The Demise of Collective Bargaining in the USA: Reflections on the Un-American Character of American Labor Law
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The Demise of Collective Bargaining in the USA: Reflections on the Un-American Character of American Labor Law Reinhold Fahlbeckt Beginning with the observation that the industrial relations system of a country is a subsystem, alongside political, economic and cultural subsys- tems, the author asserts that the American industrialrelations law subsys- tem is not in harmony with its companion subsystems in American life. This disjunction is so severe, he claims, that the system of American industrial relations is doomed. While conventional wisdom and empirical studies point to unrelenting opposition to unionism on the part of employers, as well as worker indifference, as the chief reasonsfor the decline of unions, the author regards these phenomena as symptoms of deeply rooted factors of much greater magnitude. To bolster his argument that American labor law does not suit the United States, he points to Americans' traditionaldis- trust of government intervention, suspicion of concerted activity and collec- tivism in general, and hostility to compulsory membership in organizations. Finally, he maintains that within American culture there is an unspoken, though powerful, contempt for collective labor relations that expresses itself in three ways: in exemptions from labor law for certain classes of employ- ees, in the definition of bargaining units by the National Labor Relations Board and the courts, and in restrictingaccess to the legal system by union- ized workers who wish to pursue grievances apartfrom the union. In each case, the author writes, not only are workers not trusted to decide these issues, but the restrictions in themselves, by their "un-American" charac- ter, discourage workers from joining in the first place. t Dr. Reinhold Fahlbeck is professor of labor law in the Faculty of Law at Lund University, Sweden. He also teaches at the Stockholm School of Economics. Professor Fahlbeck has been a visit- ing scholar at several U.S. law schools and in 1990 he taught at Stanford Law School as a Visiting Professor. Presently he is a Visiting Professor at Sophia Faculty of Law, Tokyo, Japan. Professor Fahlbeck is an Overseas Correspondent of the National Academy of Arbitrators. A version of this essay was originally published in THE CHANGING FACE OF LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; LIBER AMICORUM FOR CLYDE W. SUMMERS (Roger Blanpain & Manfred Weiss eds., 1993). The text is used with the permission of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany. © Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, Volume 15, No. 2, 1994. 308 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 15:307 I. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 308 II. PURPOSE .................................................... 309 Ill. THE OVERARCHING PERSPECTIVE: CONCERTED ACTIVITY IN CONFLICT WITH AND GIVING RISE TO RESPONSES IN CONFLICT WITH FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN VALUES ......... 312 A. Freedom of Markets, Restraints of Trade ............... 314 1. Labor Law as a Kind of Antitrust Law .............. 315 2. Bargaining Structures and Bargaining Units ........ 317 3. Non-Existence of Employer Organizations........... 318 4. IndustrialActions .................................. 319 5. Sum mary .......................................... 320 B. The Role of the Federal Government ................... 321 C. Concerted Activity and the Archetypal American: the Element of Contempt .................................. 323 1. Groups of Employees not Covered by Federal Labor Law and Reasons for Non-Coverage ................ 323 2. Who Decides What Constitutes a Bargaining Unit, and Why? ......................................... 324 3. Bars to Individual Access to Justice ................ 326 4. Sum mary .......................................... 327 IV. THE INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVE: LABOR LAW AS AN EXERCISE IN KEEPING INDIVIDUALS IN CHECK ......................... 327 A. Compulsion Versus Voluntarism ....................... 327 1. Compulsory Decisions on Establishing Bargaining Units .............................................. 327 2. Compulsory Union Representation .................. 329 3. Compulsory Union Membership .................... 330 B. Collectivism Versus Individualism ...................... 331 1. Exclusivity ......................................... 331 2. Fair Representation................................ 331 3. Grievance Procedure and Access to Justice ......... 332 V. CLOSING WORDS ............................................ 333 I INTRODUCTION "Comparison in labor law presents nearly insuperable problems be- cause it ultimately reaches into comparison of social structures and atti- tudes," Clyde Summers once wrote.' Elaborating on this theme in an article comparing central facets of labor and industrial relations law in Sweden and the United States, Summers added: 1. Clyde W. Summers, Comparisonsin Labor Law: Sweden and the United States, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 2 (1985) [hereinafter Summers, Comparisons in Labor Law]. 19941 PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW It is obviously impossible for one who has not lived and worked within an industrial relations system to have a full understanding of the complexities and nuances of that system. Because of incomplete knowledge, relevant considerations may be overlooked or misconstrued. More important, the deep-running social attitudes, political values, or historical traditions may not be fully or accurately sensed.2 The present article is concerned precisely with "the deep-running so- cial attitudes, political values, or historical traditions" of one country, the United States. Its thesis is that U.S. labor and industrial relations legislation is in stark disaccord with these principles. When undertaking comparative research, Summers has often stated that his purpose is limited to "obtaining a different perspective and better understanding of our own system."3 But, in fact, he has not confined him- self to such a relatively humble task. His articles contain analyses that slice through the social fabric of the foreign country under investigation. After emphasizing the daunting difficulties and uncertainties involved in present- ing something worthwhile about a foreign nation to its own people, he once went on to say: "The comparative study itself sharpens our awareness .... As one realizes how much he has failed to understand his own system, he must fear that he has failed to understand the other. But the value of com- parisons remains, for comparison provides a framework and focus outside either system for viewing both."4 It is on that note that I dare proceed. II PURPOSE This article attempts to uncover certain characteristics of American at- titudes and regulation of the labor and industrial relations field. Its purpose is to try to present viewpoints not commonly advanced in order to explore the demise of collective bargaining in the United States. The theme is an overarching one. To discuss properly "the demise of collective bargaining in the U.S." is a monumental task. It may seem preposterous to examine the topic in a short article, particularly if one is a foreigner. What follows, then, is not a full-fledged discussion, merely a bouquet of very brief-and somewhat baffled-observations. I have tried not to emulate articles on "the distinctive character of American labour law," either in form or in substance. 5 2. Clyde W. Summers, Worker Participationin Sweden and the United States: Some Compari- sons from an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 175, 177 (1984) [hereinafter Summers, Worker Participation]. 3. Summers, Comparisons in Labor Law, supra note 1, at 2. 4. Summers, Worker Participation,supra note 2, at 177. 5. See Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Law, 84 HARV L. REV. 1394 (1971). Everyone familiar with Bok's article will immediately notice that the present article-despite an unintentional similarity in title-in no way draws on that piece. Readers of this article will also notice that I have not referred to, much less relied upon, other articles presenting 310 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW [Vol. 15:307 Collective bargaining in the United States follows in the path of un- ions. Unions, in turn, exist where employees decide to form and/or join them. As is well known, the unionization rate in the U.S. is low, about fifteen per cent of the working population in the private sector.6 Thus, an- other way of stating the purpose of this article is to discuss why union membership in the U.S. is so low. To put the theme yet another way: The industrial relations system of any country is a subsystem within that country, along with other subsystems such as the political system, the economic system, the human relations sys- tem, and systems concerning human values (culture). A subsystem that is not in harmony with other subsystems will either change those other sys- tems so that harmony is established, or disappear. In the U.S., the system of labor and industrial relations law is not in harmony with other subsystems. Indeed, it seems to me that the American labor and industrial relations legal system is in disaccord with fundamental features of American society to such an extent that it is-and has been ever since its enactment in 1935- by and large doomed.7 Before proceeding I wish to make one thing absolutely clear. This article is based on the firm notion that classifications like "right-wrong," "good-bad" or "good-better-best" have no meaning per se when discussing legal institutions and arrangements in industrial relations. There simply