The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies Volume 4, Spring 2019, pp. 33-56 DOI: https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES/4/2 ISSN: 2522-347X (print); 2522-6959 (online) Assessing Iranian Soft Power in the Arab World from Google Trends Hillel Frisch Abstract Iran’s hard power in Lebanon is well-known. At its beck and call are the Hezbollah militia − the powerful military force through which it largely controls the Lebanese state, the many militias operating under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Force in Iraq, as well as links in the Palestinian arena to al-Jihad al-Islami and to Hamas. This is hardly true of its soft power. Analyzing search results presented by Google Trends, Iran’s soft power reach seems to be limited to the states with Shi’ite populations, especially in Lebanon and Bahrain. The country’s soft power is more tenuous in Iraq, the country with a majority of Shi’ites, who also represent the majority of Arabic speaking Shi’ites. Analysis of Google Trends searches suggests that Iraq is a spiritual center competing with Iran, among the smaller Shi’ite centers of population in Lebanon and Bahrain − where Shi’ite identity seems to be the most salient. While Arabic speaking Shi’ites evince interest in Iran, the Iranian public hardly reciprocates with interest in Shi’ites in the Arab world, a reflection of a center-periphery relationship between Iran and transnational Shi’ites. Keywords: Iran, soft power, Google Trends, Shi`ites, Arab world, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain Prof. Hillel Frisch – Bar-Ilan University, Israel; [email protected] 33 34 Hillel Frisch Introduction Iran’s hard power in Lebanon is well known. At its beck and call is the Hezbollah militia, the most powerful military force in the state, which most likely includes the Lebanese army. This can be clearly deduced from the behavior of the Lebanese army that has showed on countless occasions its heavy-handed methods, even brutality, against Sunni fundamentalist groups, either Lebanese, Palestinian, or of Syrian origin. This sharply contrasts with the Lebanese army’s complete reticence to interfere in Hezbollah infringements of Security Council Resolution 1701 that forbids any armed presence other than the Lebanese army and UNIFIL south of the Litani River. The army’s obeisance to Hezbollah power reached its zenith in May 2008, when Hezbollah fighters fanned out over Beirut and set siege to the Lebanese government complex, the Grand Serail, to induce the cabinet to make the legislative changes necessary to allow Hezbollah veto powers over government decisions. The army stayed away from the fighting. No less visible, though of more recent vintage, is Iran’s hard power in Syria, enhanced considerably since Syria’s regime became dependent on Iranian aid and pro-Iranian militias to change the tide of war against the opposition and ISIS. Commentators correctly noted how in Syrian President Bashar al- Asad’s first visit to Tehran since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, he was photographed at his meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani with only an Iranian flag in the background – a clear breach of protocol. Even more telling than this breach of protocol in meetings between two state leaders, which mandates the appearance of the flags of both states, was the third person in the room. Customarily, in meetings between heads of state, if there is a third person it is typically the foreign minister of the host country. In this case, it was Qasim Suleimani, the head of the Iranian al-Quds force, who coordinates the pro-Iranian militias in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The latter state is also an arena in which Iran demonstrates considerable hard power through dozens of pro-Iranian militias that are part of the Mass Assessing Iranian Soft Power in the Arab World from Google Trends 35 Mobilization Movement that emerged to fight ISIS when it seriously challenged the Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi state in the summer of 2014. It hardly requires a keen eye to see the linkage between these organizations and Iran, through the posters of Ayatollah Khomeini and the present spiritual leader, Ali Khamen’ei that these militias display in their military processions or on their Internet sites. These manifestations of hard power begs the question of whether Iran’s penetration in the Arabic-speaking world is only a function of brute power, or does Iran have soft power at its disposal as well? The Research Design A look at Google Trends that plot searches is a good way to gauge Iran’s ideological reach in the Arab-speaking world amongst both Sunnis and Shi’ites, as well as to gauge the pull of competing Arabic-speaking figures in countries with sizeable Shi’ite populations. Google Trends offers a comparative way to explore interests in people, countries, and conflicts by plotting the total numbers of searches for any given term over time, provided there are sufficient searches of the term. The trend or graph can be generated for searches conducted in the last 24 hours, one month, three months, one year, five years, and for the entire period since 2004. The graph always shows the relationship to the high point in the number of searches during the specified time for any term. For example, if “ISIS” is the term being searched in the past five years, the high point was at the end of November 2015, which corresponds to the time period in which the organization made its greatest gains in both Syria and Iraq. The graph generated plots the number of searches before and after that event, from 2013 to the exact date the search is made in 2018. At any point in time, one can see the relative interest in ISIS on a scale of one to 100 according to the state, for all states that generate at least one per cent of the searches in the country with the highest number of searches. One can broadly infer whether interest in ISIS has increased, 36 Hillel Frisch decreased, or remained broadly level.1 Given a sufficient amount of data, which there clearly is for our example, “ISIS,” the data is plotted by country and frequently within the country as well. Once again, the breakdown is given relative to the country with the highest number of searches. In the United States, the most searches are frequently made in “the District of Columbia,” that is to say, Washington, D.C. and its immediate environs. ISIS is obviously of great interest to the White House staff, the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Pentagon, U.S. security agencies, Senate and congressional aides, think tanks, and universities in the area with a strong focus on foreign affairs that cluster in the United States capital. They evince that interest by searching ISIS on Google, whose market share in total searches is over 95 percent worldwide and slightly less than 80 percent in the United States. The greatest limitation in Google Trends searches is that the terms are searched in the specific script used for the term. “ISIS” in the Roman script searches in that script only. To plot searches for the term “ISIS” in Arab speaking states and to some extent in Iran, it would have to be typed in the Arab alphabet. Of course, plotting the comparative number of searches for any given term by country or area in itself does not give the complete picture. The relative index of searches by country does not reflect the relative population size, which must be factored in by the researchers. Thus, if searches in Ireland for ISIS are measured at 20, compared to 20 for the United States, this means that per capita interest in ISIS amongst the Irish population is over 60 times greater than interest in the United States, since the population of the United States is nearly fifty times that of Ireland. Google Trends offers a method of research. The terms chosen are critical for the content and context to answer the research questions. To gauge Iran’s soft power, searches in Arab countries of key Iranian spiritual and political leaders 1 The exercise for the period from 2004 is not entirely precise since Google Trends made improvements in their data in 2011, as noted in the graphs they generate. This is clearly visible; whereas, the graph line is much more uneven before 2011, it becomes much more oval after time, as data compilation of searches over time improved. Assessing Iranian Soft Power in the Arab World from Google Trends 37 have been made. These include Ayatollah Khomeini, the man most identified with the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the revolution, Ali Khamen’ei, the present spiritual leader, Rouhani, the present president, Qasim Suleimani, the head of al-Quds Force, and other prominent Iranian or Iran-based Ayatollahs. A corresponding analysis and comparison was made of leading Shi`ite personalities in the Arab-speaking Shi’ite communities. Additionally, three major ideological concepts relating to the Iranian revolution and the subsequent emergence of the Islamic Republic were searched – wilayat al-faqih, the leadership of the spiritual leader, a concept key to the justification of the Iranian theocracy; the “mustada’fin,” the oppressed, which featured at least in the past as a key concept in legitimating Iranian interference in surrounding states, against either social or “imperialist” oppression; and Jerusalem Day. Findings for searches are limited to the Arabic speaking states with sizeable Shi’ite minorities, Sunni states closest to Iran, and large, more distant Sunni states that function as control cases. The Searches Ayatollah Khomeini – No figure is as emblematic of the Iranian revolution and as influential in creating the Islamic Republic of Iran as Ayatollah Khomeini, within or outside Iran.