Federal Jurisdiction Over Union Constitutions After Wooddell
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Volume 37 Issue 3 Article 1 1992 Federal Jurisdiction over Union Constitutions after Wooddell James E. Pfander Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons Recommended Citation James E. Pfander, Federal Jurisdiction over Union Constitutions after Wooddell, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 443 (1992). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. Pfander: Federal Jurisdiction over Union Constitutions after Wooddell VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW VOLUME 37 1992 NUMBER 3 FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER UNION CONSTITUTIONS AFTER WOODDELL JAMES E. PFANDER* I. INTRODUCTION For the first half of this century, the task of policing the inter- nal affairs of labor organizations fell, essentially by default, to state court judges.' State courts based their authority to inter- * Associate Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A. 1978, University of Missouri; J.D. 1982, University of Virginia. I wish both to thank and to absolve Don Dripps, Kit Kinports, Martin H. Malin, Thomas M. Mengler, Laurie Mikva and Clyde W. Summers (for comments on earlier drafts), Jim Piper, Lee Reichert and Tony Rodriguez (for research assistance) and the University of Illinois (for research support). 1. The state courts' initial reluctance to hear disputes arising from the in- ternal workings of labor unions stemmed from the fact that unions were typically organized as voluntary associations. At common law, such associations were said to lack any legal personality apart from their members, and thus lacked the capacity to sue and to enter into contracts. See FREDERICK H. BACON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BENEFIT SOCIETIES AND INCIDENTALLY OF LIFE INSURANCE § 27 (1888); EDWARD M. DANGEL & IRENE SHRIBER, THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS § 286 (1941); EDWIN STACEY OAKES, THE LAW OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS § 108 (1927). As a consequence, voluntary associations were often frustrated in their attempts to obtain judicial recognition of their internal pro- ceedings. In refusing to order a local body to forfeit its property to the parent in keeping with the parent constitution, for example, the New York Court of Ap- peals explained that the "courts ofjustice cannot be called upon to aid in enforc- ing the decrees of these self-created judicatories." Austin v. Searing, 16 N.Y. 112, 125 (1857); see also Bauer v. Sampson Lodge, No. 32, Knights of Pythias, 1 N.E. 571 (Ind. 1885) (mutual benefit society could establish internal regulations but could not deprive members of existing rights); Goodman v. Jedidjah Lodge, 9 A. 13 (Md. 1887) (district grand lodge and minority members could not force forfeiture of local lodge funds). Similarly, common law courts expressed reluctance to review the merits of decisions to expel a member. See, e.g., Black & White-Smiths' Soc'y v. Vandyke, 2 Whart. 309 (Pa. 1837). The rhetoric of nonintervention was suspended, how- ever, in cases where a member's property rights were at stake. In such cases, the court was to "look so far into the case as to satisfy itself that there was not a capricious or arbitrary exercise of the power." BACON, supra, § 107. Eventually state courts worked out property and contract theories that enabled them to intervene more frankly in union affairs. For a discussion of these theories, see infra notes 3-6. (443) Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992 1 Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 1 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 443 vene upon the unions' written constitutions, 2 which were said to establish contractual relationships among the unions' constitu- ents.3 Relying on contract theory and the law's traditional reluc- tance to countenance a forfeiture of property, 4 state courts 2. On the origins and evolution of union self-government, I have found Theodore Glocker's work quite helpful, both for its discussion of the factors that led to greater centralization within early national unions and for its description of how unions borrowed from a host of sources, including fraternal orders and British trade unions, in structuring early constitutions. See Theodore W. Glocker, The Government of American Trade Unions, in JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (Series XXXI No. 2, 1913). Lloyd Ulman's classic work extends Glocker's analysis by considering more ex- plicitly the factors that contributed to national union domination and by testing the hypothesis that the locus of product market competition played a decisive role in the tendency towards centralization. See LLOYD ULMAN, THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION: THE DEVELOPMENT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS STRUC- TURE, GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS, AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (1955) [hereinafter ULMAN, NATIONAL UNION]. For more general treatments of union structure and government, see HARRY A. MILLIS & ROYAL E. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR (1945);JAMES WALLIHAN, UNION GOVERNMENT AND ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1985). In addition to these works, the Twentieth Century Fund series on union structure and government teaches the important lesson that, although union constitutions have much in common, they are less the instruments of pa- rental control than the sum of the history, traditions and economic imperatives that shaped each union's growth and development. See MORRIS A. HOROWITZ, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE CARPENTERS' UNION (1962); MELVIN ROTHBAUM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OIL, CHEMICAL, AND ATOMIC WORKERS UNION (1962), LLOYD ULMAN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STEEL WORKERS' UNION (1962) [hereinafter ULMAN, STEEL WORKERS]. 3. The language of an early Pennsylvania decision illustrates the contrac- tual approach of the courts: "[E]ach member pledges himself to obey these laws as a condition of his membership, by an express undertaking in signing the con- stitution and his promise to support the constitution and by-laws as a brotherly member." St. Mary's Beneficial Soc'y v. Burford's Adm'r, 70 Pa. 321, 324 (1872); see also Polin v. Kaplan, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (N.Y. 1931) (stating that con- stitution and by-laws of unincorporated association constitute contract that sets forth privileges and rights of members); BACON, supra note 1, § 91 (articles of association set forth rights of members in incorporated or unincorporated socie- ties); OAKES, supra note 1, § 9 (stating that "[t]he constitution, rules and by-laws of an unincorporated union ... constitute a contract between the members themselves and between the association and the individual members"). For a relatively modern restatement of the contract theory, see DANGEL & SHRIBER, supra note 1, § 138. 4. As the leading British case explained, judicial review of a member's ex- pulsion depended on the court's finding a "right of property vested in the mem- ber of the society, and of which he is unjustly deprived by such unlawful expulsion." Rigby v. Connol, 14 L.R.-Ch. D. 482, 487 (1880). The judicial fo- cus on the existence of property rights enabled the courts to distinguish com- mercial associations from those where the relationship was purely personal or fraternal. Thus, treatise writers distinguished a member's wholly personal inter- est in a neighborhood bridge group, say, from the mixed interests in a beneficial society, whose members expected both conviviality and life insurance. See BA- CON, supra note 1, §§ 73, 105; Jerre S. Williams, The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members, 32 TEX. L. REV. 826, 828-29 (1954). Recognition of the importance of property interests as a source of judicial https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss3/1 2 Pfander: Federal Jurisdiction over Union Constitutions after Wooddell 1992] JURISDICTION OVER UNION CONSTITUTIONS 445 developed common law rules that protected individual union members from unfair discipline. 5 The courts also respected intervention suggests that those who developed structural reforms associated with the rise of the national labor union in the latter half of the 19th century may have unconsciously supplied the basis for judicial intervention into the union's internal affairs. Labor historians credit Adolph Strasser and Samuel Gompers, early leaders of the Cigar Makers' Union, with having developed the first mod- ern national trade union. See SELIG PERLMAN, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 75, 78-79 (1929). Building on the model of the British trade union system, the Cigar Makers' 1879 convention approved constitutional amendments that provided for centralized national control of local unions, higher dues, and a system of illness and death benefits. See JOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 155-56 (1959). Such beneficial provisions en- couraged workers to join the union initially, to maintain their membership dur- ing lean times and to obey the union's laws for fear of being expelled and losing benefits. Gompers later claimed that with these beneficial programs, national unions displayed a "stability and permanency" in the face of industrial crises that had decimated their predecessors. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, supra note 2, at 55-74. Such beneficial programs also supplied the property interests that led state courts to adopt a more interventionist posture. 5. The law of internal union affairs owes much to its leading student, Pro- fessor Clyde Summers. In a series of important articles that predated the pas- sage of federal legislation, Professor Summers managed both to describe the law of union discipline and to shape its development with a strong call for union democracy. See Clyde Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 483 (1950); Clyde Summers, Disciplinary Proceduresof Unions, 4 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.