SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1931-2002 By Josh Pollack*
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is one of America’s most important, enduring, and complex bilateral connections in the Middle East. It has been tested by many issues, including oil policies, the Arab- Israeli conflict, and confrontation with Iraq. Especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, in which many of those involved were Saudi dissidents, both sides have critiqued and reevaluated that link. This article provides a history of the U.S.-Saudi relationship and discusses its nature, problems, and limits.
The enduring contradictions of the Saudi- ambassador to the United States since 1983. American relationship have lately inspired The dean of the foreign diplomatic corps in comparisons to a marriage of convenience. Washington, Bandar has served as the virtual Its close economic and security links have personification of the relationship for two often been strained by immense political, decades. On the American side, former cultural, and psychological distances. The President George H.W. Bush and Vice breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian peace President Dick Cheney, who developed Saudi process in September 2000 brought on a ties during the Persian Gulf War, have been difficult time in the relationship, reminiscent instrumental in bringing President George W. of the period leading up to the oil embargo of Bush together with Crown Prince Abdullah, 1973-1974; moreover, unlike previous crises who currently manages the kingdom’s affairs in U.S.-Saudi relations, its effects are not in Fahd’s stead. At the same time, public mitigated by the commonality of purpose sentiment in both countries, fueled by cable experienced during the Cold War, especially television and the Internet, has played an during the 1970s and 1980s. unusually large role in the crisis. Both the The devastation of September 11, 2001 U.S. and Saudi Arabia responded with accordingly dealt a sledgehammer blow to an elaborate campaigns to improve their national already unsteady structure. In America, the images. shock provoked a complicated and angry Today’s problems are further complicated reassessment, in some ways reminiscent of by a substantial U.S. Air Force and British the reordering of U.S.-Chinese ties after the Royal Air Force presence on Saudi soil that bloodshed of June 4, 1989 in Tiananmen extends back over a decade to the Persian Square. The Saudis, thrust onto the defensive Gulf War. In the absence of any formal and frustrated with American policies and understandings on the status of forces, allied undertakings regarding Israel, Afghanistan, raids against Iraqi air defense sites have and Iraq, have engaged in some reassessment become entangled in Saudi domestic of their own. sensitivities, with problematic results for the The current situation both echoes and war in Afghanistan, as well as any future war diverges from past episodes in the against Iraq. Sustaining the relationship relationship. Both sides continue to navigate through these difficulties are the same the relationship through the narrow channels underlying factors that have always sustained of a few individuals experienced at it: the Western world’s need for maneuvering between their starkly unalike uninterrupted access to energy supplies, and systems and cultures. Notable in this respect the Saudi kingdom’s need for defense against on the Saudi side is Prince Bandar bin Sultan, predatory neighbors. confidant to the ailing King Fahd and
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THE FOUNDING, AND FOUNDATIONS, These first dealings set the pattern for OF U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS much of what followed. First, as noted Saudi-American ties began with only the above, the human links between the United slightest of contacts. Despite the recognition States and Saudi Arabia were strikingly of the kingdom in 1931, no American narrow at the start, largely channeled through diplomat visited in a formal capacity until the person of Philby. The exchanges of 1940, when the U.S. envoy to Egypt, Bert businessmen, diplomats, warriors, students, Fish, was co-accredited to the Kingdom of the and tourists expanded these contacts in the Hejaz and Nejd and Its Dependencies, as it years to come, but remained subject to the was then called. In the year he had left to constraints of Arabia’s inhospitable climate serve in Cairo, Fish made just a single trip to and forbidding mores, as well as the religious Jidda to meet the ruler and founder, King Abd authorities’ resistance to exposing the al-Aziz bin Abd al-Rahman al-Saud, also kingdom’s subjects to Westerners and their called Ibn Saud. The seeming indifference of ways.(5) the Department of State reflected the extent to Second, what turned out to be the which Washington had relegated the remote kingdom’s unparalleled oil resources laid the kingdom to the British sphere. That foundations of the relationship. Over the sentiment was not at all shared by the Saudi following decades, control of Aramco and its king and his advisers, who saw in the revenues passed by steps from American into Americans a longed-for counterweight to Saudi hands, but Washington’s attention did Britain’s regional dominance.(1) not flag. Initially, the United States focused More consequential was a 1931 visit by on excluding other foreign powers, Charles R. Crane, a Chicago millionaire and particularly the British, As one American philanthropist, world traveler, former official viewed the matter in 1944, “The oil in ambassador, and associate of American this region is the greatest single prize in all presidents.(2) Abd al-Aziz had invited the history.”(6) Later, the United States instead American at the urging of his expatriate became concerned with energy security for British adviser, St. John Philby, a nominal the entire industrial world. As President convert to Islam. The king hoped that Crane George H.W. Bush would tell King Fahd bin might facilitate exploration for assets beneath Abd al-Aziz on August 4, 1990, just hours the soil of the impoverished kingdom, starting after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “[t]he with water. security of Saudi Arabia is vital--basically Crane summoned to Jidda an experienced fundamental--to U.S. interests and really to mining engineer, Karl S. Twitchell, who the interests of the Western world.”(7) shortly proved instrumental in drawing the American leaders eventually concluded that attention of a major American oil company to their ultimate national interest in the Persian the kingdom’s potential to yield up a more Gulf was to keep the prize, and the power that fateful commodity: oil. In May 1933, after an comes with it, out of unfriendly hands, extended negotiation by telegraph with whether they might be those of radical Arabs, Philby, the representatives of Standard Oil of the Soviet Union, or revolutionary Iran. California (Socal) concluded talks in Jidda Where the profits happened to go was of with the Saudi minister of finance. Philby, secondary importance.(8) who was by then also quietly accepting The Saudis, for their part, were determined payments from Socal, advised Abd al-Aziz to from the first to the last to secure the integrity accept the results, a 60-year contract offering and sovereignty of the kingdom, and their the exclusive concession for exploration and hold on power within it. Abd al-Aziz extraction in the Hasa region, along the shores reportedly once enumerated to an American of the Persian Gulf.(3) In 1938, what was the factors behind his decision to seek ties, later to be called Aramco--the Arabian mentioning American oil expertise, a American Oil Company--first struck oil in reputation for respectful relations with other commercial quantities. Shipments abroad Arabs, greater interest in expanding business commenced the next year.(4) relations than in consolidating an imperial 78 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002 sphere, and, “lastly, you are very far away!”-- in turn, balanced Saudi security concerns in implicit but sharp distinction to the against the implementation of their own British.(9) regional and global strategies for the The king’s concerns were underscored in containment of Soviet power, from alliance- the so-called “anti-imperial” clause of the building to nuclear deterrence.(13) The results 1933 contract, which explicitly rejected any were a series of highs and lows in the company influence over the kingdom’s relationship, depending on how closely the internal affairs.(10) Never confident of their security of the Saudi state and the American independent ability to defend their borders, policy of containment could be aligned at any the Saudis have faced a continuing challenge given time. over the decades: keeping America in, but not The main complications of the early 1950s too far in. The result has been a continuous derived from the American partnership with American military presence from the end of Britain, then a major regional power whose the Second World War to the present, mostly bases encircled the kingdom, both entangling in the form of a small training mission, and them in Arabian Peninsula border disputes only sometimes in the form of larger forces, and aligning them with the Saudis’ traditional as has been the case since the Persian Gulf rivals in Iraq and Jordan. Both states were War. ruled by kings of the Hashemite dynasty, which Abd al-Aziz had earlier displaced from THE COLD WAR PARTNERSHIP the Red Sea emirate of Hejaz, home to the The initial entry of the American armed holy places of Mecca and Medina. The forces into the kingdom occurred almost Hashemites’ proximity to the oil fields, incidentally at the end of the Second World revanchist ambitions, and British-led and - War, when the United States requested trained military forces all encouraged the permission to build a modern airbase at Saudis to conclude a mutual defense Dhahran, near the Hasa oilfields, to support assistance pact with the United States in 1951. the movement of men and materiel into the It included a long-term lease of Dhahran Burma theater. Little progress was made by Airfield, which came under the auspices of the end of the war, but the U.S. Army Air the Military and Advisory Group (MAAG), Corps saw the project through to completion known from 1959 to the present as the U.S. in 1946. The Air Force leased Dhahran Military Training Mission (USMTM).(14) Airfield continuously for over a decade and a During the early reign of King Saud, the half, providing both reassurance and son and successor of Abd al-Aziz, this discomfort to their Saudi hosts.(11) strategy encountered serious difficulties when The base in Dhahran set another pattern: the Eisenhower administration set about an ambivalence concerning the in-country assembling a new anti-Soviet alliance. The American military presence, and the broader Baghdad Pact, as it came to be called, security relationship as well. While the ultimately encompassed Britain, Iraq, and United States might deter a potential Iran, as well as Turkey and Pakistan. To the aggressor in difficult times, too high an Saudis, this arrangement united America with American profile also offered a standing the kingdom’s regional rivals and foes, for provocation to the ultra-conservative religious anti-Soviet purposes, perhaps, but at Riyadh’s authorities, or ulama, and handed a powerful expense. In February 1954, Saud dismissed propaganda tool to external and internal foes the American Point IV aid mission from the alike. Worse yet, the American commitment country, and in October 1955, he signed a might not be so firm that conciliating a mutual defense pact with Gamal Abdel regional foe would be considered the more Nasser’s revolutionary, pro-Moscow Egyptian perilous path. For these reasons, Saudi regime, inviting Egyptian military trainers leaders have alternated between seeking into the kingdom in uneasy parallel to the closer security ties when feeling especially Americans. threatened, and minimizing them when they Saudi-American tensions eased deemed it too dangerous.(12) The Americans, considerably after the Suez Crisis of 1956, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 79 Josh Pollack when Eisenhower forcefully opposed the the shah of Iran, which had played a British, French, and Israeli plan to seize significant stabilizing role in the Persian Gulf Egypt’s Suez Canal, concerned that the since the withdrawal of the British in 1971. Europeans’ neo-imperial enterprise would In early December 1978, the Saudis, who had throw the region into the Soviet camp. The increased oil production to stabilize prices crisis enhanced America’s image in the during the Iranian crisis, asked Senator Robert region; it also turned the newly popular Byrd, acting as the president’s envoy, for Nasser into the primary threat to the dynasty’s America to provide for regional security. The rule. With both these considerations in mind, next month, the administration announced the Saudis renewed the American lease at that a group of U.S. F-15s would visit the Dhahran the next year.(15) But in 1958, after kingdom. the unification of Syria with Egypt and the At the same time, not wishing to revolution in Iraq, the kingdom’s erstwhile antagonize the new Iranian government of Egyptian ally became too powerful to ignore. Shahpour Bakhtiar, which they hoped might Once again, Saud sought to minimize his turn the country in a more moderate direction, American connection. In May 1961, with the Americans announced that the planes Egypt’s Voice of the Arabs radio virulently were unarmed. This irresolute display may denouncing the “imperialist base,” the Saudi have contributed to the Saudis’ decision later government announced that it would not that year to reduce oil production, driving up renew Dhahran Airfield’s lease.(16) USMTM prices in hopes of conciliating the new Iranian remained in place, but a large, high-visibility regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, American military presence of indefinite which had taken Bakhtiar’s place.(20) duration would not return to the kingdom Notwithstanding subsequent declarations by until 1990. Presidents Carter and Reagan that the U.S. More limited American military would use force to defend the Persian Gulf, excursions did periodically occur. In late the episode left an lasting impression. After 1962, when Egyptian infiltrators and planes the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, began attacking Saudi territory from bases in Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan Yemen, the Saudis reversed course again, expressed skepticism about America’s pursuing an expanded U.S. Air Force willingness to come to the kingdom’s “training mission,” to be based in Jidda.(17) defense, citing the unarmed F-15s of The Americans agreed, but insisted on 1979.(21) keeping their aircraft at Dhahran, much The Cold War struggle did not only strain farther from the Yemen border, and exercised the security relationship; it also could serve as restrictive rules of engagement.(18) The a unifying factor, especially in the 1970s, Kennedy administration’s primary concerns when the establishment of the People’s were the continuing independence of the Democratic Republic of Yemen placed a kingdom and the security of its oilfields. Soviet ally on Saudi Arabia’s doorstep. Even They regarded the defense of Saudi Arabia’s more significantly, the dramatic growth of southern border as less significant, certainly Saudi oil revenues at that time allowed the in comparison with the need to avoid an kingdom to become a major financial unnecessary confrontation with Nasser, whom contributor to the global struggle against American policymakers now considered an communism. Formerly a recipient of U.S. alternative to Soviet influence. The U.S. aid, Saudi Arabia began to send its own warplanes arrived in July 1963 and were money abroad in the mid-1970s, including withdrawn in January 1964.(19) collaborations with the Americans in Calculations of this sort gave rise to sponsoring anti-communist rebel movements recurring concerns in Riyadh about American in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.(22) dependability. The Saudis experienced Still, not all Saudi aid policies were in renewed uncertainty in the fall of 1978, when keeping with American preferences or to the Carter administration declined to America’s benefit. Particularly troublesome intervene on behalf of the faltering regime of were Riyadh’s payments to the PLO and 80 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002 rejectionist Arab states as a counter to al-Aziz extracted from President Franklin D. America’s mediation of an Egyptian-Israeli Roosevelt a two-part pledge: “(1) He peace treaty in 1978 and 1979.(23) But also personally, as president, would never do among the most controversial aid policies was anything which might prove hostile to the one that originated in the White House: in Arabs; and (2) the U.S. Government would May 1984, at the request of Reagan national make no change in its basic policy in security adviser Robert McFarlane, Bandar Palestine without full and prior consultation quietly arranged for over a million dollars a with both Jews and Arabs.”(28) month to go to a Miami bank account President Harry S. Truman renewed his belonging to the Nicaraguan contra rebels, predecessor’s pledge, but also supported the whose funding Congress had cut off. UN General Assembly resolution of McFarlane later characterized these as a November 29, 1947, which called for separate transfer of a foreign official’s “personal Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. By funds,” while Bandar simply denied the December, Abd al-Aziz indicated to the story.(24) American minister in Jidda that his own failure to withdraw Aramco’s oil concessions THE EMERGENCE OF THE ARAB OIL in response invited danger from Iraq and WEAPON Transjordan. He requested assistance against The Cold War partnership also had the such an eventuality, including arms, which benefit of normally overshadowing a potential the U.S. government was then reluctant to complication: America’s connection to Israel, provide.(29) The next year, soon after Israel’s which grew from generalized moral support declaration of independence, Aramco in the 1940s to an arms supply relationship in President James Terry Duce warned the mid-1960s, and became a de facto anti- Washington that Abd al-Aziz had threatened Soviet alliance in the late 1960s and early possible consequences for the Americans’ 1970s. The Saudis were inclined and access to Saudi resources should the United generally able to disregard the issue beyond States provide arms to the Jewish state.(30) the rhetorical level, and normally it had little But the Americans had no plans to do so. The effect on ties with Washington. But moments Saudis and other Arab oil exporters would of open Arab-Israeli conflict tended to make similar threats against the British and polarize the entire region, putting French during the 1956 Suez crisis, ultimately considerable pressure on friends of America. to little avail.(31) These crises threatened the regime’s The 1967 crisis was all the more severe, legitimacy, but by the same token, they also given the increased importance of Arab oil, provided it with opportunities to assert its closer American-Israeli ties than before, and a independence from American policy. For the regional perception of the kingdom as being Americans, though, these episodes, like all dependent on the United States. Arab other disputes touching on oil supplies, had sentiment against America spilled over into no upside; they were a “recurring bad dream,” criticism of the ruling family, which was seen culminating most nightmarishly in the oil as doing relatively little to support Egypt. embargo of 1973-1974.(25) With tensions rising between Israel and Reflecting Arab sentiment and the Egypt, three bombs exploded at the American kingdom’s special identity as the home of the embassy and USMTM facilities in Riyadh on holy places of Islam, Saudi leaders stood June 2. Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, opposed to a sovereign Jewish presence in the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, midst of the Arab world almost from the warned Aramco officials of the consequences start.(26) Palestine emerged as a matter of of U.S. support for Israel, hinting darkly at contention even before the first meeting of nationalization. Saudi and American heads of state took place On June 6, the second day of the war, in 1945 aboard an American warship Egyptian radio broadcast claims that anchored in the Great Bitter Lake, along the American and British carrier-based aircraft Suez Canal.(27) On that occasion, King Abd had attacked Egyptian airfields. Egypt and Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 81 Josh Pollack five other Arab states broke relations with Americans and Saudis stood on opposite both countries. The next day, a series of sides from the outset of the crisis. Egyptian demonstrations broke out in Saudi Arabia, President Anwar al-Sadat’s earlier decisions and King Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz proclaimed to end the War of Attrition and then to expel at a rally in Riyadh that the kingdom would Soviet forces had seemed to Nixon and cut off oil supplies “to anyone who aided national security adviser Henry Kissinger to Israel.” A combination of labor actions and validate their uncompromising Middle East mob violence shut down Aramco’s policy. To Faisal, Washington’s failure to operations, and Yamani informed Aramco reassess aid to Israel after the lessening of the officials that no shipments to the U.S. or Soviet threat to the region amounted to a Britain would be allowed.(32) Over the next betrayal, and he set about providing weapons two months, American, Venezuelan, Iranian, and aid to Sadat.(38) In May 1973, Faisal and Indonesian oil production surged to fill warned Aramco officials that American the gap, and by early September, the Arab policy placed the kingdom “in danger of producers gave up the embargo. Not until a being isolated among its Arab friends,” which few years later, when growing demand had could jeopardize the oil concessions. In an outstripped America’s remaining spare oil interview with NBC, the king declared that production and the Arabs gained greater “America’s complete support for Zionism and cooperation from other members of the OPEC against the Arabs makes it extremely difficult cartel, did market realities permit the effective for us to continue to supply the United States deployment of the “oil weapon.”(33) with oil, or even to remain friends with the After the 1967 War, and against the United States.”(39) In August, Sadat visited background of the Israeli-Egyptian War of Riyadh to apprise Faisal of his war plans. Attrition, Saudi ties to America subjected the Faisal offered financial support and the use of royal family to growing pressure from Arab the oil weapon.(40) radicals. Faisal, hoping to resolve or at least The coordinated Egyptian and Syrian lessen these tensions, continually urged the surprise attacks of October 6 fell not only on Americans to press Israel to withdraw to the the solemn Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, pre-war lines.(34) In December 1969, the but also during a meeting of OPEC and oil Nixon administration announced an American company representatives in Vienna. Unable peace plan along these lines, called the to settle with the companies on oil prices, the Rogers Plan, after then-Secretary of State exporters’ delegation adjourned to Kuwait William Rogers. The Israelis resisted the City on October 15, where they proclaimed a proposal, enabling the Americans to put some unilateral 70% hike. Yamani told his distance between themselves and Jerusalem, colleagues, “This is a moment for which I but accomplishing little else.(35) Eventually, have been waiting a long time. The moment in the face of growing Soviet support for the has come. We are masters of our own Egyptians, Rogers’ initiatives gave way to a commodity.”(41) more pro-Israeli policy.(36) The Arabs soon exercised their newfound The contradictions of the Saudi-American mastery to greater effect. On October 17, the relationship reached the breaking point in the Arab oil ministers agreed to cut back crisis of 1973-1974, when high officials in production 5% each month. On October 19, Washington would openly threaten the in response to Israeli pleas for resupply, the possibility of seizing Persian Gulf oil fields, U.S. government announced an immediate, either in Saudi Arabia or possibly in large-scale military aid package. The next neighboring Arab countries.(37) It also day, when word reached Arab capitals that marked a decisive shift in the balance of Egypt was facing defeat, the exporters relations in terms of petroleum. Saudi Arabia announced the suspension of all oil supplies emerged as the world’s “swing producer,” to the United States, with swift and disruptive possessing the bulk of global spare production effects on America’s domestic life and capacity, and thus the last word on any economy.(42) With the president paralyzed attempt to drive up prices through cutbacks. by the unfolding Watergate scandal, Kissinger 82 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002 undertook an extended program of shuttle (in dollar terms).(45) These figures include diplomacy between Egypt, Israel, and Syria, weapons, support equipment, spare parts, making side trips to Saudi Arabia. On March support services, and construction.(46) 18, 1974, after a long series of threats and During the Ford, Carter, and Reagan inducements, and with an Egyptian-Israeli administrations, arms transactions were disengagement agreement already secured, sometimes complicated by an increasingly the Saudis and most other Arab producers assertive American Jewish community, whose agreed to conclude the embargo.(43) pro-Israel lobby, the American Israel Public The embargo showed both sides the limits Affairs Committee (AIPAC), opposed sales of of the relationship. Each subsequent advanced arms to Saudi Arabia on the American administration, recognizing the grounds that they might be employed against potential for another disaster, would pursue its Israel. AIPAC’s strategy was to seek own Middle East peace plans. The Saudis congressional votes against the refrained from brandishing the oil weapon in administration’s arms export decisions; the subsequent Israeli-Arab crises, apparently Saudis, lacking a comparable option, mainly concerned about the deleterious effects of a worked through the administration. The renewed embargo on the long-term market for biggest battles concerned the transfer of oil, given both its harsh consequences for advanced weapons such as Maverick air-to- Western economies and the encouragement it ground missiles in 1976, F-15 fighter- would give to the development of alternative bombers in 1978, and AWACS airborne early energy sources. A rash American response warning aircraft in 1981. In all of these cases, was also possible. Instead, Saudi the administration prevailed.(47) But in 1985, policymakers have striven to keep the price of AIPAC scored its first major victory, oil in a “sweet spot” intended to maximize temporarily blocking the sale of additional F- demand and revenues over time, a strategy 15s by successfully persuading Congress to limited only by OPEC’s share of world intervene. The Saudis located alternatives, production and ability to cooperate.(44) including a series of major arms deals with Britain.(48) THE RISE(S) AND FALL(S) OF Saudi Arabia was also denied access to the AMERICA’S SAUDI ARMS MARKET Lance short-range surface-to-surface missile, Another result of the explosive growth of the first in a series of setbacks in prospective Saudi oil revenues in the 1970s was the sales of missiles of all kinds.(49) These ability of the kingdom to purchase advanced developments came at a sensitive moment for armaments in large quantities. The urgency the kingdom, which was seeking an answer to of national defense needs increased Iran’s missile capabilities, amply appreciably after the Iranian Revolution and demonstrated during the conflict with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, which Iraq.(50) In July 1985, Ambassador Bandar featured Iranian missile attacks on Persian bin Sultan made a surprise trip to Beijing at Gulf shipping and probes against Saudi air King Fahd’s behest.(51) The secret purpose of defenses. The Saudis decided to focus in the visit was to explore the possibility that the particular on building up the Royal Saudi Air Chinese might sell Saudi Arabia some of its Force (RSAF), and selected the United States Dong Feng-3A (CSS-2) ballistic missiles, as their supplier of choice. Sales dropped in relatively inaccurate weapons with an the late 1980s after Washington’s denial of estimated range of 3,000 to 4,000 km, key arms requests, peaked again after the designed and built to carry nuclear warheads Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and then fell as powerful as three megatons.(52) Secret off again in the mid-1990s under the twin negotiations during late 1986 and 1987 burdens of Persian Gulf War debt and falling resulted in a multibillion-dollar deal for an oil revenues. The total value of American estimated 10-15 mobile launchers and 50-56 arms sales to Saudi Arabia over the past half- specially modified missiles, reportedly century approaches $100 billion, with over a carrying heavy conventional warheads that quarter of the contracts signed in the 1990s somewhat reduced their range.(53) Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 83 Josh Pollack
American satellite imagery interpreters After Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, recognized the missile deployment in early Saudi Arabia signed several major contracts 1988.(54) The Americans were enraged at the for American weapons systems. In 1993, the subterfuge, and further embarrassed by Saudis signed a $7 billion contract for 72 F- Bandar’s involvement. The Saudis, 15s with advanced capabilities, but this would emphasizing the dangers they faced from Iran, be the last large-scale deal with the held that their decision to purchase the Americans for some time to come. Burdened Chinese missiles had followed the Congress’s by debt from the Persian Gulf War and decision to prevent the sale of F-15s in declining oil revenues, the Saudis were forced 1985.(55) Assuring the Americans that the to renegotiate payments with the U.S. missiles were conventionally armed, they government and American defense rejected any possibility of inspections.(56) contractors.(62) Total agreements fell to $4 The administration expressed its severe billion for 1993-1997 and to just $600 million displeasure, pointing out to the Saudis that in 1998-2001.(63) European sales exhibited a their new anti-Iranian weapons could provoke similar pattern, but appear to be picking up an unwanted conflict with Israel, and separate again in 2002, possibly reflecting recent groups of senators and congressmen wrote tensions with the U.S. over the Israeli- Secretary of State George Schultz to ask that Palestinian conflict and the use of Saudi bases the administration suspend planned arms sales against Iraq.(64) until the missiles were withdrawn.(57) Large arms sales to Saudi Arabia have Riyadh was unmoved. After delivering a helped keep American defense contractors’ forceful démarche to Fahd, Ambassador production lines open, and have been quite Hume Horan was recalled from his post. This significant for the balance of trade. unprecedented move, reportedly undertaken at Nevertheless, neither the buying sprees of Bandar’s urging, smoothed the path for an past decades nor recurring moves to alternate upcoming visit by Schultz to promote the suppliers seem to have lessened the Reagan administration’s regional peace kingdom’s essential dependence on the initiative.(58) Bandar, for his part, privately United States for its defense and security.(65) expressed glee at Washington’s discomfort, indicating that such developments were the THE U.S. MILITARY RETURNS TO consequence of congressional interventions in SAUDI ARABIA arms sales.(59) The Bush administration recognized The breach was not long to mend. Within immediately that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on weeks of Schultz’s visit, the Saudis signed the August 3, 1990 posed a direct threat to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, effectively security of Saudi Arabia and the interests of forswearing any nuclear ambitions, and also all advanced economies. Expediting the severed diplomatic relations with Iran. The return of American forces to the kingdom in Americans reciprocated by approving the large numbers was imperative, yet also a very planned arms sales.(60) The Saudis had delicate matter. Three days later, a senior successfully demonstrated their independence American delegation led by Secretary of from American arms export policy, much as Defense Dick Cheney briefed Fahd and his they had already done regarding oil policy. In advisers in Riyadh. A published account widely published remarks, Fahd told Saudi underscores this tension: with Bandar military and security officials, “The Kingdom translating, Cheney declared, “After the of Saudi Arabia is not tied to anyone and does danger is over, our forces will go home.” The not take part in any pact that forces upon it account continues, “Under his breath in any sort of obligations.…if things become Arabic, [Crown Prince] Abdullah interjected, complicated with a certain country we will ‘I would hope so.’ Bandar did not translate find other countries, regardless of whether this.”(66) they are Eastern or Western… We are buying The triumphant war to defend the Arabian weapons, not principles.”(61) Peninsula and liberate Kuwait marked another high point for the U.S.-Saudi partnership. But 84 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002 the danger from Iraq persisted, and Cheney’s international terrorists in the Middle East. In pledge notwithstanding, Western forces 1996, when the Americans succeeded in remained in the kingdom, even in the absence persuading the government of Sudan to expel of any formal agreement on their status. Not from its territory a violent Saudi dissident, only did they remain, to the Saudis’ growing Usama bin Ladin, Riyadh declined to request discomfort, but their presence became his extradition. The scion of an elite Saudi informally established under the rubric of the Arabian business family and the head of the “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. The al-Qa’ida terrorist organization, bin Ladin terms of the enforcement of the “no-fly zone” opposed both the royal family and the United over southern Iraq by British and American States on the grounds that the foreign, non- warplanes remains a matter of particular Muslim military presence defiled holy soil. sensitivity. In the absence of an Saudi extradition request, The priority assigned to Saudi-American bin Ladin traveled unmolested to relations declined substantially with the Afghanistan, where the United States and January 1993 inauguration of President Bill Saudi Arabia had supported the anti-Soviet Clinton. In Middle Eastern affairs, the new mujahidin insurgency in the 1980s, and where president was largely preoccupied with Arab- he had gotten his start as a sponsor of mujahid Israeli peacemaking. His administration’s activity.(72) overriding policy interest was the health of Even after the departure of the Soviets, the domestic economy and, for Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan had continued to receive official this meant a focus on balance-of-trade issues, Saudi attention, mainly in the form of support such as the purchase of civilian airliners and, for the Taliban, the rigidly Islamist militia later, oil prices. Bandar’s standing in that controlled most of the country after 1996. Washington declined accordingly.(67) His Riyadh’s sponsorship of the Taliban special value to American officials also continued even after bin Ladin, who had been appeared to decline after the incapacitation of stripped of Saudi citizenship two years before, his patron, King Fahd, by a series of strokes accepted their hospitality.(73) Only after al- starting in late 1995.(68) The ambassador’s Qa’ida simultaneously bombed America’s precise standing under the de facto regency embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August headed by Fahd’s half-brother and designated 1998 did the Saudis and Americans alike heir, Crown Prince Abdullah, is unclear.(69) make serious, if not necessarily well- In the absence of sustained attention from coordinated, efforts to pressure or bribe the the White House, U.S.-Saudi relations in the Taliban to hand over bin Ladin.(74) The 1990s were troubled by the continued Saudis pressed on with the Taliban even after presence of American and British forces at the Americans had given up, but their Saudi bases. Terrorist bombings killed seven mission, too, was abandoned as fruitless after people, including five American servicemen, the launch of cruise missiles from American at a Saudi Arabian National Guard training warships in the Indian Ocean, in a failed site in Riyadh in November 1995. Another attempt to kill the terrorist leader.(75) bomb killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel at In retrospect, the mistrust and lack of the Khobar Towers housing facility in coordination between the two sides may have Dhahran in June 1996. As a defensive been quite costly. But viewed differently, measure, Western forces were consolidated at both bin Ladin’s anti-Saudi, anti-American fewer and less accessible sites, particularly agenda and the seeming inability of Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB, in American Washington and Riyadh to work together military parlance), in the desert south of smoothly against it have sprung from a Riyadh.(70) common source: the tensions attendant on the Following the Riyadh and Dhahran indefinite American and British military attacks, law enforcement cooperation was too presence in Saudi Arabia. limited for Washington’s liking.(71) Saudi Arabia also was not closely engaged in the THE NEW CRISIS IN SAUDI- early phases of America’s pursuit of AMERICAN RELATIONS Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 85 Josh Pollack
The Clinton administration’s energetic Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s government to the devotion to the Middle East peace process peace table at Madrid. President George W. served the cause of American relations with Bush had also returned to office two senior Saudi Arabia to the extent that it kept Arab- officials familiar from a decade before, Vice Israeli issues from overheating for the better President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State part of a decade. Accordingly, the breakdown Colin Powell, and presumably was also of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and receptive to his father’s advice. the beginning of the second intifada renewed The second factor was heightened the tensions in Washington’s relationship expectations inherited from the presidential with Riyadh. campaign, in which Bush emerged as the At difficult points in the negotiations, the “Arab” candidate, while his Democratic Americans turned to the Jordanians and opponent, Vice President Al Gore, chose an Egyptians, who by virtue of their peace Orthodox Jew, Senator Joseph Lieberman, as treaties with Israel could serve as Arab his running mate.(78) Governor Bush intermediaries. The Saudis maintained their appealed directly to Arab-American voters distance.(76) During the 1999 funeral of King during the candidates’ second televised Hussein of Jordan, the Arab leader who had debate, and won a plurality of their votes on gone to the greatest lengths to identify himself Election Day.(79) But what seemed like with peace efforts, President Clinton positives only created considerable reportedly approached Crown Prince misunderstanding and confusion when the Abdullah without warning, asking if he would new Bush showed little inclination to follow like to be introduced to Israel’s leaders, then in his father’s footsteps in the Middle East. and there. Abdullah is reported to have The informality of the arrangements replied brusquely, saying, “I believe, Your governing the U.S. and British military Excellency Mr. President, that there are limits presence was also a continuing source of to friendship.”(77) The outbreak of the tension, and became a more acute problem in Israeli-Palestinian conflict in September 2000 February 2001, after the allies mounted a further tested those limits. large air raid from Prince Sultan Air Base Upon entering office in January 2001, the against air defense targets around Baghdad, administration of George W. Bush had apparently without providing prior notice to inherited a largely neglected relationship the Saudi government. Shortly after a special between the two nations from the Clinton Pentagon press conference announcing and Administration; a relationship that steadily explaining the attack, President Bush played it worsened as the fighting between Israelis and down, describing it as “routine.”(80) Palestinians provoked anti-American reaction Following this episode, the Saudis imposed in the Middle East. Yet Bush also brought to operational restrictions on allied warplanes the presidency two other inheritances that operating out of PSAB, forbidding them to initially seemed like potential mitigating conduct further offensive operations against factors. Iraq.(81) In June, Interior Minister Prince The first factor was the personal Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz again underscored the relationship between the Bush family and the Saudi government’s desire to assert its Saudi royals, inherited from Clinton’s exclusive sovereignty in matters related to predecessor and the new president’s father, hosting foreign forces, ruling out extradition George H.W. Bush. This connection seemed of suspects held in the Khobar Towers to offer hope to Riyadh for a renewal of the bombing case: “[n]o other entity has the right relationship through known channels. Like to try or investigate any crimes occurring on his father, the younger Bush was a former Saudi lands.”(82) oilman, likely to grasp the importance of In the public sphere, the intifada tended to U.S.-Saudi relations. The first Bush overshadow these problems. By disrupting administration had confronted Israel over the the Middle East peace process, it brought to expansion of Jewish settlements in the West its conclusion a relatively easy period in Bank and the Gaza Strip, and brought Prime America’s post-Cold War experiment in 86 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002 balancing relations with both Jewish and Arab thing.” He again urged the Saudi leader to allies. A demographic surge, combined with visit the United States, without success.(88) both the coming of age of Arabic-language The elder Bush’s entreaties and assurances satellite television news and the recent notwithstanding, the crown prince eventually introduction of the internet to the kingdom, turned to brinkmanship behind closed doors, put pressure on the Saudi leadership. The dispatching Bandar to threaten a break in the kingdom’s youthful populace, inflamed by formerly close relationship. The constant broadcasts of Israeli military actions ambassador’s démarche indicated that against the Palestinians, was also enraged at Abdullah had no intention of allowing himself America, widely perceived as backing the to become the next Shah of Iran: “a time Israelis, and angered by the their own comes when peoples and nations part. We are authorities’ ties with the United States.(83) at a crossroads. It is time for the United States The Americans, in turn, found themselves and Saudi Arabia to look to their separate caught between Jerusalem’s insistence that interests.”(89) they ought to support Israel’s defense of its Less than two days later, the Americans citizens against terrorist attacks, and Riyadh’s provided the Saudi embassy with a insistence that they intercede forcefully with presidential letter, which Bandar carried back Israel against its depredations in the to Riyadh. Addressing the crown prince’s territories. In one interview, a senior prince concerns in two pages, it confirmed Bush’s declared that the “reputation of the United commitment to the establishment of a States in the Arab region has dropped to Palestinian state. According to one account, zero,” adding that “too biased a stand makes Abdullah shared Bush’s letter and the text of an awkward situation for America’s his own original complaint with fellow Arab friends.”(84) Making some space between leaders, including Yasir Arafat, whom he themselves and Washington, the Saudis summoned to Riyadh. The Saudis then wrote pledged $225 million dollars in aid to the PA back to Bush, attaching a letter from Arafat in April 2001.(85) pledging to fulfill Bush’s requirements for Unable to finesse this situation, the Bush restarting the peace talks, and returned their administration shifted from one stance to ambassador to Washington.(90) another, seeking to mollify Saudi Arabia and This delicate exchange was violently Israel alternately. One consistent point in the disrupted by the terrorist attacks of September president’s personal diplomacy was to shun 11, which spawned even more serious Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, while problems for the relationship (see below). frequently inviting Israeli Prime Minister Even afterwards, Israel and the Palestinians Ariel Sharon for consultations at the White remained on the Saudi agenda. They may House. Possibly in response to this choice, have assumed even greater importance, the Crown Prince Abdullah refused an insofar as the unresolved conflict created a invitation to Washington, preferring to hurdle for cooperation with the United States communicate by a series of telephone calls on Afghanistan and especially Iraq. But to and letters from Riyadh.(86) While Riyadh’s frustration, after September 11, maintaining this distance, he repeatedly called Americans tended to regard Israel’s situation on Bush to restrain Israel.(87) more sympathetically, even Abdullah’s discontent became a empathetically.(91) On the Bush sufficiently troubling matter in Washington administration’s revised agenda, the Global that in mid-July 2001, the New York Times, War on Terrorism outranked many other citing both “a senior administration official” things, including Middle Eastern conflict and “a Middle East diplomat,” reported that resolution. the former President George Bush had phoned the crown prince to engage with him warmly, THE SAUDI PEACE INITIATIVE telling him that his son’s “heart is in the right It was in this context that Abdullah offered place” and that he was “going to do the right his own peace proposal at an Arab League summit in late March 2002, a possibility he Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 87 Josh Pollack had hinted at publicly as early as the previous Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and announcing June.(92) The March initiative materialized to reporters that he had secured from the previous month, when Thomas L. Washington a guarantee of Arafat’s safety Friedman of the New York Times quoted the during the Israeli invasion of Ramallah. crown prince as saying that his own ideas Arafat was not harmed, but the Israelis were “virtually identical” to a suggestion essentially disregarded President Bush’s Friedman himself had recently placed in public insistence on an immediate withdrawal print.(93) The columnist had proposed that from Palestinian cities. (98) the entire Arab League offer Israel “full The collective results of the summit and peace” and security guarantees in exchange Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield were the for a withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines.(94) creation of a single and apparently non- Abdullah also finally accepted an invitation to negotiable Arab position and the the United States, which came up again embarrassment of the Saudi government, both during a mid-March tour of regional capitals of which complicated American efforts to by Vice President Dick Cheney. Apparently persuade the Saudi leadership to press Arafat determined to round up support for a new war to make concessions and to convince the effort against Iraq, Cheney returned with the Palestinian rejectionist organizations to cease message that some form of progress on the conducting their “martyrdom operations” Israeli-Palestinian front would be necessary against Israeli civilians.(99) In addition, first.(95) Crown Prince Abdullah and the Iraqi delegate Apparently responding to domestic embraced during the summit, a gesture many sensitivities, Saudi authorities avoided further perceived as signaling a move toward elucidation of their concept prior to the Beirut reconciliation in response to American threats summit, explaining only that they would be to attack Iraq.(100) offering Israel additional incentives to make Despite the setback, Abdullah was not peace with its neighbors.(96) While prepared to give up, and pressed ahead with Friedman’s idea had not touched on the fate the planned visit to President Bush’s Texas of the Palestinian refugees, the consensus ranch in late April. His visit was preceded by Arab League plan that emerged from Beirut anonymous threats in the U.S. press about the featured a demand for Israel’s affirmation of possible revival of the “oil weapon” and an the “[a]chievement of a just solution to the end to the security relationship.(101) Over Palestinian Refugee problem to be agreed five hours of meetings, Abdullah rejected talk upon in accordance with UN General of using the oil weapon, but warned of a Assembly Resolution 194,” which is “deep rift,” and declined to participate in a generally understood in the Arab world as joint statement. The Saudis presented the providing for a right of return. This language Americans with a proposed eight-point roughly paralleled the Palestinian position at roadmap designed to move the Israelis and Camp David in July 2000, a point that Palestinians toward a cease-fire and a peace Palestinian Authority representatives were agreement along the lines of the Beirut swift to point out.(97) Declaration--seemingly an unsubtle indication The Saudi proposal was, moreover, swiftly of Abdullah’s lack of confidence in American overtaken by events on the ground. A mediation efforts to date. As before, the particularly shocking and deadly series of Americans relied on personal relationships to terror bombings took place in Israel on and smooth over difficulties; before visiting the around the Passover holiday, commencing as ranch, the crown prince met with the Vice the summiteers were gathering in Beirut. The President; afterwards, the president’s father Israeli response was a major offensive against took him on a train ride to visit his the bases of armed Palestinian factions in the Presidential Library in College Station, heart of West Bank cities, inspiring angry Texas.(102) protests in the streets of Arab capitals. Before Before Abdullah left the country, the the end of the summit, Abdullah was reduced Americans persuaded the Israelis to allow to offering bitter denunciations of Israeli Yasir Arafat to leave his surrounded 88 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002 compound in Ramallah, allowing the crown in the way of full cooperation against the prince to claim success.(103) But this Taliban and al-Qa’ida. From the start, they accomplishment proved minor and short- restricted the scope and visibility of the lived; in late June, after another wave of American war effort on Saudi territory.(108) suicide bombings, President Bush delivered a Saudi spokesmen ruled out attacks on any speech offering American support for a other Arab country from their soil, and also Palestinian state, but demanding that the hinted in advance that any American request Palestinians oust Arafat. Saudi royals found to launch sorties against targets in themselves in the awkward position of Afghanistan from their bases would not be praising some parts of the speech, while welcome. Senior U.S. officials, not wishing defending Arafat’s legitimacy on the basis of to exacerbate the problem, repeatedly asserted democratic processes.(104) in public that the Saudis had cooperated with To a large extent, the latest Arab-Israeli every American request, and carefully conflict had returned Saudi-American avoided making any requests that might be relations to the patterns of the War of refused.(109) Attrition and the Rogers Plan: complaints and Striking the right balance proved tricky. In threats from Saudi leaders encouraged their September, the Department of Defense American counterparts to find ways to announced the arrival of Air Force Lieutenant pressure Israel for concessions, or at least to General Charles Wald at the recently locate differences with Jerusalem that might completed Combined Air Operations Center ease tensions with Riyadh. In both cases, the (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base, from Secretary of State and other American where he would manage the air war, but not mediators spent a substantial amount of time until early October did Crown Prince in the Middle East, and in both cases, their Abdullah and Defense Minister Prince Sultan ministrations merely temporized in the face of bin Abd al-Aziz indicate their assent to an intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. And in Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and both cases, the Americans ultimately were so apparently not without some restrictions.(110) antagonized by the behavior of Israel’s enemy Despite upbeat reports from American as to turn against them, to the Saudis’ dismay. officials, accounts of difficulties in securing Saudi cooperation against al-Qa’ida on the AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 financial front also continued to crop up in the The devastating terrorist attacks on the news.(111) United States by a group of 19 Arabs loyal to In the United States, anger against the Usama bin Ladin, including 15 Saudis, kingdom soon reached a point not seen since rearranged regional politics and dealt a the 1973-1974 oil embargo. A wave of stunning blow to U.S.-Saudi relations. The harshly critical commentary from journalists, immediate reaction of large segments of the commentators, and Congressmen pointed out Saudi and other Arab publics included the limits of Saudi cooperation, and attributed spontaneous celebrations.(105) Suddenly on the rise of al-Qa’ida to Saudi (and Egyptian) the defensive, the Saudis acted swiftly to decisions to encourage virulent anti-American stabilize oil prices, and then severed relations rhetoric in place of dissent, and to export with the Taliban as the United States prepared troublemakers to assure internal to carry its war onto Afghan soil.(106) Since stability.(112) Other topics that troubled U.S. that time, Saudi police have also arrested editorialists included the rigid traditionalism suspected terrorists inside the kingdom, of Saudi society, particularly its treatment of including a Sudanese man allegedly women; Prince Nayif’s repeatedly expressed responsible for firing a shoulder-fired surface- doubts about the involvement of Saudi to-air missile at an American aircraft at Prince subjects in the September 11 attacks; and Sultan Air Base.(107) news coverage of a Saudi telethon to support At the same time, the Saudis were unable the families of Palestinians killed in the or unwilling to ignore the heightened tensions conflict, including those of suicide and anger of the past year, placing obstacles bombers.(113) Americans were also reminded Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 89 Josh Pollack of their archenemy’s origins upon learning develop and implement its own new “public that members of the bin Ladin family residing diplomacy” effort.(122) But neither of these in the United States had been airlifted home campaigns seemed quite as effective as bin en masse at the request of the Saudi Ladin’s, which was based on a steady trickle government.(114) Most recently, the families of videotaped speeches broadcast over al- of 600 victims of the September 11 attacks Jazirah, the controversial Arabic-language have filed suit against Saudi banks, charities, satellite news channel.(123) and members of the royal family, among These tensions grew even more acute after other parties, accusing them of supporting al- Bush’s January State of the Union address Qa’ida.(115) assailing an “axis of evil” that included two Americans’ anger was reciprocated by the neighboring states, Iraq and Iran, and his Saudis’ own rage at American support for insistence on the urgency of replacing Iraq’s Israel, military action in Afghanistan, and regime. Reports that U.S. forces might be detention of Arab prisoners, reportedly asked to leave Saudi Arabia were including a large number of Saudis, at a accompanied by accounts of the construction makeshift prison at the Guantanamo Bay of a new CAOC in neighboring Qatar.(124) Naval Station in Cuba.(116) They expressed Later, a leaked war plan that appeared in the their feelings in a fall-off of tourism, New York Times indicated that Saudi Arabia consumer boycotts of American products, and would not be a base of operations.(125) the divestment of billions of dollars.(117) Following another leak, which revealed that a Bombing attacks have also killed American consultant had delivered a briefing to a and British expatriates in the kingdom.(118) Pentagon advisory panel describing the In public, American officials continued to kingdom as an enemy of the United States, insist on the soundness of Saudi cooperation, Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal once again while telling Saudi leaders that the explicitly ruled out the use of Saudi bases government did not share the views so against Iraq.(126) frequently expressed in the U.S. news media. Barely suppressed anger remains the Saudi officials and editorialists generally dominant mode of U.S.-Saudi relations after accepted these assurances, tending to dismiss September 11, and greater tests are likely to all criticism as stemming from hostile come. The consequences of America’s concentrations of Jewish power. As Crown anticipated confrontation with Iraq, or of any Prince Abdullah put it to a New York Times decisive action by Israel against Yasir Arafat, correspondent, “The people of the kingdom are difficult to foresee. While Saudi Arabia’s have not been affected by what certain present financial conditions seem to preclude newspapers publish and you know who is use of the “oil weapon” in the near future, the behind this media.”(119) kingdom could conceivably extend its denial This dubious interpretation did not of basing rights to a denial of overflight preclude more sophisticated responses. Saudi rights, seriously complicating an air war officials turned to the tools of modern public against Iraq. Another move reportedly under opinion management, including radio and discussion in Saudi Arabia is to agree to an television advertisements in major U.S. media OPEC proposal switching the pricing of oil markets that invited audiences to keep an from dollars to euros, a decision likely to have open mind about the kingdom.(120) Most significant effects on the value of the unusually, an American-educated adviser to dollar.(127) the crown prince, Adel al-Jubayr, These possibilities cannot be dismissed systematically made the rounds of television lightly. Still, neither side seems able to locate news talk shows to present Saudi views to the a meaningful alternative to the other. The American public.(121) At the same time, the present crisis may well worsen, perhaps even American government, dismayed by Arab and to the dimensions of 1973-1974, or even Muslim reactions to the September 11 attacks beyond, given the absence of the Cold War and the personality of Usama bin Ladin, framework. But the bonds of over half a recruited a former advertising executive to century were never those of fondness or 90 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002 common outlook. Over the long term, the 5. The seemingly incommensurate gap in destiny of the relationship appears to be outlook has also played a starring role in guided, as ever, by the relentless logic of keeping the two sides apart. A visitor to energy and security in the hydrocarbon age. Aramco’s fenced-off “company town” in Dhahran during the 1960s “felt as if I were inside an idealised America, like an old cover *Josh Pollack is a Washington, DC-based of the Saturday Evening Post; an America defense consultant. All views herein are the untouched by the turmoil of the sixties, by author's own, and should not be attributed to long hair or drugs, with its citizens watching others. His recent work includes old movies on Aramco TV, playing baseball "Afghanistan's Missing Peace," published in or mending their cars.” Anthony Sampson, January 2002 in Current Defense Analyses. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped (New York: NOTES Viking, 1975), p. 235, as cited in Brown, Oil, God, and Gold, p. 268. 1. Parker T. Hart, Saudi Arabia and the The cultural and psychological distance United States: Birth of a Security Partnership between Westerners and Arabs, according to (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University an American raised in the expatriate business Press, 1998), pp. 35-37. On the early history community in Jidda, led Americans living in of the relationship, see also Barry Rubin, The Saudi Arabia to embrace “the comfort of Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947 absolutism.” They split into “two distinct (London: Frank Cass, 1981). camps… those who had too many Arab 2. Crane was widely known and respected in friends, and those who sat at home and drank the Arab world for his role in the King-Crane their illegal alcohol and bitched about those Commission of 1919 and his personal damn sand niggers and ragheads.” Kaplan, opposition to both Zionism and the The Arabists, p. 136. establishment of the British and French American military personnel in particular mandates in the Middle East. The 1931 trip have tended to experience isolation while in was his third visit to the kingdom. He was Saudi Arabia. A recent USMTM accompanied to Jidda by a translator, George “newcomer’s guide” reads, in part, “Tabuk is Antonius, whom he later supported in writing a very conservative Moslem community. The Arab Awakening, which was dedicated to Rules, regulations, and laws are enforced in its patron. For a pithy assessment of Crane’s the strictest manner. Although Westerners are involvement in the Middle East, see Robert generally welcome, they are expected to D. Kaplan, The Arabists: Romance of an conduct themselves in socially and religiously American Elite (New York: The Free Press, acceptable ways. Preparing for service here 1995), pp. 68-72. means being mentally prepared to accept the 3. Socal is now known as Chevron. Anthony tenets and restrictions of Islamic culture in the Cave Brown, Oil, God, and Gold: The Story fullest sense. Because of these restrictions, of Aramco and the Saudi Kings (Boston and close comradeship develops between New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, USMTM members and other Westerners in 1999), pp. 9-56; and Alexei Vassiliev, The the area. This tour provides a great History of Saudi Arabia (New York: New opportunity to complete self-study programs York University Press, 2000), pp. 316-17. such as PME [Professional Military 4. Until 1944, the operation was called the Education], etc., and also gives individuals a California-Arabian Standard Oil Company great chance to improve personal physical (Casoc). Until 1936, Casoc was a subsidiary fitness.” Text from of Socal; afterward, Socal and the Texas
24. Jeff Gerth, “The White House Crisis; 27. As a manifestation of American military Evidence Points to Big Saudi Role in Iranian and technological mastery, the setting must and Contra Arms Deals,” New York Times, have offered the desert ruler a potent November 30, 1986; David B. Ottaway, counterpoint to President Franklin D. “Saudi Envoy Has Credibility Woes,” Roosevelt’s personal frailty, which in any Washington Post, February 28, 1987; case was largely matched by his own at that Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran- time; the Saudi monarch’s legs were failing Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (New York: him. (Roosevelt made him a gift of his spare W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 389-92. wheelchair.) To judge by the outcome, in any 25. An American official’s comment from event, Abd al-Aziz held his own. Yergin, The July 1967, cited in Yergin, The Prize, p. 556. Prize, pp. 403-5. 26. The Saudi anti-Zionist policy appears not 28. William A. Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Sa’ud to have been inevitable. In 1939, St. John (New York: American Friends of the Middle Philby, accompanied by Saudi deputy foreign East, 1954), as cited in Hart, Saudi Arabia and minister Fuad Bey Hamza, proposed to the United States, pp. 38-39. Zionist leaders Chaim Weizmann and Moshe 29. Brown, Oil, God, and Gold, p. 188. Shertok (later Sharett) that they pay Abd al- 30. Specifically, he warned that he might be Aziz £20 million to be used to resettle driven “to apply sanctions against the Palestinian Arabs and also support him as the American oil concessions… not because of ruler of a unified Arab state--a proposal his desire to do so but because the pressure strikingly similar in the latter respect to upon him of Arab public opinion was so great Weizmann’s abortive agreement with Emir that he could no longer resist it.” Yergin, The Faisal of Hejaz 20 years previously. Both Prize, p. 426, and Brown, Oil, God, and Gold, Weizmann and Abd al-Aziz remained neither pp. 193-94. That pressure was evidently so committed nor openly opposed to the “Philby great that the kingdom contributed fighting Plan,” until its namesake disregarded Abd al- men to the invasion of Israel, placing them Aziz’s instructions not to divulge it to anyone under Egyptian command. In October 1948, else. In 1943, after Harold Hoskins of the they fought a fierce, close quarters American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) engagement at close quarters with Israel’s proposed that Abd al-Aziz meet with Givati Brigade at Huleiqat, near Ashkelon. Weizmann, the king wrote to President The Israelis prevailed. Chaim Herzog, The Roosevelt, rejecting the “historic fallacies or Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the social and economic theories of the Zionists,” Middle East from the War of Independence asserting that an ages-old enmity between through Lebanon (New York: Vintage Books, Muslims and Jews was documented in the 1982), pp. 23, 48, 94. Qur’an, and moreover proclaiming “a great 31. The 1956 oil embargo against Britain and personal enmity” between himself and France was ineffective until the United States Weizmann, “owing to the criminal affront threatened to join it. Once the Europeans which this person has committed against me conceded, the U.S. was able to overcome the by choosing me from among all Arabs and effects of the Arab embargo by supplying Moslems to charge me with a dastardly thing- Britain and France directly. See Yergin, The -that is that I should become a traitor against Prize, pp. 491-92. my religion and my country.” Brown, Oil, 32. Brown, Oil, God, and Gold, pp. 268-80. God, and Gold, pp. 181-85. Timing had 33. Yergin, The Prize, pp. 554-58. probably been fatal to Philby Plan’s chances; 34. The lines of June 4, 1967. Facing attacks by 1943, Saudi oil exports, while still small, from Palestinian radicals and the Soviet- had grown to the point that the kingdom was backed People’s Democratic Republic of no longer dependent on a depressed Yemen, Faisal was partial to theories about a pilgrimage trade for its revenues. For the combined Zionist-Communist plot to seize growth of oil production and export revenues, control of the Middle East. This countered see Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, any impression that he had acquiesced to an pp. 319-20, 401. American-backed Pax Israeliana. Safran, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 93 Josh Pollack
Saudi Arabia, pp. 140-1. 51. Bandar, who personified the U.S.-Saudi 35. Ibid. relationship during the Reagan and first Bush 36. Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli administrations, was well-known in Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Washington as “a specialist in out-of-channel Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: solutions and relationships,” and enjoyed an University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 181- unusual degree of access to senior American 209. figures. Woodward, The Commanders, p. 37. Brown, Oil, God, and Gold, pp. 299-301. 213. 38. Safran, Saudi Arabia, pp. 152-55. Fahd’s confidant since the late 1970s, Bandar 39. Yergin, The Prize, pp. 595-97. had been active in the AWACS and F-15 40. Safran, Saudi Arabia, p. 155. Based on battles as an informal go-between with equipment captured during the subsequent Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. fighting on the Golan Heights, the Israelis Fahd would charge Bandar with an concluded that the Saudis had also assortment of special and sensitive diplomatic contributed men and arms to the war effort. tasks in an array of foreign capitals, Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars, p. 302. effectively making him an auxiliary foreign 41. Yergin, The Prize, pp. 598-606. minister. He was appointed ambassador in 42. Ibid., pp. 606-17; Safran, Saudi Arabia, 1983, indicating just how valuable the pp. 156-60. American connection had become to Riyadh 43. Safran, Saudi Arabia, pp. 165-67. since the Iranian revolution. Situating such a 44. In June 2000, a resurgent OPEC figure in Washington indicated the primacy of established a price band of $22 to $28 per the relationship among Saudi interests. David barrel, with the Saudis identifying $25 as their B. Ottaway, “Been There, Done That: Prince desired target. Alfred B. Prados, “Saudi Bandar, One of the Great Cold Warriors, Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations,” Faces the Yawn of a New Era,” Washington Congressional Research Service, July 8, 2002, Post, July 21, 1996. pp. 9-10. See also Nawaf E. Obaid, The Oil One of Bandar’s later American counterparts Kingdom at 100: Petroleum Policymaking in would describe his unorthodox modus Saudi Arabia (Washington, DC: The operandi by an allusion to the main doors to Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Department of State: “Every 2000), pp. 97-103. The oil price hike of 1979 administration comes in determined to make was an exception that appears to have been Bandar do the normal thing and come in the C aimed at accommodating a newly threatening Street entrance. All have failed.” Mark Iran. Matthews, “ Prince Still Charming, But…” 45. Prados, “Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and Baltimore Sun, November 24, 1995. U.S. Relations,” pp. 7-8. 52. Jim Mann, “Threat to Mideast Military 46. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Balance; U.S. Caught Napping by Sino-Saudi Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Boulder, Missile Deal,” Los Angeles Times, May 4, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 114. 1988. Data on the DF-3A is from the 47. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, Federation of American Scientists; see pp. 308-10, 346-49, 398, 407-09.
Oberdorfer, “Chinese Sell Saudis Missiles Ottaway, “Oil for Security Fueled Close Ties; Capable of Covering Mideast,” Washington But Major Differences Led to Tensions,” Post, March 18, 1988. Washington Post, February 11, 2002. 56. Khaled bin Sultan with Seale, Desert 59. Jim Hoagland, “The Turtle Snaps Back,” Warrior, pp. 150-51. Introducing some Washington Post, April 13, 1988. ambiguity, the author also describes the 60. Sciolino, “Congress Is Formally Notified missiles, inter alia, as “a deterrent weapon not of Big Saudi Weapons Deal.” Some concern intended to be used, except as a last resort remains that Saudi Arabia, like its neighbors, when it should be able to demoralize the may be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, enemy by delivering a painful and decisive apparently by purchase rather than indigenous blow.” Ibid., p. 145. development. See Richard L. Russell, “A 57. By his own account, Assistant Secretary Saudi Nuclear Option?” Survival, Vol. 43, of State Richard Armitage fumed at Bandar, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 69-79. saying, “I want to congratulate you. This is 61. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Saudis Reaffirm a the law of unintended consequences. You Right to Vary Arms Dealings,” New York have put Saudi Arabia squarely in the Times, July 28, 1988. targeting package of the Israelis. You are now 62. John Lancaster and John Mintz, “U.S.- number one on the Israeli hit parade. If the Saudi Agreement Is Reached on $ 9.2 Billion balloon goes up anywhere in the Middle East, Arms Purchase Stretchout,” Washington Post, you’re going to get hit first.” Quoted in James February 1, 1994. Mann, About Face: A History of America’s 63. Richard F. Grimmett, “Conventional Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1994- to Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001,” Congressional Research Service, 1999), pp. 169-70. Armitage’s words were August 6, 2002, pp. 28-9. underscored by hints from the Israelis, in 64. The Spanish press has announced a $1.5 word and deed, that they might soon decide to billion contract for tanks, transport aircraft, attack the missile sites. The Americans and other arms. “Spain to supply Saudi interceded with the Israelis against this Arabia with arms,” United Press possibility. David B. Ottaway, “Talk of Israeli International, June 30, 2002. Raid on Saudi Missiles Concerns U.S.,” 65. Like other Arab states, Saudi Arabia has Washington Post, March 23, 1988; George C. been hamstrung by a tendency to conceive of Wilson and David B. Ottaway, “Saudi-Israeli defense in terms of advanced weaponry rather Tensions Worry U.S.; Bombing Practice May than less tangible and less readily attainable Presage Attack On Missiles in Arabia,” “force multipliers.” See Norvell De Atkine, Washington Post, March 25, 1988; John H. “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East Cushman, Jr., “Reagan Urges Israeli Restraint Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 1999). on Saudi Missiles,” New York Times, March 66. Woodward, The Commanders, p. 270. 26, 1988. For Congressional demands, see 67. By early in Clinton’s second term, Bandar Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Replacing Its Envoy to acknowledged having gotten off on the wrong Saudis,” New York Times, April 2, 1988; and foot with the new president, spending less Elaine Sciolino, “Congress Is Formally time in the American capital than before, and Notified of Big Saudi Weapons Deal,” New experiencing boredom in the post-Cold War York Times, April 28, 1988. environment. Ottaway, “Been There, Done 58. Sciolino, “U.S. Replacing Its Envoy to That.” Saudis.” The Saudis had regarded Horan with In the view of one Washington journalist, the disfavor since his appointment the previous ambassador had become chairman of “the September. For American and Saudi accounts, Persian Gulf War Boys’ Club… always quick respectively, of some of the underlying to offer Bush pere and other club members a reasons for his removal, see Kaplan, The private jet ride or a British hunting jaunt or a Arabists, pp. 232-33, and Khaled bin Sultan junket at his Aspen mansion--to which he with Seale, Desert Warrior, p. 137 and 151. transported a British pub he had dismantled.” See also Robert G. Kaiser and David Maureen Dowd, “This Dynasty Stuff,” New Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) 95 Josh Pollack
York Times, May 1, 2002. “Be Careful What You Wish For: The Future 68. Douglas Jehl, “The Wisdom of a Saudi of U.S.-Saudi Relations,” World Policy King: Choosing an Heir to the Realm of Journal, Spring 2002, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 37- Abdel Aziz,” New York Times, May 24, 1999. 49. For American efforts, see David B. 69. For Abdullah’s role, see Susan Sachs, Ottaway and Joe Stephens, “Diplomats Met “Saudi Heir Urges Reform, and Turn From With Taliban on Bin Laden; Some Contend U.S.,” New York Times, December 4, 2000. U.S. Missed Its Chance,” Washington Post, Especially after September 11, 2001, October 29, 2001. Bandar’s status increasingly came into 75. Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, “A question in Washington: “Reports of a rift Once-Stormy Terror Alliance Was Solidified between the straight-laced Abdullah and his by Cruise Missiles,” Wall Street Journal, more westernized and pro-U.S. relatives in August 2, 2002. high positions have been fueled recently by 76. The Saudi government cut off funding to the unexplained, weeks-long absence from the PLO following Yasir Arafat’s decision to Washington of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the support to Iraq in 1990. Some accounts allege Saudi ambassador to the United States… that Riyadh has since provided financial Depending on whom one talks to, he is either support to Hamas, a violent Islamist seriously ‘out of favor’ with Abdullah and Palestinian rejectionist organization lying low in Europe, recovering from an responsible for a series of terrorist attacks in illness, or engaged in high-level consultations Israel and the occupied territories during the in Riyadh.” Karen DeYoung, “Saudis Seethe 1990s. Jeremy Kahn, “Saudi diplomat seeks Over Media Reports on Anti-Terror Effort,” asylum,” Financial Times, June 15, 1994; Washington Post, November 6, 2001. Mark Matthews, “Saudis shown to aid terror, 70. Steven Lee Myers, “At a Saudi Base, U.S. Israel alleges,” Baltimore Sun, May 7, 2002; Digs In, Gingerly, for a Longer Stay,” New Herb Keinon, “Livnat puts Saudis on York Times, December 27, 1997; Howard defensive,” Jerusalem Post, May 8, 2002. Schneider, “In the Arabian Desert, U.S. 77. Elaine Sciolino, “Out Front: A Desert Troops Settle In; Temporary Deployment Has Kingdom Takes the Spotlight,” New York Permanent Feel,” Washington Post, May 3, Times, March 3, 2002. 2001. 78. The Voter News Service (VNS) national 71. Lawrence Wright, “The Counter- exit poll found 79% of Jewish respondents to Terrorist,” The New Yorker, January 14, 2002. have voted for Gore, the same proportion that 72. According to one account, some U.S. voted for Bill Clinton in 1996. George officials briefly gave consideration to Edmonson, Cox News Service, “One Nation assassinating bin Ladin at this time. Barton Evenly Divisible; The Razor-Thin Election Gellman, “U.S. Was Foiled Multiple Times in Day Margin Still Reveals Some Huge Gaps,” Efforts To Capture Bin Laden or Have Him Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 14, 2000. Killed; Sudan’s Offer to Arrest Militant Fell 79. For the debate, see Rachel Donadio, Through After Saudis Said No,” Washington “GOP Woos Arabs, Hawks as Middle East Post, October 3, 2001. Crisis Puts Democrats on Defensive,” 73. Some reports have alleged that Saudi Forward, October 20, 2000. intelligence minister Turki bin Faisal, who According to a Zogby International poll, managed the Taliban account, paid off bin 45.5% voted for Bush, 38% for Democrat Al Laden to secure the kingdom’s flanks. Gore, and 13.5% for Ralph Nader of the Seymour Hersh, “King’s Ransom,” The New Green Party, an Arab-American. An estimated Yorker, October 22, 2001; Nick Fielding, 390,000 Arab voters moved from the “Saudis paid Bin Laden £200m,” Sunday Democratic into the Republican column Times, August 25, 2002. between 1996 and 2000. “Almost half of 74. For Saudi efforts, see Ahmed Rashid, those Democrats who abandoned Gore said Taliban (New Haven: Yale University Press, that their decision to do so was influenced by 2001), pp. 138-39; and interview with Turki the presence of Senator Joseph Lieberman on bin Faisal, as cited in F. Gregory Gause III, the Democratic ticket.” James Zogby, “How 96 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September, 2002) Saudi Arabia and the United States, 1931-2002
Arab Americans voted and why,” Jordan Teitelbaum, “Dueling for Da‘wa: State vs. Times, December 19, 2000. According to a Society on the Saudi Internet,” Middle East newspaper account, 72% of respondents to a Journal, Spring 2002, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. national survey of Muslims conducted by the 222-239. Council on Islamic-American Relations 84. Sachs, “Saudi Heir Urges Reform, and (CAIR) reported voting for Bush; 85% of Turn From U.S.” these mentioned being influenced by Muslim 85. The previous October, the Arab League political organizations’ endorsement of the had pledged $800 million to preserve the Republican candidate. See Caryle Murphy, “Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem,” plus “Muslims See New Clouds Of Suspicion; another $200 million for families of Mideast Backlash Cited As Ramadan Fasts Palestinians killed in the fighting. How much Begin,” Washington Post, November 27, of this money was ever disbursed is unclear. 2000. Yasir Arafat reportedly received $45 million The Bush administration also seemed at first during a July 2001 visit to Saudi Arabia, to embrace this alignment, built around a which may have counted against the $225 “diversity cabinet” that, once completed, pledged in April. Prados, “Saudi Arabia: included two African-Americans, one Current Issues and U.S. Relations,” p. 6. Hispanic, two Asian-Americans, three 86. Jane Perlez, “Mitchell Report on Mideast women, and an Arab-American (former Violence May Thaw the Ice; U.S. Gingerly Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan), but Discusses Taking More Active Role,” New no Jews--in the last area, a striking departure York Times, May 17, 2001. from the choices of the previous 87. The extent to which the Saudi leadership administration. was drawn into the loop of the Israeli- 80. When asked whether the U.S. had Palestinian problem, or was perceived to have requested Saudi permission or even informed been, was illustrated by an account alleging Riyadh of the raid beforehand, Rear Admiral that Gaza Preventive Security Chief Craig Quigley replied, “Not that I’m aware of, Muhammad Dahlan, having come under fire no.” See official transcript at from Israeli troops on April 5, 2001,
Al-Aqsa Mosque, which is the key issue of To Reform Authority, End Resistance,” Al- the Kingdom and the Arab and Islamic Quds al-Arabi, May 2, 2002, FBIS worlds.” (FBIS translation.) translation; Ze’ev Schiff, “Analysis / Saudi The peace initiative was not intended as an pressure on Arafat has failed,” Ha’aretz in opening to direct negotiations with Israel. See English, May 26, 2002. Barry Schweid, Associated Press, 100. Bassem Mroue, “Senior Iraqi embraces “Abdullah’s Peace Plan Called a Vision,” Saudi crown prince at Arab summit,” USA Today, February 27, 2002; William Associated Press, “March 28, 2002. Orme, “Saudi Ambassador Berates Israel 101. “‘It is a mistake to think that our people Before U.N. Council,” Los Angeles Times, will not do what is necessary to survive,’ the February 28, 2002. person close to the crown prince said, ‘and if 97. It drew an immediate dismissal from the that means we move to the right of bin Laden, Israeli Foreign Ministry on the same grounds: so be it; to the left of Qaddafi, so be it; or fly “‘We cannot accept the right of return. It to Baghdad and embrace Saddam like a would mean a situation where there are two brother, so be it. It’s damned lonely in our Palestinian states,’ foreign ministry part of the world, and we can no longer spokesman Emmanuel Nachshon told AFP.” defend our relationship to our people.’ …The Agence France Presse, “Arab initiative is person close to Abdullah pointed out that ‘indivisible’: Saud al-Faisal,” March 28, Saudi Arabia's recent assurances that it would 2002. The text of the Beirut Declaration is use its surplus oil-producing capacity to blunt available at the effects of Saddam Hussein's 30-day
MacFarquhar, “Saudis Criticize the Taliban 2002. And Halt Diplomatic Ties,” New York Times, 112. Hugh Pope, “War Of Words Between September 26, 2001. Other immediate steps U.S., Saudi Media Heightens Tensions In The taken by the Saudis are described in Prados, Crucial Alliance,” Wall Street Journal, “Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. November 21, 2001. For an example, see Relations,” p. 4. “Reconsidering Saudi Arabia,” editorial, New 107. Howard Schneider, “Saudis Suspect Al York Times, October 14, 2001. Qaeda Plot Against U.S. Military, Arrest 13,” 113. Notable in this vein was a series of Washington Post, June 13, 2002; Eric columns by Colbert King of the Washington Schmitt, “Sudanese Says He Fired Missile At Post, proposing a boycott of American firms U.S. Warplane,” New York Times, June 14, that acquiesced in a Saudi policy of “sexual 2002. apartheid.” See, for instance, Colbert I. King, 108. Roula Khalaf, “Riyadh fears the fallout “Saudi Arabia’s Apartheid,” Washington from war,” Financial Times, October 8, 2001. Post, December 22, 2001. Nayif preached 109. For example, Secretary of State Colin agnosticism for months after the attacks: “So Powell characterized the Saudis as being far, we’ve received no evidence or documents “very responsive to all the requests we have from the American authorities that justify the placed on them,” adding, “I don't want to go suspicion or accusations raised against Saudi into what we have not yet asked of them.” Arabian citizens.” Howard Schneider, “Man Tom Bowman, “Transportation, staging areas on Bin Laden Tape Now Said to Be Guerilla,” for troops at issue,” Baltimore Sun, Washington Post, December 18, 2001. For the September 24, 2001. fundraising event, see Neil MacFarquhar, “No 110. Eric Schmitt and Michael R. Gordon, Jerry Lewis, but Saudi Telethon Reaches “Top Air Chief Sent,” New York Times, Goal,” New York Times, November 9, 2001. September 21, 2002; Vernon Loeb and Dana 114. Patrick Tyler, “Fearing Harm, Bin Laden Priest, “Saudis Balk at U.S. Use of Key Kin Fled From U.S.,” New York Times, Facility; Powell Seeks Reversal of Policy; September 30, 2001. Refusal Could Delay Airstrikes at Terrorists,” 115. Susan Schmidt, “Sept. 11 Families Join Washington Post, September 22, 2001; to Sue Saudis; Banks, Charities and Royals Patrick E. Tyler, “Saudis Feeling Pain of Accused Of Funding al Qaeda Terrorist Supporting U.S.,” New York Times, Network,” New York Times, August 16, 2002. September 24, 2001; Roula Khalaf, “Saudi 116. John Mintz, “Most Detainees Are Arabia denies agreeing to aid strikes: Foreign Saudis, Prince Says; Return to Kingdom Is minister Prince Saud al-Feisal says the US Sought; Bush Pledges Case-by-Case has not asked for military support,” Financial Decisions,” Washington Post, January 29, Times, October 1, 2001; Thomas E. Ricks, 2002. “Rumsfeld Confident Of Use of Saudi Bases; 117. “Summer vacationers shun the U.S.,” Royal Family Appears to Signal Assent,” Arab News, February 15, 2002; Robin Allen, Washington Post, October 4, 2001; William “Bank’s deposits hit by ‘anti-US protests,’” Arkin, “Our Saudi ‘Friends,’” Financial Times, May 24, 2002; Scott washingtonpost.com, May 6, 2002, Peterson, “Saudis channel anger into charity,”
125. “The document envisions tens of thousands of marines and soldiers probably invading from Kuwait. Hundreds of warplanes based in as many as eight countries, possibly including Turkey and Qatar, would unleash a huge air assault... Any mention of using bases in Saudi Arabia, from which the United States staged the bulk of the airstrikes in the gulf war, is conspicuously missing from the document, said an official familiar with the briefing slides. The United States would need permission to use Saudi airspace adjacent to Iraq, if not Saudi bases themselves, officials said.” Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Plan for Iraq Is Said To Include Attack on 3 Sides,” New York Times, July 5, 2002. 126. Thomas E. Ricks, “Briefing Depicted Saudis as Enemies; Ultimatum Urged to Pentagon Board,” Washington Post, August 6, 2002; Donna Abu-Nasr, Associated Press, “Saudis: Don’t Attack Iraq From Here,” August 7, 2002. 127. Roula Khalaf, “A troubled friendship,” Financial Times, August 22, 2002.
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