militia to support its capacity and capability to deal By Babak Rahimi Iraqi security forces, he justified the with terrorism once all foreign troops move by arguing that JAM could provide depart. Indeed, the ISF will have to deal since the beginning of the U.S. protection for Shi`a neighborhoods, with AQI and other threats alone in intervention in Iraq in 2003, one of especially during religious events. 2012. A first concrete step could be the the key Shi`a political players has strengthening of the INCTF’s functions, been Moqtada al-Sadr. As the leader This article will examine whether especially of gathering and sharing of a powerful Shi`a militia, the Jaysh the revival of JAM is a mere tactical intelligence between all institutions and al-Mahdi (the Mahdi Army, JAM), al- move to provide security for the Shi`a agencies involved in security matters. Sadr became one of the most important community, or whether al-Sadr is again Second, because AQI has seen its political contenders in post-Ba`athist harboring larger ambitions. It will also popular support fall dramatically, new Iraq. For the past two years, however, describe the new characteristics of JAM, measures should be taken to address its al-Sadr has maintained a low profile, which through the assistance of Iran ideological strengths that draw cadre to studying at the theological seminary has been reshaped to fit the new Iraqi its cause. Broader counter-radicalization in the Iranian city of Qom. Yet al-Sadr political context. and deradicalization campaigns should recently made a dramatic re-entry be enforced, and moderate imams into Iraq’s turbulent politics, with his Revisiting the Mahdi Army mobilized to counteract AQI’s radical bloc winning 40 seats in the 325-seat Since its inception in 2003, JAM Salafist ideology. parliament during the March 2010 has proven capable of changing nationwide elections.1 This leverage has organizational and operational tactics Eventually, Iraq’s legal and judicial enabled al-Sadr to become a kingmaker to advance the political interests of framework must be further reinforced, in a Shi`a-dominated government. In the Sadrist movement. In its original with law provisions and enforcement Iraq’s highly fractured parliamentarian manifestation in the early phases of reaching further. A body of highly politics, al-Sadr emerged to play a the post-war period, JAM emerged competent and trained counterterrorism decisive role in forging an alliance among as a “citizen militia” to address local magistrates should be established who the Shi`a bloc—led by Nuri al-Maliki’s security problems with retaliatory would be allowed to use preventive State of Law coalition and Ammar al- actions against sectarian (Sunni) and prosecution and detention powers Hakim’s Iraqi National Alliance—while foreign (U.S.-UK) threats.5 Between whenever individuals are reported to gaining considerable influence over 2003 and 2007—a period of insurgent have connections with radical insurgents who is appointed to certain government violence and (intra) sectarian conflict— such as AQI and other related groups. posts.2 By striking a major political JAM played a critical role in fomenting Within the Iraqi prison system, which deal that allowed his rival, Nuri al- sectarian tensions as Iraq entered has become a crucible for the spread Maliki, to continue as prime minister in a deadly phase of civil conflict that of Salafist ideology, the monitoring of exchange for the release of his detained almost tore the country apart. Between inmates should be enforced to more militiamen, al-Sadr has proved himself 2006 and 2008, the militia fractured, effectively prevent prisoners from a savvy political actor, capable of and some members broke away from al- radicalizing and potentially rejoining negotiating with his adversaries to Sadr’s political faction in response to the insurgency once released. enhance his own political authority. him entering negotiations with coalition forces. This development played a Myriam Benraad is a research fellow at In April 2010, al-Sadr exercised this decisive role in al-Sadr’s decision to Sciences Po Paris and associate scholar at increased political leverage by publicly move to Iran in late 2007 or early The Washington Institute. Between 2006 and announcing the restoration of his 2008, as he sought Tehran’s protection 2009, she was a consultant for the French feared militia, the Mahdi Army.3 The against his own militiamen who no Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and adviser at militia was disbanded in 2008 after longer viewed him as a spiritual and the Organization for Economic Development Iraqi security forces, supported by military leader, but instead as a mere and Co-operation where she provided international troops, neutralized al- politician.6 With diminishing clout, expertise and policy recommendations to the Sadr’s fighters during the final stages especially after the 2008 provincial Iraqi government on key economic reforms of counterinsurgency operations.4 Al- elections, the Sadrists suffered not only and the fight against corruption.

1 Adam Schreck, “2 Candidates from Iraq’s Sunni-backed Reforms Mehdi Army Amid Iraqi Crisis,” United Press Party Killed,” Associated Press, June 5, 2010. International, May 20, 2010. 2 Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraq’s Shi’ite-led Groups Edge Clos- 5 Karim Porzabid, “Moqtada-ie Javan be Donbale Mar- er to Government,” Reuters, June 16, 2010. jaeyat: Goftego ba Shaikh Youssef Naseri az Azay-e Jary- 3 “Al-Sadr Call for Reviving Mahdi Army to Keep Secu- an-e Sadr,” Shahrvand Emrooz, December 30, 2007. rity, Official Maliki Advisor Rejects,” AK News, April 25, 6 Babak Rahimi, “Two Types of Splinter Groups Break 2010. from Moqtada al-Sadr,” Terrorism Focus 4:10 (2007); Ba- 4 Sami Moubayed, “Muqtada Unleashes News, Improved bak Rahimi, “Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Pol- Army,” Asia Times Online, April 30, 2010. Also see “Sadr itics of Moqtada al-Sadr,” Terrorism Monitor 6:3 (2008).

8 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 from declining Shi`a public support, Shi`a pilgrims in Karbala. With Najaf’s tactical reasons for the recalibration but also a lack of coherent, organized and Tehran’s intervention, al-Sadr of JAM are several, one major force military force that earlier in 2005 gave agreed to a truce and issued a decree behind the changes appears to be Iran, the movement enhanced leverage in to freeze the activities of his militia, a particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Sadrist strongholds such as Sadr City decision that was renewed six months Guard Corps (IRGC), which has worked and Maysan. later to ensure his Shi`a critics of his to remold JAM into a Hizb Allah-like commitment to bring the unruly militia Shi`a militia in Iraq.13 In light of considerable pressure from under control.11 The Knights Assault the Najaf-Tehran-Qom nexus,7 al-Sadr Campaign to disarm JAM first from Iran and the Rise of the New JAM implemented a major strategic shift Basra, and then from Sadr City, ended Since 2003, Tehran actively sought by steering away from politics and in another cease-fire agreement on May to bring the Sadrist movement under instead pursuing religious activities. its sphere of influence. Yet Iraqi He transformed his militia into a nationalism and the decentralized religious association to enhance his “Al-Sadr may now feel he nature of JAM constrained Iranian leadership on a spiritual level. While has the political capital control over the movement. It was the residing in an affluent northern Tehrani bloody clashes between JAM and other neighborhood, al-Sadr began his studies to legitimize the full Shi`a factions, along with the declining at Qom in Shi`a jurisprudence under restoration of JAM as influence of Sadrists in Iraqi politics (an unknown) high-ranking cleric with after the sectarian conflict, that allowed the aim to become a mujtahid or a learned part of Iraq’s security Tehran to increasingly gain a hold scholar with the recognized ability to institutions, which could over Moqtada al-Sadr and his militia. issue religious decrees.8 As for JAM, With intra-Shi`a conflict and violent al-Sadr called for the transformation be controlled by Sadrists in JAM splinter groups, al-Sadr grew of the militia into a “cultural and a the next government.” dependent on Tehran’s financial and religious force,” charged with the military support, further undermining responsibility of leading an intellectual his ability to emerge as an independent jihad.9 The changes primarily involved Shi`a leader in the post-war period. the centralization of the command 10, 2008. Despite the truce, the Iraqi Accordingly, al-Sadr’s decision in late structure into disciplined and small security offensive expanded into other 2007 to move to Iran provided Iranian units of loyalists, vigorously training cities such as Amara and Diwanya in hardliners a major advantage to monitor to provide public services and other the summer of 2008, as supporters of the young cleric, while encouraging him community activities. The newly formed al-Sadr followed their leader’s call for to undergo religious training through religious association became known as restraint, showing no signs of major Iranian seminary circles. the “Momahidoun,” in Arabic meaning resistance. Al-Maliki, who came to those who pave the path.10 power because of al-Sadr’s support in By and large, it is not clear the extent to 2006, had now become the Sadrists’ which the IRGC has aided in regrouping The decision to remold JAM into a arch enemy. JAM into a Hizb Allah-like militia force cultural body dates back to August since al-Sadr left Iraq. Yet if Iran has 2007, when clashes between the Badr Al-Sadr’s 2008 shift toward soft been actively engaged in restructuring Organization—which is part of the power signified a self-promotional al-Sadr’s militia by weakening various Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI), a strategy designed to create a restored splinter elements and training the militia Shi`a rival to al-Sadr’s organization— civic force operating on par with the into a disciplined force (especially on and JAM led to the deaths of several Badr Organization, although mainly the leadership level), it is unlikely that modeled after Hizb Allah of Lebanon.12 the IRGC has been able to maintain 7 This nexus is marked by a set of relations—cultural, This development also underlined how focus in this restructuring process since economic, political and, at times, familial—that con- al-Sadr made considerable efforts to the Iranian election unrest of 2009. As nect clerics, their representatives and Iranian officials extricate himself from unruly elements a result of Iran’s domestic problems in a network association. Such complex relations play a within his movement, a source of stemming from the election, it appears critical role in Iraq, as many Iraqi politicians, especially tension since the escalation of sectarian that many of its intelligence resources 14 from the Shi`a faction Iraqi National Alliance, are closely violence in early 2006. Although the have been refocused internally. linked with this nexus. 8 It is widely known that al-Sadr has been in Qom. See, 11 For details on this period in time, see Rahimi, “The Fu- Of course, it is still possible that Iran for example, Babak Dehghanpisheh, “The Kingmaker,” ture of Moqtada al-Sadr’s New Jaysh al-Mahdi.” Also see continues to provide logistical and Newsweek, May 15, 2010. Babak Rahimi, “The Mumahidun: Muqtada Al-Sadr’s financial support to JAM in developing 9 Babak Rahimi, “The Future of Moqtada al-Sadr’s New New Militia,” Terrorism Monitor 6:17 (2008). the militia into a charity and religious Jaysh al-Mahdi,” CTC Sentinel 2:1 (2009). 12 The Lebanese case of Hizb Allah and its soft, public 10 The name was coined in reference to the devout fol- activities served as a model for al-Sadr, especially since 13 This assessment, and those that follow, are based on lowers of the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, who prepare 2006 when the Lebanese militia’s popularity soared in the author’s observations and research work in the re- the way for his return, which is believed by the Shi`a to the Arab world in the aftermath of a military conflict gion. culminate in the establishment of divine justice on earth. with Israel. See Bill Roggio and Daveed Gartenstein- 14 Apparently, between summer 2009 and winter 2010, For details, see “Faalyat-e Artesh-e Al-Mahdi be Halat-e Ross, “Sadr’s Special Groups,” The Long War Journal, many Iranian intelligence officers in Iraq returned to Taliq Dar Amad,” Fars News, August 29, 2008. June 10, 2008. Iran for intelligence operations.

9 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 association both inside Iraq and Iran. as part of Iraq’s security institutions, unlikely, however, unless JAM manages Along with their leader, a number of which could be controlled by Sadrists to effectively bolster its asymmetrical JAM military officers resided in Tehran in the next government. military abilities with the support of the and the shrine cities of Mashhad and IRGC, a prospect that could materialize Qom.15 This is, in a way, reminiscent of Implications in case the United States or Israel attack the 1980s when Ayatollah Hakim’s Badr The implications of JAM’s revival are Iran. officers resided in Iran and were trained several. The most critical is the sectarian by the IRGC for an eventual return to factor. While Sadrists are unlikely to In essence, the Sadrist movement is Iraq. Yet unlike the Badr Brigade in the undertake military operations against inspired by populist nationalism and 1980s and 1990s, many Iranian-based Sunnis in provinces such as Baghdad millenarian militancy. Yet the key to Sadrists continue to travel between Iran and Diyala, the resurfacing of JAM their success is the political shrewdness and Iraq, strengthening JAM’s financial could nevertheless threaten Sunnis in how they survive various assaults, and network ties across both countries. and motivate their insurgent elements and ultimately return stronger than to engage in anti-sectarian activities. before. What could eventually limit the On a more significant level, the revival A new wave of militant violence Sadrists’ militant activities is how far of al-Sadr’s political fortunes are less could return to Iraq and significantly they succeed in the political spectrum. about Iranian influence and more about undermine the country’s fragile political As long as al-Sadr remains a major his followers’ ability to cleverly exploit process, stirring the country back to the political figure, operating within the electoral politics to their advantage. The sectarian killings of 2006. Iraqi electoral process, it is unlikely that latest parliamentary elections provided JAM will return to its combative roots such an opportunity, placing al-Sadr The second aspect is the Iran factor. and reactivate its military program. Al- in the center of the political map. The Increasing pressure by the United States Sadr’s ultimate interest is to maintain key to the Sadrists’ electoral success on Tehran’s nuclear program could his political prestige, with the possible was how they applied systematic encourage the IRGC, which controls ambition to one day become the country’s polling methods such as databases with Iran’s Iraq policy, to use the new JAM first Shi`a cleric prime minister or information on voters in all provinces as a proxy force to either deteriorate perhaps a major Shi`a spiritual leader and a cunning campaign strategy to security conditions or challenge U.S. like his father, Ayatollah Sadeq al-Sadr. win voters in the south.16 Along with forces to prevent military attacks If fulfilled, then the activities of the anti-establishment and populist tactics, against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In this new JAM will primarily revolve around such as the staged referendum as a way scenario, the main question remains “cultural” pursuits, although it will to discredit al-Maliki’s authority in the to what extent Iranian hardliners always maintain a disciplined military Shi`a urban centers, al-Sadr was able could feel threatened to turn to JAM wing in case the Sadrists feel excluded to present himself and his followers as for military support inside Iraq. This from politics. the primary political force to defend the scenario is less likely, however, since, Shi`a population. Also, it is possible like Hizb Allah in Lebanon, al-Sadr Dr. Babak Rahimi, who earned his BA at that al-Sadr exploited his close ties with would risk major political capital if he UCSD, received a Ph.D. from the European General Qasim Soleimani of the IRGC, appears too obedient to Tehran. The University Institute, Florence, Italy, in who also played a part in lobbying the perils of doing Iran’s bidding could October 2004. He has also studied at the Iraqi National Alliance to merge with also severely weaken the new JAM, University of Nottingham, where he obtained the State of Law coalition to boost his as the militia could be undermined in a master’s degree in Ancient and Medieval political fortunes within the Shi`a bloc. case of a renewed military conflict with Philosophy, and the London School of This political move took away the chance the United States. In summary, the Economics and Political Science, where he for Iyad Allawi’s secular-Sunni front to costs for helping Iran are considerably was a Visiting Fellow at the Department form a government, which would have overwhelming for al-Sadr. of Anthropology, 2000-2001. Dr. Rahimi considerably diminished al-Sadr’s role has written numerous articles on culture, as a key political figure. Meanwhile, the Iran factor is closely religion and politics and regularly writes tied to the U.S. factor. Similar to Hizb on contemporary Iraqi and Iranian politics. In the aftermath of the elections, al- Allah during Israel’s withdrawal from He was a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute Sadr’s public call for the return of JAM south Lebanon, Iraq too could see a of Peace in Washington, D.C., where he reveals a sense of confidence with the rise of JAM military activities with conducted research on the institutional backing of not only Iran, but also a large the departure of U.S. forces in 2011. contribution of Shi`a political organizations Shi`a electorate. For now, the Sadrists This possible outcome is contingent on in the creation of a vibrant civil society in also have the respect of al-Maliki, Baghdad’s capability to implement the post-Ba`athist Iraq. Dr. Rahimi’s current who was forced to make considerable U.S.-Iraq “status of forces” agreement research project is on Shi`a clerics and concessions with al-Sadr to remain on both legal and perceptual levels. emerging information technology, specifically in power. In this light, al-Sadr may If al-Maliki is unable to fulfill the the internet. now feel he has the political capital to withdrawal agreement and appears too legitimize the full restoration of JAM dependent on U.S. military power, al- Sadr might shift his attention to anti- 15 This information was valid as of late 2009, when the occupation activities and engage his author conducted research in the region. new JAM in military operations against 16 Dehghanpisheh. the United States. This scenario is also

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Indoctrinating Children: pimples on his face and short,” attacked system because their children are a press club in Peshawar, killing three provided free education and room and The Making of Pakistan’s people.6 Another teenager “wearing board. In comparison, many government Suicide Bombers a vest with as many as 15 pounds of schools have limited teaching materials explosives” blew himself up near a and “an inadequate number of properly By Kalsoom Lakhani protest rally in Peshawar in April 2010, trained teachers, or in many cases killing a prominent police officer and absent teachers.”12 As a result, some in numerous armed conflicts, children as many as two dozen protesters.7 The families choose to send their children continue to be used as weapons of war. attack was later claimed by Lashkar- away to religious schools. According to Human Rights Watch, i-Jhanghvi, a group from the Punjabi the military recruitment of children Taliban nexus. According to Chinoy, the first stage in under 18 years of age and their use the indoctrination process involves the in hostilities occurs in at least 86 To comprehend the gravity of the child severing of young children from their countries and territories, with Amnesty militant phenomenon in Pakistan, families.13 Since they receive free board International estimating that there it is first necessary to understand and education, a sense of loyalty and are approximately 250,000 children the process of indoctrination, which obligation between the students and the fighting in conflicts worldwide.1 In ultimately socializes young recruits into madrasa develops. From a psychological Pakistan, a significant and disturbing hardened fighters. By understanding perspective, the separation of a child number of suicide bombers were this psychology, it is possible to find from parental control subsequently between 12 and 18 years of age, with one productive solutions. leads them to look toward a father estimate placing that number at 90%.2 surrogate as their new authority, noted Although young militants are generally The Role of Madrasas in Radicalization Jerrold Post, a Professor of Psychiatry, teenagers when asked to carry out Sources differ on the actual number of Political Psychology and International suicide attacks, the indoctrination of madrasas (religious schools) in Pakistan. Affairs at The George Washington children often starts at a much younger According to the Council on Foreign University.14 In the case of the madrasa age. In the PBS documentary Children of Relations, “Experts say there is no system, this surrogate often takes the the Taliban, journalist Sharmeen Obaid credible information for the number of form of the school cleric or teacher, Chinoy interviewed Taliban commander unregistered madrassas, but estimates whose sermons many young boys accept Qari Hussain, who boasted that he of registered madrassas range from ten without question. also recruits children as young as five, thousand to twenty thousand.”8 When six and seven years old, emphasizing, looking at the numbers of children who Children at a young age are “Children are tools to achieve God’s attend school in the country, however, deeply vulnerable, malleable and will. And whatever comes your way, only a small percentage (1.3%) receives impressionable, traits often manipulated you sacrifice it.”3 a madrasa education, versus 65% who by group leaders in conflicts throughout attend public schools and 34% who the world to indoctrinate child soldiers. In the last year alone, child suicide go to private schools.9 Nevertheless, According to Post, “The psychology of bombers have perpetrated a number according to South Asia expert Christine morality and conscience is something of attacks in Pakistan. In June 2009, Fair, madrasas are still concerning as they that is absorbed during childhood, and news agencies reported that a teenage may produce students who are more if that childhood is spent carrying out or suicide bomber detonated explosives likely than students in mainstream viewing acts of violence, it can be a very in the office of a prominent cleric and schools to support militancy.10 powerful and scary phenomenon.”15 supporter of the Pakistani offensive against the Taliban.4 The cleric, Sarfraz While not all religious schools in In the case of Pakistan, the dependency Naeemi, was killed in the attack, as well Pakistan are radical in nature, some between the student and the school is as three others.5 In December 2009, a estimates claim that about 15% preach further strengthened by the madrasa teenage suicide bomber, who a police violence or militancy.11 In areas with curriculum. According to Azhar chief described as “under 20 with a high concentration of madrasas, low- Hussain, a consultant with various income families may choose this school international organizations on madrasa 1 “Child Soldiers Global Report 2008,” Human Rights enhancement in Pakistan, the curriculum Watch, May 20, 2008. The 250,000 figure is drawn 6 “Teen Suicide Bomber Kills 3 at Pakistan Press Club,” in these schools is focused on religion, from the “Child Soldiers” section of Amnesty Interna- Kuwait Times, December 23, 2009. and rarely incorporates subjects such tional’s website. 7 Sabrina Tavernise, “Bomber Strikes Near Pakistan as math or sciences, disciplines that 2 Zahid Hussain, an expert on the Taliban who has inter- Rally,” New York Times, April 19, 2010. ultimately foster critical thinking and 16 viewed many children trained to become suicide bomb- 8 Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan’s Education System and analysis. In many of these madrasas, ers, provided this figure to CNN journalist Anderson Links to Extremism,” Council on Foreign Relations, Oc- students are also not allowed to watch Cooper, which was broadcast on “Anderson Cooper 360 tober 7, 2009. Degrees,” on January 5, 2010. 9 Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das, C. Christine Fair, and Asim 12 Bajoria. 3 Dan Edge, Children of the Taliban, PBS Frontline, Au- Ijaz Khwaja, “The Madrasa Myth,” Foreign Policy, June 1, 13 Personal interview, Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy, May 10, gust 14, 2009. 2009. 2010. 4 Alex Rodriguez, “Taliban Critic Slain in Pakistan Sui- 10 Bajoria. 14 Personal interview, Jerrold Post, April 30, 2010. cide Bombing,” Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2009. 11 Douglas Johnston, “Madrassa Reform Key,” Washing- 15 Ibid. 5 Ibid. ton Times, August 7, 2009. 16 Personal interview, Azhar Hussain, May 8, 2010.

11 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 television or read any materials not The Culture of Martyrdom of the Taliban, noted that older students prescribed by their school and are Not all madrasas are radical, and many in the schools (teenagers 15-18-years- “severely reprimanded and made an that preach hatred and intolerance old) also influence the younger children example if they do,” explained Chinoy. do not necessarily advocate violence. (9-12-years-old), framing jihadist The use of intimidation is therefore an At the same time, there is a culture fighters and suicide bombers as heroes important tool in indoctrination. As of martyrdom to which children who bring value to society and should a result, most madrasa students do not become acclimated while attending be emulated.25 According to Hussain, question or probe teachings centered on these schools. According to Post, the students as young as nine years old say narrow and arbitrary interpretations of evolution of suicide bombing in the if there were an opportunity to harm Islam. Islamist context has involved “taking Western interests, they would not hesitate in sacrificing themselves for The Common Narrative “While adult suicide “the greater good.”26 Despite the numerous types of madrasas, as well as militant organizations, one bombers may experience Surrender to the collective or group simple and overarching narrative seems some ‘existential identity is also a transformation to tie these entities together. While that occurs in the indoctrination there are variations on the enemy, more grappling,’ young children process. While adult suicide bombers radical schools base their fundamental are unable to process the may experience some “existential narrative around the notion that Islam grappling,” young children are unable is under attack. In his work on madrasas, meaning of ending one’s to process the meaning of ending one’s Azhar Hussain found that numerous life, especially if rewards life, especially if rewards are promised schools infuse teachings of religion with in the afterlife.27 Images and stories of anti-U.S. sentiment, delivering firebrand are promised in the virgins, rivers of milk and honey, and sermons that depict the United States afterlife.” other heavenly delights in paradise, as as the villain in the narrative, the force well as propaganda videos celebrating that threatens Islamic traditions and the acts of jihadist fighters, further values.17 While perceived allies of the enforce the allure of suicide bombing.28 United States, including the Pakistani something that is prohibited in the Holy Children are also told that by becoming state and NATO forces, are also vilified Qur’an—suicide—and reframing it as suicide bombers they are securing a in this scenario, the Pakistani military martyrdom.”22 Although the “greater” place in heaven for their families as in particular is a rallying cry. According jihad in Islam is the struggle within well.29 to Chinoy, clerics and militants frame oneself, firebrand clerics and militants the Pakistan Army’s operations against have shifted the emphasis to the “lesser” Children as Sacrifice militancy in Pakistan as proof that they jihad, or jihad of the sword, “which was From the radical madrasa and militant are “an enemy of Islam” since they are an obligation for Muslim men to protect perspective, children are seen as killing “fellow Muslims.”18 Chinoy Islam from invasion and its enemies.”23 expendable human resources. A noted, “Many don’t even consider the Ali and Post noted, “Over time, the common term used by extremist clerics military to be a Muslim Army.”19 terms jihad and martyrdom were in reference to these indoctrinated misappropriated by terrorist leaders students, noted Azhar Hussain, is This simple but polarizing narrative is and their members to justify acts of Qurbani ka bakra, or sacrifice. A cleric fundamental within the child militant violence in the name of Islam.”24 from a Deobandi madrasa outside Lahore context because it is digestible, noted once told Hussain, “This is a gift from Farhana Ali, a terrorism analyst who In radical madrasas, the reframing of both God that we have an unlimited number researches madrasas.20 “The narrative jihad and martyrdom are instrumental of youngsters willing to become Qurbani doesn’t have to be true,” she emphasized. in glorifying the acts of suicide bombers. ka bakra to teach America a lesson.”30 “If that’s what feeds young minds it’s These themes also further reinforce the This callous framing by clerics and irrelevant if it’s false.”21 Moreover, given fundamental narrative—that Islam is radical madrasa leaders signifies how the the sense of dependency and obligation under threat, and suicide bombing is use of children as suicide bombers and that form between the student and the a tool “to teach the enemy a lesson,” a militants is a political tactic to bolster madrasa, children absorb their teachers’ phrase often used by radical clerics and power. In a system where religion often narrative as their own fairly quickly. teachers and subsequently parroted by becomes blurred with culture, children impressionable madrasa students. Chinoy, a journalist who spent a considerable 25 Personal interview, Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy, May 10, amount of time visiting madrasas in 2010. Pakistan for her documentary Children 26 Personal interview, Azhar Hussain, May 8, 2010. 27 Personal interview, Jerrold Post, April 30, 2010. 17 Ibid. 22 Personal interview, Jerrold Post, April 30, 2010. 28 Arwa Damon, “Taliban Brainwashes Kids with Vi- 18 Personal interview, Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy, May 10, 23 Farhana Ali and Jerrold Post, “The History and Evo- sions of Virgins,” CNN, January 6, 2010. 2010. lution of Martyrdom in the Service of Defensive Jihad: 29 Personal interview, Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy, May 10, 19 Ibid. An Analysis of Suicide Bombers in Current Conflicts,” 2010. 20 Personal interview, Farhana Ali, May 10, 2010. Social Research 75:2 (2008). 30 Hussain noted similar statements by clerics from ma- 21 Ibid. 24 Ibid. drasas throughout the country, including in Karachi.

12 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 who view the world in black-and-white open to listening to other adults.”34 The Third Way: A often have a hard time comprehending Therefore, intervention efforts must such nuanced distinctions. be made to train and build capacity of Paradigm for Influence in potential guidance counselors to bolster the Marketplace of Ideas By the time children go through years the rehabilitation process. of indoctrination in the madrasa system, By Scott Helfstein many are recruited or choose to join a More importantly, a comprehensive militant organization. Again, while not approach by the government of Pakistan prior attempts at crafting a all radical madrasas advocate the use of must be developed to address this sustainable long-term strategy for violence, these children have also heard phenomenon as a whole. If the source of combating terrorism fail to appreciate the same messages repeated over and the issue is the more extreme madrasas, the importance and power of the over again and have been socialized in an then long-term efforts must be made to dichotomous choice fostered by the al- atmosphere of hatred and intolerance. strengthen parallel education systems Qa`ida narrative.1 Al-Qa`ida maintains According to Azhar Hussain, among to provide more attractive choices for that the Muslim way of life is under siege more than 200 students he interviewed, families. In the short-term, efforts by by the West, and that Muslims have many voiced an affiliation for at least local and provincial authorities to engage two options: surrender or fight. Given one militant group, some noting they madrasas in curriculum reform, conflict this choice, some portion of the Islamic liked Lashkar-i-Tayyiba but not Tehrik- resolution training, and peace-building community will inevitably choose to i-Taliban Pakistan, or they preferred workshops must also be supported. fight. Long-term counterterrorism Jaysh-i-Muhammad to Lashkar-i- Moreover, the state should undertake policy looks toward political and Jhangvi.31 Although some militant continued efforts to discredit the economic solutions, focusing far less groups, including the TTP, recruit narrative espoused by radical madrasas on the attitudes and norms that al- children as young as six years old, and militant organizations. In Pakistan, Qa`ida manipulates to generate recruits children do not become suicide bombers the issue of radicalization is a complex and support. The key to draining this until they are teenagers.32 process, which can only be countered support, and improving the long-term through a holistic, multifaceted and strategic outlook, is by disrupting this Solutions nuanced strategy. choice and presenting a “third way.” In March 2010, the Pakistan Army established a boarding school to absorb Kalsoom Lakhani is director for Social Since the September 11 attacks, and deradicalize 86 young militants in Vision, the venture philanthropy arm of ML there are numerous examples of the Swat Valley, who had either been Resources, LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based hard fought tactical and operational captured by the military or brought in company. Ms. Lakhani also runs the blog counterterrorism victories, but efforts by their families.33 While the efforts CHUP, or Changing Up Pakistan, which aims to counter the spread of violent of this center should be lauded, more to raise awareness on the issues affecting extremism have achieved limited resources must be allocated to absorb the Pakistan. Her articles have been published success. Al-Qa`ida today is a global overwhelming number of child fighters, in the Washington Post, Foreign Policy’s terrorist organization, carrying out particularly as Pakistan’s military AfPak Channel, Dawn, and the Huffington attacks against civilians around the gains ground against insurgents in the Post. She received a master’s degree in world, while simultaneously tied to country. International Affairs/Conflict Resolution regional and local insurgencies aimed from The George Washington University’s at overthrowing specific governments. Although many of these young Elliott School of International Affairs, and Kinetic activity, while important to recruits have experienced years of a B.A. in Foreign Affairs and Middle East security, will not provide a long-term indoctrination and radicalization, Studies from the University of Virginia. solution. Fundamentally, this is a norm- rehabilitation efforts must center on based fight, and al-Qa`ida’s leaders are providing them with an alternate and adept at framing issues in a normative legitimate surrogate authority, such way to generate the dichotomous choice. as a more moderate cleric or a member of the military. According to Hussain, The vast majority of people will never although many children with whom he aim to kill their neighbors or blow up spoke were willing to blow themselves a local café. Those prepared to do so go up, “Most were timid and very much through a period of radicalization and mobilization where choices steadily disappear, and they are faced with 31 Personal interview, Azhar Hussain, May 8, 2010. a single path. These people develop 32 If children are recruited at a young age, they go strong attitudes and overcome the through a similar indoctrination process until they are normative constraints on the use of teenagers. Prior to this time, they are also allowed to hold violence. Breaking this cycle is crucial guns, or ferry items around for the militant group. De- tails are based on personal interview, Sharmeen Obaid 1 The author would like to thank Nassir Abdullah, Alek- Chinoy, May 10, 2010. sander Matovski, Reid Sawyer, Bill Braniff, and Don 33 Kalsoom Lakhani, “We Neglect Child Soldiers at Our Rassler for comments and assistance on prior drafts. All Peril,” The AfPak Channel, March 29, 2010. 34 Personal interview, Azhar Hussain, May 8, 2010. mistakes are those of the author.

13 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 to containing or eliminating terrorism, poor governance associated with dichotomous choice, fight or surrender, and any successful counter-narrative apostate regimes, the Israeli-Palestinian acts as a powerful, emotional motivator. should aim to disrupt the dichotomous conflict, the oil trade, U.S. actions, and Building a narrative that helps to choice that al-Qa`ida propounds. An jihad around the world from Kashmir to complicate or dislodge the dichotomous understanding of attitudes and norms the Philippines.3 People from different choice is the best hope of marginalizing suggests that this is best done by countries and backgrounds can find a al-Qa`ida and its extreme views in the delegitimizing the source, the message, place in al-Qa`ida’s jihad. The narrative long-run. and the values put forth by violent stresses that all Muslims can, and are actors, cognizant of the limitation of technically obligated to, participate Attitudes, Norms and Terrorism any one path. irrespective of ethnicity, social status, Al-Qa`ida’s message plays to its or local grievance. Only a commitment strengths, harnessing tools such as Attempts to counter the al-Qa`ida to violent jihad is required. One of emotional illustrations, common narrative and contain the spread of the ways that al-Qa`ida achieves this experience, and history. Any attempt violent extremism must disrupt the universalism is through audience to counter this message must draw on frame, proving that fighting for al- segmentation. a range of mechanisms and leverage Qa`ida is not what the group promises, existing scientific knowledge of while also showing that the United Communiqués from al-Qa`ida’s leaders attitudes and behavior. Psychologists States does not have grand designs for often address a broad audience by suggest that a person’s attitude, their the destruction of Islam. Al-Qa`ida is covering the major themes above, summary evaluation of an object, serves adept at manipulating attitudes and but tailored statements to specific as a filter between beliefs and behavior.5 norms, and prior U.S. strategies have groups reinforce the universal appeal. Attitude is central to forming behavioral not utilized all the different levers of A message may be segmented along intent, and the act of terrorism is like counter-influence. Ultimately, there is support lines, speaking to fellow any other behavior. Any successful no “unified” strategy that will result in jihadists, those providing material strategy aimed at combating terrorism success. Undermining the source and by altering the behavior must rely on narrative may transcend borders, but current understandings of attitude. developing alternative paths or fostering “People from different norms of cooperation must rely on local countries and backgrounds People form attitudes about objects factors. While there are risks associated both consciously and unconsciously, with engaging such issues, the United can find a place in al- dealing with issues as diverse as States must not be afraid to spur debate Qa`ida’s jihad.” politics and weather. Research on and help generate a more competitive attitudes toward terrorism and anti- marketplace of ideas. Americanism yield some interesting conclusions.6 There is little evidence The Dichotomous Choice support, those empathetic to goals, those linking religiosity with support for According to al-Qa`ida, the West is at indifferent, those opposed, and non- terrorism, corresponding with advice war with Islam. The only acceptable Muslims. Messages are also segmented from an al-Qa`ida recruitment manual response is jihad. Jihad, a term with a along nationalist lines, with sections encouraging operators to target complex definition often referring to often targeting individuals in Pakistan, uninformed individuals.7 The greatest inner struggle, is distilled to a basic Saudi Arabia, Palestine, among other predictors of support for terrorism in and violent definition used to condone countries. The segmentation actually Algeria and Jordan are negative feelings acts of violence against any Muslim serves to increase the universal appeal toward one’s own government rather and non-Muslim deemed the enemy of the narrative since people can than economic conditions or judgments of “true” Islam. The limited religious see themselves in the message while about Western culture.8 While al- justification for such action relies on a sympathizing with the larger grievances Qa`ida cloaks political issues in a distinction between clerically-condoned that al-Qa`ida claims to fight. offensive and obligatory defensive For difficulties in Iraq, see Brian Fishman, Dysfunction jihad. By declaring the current conflict Given the universal appeal of the and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside al-Qa`ida in Iraq a defensive jihad, al-Qa`ida has lowered grievances, the message segmentation (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009). the barrier of entry for those willing to and the low barriers to entry, core 5 Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, Understanding At- 2 fight. aspects of al-Qa`ida’s narrative titudes and Predicting Social Behavior (Englewood-Cliffs, continue to resonate widely even as NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980). Al-Qa`ida has patiently spun this the organization itself struggles in 6 Mark Tessler, “Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: 4 narrative over time, and one of al- places such as Algeria and Iraq. The Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey Research,” Inter- Qa`ida’s strengths is the universal national Studies Perspectives 4:2 (2003): pp. 175-181. nature of its message. The issues that 7 Abu-Amr al-Qaidi, “A Course in the Art of Recruit- al-Qa`ida prioritizes resonate broadly 3 Carl J. Ciovacco, “The Contours of Al Qaeda’s Media ment,” undated. across the global Muslim community Strategy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32:10 (2009): 8 Survey information in Mark Tessler and Michael D.H. including the threat from the West, pp. 853-875. Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and 4 For difficulties in Algeria, see Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al- Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Message to the Islamic Ummah,” Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb: A Case Study in the States?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51:2 (2007): pp. 305- al-Jazira, November 29, 2004. Opportunism of Global Jihad,” CTC Sentinel 3:4 (2010). 328.

14 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 religious veneer, this research suggests into logical arguments, and attempts at its tactical strength is the willingness that supporters are often motivated by logical appeal must address such basic to violate such norms. Strong norms political rather than religious cues. differences before moving forward. prohibiting terrorism can provide a powerful check on radical attitudes, Once attitudes form, the ease with Emotion or affect can also have a either preventing action or forcing which they change varies significantly. major impact on attitudes and attitude individuals to go beyond the local Attitude changes occur in one of two change. This is particularly important community for validation. ways: logic and heuristics.9 Logical since al-Qa`ida’s narrative evokes attitude change occurs when a person strong emotion.11 Affective associations Societal norms are generated and gathers new information, and reasoning are often triggered more rapidly reinforced by patterns of social than cognitive associations, meaning interaction, both negative and positive. “While al-Qa`ida cloaks that a person’s first response to new Norms of cooperation emerge in information is more likely emotional societies where people have positive or political issues in a than logical.12 By extension, al-Qa`ida’s cooperative interactions, and the belief religious veneer, this message should be most successful when that others will act cooperatively helps used preemptively, blocking the logical sustain and reinforce such behavior.15 research suggests that appeals of others. Further, negative Empirical research on terrorist groups supporters are often affect-inducing communications exert across 190 countries from 1994 to larger influence on attitudes when the 2006 supports this idea.16 Terrorist motivated by political source is perceived to be credible.13 groups are far more likely to exist rather than religious cues.” Al-Qa`ida can benefit from this, but in countries with recent histories of research also shows that illegitimate intrastate conflict. Citizens of these sources find it far more difficult to rely countries regularly observe violent on negative affective messages. Finally, social interactions, and normative leads them to a new position. People fear has a big impact on attitudes when rely on heuristics, or rule-based people feel vulnerable, which is a “While terrorists may have mechanisms, when they are unwilling recurrent part of the jihadist message. or unable to engage in logical analysis. political aims, terrorism Heuristic change often relies on the While there is no single theory of itself is inextricably tied information source, where those trusted behavior, most scientists believe that exert greater influence on attitude. behavior is motivated by attitudes and to society’s norms, and Logical attitude change is stronger social norms, so attitudes are one half its tactical strength is the and more enduring, whereby heuristic of the coin and social norms the other.14 change is less stable, more accepting The attention proffered to political and willingness to violate such of counter positions, and less likely to economic explanations of terrorism are norms.” drive behavior. surprising when one considers that, at its core, terrorism is a normative issue. Some argue that “moderate voices in Terrorism is unique among forms of Islam” provide the best counter to political violence, not in its aims or constraints on the use of violence are al-Qa`ida’s message. Enlisting such brutality, but in its violation of societal weak or non-existent. By contrast, the authoritative figures relies on heuristic norms on the acceptable use of violence. opportunity to interact with others change, and resulting beliefs thereby Targeting of civilians for political in a mutually beneficial way, through subject to counter by other sources. means is eschewed across many cultures certain freedoms or healthy commercial Any attempts at triggering such attitude around the world. While terrorists may exchange, helps to generate cooperative change must be matched by actions have political aims, terrorism itself is norms that reject the use of violence aimed at delegitimizing al-Qa`ida and inextricably tied to society’s norms, and against civilians. Anecdotal evidence its message to prevent backsliding. shows that radicalized individuals This approach will not be as powerful 11 Leandre R. Fabrigar and Richard E. Petty, “The Role of often look to others for approval before or enduring as logical attitude change, the Affective and Cognitive Bases of Attitudes in Suscep- carrying out violent actions. but different a priori attitudes complicate tibility to Affectively and Cognitively Based Persuasion,” such efforts. For example, in 2002, 78% Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25:3 (1999): pp. of respondents from nine predominately 363-381. Muslim countries did not believe that the 12 Roger Giner-Sorolla, “Affect in Attitude: Immediate 10 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by Arabs. and Deliberative Perspectives,” in Shelly Chaiken and Such asymmetry in assumptions flows Yaacov Trope eds., Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychol- 15 Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (New York: ogy (New York: Guilford Press, 1999). Basic Books, 1984); Robert Axelrod, “An Evolutionary 9 William D. Crano and Radmila Prislin, “Attitudes and 13 Gerd Bohner and Thomas Weinerth, “Negative Affect Approach to Norms,” American Political Science Review Persuasion,” Annual Review of Psychology 57 (2006): pp. Can Increase or Decrease Message Scrutiny: The Affect 80:4 (1986): pp. 1095-1111. 345-374. Interpretation Hypothesis,” Personality and Social Psy- 16 Scott Helfstein, “Lurking in the Shadows: The Exis- 10 Matthew A. Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro, “Media, chology Bulletin 27:11 (2001): pp. 1417-1428. tence of Terrorist Entities,” paper presented at the Inter- Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World,” 14 Icek Ajzen, “Nature and Operation of Attitudes,” An- national Studies Association Annual Conference, New Journal of Economic Perspectives 18:3 (2004): pp. 117-133. nual Review of Psychology 52 (2001): pp. 27-58. Orleans, LA, February 2009.

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The Way Forward fellow Muslims than taking the fight Foreigners wishing to “fight” in Iraq To date, counter-messaging strategies to its Western enemies. From 2004 were stripped of their passports, money, suffer from four weaknesses: lack to 2008, 85% of al-Qa`ida’s victims and personal items, then forced to take of coordination across government, hailed from countries with Muslim part in suicide missions. Fighting for homogenous approach to issues, vague majorities and only 15% came from al-Qa`ida also involves breaking codes articulation of goals, and lack of framing Western countries.17 Its actions on and of conduct based on Shari`a law. The to address the dichotomous choice. off the battlefield should also drive killing of hostages, common in places Generating and implementing a strategy questions about its leaders’ perceived such as Algeria and Iraq, violates that overcomes these weaknesses is piety. Al-Qa`ida condones the murder Shari`a law dictating that prisoners crucial to long-term counterterrorism of disarmed hostages, which is strictly should not be harmed once disarmed. success and broader national security prohibited by Shari`a law.18 Coupled concerns in important regions. Existing with allegations that al-Qa`ida’s leaders Reducing the costs of “surrender” will knowledge on attitudes and norms paid bribes, there is ample ammunition also lessen the appeal of terrorism. should inform policy, identifying to assail their perceived piety, driven Al-Qa`ida’s narrative is strongest levers of influence to generate a sound by political expedience rather than when surrender is associated with strategy. religious doctrine.19 “Attitudes and norms There are four potential paths to Delegitimizing the source helps to countering al-Qa`ida’s message and stifle heuristic influence and emotional change slowly, and the violence it propounds. First, a appeal, but it does not foster logical progress must be measured strategy should aim to discredit the attitude change. Stronger and enduring source, helping to limit al-Qa`ida’s changes require logical arguments, in years and decades rather heuristic and emotional influence. which is difficult when people dispute than hours or days.” Second, the strategy should discredit basic underlying facts or assumptions. the message, appealing to logical Nonetheless, al-Qa`ida’s own messaging aspects of attitude change by showing strategy offers clues for presenting that the dichotomous choice is not as logical arguments. In the dichotomous the death of Islam and Muslims. That al-Qa`ida presents. Third, disrupting choice, individuals can choose whether association triggers a strong affective the choice by challenging the communal to fight or surrender, presumably response tied to vulnerability, making norms that underlie the movement will calculating the benefit from each course it important to expose this fallacy. This effectively raise the barrier to entry. of action. Large perceived benefits to is difficult when there are two ongoing Finally, an effective message should fighting, combined with a high cost wars in Muslim countries, but it is not highlight alternatives to violent jihad. for surrender, pushes people toward impossible. Leveraging actions such as These paths are not mutually exclusive, al-Qa`ida and terrorism. Setting this the U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq will often be synergistic, but at times choice as a decision problem shows that can help to discredit the idea that the may also neutralize one another. disruption requires two very different United States seeks to occupy Muslim counter-narratives necessary for lands, while simultaneously denying Delegitimizing the source, in this success: reducing the benefits to fighting al-Qa`ida the ability to claim that it case al-Qa`ida and its allies, can be a and increasing those to surrender. drove the Americans out. Highlighting valuable weapon. The legitimacy of the shared values, such as accountability source is central to heuristic attitude One method for lowering the perceived of government, justice, and minimal changes, and those lacking credibility value of fighting involves displaying corruption, is equally important.20 have little ability to alter the attitudes of military capabilities and the futility others. This is especially true for affect- of rebellion. Ultimately, this may One could also delegitimize the narrative based appeals that trigger emotional only buttress al-Qa`ida’s narrative by presenting a third way, inherently responses before logical ones, and of rebellion of weak against strong. disrupting the dichotomous choice. credible sources can convey negative- Another alternative highlights what it The third way itself must take local affect messages with great impact. means to actually fight for al-Qa`ida, conditions into account, since varying Delegitimizing al-Qa`ida as a source since perceptions are far from the truth. social, political, and economic conditions makes heuristic attitude change more mean that alternative pathways must difficult, and perhaps more importantly 17 Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, and Muhammad al- leverage the strengths of the particular blocks al-Qa`ida’s ability to leverage Obaidi, Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence situation. It is important to recognize, negative emotional appeals. Against Muslims (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism however, that alternative paths already Center, 2009). exist. Groups such as the Muslim The source of al-Qa`ida’s credibility 18 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for example, cites Qur’anic verse Brotherhood and Tablighi Jamaat offer comes from actions in defense of the al-Ma’idah 32 to prohibit the killing of hostages in ter- an alternative to the violent message Muslim masses, perceived piety, and rorist operations. See www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/ar- of al-Qa`ida, but there are risks to care for its fighters. The group’s deeds, ticle.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=4568&version=1&template_ working with such groups that may have however, undermine these sources of id=256. legitimacy. Despite declaring itself the 19 For a discussion of Ayman al-Zawahiri paying bribes vanguard of the Muslim community, al- to escape Dagestan in 1996, see “The Jihadists Theorist,” 20 Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy and the War on Qa`ida is far more adept at attacking Asharq al-Awsat, November 25, 2008. Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 81:5 (2002): p. 74.

16 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 fundamentally different interests.21 The third path or undermining the group’s It is important to note that any progress question for policymakers is whether norms must rely on a disaggregated or will be slow, difficult to observe, and they wish to strengthen the appeal of tailored strategy, acknowledging local hard to measure. Attitudes and norms such groups or prefer to design a third conditions (such as membership in change slowly, and progress must be path as a competitor. Either way, the proselytization groups) and community measured in years and decades rather development of alternative paths does norms (such as the Pashtunwali code). than hours or days. Changing attitudes not occur in a vacuum, and there is little and norms will be difficult, but it is reason to believe that these non-violent The Third Way as a Third Policy Lever absolutely crucial given current trends proselytization groups will moderate The third way represents an approach around the world, such as the growing their views without constructive to counter al-Qa`ida’s narrative, but it anti-American and extremist tone of engagement. also serves as a third policy lever for U.S. pop music in Pakistan along with the counterterrorism. Counterterrorism growth of extremist television clerics One can also take action to undermine efforts usually focus on kinetic activity throughout the Middle East.24 the norms espoused by al-Qa`ida, or large societal programs. Given the which are rejected by most societies. cost and difficulty associated with It is easy to conclude that the problem Islam has strict rules on the use of successfully implementing large is too difficult, and the third way violence, and most societies reject programs, such as nation-building strategy too soft or too slow. Yet 50 takfir, or the excommunication of fellow or regime change, kinetic activity years ago Muslims were not using Muslims. Combining takfir with the is often the favored option. Kinetic suicide attacks, and public perception lack of a single overseeing authority, counterterrorism efforts effectively of the United States in the Middle East factions that disagree with one another address the symptoms without was generally positive. Attitudes and often find themselves labeling Muslim addressing its roots. It also generates norms change, but the process takes enemies apostates to justify infighting.22 discontent, reinforces al-Qa`ida’s time. Right now al-Qa`ida is losing The norm of conflict is pervasive. narrative and possibly contributes to support, but anti-Americanism and the Undermining al-Qa`ida’s support will future terrorism. Given the paradoxes extremist milieu are gaining ground. be particularly difficult in places where associated with kinetics and the costly It is crucial to address this issue and civil conflict and insecurity have eroded difficulties of large societal programs, try to change the trajectory. Al-Qa`ida local social norms, since communal policymakers should see the third way spent years developing and reinforcing constraints on the use of violence are as a third policy lever. Such an approach their narrative, it will take time to lay already low. Normative constraints can is especially important as appetite for it bear. play a key role in mitigating violent resource intensive counterinsurgency behavior.23 Even Usama bin Ladin is operations wanes, while the al- Dr. Scott Helfstein is an Associate at said to have sought external validation Qa`ida threat becomes a more diffuse, the Combating Terrorism Center and an for the use of nuclear weapons, given disaggregated alliance bloc. Assistant Professor in the Department the strong normative constraints, a call of Social Sciences at the United States that was widely condemned. Changing Prior attempts at stimulating debate call Military Academy at West Point. He has interaction and fostering norms need not for action from the moderate Muslim published work on national security issues be tied to grand societal programs and community, and the assumption is in leading scholarly journals and provides are common in reconciliation plans. that Western sources lack capacity policy advice to the U.S. Department of for influence. While waiting, the Defense and Combatant Commands. Dr. These examples do not have to be marketplace of ideas is a monopoly or Helfstein holds a joint Ph.D. in Political mutually exclusive, and many speak oligopoly inherently antagonistic to the Science and Public Policy from the to source, message, and norms. It is United States and its interests. Evidence University of Michigan and an MA in War important when messaging that target suggests, however, that well-reasoned Studies from King’s College, London. or targets be clearly articulated. While and empirically-supported arguments delegitimizing the source, message and are capable of fostering debate and norms are crucial to any long-term altering discourse in the marketplace. success, it is important to acknowledge A short report on al-Qa`ida’s violence the shortcomings of any “unified” against Muslims recently fostered strategy. Undermining al-Qa`ida as a discussion in venues such as Muslim. source, or its dichotomous message, net and Ikhwanweb.com. Al-Qa`ida may resonate across different regions; has no hesitations about participating however, attempts at establishing a in this marketplace, and Western sources should not be afraid to put 21 Marc Lynch, “The Brotherhood’s Dilemma,” Middle forward empirical arguments to foster East Brief 25 (2008). debate. This approach will not generate 22 Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction widespread Muslim support for the (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). United States or its policies, but it will 23 For an example in the jihadist context, see Thomas be successful if people reject al-Qa`ida Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan- and embrace a third way. Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 24 Adam B. Ellick, “Tuning Out the Taliban,” New York Press, 2010). Times, video production, 2009.

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Still Fighting for RS attempted a second bombing, at a that resort to terrorism, claimed that Citibank branch in Neo Psychico, a its cause justified extremism. The Revolution: Greece’s New northern Athens suburb. RS placed a group presented itself and its violence Generation of Terrorists call 35 minutes before the scheduled in terms of political dissent, moral explosion, giving police barely enough conviction and armed insurrection. By George Kassimeris time to disarm it with two controlled Narrating its discourse through lengthy explosions. The next attack, on May 5, attack communiqués which, thanks to on january 12, 2007, Greece’s leftist 2004, targeted a police station in the 17N, have long become an established Epanastatikos Agonas (Revolutionary working-class suburb of Kallithea; the Greek media ritual, RS elaborated the Struggle, RS) terrorist group fired triple bombing came just three months presentation of political events and an anti-tank grenade into the heavily before the opening of the Athens expanded the dimensions of their violent fortified U.S. Embassy in Athens. In Olympic Games. The first two bombs early 2009, the RS executed multiple exploded within minutes of each other “The group’s modus bomb attacks against the American and the third approximately 30 minutes banking giant Citibank in the Greek later, leading police to the conclusion operandi incorporated capital. The RS’ continued attacks on that the group intended to cause human high-profile assassination international targets led U.S. Secretary casualties. The attack, somewhat of State Hillary Clinton to declare the inevitably, received huge press coverage attempts, armed raids, car group a foreign terrorist organization and prompted security experts and the bombs and rocket attacks on April 22, 2009.1 In April 2010, international media to openly question however, Greek authorities achieved Greece’s resolve in providing safety and against Athens-based U.S. a major victory, arresting almost all security for the first post-9/11 Olympic targets.” of the group’s known members in Games. counterterrorism raids. Ten days after the Kallithea attack, This article examines RS’ campaign the RS issued a 16-page ideological context in an attempt to dramatize the of violence, its selection of targets, manifesto claiming responsibility for anomalies of the existing system, deny ideology and operational development. the triple bombing and publicizing the its legitimacy and propound alternative It also discusses the group’s chances group’s “revolutionary” credentials. models. The group believed that it was of survival after the April 2010 arrests Entitled “New World Order or the a priority to create an insurrectionary of six of its alleged members by Greek Terrorism International,”3 the text mood that would awaken consciences police. Finally, the article warns that outlined RS’ political positions, offering and radicalize Grecians. Utterly despite the recent success against the RS, at the same time a commentary on convinced that the “age offers unique Greece’s counterterrorism apparatus domestic and international conditions.4 opportunities for anyone wishing to remains inadequately prepared for a A mixture of ultra leftist political fight,” RS sought to take the role of number of threats still on the horizon. analysis, international relations vanguard of the movement and persuade commentary and polemical hyperbole, other groups making up the panorama Violent Debut “New World Order or the Terrorism of the Greek extra-parliamentary left From its initial bomb attack on Athens’ International” was similar in style to that “conditions for an overthrow of the Evelpidon courthouse in September past 17N communiqués and explored system by revolutionary armed struggle 2003, the RS was determined to make a number of themes5 from which the are ripe.”7 In fact, as far as the group a bloody splash. Two bombs were timed group drew inspiration and motivation was concerned, “the conditions were to explode 15 minutes apart with no for its campaign. never better.”8 RS held it as axiomatic advance notice, designed to kill police that the regime had entered a phase of responding to the first explosion at the As stated by a senior Greek destabilization and would therefore be courthouse. The RS attack coincided counterterrorism officer, the RS’ central “exceedingly vulnerable” if attacked with the trial of Greece’s leading ambition was to “stand alongside 17N in with increasing violence.9 As such, the left-wing urban terrorist group, the Greek pantheon of great revolutionary group’s modus operandi incorporated the Revolutionary Organization 17 forces.”6 RS, like all organizations high-profile assassination attempts, November (17N).2 On March 14, 2004, armed raids, car bombs and rocket November, 1975-2002,” Journal of Southern Europe and attacks against Athens-based U.S. 1 Ian Kelly, “Designations of Three Greek Foreign Ter- the Balkans 6:2 (2004). targets. rorist Organizations,” U.S. State Department, May 18, 3 This was a clear reference to the “Communist Interna- 2009. tional.” 2 Comprised of a small group (approximately 12) of dedi- 4 “New World Order or the Terrorism International,” To cated militants, 17N operated for 27 years with lethal ef- Pontiki, May 13, 2004. fectiveness without ever being infiltrated. Between 1975 5 The themes included: “the Greek political establish- and 2000, it carried out hundreds of attacks and was ment,” “the trial of 17N,” “capitalist exploitation,” “glo- ficer, Athens, Greece, February 2010. responsible for assassinating 22 people before being balization,” “9/11,” “the U.S.-led war on terror,” “the wars 7 RS attack communiqué on Citibank, dated March 12, taken down by the Greek authorities in June 2002. See in Iraq and Afghanistan,” “the Arab-Israeli conflict” and 2009. George Kassimeris, “Fighting for Revolution? The Life “U.S. hegemonic plans in the Balkans,” among others. 8 Ibid. and Death of Greece’s Revolutionary Organization 17 6 Personal interview, senior Greek counterterrorism of- 9 Ibid.

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The group’s relatively long run came around the Greek authorities primarily was apparently able to act with impunity to a halt in the early hours of March because they took advantage of the fact despite being known to the police since 11, 2010, when 35-year-old Lambros that Greece’s national counterterrorism the late 1990s when he was put behind Foundas, an RS commando, was shot effort was conducted for more than two bars for attempting to detonate a bomb dead by police after he was caught trying decades against a background of half- outside the Development Ministry.13 to steal a car in the southeastern Athens measures, polarization, rivalry and One would expect that upon his release neighborhood of Dafni.10 Next to the exaggeration. Greece’s state response to in August 2001 he would be placed body of the fatally wounded Foundas, the 17N violence can in fact be used as under police surveillance. Instead, after who wore double leather gloves and an excellent case study of what not to do his release he allegedly coordinated carried no cell phone or identification, when dealing with terrorism. more than a dozen RS attacks, including was a Zastava gun. In his backpack were bombings, rocket attacks and armed a handmade bomb (of a similar type History began to repeat itself when the raids. used in previous RS operations) and RS emerged. Greece’s state response a two-way radio transceiver.11 Police to the RS amounted to nothing more The election of a new government in believe that the stolen Seat Ibiza was substantial than the usual empty October 2009, however, improved to be used in an operation within the government rhetoric. The Greek Greece’s counterterrorism policy. The next 24 hours. A police examination of state seemed to be following the same return of Michalis Chrysohoidis (who the contents of Foundas’ mobile phone lethargic, dilatory, if not indifferent was in charge during the 17N break and laptop provided the authorities counterterrorism approach that served up) to the Ministry of Public Order with a list of suspects that led to the the country badly in the past. Dealing and the inevitable change of all top arrests of five men and one woman, with experienced and heavily armed police, counterterrorism and national aged between 30 and 41, who were terrorists, such as members of the RS intelligence personnel for reasons subsequently charged with multiple and the 17N before them, requires a of political patronage—regardless counts of attempted homicide, causing combination of discipline, alertness of the negative light it cast on explosions and armed offenses linked and operational proficiency on the part Greece’s political culture—meant that with the RS. Police announced that of the security forces. This is the one Chrysohoidis surrounded himself with during searches in the home of detainee lesson that Greek authorities should people he trusted and whose specialized Nikos Maziotis, who is allegedly the have learned after the 17N fiasco and knowledge and experience was vital in group’s leader of operations, they found therefore should have taken the RS rooting out 17N in the summer of 2002. original RS communiqués, hand-drawn terrorist threat more seriously. Put As one of his senior counterterrorism plans of future targets and detailed road differently, the inability on the part officials stated, “These were extremely maps for upcoming strikes. of the authorities and the intelligence dangerous and violent people and they community to quickly understand the would murder a lot of people if allowed to Greek Counterterrorism Measures and group’s objectives and how dangerous continue. The lessons of the recent past Failures it could become gave the terrorists were considered, comprehended and Even though all terrorist groups invaluable time to organize and establish carefully calibrated for the particular eventually end, until that outcome is themselves. circumstances and the particular achieved more people die and the damage strategy of the group in question.”14 toll rises. It is worth remembering that Yet like the 17N during its early years, for an astonishing 27 years (from the the RS seemed to receive the same Outlook for the Future mid-1970s until 2002), the 17N pursued weak, uncoordinated counterterrorism Is this the end of the road for the RS? one of the most intransigent campaigns treatment. Rather than sending the Could the organization regroup and of terrorism in Europe, assassinating terrorists an early and clear signal make a comeback? If the six people U.S. and British diplomats, Greek that violence would not be tolerated, captured are, as the Greek police insist, politicians, newspaper publishers and the Greek authorities seemed to be in the core members of the RS, then the industrialists, detonating hundreds denial. A considerable number of senior group faces an uphill battle to maintain of bombs, and firing rockets against officials at the Ministry of Public Order momentum. According to sources close foreign embassies and businesses, at the time were seriously entertaining to the Public Order minister, the group causing hundreds of millions of dollars the theory that 17N’s dismantling had can only count on another three, at most of property damage. It is also worth brought the final victory over terrorism four members still at large, leaving the noting that in this time successive in Greece, insisting that whatever small organization facing a profound period Greek governments failed to bring to splinter groups still remained posed no of crisis that could, and probably will, justice even one member of the group real security threat.12 Unsurprisingly, and, in the end, it was only a massive this inability on the part of Greece’s 13 In 1999, Maziotis was convicted and sentenced to blunder on the part of the terrorists security community to assess accurately three-and-a-half years in prison for planting a bomb, that led to their arrests and the group’s the real danger posed by the RS gave which failed to explode, outside the Ministry of Develop- demise. History may well judge 17N as the terrorists enough time to organize ment building in December 1997 to protest against the a failure, but this does not alter the fact and improve operationally. The group’s installation of a gold metallurgy by multinational com- that they succeeded in running rings alleged mastermind, Nikos Maziotis, pany TVX Gold in the village of Strymonikos, Halkidiki in northern Greece. 10 Kathimerini, March 12, 2010. 12 Personal interviews, Ministry of Public Order offi- 14 Personal interview, senior counterterrorism officer, 11 To Vima, March 13, 2010. cials, Athens, Greece, June 2005. Athens, Greece, April 2010.

19 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 become definitive.15 It is a mistake, with Afghan Taliban fighters. Speaking to however, to think that the logistical and Recent Highlights in a U.S. reporter, Afghan Taliban fighters operational dismantling of RS marks the Terrorist Activity who want to come “to the other side” need end of revolutionary terrorism in Greece. to “renounce Al-Qaeda. They have to Other post-17N groups such as the “Sect May 1, 2010 (UNITED STATES): A car renounce violence. They have to give up of Revolutionaries” and “Conspiracy of bomb was discovered in New York City’s their arms. And they have to be willing to the Cells Fire” are almost certain to take Times Square after street vendors noticed abide by the Afghan constitution.” – AFP, the baton of violence from the RS.16 smoke coming from a Nissan Pathfinder. May 1 The bomb had been ignited, but failed It is critical, therefore, that Greek to explode, and authorities were able to May 2, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A security forces rely less on luck to stop disarm the device before it could cause roadside bomb ripped through a minibus future terrorists and more on a coherent any casualties. On May 2, the Pakistani in Paktia Province, killing eight Afghan counterterrorism strategy and an Taliban purportedly took credit for the civilians including women and children. integrated counterterrorism capability. attempted attack, in a statement posted on – al-Jazira, May 3 Whatever lies ahead, each new group Islamist web forums. The statement read, and each terrorist campaign serves as “The Pakistani Taliban announces its May 3, 2010 (UNITED STATES): U.S. a reminder that Greece has one of the responsibility for the New York attack in authorities arrested Faisal Shahzad as most sustained problems of political revenge for the two leaders [Abu `Umar] he tried to flee the United States on a violence anywhere in Europe. Indeed, al-Baghdadi and [Abu Hamza] al-Muhajir Dubai-bound jet. Shahzad, a Pakistani- only days after the arrests of Maziotis and Muslim martyrs.” Despite the claim American, is the key suspect in the May and his alleged collaborators, graffiti of responsibility, it was not immediately 1 failed car bombing in New York City’s appeared on numerous walls in central clear whether the Pakistani Taliban were Times Square. Authorities said that Athens warning, “Nothing is finished, it involved in the failed attack as a number Shahzad, who is 30-years-old, admitted all continues.” of conflicting reports later emerged. his role in the plot, and he claimed that he – Reuters, May 2 received explosives training in Pakistan. Dr. George Kassimeris, Senior Research Reports from Pakistan after Shahzad’s Fellow in Conflict and Terrorism at May 1, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide arrest state that a handful of individuals Wolverhampton University, England, is the bomber detonated his explosives in were arrested for possible connections to author of Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: The Pakistan’s Swat Valley, killing two people. the plot. Shahzad is the son of a retired Revolutionary Organization 17 November The incident occurred after security forces senior Pakistani Air Force officer. – New (New York University Press) and editor of surrounded the bomber near Mingora’s York Times, May 4; New York Times, May 5 Playing Politics with Terrorism: A User’s Sohrab Khan market. The Swat faction of Guide (Columbia University Press). the Pakistani Taliban later claimed credit May 3, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide for the attack. – Reuters, May 1; The News bomber attacked Forward Operating Base International, May 3 Chapman, a U.S. military facility in Khost Province. One civilian was killed in the May 1, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A bomb blast. The Taliban claimed responsibility. attached to a tricycle exploded in Quetta, Camp Chapman is the site of the December Baluchistan Province. The remotely- 2009 suicide bombing that killed seven detonated explosive targeted a police CIA operatives. – al-Jazira, May 3; CNN, van, causing injuries to six people. – AFP, May 3 April 30 May 3, 2010 (IRAQ): The U.S. military May 1, 2010 (SOMALIA): Two bombs announced the arrest of Abu Abdullah ripped through the crowded Abdala al-Shafi’l, the alleged leader of Ansar Shideye Mosque in Mogadishu’s Bakara al-Islam, a militant jihadist group. He Market, killing at least 30 people. was arrested by Iraqi security forces in According to one witness interviewed by Baghdad. – CNN, May 4 Voice of America, “a high-ranking member of al-Shabab, an Islamist insurgent group May 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Hakimullah with ties to al-Qaida, was the target of Mehsud, the head of Tehrik-i-Taliban the attack. Fuad Mohamed Qalaf, also Pakistan, appeared in a new video posted known as Fuad Shongole, was reportedly on Islamist web forums. It was the first inside the mosque as the bombs went off.” time that Hakimullah has been seen alive Shongole survived the attack, and accused since reports of his death from a U.S. 15 Personal interview, adviser to the minister of Public U.S. security companies of organizing the drone strike in January 2010. – New York Order, Athens, Greece, April 26, 2010. blasts. – Voice of America, May 1; Garowe Times, May 3 16 The Sect of Revolutionaries first appeared in Febru- Online, May 4 ary 2009 with an armed attack on a police station in May 3, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni authorities Korydallos, southeastern Athens, a few weeks after the May 2, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S. announced that preemptive military December 2008 killing of teenager Alexis Grigoropoulos Secretary of State Hillary Clinton identified strikes in recent months have killed by a police guard in central Athens. the conditions required for reconciliation more than 35 al-Qa`ida operatives in the

20 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 country. Dozens of al-Qa`ida suspects May 6, 2010 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- May 10, 2010 (IRAQ): Security checkpoints were also arrested during the time period. Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) across Baghdad were attacked by gunmen – UPI, May 3 demanded that imprisoned group in speeding vehicles, who apparently used members be set free in exchange for the silencers in the shootings. The wave of May 4, 2010 (IRAQ): Iraqi police arrested release of a French national held since shootings killed a number of Iraqi soldiers a Saudi Arabia-born al-Qa`ida leader in April. The Frenchman was kidnapped and police. – Voice of America, May 10 western Mosul. The leader was identified from Niger. – AFP, May 6 as Mohamed Mahmoud Salama, and May 10, 2010 (IRAQ): Two suicide authorities believe that he entered Iraq in May 7, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): The bombers killed at least 13 people at a 2004. – RTTNews, May 4 Australian military announced that it market in al-Suwayra, located 30 miles captured the Taliban leader responsible southeast of Baghdad. – Reuters, May 10 May 4, 2010 (LITHUANIA): Prosecutors for kidnapping New York Times journalist announced that a Lithuanian woman, David Rohde. The leader, Mullah May 10, 2010 (IRAQ): Two suicide Egle Kusaite, has been detained since Atiqullah, was apprehended in April. bombers in vehicles detonated their October 2009 on suspicion of ties to Rohde, who was kidnapped in November explosives at a textile factory in Hilla, radical Islamist groups and plotting a 2008, managed to escape his captors in Babil Province. As police and emergency suicide attack against a Russian military June 2009. – AAP, May 7 personnel arrived at the scene, a third target. Prosecutors allege that Kusaite, suicide bomber detonated his explosives who is 20-years-old, has links to terrorist May 9, 2010 (RUSSIA): A vehicle, driven causing further casualties. At least 45 groups in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and by a suicide bomber, exploded near a people died in the blasts. – Reuters, May the United Kingdom. If found guilty, she marine infantry checkpoint in Dagestan, 10; AP, May 11 could receive a prison sentence of up to 10 located in Russia’s North Caucasus years. – AP, May 4 region. Only the bomber died in the blast. May 10, 2010 (IRAQ): Three bombs ripped – AFP, May 8 through southern Iraq’s Basra Province, May 5, 2010 (SWEDEN): According to killing an estimated 30 people. – Reuters, United Press International, “Sweden’s May 9, 2010 (YEMEN): The British May 10; AP, May 11 security service says it fears more than Embassy in Sana`a reopened. The 20 young Swedes have been recruited by embassy was closed after the April 26, May 11, 2010 (IRAQ): Speaking after a an al-Qaida-linked extremist group [al- 2010 attempt to assassinate the United wave of violence tore through Iraq on May Shabab] to fight in Somalia.” The report Kingdom’s ambassador to Yemen. – AFP, 10, U.S. Brigadier General Ralph Baker also noted, “About 400,000 to 500,000 May 9 said that the attacks serve as “a wakeup people in Sweden have roots in Muslim call to the Iraqi security forces that they countries, security officials estimate.” May 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Authorities can’t rest on their laurels in terms of – UPI, May 5 stopped a man passing through airport their recent successes.” Baker said that security in Karachi after discovering the string of attacks, which killed more May 5, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban electrical wiring, two batteries and than 100 people in one day, show “that al suicide bombers and armed militants a switch in his shoes. The suspect— Qaeda still possesses a limited ability for attacked government buildings in identified as Faiz Mohammad, a 30-year- command and control across the country.” southern Afghanistan’s Nimroz Province. old civil engineer reportedly from the – Reuters, May 11 At least three Afghan police officers and North-West Frontier Province—was one provincial council member were killed planning to board a Thai International May 11, 2010 (IRAQ): A roadside bomb in the assault on the provincial capital. All Airways flight to Muscat, Oman. Despite killed five Iraqi police officers near a of the nine militants, who were reportedly the circuitry in his shoes, no explosives Baghdad market. According to press dressed in police uniforms, were also were found. – Telegraph, May 10; AHN, reports, “Police were lured to the scene killed. – New York Times, May 5 May 10 by the explosion of a first roadside bomb in the Doura district of southern Baghdad May 6, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): The May 10, 2010 (BELGIUM): A court and were caught in the detonation of a Afghan Taliban ordered mobile phone sentenced Malika el-Aroud, a widow of second.” – Reuters, May 11; Reuters, May operators in northern Kunduz Province one of the men who assassinated Afghan 12 to shut down their networks during the commander Ahmad Shah Massoud in night. A Taliban spokesman explained 2001, to eight years in prison for leading May 11, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two U.S. that U.S. and NATO forces were using a cell that used the internet to recruit unmanned aerial drone strikes killed the networks to locate Taliban fighters. people to join terrorist training camps at least 24 suspected militants in North Mobile phone operators complied with on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Waziristan Agency of the Federally the demands after the Taliban destroyed Her current husband, Moez Garsalloui, Administered Tribal Areas. – Voice of several phone towers. – Reuters, May 6 received the same sentence in absentia America, May 11 since he is still at large. Several other May 6, 2010 (INDIA): The lone surviving suspects in the cell were also convicted May 12, 2010 (IRAQ): A bomb exploded in gunman in the November 2008 Mumbai and sentenced. – Reuters, May 10; BBC, a grocery store in a Shi`a area of Baghdad, attacks, Ajmal Kasab, was sentenced to May 10 killing three people. – Reuters, May 12 death by an Indian court. – NDTV, May 6

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May 12, 2010 (IRAQ): A car bomb exploded the Somali government and neighboring the ISI. According to the statement, the outside a café in a Shi`a area of Baghdad, Kenya. According to Voice of America, new leaders are “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi killing seven people. – Reuters, May 12 “Ras Kamboni will be led by Ahmed al-Husseini al-Qurashi, the Emir of the Madobe, who replaced hard line Islamist Believers of the Islamic State of Iraq” May 12, 2010 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida in the Hassan Turki last year as the group’s and “Sheikh Abu Abdullah al-Hassani Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) reportedly military commander.” The news report al-Qurashi is his prime minister and claimed responsibility for the attempted further explained, “After Ras Kamboni’s deputy.” – AFP, May 16; Reuters, May 16 assassination of Britain’s ambassador conservative Islamist leader Hassan to Yemen on April 26, 2010. The suicide Turki defected to al-Shabab in February, May 15, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Armed bombing against the ambassador’s convoy Madobe declared that the extremist gunmen purportedly dressed as police failed to injure the diplomat. According group [al-Shabab] was Somalia’s greatest officers kidnapped 25 people in Kurram to the purported AQAP statement, the enemy.” – Voice of America, May 13 Agency of the Federally Administered attack targeted “the so-called British Tribal Areas. Twenty-three of the ambassador, who leads the war against May 14, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): hostages, however, were released by May Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula on Militants killed five Afghan security 17, and officials were working to secure behalf of his state. Britain is America’s guards escorting a fuel truck convoy on the release of the final two hostages. closest ally in its war on Islam, and it is the the main highway in Ghazni Province. – BBC, May 17 one which called the London Conference, – New York Times, May 15 in which it plotted against the Arabian May 15, 2010 (YEMEN): Various press Peninsula.” – Reuters, May 12 May 14, 2010 (IRAQ): The Islamic State of reports state that Nayf Muhammad al- Iraq appointed “Abu Suleiman” as its new Qahtani, a senior leader of al-Qa`ida May 13, 2010 (RUSSIA): The Russian minister of war, replacing Abu Ayyub in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), was Federal Security Service (FSB) announced al-Masri, who was killed during a U.S.- killed in a firefight with Saudi security that three suspects accused of organizing Iraqi military strike in April 2010. Abu forces the previous month. According the Moscow metro suicide bombings of Suleiman’s first statement threatened to the Guardian, “The time and place of March 2010 were killed by authorities. “polytheistic rejecters,” referring to Iraqi Qahtani’s death are not yet known, but a “Unfortunately we were not able to detain Shi`a, and said that “dark days soaked member of al-Qaida’s leadership in Yemen them alive,” said Alexander Bortnikov, with blood” lie ahead. – AP, May 14 has confirmed that he was killed and the head of the FSB. “They offered armed said the group would officially announce resistance and were destroyed.” Bortnikov May 14, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide the loss in the coming week.” In a later did not explain when the incident bomber blew up an explosives-laden report, U.S. officials told Fox News that occurred. – Radio France Internationale, vehicle outside a sports stadium in the al-Qahtani accidentally blew himself up May 13 predominately Shi`a town of Tal Afar, while “messing with a bomb.” – Guardian, Ninawa Province. Ten people were killed May 15; Fox News, May 21 May 13, 2010 (RUSSIA): A bomb killed in the blast. – BBC, May 14; AP, May 14 eight people in Dagestan, located in May 16, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Rahman Russia’s North Caucasus region. As stated May 14, 2010 (INDONESIA): Indonesia’s Gul, a prominent Muslim religious leader by Agence France-Presse, “The victims national police chief announced that pushing for peace in Afghanistan, was were workers who were sent to fix a cell authorities foiled an assassination assassinated in Kunar Province. His phone mast that had been blown up the attempt against the country’s president. brother and a relative were also killed in previous day by unidentified attackers in Indonesian authorities allege that the plot the attack. – al-Jazira, May 17 the district of Sergokalinsk, investigators involved Islamists with ties to al-Qa`ida- said.” – AFP, May 13 linked groups. – CNN, May 14 May 16, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Three suicide bombers launched a coordinated May 13, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A Pakistani May 15, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): An attack against a police headquarters in anti-terrorism court acquitted nine men Afghan Taliban spokesman claimed Kandahar Province. The first bomber accused of involvement in the suicide that the group kidnapped and killed detonated an explosives-laden motorbike bomb attacks on Lieutenant General four Afghan interpreters because they outside the compound, destroying the Mushtaq Baig and an army bus in February allegedly worked for the U.S. military and perimeter wall. The remaining two suicide 2008, citing insufficient evidence. Baig, a Western contractor. The men, kidnapped bombers then entered the compound the Pakistan Army’s surgeon general, in Khost Province, were participating in a and opened fire on policemen. The two was killed in the attack, along with seven wedding at the time of the incident. The bombers eventually exploded, possibly as other people. The attack on the army bus groom was among those killed. – New York a result of police gunfire. Four policemen killed six people. Both attacks occurred in Times, May 15 were wounded during the attack. The Rawalpindi. – AFP, May 13 night-time attack was claimed by the May 15, 2010 (IRAQ): The Islamic State Afghan Taliban. – AFP, May 16 May 13, 2010 (SOMALIA): Ras Kamboni, of Iraq (ISI) purportedly announced that the most powerful faction part of Somalia’s it has appointed new leaders to replace May 16, 2010 (YEMEN): A new audio Hisbul Islamiyya insurgent coalition, has those lost in the U.S.-Iraqi operation on statement from Nasir al-Wahayshi, officially cut its ties to the group. The April 18, 2010 that killed Abu Ayyub the head of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian split occurred after reports that the Ras al-Masri, the head of al-Qa`ida in Iraq, Peninsula (AQAP), appeared on Islamist Kamboni faction signed a secret deal with and Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi, the head of websites. During the speech, al-Wahayshi

22 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6 defended the Yemeni-American Muslim at least 12 Afghan civilians. – Washington May 21, 2010 (UNITED STATES): U.S. cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi, stating that Post, May 20 Director of National Intelligence Dennis al-`Awlaqi is currently “among his Blair officially resigned his post. – CBS/ supporters, crowds of Muslims who are May 18, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide AP, May 20 angry at your [United States] oppressive bomber in a vehicle targeted a police van policies and they will never hand him over. in Dera Ismail Khan District of the North- May 21, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Four They know very well that it is hypocrisy West Frontier Province, killing 12 people. militants attacked a police post in Paktika and a betrayal to hand him over to the – Reuters, May 18; Canwest News Service, Province, killing at least one policeman. infidels. The sheikh is in good hands and May 18 All of the militants were killed. – Reuters, we will protect him in every way.” – CNN, May 20; BBC, May 21 May 16 May 19, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Khalid Ouazzani, a naturalized U.S. citizen from May 21, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber May 16, 2010 (SOMALIA): Militants Morocco, pleaded guilty to providing in a pickup truck attacked a commercial launched mortars at a Somali parliament support to al-Qa`ida by sending strip in a predominately Shi`a town in meeting in Mogadishu, killing at least 16 approximately $23,500 to the group. Diyala Province, killing at least 21 people. people, mostly civilians. Lawmakers were Ouazzani, a used car dealer in Kansas – New York Times, May 21 meeting in the parliament building for the City, swore allegiance to al-Qa`ida in first time since it was renovated. It does 2008. He faces up to 65 years in prison May 22, 2010 (UNITED STATES): A not appear that the parliament building without parole. – Reuters, May 19 report in the Los Angeles Times stated itself was hit by the shelling. – Voice of that “Pakistani and U.S. investigators America, May 16; AFP, May 16 May 19, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): The cited growing evidence Saturday that Afghan Taliban launched a brazen pre- a Pakistani army major had been in May 17, 2010 (YEMEN): Qasim al-Raymi, dawn attack against Bagram Air Base. cellphone contact with a man [Faisal the military chief for al-Qa`ida in the Approximately 20-30 Taliban fighters Shahzad] who allegedly attempted to Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), released launched rockets and grenades at the bomb Times Square in New York [on a new audio message stating that the base. One U.S. contractor was killed and May 1], including the possibility that they United States has given the group “1,000 nine U.S. soldiers wounded. Ten Taliban spoke shortly before the failed bombing.” reasons” to attack the U.S. homeland. Al- fighters were killed. – Washington Post, One of the phone calls may have “occurred Raymi was reacting to the death of Jamil May 20 as the Pakistani American was allegedly Nasser Abdullah al-Ambari, who headed parking his SUV rigged with propane AQAP’s cell in Abyan Province. Al- May 20, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida tanks, fertilizer and fireworks.” – Los Ambari was killed in March by Yemeni second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri Angeles Times, May 23 forces, reportedly with the help of U.S. released a new audiotape praising two al- intelligence. – AFP, May 17 Qa`ida leaders recently killed in Iraq. Al- May 23, 2010 (GLOBAL): Yemeni- Zawahiri said that Abu Ayyub al-Masri American cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi May 18, 2010 (UNITED STATES): and Abu `Umar al-Baghdadi revived released a video message encouraging U.S. President Barack Obama’s top jihad in Iraq, and he compared them to Muslims to kill Americans, stating that counterterrorism adviser, John Brennan, early Islamic leaders. – Reuters, May 20 “the American people, in general, are suggested that U.S. citizens who fight taking part in this [the wars in Iraq alongside al-Qa`ida and the Taliban are May 20, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): The and Afghanistan] and they elected this “legitimate targets” for lethal strikes. Afghan government announced the arrest administration and they are financing “Individuals shouldn’t be able to hide of the Afghan Taliban’s shadow governor the war.” The video was produced by al- behind their U.S. passport, their U.S. for northern Samangan Province. The Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s media citizenship,” Brennan said. “If they present shadow governor was identified as Mullah arm. Al-`Awlaqi is believed to be hiding a threat and challenge to us, we need to Gulistan. – Reuters, May 20 in Yemen. – AP, May 23 make sure that we’re able to address that threat appropriately so that they are May 20, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber May 24, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): prevented from carrying out murderous killed three people at a checkpoint in Afghanistan’s intelligence agency said it attacks.” He further said, “If they have Mosul, Ninawa Province. – AFP, May 20 has arrested seven people part of a Taliban- a rifle or a grenade or something that’s linked “terrorist group” responsible for going after our troops in Afghanistan, to May 20, 2010 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed the deadly May 18, 2010 suicide attack in me, they’re a legitimate target. If they... two policemen at a checkpoint in Mosul, Kabul. – Dawn, May 24 plan to carry out attacks against the Ninawa Province. – Reuters, May 20 United States, against American citizens May 24, 2010 (YEMEN): A government from somewhere else, they are part of that May 20, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Taliban airstrike targeting an al-Qa`ida hide- enemy that is trying to prosecute a war fighters strapped explosives to two men out accidentally killed a provincial against us.” – Reuters, May 19 accused of being U.S. spies and blew councilman and two of his bodyguards. them up during a public execution in Angry tribesmen reacted to the strike by May 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A North Waziristan Agency of the Federally attacking government buildings, blowing Taliban suicide bomber in a vehicle Administered Tribal Areas. – Reuters, up an oil pipeline and threatening to targeted a U.S. convoy in Kabul, killing May 21 destroy the Marib oil facility. – AP, May five U.S. soldiers, a Canadian colonel, and 25

23 june 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 6

May 25, 2010 (IRAQ): Approximately Agency of the Federally Administered CTC Sentinel Staff 15-20 gunmen stormed into a Baghdad Tribal Areas. – AFP, May 26 street of goldsmiths, shooting customers Editor-in-Chief and shopkeepers while grabbing cash and May 27, 2010 (KENYA): Al-Shabab Erich Marquardt gold. A total of 15 people were killed in militants from Somalia launched an attack Senior Editor, CTC the daytime raid. The attack was blamed on a village in Kenya. Several people in on al-Qa`ida in Iraq. – Los Angeles Times, the village were wounded, and it was Editorial Board May 26; AP, May 25 not immediately clear why al-Shabab COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. attacked the village. – Voice of America, Department Head May 25, 2010 (MAURITANIA): A court April 28 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) sentenced three al-Qa`ida suspects to death after finding them guilty of May 28, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Militants COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. murdering four French tourists in 2007. attacked two mosques in the heart of Deputy Department Head – RTTNews, May 25 Lahore, killing more than 90 members of Department of Social Sciences (West Point) the city’s minority Ahmadi community. May 26, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Hosam Police said that the militants belonged LTC Reid Sawyer Smadi pleaded guilty in a Dallas federal to the Pakistani Taliban and were Director, CTC court to attempted use of a weapon of mass trained in the country’s northwest destruction. Smadi, who is Jordanian, tribal region. A Taliban spokesman Christopher Heffelfinger admitted leaving what he thought was claimed responsibility for the attack. FBI Fellow, CTC a truck bomb underneath a Dallas – Time Magazine, May 28; Washington Post, May skyscraper in September 2009. The truck 30; Daily Times, May 30 bomb, however, was a decoy provided by FBI agents posing as al-Qa`ida members. May 28, 2010 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida in – AP, May 26 the Arabian Peninsula named Othman Contact Ahmed al-Ghamdi as a new senior Combating Terrorism Center May 26, 2010 (RUSSIA): A bomb ripped member of the group. Al-Ghamdi U.S. Military Academy through a crowd gathered in Stavropol, is reportedly a former detainee at 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall killing seven people. According to the Guantanamo Bay who was released from West Point, NY 10996 Associated Press, “Russia’s Investigative the facility in 2006. – Reuters, May 28 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Committee said in a website statement Email: [email protected] that the blast occurred near an outdoor May 29, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ cafe that served as a cultural center. A suicide bomber detonated his explosives renowned Chechen dance company was in Kabul, but failed to cause any * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 scheduled to perform there 15 minutes casualties. – AFP, May 29 after the blast struck.” – AP, May 26; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, May May 31, 2010 (PAKISTAN): According 27 to the Washington Post, “A U.S. official said there is ‘strong reason’ to believe that May 27, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Adnan Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, known as Sheik support Babar Mirza was convicted in a Houston Saeed al-Masri, apparently was killed The Combating Terrorism Center would federal court of conspiring to aid the by a CIA drone strike in Pakistan’s like to express its gratitude to its financial Taliban and of illegal possession of tribal belt within the past two weeks.” supporters, for without their support and firearms. Mirza, a 33-year-old Pakistani, Al-Yazid was considered the “number shared vision of the Center products like came to the United States as a student. He three” in al-Qa`ida, “with a hand in the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If faces up to 10 years in prison. – New York everything from finances to operational you are interested in learning more about Times, May 27 planning.” – Washington Post, June 1 how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. May 27, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Maulana May 31, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at Fazlullah, the leader of the Pakistani disguised in police uniforms stormed a West Point’s Association of Graduates at Taliban faction in the Swat Valley, may Pakistani hospital caring for victims of 845-446-1553. have been killed during a clash with the May 28 attacks on Ahmadi mosques Afghan police in Nuristan Province. in Lahore. At least four people were Taliban sources, however, insist that killed during the shootout between the Fazlullah is still alive. – New York Times, militants and security forces. – AFP, May May 27 31

May 27, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Taliban The views expressed in this report are those of fighters stormed the home of a pro- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, government Pakistani tribal elder, killing the Department of the Army, or any other agency him, his wife and his son before destroying of the U.S. Government. the house. The incident occurred in Bajaur

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