Muslim Migrants in Europe: a Challenge to the Policy of the State Solomiya Zinko
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Muslim migrants in Europe: A challenge to the policy of the state Solomiya Zinko Although there have been the Turkish presence is generally familiar with the language, norms Muslims in Western Europe for identifi ed with Germany, Turks and practices of the metropolises. ages - including foreign traders, are also present in most European Among these immigrants were diplomats and students - they have countries. The levels of their con- signifi cant numbers of higher- never before been present on such centration differs, however. The class representatives, which was a a large scale as they are now. There third large group of Muslims in noteworthy difference to the next are no authorative maps of the dis- Europe consists of those originat- immigrant groups. Many other tribution of Muslims in Europe ing in the Indian sub-continent, Muslim migrants were recruited or counting systems that warrant especially Pakistan. According to under the guest worker scheme reliable statistics about the precise the International Organization for that was implemented in most number of Muslims. According to Migration, 500,000 immigrants - Western European countries (un- the U.S. Department of State An- mainly, family reunifi cation cases til the mid 1970s), or came under nual Report on the International and 400,000 asylum seekers ar- family unifi cation scheme or are Religious Freedom 2003, more rive in Western Europe each year the children of these recent im- than 23 million Muslims reside in (World Migration Report 2000, migrants. Islam fi rst emerged as a Europe, comprising nearly fi ve per 195). Muslims also constitute a social issue between Muslim com- cent of the population. The over- signifi cant number of Western Eu- munities and their host societies in whelming majority of Muslims rope illegal immigrants (between Western Europe when European - approximately three quarters of 120,000 and 500, 000 arrive in Eu- governments changed their im- the total - are living in Western Eu- rope annually (Migration Policy migration policies in response to rope as fi rst and second-generation Issues no. 2, 2003, 2). the economic crisis of the 1970s. immigrants. Since the 1950s, Britain, Family reunifi cation plans, intro- The largest Muslim group con- France and the Netherlands have duced by the European govern- sists of Arabs, especially North experienced postcolonial im- ments, actually forbid the arrival Africans. The second group con- migration. Indians, Pakistani, of the new male workers. Family sists of Turks, although a portion Bangladeshi and Caribbeans reunifi cation was a positive step of these Turks is ethnic Kurds, approached United Kingdom. towards integration with the host originating from Turkey. Although France was popular with Mo- society: Muslim women and chil- rocco, Algeria and other North dren appeared at the public scale. Solomiya Zinko, MA student of the African countries. Netherlands The second generation of the mi- Ivan Franko National University of attracted Muslims from Indonesia, grants placed their practicing of Lviv, Ukraine. Paper presented at Moluccans and Surinam. Their religion in the public sphere. Their the 4th International Immigration arrival in Europe coincided with Western education and infl uential Conference “Contemporary migra- tion issues: migration and society. the economic boom in the 1960s public institutions allowed them to Legal framework of migration ver- and 1970s. They were eligible for gain visibility. All the above-men- sus human rights. 21.-23.11.2004, Dutch, British and French citizen- tioned prerequisites were crucial Warsaw, Poland. ship and were to a large extent in creating a generation and out- 12 Muslim Migrants in Europe: A Challenge to the Policy of State look gap between fi rst and second The next decade will defi nitely Socio-economic factors are generation of migrants. The ”fi rst display the pattern of the possible also decisive in defi ning Muslim generation” of Muslims arrived de-secularizing of the youth. Mus- identity. The qualifi cations and from the countries where Muslims lims, which will comprise at least educational level of the Muslim constitute a majority. The ”second 20 per cent of the population by workers are relatively low. The generation”, however, was urged 2050 (up from 5 per cent today). participation of Muslim women to cope with the novel minority Austria, Denmark, the Nether- in the workforce is limited not on- status. lands, Norway and Sweden dem- ly in quantity indicators but also in The Muslims' birth rate is more onstrate the most evident growth some professional spheres, which than three times that of non-Mus- of immigrants and asylum seekers are not allowed by the sharia prac- lims (Caldwell 2000, 22). Muslim in Europe. It can be straightfor- tice. communities in Europe are con- wardly explained by more liberal Concerning geographic dis- siderably younger than the gray- rules for naturalization, which is tribution, Muslims tend to pre- ing native population. Europe’s generally obtainable after fi ve fer industrialized (most of them ”Generation X” and ”Millennium years of residency (current levels received technical education), Generation” include consider- of citizenship are 15 - 30%). Al- urban areas. Muslims constitute ably more Muslims than does the though being labor catchment’s 20 per cent of Malmo, 10 per cent continent’s population as a whole areas for Muslims immigrants, of Oslo and Copenhagen (Haddad (Mandaville 2002, 219-230). Spain and Germany offer far less 2002, 110). Urbanized areas are Would it mean the possible shift in favorable procedures for obtaining the destination place due to the values and norms of the younger citizenship. Hence the percentage commonly more developed sense generation with religion being top of Muslim citizens in Germany of multiculturalism as well as bet- priority? If so, the broad inclu- is approximately 15-20 (Wilam- ter labor market. Their settlement siveness of the religion in youth owitz-Moellendorff 2001, 1-2). pattern is generally associated with sub-culture could lead both to anti The Balkan wars and Turkish and poor, self-encapsulated neighbor- systematic movements (religious Albanian out-migration provoked hoods. This often provoke the raise fundamentalism) and intro sys- a substantial decline of the indig- of a parallel, often hostile, culture, tematic (institualization of youth enous Muslim population in South which avoids assimilation with the movements in the public sphere). Eastern Europe. host society. Hence, the identity of Mus- 100 lims in Europe is marked by an 90,3 isolationist model of behavior. 90 The everyday contacts with the 80 74,8 EU-15 indogenous population are often 70 minimal, Muslim communities 62,9 New EU Members 60 56 often create a ”world in itself” with its own hierarchical system. 50 EU-15 plus New EU Members Millions On the contrary, to the attempts of 40 Other European States (incl. Turkey). the government to control com- 30 All European States munal life of Muslims through 20 15,2 15,5 state-established councils, they 10 6,8 7 are more inclined to seek guid- 0,2 0,3 ance by the means of electronic 0 1982 2003 or printed media, satellite TV or other transnational media. Among Figure 1. Muslim Presence in Europe in 1982 and 2003. Comparative the mediators, we fi nd imams, table. (Current numbers from U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on Inter- teachers and preachers visiting national Religious Freedom 2003; 1982 estimates from Kettani, 1986) Western Europe, as well as ulama, 13 Siirtolaisuus-Migration 2/2005 intellectuals and journalists in the by local governments and other Islam in Europe universalized or ”home” countries. The mobiliz- institutions, and in part because of differentiated? Cultural and ethni- ing potential of Islam is displayed the different functions the mosque cal differentiation was common in through numerous requests for fulfi ls in the diaspora. Turkey, the past. For example, the Turkish fatwa (authoritative opinion based Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Ara- community was a model for its on the norms of Islam). The range bia make great efforts to keep their co-coordinated action among her of questions differs signifi cantly: subjects under control through members. The broad presentation from participation in elections to Muslim associations, centers of Turks in the Western European celebrating holidays in the host and mosques. These states were countries enabled this action and countries and e-dating. particularly active in granting fi - allowed Turkey to perform exter- At the early stages of Muslim nancial aid to the institutions of nal infl uence. migration, there was a dominant the Muslim newcomers in 1970s. First generation migrants, scholar attitude Muslims should Morocco and Algeria tried to ex- particularly from North African always consider that their presence tend this infl uence in the political countries often visited their home in host society is temporary; there- sphere through their communities countries and frequently sough fore, they had to conform to their when seeking advantages in the spouses for their children there. own norms and practices. How- Barcelona Conferences as well as Some even used the black mar- ever, this attitude has transformed Mediterranean Dialogue. ket of the countries of origin to over precedent decades. Prominent All the above-mentioned issues organize trade routs. In addition Muslim scholars approached the cause the reasonable question: is to this, political opposition that contemporary minority status of the Muslim migrants and favored Muslim popula- Country of origin Population Turks their integration as to achieve tion institutional goals. Conversely, Austria 8.102.600 (1999) 300.000 (1997) 138.860 their scholar opponents played the 10.192.240 radicalism card. From the safety Belgium 370.000 70.700 of Western cities, they counsel (1998) belligerence and inveigh against Denmark 5.330.020 (2000)150.000 36.500 assimilation. They forbid shaking hands with women examiners at Finland 5.171.302 (1999) 20.000 2.334 universities.