Muslim migrants in Europe: A challenge to the policy of the state Solomiya Zinko

Although there have been the Turkish presence is generally familiar with the language, norms Muslims in Western Europe for identifi ed with Germany, Turks and practices of the metropolises. ages - including foreign traders, are also present in most European Among these immigrants were diplomats and students - they have countries. The levels of their con- signifi cant numbers of higher- never before been present on such centration differs, however. The class representatives, which was a a large scale as they are now. There third large group of Muslims in noteworthy difference to the next are no authorative maps of the dis- Europe consists of those originat- immigrant groups. Many other tribution of Muslims in Europe ing in the Indian sub-continent, Muslim migrants were recruited or counting systems that warrant especially Pakistan. According to under the guest worker scheme reliable statistics about the precise the International Organization for that was implemented in most number of Muslims. According to Migration, 500,000 immigrants - Western European countries (un- the U.S. Department of State An- mainly, family reunifi cation cases til the mid 1970s), or came under nual Report on the International and 400,000 asylum seekers ar- family unifi cation scheme or are Religious Freedom 2003, more rive in Western Europe each year the children of these recent im- than 23 million Muslims reside in (World Migration Report 2000, migrants. Islam fi rst emerged as a Europe, comprising nearly fi ve per 195). Muslims also constitute a social issue between Muslim com- cent of the population. The over- signifi cant number of Western Eu- munities and their host societies in whelming majority of Muslims rope illegal immigrants (between Western Europe when European - approximately three quarters of 120,000 and 500, 000 arrive in Eu- governments changed their im- the total - are living in Western Eu- rope annually (Migration Policy migration policies in response to rope as fi rst and second-generation Issues no. 2, 2003, 2). the economic crisis of the 1970s. immigrants. Since the 1950s, Britain, Family reunifi cation plans, intro- The largest Muslim group con- France and the Netherlands have duced by the European govern- sists of Arabs, especially North experienced postcolonial im- ments, actually forbid the arrival Africans. The second group con- migration. Indians, Pakistani, of the new male workers. Family sists of Turks, although a portion Bangladeshi and Caribbeans reunifi cation was a positive step of these Turks is ethnic Kurds, approached United Kingdom. towards integration with the host originating from Turkey. Although France was popular with Mo- society: Muslim women and chil- rocco, Algeria and other North dren appeared at the public scale. Solomiya Zinko, MA student of the African countries. Netherlands The second generation of the mi- Ivan Franko National University of attracted Muslims from Indonesia, grants placed their practicing of Lviv, Ukraine. Paper presented at Moluccans and Surinam. Their religion in the public sphere. Their the 4th International Immigration arrival in Europe coincided with Western education and infl uential Conference “Contemporary migra- tion issues: migration and society. the economic boom in the 1960s public institutions allowed them to Legal framework of migration ver- and 1970s. They were eligible for gain visibility. All the above-men- sus human rights. 21.-23.11.2004, Dutch, British and French citizen- tioned prerequisites were crucial Warsaw, Poland. ship and were to a large extent in creating a generation and out-

12 Muslim Migrants in Europe: A Challenge to the Policy of State

look gap between fi rst and second The next decade will defi nitely Socio-economic factors are generation of migrants. The ”fi rst display the pattern of the possible also decisive in defi ning Muslim generation” of Muslims arrived de-secularizing of the youth. Mus- identity. The qualifi cations and from the countries where Muslims lims, which will comprise at least educational level of the Muslim constitute a majority. The ”second 20 per cent of the population by workers are relatively low. The generation”, however, was urged 2050 (up from 5 per cent today). participation of Muslim women to cope with the novel minority Austria, Denmark, the Nether- in the workforce is limited not on- status. lands, Norway and Sweden dem- ly in quantity indicators but also in The Muslims' birth rate is more onstrate the most evident growth some professional spheres, which than three times that of non-Mus- of immigrants and asylum seekers are not allowed by the sharia prac- lims (Caldwell 2000, 22). Muslim in Europe. It can be straightfor- tice. communities in Europe are con- wardly explained by more liberal Concerning geographic dis- siderably younger than the gray- rules for naturalization, which is tribution, Muslims tend to pre- ing native population. Europe’s generally obtainable after fi ve fer industrialized (most of them ”Generation X” and ”Millennium years of residency (current levels received technical education), Generation” include consider- of citizenship are 15 - 30%). Al- urban areas. Muslims constitute ably more Muslims than does the though being labor catchment’s 20 per cent of Malmo, 10 per cent continent’s population as a whole areas for Muslims immigrants, of Oslo and Copenhagen (Haddad (Mandaville 2002, 219-230). Spain and Germany offer far less 2002, 110). Urbanized areas are Would it mean the possible shift in favorable procedures for obtaining the destination place due to the values and norms of the younger citizenship. Hence the percentage commonly more developed sense generation with religion being top of Muslim citizens in Germany of multiculturalism as well as bet- priority? If so, the broad inclu- is approximately 15-20 (Wilam- ter labor market. Their settlement siveness of the religion in youth owitz-Moellendorff 2001, 1-2). pattern is generally associated with sub-culture could lead both to anti The Balkan wars and Turkish and poor, self-encapsulated neighbor- systematic movements (religious Albanian out-migration provoked hoods. This often provoke the raise fundamentalism) and intro sys- a substantial decline of the indig- of a parallel, often hostile, culture, tematic (institualization of youth enous Muslim population in South which avoids assimilation with the movements in the public sphere). Eastern Europe. host society. Hence, the identity of Mus-

100 lims in Europe is marked by an 90,3 isolationist model of behavior. 90 The everyday contacts with the 80 74,8 EU-15 indogenous population are often 70 minimal, Muslim communities 62,9 New EU Members 60 56 often create a ”world in itself” with its own hierarchical system. 50 EU-15 plus New EU Members Millions On the contrary, to the attempts of 40 Other European States (incl. Turkey). the government to control com- 30 All European States munal life of Muslims through

20 15,2 15,5 state-established councils, they

10 6,8 7 are more inclined to seek guid- 0,2 0,3 ance by the means of electronic 0 1982 2003 or printed media, satellite TV or other transnational media. Among Figure 1. Muslim Presence in Europe in 1982 and 2003. Comparative the mediators, we fi nd imams, table. (Current numbers from U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on Inter- teachers and preachers visiting national Religious Freedom 2003; 1982 estimates from Kettani, 1986) Western Europe, as well as ulama,

13 Siirtolaisuus-Migration 2/2005

intellectuals and journalists in the by local governments and other Islam in Europe universalized or ”home” countries. The mobiliz- institutions, and in part because of differentiated? Cultural and ethni- ing potential of Islam is displayed the different functions the mosque cal differentiation was common in through numerous requests for fulfi ls in the diaspora. Turkey, the past. For example, the Turkish fatwa (authoritative opinion based Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Ara- community was a model for its on the norms of Islam). The range bia make great efforts to keep their co-coordinated action among her of questions differs signifi cantly: subjects under control through members. The broad presentation from participation in elections to Muslim associations, centers of Turks in the Western European celebrating holidays in the host and mosques. These states were countries enabled this action and countries and e-dating. particularly active in granting fi - allowed Turkey to perform exter- At the early stages of Muslim nancial aid to the institutions of nal infl uence. migration, there was a dominant the Muslim newcomers in 1970s. First generation migrants, scholar attitude Muslims should Morocco and Algeria tried to ex- particularly from North African always consider that their presence tend this infl uence in the political countries often visited their home in host society is temporary; there- sphere through their communities countries and frequently sough fore, they had to conform to their when seeking advantages in the spouses for their children there. own norms and practices. How- Barcelona Conferences as well as Some even used the black mar- ever, this attitude has transformed Mediterranean Dialogue. ket of the countries of origin to over precedent decades. Prominent All the above-mentioned issues organize trade routs. In addition Muslim scholars approached the cause the reasonable question: is to this, political opposition that contemporary minority status of the Muslim migrants and favored Muslim popula- Country of origin Population Turks their integration as to achieve tion institutional goals. Conversely, Austria 8.102.600 (1999) 300.000 (1997) 138.860 their scholar opponents played the 10.192.240 radicalism card. From the safety Belgium 370.000 70.700 of Western cities, they counsel (1998) belligerence and inveigh against Denmark 5.330.020 (2000)150.000 36.500 assimilation. They forbid shaking hands with women examiners at Finland 5.171.302 (1999) 20.000 2.334 universities. They warn against offering greetings to ”infi dels” on France 56.000.000 4/5.000.000 350.000 their religious holidays, or serving Germany 82.000.000 3.040.000 2.280.000 in the armies and police of the new Greece 10.000.000 370.000 70.000 56.778.031 lands (Ajami 2004). Italy 600.000 (2000) 10.000 (1991) The role of the mosques, Luxembourg 435.700 (2000) 3.800 . Qur’an courses and institutes of formal or informal Islamic edu- Portugal 9.853.000 (1991) 35.000 . cation in forming Muslim iden- 40.202160 Spain 300.000 . tity should not be underestimated. (1999) State schools can be also ”Mus- lim-favored” when including Sweden 8.876.611 (2000) 250. /300.000 20.000 Islam studies in the curriculum. 15.760.225 The Netherlands 695.600 (1998) 284.679 Mosque imams appear to be far (1999) more infl uential in the diaspora 55.000.000 45.000 (Turkish United Kingdom 1.406.000 than in the home countries, at least (1991) Cypriots) in part because of the pastoral role and authority attributed to them Table 1. Turkish population in European countries (Maréchal 2002)

14 Muslim Migrants in Europe: A Challenge to the Policy of State

was oppressed in the Middle East According to Oliver Roy, the ing. London, another cultural and and North Africa countries gained Salman Rushdie affair contributed intellectual heart of Europe will be support among diaspora in the to the shift from diasporic to uni- soon transformed into basis ”Café Western Europe. Immigrant cir- versalistic Islam. The September Medina” project, the Internet-con- cles in Europe frequently served 11 attack was the direct outcome nected network of mosques and as sounding boards for political of the universalized Islam. The hi- radical Muslim associations. This dissent that would normally be jackers were the product of Europe very fact could convert Britain to prohibited in the countries of itself, being educated and social- from Albion to oriental ”Al-Bion”. origin. The Berber rights move- ized in the West. ”We will remodel this country in ment, initially suppressed in both Europe’s counter terrorism of- an Islamic image,” claims Syr- Algeria and Morocco, fi rst gained fi cials estimate that 1-2 percent of ian-born Sheikh Omar bin Bakri, a foothold in France; Germany has the continent’s Muslims-between a foremost Islamic leader in Brit- provided fertile ground for the 250,000 and 500,000 individu- ain, who is active in ”the struggle Turkish Islamists movement. als-are involved in some type of against racism and discrimination” Nowadays, this process trans- extremist activity. The radicali- to which the Muslims in Britain forms to what the French expert zation of Muslims goes hand in are supposedly subjected. Oliver Roy (Roy 2003, 63) has hand with Westernization. The The favorable socio-economic described as ”recomunalization ”born-again Islamists” are not the position of the Jewish population along supranational lines”. The product of Middle Eastern intelli- in the Western European countries transnational fl ows are directed gence services but of the cultural as well as Israeli-Palestinian con- not inwards but outwards Western shock experienced because of fl ict provokes fi erce anti-Semitic Europe. The distinct European Is- harsh secularization and moderni- attacks held by young Muslim rad- lam emerges with the institutions zation conditions. As Olivier Roy icals. According to the statement both at the local, national and has observed, the sociological of Nathan Sharansky, minister of transnational levels. There was background of Western Europe’s Israel, the number of anti-Semitic a shift from transnational rela- violent Islamic militants fi ts a attacks and Jewish emigrants from tions (between migrant commu- pattern common to most of the France doubled between 2001 and nities and their homeland and western European radical leftists 2003 (Broughton 2004). In the relations between migrants of of the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Ger- recent year, the Prime-minister same cultural background living many’s Rote Armee Faktion, Ita- of Israel even called for Jewish in various European countries to ly’s Brigatta Rosso, and France’s out-migration from France due relations transcending ethnic and Action Directe). All the radical to the threat posed by the Islam- state boundaries. However, to talk literature and Internet links stress ists. Even though this declaration about one Muslim community is the need to perform ”peripheral” was viewed by the French govern- misleading. The mentioned trends jihad, which can be easily ap- ment as diplomatic mauvais ton, it are often parallel and simultane- plied to the case of Bosnia. Most raised the emigration indicators of ous, yet the universalistic tran- of jihadi websites are based in the Jewish population. snational trend is dominant. Most Western Europe, not only because Growing Muslim presence con- prominent contemporary Muslim of better technical equipment, but tributed to the spread of the radical scholars in the social sciences, also owing to the radical leader- right-wing parties in Europe (e.g. which investigate, for example, ship, eager to export Islamist rev- Flemish Block), which speculated nationalism, feminism or Muslim olution from the safety of Western on the common fears and misper- cyber society are mainly citizens breeding ground. Milan, one of the ceptions. The Europeans provoked of Western countries. Hence, not primary cultural centers in Europe the raise of the Muslim radicalism only the movement of Muslim is believed to be a logistics basis themselves by granting support to capital is directed outwards Eu- of the Islamists. Young Muslim the far right leaders and maintain- rope, but also the fl ow of modern radicals are recruited there and ing stereotypes in the everyday knowledge and ideas. then conducted for further train- life. According to Oliver Roy

15 Siirtolaisuus-Migration 2/2005

(Roy 2003, 16), the decision of the politically, priority being given to native ways of integration, since Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn to apolitical concerns, such as family some prominent researchers (e.g. enter the politics was affected by or religion. With the exception of Lewis and Huntington) highlight the speech of a Moroccan-born im- Denmark and Belgium, Muslims that all spheres of the life of the am who called homosexuals ”sick are highly underrepresented. Muslim, including political, eco- people”. For the part of the imam, While the parties based on the eth- nomic, social, are subordinate to it was a way to exclude homosexu- nical criteria sometimes proved a the norms and principles of Islam. als from the harsh norms of sharia. success, the parties based on the Even though Europeans are more The pronouncement of Switzer- religious component - Islam, ac- accustomed to the secular defi ni- land’s People’s Party to close the tually failed. Muslim population tion of Westphalia state, through doors to migration was the easiest in Europe used to lean to left-of- social tolerance they should seek but not the most effective mode of center parties, particularly at the a way of mutual fruitful dialogue expression of the frustration with fi rst stages of migration, owing with Muslims. the failure of the government mi- to the welfare programs, attrac- European states are put under gration policy. tive to the Muslim minorities as pressure both owing to the expan- The brand new type of xeno- they were deprived of the major- sion of the EU structures and to the phobia has emerged. It was the ity of the socio-economic rights. inner ”corrosion” of the native so- British who coined the term for With the raise of entrepreneurship ciety because of immigrant infl ux. it - Islamophobia. In 1997, there among Muslims as well as obtain- This double pressure contributes was a very famous report by the ing basic citizenship rights, there to the growth of nationalist senti- Runnymeade Foundation, which could be a shift in their preferences ments, which is obvious in case of is now quoted by everyone on toward right-of-center parties. Yet, the negative results of the various Islamophobia. This report tried most likely the representatives of EU referenda. to investigate various kinds of the far right would try to pass up Finally, Muslims assisted in discrimination faced by Muslims this possible cooperation. redefi ning European identity, in British society. The European Muslim presence redefi ned putting it aside from materialistic Monitoring Centre on Racism and the painful issue of the place of attitudes. The hotly debated issues Xenophobia, while analyzing situ- religion in the public life, which is on the place of religion in the Euro- ation in the Muslim communities especially signifi cant for France. pean Constitution mark the return in 2001 in the fi ve European cit- The most evident example is the to the original European values. ies (Aarhus, Bradford, Mannheim, current headscarf issue. France is The pessimistic scenario of Rotterdam and Turin) emphasized placing great value on the secular the Muslim presence in Europe the need for local initiatives which institutions; therefore, the pub- foresees the intense out-migration are able to create positive social lic practicing of the religion is of native Europeans, their cultural climate and the atmosphere of mu- viewed as posing a threat to the and religious institutions. The tual understanding. fundamental principles of the Vatican could be easily relocated However, the European poli- state. ”Islam question” provoked to Buenos Aires or Manila. Under ticians are actively taking into debates on the status of ethnicity the Koran, it is the duty of every consideration the infl uence the in the UK and status of national- believer constantly to strive to ex- events on the international arena ity in the UK. Even though Europe pand the borders of Dar al Islam, could have on the Muslim citizen. has been successful in assimilat- and every peace treaty with unbe- These political calculations could ing previous non-Muslim fl ows lievers can only be a ”Hutna”, a have been decisive in forming the of migrants (of Far Eastern and tactical truce. The fundamentalist position of the German and French South-Eastern Asian origin), the view is that any part of the world President on the situation in Iraq. situation is signifi cantly dissimilar that has ever been part of Islam Due to their minority status as with the current wave of Muslim must be so again. This would in- well as specifi c implications of migration. Consequently, the Eu- clude Spain, Portugal, Southern Islam, Muslims stay disconnected ropean society should seek alter- Italy, Sicily, all the Balkan coun-

16 Muslim Migrants in Europe: A Challenge to the Policy of State

tries, most of southern Russia and the ”Muslim street”. They should the United States (6,000) and Ger- Ukraine. (Reingold 2004). avoid bonding their foreign policy many (unknown) (Lederer 2000). Some researchers propose to to the American own directions, The colonial period witnessed fi ll needed jobs by increasing im- since the image of America is not one of the most dramatic out-mi- migration from Eastern Europe very positive in the Muslim world. grations in European history. The (Poland, Russia, Bulgaria, etc.), European governments can also Crimean Tatar population left and from non-Muslim Asia, and try to moderate a dialogue with in a series of waves, culminat- Latin America. Spain is now en- the extremist Muslim groups, ing in a mass migration after the couraging the arrival of new citi- with Belgium being a successful Crimean War of 1853-56. Accord- zens from the many unemployed candidate to fulfi ll this task. Eu- ing to some sources, this wave Argentines and Mexicans. Roma- ropean community is advised to may have reached 200,000 of the nians are replacing Arab workers further implement strategies for 300,000 Tatars then living in Cri- in Israel. There may well be a dif- Islamic ”near abroad”, such as ” A mea. The Russian appropriation ference between ”old Europe” and Secure Europe in a Better World” of the Tatars’ land, together with ”New Europe” on this score. It is and ”Wider Europe - New Neigh- the oppressive conditions of the highly possible that there will be borhood”. Europeans should take new regime, are two of the fac- less tolerance of this threat among into consideration the possible tors that made the Tatars willing to those who have recently regained outcomes of the proliferation of leave. The presence of linguistic, their freedom. the arms of mass destruction as religious, and cultural kin across The optimistic scenario an- well as black market operations, the Bosporus in Turkey provided ticipates the origin of Euro-Islam, which are common in the Middle added incentive. composed of Western culture and East and North Africa. The national content before Islamic orthopraxy. It also pre- Many analysts consider Crimea the forced migration of the Crime- dicts broad Muslim involvement as potential hotspot of Ukraine. an Tatars was the following is in electoral processes, political The reason for such undesirable descirbed in Figure 2. parties, economic life and achieve- script is the Crimean Tatar com- Tatar collaboration with the ment of social mobility. The Euro- munity on the peninsula. As some German regime is one of the most pean governments should avoid Ukrainian politicians predict, rap- controversial topics in Soviet his- nationalizing and secularizing id growth of the Tatar population, tory. The Crimean Tatars were Muslim institutions. Both Europe- insularity of its social structures, charged with engaging in puni- ans and Muslim migrants should sibling connection Tatars, Turkey tive expeditions against the Soviet overcome the wish to pursue sta- and other Muslim countries will in partisans; participating in the Ger- tus quo in the already established some time result in Ukrainian Kos- man self-defense battalions; and relations. ovo (Romanenko, Dremov 2003). providing intelligence services The foreign policy implica- The Crimean Tatars are a Tur- for the German and Romanian tions are supposed to be based on kic-speaking, Sunni Muslim peo- occupation. However, it has since the assumption that Muslims pay ple who trace their origins to the been recognized that Crimean considerable attention to Israeli- Crimean peninsula (now southern Tatar participation in the German Palestinian, Iraq and Bosnia con- Ukraine). In addition to residing in battalions was not necessarily fl icts. The level of this attention is the historic homeland of Crimea voluntary, often being secured at visualized not only by the fi nancial (where a population of 270,000 gunpoint. It must also be added support, but also the coordination comprises 11.9 percent of the total that severe hunger and disease in of action from the European logis- population) and places of former the Soviet ranks led people of all tic centers. The politicians should exile such as Uzbekistan, there nationalities to desert and join the always take into consideration are large populations of Crimean Germans. the effect of the policy toward Tatars in Turkey where they On May 18, 1944, 191,044 of these confl ict zones both on the number over fi ve million, Bul- Crimean Tatars were loaded onto election bulletin and simply on garia (10,000), Romania (40,000), trains for livestock. Since most of

17 Siirtolaisuus-Migration 2/2005

Bulgarians Armenians Others came to take him for questioning, 1 % 3 % 1 % he immolated himself in front of Germans Greeks 2 % his home. After his death, Mamut Jews 5 % 6 % became a martyr and a model. Russians In July 1987, over 2,000 Ukrainians 49 % 14 % Crimean Tatars, from all parts of the Soviet Union held a series of highly visible demonstrations in Crimean Tatars Moscow. Their protest registered 19 % in the international news and Fig. 2. National content of the Crimean population sparked numerous letters on their behalf from other dissidents. The the able-bodied men were still at cow had stipulated that while they Crimean Tatars began repatriating the front, the majority of depor- were free to move about, they on a massive scale beginning in tees consisted of women, children, should not be allowed to obtain a the late 1980s and continuing into and the elderly. The point of their propiska (residence permit) or be- the early 1990s. The population of destination was Ural Mountains come employed in Crimea. Begin- Crimean Tatars in Crimea rapidly and Soviet Central Asia, primarily ning in the summer of 1965, there reached 250,000 and leveled off at Uzbekistan. Not only were they was an almost uninterrupted pres- 270,000 where it remains as of this deprived of food and sanitation, ence of Crimean Tatar delegates in writing. There are believed to be the Crimean Tatars were not al- Moscow. As a result of the Tatars’ between 30,000 and 100,000 re- lowed to give the dead a Muslim agitation to return, the Soviet au- maining in places of former exile burial and they were thrown out thorities dealt major repressive in Central Asia. of the trains. When they arrived, blows. Crimean Tatars suspected While the vast majority of the Tatars were interned under of disloyalty to the Soviet Union the Tatars remaining in Central forced-labor conditions in what were arrested, tried, and impris- Asia still hope to return, political is referred to as the ”special set- oned. Even as the Soviet regime and economic conditions prevent tlement” system. In the fi rst three attempted to portray the activists them. A fl ooded real estate mar- years, according to conservative as petty thieves, and sometimes ket makes it diffi cult for Tatars NKVD estimates, approximately imprisoned them with regular as to sell their homes in Central Asia 22 percent of the population per- opposed to political criminals, the and rampant infl ation in Ukraine ished from infectious diseases, Crimean Tatars built their move- makes it close to impossible to malnutrition, and dehydration. ment along peaceful, democratic construct or purchase new ones. According to Crimean Tatar ac- lines as a movement for human New border and customs regula- counts, however, the losses are and national rights. tions complicate relocation. much higher, consisting of 46 A pivotal moment in the Na- Despite the successful repatri- percent or approximately half the tional Movement came in 1978 ation of over half the population, population. when a Crimean Tatar man named the Crimean Tatars’ struggle for In 1956, the special settlement Musa Mamut protested their con- full repatriation and a full restora- system was dismantled and many dition. He had been denied regis- tion of their rights is not complete. of the Crimean Tatars in the Urals tration at his home and imprisoned Battles for representation in the relocated to Central Asia to be for ”violation of the passport re- Crimean legislature as well as closer to Crimean Tatar kin and gime.” Upon returning from pris- disagreements about suffrage and other Muslims. A decree absolv- on, he was again threatened with citizenship have characterized the ing the Tatars of mass treason was imprisonment. Mamut decided last decade. The present state of af- not issued until 1967. This sparked he preferred death to losing the fairs represents deterioration from many Tatar families to try to return freedom to live in his homeland. the situation beginning in the mid- to Crimea, but authorities in Mos- Therefore, when the authorities 1990s when the Crimean Tatars

18 Muslim Migrants in Europe: A Challenge to the Policy of State

trum voor Islam in Europa of held a quota of fourteen seats in discontent with the state policy. Universiteit Gent, Belgium, 2, the Crimean Parliament. In 1998, This in turn permits the Muslim September 2000 issue, pp. 1-2. there was a series of mass demon- spiritual governmental and non- Mandaville, Peter: Muslim Youth strations protesting the Crimean governmental organizations of in Europe. Islam, Europe’s Tatars lack of voting rights (linked Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran to Second Religion, ed. Shireen to citizenship) in what is now the spread their infl uence to Crimean T. Hunter. Westport, Conn.: Autonomous Republic of Crimea peninsula, which can pose serious Praeger, 2002, pp. 219-230. (ARC). The citizenship issue has threat to the national security of Maréchal, Brigitte: A guidebook on been largely resolved but the issue Ukraine. Islam and Muslims in the wide of representation remains com- contemporary Europe, Euro- plicated by the Tatars minority Litterature pean Institute for Research on status. As of 2001, the Crimean Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Tatars still comprise only 11-12% Ajami, Fouad: The Moor’s Last Cooperation, 2002, p. 17. of the population. One of the more Laugh. Radical Islam fi nds a Osmanov, Lufti: Status krymsko- signifi cant political victories came haven in Europe. OpinionJour- tatarskoyi movy ta problemy in 1998 when two prominent nal from The Wall Street Journal otrymannya osvity ridnoyu Tatar political leaders, Mustafa Editorial Page. Sunday, March movoyu. Medzhlis krymsko- Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, 28, 2004. tatarskogo narodu. Simph- were elected to the Ukrainian Up- Broughton, Philip Delves: French eropol, 2003, p.1-5. per Parliament. Complicating the Anti-Semitism Drives More Reingold, Arnold E.: The Impend- political diffi culties has been the Jews to Settle in Israel. Tel- ing Death Of Western Europe. increasing criminalization of the egraph, January 29, 2004, - Freeman Center, A Conserva- Ukrainian economy and the pro- www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ tive News Forum, January liferation of criminal groupings. main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/ 2004. The Crimean Tatars’ primary ob- 01/29/wsemit29.xml Caldwell, Romanenko, Yuri; Alexey Dremov: jectives are government sponsored Christopher: The Cresent and Chyzhyntsi u vlasnomu narodi: return of the Crimean Tatar people the Tricolor. Atlantic Monthly. krymski tatary v Ukraini. to Crimea; full restoration of their November 2000, p. 22. Medzhlis krymsko-tatar- rights and property; recognition Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeek: Muslims skogo narodu, Simpheropol, of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis as in the West: From So-journers 30.09.2003. the offi cial representative body; to Citizens. New York: Oxford U.S. Department of State: Annual and representation of the Crimean University Press, 2002, p. 110. Report on International Reli- Tatars in the Crimean Parliament. International Organization for Mi- gious Freedom 2003. In addition to a full political reha- gration (IOM), World Migration Roy, Olivier: EuroIslam: The Ji- bilitation and repatriation to the Report 2000 (IOM: Geneva, had Within? National Interest homeland, the Crimean Tatars 2000), p. 195. (spring 2003), p. 63. are engaged in revitalizing their IOM, ”Facts and Figures on Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich religion, language, and culture International Migration,” von: Türken in Deutschland. (Osmanov 2003, 37). Migration Policy Issues Sankt Augustin, Germany: Kon- To sum up with, the obstacles no. 2 (March 2003): 2, rad Adenauer Foundation, 2001, experienced by the Ukrainian re- www.iom.int/DOCUMENTS/ pp. 1-2, www.kas.de/db_fi les/ patriates signifi cantly differ from PUBLICATION/EN/MPI_se- dokumente/arbeitspapiere/7_ the complexities faced by the mi- ries_No_2_eng.PDF dokument_dok_pdf_12_1.pdf grants to Western Europe. Lack Kettani, M. Ali: Muslim Minorities of the institutional basis, fi erce in the World Today. London; economic conditions and specula- Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1986. tions of the Ukrainian politicians Lederer, Gyorgy: Islam Takes Root provoke growing Crimean Tatar in Ukraine.-Newsletter of Cen-

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