41 Dirasat Iran’s Clandestine War on the Kingdom of Bahrain: Saraya al Ashtar and the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain Jumada I, 1440 - January 2019 Mitchell Belfer - Khalid Alshaikh Iran’s Clandestine War on the Kingdom of Bahrain: Saraya al Ashtar and the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain Mitchell Belfer - Khalid Alshaikh 4 Dirasat No. 41 Jumada I, 1440 - January 2019 © King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2019 King Fahd National Library Cataloging-In-Publication Data Alshaikh, Khalid - Belfer, Mitchell Irans Clandestine War the Kingdom of Bahrain: Saraya al Ashtar and the Military Wing of. / Alshaikh, Khalid - Belfer, Mitchell . - Riyadh , 2019 (دراسات ؛ p ; 23 x 16.5 cm . - ( 41 32 ISBN: 978-603-8268-00-1 1 - Iraq - Foreign relations 2- Bahrain I - Title II-Series 327.537055 dc 1440/3856 L.D. no. 1440/3856 ISBN: 978-603-8268-00-1 Table of Contents Abstract 6 Introduction and Overview 7 Saraya al Ashtar (SaA) 9 The Al-Wafa Islamic Movement and the SaA 13 The Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain (MWHB) 19 Some Impacts to Consider 24 Constraining the Iranian Threat 26 Conclusion 28 5 6 Dirasat No. 41 Jumada I, 1440 - January 2019 Abstract The 1979 Iranian revolution continues to reverberate throughout the Middle East. While many of the more pronounced Iranian proxies, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthi militia in Yemen, are the focus of a wide assortment of terror-state explorations, it is important to look at some of the other organizations that Tehran utilizes in pursuit of its regional and international interests. Bahrain, has long been of a strategic interest to the Islamic Republic as it regards it as its Fourteenth Province and a stepping stone to a more direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp prioritizes operations against Bahrain, for Manama has faced a host of radicalized terrorist groups commanded by the IRGC over the years which conducted terrorist attacks and coup attempts. While Bahraini security operations were able to contain most Iranian terrorist groups, the 2011 upheaval in much of the Arab world provided clandestine groups with new opportunities to polarize Bahrain and inspire political violence. This study focuses on several of the main Iran-backed groups to have emerged in Bahrain since 2011. Identifying the so-called: Saraya al Ashtar, along with its political umbrella Al Wafa movement, and the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain, as the main groups, this study seeks to provide an understanding of those organizations since they pose the most pronounced challenge to Bahrain (at present) and to stability in the wider Arab Gulf. Additionally, the study presents and analyses the groups noted above (with reference to their context). It then asseses areas of impact of the groups and concludes with summarizing Bahrain’s measures on how to curtail these groups and their Iranian backers. Introduction and Overview The Islamic Republic of Iran was born and continues to live under the double concepts of taqqiyah and khode, which simultaneously encourage the use of mis- and disinformation and the generation and pursuit of hidden agendas. In a modern political context, this is manifesting itself in the manner in which Iran deploys its propaganda and the way it fights its wars. Iran is heavily involved—and bears responsibility (to a degree) for initiating conflict—in the civil wars and sectarian violence in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, and the Sahel. In those conflicts it is a direct and explicit actor that uses an assortment of its assets in pursuit of its strategic objectives, which include constructing land bridges from Iran to the Mediterranean (such as the Iran- Iraq-Syria highway) and eroding, through various means, regional nodes of traditional stability, such as the countries of the Arab Gulf. These are meant to increase Iran’s geopolitical position and establish a grand pincer with which to surround and pressure Saudi Arabia. Analyzing Iran’s behavior in the region exposes these objectives and the tools it uses to reach them. Iran has been, metaphorically, testing the waters in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain1 to gauge the level of traction it has to commence and fuel insurgencies in those countries. For the most part, it is not yet able to inspire such activities, but not for lack of trying. Much like its behavior in Lebanon in the early 1980s, Iran is currently developing and utilizing special clandestine organizations imbedded within the Shia communities of the Arab Gulf states to conduct acts of sabotage and terrorism, and to generally stoke sectarian violence. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of Bahrain: Iran's hardliners claim Bahrain as their fourteenth province (1) Qatar is deliberately omitted from this list, given the recent information about Doha’s duplicity in Iranian actions in the Gulf, coupled with its clear bandwagoning tendencies in the region, which involve engaging both Turkey and Iran on the strategic level, at the expense of its relationship with its traditional allies. 7 8 Dirasat No. 41 Jumada I, 1440 - January 2019 and they are determined to expand their revolution to the Island State. If Iranian claims to Bahrain were regulated as a rhetorical game, few would take notice. However, Iran has been steadily recruiting, training, and ultimately, deploying radicalized members within some of the Bahrani community—who pledge their allegiance to the Islamic Republic—to physically attack Bahrain, both to disrupt that country’s development and cohesion and as a stepping stone to doing the same in Saudi Arabia. Over the decades, Bahrain has faced a variety of terrorist groups that were trained and deployed under the command of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The most formidable challenges in the past have been: (1) the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), (2) the Military Wing of Hezbollah Bahrain (MWHB), and (3) Sacred Defense Bahrain (SDB). While the IFLB was subdued and dismantled following the Shia intifada in the 1990s, many of its proponents evaded arrest and joined the other active groups. The MWHB and the SDB survived into the 2000s and have been joined—in a post-2011 security environment—by several others, including the Youth of 14 February and the Saraya al Ashtar (SaA). Effective police work, coupled with several cases of infighting, thinned the numbers of these organizations, and a process of incorporation began. At present, while the Youth of 14 February remain active, their operations have been reduced to petty vandalism and limited Molotov cocktail attacks on stationary police forces. However, on the other end of the spectrum, Iran has honed the capacities of its two most pronounced agents in Bahrain: the SaA and the MWHB. As such, this study is meant to provide an understanding of those organizations, which currently pose the most pronounced challenge to Bahrain and to stability in the wider Arab Gulf. This study will proceed as follows. First, it presents and analyzes the SaA, followed by the MWHB. Second, the study will assess some areas of potential impact of the groups’ activities in Bahrain. This study will conclude with analyzing the Bahraini security policy toward Iran’s clandestine operatives in the region. Saraya al Ashtar (SaA) Clandestine operations organized and executed by members of an Iran-backed militia—later named Saraya al Ashtar (SaA)—can be traced to 2007. At that time, acts of violence had been greatly reduced as the result of coordinated police actions and high-profile prosecutions. However, a regrouping and incorporation of members of the (then) dissolved IFLB was in process. Although operating without the SaA brand until 2012, the organization existed as a clandestine unit that took advantage of the mounting troubles in early 2011 to form a new, radicalized terrorist group in Bahrain. As part of their training exercises, young men in the SaA (all from the Shia sect) from some of Bahrain’s villages—for example, Sanabis, Sitra, Diraz, Daih, and Bani Jamra—began the process of militarizing demonstrations by using political dissent as a means of triggering strategic riots aimed at attacking Bahrain’s security forces.2 The process followed a pattern: First, groups of young men and women would stage a march or protest in one of the Shia villages. The police would be present but would not engage with the protesters. From behind the main part of the protest lines, young SaA members would pelt security personnel with stones. The police would then attempt to arrest those engaging in stone throwing, which poses a danger to public safety. In response, the SaA trainees would scatter and regroup behind prearranged street barricades. Tires would be set ablaze and small arsenals of Molotov cocktails would be hurled at security force vehicles and riot police. At the time, such acts were seen as the last embers of the violent intifada from the (2) See Mitchell Belfer, Small State, Dangerous Region: A Strategic Assessment of Bahrain (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishing, 2014), pp. 202–240. 9 10 Dirasat No. 41 Jumada I, 1440 - January 2019 previous decade. However, they were, in fact, training exercises for far more violent and coordinated campaigns that came to fruition in the wake of the 2011–2012 wave of public violence. While many in Europe applauded the 2011 events in Bahrain, such an approach was misguided. Bahrain was not facing a human rights–centered protest only, but rather a new form of Iranian-supported public violence. As a result, Bahrain was forced to deal with the opportunistic SaA, which sought to exploit the regional upheaval and deploy its fighters to engage Bahrain’s security forces.