The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2010: Obama in Charge
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
The Middle East Situation The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2010: Obama in Charge Christian-Peter Hanelt estinians, especially, hoped for a more “even-hand- Senior Expert - Europe and the Middle East ed” approach and an intensified engagement. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh In many regards, Obama meant to mark a turning Keys point in US-Middle East relations: he advocated for Maren Qualmann renewed trust and confidence between the parties Consultant, Hamburg and the US, while once again attempting to trans- form the image of the US into that of a serious and honest broker for peace and democracy. As a con- 2011 the Setting: obama’s new Middle East sequence, his unusual decision to tackle the Israe- Med. approach, His “Cairo-Vision” and the Second li-Arab peace process at the beginning of his term term of benjamin netanyahu by “actively and aggressively seek[ing] a lasting peace between Israel and Palestinians, as well as On 2 September and 14 September 2010, direct between Israel and its neighbours”1 became a lit- negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Benja- mus test for his new relations with the Middle East. 47 min Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mah- In one regard, though, Obama used the speech to moud Abbas and United States President Barack reinforce a strategic change undertaken by the pre- Obama took place in Washington with the ultimate vious administration. While the Bush administration aim of reaching an official “final status settlement” to did not give high priority to the Arab-Israeli conflict the conflict by agreeing on a two-state solution. At until the Annapolis Process, in her last year in office the end of the same month, the direct talks ended Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did confirm when Israel failed to renew the 10-month settlement that solving the Arab-Israeli conflict was in the US freeze that had been in place since November 2009 administration’s strategic interest. The US has and the Palestinians failed to recognise Israel as a been an important player in the region for decades, Jewish state as a precondition for continuing the pursuing three main goals: energy security, Israel’s peace talks. None of the efforts made by different security and regional stability. However, since the actors on all three sides over the rest of the year deployment of over 230,000 US soldiers in the re- were able to bring the three parties back to the ne- gion,2 the third goal has taken on new meaning, gotiation table. particularly with respect to America’s global repu- Obama’s speech in Cairo on 4 June 2009 was tation and internal politics. The Arab-Israeli conflict widely seen as a new beginning for US relations was seen as paramount to US strategic interests with the Muslim world, not only after the eight years because success in achieving peace between Pal- of the proceeding administration but, as Obama estinians and Israelis seemed to be key to making stressed at the very opening of his speech, after progress on pressing challenges for the US in Iraq decades of alienation and mistrust during the Cold and Afghanistan, the difficult situation with Iran and, War. Throughout the region, hopes for the new indeed, more sweeping issues, such as the need president’s Middle East policy were high. The Pal- for political reform in a generally repressive region. 1 Michael D. sheAr and Glenn KessLer, “Obama Voices Hopes for Mideast Peace in Talk with Al-Arabiya TV,” Washington Post, 27 January 2009. 2 www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2010/hst1003.pdf. (The number includes Iraq.) Obama followed up on this by calling the Arab-Is- Obama and Netanyahu on 18 May 2009 prior to raeli conflict the second-largest cause of tension, the speech, the Obama administration made very ranking behind only the US military missions in Af- clear that support for the Israeli position on Iran ghanistan and Iraq and before the international was linked to the peace process,5 that all building conflict with Iran.3 activities in the settlements were to be halted, and that the current administration would not abide by a 2004 letter to former Prime Minister Ariel Shar- Obama’s speech in Cairo was on in which then President George Bush agreed widely seen as a new beginning to allow Israel to retain major settlements. After for US relations with the Muslim Netanyahu returned to Israel, he briefed the Knes- set on his visit and repeatedly disagreed with a world after decades of alienation settlement freeze. At the same time, however, he and mistrust during the Cold War began to dismantle illegal outposts, a decision that was met by resistance from the settlers and Keys arguments with the pro-settlement parties in his The US administration was therefore left in the coalition. Thus, Netanyahu’s Bar Ilan speech rep- position of not only being first and foremost the resented a compromise between his government guarantor of Israel’s security and an overarching and strong demands from the US and was seen as regulatory power in the region, but also (some- a response to Obama’s Cairo speech, coming, as 2011 how) having to voice its own interests. In addi- it did, only a few weeks later. tion, in his Cairo speech Obama cited what was, On the heels of strong diplomatic efforts during Med. in his view, the largest hurdle on the Israeli side the fall and faced with resistance from large – the settlements. swathes of his coalition, Netanyahu imposed a 10-month settlement freeze on 26 November 2009. The freeze excluded East Jerusalem, infra- negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians structure, schools and synagogues and permitted 48 on the Washington-Jerusalem axis the completion of apartments and buildings that were already underway. When Benjamin Netanyahu started his second From the Palestinian perspective, the substantial term as prime minister on 31 March 2009, it took pressure on Israel to freeze the settlements can him a while to adjust to the new US administra- be seen as an instrument of the US administration tion’s policy. In June 2009, he responded to the to regain the trust of both Abbas and the Arab perceived changes with what seemed a significant League. While the Bush administration set the change in his stance on the peace process. In a tone of negotiations in sync with the Israeli side by speech on 14 June 2009 at Bar Ilan University, he demanding a halt to all terror attacks from the Pal- endorsed the building of a Palestinian state. At the estinians as a precondition for direct negotiations, same time, he must have been keenly aware that the Obama administration turned this formulation his first term in 1999 ended when he lost his own around. Agreeing with Abbas, Obama insisted coalition’s support, and he thus reached out to his that no direct negotiations should begin before own constituency by stating that there would be the Israeli side had ceased settlement construc- no settlement freeze in East Jerusalem.4 This tion. Throughout 2009, Abbas remained publicly change was widely seen as an outstretched hand silent and waited for the US to deliver, while the towards the US, especially after special envoy US helped in Sharm el-Sheikh raising funds to re- George Mitchell had put immeasurable effort into build Gaza after the war, supported Salam Fayyad preparing proximity talks. In the meeting between in improving infrastructure and economic develop- 3 See also the comment by US Central Command Chief General David Petraeus that Israel must see its conflict with the Palestinians “in a larger, regional context” having a direct impact on America’s status in the region. Journal of Palestine Studies 155, Spring 2010. 4 During his first term as prime minister, Netanyahu had signed, despite the protests of the right-leaning parties, the so-called Hebron Protocol and the Wye River Memorandum. He was also criticised by the more left-leaning Israeli parties for his “Three No’s” policy. 5 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as reported in the Washington Post, 24 April 2009, by Glenn KessLer (“Clinton Counters Israeli Stance on Palestinians and Iran”). ment in the West Bank and sent Mitchell to the genuine power struggle. On the Palestinian side, Arab neighbours to lobby in support of Obama’s it could have served as a moment to reconsider peace approach. On 3 March 2010, the Arab the pitfalls of the narrow preconditions. Indeed, League endorsed the proximity talks for a period Obama did consider proposing a US peace plan of four months under the condition that they not on the suggestion of former National Security Ad- be continued thereafter if no border outlines had viser Samuel Berger under a committee headed been agreed on. by General James Jones. Again, the six former na- In early 2010, under pressure from the US, both tional security advisers deemed the Middle East parties agreed to proximity talks with Mitchell. conflict too important in relation to Iran to follow However, the political strain involved provoked Mitchell’s step-by-step approach to bringing the growing tensions between the US and Israel, two sides together.7 However, this decisive mo- prompting Israeli Ambassador to Washington ment passed, and the US administration began to Michael Oren to refer to the moment as the worst endeavour instead to tone down its actions and crisis between the countries since 1975. During a focus on bridging the gap, while the Israeli side visit to Israel by Vice President Joseph Biden, who remained entrenched.8 Keys wanted to announce the direct talks, Israeli Interi- Particularly unusual at this point in the process, or Minister Eliyahu Yishai (Shas) announced the was the reaction of the Mideast Quartet.