ON FOREIGN SCORECARD FLASH RELATIONS ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma & Nick Witney

The 29 July edition of ’s Welt am Sonntag hit newsstands like a bombshell. The weapon in question was painted in German national colours, and illustrated the front- SUMMARY page headline “Do we need the bomb?” Inside, the writer • Europeans remain unwilling to renew their argued that: “For the first time since 1949, the Federal Republic thinking on nuclear deterrence, despite of Germany is no longer under the US nuclear umbrella.” growing strategic instability. Their stated goal of “strategic autonomy” will remain an empty It is extraordinary that this question should arise so phrase until they engage seriously on this matter. prominently in peace-loving, anti-nuclear Germany. But it is not before time. This year, the European Council on • This intellectual underinvestment looks set to Foreign Relations conducted a comprehensive survey continue despite: a revived “German bomb” of attitudes towards nuclear issues across the member debate; a new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear states of the . Two overarching themes Weapons; and the crumbling of the INF treaty. emerged. Firstly, despite the growing insecurity all around them, Europeans remain unwilling to face up to the • Attitudes to nuclear deterrence differ radically renewed relevance that nuclear deterrence ought to have from country to country – something which in their strategic thinking. Secondly, and as a consequence, any new engagement on the nuclear dimension national attitudes remain much where they were when will have to contend with. And, while many the subject dropped off the agenda at the end of the cold governments and their voting publics are aligned war – which is to say, scattered across the entire spectrum in attitudes, in some crucial players like Germany from those who continue to see nuclear deterrence the government and public are at loggerheads. as an essential underpinning of European security to enduring advocates of unilateral nuclear . • No European initiative to declare strategic nuclear autonomy is yet practicable but a strategy This is hardly the only important challenge on which to hedge for future uncertainties is available. Europeans’ views are all over the place, and about which they would prefer to remain in denial. As one official told the • As a first step, the UK and France should convert authors, “Europe has not only outsourced its security, but the idea of a European deterrent from mere notion also its security thinking”. But when set against the dramatic into credible offer, thickening their bilateral changes occurring in the international security environment, nuclear cooperation and sending growing signals the results of this research demonstrate that there is now an that indicate their readiness to protect others. urgent need for Europeans to think about, and debate, nuclear deterrence anew. A ‘German bomb’ is unlikely to prove December 2018 2 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE epn (PW a te ntd ain i 21. But 2017. in Nations United the at (TPNW) Weapons Nuclear Prohibition of Treaty on the the of adoption the diplomatic effortledto is obvious.Arecentconcerted environment the nucleardimensionofthissecurity And yet almost entirely. to ignorenuclearissues all toohappy were governments European developments, and discussions these base. Inall and industrial technological defence and Europe’s conventional capabilities only addressed has 2016 since Union Defence European Theprogress a towards made for Europeans. frame security defining the and remain, were, guarantee security US accompanying NATO andthe truth isthat US. Butthe on the dependence their and reducing own feet on their standing by defence to domoreon and, consequently, for themselves fend indicated nonetheless concept to readier be to need the acknowledged Europeans that this ill-defined, Though states. member and its EU ambition forthe centrepiece 2016 The NATO. through including security, to Europe’s commitment States’ United the have risenabout doubts White House, in the Donald Trumpresident of Crimea.Andwith annexation ’s following began that Ukraine eastern European war in and the budgets defence rise inEuropean the in role key a between coincidence the by as evidenced perceptions, played also has Russia Putin’s form ofterrorism. But Vladimir territory inthe European into ventured has violence this that too know They fire. of a ring to closer into something turned has instead friends turn intoaringof to aspired once they neighbourhood Theyknowthatthe environment isdeteriorating. security their that course, aware are, of Europeans Darkening skies tight shut. environment is tokeeptheireyes shifting strategic a rapidly of dimension nuclear the to approach Europeans’ most And yet guarantee. nuclear US a credible by not backed a Europe whip handinanymilitaryconfrontationwith the Europeans will continue to believe that Russia will always hold this, many autonomy. But,without bid forstrategic stated its canmovetowards are manywaysinwhichEurope there fatal flaw for such an ambition. Besides nuclear capabilities, may bea deterrent of aEuropean dimension. Theabsence on thenuclear seriously engage they an emptyphraseunless autonomy”ismorethan ambitionof“strategic their declared that situation issuchthatEuropeanscannolongerpretend ECFR’s pan-European research team, one thing is clear: the Saint-Malo”, toborrowaphrasecoinedbymemberof “nuclear a to agree to viable proves it whether of Regardless weapons- ofnuclear re-engage. to need Europeans which with topics related arange to belongs but significant is this issue that concludes to Europe.Thispaper guarantee nuclear US current for, the to, orsubstitute complement British ‘nuclearand desirable umbrella’bea possible would a Franco- to whether must insteadgiveseriousconsideration Europeans to Germansthemselves. attractive –notleast Global StrategyGlobal set strategic autonomyasthe set isls o h Rsin xlv o Klnnrd which Kaliningrad, of exclave Russian the to missiles of short-range nuclear-capable but alsothedeployment rhetoric just not through – sabre-rattling nuclear Russian to crisis inUkrainehasgivenway the itself, In Europe companies. on European sanctions secondary threatening by itsownnon-proliferationstrategy from implementing but alsotryingtopreventEurope deal not onlyexitingthe to theUS due deal alive, it facesaformidablechallenge Iran nuclear the is playingacrucialroleintryingtokeep it Asia. And,although in east situation the solve to efforts absent from is moreorless Europe unpredictable. highly various in bothregionsremains last year.Thesituation in the times at headlines the dominated has Korea North and crises inIran risk ofproliferation and the nuclear states; number of worries aboutariseinthe have increased East Middle Asia andthe in east time, events same the At its and Review 2018 Nuclear Posture its has under US policy “flexible” the more a while to moved strategy, defence Russia’s in salience the contrary, have sincegainedfurther nuclear weapons others. On Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)orthe the by recognised those whether – states weapons nuclear current the from anyof no support won effort this recent ministry’s French armedforces formally: forinstance,the governments changing environment the recognise to have begun Some Russia. of wary are really Others eye. years agoresultinsomegovernments turningablind of 35 protests Euromissile Of course,memoriesofthe public. with oneanother,nottomentionthe issues weapons nuclear discussing of practice of far out so fallen have they war order. This ispartlybecause post-cold the comfort blanketof the on takingadvantageof can go they that or hope, believe, to continue governments European the USmay wellfold upitsnuclearumbrella era tocome, post-Trump terms withthisfact.Buteveninthe coming to are onlyslowly Europeans even though as obsolete, NATO described he when it meant he that shown Trump has way. other the looking by SSC-8 the of appearance the crisis. have chosentoreact In contrast,Europeans the SS-20, in thecoldwar, the resultwasEuromissile from theINF treaty to actuponituntil seemed scarcely have raisedthisissue, Europe statements NATO although arsenals. Yet, strategic their strengthen to plans have announcednew missile. Bothpowers capable nuclear- intermediate-range, prohibited and new a SSC-8, Intermediate-range the violated the and deploying Treaty (INF)bytesting Forces Nuclear likely has Russia while in 2002, Treaty Missile Anti-Ballistic the terminated unilaterally US scrutiny. The much bear too not does war order notion of anunchangingpost-cold the decades; Russia and US the which for nearlytwo making changes actively have, infact,been to order security European a member states.Thishasfurtherweakened borders twoEU strategicreview . When Russia deployed a new missile, new a deployed Russia When . the USannounced its intent to withdraw noted the emergence of a“nuclear the emergence noted inclusion oflow-yield warheads . For the moment, . multipolarity”, the growing risks associated with the “deconstruction of the security architecture in Europe”, and the strategic “unpredictability and ambiguity” that come with it. But most European leaders still shy away from opening up what they fear could be a Pandora’s box of difficult questions and possible political opposition. Silence above, ignorance below

European attitudes are a patchwork of opinions: the United Kingdom and France are nuclear powers in their own right, with public opinion more or less solidly behind this status. The historical experience of Poland and the Czech Republic leads these states to be more confidently supportive of nuclear deterrence. Countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany have seen civil society clash with their governments’ decisions public attitudes does now come about, this may emanate around hosting nuclear weapons. Ireland and are from high-level activism. In the context of the TPNW, active campaigners for the abolition of nuclear weapons. the decision to award the 2017 to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons hints Despite all this, most EU member states have two things at a new wave of abolitionism. This also finds stronger in common in this matter. First, nearly all of them expression in national politics: last year’s German federal share an official, if ostensible, commitment to reducing election saw the Social Democrat challenger for chancellor nuclear weapons: research for this paper revealed that promise the removal of US nuclear weapons from the only three member states harbour reservations about country. And, in the UK, a unilateralist disarmer is now the goal of . This is all while many leader of the Labour Party and Scotland’s ruling Scottish of these countries remain within NATO, which is of National Party is firmly opposed to nuclear weapons. course underpinned by the potential of nuclear-backed intervention via Article 5. The potential tension between The current fraught and unstable international environment this pro-disarmament stance and the enjoyment of the has not led the wider public to fret about nuclear issues – US nuclear umbrella is something yet to fully play out. yet – nor for their governments to take the lead on this. The disconnect between public leanings and government policies Second, nuclear weapons have little salience in the public appears to have induced governments to keep discussion of imagination. On the occasions in the late period nuclear matters low key. If this is the case, it seems to have when European governments were obliged to make difficult worked. But Europe probably has the ingredients for popular decisions about nuclear weapons, these became fraught and opposition to nuclear deployments to emerge once again. contested in the country at large as well as in parliament. But with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, Western Europe’s nuclear families: governments and populations became less obliged to think, cousins and rivals and argue, about nuclear weapons with the degree of heat and rigour that they had had to prior to 1989. In Europe, To understand the situation better, ECFR’s network of most were more than content to enjoy the happier and more 28 associate researchers carried out investigations into hopeful international environment, and to simply dismiss European attitudes towards nuclear weapons. These nuclear worries from their minds. Rather than peace comprised interviews with more than 100 policymakers underpinned by nuclear weapons, as many cold war leaders and analysts, and research into policy documents, academic characterised it, Europeans began to enjoy peace with nuclear weapons still around. Nuclear weapons disappeared from the public debate. The end of the cold war led to an effort to reduce the total number of nuclear warheads in the world, with Russia and the US doing substantially more heavy lifting in this regard even if they still possess considerably more weaponsthan France and the UK, which have both moved significantly towards minimal deterrence.

If anything, the public today is rather inclined towards disarmament – which may partly explain its relative lack of concern as the total number of weapons in the world fell, although it is hard to say that Russia and the US won many plaudits for their efforts either. If a shift in 3 4 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE – aspartofa bilateralarrangement. That said,these recently offeredtopayfora new USbase–“FortTrump” elements ofNATO’smissile defencesystem, andPoland superpower. Bothcountrieshostarotatingbrigadeand thefrom their soil on presence physical increased even andUS the from reassurance out seeking in active are and Russia with preoccupied greatly are they because camp Believers True the to belong also Romania and Poland are deployed. its weapons where Each hasalsolimited of minimumdeterrence. under doctrines in theirsize also pursuingreductions their nucleararsenalswhile modernised have UK the the and Since France war, vote. cold the 2016 of end a in Trident of renewal the backed parliament of Labour members most opposition, the disarmer leading unilateral an avowed way: evenwith that stay to plan and The states, weapons Romania. nuclear are and two first Poland by accompanied UK, the and the lie spectrum of the At oneend Conflicted attitude nuclear deterrence: to ontheir depending groups five into fall they and – abolitionists to determined nuclear powers committed from spectrum full the span to continue states member EU ignorance. public and dispel break theirsilence to for governments impetus provides little This, therefore, matters. on nuclear position their of reconsideration further survey for need is little environment, there changed the despite the of that, conclude right. They attitudes traditional proving their finding as events recent see countries all, European not if Most, striking most across Europe. immutability ofattitudes concerns the the Perhaps annex. in the are contained analyses country-by-country The topics. on these countries their respective of position the be to believe experts and officials what reflect data The in response. are considering security, andwhatactionthey nuclear threatstotheirown deterrence, howtheyassess onwhatcountriestodaythink of nuclear questions centred discourse, mediaanalysis, and opinionpolls.Theresearch , Pragmatists True Believers , and True Believers Conformists , Neutrals : France . , s el s redy eain wt Rsi. hy forgo They Russia. with relations friendly as well as non-alignment,have traditionsof and Cyprus Malta can halttheirproliferation. condemnation ofsuchweapons abandonment and only ageneralised view that the holding of theabolitionistagenda, vocal andintransigentsupporter front disarmament. promoting to in addition weapons nuclear of free a world Ireland’s of One proactively sponsoredtheTPNW attheUNandsignedit. years they last few on theiranti-nucleartradition: over the themselves pride two first The EU). the of members NATO Ireland, Austria, Malta,Cyprus,andFinland(allnon- are the spectrum At theotherendof deterrence. tonuclear commitment their about conflicted are not in theircountriesisbehindthem,meaningthey may sharethisapproach,suchasGermany, public opinion strategy.In addition,unlikeothersthat and nationalsecurity an importantpartintheirdefence should play deterrence nuclear that determined and havealso assessments strategic important intheir as threats rank nuclear four countries All involve hostingUSnuclearweaponsontheirterritory. countries’ commitmenttonucleardeterrencedoesnot within the government over its signing of the TPNW, government overitssigningofthe within the defence splits open to led ‘peace’ tradition.Thishas cherished increasing and Russia its with US and NATOhaveclashed the with cooperation about worries growing overthe ofcontroversy case, In ’s wider public. among the nuclear issue level a deeper reflect parliament votes inthenational and criticalofnuclearweapons,while is activelyorganised countries, civil society In all these Netherlands, andGermanyinthe – which,therefore,joinsthe be lesstrueofSweden controversy, nothingcould minimal domestic with have takentheirpositions in this typology the Neutrals if UN. Yet TPNW in favourofthe at voted Sweden EU, neutral memberofthe As anotherhistorically self-contained. that itissoresolutely fact on the own, based of its in acategory some extent,Finlandcouldbeconsidered NPT. To for the support beyond issues at allonnuclear avoid anyposition to seems, it – determined, treaty the sign to TPNW voteandhasdeclined Finland didnottakepartinthe agenda: abolitionist the to comes it when group Neutrals than othersinthe Still, itstrikesamoremoderatepose strategy. Finland’s defence remains marginalto deterrence ofitsenvironment. assessment Consequently, strategic is notapriorityinits nuclear threat years butthe recent NATO in to closer has grown non-aligned, Finland, also the activismdisplayedbylattertwocountries. they contrastwithIrelandandAustriabecauseof although and theyalsovoted infavouroftheTPNWatUN, reliance onnucleardeterrenceintheirdefencepolicy, : it ratified the TPNW in May, and it has also been a been also has it and May, in TPNW the ratified it : they havenotyetsignedthetreaty Austria hasbeeneven more active on this fivecoreforeignstatedpolicies Conflicted is to achieve isto Neutrals group. . But : and to the creation of a special commission to review Meanwhile, in Germany, the public has long been the arguments for and against acceding to the treaty. overwhelmingly hostile to NATO’s nuclear policy, but German governments have traditionally supported it. Similar tensions caused the Netherlands to break NATO ranks Despite its familiarity with this tension, Germany’s upcoming by engaging in the TPNW negotiations, under pressure from decision on a dual-capable Tornado replacement will not be the Dutch parliament – only to then vote against the treaty. straightforward. This is all the more true now that key figures There are further difficulties ahead for the Netherlands as it in government, including the chancellor, are challenging the will soon need to replace its fleet of F16s (see box). In 2012 traditional exclusive dependency on the US strategic umbrella. its parliament voted that the replacement aircraft should not be nuclear-capable, putting in doubt The Hague’s ability to The remaining 16 EU member states are all NATO members. continue to be part of NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. They subscribe to NATO policy on nuclear deterrence, and they all followed the NATO line on the TPNW, which 5 6 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE attitudes. At one end of the spectrum, Croatia isfundamentally spectrum, of the At oneend attitudes. national own course, hasits country, of and Portugal.Each Slovenia, Hungary, Greece, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain, are the course. They advantageous most and easiest the is flow NATO the with For them,going importance totheirdefence. only limited of as look ondeterrence are, andthat countries European other than some threats nuclear with concerned are less that states NATO group: largest, and final, the leaves This properly. it handles Europe if threat a be not need Russia US allytakeprecedenceoverthewidespreadview that the F35: theadvantagesofpositioningitselfasastaunch too willremainaburden-sharerasithasalreadyoptedfor Italy reasons. political and industrial defence for difficult it toofacesadual-capableaircraftdecisionthatwillbe Belgium’s future asanuclearburden-sharerisnotindoubt,though too). this for reasons other have (they Russia NATO’s strategy.Thisislargelyduetotheirdistrustof acceptance oftheimportancenuclearelementin states European matter-of-factdegrees, a to varying group share, eastern this in and central five The Italy. and Belgium, Republic, Czech the Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, the is these of first The reflected conviction, of further groups. into two in theirroughsegregation degrees differing exhibit states damaging totheNPT.member But these potentially treaty asunrealisticand was todismisstheproposed Pragmatists Conformists . Theseare: Estonia, : Croatia,Slovakia, tend to cluster at the more hardline side of the spectrum, of the more hardlineside at the to cluster tend status, power nuclear its of irrespective threat, a as Russia between Those thatsee perception. that haveasimilarthreat those even attitudes of diversity a is there But Russia. of assessment on theirstrategic are divided member states EU that no surprise as It comes states. EU most of stance thenuclear in influencing role significant a plays threat a as Russia of perception the that confirm results survey The Russia inEurope’sthreatperception NATO. and defence; disarmament; missile crises; nuclear of theUSnuclearsecurityguarantee;proliferation otherwise or reliability the Russia; public: the and governments both opinion among shaping are actively are livemattersthat All country’s overallviewofnucleardeterrence. to each contribute that issues the on light sheds research ECFR’s Shaping thenuclearquestion indefinitely. over rolled was policy nuclear on language NATO if agreed happy be that would of Europeancountries minded Atlanticism. But all belong firmly in the mainstream meanwhile, Denmark, tough- aversion with a traditionalNordicnuclear combines Balkans. the in activities Russian by is worried it but issues, nuclear about unconcerned all agree that there is a threat from Russia that is amplified is that Russia from threat a is there that agree all neighbours. they that sense in the – Pragmatists andLatvia – Estonia with Conflicted its group, overlap Ireland andAustria, Neutrals members ofthe towards it drives what is a priority,which threats nuclear considers Sweden priority a caseforothercountries: – threats.Butthisisalsothe be to threats nuclear non-conventional conventional and – other to relative consider UK) the and (France, Poland, True Believers four the of Three perspective. Instead, proliferationistheirmainconcern. threat nuclear a from concern top their as Russia see a threatatall. But,overall, mostmemberstatesdonot a is – asthis see not do states member of while half threat, 2,000 – Russia of those and – 200 – weapons the reportednumbersofUSnon-strategicnuclear same statesalsoagreethattheimbalancebetween member statesareTrueBelieversorPragmatists. These and states member 11 of a leadingconcernofseveralothers. Mostofthese concern top the is arsenal nuclear Russia’s perceptions. and attitudes Europeans’ the greatestthreatsfurtherrevealsdiversityof Studying memberstates’views onwhatconstitutes on howtorespond. it isathreatin this waybutdisagree agree that groups in all are countries there weapons; nuclear a country thinking Russia a threat and Russia’s possession of link between no clear is there But states. neutral traditionally from come agenda abolitionist the support who those that strongly feature threat a sense makes it And group. Conformist large the among as Russia see not do that those end, other the or asPragmatists.At as TrueBelievers either by its possession of a nuclear arsenal. The difference between them resides in the fact that the former consider Tough decisions ahead: this to further support their case for nuclear abolition while Nuclear burden-sharing and the latter insist that NATO deterrence plans should take into account scenarios involving the use of tactical nuclear dual-capable aircraft renewal weapons by Russia. Countries that consider nuclear threats Four European countries keep US free-fall to be less important than other types of threat feature nuclear bombs on their territory, for delivery strongly among the Pragmatists and the Conformists. by their own aircraft: Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. This long-established Trump: not a game-changer arrangement is part of NATO’s doctrine of ‘nuclear burden-sharing’ – the idea that nuclear Trump’s arrival in the White House as the first “America risks and responsibilities should be shared, to First” president in decades, and certainly in the NATO demonstrate alliance solidarity and to make the era, might have increased European insecurities to the alliance’s deterrent threat more credible. point of prompting Europeans to consider shouldering more responsibility for their own defence – and consider The dual-capable aircraft involved in this too that doing so might include a nuclear dimension. This nuclear-sharing mission all need replacement has found a voice in some quarters: key US allies have in the near to medium term. This means that raised the issue publicly since Trump’s election. In 2017 in Belgium and the Netherlands (which currently Poland, Jaroslaw Kaczynski expressed support for the idea use F16s), and Germany and Italy (which use of a European nuclear power, only to lament that he did not Tornados), will not only need to acquire new think it would happen. The year before, member aircraft, but also to include special wiring in a Roderich Kiesewetter remarked: “if the proportion of the replacement national fleets to no longer wants to provide this guarantee, Europe still make them dual-capable – that is, able to deliver needs nuclear protection for deterrent purposes”. He also both nuclear bombs and conventional munitions. raised the notion of a Franco-British nuclear umbrella for . The US is making dual-capable as well as The Bundestag subsequently commissioned a review that conventional F35s for its own national purposes Europe financed through a joint European military budget determined that Germany could legally finance the British and is keen for European nuclear burden-sharers or French nuclear weapons programmes, and accept such to buy this aircraft. weapons on German soil, in exchange for their protection. The acquisition of F35s is, in any case, a real bone Seven EU member states – four of them NATO countries of contention from the standpoint of Europe’s – believe that the US nuclear security guarantee has growing preference for fostering its own defence become less credible under Trump. This includes two technological and industrial base. But the states from the Conflicted group, Sweden and Germany, dual-capable issue is creating problems of its as well as France – unsurprisingly, given that France never own. Italy and the Netherlands have already accepted total reliance on the US umbrella, and based its decided to procure F35s, while Belgium and policy of a national and independent deterrent on such Germany have not made their decision yet. But doubts. The survey nevertheless shows that no fewer than even the former pair have not publicly made 22 member states – all of them NATO members – believe known their choice concerning the ability of these that the US guarantee remains credible. Three – Estonia, aircraft to carry nuclear weapons. Among the the UK, and Poland – even believe it has become more latter, the Dutch parliament has voted against credible, perhaps judging that the new unpredictability such a move. of the guarantee will act as an added deterrent. Iran’s nuclear programme and in reaching the July 2015 agreement with the Iranian government illustrated this. Doubts about US commitment to the alliance are nothing new, in any case. Europeans may yet still Non-proliferation remains an area of concern, as well need to face the prospect of the US failing to fulfil its as of consensus. At the time that ECFR conducted its Article 5 obligations. But Trump’s arrival has done next research (before Trump withdrew the US from the Iran to nothing to jolt Europeans into more substantive deal), several countries spread across the five groups thinking about nuclear and other strategic matters. – ranging from Portugal and Ireland to Germany – named the situation on the Korean Peninsula as their Proliferation crises and other nuclear concerns top nuclear-related concern. In contrast, the situation in the Middle East caused less worry among most Non-proliferation was always an issue EU member states Europeans: no member state named it as its top priority. were able to agree and act on. The role of the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK), of the EU high representative, This commitment to non-proliferation helps explain why and of EU sanctions in managing the crisis around member states see any merits of nuclear weapons in the 7 8 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE The survey confirms that a clear majority ofmember the nuclear-armed states,the principle. This includes majority aclear are infavour in of nucleardisarmament, states at least that confirms survey The states. member between divergence into astrong turned now has uncertainty TPNW, this the banner of the under efforts abolitionist of renewal abolition? Withthe or full the ambiguityofterm. Does itmeanmerereductions to not least for Europeans–due issue a moreproblematic to non-proliferation, disarmamenthaslongbeen In contrast Attitudes towardsnucleardisarmament of itsmilitarynuclear programmeaskeyworries. development Asia, orChina’s in south East, tensions Middle the cited and Finland). Few (Malta concern among Neutrals some Cyprus). Therisk of anuclearmilitaryaccidentgenerates (Austria and Slovenia, Slovakia, and Spain)Neutrals This isaparticularconcernforConformists(Portugal, is nuclearandradiologicalterrorism. concern acrossEurope security priority of nuclear-related top another consistent Russia, to addition In Europe. in concern of source only the that proliferationcrisesarenot Still, itisimportanttonote that Europeanscan do, if anything, is tosupporttheUS. that theonlymeaningfulthing a smallminority believe role sofar. Just has hadalimited Peninsula, whereEurope Korean the on that including – crises proliferation major resolve trying to continue should EU the that believe states secure.Asa consequence, mostmember even “muchless” or East andAsialess Middle makesthe nuclear deterrence fear thatlocal to otherregions:apluralityofmemberstates not appeartoapply does same logic world aswell.Butthe secure, and nearly half think that this benefits the rest of the more” or even“much more makes Europe deterrence the world.thatnuclear Two-thirds ofEUcountriesbelieve of parts other to applicable not as context security European point to a variety of specific measures, including the including measures, specific of variety a to point to comes it when on disarmament:countries be should steps next the what holds consensus This France. and UK with Neutrals on the issue, the alliance’s official response official alliance’s the issue, the on Neutrals with on disarmamentattheEUlevel. AsNATOmembersdisagree down discussions locked and effectively has polarised issue this But it. ratified alone Austria and it, signed Ireland and Austria just (Finland abstained),while UN at the favour ofit only Austria, voted in Ireland, Malta, Cyprus,andSweden are split: The problemisnotsomuchthatmemberstates within theEUatmoment. most divisivenuclearissue better than the fierce debate around the TPNW, which is the and/or reveals this unilateral disarmament.total Noissue on appear, to for security environmentallows current global the whether divisions and show, to begin Reservations rather thanarsenalreductions. treaties) as the (such measures rules-based majority insupporting joins the France rather thanunilateraldisarmament–while involving reductions of favour for multilateral all states–likelyoutofapreference in particularly is UK the states, weapons nuclear two the Of powers. nuclear all across shared FMCT, andreductions CTBT as theand such options, available other behind lags weapons strategic for support and non- in bothstrategic a newroundofreductions Russia: and US the to solely buck the pass to quick not are countries EU surprisingly, somewhat Perhaps front. on this progress making genuine a barrierto to points also but issue, this on debate of level low the reflects be. Thislikely should next step on whatthe no consensus for moving is towards disarmament, general support there as apriority.Thatsaid,despite positions, common EU by Treaty (FMCT),agoalendorsed MaterialCut-off a Fissile support thenegotiationof states. Halfofmemberstates member of two-thirds of support (CTBT), has the which Ban Treaty Test Comprehensive the force of into entry to the treaty has been that nuclear disarmament should happen in a “step-by-step and verifiable way” and “on the basis of reciprocity”. Rather than creating “the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”, NATO said, the treaty risks undermining the current non-proliferation regime.

Missile defence

US engagement with Europe has actually deepened in one respect: through the construction – already under way – of missile defence infrastructure. As then US president decided to scale this programme back, its rollout attracted less controversy than it might have done. But the trend has reversed under Trump, and the programme is now in full swing in Poland and Romania. neighbours or key member states such as France, the UK, and Germany. Bilateral cooperation between France and the Despite Europeans’ traditional ambivalence on this UK is the obvious exception to this pattern. This cooperation issue, the survey shows that a majority of member – which entails political and legal commitments, and states are supportive of missile defence deployments technological collaboration, such as that on simulating in Europe. Only Malta and Ireland believe that it is nuclear weapons tests – is set to continue despite Brexit. strategically destabilising and likely to provoke Russian countermeasures. And, despite the risk of their deterrent *** ultimately being compromised by effective strategic missile These findings show that most EU member states feel defence, the UK, and even France, have still joined the vindicated in their established positions, whether in ranks of countries that are supportive of the programme. justifying a national deterrent, embracing the abolition of nuclear weapons, or underlining the importance of But the reasons for this support provide yet another hint the transatlantic umbrella. The Conflicted are the rare at Europeans’ lack of strategic cohesion on these issues. exception to this pattern, as they struggle to reconcile A plurality of member states stick to NATO’s official their traditional views with the immediate issues they face. rationale that it needs these defence systems to counter In Sweden, debate rages within the government on both potential regional threats. But an equivalent number of the opportunities and the consequences of ratifying the countries (coming from both Pragmatist and Conformist TPNW. The Swedish government is struggling to maintain ranks) admit that they find such missile defence systems consistency between its traditional pro-disarmament stance useful first and foremost as a way to tie the US tothe and the attempt to strengthen defence ties with the US it defence of Europe. And a smaller but similar number has made out of concern about its immediate security of them believe missile defence is useful mainly as a environment. But even Conflicted countries’ positions have response to Russian intimidation. This group includes still not changed significantly. In Germany, the recent debate Poland and Romania, which are both True Believers on a national deterrent was unprecedented, but it concluded and play a key role in the deployment of the new system. quickly by settling back into its more traditional stance.

NATO The picture emerging from ECFR’s survey results and the history of this contested arena is one of a continent The vast majority of member states agree that nuclear that is not devoting enough intellectual energy to the deterrence is central to NATO; indeed, ten member states hold that this has become even more important in the current climate. Those that agree that the nuclear dimension is “problematic” all belong to the Neutrals group.

For NATO members, national positions are primarily influenced by consultations and decisions through the alliance (and, consequently, by the US) rather than by consultations with other European partners. The difficulty of reaching common EU positions reinforces this pattern. For instance, as noted above, NATO played a key role in encouraging its EU members to oppose the very notion of a treaty that seeks to prohibit nuclear weapons.

This aside, coordination between EU member states is rare, although it does take place formally and informally between 9 10 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE issue that most Europeans would greatly prefer to ignore. to prefer greatly would Europeans most that issue nuclear more one just is this confirms, survey the as And, to Europe, renderingB.’”‘Plan unnecessary thenuclear Mr. Trump to end doubts over American security commitments silent. remained matter. ParisandLondonhave in the interest no public shown have circles official German fire. caught hardly has it was, in Germany subject of the re-emergence the Striking though else. from Germany,or anyone response of way by receiving much without deterrence”, “concerted proposed aEuropean of Morerecently,France Union withappropriatecapabilities”. creation especially unification, European to hinder the further development treaty canbeconstrued NPT withthe nuclear the French programme. Germany even for glossed its 1975 support ratification of financial the for exchange in Germany underitsnuclearumbrella, that Franceinclude after he was elected in 1958. Later, Helmut Schmidt suggested as progress any further halted Gaulle de Charles so, but did Adenauer Konrad France: to out reached that Germany was century. Attimes,it twentieth in the voce, atseveralpoints sotto idea, the discussed and Germany France for decades. operationally. around has been The notionofaEuropeannucleardeterrent perhaps, and, financially, theburden politically, to share – ways finding protégés and partners their non-nuclear umbrella, with and Britainprovidingthe on France variant isbased national territory.Theusual nuclear forcesare“defacto”protectingmorethanjust deterrents their of control national that unilateral statements existing) (already to ultimate ceding UK the and options, rangingfromFrance different covers anumberof That notion actually nuclear deterrent. that ofaEuropean t In Germany thisyear,PutinandTrumpbetween A Europeannucleardeterrent? proliferation. regional potential and revanchism Russian of age new alone tothe war era,let post-cold to the issues thinking onnuclear its adapted not has EU The subject. hem prompted a prompted hem explicitreservation Even Kiesewetter said that: “hehoped to spur e fur o interest of flurry new that “no stipulation in the “no stipulation that in an old idea – idea in anold

to theBrexitnegotiationscouldputanendanysuch it as security partners’ conclusionbitter a and unlikely; seem may EU the leaves rejected its guaranteeing UK A necessarily beseenasaterminalblowtosuchpossibility. Implausible thoughitmaysoundtoday, Brexitshouldnot wanted. partners their what is that if deterrence, extended such offer to able and willing be really might they that for such appeal to to beginsignal than onthetwonuclear powers protection beneficiaries supposed the on less be initial onuswould option, the provocation toseriouspolicy from newspaper progress to ever were a -deterrent if So be squaredwithBritain’s possibly decision toleavetheEU? a development such could in history:how point at this all above in return?And expect they What would trusted? be they capabilities? Should have adequate so, dothey If a guarantee? such to offer willing London andParisbe topromptonlymorequestions:Would talk tends deterrent concept. Euro- credible and allies–wasanimmediately partners European to deterrence nuclear and French of British extension – thatis,the deterrent a European guarantee nuclear all, asthough It wasnot,after seriously? less Europe to US the take to Kremlin the encourage traction official Trump? Andwhy surprising. Whyantagonise hardly is gain to failure idea’s Euro-deterrent The security guarantee for itself,thefactisthat,asoneobserver guarantee security by othersasacredible deterrence extended never trusted amounts to de facto European protection have positions official France’s territory; and French of the boundaries the with interests national vital confuse exclusively to never designed was French deterrent other hand,the in particular.Onthe Planning Group NATO’s Nuclear of alliance, stayingout to the to commititsnuclearforces France hasdeclined NATO militarycommandin2009, rejoined the it after Even national andindependent. is essentially deterrent its that insisted always has hand, it one the On subject. more ambivalentonthis autonomy, Francehasbeen strategic of European proponent leading being the Despite Extending deterrence, the UK could argue, is nothing new. relevant forceshavealwaysbeenfullycommittedtoNATO. the alliance”preciselytobolsterthiscontention. Their of the“secondcentrenucleardecision-makingwithin allies asfornationalpurposes.Theyinventedthedoctrine nuclear weaponsaremaintainedasmuchaserviceto have adeephistoricalattachmenttotheideathattheir committed” toEurope’ssecurity. Moreover, theBritish reiterates thatBritainwillremain“unconditionally EU, the leaving not Europe”,theBritishinsist; andtheprimeminister are “We EU27. the a with policy for defence appetite government’s UK “deep andspecialrelationship”inforeign,security, and the whetted have to period sincetheBrexitreferendumseems, ifanything, of supportingthedeterrent. Yet,counterintuitively, the disarmer, albeitoneatoddswithhisownparty’spolicy of theLabouroppositionisalongstandingunilateral notion forageneration. Anditdoesnothelpthattheleader repeatedlyit madeclearthat . Although France . Although has commented, it “paradoxically has an interest in others “Bearing in mind that they do not see situations arising in believing in it for themselves: beneficiary states, so as not which the vital interests of either Party could be threatened to be tempted to develop their own nuclear capabilities; and without the vital interests of the other also being threatened”. potential adversaries, so as to be deterred from attacking”. 1 “Vital interests” here is code for “things that matter to us so much that you cannot attack them without risking nuclear As a consequence, in 1995, France’s then prime minister, retaliation”. In other words, Britain and France have Alain Juppé, proposed the notion of “concerted already given each other a sort of oblique mutual nuclear deterrence”, stressing the need for a dialogue between guarantee, and they have even done this in treaty form. France and Germany rather than a simple “extension” of the French nuclear umbrella. This has since become a If a mutual nuclear guarantee, why not a joint guarantee standard reference point for the French authorities’ nuclear to non-nuclear European partners and allies? Few doubt doctrine. It has, however, tended to fall flat because of the Emmanuel Macron’s appetite for bold policy departures lack of interest, or even negative reaction, from other or his belief in the need for Europeans to stand on their European countries, especially Germany – at which own feet: his 2017 Sorbonne speech these ideas were largely directed. spoke of the “gradual and inevitable disengagement” September of the US from Europe. The section of France’s new Nonetheless, since the end of the cold war, France Strategic Review that addresses nuclear matters and Britain have been pursuing a slow but steadily reiterates that “the definition of [France’s] vital developing dialogue on nuclear matters, beginning with interests cannot be restricted to the national scope, a bilateral Nuclear Commission to deepen mutual because France does not conceive its defence strategy understanding of respective doctrines and in isolation, even in the nuclear field”, and that programmes, and progressing to the 2010 Lancaster “beyond these commitments, the political reality House treaty on nuclear cooperation. Strikingly, the implies that an external aggression against European treaty’s preamble includes the words: integrity or cohesion would severely affect our interests”. Flirting with a wider definition 11 1 Nicolas Roche, “Pourquoi la dissuasion?”, Presses Universitaires de France, 2017, p. 155. 12 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Macron ought to makethe samecommitmenttothedefence Macron ought In isthe France, there suffice giventheGerman public’s potentialreaction. that agovernment-to-government agreementwould someone else’s bomb.Yet,itishardlyimaginable may insteadbewhetherthecountryshouldwelcome question focusedonabombforGermany, theissue tolerate, thisnewtrajectory. While theWeltamSonntag countries inEuropewouldactivelysupport, oratleast UK the and should embarkonthiswithoutbeingconfidentthatother France that inconceivable is it course, Of youwantor too, evenneedit.” if youdon’tyetfeel have yours have eachother’sbacks,andwe “we deterrence: facto extended of de a sense be tocreate The aimwould their own“vitalinterests”. threatening partners as armedagainst EU view aggression would that they declaratory policytobeincreasinglyexplicit their up scaling with bilateral cooperation publicised The twocountriescouldcombinecloseranddiscreetly in combination. cause devastating) thatbothcould France or UK (in truth, damage the have toweigh would individually the of capability second-strike and forces ignore to disposed – Russia minimum deterrent by the retaliatory threatposed the i.e. – aggressor” “any that of signalling way useful be aparticularly could latter UK planning. The or jointtarget for example, propulsion, the which in areas – nuclear further cooperation take that could and France various are There cooperation. last word onbilateralnuclear wasnotthe Lancaster House others. protect to readiness ever moreclearlyattheir thickening theirbilateralnuclear cooperationandhinting European a offer, by from amerenotionintocredible deterrent of idea the convert could France and UK the to Brexit), caveats(over time, andsubject the necessary certainly available.Withall is future the of uncertainties against the to hedge or even conceivable–butastrategy nuclearautonomyispracticable,desirable, strategic declare above, no immediateEuropeaninitiativeto discussed reasons is nota policy. Forthe best for the hoping But just nuclear underpinning. a European fatal lackof ignoring its totalk tocontinue autonomy while forEuropeanstrategic about theneed and – solid rock remain, indefinitely is, andwill Europe to US nuclearguarantee that the belief no have the to cling to be will resistance least agenda. Thepathof Europeans that confirms on anyformal Euro-deterrence for putting current appetite survey ECFR’s and sensitive; are uniquely issues ‘not much’.Nuclear suggests to date efforts defence What next?ThehistoryofEuropean even some,ofitsEuropeanpartners’“vital interests”. of explicitlyextendingitsnuclearumbrellatoall, and war cooperationinthisarea.YetFrancestoppedshort given theprecedentofcloseFranco-Britishpost-cold particularly significant, is does Review Strategic the as start of adiscussion start aboutwhether and policies (arguably, they have given little), almost none have givenlittle), (arguably, they and policies interests strategic their to havegiven Europeans thought that, whatever is research ECFR’s of finding primary The Conclusion apparent road. along this journey the begin to for them wise be Europeans’ and autonomy, in it would the needtobuildstrategic belief world twenty-first-century of the unnecessary. But,giventheunpredictability process combine torenderthe easily that timecould during or more.Events a decade work of the be would vocation” fortheBritishandFrenchnucleardeterrents of sucha“European andacceptance The development the nuclearumbrella)andsomeformofburden-sharing. nuclear ininto up consultation (ratherthanasimpleunilateralextensionof these firming eventually discussions, EU partnersintonuclear to drawrelativelyreceptive could hope Over time, thetwoEuropeannuclearpowers of Europeanisation – the is a French deterrent the reunification) German to led (which Four Agreement Two Plus NPT andthe the under its ownbomb–andbreakingcommitments developing have UK made the to each other and since 1995. France Indeed, rather than that Germany interests” “vital German of 2018. German axisanditsimplications forEuropeansecurityanddefence’, UIBrief,n°2, 2 ClaudiaMajor,ChristianMölling&Gesine Höltmann,‘ThefutureoftheFrench- far offevenreachingNATO’s of GDPdefence 2 percent Germany remains a proposal. for such no enthusiasm a Germanbombhasseen about sparked debate newly the soon: any time nuclear taboo overcome its Germany to many more expects one No nuclear issues. than addressing autonomy are there that strategic dimensions thatarerequiredtomovetowards is finding main second The between. in caught those on toll its takes Russia and US the between alignment strategic and even political possible a before do this should now; they haveup until than they years. few last have clearlyevolvedinthe issues towards defence attitudes matters; German in security more self-reliant become Macron inrecent remarks may have Merkel Angela escaped. war –cannotbe during thecold US –atraditionalconcernacrossEurope from, or justamoredistant, of decoupling The possibility may rendersuchquestionsyetsharperforallEuropeans. guarantee security US of the solidity the environment and nuclear Europe’s the growinggapbetween others, while onto forcing themselves are slowly about nucleardeterrence are nolongersustainable. Familiar questions attitudes fact thatpast most visibleillustrationofthe are onlythe countries Conflicted The “obsolete”. is NATO that instinct held deeply president’s the banner and “America First” its significant no reaction. It isstilltrueundertheTrumpadministration, with in resulted but worry of touch a prompted This was truewhenthe“pivottoAsia”underObama security. European dimension of nuclear the about has been 2 Europeans need to do some harder thinking some do to need Europeans about the need for Europe to for Europe need aboutthe topic ofdiscussion in Berlin echoed . spending target. Still, moving along on conventional end. Europe’s dependence on a faltering US security guarantee defence while leaving aside decisions and even discussions could leave the continent exposed to a variety of threats. on the nuclear issues is not a sustainable approach. In particular, Europeans need to be able to weigh in much This is not just about the relationship member states have more directly and forcefully on the development of the with the US. Above all, it is about Europeans’ collective European security order, whose nuclear dimension they responsibility to themselves; and about governments’ cannot avoid. The combination of missile defence, the responsibility to their peoples, however unattractive it deployment of non-strategic weapons, the TPNW, and the looks to broach the nuclear issue. France and the UK evolution of both US and Russian nuclear postures should should deepen their nuclear relationship and develop bring Europeans towards confronting these issues head on. their declaratory policy; they must also prepare for a time when a joint offer to provide that capability might seem The third key point is that EU countries must acknowledge both credible and welcome to their European partners. the almost total evaporation of the intellectual investment made in the last century in understanding and thinking In short, Europeans need to overcome their strategically about nuclear deterrence. The case in favour deep-seated reluctance to think about nuclear issues of these weapons – as guarantors of peace and stability anew. They must prise their eyes open and take a – has gone largely by default. The fact is that it took a good hard look at the implications of the strategic strong US lead (and NATO statement, providing the autonomy they have endorsed. Soberly, seriously, necessary arguments) to ensure that most Europeans and with some resolve, Europeans must answer the stayed out of the UN initiative to “prohibit” nuclear question of whether they can ever enjoy such autonomy weapons. This clearly indicates that most of the strategic unless they possess a deterrent capability of their own. thinking on nuclear issues stems from the US, at a time when European impetus on the topic seems essential. If it is to happen, progress on these issues will require far clearer thinking about Europe’s threat perceptions, The international landscape is changing quickly. Europeans its security interests, and its strategy for confronting the perceive it, whether through their concern about a less current and future international environment. As such, predictable US nuclear alliance or in news headlines on the nuclear dimension is not the only indicator, but it is a the situation in the Middle East or even on the Korean telling one – revealing both the need to move forward and Peninsula. But they seem paralysed by these changes the distance to be closed by Europeans who wish to do so. rather than prompted to confront them. And yet more factors will only add to this turmoil. Countries that are still debating their stance on the TPNW or whether and how to replace their dual-capable aircraft fleet will find themselves buffeted by all sorts of demands if they do not now take some time to sort out their strategic positions.

In this context, it is hard to overcome the contradiction between idealist support for a bold disarmament agenda and the realist assessment of a dangerous world. This is even more difficult now than in 2009, when the Obama administration called for a “world without nuclear weapons” and yet prepared for a major modernisation of the US arsenal. The increasing challenge of this issue is not limited to the Conflicted countries. The growing differences – between public opinion and governments, between parliaments and governments, and within and between EU governments – are likely to burst out more obviously into the open at some point. This will have ramifications beyond countries where political disagreements on nuclear issues are greatest.

Fourth, there is now a nascent discussion about a Euro- deterrent – whatever form this might eventually take. But this discussion urgently needs to expand and deepen. Unless this debate acquires new energy and sophistication, the worst result of it would be to conclude with the status quo by default. Recognising that in Europe is a non-starter is one thing but failing to contemplate the Europeanisation of the British or French deterrent, or both, would only leave Europe facing a strategically dangerous dead 13 14 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE are largelyalignedonnuclearweaponspolicy. of nuclearabolition. Governmentandpublicopinion it isaneutralcountry,andalsostrongproponent Austria’s positionisunique –asanon-NATOmember the political on debate opinion public of Influence assessment doesnotcitenuclearweaponsasapriority. of massdestruction. Overall, Austria’sstrategic Korea’s North terrorism, nuclear weapons, andtheproliferationofweapons radiological and nuclear with otherseriousnuclear-relatedconcerns,including: one. Austriangoverningcirclesareinsteadpreoccupied major a not but threat, a as Russia perceives Austria Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear status weapons nuclear No

AUSTRIA

is theonlyEUmember Nuclear Weapons Signed thetreatyand Prohibition of Treaty onthe state toratifyit

Grouping Neutral humanitarian pledge signed by 127 countries in 2014. In and wastheoriginatorofadocumentthatbecame on thehumanitarianconsequencesofnuclearweapons Austria hasinitiatedinternational-level conferences Stance ondisarmament the EUshouldplayaroleinIran’s nuclear programme. such asNorwayandSwitzerland. Austria believesthat such astheNordicstates, aswell non-EU members Austria coordinatescloselywithlike-mindedcountries role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European measures bynuclearweaponsstates. disarmament; and the adoption of confidence-building Ban Treaty; advancesinmethodsforverifyingnuclear entry intoforceoftheComprehensiveNuclearTest- involving allstatesthatpossessnuclearweapons; the should beasfollows: areductioninstockpiles For Austria,thenextstepsonnucleardisarmament of Prohibition the on Nuclear Weapons. Treaty the adopted, to 2017 Assembly in General leading UN the which 71/258, Resolution UN co-sponsored Austria 2016, December security concern nuclear-related Most serious Nuclear and radiological terrorism

element toAustrianinitiatives unpredictability asupporting Not amemberofNATO. to bannuclearweapons Credibility ofUS nuclear security Considers Trump internationally guarantee

BELGIUM

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Pragmatist Has not signed – North Korea’s nuclear Belgium considers NATO Host political consensus weapons and accidental the centrepiece of its country against it launch of nuclear weapons security architecture

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

Belgium believes that nuclear weapons pose a In principle, Belgium strongly supports nuclear significant – but not priority – threat. It perceives disarmament. However, federal officials believe Russia as a threat irrespective of the latter’s nuclear that a non-nuclear world is currently out of reach: weapons. Belgium considers Russia to be a frustrated growing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, in power that seeks to regain, to some extent, part of its Asia, or even in eastern Europe make it difficult, for lost influence. Nevertheless, Belgian officials do not the moment, to seriously consider the possibility of consider Moscow a major threat: the government sees massive, worldwide disarmament. The only parties real possibilities of cooperation with Russia on a range opposed to this view in Belgium have far-left leanings of issues, including terrorism. or are Green party members, who currently have very limited influence on policymaking. Influence of public opinion on the political debate For Belgium, the next steps on nuclear disarmament should be the entry into force of the Comprehensive Belgian citizens do not cite the nuclear issue as Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the launch of negotiations a major concern. During the Euromissile crisis, on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. large demonstrations against the deployment of US nuclear weapons took place on Belgian soil. This led European coordination and perception of the the government to postpone the installation of the need for a European political and/or military weapons. role

The “European federal dream” has formed the centrepiece of Belgium’s foreign policy in the last few decades. Were any form of European deterrence architecture to emerge, France would be its backbone. However, Belgian officials mostly see this as a kind of utopia and, therefore, prefer to resort to NATO when tackling such issues.

15 16 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE the senseofupgradingWesternnuclearweapons. round tofavouringnucleardeterrence–butonlyin The geopoliticalcontexthasbroughtthegeneralpublic the political on debate opinion public of Influence of theconventionalarmsagreements”. and breaches Crimea militarisation of contested “the Bulgarian politicalpartiesandotherstakeholdershotly that notes also It Europe”. peaceful and free unified, regional instabilityandthreatenourmaingoalfora of source a are Russia of actions “the that states 2017, September in published Bulgaria, of Republic the of Security National of State the on Report annual The believes and threat threat. this amplifies power nuclear a as status its that a as Russia perceives Bulgaria its mostprominentconcerns. among figures also waste nuclear of management The means ofdelivery–nuclearandmissileprogrammes. proliferation ofweaponsmassdestructionandtheir Bulgaria’s mainnuclearsecurityconcernisthe Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear weapons status nuclear No

BULGARIA Nuclear Weapons Prohibition of Treaty onthe political consensus Has notsigned– against it

Pragmatist Grouping Weapons (TPNW). Asoneexpertcontributingtothis behind theTreatyonProhibitionofNuclear disarmament. However, itputnoneofitsweight Sofia considers itself to be strongly in favour of nuclear S forces asirrelevanttotheircountry’ssecurity. Bulgarians generallyview Frenchand Britishnuclear security. country’s the to committed less are powers in defendingEurope,andfearsthatwesternEuropean role strategic primary the has States United the that fora need the European deterrent. Traditionally, Bulgaria believes about debate significant no is There role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European nuclear weaponsstates. by measures confidence-building of adoption the and of negotiationsontheFissileMaterialCut-offTreaty; launch the Treaty; Ban Test Nuclear Comprehensive should beasfollows: theentryintoforceof For Bulgaria, thenextstepsonnucleardisarmament disarmament andnon-proliferation. attention awayfrommoreimmediatetasksinnuclear the TPNWanddivertsinternationalcommunity’s believes thatthetreatythreatenslegitimacyof destruction ofevenasinglenucleardevice.”Bulgaria joined itanditsentryintoforcewillnotresultinthe have not explained: “nuclear-weaponstates study tance ondisarmament weapons andnuclear security concern nuclear-related North Korea’snuclear radiological terrorism Most serious

Credibility ofUS nuclear security Member ofNATOand looks toUSasitskey security provider guarantee

CROATIA

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

No Has not signed – Conformist Nuclear and radiological NATO nuclear political consensus terrorism and Russia’s member weapons against it nuclear weapons state

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

Croatia considers threats such as terrorism, cyber Croatia subscribes to the international consensus on warfare, and intra-state conflicts that could lead nuclear disarmament: it is a signatory party to all major to regional destabilisation to be more important international agreements on the non-proliferation than nuclear threats. It perceives Russia as a threat of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, and irrespective of the fact that it possesses nuclear disarmament. However, Croatia’s governing circles weapons. elites were all against the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Zagreb claimed that US nuclear Influence of public opinion on the political weapons were essential to Croatia’s security. It believes debate that the next step on nuclear disarmament should be a reduction in stockpiles involving all states that possess The general public does not name nuclear deterrence nuclear weapons. as an important issue and no significant debate on the topic has taken place in recent years. European coordination and perception of the need for a European political and/or military role

Other European Union and NATO members influence Croatia’s policy on nuclear issues through formal mechanisms. As a rule of thumb, the Croatian foreign and defence ministries align themselves with NATO and EU positions on nuclear issues, issuing statements that criticise breaches of international law and treaties (such as those by North Korea, China, and Iran) or supporting EU and NATO decisions on security issues.

17 18 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE not resonateinthecountry’spublicdebate. onnuclear- related issues.Even recentnuclearthreats inAsiadid debate public significant no in engages Cyprus doesnotregardnucleararmsasathreat,and the political on debate opinion public of Influence the Intermediate-RangeNuclearForcesTreaty. Europeans should ignore Russia’s alleged violations of Cyprus isoneofjusteightcountriesthatsay international issues, andEuropeanUnionaffairs. which coverspolitics,economics, energy, defence, period, 2018-2020 the for plan action joint a signed Cyprus and Russia of presidents the 2017, October In Russia. to ties historical close having as itself sees it Instead, threat. a as Russia perceive not does Cyprus nuclear accidents. do withnuclearandradiologicalterrorism, aswell nuclear concerns,accordingtooursurvey, hasmoreto not oneofCyprus’ssecuritypriorities: thenatureofits is Cyprus’smainsecurityconcern. Nuclearthreatsare non-transparent and manner. However,Turkey’soccupationoftheisland non-verifiable a in place take Cyprus isvery worriedaboutnuclearactivitiesthat Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear status weapons nuclear No

CYPRUS

yes atUN,buthasnotsigned negotiating thetreaty,voted Nuclear Weapons Formally involvedin or ratifiedthetreaty Prohibition of Treaty onthe

Grouping Neutral supports the entry into force of the Comprehensive the of force into entry the supports as theultimategoalofthisprocess. Italsostrongly and seesthetotaleliminationofnuclearweapons Cyprus isstronglyinfavourofnucleardisarmament S nuclear views. number ofcountrieswithintheEUtoholdstronganti- irrelevant toitssecurity. Cyprusisoneofthesmall Cyprus seesFrenchandBritishnuclearforcesas role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European to beuniversallyadopted. Nuclear TestBanTreatyandwouldlikethemeasure tance ondisarmament launch ofnuclearweapons terrorism andaccidental Nuclear andradiological security concern nuclear-related Most serious

nuclear dimensionasproblema against NATO.Inconflictwith Not inNATOandoneofthree tic. Mainopp’npartystrongly EU statesthatseeNATO’s Credibility ofUS nuclear security NATO memberTurkey. guarantee

- CZECH REPUBLIC

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

No Has not signed – Pragmatist North Korea’s NATO member, nuclear political consensus nuclear weapons committed weapons against it Euro-Atlanticist

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

The Czech public does not exhibit much interest in The Czech Republic was strongly opposed to the Treaty topics related to nuclear deterrence or weapons except on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It thinks that when there is media coverage of the North Korean this treaty challenges transatlantic ties and NATO. nuclear and missile programmes. The Czech Republic does not believe that nuclear disarmament is achievable and suggests instead The Czech Republic sees Russia as a threat amplified focusing attention on the Non-Proliferation Treaty by its nuclear weapons. Some Czech experts argue that regime. Russia would be less hesitant to use nuclear weapons than NATO would, expressing concern about a lack of Should new steps be taken in the framework of democratic control over Russia’s nuclear weapons and disarmament, the Czech Republic would pursue the their possible use. Other experts think that Russia is following, in priority order: new US-Russia reductions a responsible and stable nuclear power. There are no in strategic weapons; the entry into force of the public documents or speeches from Czech officials that Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the launch name Russia as a threat to the country. of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; advances in the verification of nuclear disarmament; Influence of public opinion on the political and the adoption of confidence-building measures by debate nuclear weapons states.

The possible deployment to the Czech Republic of radar European coordination and perception of the as part of the US missile defence system resonated need for a European political and/or military strongly with the public in the late 2000s. At that time, role two-thirds of Czechs were against such a deployment. Consultations on nuclear issues mainly take place with the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence and with the German and French ministries of foreign affairs. NATO remains the Czech Republic’s primary security provider.

19 20 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE alliance withnuclearcapabilitiesatitscore. sentiment andthefactofmembershipamilitary which trytotakeaccountofbothpopularanti-nuclear remains abalancingactforDanishgovernments, strong domesticanti-nuclearsentiment. Theissue foreign andsecuritypolicy. Thereis, however,stilla with theUSisfundamentalframeworkforDanish the 1980s, not least because NATO and of the relationship policies the from themselves distance significantly then, Danishpolicymakershave madeeffortsto Denmark decidednottostationonitsterritory.Since particularly strainedovernuclearweapons, which relationship withtheUnitedStatesandNATObecame deterrence. During the 1970s and the 1980s, Denmark’s nuclear against is public Danish majority ofthe large A the political on debate opinion public of Influence possesses nuclearweapons. it that fact the despite threat a as Russia perceive not important thanmostotherthreats.Denmarkdoes Denmark generallyperceivesnuclearthreatsasless Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear status weapons nuclear No

DENMARK

Nuclear Weapons Prohibition of political consensus Treaty onthe Has notsigned– against it

Conformist Grouping oppose theUnitedNations’ recentefforttoadoptthe significant made moves towardsmakingthisareality. Whileamajority not have they power, in when but, All politicalpartiesareinfavour ofnucleardisarmament Stance ondisarmament foreign EUmissionswithadefencecomponent. defence implicationsanddoesnotparticipatein with is excludedfromEUforeignpolicydiscussions EU’sCommon the from Consequently,Security andDefencePolicy. Denmark an opt-out from benefited formally has it (1997), Amsterdam of Treaty the since nuclear Korea’s However, issues. weapons nuclear on members NATO North and Iran’s programmes. Denmarkalsocoordinates withother on action take Denmark believesthattheEuropeanUnionshould role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European all statesthatpossessthem. weapons; andreductionsinnuclearweaponsinvolving non-strategic in reductions US-Russia new weapons; strategic in reductions US-Russia new include: should For Denmark, thenextstepsonnucleardisarmament weapons. nuclear Denmark shouldsupportanyattempttolimit and left–red/greenallianceEnhedslistenarguedthat Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, pacifist security concern nuclear-related North Korea’sand Most serious Russia’s nuclear weapons

Credibility ofUS nuclear security guarantee Member NATO of

ESTONIA

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

NATO member. US main source of No Has not signed – Pragmatist Russia’s credible nuclear deterrence against nuclear supports US nuclear Russia and more credible under weapons position weapons Trump, as capable of taking a nuclear decision more quickly than Barack Obama or Hillary Clinton Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

Estonia views nuclear deterrence and the use of nuclear Nuclear deterrence is vital to Estonia’s defence assets as a last resort, though one it is prepared to strategy. The country would not support steps towards support. Estonia perceives Russia as a threat amplified nuclear disarmament if this would put it at risk. by its nuclear weapons; Tallinn’s main concern is that Moscow will threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons However, should new steps be taken in the framework as a component of a hybrid warfare scenario against of disarmament, Estonia would pursue the following, NATO forces in the Baltic region. in priority order: new US-Russia reductions in strategic weapons; new US-Russia reductions in non-strategic Estonian experts also believe that NATO should weapons; and reductions in nuclear weapons involving signal its willingness to use nuclear weapons against all states that possess them. Russia if needed. In such a scenario, the Baltic states would be part of a wider Russia-NATO confrontation. European coordination and perception of the need for a European political and/or military Influence of public opinion on the political role debate As US-based nuclear deterrence plays a central role in In general, the Estonian-speaking majority is in favour Estonia’s defence and deterrence strategy, the country of nuclear deterrence and the Russian-speaking supports the US position unconditionally. Estonia minority is critical of it. The political elite has stressed views Western nuclear capabilities as sufficient to several times that nuclear deterrence is a critical deter Russia. The main critical variable is a readiness component of NATO’s model in the region and should to use those assets. However, Estonia has the US in be applicable if Estonia comes under threat. mind when it talks about NATO, as it views the United Kingdom and France as insufficiently capable.

21 22 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE the coldwar. awareness of,nuclearissuesdecreasedaftertheendof and non-membershipofNATO. Finns’ interestin, and politics andFinland’svulnerablegeopoliticalposition power great of general distrust Finns’ of product a non-proliferation – and arms control nuclear Finland hasalong-standingtraditionofpromoting the political on debate opinion public of Influence “wide-ranging threats persist”. that argues (CBRN) nuclear and radiological biological, chemical, it Secondly, (C4ISR).” digital command&controlandintelligencesystems nuclear weapons, airandspacedefenceaswell aircraft andunmannedaerialvehicles, robotics, capability andprecision-guidedweapons, manned strike long-range on forces armed its of development notes it Russia, that “much as in the West, Russia focuses the material to relation in Firstly, twice. threats white paperondefencepolicymentionsnuclear threats onlyinpassing. Thegovernment’s mostrecent Finland’s keystrategicdocumentsrefertonuclear Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear weapons status nuclear No

FINLAND Nuclear Weapons Has notsignedbecause nuclear weaponstates Prohibition of Treaty onthe are notpartytoit

Grouping Neutral Treaty (NPT)andtheComprehensiveNuclearTest also beenanactivesupporteroftheNon-Proliferation has Finland zone. weapons-free nuclear Nordic a of During thecoldwar,Finlandactivelypromotedidea Stance ondisarmament the USpresenceinEuropeasessentialtoitssecurity. Although FinlandisnotaNATOmember, itregards issues. nuclear on policy Finland’s influence formally Other EUmemberstatesandNordiccountries role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European Material Cut-offTreaty. CTBT; andthelaunchofnegotiationsonFissile states thatpossessthem; theentryintoforceof weapons; reductionsinnuclearweaponsinvolvingall non-strategic in reductions US-Russia new weapons; strategic in reductions US-Russia new include: should For Finland,thenextstepsonnucleardisarmament policy. continues tobethecornerstoneofFinland’s nuclear existing agreements–mostnotablytheNPT, which signed uptoit. Instead, theTPNW could weaken disarmament becausenuclear-armedstateshave not It positsthatthetreatywillnotcontributetonuclear Treaty ontheProhibitionofNuclearWeapon(TPNW). the government,andcivil service) hasopposedthe foreign policyleadership(comprisingthepresident, Ban Treaty(CTBT). However, recently, Finland’s Russia’s nuclearweapons and accidentallaunchof security concern nuclear-related Most serious nuclear weapons

sees USpresenceinEuropeas Not amemberofNATObut Credibility ofUS nuclear security essential toitssecurity guarantee

FRANCE

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Nuclear Has not signed – the treaty does True believer Russia’s NATO member but France’s security weapons not pay adequate heed to current nuclear doctrine underlines the independence state global security environment weapons of its nuclear posture

Perception of nuclear threats so, according to the defence ministry’s 2017 Defence Barometer. Still, there is more tacit approval than real The Strategic Review on Defence and National public debate. This is not because of a lack of public Security, published in October 2017, identifies interest but is instead a question of political culture: terrorism as the most important threat to French foreign policy, security, and defence are prerogatives national security. Armed forces minister Florence of the executive branch. There is a consensus on Parly’s foreword to the review states that: “Jihadist deterrence among mainstream parties as it is an terrorism remains the most direct threat our country integral part of the country’s credibility on foreign faces today. France and its European neighbours policy. have been hit hard.” However, nuclear threats feature prominently in the document, which links them Stance on disarmament with the resurgence of great power rivalries. In fact, the review’s introduction argues that: “given that France is in favour of nuclear disarmament – but only the nuclear factor is set to play an increasing role in if the global security environment improves, given France’s strategic environment, maintaining over the that it is set on a minimal deterrence policy. The long-term our nuclear deterrent, the keystone of the government describes its vision as “pragmatic and Nation’s defence strategy, is essential now more than progressive”. This gradual approach to disarmament ever.” France considers the proliferation of nuclear is reiterated in the Strategic Review: “Disarmament weapons to be a major threat. cannot be decreed but ought to be built gradually. This is why encouraging a realistic process of arms control France does not directly characterise Russia as a threat and confidence-building is important, in order to in official documents but sees its security activities and contribute to strategic stability and shared security.” its strategic intimidation policy as a threat to French national security. France recognises that Russia’s European coordination and perception of the nuclear programme is a central element of Russian need for a European political and/or military power but that it may pose a threat to France when role combined with its aggressive behaviour. The Strategic Review contains a chapter dedicated to “Issues arising There were attempts to debate the Europeanisation from renewed Russian power”. France acknowledges of deterrence in the early 1990s in France, but French that Russia’s efforts to modernise its military, governing circles remain sceptical about this. However, including its nuclear deterrent, launched in the 2000s France does officially recognise a European dimension and accelerated since 2010, are already yielding to its nuclear deterrence: the Strategic Review notes significant results. the deterrent’s contribution to the overall security of the Atlantic alliance and of Europe. France coordinates Influence of public opinion on the political with the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons issues. debate France’s independent nuclear posture still includes its non-participation in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, The general public is in favour of nuclear deterrence even if the country has gradually acknowledged that and believes it should be modernised by renewing the its national nuclear forces contribute to the overall French arsenal to preserve credibility – increasingly deterrence capability of the alliance. 23 24 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE independently ofpopularsentiment. and thegovernment takesnuclear-relateddecisions most politicaldiscussionstake placebehindthescenes start. Given popularoppositiontonuclearweapons, Prohibition ofNuclearWeapons (TPNW)fromthe fact thatthegovernmentopposedTreatyon the over influence government onthisissue.Thiscouldbeseeninthe significant exert not does public But, unlikeintheNetherlands, forexample,the the politicalestablishment. and general public the Germany exhibitsastrongdivergenceofviewsbetween the political on debate opinion public of Influence weapons. only hasanexistentialdimensionduetoitsnuclear German experts agree that the threat that Russia poses the widersecuritycontext. government isreluctanttodiscussnuclearweaponsin German the that fact the reflects rather but priority a maintain that thisdoesnotimplynuclearthreatsare Experts statements. official government’s receive moreattentioninthewhitepaperand warfare, hybrid and terrorism as such threats, other destruction. However,weapons ofmass obtain also pointstotheriskthatterroristnetworksmight It destruction. mass of weapons other and weapons nuclear of proliferation the of risks” “incalculable sharing willcontinue. Thewhitepaperhighlightsthe nuclear and deterrence nuclear of imperative the German weapons remainafactorinmilitaryconfrontations, on paper white security policystatesthat, foraslongnuclear 2016 government’s The Germany’s assessmentofthestrategicenvironment. Nuclear threatshaverecentlyriseninprominence Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear status country Host

GERMANY Has notsigned.Germanyboycotted disagreements withnuclearallies the negotiationsinordertoavoid Nuclear Weapons Prohibition of Treaty onthe

Conflicted Grouping weapons. ThevastmajorityofGermansareinfavour this area.Thepublicsharesmoralrepugnanceatall the coreprinciplesunderpinningGermanpolicyin Nuclear disarmamentandnon-proliferationare Stance ondisarmament debate”. “phantom a it called even newspaper one – lived short- was in theissue interest However,discussed. to suggestionsthatEuropeandeterrenceshouldbe but lesssounderDonaldTrump. This hasevenled The USnuclearsecurityguaranteeisseenascredible, role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European nuclear weaponsstates. by measures confidence-building of adoption the and of negotiationsontheFissileMaterialCut-offTreaty; launch the Treaty; Ban Test Nuclear Comprehensive should include: theentryintoforceof For Germany, thenextstepsonnucleardisarmament to theTPNW. up sign to government their wanted percent 70 than nuclear weaponsstationedinthecountry, andmore of Germanswantedtheirgovernmenttoremove US two-thirds 2017, of As weapons. nuclear of abolition of worldwidenucleardisarmamentandthetotal security concern nuclear-related Most serious North Korea’s weapons nuclear

nuclear weaponsisongoing Credibility ofUS debate onhostingofUS nuclear security NATO memberbutthe guarantee

GREECE

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Conformist No Has not signed – North Korea’s nuclear Member nuclear political consensus weapons and accidental of weapons against it launch of nuclear weapons NATO

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

The Greek government considers the proliferation Greece has declined to set out a position on the recent of weapons of mass destruction and their technology effort at the to adopt the Treaty on the to be one of the most severe threats to international Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The official Greek peace and security. position is based on Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which calls for a “gradual” approach to The current Greek government does not view Russia achieving nuclear disarmament. as a threat. For Greece, the next steps on nuclear disarmament Influence of public opinion on the political should include reductions in involving all states that possess them and advances in the verification of nuclear disarmament. In recent years, Greek governments have supported the international community’s non-proliferation European coordination and perception of the initiatives and have publicly spoken about the need need for a European political and/or military to support dialogue on this subject. But they have not role played any active role in this. The issue is not on the public agenda in Greece. Greeks’ only potential nuclear On both Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programmes, concern derives from media reports on tensions on the Greece believes the only meaningful thing European Korean Peninsula. Union member states can do is to support the United States. On nuclear issues, Greece is influenced mostly by the US. It coordinates its positions on nuclear weapons issues with other NATO member states.

25 26 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Hungary’s membershipofNATO. and considerations geopolitical by driven is it 1990s; deterrence hasbeenstableandconsistentsincethe debate lately.Thegovernment’s positiononnuclear deterrence, andithasnotbecomeatopicofpublic There arenorecentpollsonthequestion ofnuclear the political on debate opinion public of Influence the country’snuclearcapabilities. on focus particularly not do but threat, a be to Russia Hungarian militaryandsecurityexpertsconsider discourse. Europe –and, atthepoliticallevel, theydominatethe threats toHungaryand pressing as themost migration the currentOrbangovernmentframesterrorismand However, actors non-state violent of hands the into fall states thathavethem, andthepossibilitythattheywill includes theirspread, thegrowthinnumberof weapons, areastrategicthreattoHungary.This that notes Strategy weapons ofmassdestruction, includingnuclear Security Hungarian 2012 The Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear weapons nuclear status No

HUNGARY Nuclear Weapons Prohibition of Treaty onthe political consensus Has notsigned– against it

Conformist Grouping cornerstone ofthenuclearnon-proliferationregime. the Non-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)shouldremain on theProhibitionofNuclearWeapons, arguingthat Hungary’s governingcircleswereagainsttheTreaty Stance ondisarmament North Korea’snuclearprogrammes. the EuropeanUnionshouldtakeactiononIran’sand deterrent asitseesthisunrealistic. Itdoesbelieve It hasnoambitiontopursueaseparateEuropean Hungary seesnoalternativetotheAmericandeterrent. role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European nuclear weaponsstates. by measures confidence-building of adoption the and disarmament; nuclear of verification the in advances of negotiationsontheFissileMaterialCut-offTreaty; launch the Treaty; Ban Test Nuclear Comprehensive should include: theentryintoforceof For Hungary, thenextstepsonnucleardisarmament states andpreservestheintegrityofNPT. disarmament thatfullyengageswithnuclearweapons Hungary supportsanincrementalprocessofnuclear security concern nuclear-related Most serious North Korea’s weapons nuclear

Credibility ofUS nuclear security guarantee Member NATO of

IRELAND

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

No Formally involved in Neutral NK nuclear weapons, China’s, Ireland deems US nuclear nuclear negotiating the treaty, voted India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear security guarantee to weapons for and signed it, but has not prog’s, Russia’s nuclear weapons, NATO allies less credible ratified it Middle East nuclear weapons under Donald Trump

Perception of nuclear threatss Stance on disarmament

Ireland does not view nuclear weapons as a direct As support for nuclear disarmament and non- domestic threat, but the government generally adopts proliferation remains one of its key foreign policy a broader approach to the issue by supporting global positions, the government holds that its priority disarmament. Official Irish policy positions focus on within the framework of nuclear disarmament should the impact of nuclear threats on the international be reductions in nuclear weapons involving all states community. The government’s 2015 white paper on that possess them. defence expresses concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. In 2017, the Irish UN disarmament delegation, along with six international partners – including its Austrian In light of its opposition to nuclear weapons, Ireland’s counterpart – won the Arms Control Person of the perception of Russia as a nuclear power is inevitably Year for its role in the creation of the Treaty on the unfavourable. Ireland has begun to acknowledge the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. potential danger of Russia’s unpredictable actions in recent times, its continuing efforts to modernise European coordination and perception of the its nuclear forces, and its apparent violation of the need for a European political and/or military Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. However, role Irish officials rarely single out any one country for criticism on nuclear issues, with the exception of the Ireland sees French and British nuclear forces as non-signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation irrelevant to its security. Were a debate on the need for of Nuclear Weapons. This is likely a consequence of its a European deterrent to enter the Irish public domain, desire to be seen as an honest broker on these issues in where opinion is already highly charged on the topic of international forums. the relatively limited European defence proposals, it would likely generate deep suspicion and negativity. It Influence of public opinion on the political could even have an impact on the enthusiasm the Irish debate currently feel for their membership of the European Union. Ireland is not a NATO member state. The Irish public takes a dim view of the use of military force in general. This sentiment inevitably spills over into public attitudes towards nuclear weapons, which is generally negative. For 60 years, Irish governments have been proponents of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. This is a principled stance shared by all political parties in Ireland.

27 28 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE nuclear weaponsontheirsoil. only survey, of existence the of 2006 aware were Italians of percent 32.8 a to According debate. public to competence ofthemilitary andhasnotbeensubject then, Since the topichasremained under thequasi-exclusive Crisis. Euromissile during 1980s, and early 1970s late the in and signed; was Non-Proliferation (NPT) the Treaty when 1975, in NATO; join to three main occasions: in the 1950s, when Italy decided Nuclear deterrenceformedthefocusofdebateon war erathathavelittlerelevancetoday. Italians viewnuclearissuesasremnantsofthecold the political on debate opinion public of Influence Forces Treaty. Nuclear Intermediate-Range the of implementation called on the Russian government to commit to the full to tackleglobalissuesjointly. However, Italyhasalso aims toenhanceformsofcooperationwithMoscow Rome regard, In this measures. and confidence-building dialogue through defused be could Russia with threat. nuclear a as Russia On thecontrary,Italybelievesthatnucleartensions of think not does Italy and theHornofAfrica. Sahel, the Mediterranean, central the namely, – areas focus onsecuritythreatsstemmingfromkeystrategic risk tonationalsecurity. Nationalprioritiesmainly potential a as actors, non-state and threat terrorist the proliferation, includingitspotentialconnectionsto nuclear identify does it But challenge. security major a that thegovernmentdoesnotconsidernuclearthreats suggests Book, White 2016 the Defence, of Ministry The latestnationalstrategicdocumentissuedbythe Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear country status Host

ITALY Nuclear Weapons views betweenparliament Has notsigned:diverging Prohibition of Treaty onthe and government

Pragmatist Grouping that itwasworkingtomaketheNPTcornerstone commitment tonucleardisarmament. Italystressed nuclear stateswould, inthelongrun, maintaintheir Italy agreedtosigntheNPTonassumptionthat Stance ondisarmament Atlantic alliancewouldresistthemove. as countriesthatareoutsidetheEUbutwithin of nucleardeterrencewouldriskdamagingNATO, Furthermore, Italyfearsthatthe Europeanisation force. nuclear common EU27 unlikely more even an nuclear umbrellatotheotherEUmemberstatesorfor whether foranextensionoftheBritishandFrench deterrent. Thisproposalhasnotwongeneralapproval: ongoing debateinItalyabouttheneedforaEuropean an is within NATO, there coordination In additionto role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European states. weapons nuclear by measures confidence-building of verification of nuclear disarmament; and the adoption on theFissileMaterialCut-offTreaty; advancesinthe Nuclear TestBanTreaty; thelaunchofnegotiations include: theentryintoforceofComprehensive For Italy,thenextstepsonnucleardisarmamentshould of thenuclearnon-proliferationprocess. security concern nuclear-related Most serious North Korea’s weapons nuclear

the EU:70outof180 US nuclearweaponsin of thelargestnumber NATO memberandhost Credibility ofUS nuclear security guarantee

LATVIA

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

No Has not signed – Pragmatist Russia’s NATO member and ongoing nuclear political consensus nuclear trust in US resolve, weapons against it weapons regardless of the president or party in power

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

Latvia considers nuclear threats to be a priority. The Latvia supports the Global Zero approach to nuclear Russian government’s announcements that it could weapons, but it also understands the practical use nuclear weapons to defend Crimea have caused implications of strategic balance in nuclear capacities. concern. The possibility of it using Iskander rockets The government believes that the global security to carry nuclear warheads, and their location in situation does not allow for full nuclear disarmament, Kaliningrad next to Baltic states, have led the Latvian although it backs the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban government to include nuclear threats in its security Treaty (CTBT). assessments. For Latvia, the next steps on nuclear disarmament Influence of public opinion on the political should include: the entry into force of the CTBT; the debate launch of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut- off Treaty; advances in the verification of nuclear In the past five years, Latvians have become disarmament; and the adoption of confidence-building increasingly supportive of nuclear deterrence but only measures by nuclear weapons states. in the form of upgrading Western nuclear weapons. A 2014 study for the Latvian defence ministry found that European coordination and perception of the 25 percent of respondents believed NATO should deal need for a European political and/or military with the proliferation of nuclear weapons across the role world. The dominant attitude in Latvia is: ‘Why fix something Generally, there is no substantial discussion in Latvia that is not broken?’ The strategic partnership with the on nuclear deterrence as policymaking is mostly United States is of paramount importance to Latvia, driven by other factors, including security concerns so any substitution of the US role is viewed with great about Russia. caution.

29 30 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE public viewsonthisissue. debate. Thereisnoreadilyavailableinformationon the public Nuclear deterrenceisnotalivetopicin the political on debate opinion public of Influence community. the securityofLithuaniaandwholeEuro-Atlantic not possessone–thisposesanadditionalchallengeto to useanuclearweaponeven againststateswhichdo prepared is it that stated has Russia security. national its nuclearweaponsandthemainthreattoLithuanian of irrespective threat a as Russia perceives Lithuania nuclear concerns in the context of a threat from Russia. The Lithuanian NationalSecurityStrategyrefersto Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear status weapons nuclear No

LITHUANIA

Nuclear Weapons Prohibition of Treaty onthe political consensus Has notsigned– against it

Pragmatist Grouping remain themainforumsfordiscussion. Thereisa government believesthatexistingprocessesshould the but goal official an is It disarmament. nuclear on opinion strong a expressed not has government The Stance ondisarmament effective. deterrent separatefrom NATO asmeaningfulor Lithuania doesnotseethedevelopmentofaEuropean of UStroopstoLithuania andotherBalticstates. deployment the and flank eastern NATO’s for budget deterrence the in rise percent 40 the given especially be credible, regardlessofwhoholds thepresidency– in Europe. ItconsidersWashington’s commitmentsto and NATOarethemainguarantorsofnuclearsecurity The consensusinLithuaniaisthattheUnitedStates role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European building measuresbynuclearweaponsstates. nuclear disarmament; and the adoption of confidence- Material Cut-off Treaty; advances in the verification of Ban Treaty; thelaunchofnegotiationsonFissile the entryintoforceofComprehensiveNuclearTest US-Russia them; possess that states all involving weapons nuclear new weapons; reductions innon-strategicweapons; reductionsin strategic in reductions US-Russia new include: should disarmament nuclear For Lithuania, thenextstepswithinframeworkof which arecrucialtoLithuania’s andEurope’ssecurity. affects NATO’sdefenceanddeterrencecapabilities, negatively it if good than harm more do TPNW could global securityanddisarmament. Theirviewisthatthe (TPNW) isnottherightmechanismforpromoting that theTreatyonProhibitionofNuclearWeapons consensus withinthegoverningcirclesofLithuania security concern nuclear-related Most serious weapons Russia’s nuclear

regards UScommitmentsascredible,

Consensus thatUSandNATOare

the mainguarantorsofnuclear regardless ofwhoispresident security inEurope.Lithuania Credibility ofUS nuclear security guarantee

LUXEMBOURG

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Conformist No Has North Korea’s Member nuclear not nuclear of weapons signed weapons NATO

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

Nuclear military threats are not a security concern Despite the lack of public interest, Luxembourg is for Luxembourg. Out of many nuclear-related issues, one of the European Union’s strongest supporters of only nuclear threats in North Korea and India and non-proliferation and disarmament. It is party to the Pakistan have resonated at all in the country’s public Non-Proliferation Treaty and, as such, it is committed and political debate on security. Russia does not figure to its three pillars: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear among Luxembourg’s principal concerns. disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Luxembourg, therefore, believes that the next steps on Influence of public opinion on the political nuclear disarmament should include: new US-Russia debate reductions in strategic weapons; new US-Russia reductions in non-strategic weapons; reductions in The public has exhibited no interest in the issue of nuclear weapons involving all states that possess them; nuclear deterrence. the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the launch of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; advances in the verification of nuclear disarmament; and the adoption of confidence- building measures by nuclear weapons states.

European coordination and perception of the need for a European political and/or military role

Luxembourg is too small and secure to have a strong interest in nuclear-related issues. As a result, it does not view nuclear deterrence as important. It simply follows NATO and EU positions on this issue.

Luxembourg’s position on missile defence is interesting: the country is neutral on the usefulness of missile defence in Europe. It understands the value that these systems may have for NATO allies in light of potential regional threats but it holds a more cautious position than they do.

31 32 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE increased supportforglobalnucleardisarmament. Trump administration’s nuclearpolicy, hasmarginally the about concerns as well as Peninsula, Korean disarmament. the ofnuclear favour Indeed, theriseofnucleartensions fromUkraineto in firmly remain weakening, butbothpoliticiansandpublicopinion There issomesignthatthisadherencemaybe Malta isconstitutionallycommittedtoneutrality. the political on debate opinion public of Influence as interests, Russian on exemplified byits firm stanceinsupportofsanctions. position hardline more a Libya havepushedthegovernmentofMaltatowards Assad forthe regime in Syria, and the Russian intervention in support Russia’s Ukraine, eastern in conflict its nuclearweaponsamplifythisthreat. Theprotracted that agrees and threat a be to Russia perceives Malta firm a maintains position insupportofnucleardisarmament. Malta community. international existence ofnuclearweaponsthreatenstheentire the politicaldividebelievethatriskposedby among Malteseconcerns.However, politiciansacross Mediterranean morebroadlyranksmuchhigher Indeed, instabilityinLibyaandacrossthesouthern consider Maltatobealikelytargetofnuclearattack. Neither thegeneralpublicnorpoliticalelite Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear weapons status nuclear No

MALTA Nuclear Weapons in favourofadoptingit.No negotiating thetreatyand signature orratification Prohibition of Treaty onthe Formally involvedin

Grouping Neutral Austria, Cyprus,andIrelandfortheadoptionof European Union, MaltavotedalongsideSweden, position onnucleardisarmament. Within the Malta maintainsaparticularlyindependent, durable Stance ondisarmament nuclear forces. security wouldbestrongerwithoutFrenchandBritish European believes Malta cohesion. enhancing thereby integrated non-nuclearEuropeandefencecapacity, European foreignpolicyandamoreindependent United Statesasanopportunitytodevelopatruly transformation ofrelationsbetweentheEUand the current for theEuropeanprojectandframe Maltese politiciansremainsteadfastintheirsupport role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European nuclear weaponsinvolvingallstatesthatpossessthem. nuclear disarmamentshouldincludereductionsin For Malta, thenextstepwithinframeworkof the treaty. ratified not has Malta However, 2017. in passed Treaty ontheProhibitionofNuclearWeapons, which security concern nuclear-related Most serious nuclear weapons Accidental launch of

Credibility ofUS nuclear security guarantee member of NATO Not a

THE NETHERLANDS

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Host country Only NATO country to have Conflicted North Korea’s nuclear Member of of tactical nuclear participated in the weapons, nuclear and NATO, weapons negotiations but vote radiological terrorism, strongly Atlanticist against it Russia’s nuclear weapons

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

The Netherlands’ 2013 international security strategy The Netherlands belongs to the handful of European and subsequent policy documents cite nuclear Union member states in which there is real tension weapons as a potential threat. However, other issues between government positions and opinion in (cyber attacks, terrorism, and transnational crime) parliament and among the public. This is the reason feature as more urgent threats. Moreover, the nuclear the Netherlands was the only NATO country to take threat they identify is more that of nuclear terrorism part in the talks on the Treaty on the Prohibition of than one stemming from nuclear weapons states. Nuclear Weapons. This was despite the fact that the country participates in NATO’s nuclear burden- The Dutch believe Russia is a threat whose possession sharing arrangements and hosts around 20 American of nuclear weapons increases the danger it poses. This tactical nuclear weapons. It did so following a motion has been the case since the beginning of the conflict in the Dutch parliament that called on the government in Ukraine in 2014, which increased political tension to pursue this. Eventually, though, the government between the two countries, especially after the downing voted against this treaty. of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. The political rhetoric Russian spokespeople have deployed has pushed Both the Dutch government and the public are nuclear weapons up the agenda. The Netherlands is in favour of nuclear disarmament, but not at the also concerned about the modernisation of the Russian expense of NATO’s security. They do not support the armed forces, particularly its nuclear weapons. unilateral disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons, and believe that disarmament should also form Influence of public opinion on the political part of negotiations involving Russia. Indeed, for debate the Dutch, the next steps on nuclear disarmament should include: new US-Russia reductions in strategic According to a 2013 poll by the Netherlands Red weapons; new US-Russia reductions in non-strategic Cross Society, 85 percent of Dutch people favour a weapons; reductions in nuclear weapons involving all ban on nuclear weapons. Moreover, a majority in the states that possess them; the entry into force of the Dutch parliament has expressed a similar view on Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the launch several occasions, including through a 2013 motion of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; to ensure that the fighter jet the Netherlands procures advances in the verification of nuclear disarmament; as a successor to the F16 is not capable of delivering and the adoption of confidence-building measures by nuclear weapons. nuclear weapons states.

European coordination and perception of the need for a European political and/or military role

There is no public debate about a European deterrent, as most Dutch citizens associate nuclear deterrence with NATO. 33 34 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE country itself. Poland butnoteffortstohostnuclearweaponsinthe This meansthatPolesendorsethenuclearshieldover idea andslightlymorethan25percentweresupportive. showed thathalfofallrespondentswereagainstthe the deploymentofnuclearweaponsonPolishsoil– on Poland’sparticipationinNATOnuclearsharing– June 2016, one poll for the Polish edition of Newsweek in Nevertheless, Russia. against Poland defends that US the with alliance the of and NATO of pillar key a Generally, Polesareinfavourofnucleardeterrenceas the political on debate opinion public of Influence weapons tactical weapons onthecontinent. Russian of that demands aconsiderableincreaseinUStacticalnuclear that the and Europe in believes Poland difference betweenthenumberofUS-hostedweapons Warsaw. as identified several rehearsed tactical nuclearattacksonacentralEuropeancapital Russia exercises, military Zapad 2017 its During polarised. highly otherwise is which of consensuswithinthePolishpoliticalestablishment, point rare very a is Poland to threat a is Russia That 300km fromWarsaw. only located is exclave Russian The security. Polish to threats main the of one be to Kaliningrad to weapons nuclear tactical of deployment Russia’s considers policy. It foreign assertive its and Russia of prism the Poland perceives nuclearthreatsmostlythrough Perception ofnuclearthreats Nuclear weapons status nuclear No

POLAND Nuclear Weapons Prohibition of Treaty onthe political consensus Has notsigned– against it

True believer Grouping the domesticdebate. Polanddoesnotruleoutdetente happen. Asaresult, theissuedoesnotresonatemuchin disarmament asabeautifulillusionthatwillnever The Polishpoliticalelitetreatscompletenuclear Stance ondisarmament government favours. umbrella, althoughthisisnotsomething thePolish an alternativetotheUS into anattempttoconstitute to becredible. Inthelongterm, thiscouldevolve deterrence, notleastasthearsenalwould betoosmall therefore, apriorisuspiciousoftheideaEuropean the onlycredibleguarantorofitssecurity. Warsaw is, idea. PolandperceivesNATOunderUSleadershipas deterrent, butopinionhasmostlyhardenedagainstthe a European debate about is anongoing There role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European building measuresbynuclearweaponsstates. confidence- of adoption the as well as disarmament, nuclear of verification the in advances include should nuclear disarmament on steps next the the Poles, For pillar ofitsstatusasaglobalpower. in itsnucleararsenalbecausethisconstitutesabasic that Russia would never accept a substantial reduction and gradualpartialdisarmament, butitmaintains security concern nuclear-related Most serious weapons Russia’s nuclear

Credibility ofUS nuclear security NATO, strongly guarantee pro-American Member of

PORTUGAL

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Conformist No Has not signed – North Korea’s nuclear Member of NATO. Portugal nuclear political consensus weapons, nuclear and considers the US and NATO to weapons against it radiological terrorism be primary security providers

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

Portugal’s National Defence Strategic Concept names The public is generally in favour of nuclear nine “Global security environment threats and risks”. disarmament; indeed, it is a principle enshrined in In this list, nuclear proliferation ranks fourth, after the Portuguese constitution. But mainstream parties transnational terrorism, piracy, and transnational believe this is a long-term goal that should not organised crime. The document also specifies nuclear jeopardise nuclear deterrence. proliferation in its “National security threats and risks” section, ranking this second after transnational For Portugal, the next steps on nuclear disarmament terrorism. In both lists, nuclear proliferation refers should include new US-Russia reductions in non- to horizontal nuclear proliferation, or transnational strategic weapons and advances in the verification of terrorist groups’ and rogue states’ acquisition of nuclear disarmament. nuclear weapons.

Portugal does not perceive Russia as a threat despite European coordination and perception of the its nuclear weapons. Although Portugal understands need for a European political and/or military other NATO countries’ concerns about Russia and its role nuclear capacity, Portuguese leaders continue to view Moscow as an indispensable partner in stabilising The Portuguese government considers a Franco-British Europe and neighbouring regions. nuclear arrangement to be impracticable. Portugal believes that membership of the same military alliance Influence of public opinion on the political as nuclear powers the United Kingdom and France is debate a positive thing. However, the government is of the opinion that deterrence in Europe comes mostly from Younger Portuguese citizens tend to be relatively NATO and that the US nuclear deterrent covering the supportive of global nuclear disarmament, but the entire Euro-Atlantic area is paramount. issue of nuclear deterrence is not a topic of public debate.

35 36 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE usa ageso rmis permanent circles andthegeneralpopulationareconcerned a and supportfromitsWesternpartners. Governing remains assurances seek actively to continues government the aggression preoccupation for the Romanian public, which is why Russian the political on debate opinion public of Influence nuclear weapons. has it that fact the of irrespective threat a as Russia radioactive of trafficking materials andcyberattacks. Thecountryperceives illicit the nuclear and with terrorism associated risks recognises Romania appetites in Romania’s neighbourhood. Furthermore, threats. Crimeaisagrimreminderofexpansionist conventional militaryaggression–overnuclear mainly – threats conventional prioritises but it important, be to threats nuclear considers Romania Perception ofnuclearthreats about Russia. Nuclear status weapons nuclear No

ROMANIA

Nuclear Weapons Prohibition of Treaty onthe political consensus Has notsigned– against it

True believer Grouping country isstronglyinfavourofnucleardisarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, anddisarmament. The defence strategyisitsnationalpolicyonarmscontrol, and security national Romania’s of component core A Stance ondisarmament place withtheUSandNATO. takes issues nuclear on work Romania’s of bulk The differences betweentheEuropeanUnionandUS. States. Romania tends not to take sides when there are emphasis ontheimportanceofNATOandUnited great place deterrence nuclear on positions Romanian role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European Nuclear TestBanTreaty. should betheentryintoforceofComprehensive disarmament nuclear on step next the Romania, For the globalandregionallevels. disarmament andofnon-proliferationinstrumentsat supporting themultilateralframeworkofinternational security concern nuclear-related Most serious weapons Russia’s nuclear

history ofengagementwith NATO member;bipartisan Credibility ofUS nuclear security the USpost-1989 guarantee

SLOVAKIA

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Conformist No Has not signed because Nuclear and Member nuclear nuclear weapons states radiological of weapons are not party to the treaty terrorism NATO

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

Slovakia believes that the greatest threats to the Slovakia supports disarmament and reductions in all strategic environment are: breaches of, and disregard weapons, not only nuclear weapons. To that end, it for, international law and standards; cyber warfare; backs the following steps: new US-Russia reductions and hybrid forms of war. Slovakia describes nuclear in strategic weapons; new US-Russia reductions in weapons as a “sub-threat” – or a real threat but not a non-strategic weapons; reductions in nuclear weapons priority. involving all states that possess them; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; The relationship between Slovakia and Russia is one the launch of negotiations on the Fissile Material of pragmatic cooperation with the aim of mutual Cut-off Treaty; advances in the verification of nuclear enrichment. Slovakia sees Russia as an important disarmament; and the adoption of confidence-building economic partner and an important player in the measures by nuclear weapons states. international political realm without which any important regional affairs and questions cannot be Slovakia’s governing circles were against the Treaty on solved. Slovak foreign policy and diplomatic circles do the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons because nuclear not consider Russia to be a big threat. weapons states were not party to it, thereby defeating the treaty’s purpose. Influence of public opinion on the political debate European coordination and perception of the need for a European political and/or military There is no real debate on nuclear deterrence and very role little public interest in the matter, but the question of nuclear weapons resonates more and more in public There is no significant debate on the need for a debates because of India-Pakistan tensions, Iran’s European deterrent. Slovakia sticks to the standard nuclear capacity, and tensions around North Korea. NATO line on deterrence, which is that nuclear weapons That said, the general approach is that the world should are a core component of the alliance’s capabilities for be nuclear-free. The public and the government are in deterrence and defence alongside conventional and full agreement on this position. missile defence forces.

37 38 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE decision nottosigntheTreatyonProhibition on thegovernment’sThe government’s position. The public debate does not have a significant influence the political on debate opinion public of Influence direct threat. a as Russia regard not do decision-makers Slovenian community. that concernSloveniaasamemberoftheinternational threats comprises global tier This second activities”). information technologyandsystems, intelligence technology, terrorism,cyberthreats, theabuseof weapons, weaponsofmassdestructionandnuclear threats, illegalactivities concerningconventional “military with (along threats of tier second its in threat nuclear the places strategy defence 2012 Slovenia’s Perception ofnuclearthreats after thefact. for thegovernmenttohaveexplainitsdecision society inresponsetothedecisionwasstrongenough of thepublicandcriticismvoicedbypartscivil sentiment general the But umbrella. nuclear its on alliance’s policy the adheres to that member NATO of NuclearWeaponswasbasedonSloveniabeinga Nuclear status weapons nuclear No

SLOVENIA

Nuclear Weapons main countriesconcerned are notpartytothetreaty Has notsignedbecause Prohibition of Treaty onthe

Conformist Grouping to generate confidence in the process. This includes process. the in confidence generate to preconditions, security and technical specific meet to it believesthatachievingthisgoalwillrequire states Slovenia isinfavourofnucleardisarmament.However, Stance ondisarmament for aEuropeandeterrent. states but engages in no significant debate on the need issues withotherEuropeanUnionandNATOmember Slovenia coordinatesitspolicyonnucleardeterrence role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European security environmentdoesnotmeettheseconditions. verification of nuclear disarmament. Today, the global Fissile MaterialCut-offTreaty,andadvancesinthe Test BanTreaty, thelaunchofnegotiationson the entryintoforceofComprehensive Nuclear security concern nuclear-related Most serious Nuclear and radiological terrorism

Credibility ofUS nuclear security guarantee Member NATO of

SPAIN

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

No Has not signed – Conformist Nuclear and Member of NATO. nuclear political consensus radiological Spain sees US nuclear weapons against it terrorism guarantee as credible

Perception of nuclear threats Stance on disarmament

The 2017 National Security Strategy places no special Spain’s official is to give close support to the NPT emphasis on nuclear issues. In both its 2017 and 2013 regime while positioning itself as a reliable partner in strategies, Spain devotes only limited space to nuclear NATO. Following these parameters, Madrid rejected weapons in the section on the non-proliferation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, weapons of mass destruction. which it views as weakening the NPT. Should new steps be taken in the framework of nuclear disarmament, Spain does not consider Russia to be a threat, despite Spain believes they should include: new US-Russia it being the only non-Western nuclear power with the reductions in strategic weapons; new US-Russia potential to strike Spanish territory. reductions in non-strategic weapons; reductions in nuclear weapons involving all states that possess Influence of public opinion on the political them; and the entry into force of the Comprehensive debate Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Spain is an Atlanticist with little to no interest in European coordination and perception of the nuclear weapons. In addition, there is scarce public need for a European political and/or military or media interest in the topic of nuclear deterrence. role Spain’s position is determined by three issues: it enjoys the cover of the NATO nuclear umbrella; it does Spain believes cooperation with the United States on not possess nuclear weapons; and it supports the Non- nuclear-related issues to be crucial and more important Proliferation Treaty (NPT). than that with France or the United Kingdom. The strategic cultures of France and the UK discourage Spain from supporting a European deterrent. Spain generally prefers pan-European security initiatives.

39 40 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE government continuestoemphasisetheimportance Swedish The Crimea. of annexation illegal Russia’s prominent inthecountry’spoliticaldebatesince become increasingly have debate but Sweden’s public on effect little had have capabilities nuclear Russian implications. far-reaching have could this that Asia, and east in sources ofgeopoliticalinsecurityandinstability that the situation in North Korea is one of the biggest failure oftheinternationalcommunity. Italsoholds to humanityandthattheircontinuedexistenceisa nuclear weaponsconstitutethesinglegreatestthreat that declared has Sweden occasions, numerous followed byterrorismandviolentextremism. On military information spherearethecountry’s nextpriority, identifies and cyber the in Threats threat. security leading its government aggression –includingitsnucleardimensionas Swedish The Perception ofnuclearthreats in theSwedish debatebetweenthegovernment’s means ofprovidingsecurity. Thereseemstobeagap weapons andnucleardeterrence arenotalegitimate Wallstrom hasbeenoutspokeninsaying thatnuclear have rhetoric and been veryanti-nuclear: foreignministerMargot policy official Its government. Public debatehasmadeastrongimpactonthe the political on debate opinion public of Influence its lackofconventionalmeans. non-strategic nuclearweaponsascompensationfor increasingly aggressive nuclearrhetoricanditsmodernisation of Russia’s about worries establishment and Russia both see defence Swedish The roles. leading up take US the to Russia, wants Sweden with which in – dialogue open disarmament nuclear comes to when it especially an maintaining of Nuclear status weapons nuclear No

SWEDEN Split betweentheforeignand defence ministers.Formally and votedforthetreaty.No Nuclear Weapons involved innegotiations Prohibition of Treaty onthe ratification yet

Conflicted Grouping with NATO. Thecountryisgraduallybalancingthese cooperating and security politics ties in transatlantic for globalnucleardisarmamentwhileretainingstrong advocate leading a as its position to maintain trying efforts atglobalnucleardisarmament. Swedenis management ofsecurityandnuclearpoliticsits possible NATOmembership. coordination withtheUSonnuclearmattersandby by prompted mostly is in Sweden debate The role military and/or political European a for need the of perception and coordination European on transatlanticcooperation. nuclear positionregardlessoftheeffectthismayhave Sweden andNATO, itwillmaintainastronganti- despite theimportanceofpartnershipbetween Furthermore, theSwedishgovernmentmaintainsthat, entertaining theprospectofjoiningalliance. cooperation andworkingwithNATOwithout maintains itsneutralitybyengagingintransatlantic As anadvocateofglobaldisarmament, Sweden Stance ondisarmament stalwart opponentagainstnuclearweapons. the government’s decisiontomaintainitspositionasa to nuclear weapons. opposed This has influenced, and given firmly confidence to, is public The other. each camps feelthatthetwoprioritiesinherentlycontradict come togetherinacoherentpolicy. Membersofboth equally importantfactorsbutthetwohavenotyet security concern nuclear-related Most serious North Korea’s weapons nuclear

Not amemberofNATO Credibility ofUS nuclear security transatlantic ties but hasstrong guarantee

UNITED KINGDOM

Nuclear Treaty on the Most serious Credibility of US Prohibition of nuclear-related nuclear security status Grouping Nuclear Weapons security concern guarantee

Nuclear Has not signed – True believer Nuclear and Member of NATO, and hopes weapons political consensus radiological it has a “special relationship” state against it terrorism with the US

Perception of nuclear threats nuclear submarine fleet, in line with public opinion (albeit with Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn remaining The United Kingdom ranks security risks in three tiers personally committed to unilateral disarmament). The based on a joint assessment of likelihood to occur political exceptions are the Green Party and the Scottish and impact, with Tier One being the highest in this National Party, which advocate denuclearisation (the taxonomy. An attack using weapons of mass destruction UK’s fleet of nuclear-armed submarines are based in (chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear) is a Tier Scotland). The Liberal Democrats propose a smaller Two priority. Terrorism, cyber warfare, international “minimum deterrent”. military conflict (between non-state or state actors), public health threats, natural disasters, and instability Stance on disarmament overseas are all Tier One priorities. Moreover, the government states that both Tier One and Tier Two For decades, the UK’s ruling consensus has been risks could have greater impacts or higher likelihoods that nuclear disarmament should take place through over the next two decades. However, the importance of multilateral steps and negotiations governed by nuclear threats has remained constant over time due to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: reductions in nuclear the UK’s commitment to maintaining only a minimal weapons involving all states that possess them. The strategic nuclear force. Any heightened importance in UK has already reduced its deterrent capacity to a the future would derive from nuclear threats to NATO minimum deterrent – a single nuclear weapons system allies through the UK’s commitment to mutual defence. – as it has dismantled the rest of the arsenal. A July 2016 poll showed only 36 percent of Scots support the Russia’s destabilising actions over the past few replacement of the UK’s nuclear deterrent. years have caused the UK to perceive it as a threat irrespective of its status as a nuclear weapons power. European coordination and perception of the The UK ultimately assures its security, vis-à-vis need for a European political and/or military Russia’s nuclear power, through its national deterrent. role This deterrent can independently launch a catastrophic strike on Russia, even if the UK is attacked first. Put Franco-British collaboration on the coordination of another way, the UK regards Russia’s nuclear power nuclear policy and doctrine dates back to the 1992 Anglo- status as something it must live with. French Joint Nuclear Commission. In 2010 cooperation went one step further following the signing of a treaty Influence of public opinion on the political outlining cooperative measures on existing nuclear debate stockpiles. Generally speaking, though, the UK has more typically opposed further European integration measures British public opinion has always been substantially in in security and defence that take place outside NATO. favour of the UK’s nuclear deterrent; when the Labour Party embraced unilateral nuclear disarmament in the Ironically, Brexit seems to have sharpened the UK 1980s, this contributed to two heavy general election government’s commitment to European security. But defeats and a return to a pro-deterrent policy. Today, it is hard to see how divorce can take place without in both the governing Conservatives and the Labour practice diminishing the credibility of any British offer opposition support the modernisation of Britain’s of extended deterrence, especially outside NATO. 41 42 ECFR/275 December 2018 www.ecfr.eu EYES TIGHT SHUT: EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE from www.flaticon.com US flag:IconmadebyElectionIcons from wwwflaticoncom Question mark:IconmadebyFreepik from www.flaticon.com Treaty: IconmadebyNikitaGolubev from wwwflaticoncom Nuclear bomb:IconmadebyProsymbols Icon credits(map) Security Policy Kammel Arnold Laurynas Jonavicius Affairs Tuomas Iso-Markku Álvaro Imbernón Studies Gyelnik Teodor Affairs Andrew Gilmore Lívia Franco Giovanni Fedele Affairs Bjorn Fägersten Simon Desplanque Robin-Ivan Capar Affairs (LIIA) Karlis Bukovskis Policy Bartovic Vladimir Adam Balcer Associate researchers , , Catholic UniversityofPortugal University ofWarsaw , , , , independent researcher , , Institute of International and European Institute ofInternationalandEuropean ,

Austrian Institute for European and European InstituteofCross-borderEuropean Nebrija University , , researcher andadviser SwedishInstitute forInternational , EUROPEUM Institute for European Latvian Institute ofInternational Institute Latvian Louvain University , , Vilnius University Finnish Institute for International Finnish InstituteforInternational

Hüseyin Silman States inParis Lelia Rousselet States inParis Quencez Martin Jonathan Ponchon Ylva Petterson Luka Orešković Studies Christine Nissen Daniel Mainwaring Marko Lovec Marin Lessenski Nuclear symbol:www.pixabay.com from wwwflaticoncom Fighter jet:IconmadebyDaveGandy Nuclear bomb:www.pixabay.com NATO symbol:freebiesupply.com Icon credits(countryprofiles) Sarah Wohlfeld Zsuzsanna Végh Viljar Veebel Niels vanWilligen George Tzogopoulos Andrew Stark , , , Estonian NationalDefenceCollege University ofLjubljana , University ofCambridge Swedish InstituteofInternationalAffairs , , , , , , freelance researcher andadviser , German CouncilonForeignRelations independent researcher European UniversityViadrina German Marshall Fundof the United Open SocietyInstitute German Marshall Fundof the United ,

, , Leiden University , Danish Institute for International for Institute Danish University ofLuxembourg Global PolicyResearcher , Democritus University ofThrace

About the authors Acknowledgements Manuel Lafont Rapnouil is head of the European Council The authors would like to thank their colleagues at the on Foreign Relations Paris office and a senior policy fellow. European Council on Foreign Relations: Jeremy He previously headed the Political Affairs Division of the Shapiro for his support, Pawel Zerka for his help in Department for United Nations affairs at the French Ministry coordinating the project, Mathilde Ciulla, as well as of Foreign Affairs and International Development. He was a Matthew Jablonski, Cecilia Vidotto and Marta Pellon rapporteur in 2008 for both French white papers on defence Brussosa for their assistance at various stages of this and national security and on foreign and European policy, project. Adam Harrison deserves special thanks for his and also a visiting fellow at the Europe Programme of the outstanding assistance (and also patience) in editing this Center for Strategic and International Studies. paper, and Chris Raggett for contributing to the graphics.

Tara Varma is deputy head of the ECFR Paris office and The authors would like to thank all the experts a policy fellow. She joined ECFR in January 2015. Varma who gave their advice and insights, as well as the previously worked in Shanghai and at the consultancy firm officials, both French and foreign, who shared their CEIS. She graduated from Sciences Po Lille and SOAS in views and time under the condition of anonymity. London in international relations, with a focus on Asian politics and Indian and Chinese foreign policy. Nick Witney would like to express particular thanks to the Nick Witney is a senior policy fellow at ECFR. He previously late Olivier de Bouzy, discussion with whom (and Bob Levine) served as the first chief executive of the European Defence at RAND in 1994 he recalls with gratitude and affection. Agency in . Witney served in the British government including with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and However, as with all ECFR publications, the arguments, later with the Ministry of Defence. As a diplomat, he learned conclusions, and recommendations of this flash Arabic in Lebanon and Jordan, served in Baghdad, and spent scorecard represent only the views of their authors. four years as private secretary to the British ambassador in Washington DC.

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