Issue No. 1313 4 May 2018 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Feature Report
“Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities”. Written by Amy F. Woolf, published by the Congressional Research Service; April 18, 2018 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44442.pdf Summary The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill funds civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies. The DOE budget includes funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE. NNSA operates three programs: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which secures nuclear materials worldwide, conducts research and development (R&D) into nonproliferation and verification, and operates the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program; Naval Reactors, which “is responsible for all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion work”; and Weapons Activities. The last is the subject of this report. The Weapons Activities account supports programs that maintain U.S. nuclear missile warheads and gravity bombs and the infrastructure programs that support that mission. Specifically, according to DOE’s budget documentation, these programs “support the maintenance and refurbishment of nuclear weapons to continue sustained confidence in their safety, reliability, and performance; continued investment in scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities to enable certification of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile; and manufacture of nuclear weapons components.” NNSA’s budget request for FY2019 seeks $11.02 billion for Weapons Activities within a total of budget of $15.09 billion for NNSA. This represents a 3.6% increase over the $10.642 billion for Weapons Activities in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) and a 19% increase over the $9.314 billion enacted for Weapons Activities in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). The requested increase of 19% in funding for Weapons over the FY2017-enacted amount is within an increase of 16.7% over the FY2017 amount enacted for NNSA’s total budget. Weapons Activities has three main programs, each with a request of over $2 billion for FY2018, as follows: • Directed Stockpile Work supports programs that work directly on nuclear weapons. It includes life extension programs, maintenance, and other activities. The FY2017 appropriation was $3,308.3 million, and the FY2018 appropriation was $4,009 million; the FY2019 request is $4,666 million, an increase of 16% over the FY2018 appropriation. • Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Programs, which advance the science, engineering, computation, and manufacturing, support Directed Stockpile Work. The FY2017 appropriation was $1,842.2 million, and the FY2018 appropriation was $2,034 million; the FY2019 request is $1,995 million.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 2
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
• Infrastructure and Operations maintains, operates, and modernizes the National Nuclear Security Administration infrastructure. It supports construction of new facilities and funds deferred maintenance in older facilities. The FY2017 appropriation was $2,808.4 million, and the FY2018 appropriation was $3,118 million; the FY2019 request is $3,002 million. Weapons Activities also includes several smaller programs, all of which are described in this report: Secure Transportation Asset, Defense Nuclear Security, Information Technology and Cybersecurity, and Legacy Contractor Pensions. This report will be updated as necessary.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 3
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS • Air Force Advances Testing of New Nuclear Gravity Bomb: General • Pit Production Expansion Susceptible to Schedule Risks, DOE Report Says • Another Way to Define Nuclear Triad: Three Legs, Plus ‘Space Capability’ • Vandenberg Hosts Test Launch of Unarmed ICBM; Anti-nuclear Activists Take Issue • LANL Rolls Out Plan to Correct Pit Handling Errors US COUNTER-WMD • In Alaska, Soldiers Relish Role in U.S. Missile Defense • U.S. Spy Agencies Seek Tech to Identify Deadly Chemicals from 30 Meters Away US ARMS CONTROL • Kim Says He’d End North Korea Nuclear Pursuit for U.S. Truce • Nuclear Threat Initiative Highlights Separated Plutonium Security Risks • Pompeo: Trump Will Exit Iran Deal If It's Not Fixed • The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at 50 • Obama Officials Defend Iran Deal as Trump Threatens to Blow It Up ASIA/PACIFIC • Leaders Commit to Build Resilient, Innovative ASEAN • Leaders of South Korea, Japan, China to Discuss North Korea EUROPE/RUSSIA • European Leaders and Others Push Back against Netanyahu's Criticism of The Iran Nuclear Deal MIDDLE EAST • Iran Leader: U.S. Pushes Riyadh to Confront Tehran, Stirs Crisis • US Calls for Global Action against Iran INDIA/PAKISTAN • India Using Chemical Weapons against Kashmiris: AJK PM • Pakistan Cosies Up to Russia, But Moscow Doesn’t Seem to Want to Take Sides COMMENTARY • A Real Missile Gap Is Looming In Hypersonic Weapons • Major Powers Starting to Deploy Hypersonic Weapons • Expect a Fight on The Iran Deal between America and Europe • How Much Do the Panmunjom Agreements Matter? • Can North Korea Really Give Up Its Nukes?
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 4
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
US NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Military.com (San Francisco, Calif.) Air Force Advances Testing of New Nuclear Gravity Bomb: General By Oriana Pawlyk May 1, 2018 The U.S. Air Force has conducted dozens of developmental flight tests of the B61-12 guided nuclear gravity bomb, intended to be three times more accurate than its predecessors, a top general said Tuesday. "We've already conducted 26 engineering, development and guided flight tests," said Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration. "The program's doing extremely well." The B61-12 modification program, which has been in the works for at least seven years, is slated to be carried by the B-2 Spirit, as well as the future B-21 Long Range Strategic Bomber, known as the Raider. Weinstein did not say which platforms have done the latest testing, but the F-35 Lightning II joint program office has been working on integrating the latest modification into its weapons arsenal. It is slated to be fielded sometime in the 2020s. During his speech to an audience at an Air Force Association breakfast in Washington, D.C., Weinstein highlighted the progress the U.S. has been making in its nuclear force. The Pentagon's recent Nuclear Posture Review not only calls for more low-yield nuclear weapons but emphasizes the "crucial" need to modernize current standing weapons, such as the air-launched cruise missile and intercontinental ballistic missiles, as part of the nuclear triad. The triad consists of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Weinstein cited bombers such as the B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit, which are capable of launching both conventional or nuclear payloads, and also legacy fighters such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-15E Strike Eagle. "When I say 'dual-capable aircraft,' I need to be really specific," he said. "Dual-capable aircraft is called the B-52 and B-2 -- it does conventional and nuclear. It also means F-16s and Strike Eagles, and other aircraft our NATO partners fly." The F-35 was designed with a requirement to carry a nuclear payload. In 2015, an F-35 flew with the B61-12 to measure its vibration in the aircraft's weapons bay. Both of the fourth-gen fighters will be able to deploy the B61-12 bomb. The B61-12 also conducted its third and final developmental test flight aboard an F-15E in 2015. LONG LIVE THE B-52 Weinstein added that re-engining the B-52 -- long on the Air Force's wish list, along with a new radar -- remains critical if the service intends to keep the venerable bomber flying into the 2050s. The Air Force requested roughly $1.5 billion in its fiscal 2019 budget to kick-start the re-engining effort. The program is expected to cost roughly $7 billion to $8 billion over its lifetime.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 5
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
"Every time you renovate a house, you don't realize there's asbestos behind the wall," Weinstein said, referring to problems that may develop as the service renovates the Cold War-era bomber. "We've been talking about re-engining the B-52 for a long time," he said, adding that he's received reassurance from Dr. Will Roper, Air Force undersecretary for acquisitions, technology and logistics, that the re-engining program will continue with proper supervision. "Am I going to sit here and say we're not going to have a problem with the re-engining? I'm not going to say that," Weinstein said. "I will tell you an awful lot of work has gone into evaluating how to re-engine, what is the best way to do it, why we [decided] not to do a [service] life extension program on [a] really old engine ... so the work that has been upfront. It's going to take ... constant oversight as we go through the process." Overall, he added, nuclear modernization is well on its way to becoming more manageable and survivable -- as long as budgets remain consistent. "I'd like to say I want [things] faster and cheaper," Weinstein said, referring not only to weapons currently in production such as the Long Range Standoff Weapon, but also communication and control systems. He said current funding in the fiscal 2018 National Defense Authorization Act for the nuclear enterprise remains "healthy" for what the force needs. "Overall, I'm really pleased with the support we're getting from the Hill," Weinstein said. "That budget, it was a pretty good-sized chunk" for nuclear weapons and systems. "We'll see what happens with [other] budgets in the future," Weinstein added. https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/05/01/air-force-advances-testing-new-nuclear-gravity- bomb-general.html Return to top
Aiken Standard (Aiken, S.C.) Pit Production Expansion Susceptible to Schedule Risks, DOE Report Says By Colin Demarest May 1, 2018 The U.S. Department of Energy's plutonium pit production buildout is markedly vulnerable to timetable, construction and resource-based risk, among other things, according to documents obtained by the Aiken Standard. An executive summary of the National Nuclear Security Administration's 2017 analysis of alternatives – of which only several pages have become publicly available – states a "key finding" of the study is the "high schedule risk" for all possible production locations and approaches. Schedule risk is the potential for a project to take longer than anticipated. The NNSA is a semiautonomous DOE agency in charge of the nation's nuclear weapons and nonproliferation complex. The NNSA has a Savannah River Site footprint. The 2017 analysis of alternatives was commissioned to determine the best place for a modernized, robust pit production facility.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 6
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Pits are nuclear weapon cores, often referred to as triggers. No weapon-usable pits have been produced since 2011, but the NNSA is now under orders to produce 80 pits per year by 2030. The agency's analysis identified two prominent locations to do so: Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and SRS. Both locations could undergo new construction, according to the analysis. At SRS, though, the NNSA has also suggested repurposing the partially complete Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. All of these options, the NNSA executive summary reads, have associated liabilities – "complexity" and "executability" risks, more specifically. Complexity is associated with the design, procurement and construction of pit production equipment and facilities. Executability is related to available resources and personnel. Both are considered types of schedule risk. Executability, the ability to meet deadlines as designed, is reflected in cost estimations: A repurposed MOX would cost upward of $5.4 billion in fiscal year 2018, whereas new pit construction at SRS would cost upward of $6.7 billion, according to the analysis. The National Nuclear Security Administration studied locations for possible plutonium pit production and issued this document in November 2017. Further complicating things are site-specific influences. While MOX-to-pit renovation at SRS could be completed quicker and cheaper than a new construction, it "introduces the qualitative risk" of reconfiguring a facility for a new mission in a new location, according to the summary. And while new construction at Los Alamos – where pits have been produced for years now – ensures a learned local workforce, it brings with it environmental and administrative considerations that come with such a nuclear-centric facility. Those issues, including regulatory milestones, have been "historically difficult to navigate in early design," the executive summary notes. New construction at SRS is estimated to be cheaper than new construction at Los Alamos, according to the analysis. Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, the NNSA chief, has said a location decision could come as early as May 11. https://www.aikenstandard.com/news/pit-production-expansion-susceptible-to-schedule-risks- doe-report-says/article_1e778fd0-4d55-11e8-b667-d3b4bf93dff0.html Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 7
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Space News (Alexandria, Va.) Another Way to Define Nuclear Triad: Three Legs, Plus ‘Space Capability’ By Sandra Erwin May 1, 2018 Weinstein: “We need the capability of early warning satellites to know what is going on. We need an unblinking eye." WASHINGTON — The Pentagon projects to spend over a trillion dollars in the coming decade on a new generation of nuclear bombers, submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles that collectively are known as the nuclear triad. “But the triad is more than a triad,” said Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, Air Force deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration. Everyone talks about the vehicles and the weapons, and it’s easy to forget other “vital” components of nuclear modernization, such as the early warning network, and the communications, command and control systems, Weinstein said on Tuesday at a Mitchell Institute event on Capitol Hill. All of that is entirely dependent on space, he said. “The triad also means space capability.” Weinstein elaborated: “We need the capability of early warning satellites to know what is going on. We need an unblinking eye to find out what is going on. That unblinking eye is provided by space. We need the capability of military communications, secure military communications satellites, EMP [radiation] hardened communications.” The classified communications network that keeps the president connected to military forces during a nuclear event — known as NC3 for nuclear command, control and communications — has not “historically been put in the triad but is vital for our defense,” said Weinstein. The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review called out NC3 as a system badly in need of modernization, and directed the Joint Staff to consider a new governance structure for the program, now overseen by the Air Force Global Strike Command. Protecting satellites and signals from jamming or hacking is taking on outsized importance, said the Nuclear Posture Review, as China and Russia are developing means to disrupt and disable U.S. assets in space. “I can talk all day about the importance of NC3,” said Weinstein. “The president has to communicate with forces. We need command posts that can take over those missions. Then you need the processes and procedures so that crew members know that a message is authentic and valid,” he said. “That is foundational to this nuclear force.” The Joint Staff review of NC3 was due to be presented to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis May 1. U.S. Strategic Command’s Gen. John Hyten also has been closely involved in the review as he is responsible for defining the requirements of the system. The NC3 includes warning satellites and radars; communications satellites, aircraft, and ground stations; fixed and mobile command posts; and the control centers for nuclear systems. The Nuclear Posture Review said many of these systems use antiquated technology that has not been modernized in almost three decades. There are central questions that need to be answered, said Weinstein. “What should that future architecture look like? We are modernizing systems now and need to make sure we have
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 8
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // connectivity into AEHF satellites.” AEHF are classified communications satellites that can be used for both conventional and nuclear missions. The Air Force has programs under way to modernize communications and early-warning satellites. How these future constellations will be integrated with NC3 is one piece of the enormously complex architecture. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that modernizing the NC3 will cost $58 billion over 10 years. Hyten said modernizing the NC3 is critical because a decade from now the Pentagon will start rolling out the next generation of nuclear bombers, missiles and submarines whose command and control systems most certainly will not be compatible with a network designed in the 1960s. The future ground-based leg of the triad — known as the ground-based strategic deterrence — will be a network of 400 missile silos that require redundant and assured communications. The current Minuteman 3 nuclear missile silos are spread across three Air Force bases and connected by 30,000 miles of copper wire buried deep beneath the ground. It’s highly reliable but low bandwidth communications. The contractors that are competing for the potentially $50 billion to $60 billion GBSD program — Boeing and Northrop Grumman — have to come up with options for upgrading communications for cyber security but also to improve Air Force crews’ quality of life in their underground bunkers. Weinstein said the Air Force is increasing the cyber and space-related portion of the curriculum for officers in the nuclear career field. “We need a next generation of leaders that can talk about this,” he said of the broader policy and technology issues associated with nuclear modernization. “The atrophy that happened a few years ago when we weren’t modernizing the nuclear force, when we did that there was a lack of strategic thinking,” Weinstein said. “Human capital development is more important than when you just talk about things.” The training of the force is not a concern, he said. “We know how to train people. I’m talking about educating the workforce, civilians too,” he added. “Everyone in the U.S. Air Force needs to understand the value of the nuclear force, just like everyone in the U.S. Air Force needs to understand the value of the space force. … Strategic deterrence in the 21st century is more than just nuclear. It’s space, cyber and conventional.’ http://spacenews.com/another-way-to-define-nuclear-triad-three-legs-plus-space-capability/ Return to top
Santa Maria Times (Santa Maria, Calif.) Vandenberg Hosts Test Launch of Unarmed ICBM; Anti-nuclear Activists Take Issue By Willis Jacobson April 25, 2018 An unarmed intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, was successfully launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base on Wednesday morning as part of an operational test that raised concerns among anti-nuclear weapon activists. The Minuteman III missile was fired from a silo on the base around 5:26 a.m. The test launch was the first of its kind this year from VAFB. A similar test that had been scheduled for February was canceled.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 9
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
The test was to check the readiness, effectiveness and accuracy of the weapons system, according to the Air Force. VAFB regularly hosts Minuteman missile test launches, and base officials typically provide advance notice of upcoming tests. That wasn't the case ahead of Wednesday's launch, however, and that lack of notice was among several issues raised by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, an organization that supports worldwide efforts to abolish nuclear weapons. "There was little prior notice from military officials regarding this latest test," read a portion of a release sent Wednesday by the organization. "Civilians and residents living near the base, who regularly receive ample notice of missile tests, were left in the dark this morning as the missile raced through the early morning sky." Messages to VAFB public affairs regarding the notification of the test weren't returned as of press time Wednesday. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation also raised concerns about the missile tests being conducted while the U.S. government remains critical of the North Korean government for developing and testing similar weapons, and the timing of the test launch. "It’s very disappointing that the United States chose to test an ICBM today, just days before the long-awaited summit between Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in," Rick Wayman, director of programs and operations at the Foundation said, referring to the leaders of North Korea and South Korea, respectively. "If we expect North Korea to cease developing and testing ICBMs, the least the U.S. could do is cease testing its own ICBMs while these delicate negotiations proceed.” The most recent ICBM test launch from VAFB, prior to Wednesday, was Aug. 2, 2017. That test also drew protests from anti-nuclear weapon activists. https://santamariatimes.com/news/local/vandenberg-hosts-test-launch-of-unarmed-icbm-anti- nuclear-activists/article_ee586de9-bb71-57a5-8d5b-64f79bb48f1f.html Return to top
The Los Alamos Monitor Online (Los Alamos, N.M.) LANL Rolls Out Plan to Correct Pit Handling Errors By Tris DeRoma May 2, 2018 The Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Pit Technologies Division has developed a plan designed to prevent the mistakes workers made handling nuclear materials earlier this year, an inspection report from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board said. “They developed a criteria and review approach document to assess all of their operations through plant walk-downs and discussions with fissile material handlers. The assessment evaluated three areas: compliance and usability of the criticality safety postings; worker engagement and understanding; and best practices and areas of improvement from the perspective of the ‘voice of the worker,’” a statement in a March 30 inspection report said. A lab spokesman said the review took two days, and that it was productive. “The program conducted a safety review and a limited operational pause over a two-day period. Safety reviews are aimed at getting workers together to discuss best practices and safety issues,” the lab spokesman said.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 10
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
The Pit Technologies Division also required that employees who weren’t involved in the operations take part as a way to “ensure objective evaluation.” The review was completed last Wednesday, and since then, 93 “fissile material operations” have resumed at LANL’s plutonium pit manufacturing facility, where the violations in nuclear material movement occurred. However, seven tasks have not resumed, after new discoveries were made regarding how nuclear material was handled that could lead to more safety issues. The March 30 DNFSB report cited two incidents, one where fissile material was placed inside a half of a plutonium pit, a move that was against safety protocols. Another incident occurred when lab personnel placed a plutonium pit in a glove box that was not approved to hold the pit. A spokesman for the lab described the review as a valuable tool for continuous improvement. “These two process deviations and the two-day safety review have not slowed down our pit operations in any meaningful way, and – to the contrary – are actually helping us to further refine the safety and efficiency of our processes and procedures,” the lab spokesman said. The Los Alamos National Laboratory contains the only facility in the nation where plutonium pits are made. The pits are used in the triggering systems of certain nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy came out with a plan for the lab to ramp up production of the pits in the coming years. “The Laboratory’s criticality safety program continues to improve as evidenced by an increase in workers self-reporting process deviations and by a reduced rate of such deviation occurrences,” a lab spokesman said. “Reporting process deviations are part of maintaining the Lab’s safety margin. Given the critically safety margins now in place, we have already greatly reduced our radiological risks.” The March 30 report also included an item on a federal oversight inspection National Nuclear Security Administration officials did at the lab. The inspection was to observe whether lab personnel were following the National Nuclear Security Administration’s “enhanced oversight plan.” While on the inspection, National Nuclear Security Administration’s field office, personnel discovered some lab personnel weren’t adhering to the plan’s “Plan of the Day” routine – a protocol in the plan the National Nuclear Security Administration wants the lab to follow. “An accurate plan of the day is necessary to ensure work activities are authorized, conflicting work is precluded, and supporting resources are available,” the report said. “An accurate plan of the day can also be a useful tool for laboratory management and NNSA oversight personnel to effectively plan work observations necessary to strengthen conduct of operations.” The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Los Alamos Field Office staff plan to correct the mistakes through future discussions with LANL personnel in future briefings. http://www.lamonitor.com/content/lanl-rolls-out-plan-correct-pit-handling-errors Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 11
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
US COUNTER-WMD
Reuters (New York, N.Y.) In Alaska, Soldiers Relish Role in U.S. Missile Defense By Justin Mitchell April 27, 2018 FORT GREELY, Alaska (Reuters) - Two hours south of Fairbanks, Alaska, near the starting point of the Alaska highway, sit row upon row of missile silos embedded in the frozen ground in the shadow of snow-capped mountains. Despite their location, far from Washington, D.C., Pyongyang, or Moscow, the 40 missiles here could one day decide the fate of millions of Americans. The missiles and a few dozen National Guard soldiers will form the first line of defense should North Korea, or any other country, fire an intercontinental ballistic missile at the United States. In recent months, North Korea has said it has developed a missile that can reach the United States mainland. In a control room at Ft. Greely, just outside the small town of Delta Junction, five soldiers performed a simulation on Thursday showing reporters how they would respond to an attack. “The first threat in the system shows an impact location of Los Angeles,” said Captain Jospeh Radke, the team’s battle analyst, referring to the second largest U.S. city. “Threat in the system is showing Los Angeles, we’re going to engage at this time,” said Major Terri Homestead, the crew’s director. Homestead then gave orders to the team’s weapons operator, Staff Sergeant Justin Taylor, to fire one missile from Ft. Greely and another from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The five-person team is one of 10 units that operate the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system. They spend 60 percent to 70 percent of their working days running drills, trying to account for any possible scenario. GROWING TENSION Soldiers such as Homestead and Radke have seen the facility take on increasing significance in global affairs in recent years, as tension with North Korea has escalated. Most recently, U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un spent much of late 2017 and early 2018 trading threats of annihilation. The soldiers said the high stakes are part of what makes them love the job, despite the remote location and the strain of weighing life-or-death options. “That responsibility is what drives us,” Radke told reporters. “It’s really what allows us to put in the time that we do up here. Knowing not just that you’re protecting the 300 million people in the United States, but also your family members, your friends across the United States.” The system became operational in 2004 under the direction of President George W. Bush. Now there are plans to add 20 more missiles to the 40 waiting silently just underground in Ft. Greely, with additional interceptors at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 12
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
The most recent test, in May, was successful. Colonel Kevin Kick, the commander of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade, which oversees the missile defense system, said it was constantly being improved. “These ground-based interceptors in the system fielded right now at Ft. Greely and at Vandenberg Air Force Base are the best of what we’ve got,” Kick said. “We’re ready, if called on, to respond to threats against our nation.” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-korea-missiles-alaska/in-alaska-soldiers-relish-role-in- u-s-missile-defense-idUSKBN1HY0FD Return to top
IEEE Spectrum (New York, N.Y.) U.S. Spy Agencies Seek Tech to Identify Deadly Chemicals from 30 Meters Away By Samuel K. Moore April 25, 2018 Three teams are developing rival technologies to combat explosives, nerve gases, and other threats Sergei Skripal, a former Russian intelligence officer who became a double agent for the United Kingdom, and his daughter, Yulia, weren’t the only people affected by a nerve-agent attack in Salisbury, England, in March. Nearly 40 others were sickened, including three police officers who were hospitalized, one of them for more than two weeks. A swarm of hazmat-suited chemical warfare experts inspected every place the Skripals had been recently in the hope of finding out what happened and whether there was still a danger to the public. U.S. intelligence agencies have been on the hunt for a technology that would make such investigations faster and safer and perhaps even prevent this kind of attack altogether. The Standoff ILluminator for Measuring Absorbance and Reflectance Infrared Light Signatures (SILMARILS) program at the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity should conclude, by mid-2021, with a possible solution: a portable scanner that can identify a fingerprint’s worth of a library of some 500 chemicals—spanning the dangerous (the explosive PETN) to the mundane (caffeine)—on surfaces like car doors from a distance of 5 to 30 meters. Program director Kristy DeWitt explains that detecting such chemical signatures is already possible using what’s called Raman spectroscopy. That technology uses a laser, made up of a single wavelength of light, that produces a minuscule fraction of photons of a variety of wavelengths when the beam scatters off the scanned material. What those wavelengths are and what their relative abundance is act as an identifying signature. The problem is that the fraction of new photons is so small that you need a strong—potentially burn-your-eyes-out strong—laser behind it. And that’s no good if you’re planning to surreptitiously scan everyone who walks into an airport. The systems that SILMARILS is exploring instead use lasers that span a wide swath of the infrared (IR) spectrum and look for spectroscopic signatures in the few photons that reflect back. Using a broad range of IR wavelengths means you can use a less-powerful light source—something no more dangerous than a grocery store scanner, DeWitt says. The three teams in the program are developing a complete system that includes both illumination and spectroscopy, but they each have specialties. Defense contractor Leidos is relying on a pulsed supercontinuum laser. Such devices are typically optical fibers doped with chemicals and with
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 13
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // micro- or nanostructures built into them to produce a peculiar nonlinear effect. Specifically, some light pumped into the fiber stimulates the production of a continuous spectrum of wavelengths. Using a series of differently doped fibers, Leidos and researchers at the University of Michigan recently managed to produce a supercontinuum laser with wavelengths that span from 2 micrometers all the way to 11 µm. Block MEMS, based in Marlborough, Mass., is also using a specialized laser, although one that’s less experimental. The company already provides several chemical detection products based on its quantum cascade lasers. These lasers are made of semiconductors with precisely controlled subnanometer thicknesses. Electrons see these layers as if they were a “staircase” of energy and emit a photon at each step. Block MEMS’s twist on this technology is a laser that rapidly sweeps through a range of infrared wavelengths, by adjusting optical components outside of the semiconductor, explains CEO Petros Kotidis. Honolulu-based Spectrum Photonics has leveraged its experience building compact, low-power hyperspectral imaging systems. These camera-based spectrometer systems capture a rapid series of images, each with encoded spatial and wavelength information. Spectrum Photonics president Ed Knobbe says the company is developing an imaging spectrometry system for SILMARILS that can detect light with wavelengths of 1.2 µm (short-wavelength IR) to 13.5 µm (long-wavelength IR). “Most of the primary spectral information is in long-wave infrared,” explains Knobbe. “But there is a tremendous amount of complementary information in midwave and shortwave IR bands.” Much of the work now lies in interpreting the returned signal—the brains of the system rather than its beams, says DeWitt. “One of the hardest problems is dealing with the fact that the signature on a surface is not the same absolute bar code you’d get from a chemical floating in the air. When you have small quantities of chemicals on a surface, the spectrum changes considerably according to the substrate and the particle size.” If any of these teams can solve the remaining problems, the applications will extend well beyond intelligence agencies’ needs. “It changes the whole idea of standoff detection,” predicts Block MEMS CEO Kotidis. For Leidos’s principal investigator, Augie Ifarraguerri, it’s kind of a dream come true. “There was always this sense that out there, somewhere, was the ability to make the ultimate sensor—the ‘Star Trek’ tricorder,” he says. When he started his career in the 1990s, “it seemed very elusive.” But the technology is close now, and he’s finally getting to do what he’d wanted to do “for, I don’t know, 30 years.” This article appears in the May 2018 print issue as “Spying Deadly Chemicals From 30 Meters.” https://spectrum.ieee.org/semiconductors/optoelectronics/us-spy-agencies-seek-tech-to-identify- deadly-chemicals-from-30-meters-away Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 14
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
US ARMS CONTROL
The New York Times (New York, N.Y.) Kim Says He’d End North Korea Nuclear Pursuit for U.S. Truce By Choe Sang-Hun April 29, 2018 SEOUL, South Korea — Keeping diplomatic developments coming at a head-snapping pace, the South Korean government said on Sunday that North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, had told President Moon Jae-in that he would abandon his nuclear weapons if the United States agreed to formally end the Korean War and promise not to invade his country. In a confidence-building gesture ahead of a proposed summit meeting with President Trump, a suddenly loquacious and conciliatory Mr. Kim also said he would invite experts and journalists from South Korea and the United States to watch the shutdown next month of his country’s only known underground nuclear test site. In Washington, Trump officials spoke cautiously about the chances of reaching a deal and laid out a plan for the dismantling of the North’s nuclear program, perhaps over a two-year period. That would be accompanied by a “full, complete, total disclosure of everything related to their nuclear program with a full international verification,” said John R. Bolton, Mr. Trump’s new national security adviser. The apparent concessions from the youthful leader were widely welcomed as promising signs of ending the standoff on the Korean Peninsula, frozen in place since fighting in the Korean War ended 65 years ago. But skeptics warned that North Korea previously made similar pledges of denuclearization on numerous occasions, with little or no intention of abiding by them. Mr. Kim’s friendly gestures, they said, could turn out to be nothing more than empty promises aimed at lifting sanctions on his isolated country. A South Korean government spokesman, Yoon Young-chan, provided remarkable details of a summit meeting the two Korean heads of state held on Friday, when Mr. Kim made history by becoming the first North Korean leader to set foot in the South. “I know the Americans are inherently disposed against us, but when they talk with us, they will see that I am not the kind of person who would shoot nuclear weapons to the south, over the Pacific or at the United States,” Mr. Kim told Mr. Moon, according to Mr. Yoon’s account. It was another in a series of startling statements by Mr. Kim, whose country threatened to do exactly those things during the height of nuclear tensions last year. Mr. Kim’s apparent willingness to negotiate away his nuclear arsenal was revealed just as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo spoke for the first time about a “good conversation” he had with Mr. Kim during his secret visit to Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, over Easter weekend. Mr. Pompeo told ABC News in a broadcast on Sunday that the Trump administration’s objective was “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization” with North Korea, and that Mr. Kim was prepared to “lay out a map that would help us achieve” denuclearization.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 15
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
“We had an extensive conversation on the hardest issues that face our two countries,” Mr. Pompeo said. “I had a clear mission statement from President Trump. When I left, Kim Jong-un understood the mission exactly as I described it today.” But Mr. Bolton, a longtime critic of past diplomacy with North Korea, expressed skepticism on Sunday, recalling past moments that looked hopeful. Those would include a commitment by Pyongyang in the 1990s to give up its nuclear program and the destruction of a nuclear power cooling tower in 2008 as part of a similar promise. “We want to see real commitment,” he said on “Face the Nation” on CBS. “We don’t want to see propaganda from North Korea. We’ve seen words. We’ve seen words so far.” Asked about North Korea’s insistence on a promise by the United States not to invade, Mr. Bolton noted that was an old demand that had been rolled out on other occasions. “We’ve heard this before,” he said. “The North Korean propaganda playbook is an infinitely rich resource.” Mr. Trump sees the potential for a historic deal with Mr. Kim, “a breakthrough nobody would have imagined a few months ago,” Mr. Bolton told Fox News on Sunday, but his administration is not “starry eyed about what may happen here.” “I think it is going to happen; the dates and the places are still under discussion,” he said. “I think the president is eager to do it as soon as possible.” On Friday, Mr. Kim and Mr. Moon signed a joint declaration recognizing “a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” and “complete denuclearization” as a common goal of the two Koreas. But during the summit events, some of which were broadcast live around the world, Mr. Kim never publicly renounced his nuclear weapons. Even in the additional details released on Sunday by South Korean officials, Mr. Kim appeared to hedge his bets, indicating that denuclearizing his country could be a long process that required multiple rounds of negotiations and steps to build trust. But he laid out a vague idea of what his impoverished country would demand in return for giving up its nuclear weapons. “If we meet often and build trust with the United States, and if an end to the war and nonaggression are promised, why would we live in difficulty with nuclear weapons?” Mr. Kim was quoted as saying by South Korean officials. Mr. Moon briefed Mr. Trump on the meeting during a call on Saturday, telling him that Mr. Kim had said that he and Mr. Trump could “get along well,” to which Mr. Trump responded that he “looked forward” to their meeting. On Sunday, Mr. Moon also spoke with the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, to relay Mr. Kim’s willingness to open dialogue with Tokyo, which is threatened by the North’s nuclear weapons and missile development. The peacemaking comments stand in stark contrast to previous remarks and actions by Mr. Kim, who drove the Peninsula close to the brink of war last year by undertaking a series of missile and nuclear tests. He suddenly switched to diplomatic overtures this year, extending an offer to meet Mr. Trump, which, surprisingly, was accepted. A week ago, Mr. Kim announced an end to all nuclear and long- range missile tests and the closing of the nuclear test site in mountainous Punggye-ri, in northeast North Korea. In the meeting on Friday, Mr. Kim and Mr. Moon also agreed to start talks this year with Washington to negotiate a peace treaty to formally end the 1950-53 Korean War, one of the key security guarantees that the North has long demanded.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 16
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
But North Korea has so far offered no timeline for dismantling its nuclear weapons and facilities. Nor has it clarified how it defines a “nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” and especially whether that means a withdrawal or significant reconfiguration of American troops based in South Korea, as it has demanded before. Even before Mr. Moon met with Mr. Kim, South Korean officials said any joint statement was bound to be vague on the terms of denuclearization because Mr. Kim would try to settle critical issues directly with Washington. If Mr. Kim intends to win a peace treaty, diplomatic recognition and billions of dollars in economic aid from Washington and its allies, as South Korean officials hope he does, trading away his nuclear arsenal is his biggest bargaining chip. He cannot reveal his hand too soon, South Korean officials said. Skeptics fear that Mr. Kim does not really intend to give up his nuclear weapons and is merely trying to soften his image, escape sanctions and make it more difficult for Mr. Trump to continue to threaten military action. But South Korean officials argue that Mr. Kim is sincere in trading his nuclear weapons for a promise to end hostilities and get Washington’s help to improve his country’s economy. North Korea’s promise to invite outsiders to Punggye-ri reflected “Mr. Kim’s determination to actively and pre-emptively deal with the process of verifying denuclearization,” Mr. Yoon said. In another conciliatory gesture toward South Korea, Mr. Kim made his own pledge of nonaggression toward the South. “I am determined not to repeat the painful history of the Korean War. As the same nation living on the same land, we should never shed blood again,” he told Mr. Moon, according to Mr. Yoon. Mr. Kim even vowed to readjust his country’s clock to match the time zone in South Korea, which with the rest of the region runs 30 minutes ahead of the North’s. “When I was sitting in the waiting room, I saw two clocks on the wall, one of the Seoul time and the other of the Pyongyang time, and I felt bad about it,” Mr. Kim was quoted as telling Mr. Moon. “Why don’t we reunify our clocks first?” Peter Baker contributed reporting from Washington. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/29/world/asia/north-korea-trump-nuclear.html Return to top
Homeland Preparedness News (Washington, D.C.) Nuclear Threat Initiative Highlights Separated Plutonium Security Risks By Kevin Randolph April 27, 2018 A new paper from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) provided recommendations for mitigating risks related to separated plutonium. As compared to highly enriched uranium (HEU), separated plutonium has not received enough attention as a security risk, NTI Counselor John Carlson said in the paper, titled “Mitigating Security Risks from Separated Plutonium: Some Near-Term Steps.”
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 17
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Eight countries currently hold more than 375 metric tons of separated plutonium, which is produced by reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel. The paper recommends minimizing stocks and specific actions in production, storage and use of the material. “Even small quantities [of plutonium] could be of interest to terrorists if they see opportunities for acquiring plutonium in a number of locations or for use in a radiological dispersal device,” Carlson said. The paper recommends that INFCIRC/549 participants, other interested states, and the IAEA strengthen the INFCIRC/549 arrangement so that it can be used as a mechanism for consultation and coordination on minimizing stocks, eliminating non-essential holdings, developing a code of conduct, promoting best practices and other risk mitigation actions. In the meantime, states should commit to arresting growth in separated plutonium stocks, the paper said. https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/28131-nuclear-threat-initiative-highlights-separated- plutonium-security-risks/ Return to top
VOA (Washington, D.C.) Pompeo: Trump Will Exit Iran Deal If It's Not Fixed By Ken Bredemeier April 30, 2018 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made clear Sunday that President Donald Trump plans to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal next month unless it is "fixed" to the U.S. liking. Pompeo, in the Middle East on his first overseas trip as the top U.S. diplomat, said, "President Trump’s been pretty clear, this deal is very flawed. He’s directed the administration to try and fix it and if we can’t fix it he’s going to withdraw from the deal. It's pretty straightforward." Speaking in Israel, he said that "unlike the past administration, President Trump has a comprehensive Iran strategy that is designed to counter the full array of threats emanating from Tehran." En route from Saudi Arabia to Israel, Pompeo told reporters that he had briefed Riyadh's leaders on U.S. talks with European officials on efforts to end Iranian missile tests and combat Tehran's military involvement in Syria, Yemen and elsewhere in the Mideast. He said the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a "common challenge in Iran," but that "there's still some work to do" in crafting any changes to the 2015 nuclear deal or in creating a new pact. For its part, Iran has said it has no intention of altering the deal it agreed to with Germany, France, Britain, China, Russia and the U.S. in any way or agreeing to a new nuclear pact. Trump faces a May 12 deadline whether to reimpose economic sanctions against Iran, pulling the U.S. out of the deal agreed to by former U.S. President Barack Obama. Trump stands alone among the six signatories to the accord in threatening to abrogate it.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 18
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
In Tel Aviv, Pompeo, after meeting with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, said the U.S. remains "deeply concerned about Iran's dangerous escalation of threats towards Israel and the region." Earlier, in Riyadh, the new secretary of state said, "Iran destabilizes this entire region. It supports proxy militias and terrorist groups. It is an arms dealer to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. It supports the murderous Assad regime [in Syria] as well." Pompeo stressed the need for unity among Persian Gulf allies of the U.S. to show support for new sanctions against Iran unless new restrictions are imposed on Iran's nuclear program. In Saudi Arabia, a senior policy adviser to Pompeo who is accompanying the secretary of state, called on European allies and other countries to impose sanctions on Iran to weaken its missile program. "We are urging nations around the world to sanction any individuals and entities associated with Iran's missile program, and it has also been a big part of discussions with Europeans," the adviser told reporters in Riyadh. The three-day trip also includes a stop in Jordan. In Brussels on Friday, Pompeo said he had discussed the nuclear deal with his NATO counterparts. Pompeo is said to be more "hawkish" on the Iranian government than his predecessor, Rex Tillerson, who wanted the U.S. to stay in the Iran nuclear agreement. Tillerson was abruptly fired by Trump last month, just hours after returning from a trip to Africa. Trump said he and Pompeo are much more "on the same wavelength" on Iran and other issues. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-secretary-of-state-mike-pompeo-arrives-in-israel-/4369574.html Return to top
Stratfor (Austin, Texas) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at 50 Author Not Attributed April 29, 2018 Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman caused a media stir in March when he warned that Saudi Arabia will develop a nuclear weapon if Iran does, raising the troubling possibility of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. "Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb," the crown prince told the CBS news program 60 Minutes, "but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible." Salman's remarks came as President Donald Trump considers whether to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear deal and amid tensions over North Korea's nuclear weapons testing. Nuclear proliferation has reentered the heart of the global security discourse. A Remarkable Success The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which opened for signing 50 years ago on July 1, 1968, governs the pursuit of nuclear weapons and associated technologies. The treaty effectively bars any state outside the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) from possessing nuclear weapons. Such a possession or
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 19
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // pursuit is known as nuclear proliferation. Practically all countries — India, Pakistan and Israel being the main exceptions — have signed the treaty; North Korea withdrew in 2003. In the early years after its invention, the atomic bomb was seen by top U.S. politicians and military leaders as a weapon like any other, albeit a much more destructive one. Over time, a campaign for nuclear disarmament emerged globally, championed by post-colonial countries such as Ireland and India. It took a decade or more for a compromise to emerge between the idealism of a nuclear-free world and the dangers of ready battlefield use by anybody and everybody. The NPT was the embodiment of this compromise. The NPT lays out four core principles of the global nuclear order. The first legitimizes the five permanent Security Council members as nuclear weapons states and shuts the legal door on any new entrants to the nuclear club. The second forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons and technologies from the five founding nuclear weapon states to any other state. The third (Article IV) enshrines the "inalienable right" of all signatories "to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." And the fourth (Article VI) requires the permanent five to undertake "good faith" negotiations leading to universal nuclear disarmament. More subtly than its raft of associated arrangements, the legal aspects of the treated also created an international norm against nuclear weapons use that Brown University scholar Nina Tannenwald famously called "the nuclear taboo." States that have nuclear weapons risk enormous opprobrium if they actually use them. This is not to say that the use of nuclear weapons is forbidden. But the norm has had the effect of inducing extreme caution among the states that possess nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation treaty's remarkable success can also be measured by the fact that since its inauguration five decades ago, only three additional countries have acknowledged embracing nuclear weapons. A fourth, South Africa, developed nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but subsequently gave them up, as did three new post-Soviet states that had inherited Russian nuclear weapons. Overall, about 20 countries that pursued nuclear weapons have stopped their efforts. Thus, 50 years after the NPT was first signed, we are left with a small set of only eight nuclear weapons states. (A ninth, Israel, is believed to have developed nuclear weapons in the 1960s but declines to confirm that it possesses them.) Considering the large number of countries facing acute security threats, including from nuclear powers, that single-digit number counts as remarkable success. Technology and Motivation Fundamentally, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is a supply-demand problem. On the supply side, it is about the availability of technologies, material and know-how for making nuclear weapons, but it is also about systems for their delivery — such as missiles, submarines and nuclear-capable aircraft. With the passage of time, the technology needed to make nuclear weapons (particularly the capacity for uranium enrichment) has become widely known and within the reach of almost all medium-size countries. The demand side evokes the core motivations of states to pursue latency (that is, the capability to build nuclear weapons but not possess them) or possession. Extended deterrence — the commitment by a (usually) great power to use its own nuclear weapons to defend an ally threatened by another nuclear weapons state — is a key inhibitor of demand. NATO embodies the strongest and clearest such extended deterrence; other key examples include U.S. treaties with Japan, South Korea and Australia. States have pursued the nuclear option mostly when they have perceived an acute security threat. Two examples are the Soviet program to counter the U.S. bomb, and China's to counter both the Soviet and American arsenals. Achieving global status has also been a prime motivator in a few
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 20
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // cases — for example, France's nuclear weaponization in the 1950s under a NATO nuclear umbrella. Domestic interest groups sometimes have contributed to the nuclear drive in order to expand their turf, an example being India's civilian nuclear research community. The United States got serious about enforcing nonproliferation with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. While the Arms Export Control Act barred assistance to any state that imported or exported enrichment and reprocessing technologies, the nonproliferation act requires full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and barred enrichment and reprocessing using any U.S.-supplied nuclear materials. Other major powers have had a more complicated relationship with nonproliferation. China is believed to have aided Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1980s. The Soviet Union generally cooperated strongly with the United States, but more recently Russia has been sanctioned by Washington for allegedly providing modest aid to the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programs. And Pakistan's A.Q. Khan network is known to have sold enrichment technologies to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Pressure, Persuasion and Partnerships In the case of adversaries such as North Korea, Iraq or Iran, the United States has taken a proactive stance, known as counter-proliferation, using mostly coercive tools such as sanctions, interdiction on the high seas or military intervention. The situation has been more challenging when an ally or non-adversary has pursued nuclear weapons. Here, the United States has used a combination of nonmilitary coercive tools and inducements. The strongest inducement the United States has been able to provide to an ally is that of a nuclear umbrella, also known as extended deterrence. This has been granted to all NATO states as well as Japan and South Korea. However, a formal commitment still leaves uncertainties in the minds of some allies, particularly those outside NATO, as to whether the United States will truly step in and risk its own security when the nuclear chips are down. In other words, would Washington risk San Francisco to save Seoul? This fear was one factor behind South Korea and Taiwan's push toward mastering nuclear technologies in the 1970s. The United States had to threaten sanctions — including a cutoff in military aid and the withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella in the case of South Korea — and offer sweeteners for the two countries to eventually back off. Japan also has pushed but succeeded in getting the United States to enable it to enrich nuclear fuel and reprocess waste as part of a more relaxed nuclear deal with Washington. A small set of countries have opposed the nonproliferation regime from the beginning. For example, India long resisted signing the NPT on largely moral grounds. But facing perceived threats from China and Pakistan, New Delhi embarked on a tortuous nuclear journey marked by vigorous contestations among domestic constituencies, and eventually developed nuclear weapons in the late 1980s. Pakistan, seeing India as a threat, simultaneously developed nuclear weapons. The United States was aware of Pakistani proliferation but decided to prioritize its alliance with Islamabad during the Soviet war with Afghanistan. Having failed to change Indian behavior through economic sanctions, and faced with a need to balance China in Asia, the United States decided to enter into a strategic partnership with India through the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2005. India is now effectively a legitimate nuclear power, though outside the NPT and lacking full treaty rights of the NPT's five nuclear weapons states. Pakistan remains in limbo, not subject to meaningful pressure on its nuclear weapons, but by no means legitimized under the nonproliferation regime. Greater Possibilities for Proliferation
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 21
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Three big drivers, however, are putting enhanced pressure on the nonproliferation treaty as it currently stands. First, a great power competition is emerging involving the United States, China and Russia, with Moscow and Beijing acting in close concert on many matters. This competition is marked by more global institutional deadlock than at any period during the Cold War, and by the fraying of certain U.S. alliances. Second, and related to this competition, is the increased autonomy among a number of regional and middle powers. The third driver is ever-greater access to technologies relevant to nuclear proliferation. This has been in play for the past two or three decades, but is getting even easier going forward. For example, gas centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment can be mastered by many candidate countries and is hard to detect. Technologies for missiles, particularly of the shorter-range variety, are also more widely available than before. The end result is an enhanced sense of insecurity among those outside, or in some cases inside, a formal nuclear umbrella. In terms of over-the-horizon proliferation threats, the Middle East and East Asia are regions most vulnerable, any prospects of a North Korean disarmament notwithstanding. And among the new nuclear powers, India and Pakistan are already locked in a nuclear arms race that shows no signs of easing. Iran's dangerous nuclear drive is well-documented. But Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey also present nuclear possibilities. The first two are not covered by a formal U.S. nuclear umbrella. Israel's alleged nuclear arsenal could also become a greater issue going forward as Iran enhances its role in the region. In Asia, China's meteoric rise implies that Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and perhaps even Vietnam have reasons for entering the nuclear candidates' club in the long run. Regional power assertion takes the form of striking nuclear energy deals with multiple countries, and opening up the old debate about Article IV of the NPT: Does the "inalienable right" to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear technology include a right to enrich and reprocess? This has been Iran's position, and it was India's before that. The five permanent Security Council members, however, do not hold a consistent position on this issue, differentiating how states are treated. For example, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran and U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with India and Japan have formalized this "right" for these states. Other states are increasingly making a moral argument, citing Article VI of the NPT, which enshrines a "good faith" effort for disarmament by the treaty's five nuclear weapons states. Though this article was not an ironclad commitment, it has given an opening to those who claim to resist a permanent division of the world between the nuclear haves and the have-nots. Thus, looking ahead, the overall prospects for nonproliferation are rather fraught. While the United States has been primarily responsible for ensuring the nonproliferation successes of the past 50 years, the dynamic of great power competition implies that Washington will increasingly come up against Moscow and Beijing on questions of nonproliferation, particularly in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. And regional actors will get bolder in doing what they think they need to do to enhance their security, even as a small but vocal disarmament movement continues to thrive in the shadows. https://www.stratfor.com/article/nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-50th-anniversary-united- states-russia-china Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 22
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Defense News (Washington, D.C.) Obama Officials Defend Iran Deal as Trump Threatens to Blow It Up By Joe Gould May 2, 2018 WASHINGTON — Amid Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s latest accusations about Iran’s past nuclear activities, former U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz warned Wednesday that dropping out of the Iran deal would isolate the U.S. from its allies. Moniz, a key Obama administration negotiator of the deal, said that pulling out of Iran’s 2015 deal with world powers would drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies and “short circuit” a “deep investigation” into Iran’s nuclear activities. “Iran is now on the spot and it would be foolish to let them off the hook,” Moniz said Wednesday on CNN’s “New Day.” The comments came as the Trump administration is up against a mid-May deadline, weighing whether it will renew an Iran sanctions waiver and remain in the Iran nuclear agreement. President Donald Trump, a frequent critic of the deal, said Tuesday the deal was flawed because it doesn’t ban Iran’s testing of ballistic missiles. “The Iran deal was one of the worst and most one- sided transactions the United States has ever entered into,” he said. Though Netanyahu provided arguments to scrap the deal, allies are urging against that path. French President Emanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Washington last month to persuade Trump to keep the deal. On Wednesday, China reiterated that all sides should continue to uphold the agreement. Netanyahu had presented evidence that he said shows Iran once had a nuclear weapons program. He said the documents his government obtained prove that Iran lied about its nuclear ambitions before signing the deal. Moniz argued that Netanyahu’s presentation “did not reveal anything new at a high level” and that there’s broad agreement Iran is complying with nuclear restrictions. “We’ve always said, and we knew quite well, that Iran had a structured nuclear weapons program until 2003,” he said. “The revelations now reaffirm that. Frankly, it reaffirms our intelligence community’s conclusion that that program, that structured program, ended around 2003-2004.” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has supported and continues to support the deal, a spokesman told reporters Tuesday, pointing to a statement from the International Atomic Energy Agency that says it has “no credible” evidence Iran was working on developing a nuclear “explosive device” after 2009. Still, the White House seemed to be leaning toward Netanyahu. Spokeswoman Sarah Sanders said Tuesday that Iran “lied on the front end” and that its nuclear weapons-making capabilities were more advanced than Tehran had admitted. “We think the biggest mistake that was made was under the Obama administration by ever entering the deal in the first place,” she said. The White House was on the defensive Tuesday after it released a statement that is says has since been corrected: “Iran has a robust, clandestine nuclear weapons program that it has tried and failed to hide from the world and from its own people.” Sanders called the word “has” a “typo.”
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 23
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
A senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Ben Cardin, said the administration has strong options outside of amending or violating the Iran nuclear deal. Congress has given Trump other tools, he argued, to sanction Iran for or its support of terrorism, ballistic missile violations and human rights violations — in concert with action for European allies. “I think the disagreement between President Trump and our European allies, and with many of us in Congress, is the president is talking about reimposing sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program even though they’re in compliance with their nuclear commitments,” Cardin, of Maryland, told Bloomberg News. “That would isolate the United States.” Former Secretary of State John Kerry, the top diplomat when the deal was negotiated, sought to counter Netanyahu, in a series of tweets Tuesday. “Every detail PM Netanyahu presented yesterday was every reason the world came together to and had to be stopped. It’s working!” apply years of sanctions and negotiate the Iran nuclear agreement ― because the threat was real The international community had no visibility and no say about Iran’s nuclear program before the deal, he said, adding: “Blow up the deal and you’re back there tomorrow!” U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis seemed to offer some defense of the Iran deal last week in congressional testimony. While he would not give his opinion about whether to stay in it, he said its provisions allow “pretty robust” oversight of Iran. “I’ve read it now three times … and I will say that it is written almost with an assumption that Iran would try to cheat,” Mattis told the Senate Armed Services Committee. “So the verification, what is in there, is actually pretty robust as far as our intrusive ability to get in, IAEA to get in,” Mattis said. “Whether or not that is sufficient, that is a valid question.” https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/05/02/obama-officials-defend-iran-deal-as- trump-threatens-to-blow-it-up/ Return to top
ASIA/PACIFIC
Manila Bulletin (Manila, Philippines) Leaders Commit to Build Resilient, Innovative ASEAN By Argyll Cyrus Geducos April 28, 2018 SINGAPORE—Leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) vowed to address the increasing change and growing uncertainties in the global strategic landscape and the implications that evolving major power dynamics have on the region. In one of the three outcome documents during the 32nd ASEAN Summit in Singapore, the 10 leaders committed to build a resilient and innovative ASEAN that is able to navigate these challenges in a coordinated, integrated and effective manner. Based on the outcome document titled “ASEAN Leaders Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN,” the 50-year-old regional bloc committed to remain united in promoting the region’s vital interests, ideals and aspiration. They also reiterated to promote the rule of law and uphold a rules- based regional order, anchored in respect for international laws and norms.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 24
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Peace and security The ASEAN leaders reiterated that the region should remain an area of peace, freedom, and security where differences and disputes are resolved by peaceful means. They also stated that the region should be free from nuclear weapons or any weapon of mass destruction. The leaders vowed to work on an ASEAN Extradition Treaty to strengthen the region’s capacity to combat transnational crimes. They also agreed to develop guidelines for air and maritime safety of ASEAN militaries. They also reaffirmed to strengthen ASEAN’s capability and capacity to detect and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, by facilitating the sharing of information and best practices. The leaders also agreed to strengthen ASEAN capacity in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and work actively towards the conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. Terrorism To counter terrorism, the leaders resolved to cooperate effectively with partners within and beyond the region to counter the rise of radicalization and violent extremism of all forms. Based on the outcome document, ASEAN will pursue its commitment to the formulation and development of an ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism as stated in the Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. The leaders will also address emerging non-traditional threats such as climate change, cyber threats, pandemics, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. They vowed to strengthen cooperation on border management to jointly address matters of common concerns including combating transnational crimes, particularly drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, and smuggling of goods, people and weapons. The leaders committed to work towards an ASEAN Joint Statement which affirms the importance of rules-based order for cyberspace, and the need for basic, operational and voluntary cyber norms of behavior in the region which will serve as an enabler for economic progress and improved living standards across ASEAN. Other commitments Meanwhile, the ASEAN leaders also committed to keep its markets open and competitive, deepen economic integration towards targets such as the doubling of intra-ASEAN trade by 2025. They also vowed to forge high quality and mutually beneficial economic agreements with external partners that reflect modern business realities to strengthen resilience against rising protectionism and global volatilities. ASEAN will also embrace the opportunities afforded by new technologies and innovation arising from the digital revolution, to implement smart and innovative solutions. The leaders vowed to nurture and invest in its youth to fully realize the energy and potential of its youthful demographic, as well as provide social protection for the elderly and promote active ageing so that they can continue to contribute to the region. The ASEAN also reaffirmed its commitment to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) and Phnom Penh
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 25
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Statement on the Adoption of the AHRD, as well as international instruments to which ASEAN Member States are parties. https://news.mb.com.ph/2018/04/28/leaders-commit-to-build-resilient-innovative-asean/ Return to top
Associated Press (New York, N.Y.) Leaders of South Korea, Japan, China to Discuss North Korea Author Not Attributed May 1, 2018 SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — Leaders of South Korea, Japan and China will meet next week for a summit expected to focus on North Korea’s nuclear program and other regional issues. The three Asian countries have been holding regular trilateral summits since late 2008. Next week’s summit, the seventh, comes amid a flurry of high-profile diplomatic contacts aimed at ridding North Korea of its nuclear weapons. Last week, the leaders of North and South Korea met at a border village and agreed on a number of steps aimed at reconciliation. Their summit, however, didn’t produce a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump are expected to meet in several weeks. South Korea’s presidential office said Tuesday that President Moon Jae-in will attend next Wednesday’s meeting in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. The Japanese government confirmed the meeting. “I believe it will be an extremely important summit. I plan to have heart-to-heart talks with President Moon and Premier Li,” Abe said while visiting Jordan. “I hope to discuss thoroughly how we can get North Korea to walk on the right path” and resolve the nuclear and missile issues comprehensively, he said . Moon’s office said he will brief Abe and Li about the results of his summit with Kim. It said Moon also plans to discuss ways to boost three-way cooperation toward achieving denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea, Japan and China are closely linked economically and are also members of now-stalled regional disarmament talks aimed at ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. But anti- Japan sentiment still runs deep in South Korea and China because of territorial and historical disputes dating back to Tokyo’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula and invasion of China in the first half of the 20th century. Further complicating their relations, Seoul and Tokyo are key U.S. allies, while Beijing is North Korea’s last major ally. https://www.apnews.com/a6a8dd3fc26441338268ec3951321eec/Leaders-of-South-Korea,- Japan,-China-to-discuss-North-Korea Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 26
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
EUROPE/RUSSIA
Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, Calif.) European Leaders and Others Push Back against Netanyahu's Criticism of The Iran Nuclear Deal By Noga Tarnopolsky May 1, 2018 European leaders and other supporters of the landmark Iran nuclear deal pushed back Tuesday against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's announcement that he had documents proving Tehran lied about its attempts to build an atomic bomb. Officials in France, Germany and Britain said their governments concluded long ago that Iran's nuclear program was not solely for peaceful uses, which was the reason for negotiating the landmark 2015 deal in the first place. Although they said they would need to study the documents obtained by Israel, they said Netanyahu had not presented any evidence that Iran was in breach of its obligations. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which monitors Iran's compliance, reiterated Tuesday that it had "no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009." Associates of the prime minister rushed to his defense, however, saying the recovery of some 100,000 Iranian documents detailing a nuclear weapons program known as Project Amad was indeed evidence of a breach. "People have lost their minds," said Yaakov Nagel, a former director of Israel's national security agency. "Iran promised not to seek, develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the prime minister unequivocally demonstrated that they have failed to comply." Though Netanyahu acknowledged in his presentation Monday that the project was shelved in 2003, he said Iran cheated by failing to disclose it when signing the deal with the United States, Britain, China, Germany, France and Russia. President Trump, who has labeled the accord negotiated by the Obama administration a bad deal, has said he will pull out unless it can be strengthened by May 12. European diplomats have been meeting with their U.S. counterparts to try to negotiate supplementary agreements to address Trump's concerns, including the fact that some of the restrictions on Iran's nuclear program will expire and the deal does not include any mechanisms to address Tehran's ballistic missile program. Netanyahu's presentation was seen by many as evidence that the Trump administration is preparing to unilaterally reimpose U.S. sanctions on Iran that were lifted when the country agreed to restrictions on its nuclear activities. Supporters of the deal worry that could play into the hands of Iranian hard-liners who have been making the case in their country that the U.S. is acting in bad faith, and Tehran should walk away from the deal. In a tweet Tuesday, Mohamed ElBaradei, a former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, suggested that, rather than signal that the United States "is fickle in its agreements & capricious in its diplomacy," the administration should use the nuclear accord as a "building block for a balanced & stable regional security structure."
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 27
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
"Mutual demonization & destroying [the] entire temple could have disastrous consequences!" he warned. The French Foreign Ministry said Israel's disclosures reinforce the importance of the agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The inspection system put in place by the International Atomic Energy Agency is "one of the most comprehensive and robust in the history of nuclear nonproliferation," ministry spokeswoman Agnes von der Muhll said in a statement. "It is essential that the IAEA can continue to verify Iran's respect for the JCPoA and the peaceful nature of its nuclear program." But she said the documents acquired by Israel could confirm the need for longer-term assurances about Iran's nuclear program. "This information should be studied and evaluated in detail," she said. Boris Johnson, the British foreign secretary, echoed the sentiment in a tweet saying Netanyahu only "shows why we need Iran Nuclear deal. Iran deal based not on trust but verification, allowing the IAEA unprecedented access. Need to keep deal & build on it to take account of US & allies' concerns." Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, returning from a tour of the Middle East that included a meeting with Netanyahu, vouched for the authenticity of the documents Israel obtained, but declined to say if he believed they revealed an Iranian violation of the agreement, preferring to leave that "up to lawyers." "There's still a lot of work to do to figure out precisely the scope and scale of it," Pompeo said. "But it is the case [that] there is new information about that program" apparently aimed at developing nuclear weapons, which Iran has said it was not doing. In an interview, Nagel pointed to a sentence in Netanyahu's presentation, which was amplified by dramatic graphics, video clips, and excerpts from the Iranian documents. After stating his main thesis, "Iran lied. Big time," Netanyahu added that after signing the nuclear deal in 2015 Iran moved its nuclear weapons files to a highly secret location in Tehran in 2017. That detail, Nagel said, proves Iran's failure to comply with the agreement under which Tehran reaffirmed that it would under no circumstances "seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons." Transferring documents for safekeeping "reveals Iran's treachery and its brazen breach of the agreement by compiling a crazy archive filled with the details, photos, videos, technology and know-how you need to build a nuclear bomb," Nagel said. "That is what you do when you seek a nuclear project," he said, "not to rid yourself of it." As his office shared James Bond-like specifics of the Mossad agents' prowess — they found and retrieved an entire safe containing the documents, absconding with it as Iranian forces closed in on them — Netanyahu said in an interview with CNN that his revelations had "turned a lot of question marks into exclamation marks." This was disputed by Ram Ben-Barak, a former deputy head of the Mossad, who now represents the centrist Yesh Atid party in Israel's parliament. "No," he said in an interview, "we had no question marks. We had clear knowledge based on documents. Everyone from Obama to the Europeans knew, and that is the reason they made this agreement. "Everybody who needed to know knew. They knew exactly what Netanyahu 'revealed' and they made a conscious choice to ignore Iran's lie.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 28
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
"They think they signed a good deal," he said of the United States and other major powers that co- signed the deal with Iran. "I think it is a bad deal," he said, in a sole instance of accord with Netanyahu and Trump, "but what Netanyahu and [Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor] Lieberman are doing, raising Israel's profile with talk highlighting 'belligerent Israel,' when everything is already so tense with Iran in Syria, instead of doing the job as it should be done, quietly, is bad." Tarnopolsky is a special correspondent. Times staff writers Alexandra Zavis in Beirut and Tracy Wilkinson in Washington contributed to this report. http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-netanyahu-reaction-20180501-story.html Return to top
MIDDLE EAST
Reuters (New York, N.Y.)
Iran Leader: U.S. Pushes Riyadh to Confront Tehran, Stirs Crisis By Parisa Hafezi April 30, 2018 ANKARA (Reuters) - Iran’s supreme leader on Monday hit out at the United States a day after new Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Riyadh, accusing Washington of trying to stoke a “regional crisis” by provoking its ally Saudi Arabia to confront Tehran. In remarks broadcast on state television, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated longstanding calls for the United States to “leave” the Middle East, which he called Iran’s home, and said any power seeking to challenge Iran would be defeated. “One of the ways to confront Iran is to provoke inexperienced rulers of the region,” he said, in an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia’s 32-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. “Americans are trying to provoke Saudi Arabia against Tehran ... Their aim is to create more regional crisis ... to push Muslims to fight against Muslims.” “If these governments gain more wisdom, they will not confront Iran. If they confront Iran, they will be defeated.” Khamenei’s remarks were aired a day after Pompeo met Saudi King Salman in Riyadh on a flying visit to the region. Pompeo said on Sunday that the United States was deeply concerned by Iran’s “destabilizing and malign activities” in the Middle East. Appearing to address those remarks, Khamenei said Iran had no intention of limiting its influence in the Middle East. “Americans are the ones who should leave ... The Middle East, the west of Asia and the Persian Gulf is our home,” Khamenei said. Tehran and Riyadh have long been locked in a proxy war, competing for regional supremacy from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon to Yemen. U.S. President Donald Trump has strongly backed Saudi Arabia in its efforts to counter Iran’s influence.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 29
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
SANCTIONS RELIEF Iranian state TV quoted Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Qasemi as saying Tehran would keep on backing its friends in the region despite U.S. pressure to curb its influence. “The cooperation between America and Saudi Arabia will further destabilize the Middle East and will lead to more crisis in the region,” Qasemi said. “Pompeo’s remarks about Iran are baseless and repetitive ... As long as the legitimate governments of the regional countries need our help, Iran will remain in those countries.” In Riyadh, Pompeo reassured Saudi Arabia that the United States would exit Iran’s 2015 multinational nuclear deal, unless European signatories of the accord “fix” it. Trump has given the European signatories a May 12 deadline to “fix the terrible flaws” of the 2015 nuclear deal, or he will refuse to extend U.S. sanctions relief on Iran. Under Iran’s settlement with the United States, France, Germany, Britain, Russia and China, Tehran agreed to curb its nuclear program to satisfy the powers that it could not be put to developing atomic bombs. In exchange, Iran received relief from sanctions, most of which were lifted in January 2016. Khamenei has warned that Tehran would stick to the accord as long as the other signatories respected it, but would “shred” the deal if Washington pulled out. Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the European Union say Washington cannot unilaterally cancel an accord enshrined by a U.N. resolution. But they have called on Iran to curb its regional influence and ballistic missile program. Trump accuses Iran of supporting terrorism and says the 2015 deal does not do enough to block its path to acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran says it does not seek nuclear arms, and blames Washington and its allies for stirring Middle East tension. Iranian officials on Monday reiterated that Tehran had no intention of suspending its defensive missile capability. “By accusing Iran, Americans want to justify their presence in the region and to sell weapons to the regional countries,” Tasnim news agency quoted deputy head of Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards Hossein Salami as saying. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iran-usa/iran-leader-us-pushes-riyadh-to- confront-tehran-stirs-crisis-idUSKBN1I10IV Return to top
Arab News (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) US Calls for Global Action against Iran By Noor Nugali April 30, 2018 RIYADH: New US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called on Sunday for concerted international action to curb Iran’s regional meddling and halt its missile programs. “Iran destabilizes this entire region,” Pompeo said in joint remarks with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir on a visit to Riyadh.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 30
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
“It supports proxy militias and terrorist groups. It is an arms dealer to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. It supports the murderous Assad regime as well.” Iran supplies ballistic missiles fired into Saudi Arabia by Houthi militants in Yemen, most recently on Saturday, and Pompeo — on his first overseas trip since being confirmed in his new post last week — said Saudi security was a US priority. “We will continue to work closely with our Saudi partners to counter threats to this country’s security. That, of course, starts with Iran,” he said. Pompeo said US President Donald Trump would abandon the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran unless talks with European partners yield improvements to ensure Tehran never possesses nuclear weapons. The deadline for a decision on the deal is May 12. “Unlike the prior administration we will not neglect the vast scope of Iran’s terrorism,” Pompeo said. “We are determined to make sure that it never possess a nuclear weapon. The Iran deal in its current form does not provide that assurance.” Trump’s policy backed Al-Jubeir said Saudi Arabia supported the Trump administration’s policy on the nuclear agreement. “Iran must face the consequences of its constant interference in our region,” he said. Trump has also called on Gulf allies to contribute funding and troops to stabilize areas in Iraq and Syria where a US-led coalition has largely defeated Daesh terrorists. Al-Jubeir said this month that Saudi Arabia would be prepared to send troops into Syria under the US-led coalition. Pompeo said: “We will sit down and talk about ... how to best make sure that this is not America alone working on this, it’s the Gulf states working alongside us.” The secretary of state held talks in Riyadh with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, before flying to Israel to meet Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. http://www.arabnews.com/node/1293756/saudi-arabia Return to top
INDIA/PAKISTAN
The Express Tribune (Karachi, Pakistan) India Using Chemical Weapons against Kashmiris: AJK PM By MA Mir May 2, 2018 ISLAMABAD: Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) Prime Minister Raja Farooq Haider Khan accused India on Wednesday of using chemical weapons in the Indian occupied Kashmir. “There are evidences that Indian forces deployed in Kashmir had been using weapons that contain chemical agents in Kashmir,” Khan said during his visit to the office of All Parties Hurriyat Conference in Islamabad. “We demand an independent investigation into the alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians in Indian-held Kashmir and gross violation of human rights of Kashmiri people by Indian forces,” PM Haider said.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 31
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Paying glowing tributes to Yaseen Malik, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Shabir Ahamed Shah and others, he said Kashmiri leaders had lived most of their lives behind bars, fighting for their right to self- determination. Terming Kashmiri people’s struggle as ‘struggle to complete Pakistan’, he said India cannot lessen Kashmiris’ love for Pakistan with coercion and oppression. He alleged that use of chemical weapons is worst kind of persecution that put the lives of entire population in danger. The AJK prime minister assured the Hurriyat leadership that reinforcing Kashmir liberation struggle would remain the top priority of AJK government and all available resources would be utilised for this purpose. The government in the base camp of Kashmir liberation struggle would consult Hurriyat leaders in matters relating to Kashmir freedom movement. The prime minister also assured that problems being faced by the refugees from occupied part of Kashmir would be solved on priority basis. Earlier, speaking during a TV interview after visiting the Line of Control (LoC), PM Haider said Indian premier Narendra Modi was trying to increase his vote bank by shedding the blood of innocent Kashmiri people. He alleged the BJP government of whipping up ‘jingoistic frenzy’ to get political mileage in India. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1700773/1-india-using-chemical-weapons-kashmiris-ajk-pm/ Return to top
Defense News (Washington, D.C.) Pakistan Cosies Up to Russia, But Moscow Doesn’t Seem to Want to Take Sides By Usman Ansari May 2, 2018 be trying to balance its South Asia relations rather than abandon its traditional strategic partner India.ISLAMABAD ― Pakistan and Russia have pledged to improve defense ties, but Moscow appears to The latest pledge came as Pakistan’s national security adviser, Nasser Khan Janjua, for the first time led a ministerial-level delegation comprising the heads of the various defense, national security and space ministries to Russia where they met their counterparts. According to a Russian news release, “issues of bilateral military cooperation in information security and countering international terrorism were studied.” James Hackett, editor of The Military Balance blog and defense analyst with the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank, highlighted “recent changes in the Russia-India defense relationship,” such as the Indo-Russian fifth-generation fighter aircraft program from which India pulled out. “But Russia is still very heavily invested in current and future Indian defense equipment,” Hackett added, as a considerable amount of materiel in India’s arsenal is of Russian origin. “So in this context, because of India’s potential reaction, Russia would likely weigh carefully any decision to significantly deepen defense ties with Pakistan.” India has repeatedly requested Russia not sell arms to Pakistan. Despite trying to wean itself off Russia, India has still placed large orders with the country, partially to entice Russia to refrain from selling weaponry to Pakistan.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 32
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
India’s 2016 $5.5 billion S-400 surface-to-air missile deal was signed under these circumstances. As part of the delegation, Pakistan’s Army chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, met Russia’s chief of the general staff for the armed forces to discuss “regional security, stability and bilateral security cooperation,” plus support for “Pakistan’s efforts towards reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan.” The meetings came against the backdrop of the 9th International Meeting of High-Level Officials Responsible for Security Matters, hosted by Russia in Sochi. It also came in the wake of a meeting between the Pakistani and Russian defense ministers at the 7th Moscow Conference on International Security in early April where Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said both nations would build upon efforts to boost defense cooperation. Shoigu also expected interaction under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or SCO, would “contribute to developing and strengthening friendly ties between our defense ministries” and that better bilateral relations were “an important factor of ensuring regional stability.” No details regarding further closer cooperation between Moscow and Islamabad were forthcoming from Pakistan’s military, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Russian Embassy in Pakistan when contacted by Defense News. Kamal Alam, Pakistan analyst at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, thinks Russia may still restrict the amount and type of weaponry offered to Pakistan, but that this stance could change if India continues purchasing Western equipment. However, as India “approaches the U.S. aggressively to replace Pakistan as the South Asia base for U.S. pivot” and seeks to acquire Western combat aircraft, “Russia needs Pakistan to counter the U.S. in Afghanistan and Central Asia,” Alam added. Analyst, author and former Australian defense attache to Islamabad Brian Cloughley believes Pakistan partially wants “to continue distancing itself from the U.S., which it regards with increasing distrust and suspicion, given much impetus by [U.S. President Donald] Trump’s New Year[’s] tweet.” For the time being, Russia appears to be playing a balancing game. The government announced plans host military drills under Peace Mission 2018 in the August/September time frame under the auspices of the SCO that would for the first time include both India and Pakistan. Nicholas Redman, the director of editorial with IISS, believes “at a time of considerable tension in ties between Russia and the West, there is a stronger incentive for Russia to develop the non- Western vectors of its foreign relations.” This can also help boost Russia’s defense industry, and “there is little reason to think that the Kremlin sees arms sales to Pakistan and India as mutually exclusive,” Redman noted. Weapon sales are certainly on Pakistan’s mind, and Cloughley thinks it is “in Pakistan’s best interests to widen its acquisition base, as it can no longer rely on Washington to provide equipment” with the U.S. and the European Union concentrating on India. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/05/02/pakistan-cosies-up-to-russia- but-moscow-doesnt-seem-to-want-to-take-sides/ Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 33
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
COMMENTARY
The National Interest (Washington, D.C.) A Real Missile Gap Is Looming In Hypersonic Weapons By Dan Goure May 1, 2018 In a speech on the Senate floor on August 14, 1958, then-Senator and aspiring presidential candidate John F. Kennedy proclaimed the existence of a “missile gap” between the United States and Russia. Kennedy went on to warn that unless this gap was immediately addressed, the result would be the erosion of the U.S. strategic forces’ ability to deter the Soviet Union. It later became apparent that the balance in nuclear-capable ballistic missiles decisively favored the United States. A new “missile gap” is emerging, one that is based in fact. This is the disparity between the United States and its main competitors, Russia and China, in the field of hypersonic weapons systems. A hypersonic vehicle is one that moves through the atmosphere at a minimum speed of five times that of sound, or Mach 5. A hypersonic cruise missile travels continuously through the air employing a special high-powered engine. A hypersonic glide vehicle is launched into space atop a ballistic missile, after which it maneuvers through the upper reaches of the atmosphere until it dives towards its target. Both vehicle types can carry either conventional or nuclear weapons. Hypersonic weapons systems could dramatically alter the existing balance of conventional military power forces between the United States and its major competitors. They could strike key military targets such as airfields, command and control centers, depots and force concentrations almost without warning. Hypersonic delivery systems are viewed as particularly useful against aircraft carriers, large surface combatants, amphibious warfare ships and even transports carrying critical military supplies. This new gap could be far more consequential than that which concerned Senator Kennedy some sixty years ago. Hypersonic weapons are extremely difficult to track with existing air and missile defense sensors and virtually impossible to intercept. According to General John Hyten, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command: “We don't have any defense that could deny the employment of such a weapon against us, so our response would be our deterrent force, which would be the triad and the nuclear capabilities that we have to respond to such a threat.” Senior U.S. defense officials have made it clear that Russia and China currently have the lead in the race to develop and deploy hypersonic missiles. Last year China tested a hypersonic missile, the DF- 17. According to the recently confirmed Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. Michael Griffin: China has fielded or can field... hypersonic delivery systems for conventional prompt strike that can reach out thousands of kilometers from the Chinese shore, and hold our carrier battle groups or our forward deployed forces... at risk. We, today, do not have systems which can hold them at risk in a corresponding manner, and we don't have defenses against those systems. Should they choose to deploy them we would be, today, at a disadvantage. In his election-eve televised speech to the Russian Federal Assembly, Vladimir Putin emphasized the point that the Russian military had deployed invincible strategic weapons capable of defeating any defense. He went on to announce that his country is “actively developing hypersonic weapons.”
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 34
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) director Steven Walker pointed out that China has built significant scientific and engineering infrastructure to support the development of hypersonic weapons systems. “If you look at some of our peer competitors, China being one, the number of facilities that they’ve built to do hypersonics… surpasses the number we have in this country. It’s quickly surpassing it by 2 or 3 times. It is clear that China has made this one of their national priorities. We need to do the same.” Hypersonic delivery systems will be an integral part of Russian and Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies. The goal of these strategies is to create a lethal offensive and defensive environment that reaches possibly thousands of miles from their respective homelands that adversaries, especially the United States, cannot penetrate. Both countries are already busily deploying highly sophisticated and integrated air and missile defense systems along with land- and sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles, some capable of striking mobile targets. It is vitally important that the U.S. military develop the capabilities to defeat Russia’s and China’s A2/AD strategies. This requires systems that can penetrate integrated air defenses and counter the threat posed by long-range strike systems, particularly hypersonic weapons. Stealthy systems such as the B-2, F-22, F-35 and, in the not-to-distant future, the B-21 are part of the answer. Enter U.S. hypersonic delivery systems. According to recent press reports, what was for a long time nothing more than a series of science experiments has now been organized into a coherent program intended to produce a new generation of long-range, extremely high-speed weapons capable of negating hostile integrated air defenses and holding at risk a range of targets including ballistic missile launch sites. The Air Force has a roadmap to develop a hypersonic strike weapon by 2020 and a hypersonic aircraft to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in an A2/AD environment by 2030. In mid-April, the Air Force awarded Lockheed Martin a $1 billion dollar contract for an air launched, hypersonic conventional strike weapon. DARPA is at the forefront of the Pentagon’s efforts to get back in the hypersonic delivery vehicle race. Resources for hypersonics research has tripled over the past three defense budgets. DARPA plans to start flying air breathing test vehicles in 2019 and a tactical boost-glide prototype in 2022 or 2023. These developments come none-to-soon in light of what China and Russia are doing. Over the past several decades, the U.S. may have lost its erstwhile lead in a number of advanced military technologies, including hypersonics. But this does not mean it is out of the race. In reality, hypersonics is one area that must be a modernization priority for the Trump Administration and those that follow. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/real-missile-gap-looming-hypersonic-weapons-25650 Return to top
Asia Times (Hong Kong) Major Powers Starting to Deploy Hypersonic Weapons By Stephen Bryen May 1, 2018 Many questions remain about missiles that fly at up to 20,921 kilometers per hour, but the US, Russia and China are pushing ahead with development.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 35
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Are hypersonic weapons a game changer – it all depends on which game you want to change and if hypersonic weapons perform as advertised. The United States, Russia and China are known to be heavily engaged in developing hypersonic weapons, but while the technology challenges are more or less similar, the goals of each of the players are significantly different. The United States aim is for a new generation of conventional weapons and platforms covered by three major programs: a new Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) first tested in 2011; a Tactical Boost Glide Weapon (TBG) which is a rocket glider that can reach speeds of 20,921 kilometers per hour, or MACH 20, and uses a scramjet/ramjet engine (itself based on the hypersonic test vehicle HTV-2); and an Advanced Full Range hypersonic Engine program (AFRE) which is intended as a reusable hypersonic engine that combines an off the shelf jet turbine engine with a dual mode ramjet engine. The US Army Space and Missile Defense Command working with Sandia National Laboratory is in charge of AHW development. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the US Air Force are working on the Tactical Boost Glide program. Recently the US Air Force awarded Lockheed a $1 billion contract for a hypersonic conventionally armed cruise missiles that can be launched from bomber and fighter aircraft. The US has a Conventional Prompt Global Strike Program that will use hypersonic cruise missiles capable of striking any target in the world within an hour. Conventional or nuclear? The problem in any conventional hypersonic program is how does a defender know if the incoming weapon is conventional or nuclear? Today there is no satisfactory answer to the question. Russia, China or even North Korea or Iran may believe that a hypersonic cruise missile or space launched glide vehicle is nuclear and may, therefore, launch their own weapons in response, especially since the chance to destroy any incoming hypervelocity weapon is poor. Even so, the US is sticking to the argument that its hypersonic weapons are only conventionally armed. While the United States wants to speed up conventional weapons delivery against any target anywhere, it also will be able to overcome most aircraft and missile defense systems, even the much-ballyhooed Russian S-400. That’s because hypersonic vehicles are hard to detect, hard to track and hard to kill. Hypersonic vehicles also can operate autonomously over targets, don’t need to rely on GPS systems for guidance and probably cannot be electronically jammed. The idea of overcoming missile defenses is the primary objective the Russian hypersonic program addresses, but for the Russians their hypersonic weapons are nuclear, not conventional. There are three such systems so far known: the 3M22 Zircon (or Tsirkon), which is intended either for ship or submarine launch and is relatively short range; the YU-71 and YU-74 for launch on ballistic missiles and the air-launched KH-47M2 Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a high precision air to surface missile with a range of 2,000km and a claimed speed of Mach 10. The 3M22 Zircon, which is said to have a speed of Mach 7, has a range of 241km to 434km. It is essentially an anti-ship weapon, although it can be used against land targets. It was successfully tested in 2017 and two Kirov class battlecruisers, the Admiral Nakhimov (2018) and the Pyotr Veliky (2022), are being fitted to accommodate the Zircon in the same launchers that can also be used for Kalibr cruise missiles. The Zircon uses a scramjet engine after it is launched with a rocket boost. The Zircon warhead may be nuclear or conventional, although the well-regarded Stratfor analytical group speculates the
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 36
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // warhead is nuclear. Zircon is designed to challenge the naval power of the United States and its NATO allies and defeat shipboard defenses. US slow to deploy The Yu-71 is a hypersonic attack aircraft and missile glide vehicle either for missiles or for Russia’s bombers including Russia’s proposed stealth bomber, the Tupolev PAK-DA. The Yu-71 has a claimed speed of 11,200km/h and may be launched from the new Russian super-heavy MIRVed ICBM known as Sarmat (Samaritan). The Yu-74 is a hypersonic glide vehicle also launchable from the Sarmat, with a 10,000km range. The Yu-71 and Yu-74 are augmentations to ballistic missiles and weapons for long range bombers that the Russians appear to believe can overcome US and allied missile defenses. While the US is slow in deploying a full scale ballistic missile defense system, it has deployed THAAD against short and intermediate range ballistic missiles in South Korea, Turkey and the UAE and it has put the exoatmospheric Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) in Alaska at Fort Greely and in northern California at Vandenberg Air Force Base. The US and Japan have also jointly developed the SM3-Block 2a missile (RIM-161) advanced missile which is part of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System used by the US Navy, Japan’s Self Defense Forces and at Redzikowo in northern Poland for NATO defense. The Russians are betting that its hypervelocity vehicles can defeat American, NATO and allied missile defenses. Testing of the Yu-71 and Yu-74 is highly secretive, but what has leaked out is that most of the tests have been unsuccessful. If the Yu-71 and Yu-74 can’t be deployed, the Russians will have to rely on the KH-47M2 Kinzhal to penetrate US and allied missile defenses. The Kinzhal is carried by aircraft and is more likely to be a factor in the NATO theater. It carries a nuclear warhead of a size unknown. Many analysts think any general war along the NATO boundary will involve tactical nuclear weapons because this is how Russia’s military thinks it can rebalance the correlation of forces which, otherwise are negative for Russia when compared to NATO. In effect, Kinzhal could become the Russian replacement for the cancelled SS-20 mobile missiles that were eliminated under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, that also eliminated the US Pershing II deployment in Europe. The Kinzhal is air launched and therefore is not covered by the INF Treaty. China’s ‘carrier killers’ China, at least so far, has announced and may have deployed the DH-17, previously called the WU- 14, hypersonic glide vehicle which has a speed of somewhere between Mach 5 and Mach 10 and features a combined cycle engine and glides atop the earth’s atmosphere. It has been tested a number of times and China claims it hit its targets. Once the DH-17 is ready for deployment it may become an add-on to the DF-21D missile, already portrayed as a “carrier killer.” Adding on the DH-17 would significantly extend the range of the anti-ship DH-21D missile and create serious problems for even a robust missile defense system such as Aegis and its new SM3- Block 2a missiles. In effect, China’s primary goal for its hypersonic vehicles is to support the execution of its strategy to chase away the US carrier battle groups operating in the East and South China seas region by executing an effective area denial strategy. Reports say the DH-17 will become operational in 2020. No one yet knows if China can actually hit a moving aircraft carrier, or if the DH-17 can survive against a clustered response by US missile ships that are part of a carrier task force. When China
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 37
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // deploys the DH-17 will the US Navy back away from trying to support freedom of navigation in the Pacific? Not likely. While the rise of hypersonic weapons certainly presents new challenges, it is far too early to judge if they are a game changer. What we do know about the rise of hypersonic weapons is that we will see more of them in future. http://www.atimes.com/article/major-powers-starting-to-deploy-hypersonic-weapons/ Return to top
The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Expect a Fight on The Iran Deal between America and Europe By David Thorne May 2, 2018 Neither French President Emmanuel Macron nor German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited President Trump last week with high hopes of changing his mind about the Iran nuclear agreement. But both European leaders no doubt reminded the American president that walking away from what he derides as the “worst deal ever” will not be so easy. In foreign policy, every action has a reaction, and, as in a gentlemen’s duel to settle a disagreement, Trump may fire first, but Europe can and will fire back. Given transatlantic interconnectedness, the ramifications and reverberations of Trump’s pending Iran deal decision this month will be felt not just in Europe, but at home in Washington. Trump should tread carefully: Europe has its own hand to play. Make no mistake, if Trump upends the Iran nuclear agreement while Tehran is in compliance, he will bring about the single biggest alienation of the United States from its European allies since President Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. It took our country seven years to rebuild the prestige and credibility we lost on the world stage because of that misadventure. Trump’s abrogation of the world’s work of more than a decade to rid ourselves of the Iranian nuclear threat would represent even more of a seismic shift away from our allies of first resort. Germany’s foreign minister says the Iran nuclear agreement “prevented a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.” The International Atomic Energy Agency in Austria is charged with monitoring Iran’s activities confirms that Iran is in compliance with the toughest standards ever agreed to in a nonproliferation framework. Trump could let the Iranian nuclear genie out of the bottle at great peril to his European relationships. Perhaps to Trump, these European alliances aren’t of great consequence, but they should be. It is, after all, this president who has insisted that Europe share the burdens of national security in greater proportions. Alienating Europe is a way to ensure the opposite. When I served as U.S. ambassador to Italy during President Obama’s administration, I saw just how much the security of the United States was connected to our diplomatic and military cooperation with Italy. We cooperated on basing and joint exercises and sorties for Libya airstrikes out of Sigonella. We shared the burden on efforts to provide humanitarian help to Syria. Italy was an effective convener for global efforts to support struggling nations after the Arab Spring roiled the Middle East and North Africa. Driving away our allies is a guaranteed way for the United States to have the burden for essential efforts land squarely in our lap, and to lose the ability to pull allies to our side.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 38
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
Trump may not appreciate how vital these relationships are, but as a native New Yorker, he should. NATO’s Article V commitments were invoked, for the first and only time, to come to America’s aid after the 9/11 attacks. European troops have deployed side by side with ours in Iraq and Afghanistan. Europe may not be able to persuade Trump to pay heed to common sense but can certainly pressure him with the reality of transatlantic leverage. First, as Merkel has said, a consequence of Trump splitting the United States away from Europe on Iran could be that it pushes our closest allies toward more constructive and more necessary relationships with Russia, China and Iran itself, all of which want the nuclear agreement to remain intact. This would be a tough pill for the United States to swallow and is likely to jeopardize American influence over many important questions, from western Europe’s energy independence from Russia to access to the Arctic region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Second, Europe has more leverage than Trump concedes to keep the deal afloat without us. Would Washington really enforce secondary sanctions on European companies? Would Brussels block them? Would this incentivize a shift away from conducting business through U.S. channels? While the economic impact is likely to be minimal given that even after the Iran deal, Europe’s trade with Iran is a minimal percentage of its economies, but the opportunity to set precedent that undermines the preeminence of our financial institutions is undeniable. Europe could take the United States to the woodshed at the World Trade Organization. Europe has precedence for bucking American ideological bombast, as just before this century, Brussels launched a case against the United States over American penalties against foreign companies trading with Cuba, and it worked. Compromise was struck and the United States largely surrendered the threat of secondary sanctions for continuing to do business with Cuba. What I know is true on both sides of the Atlantic is to expect a fight. Europe fought hard and sacrificed much in order to arrive at a nuclear agreement with Iran that protected a continent that is geographically, culturally and historically closer to the Middle East than the United States will ever be. This issue is deeply personal to Europe. President Trump risks finding out just how personal it is the hard way. http://thehill.com/opinion/international/385810-expect-a-fight-on-the-iran-deal-between- america-and-europe Return to top
The Diplomat (Washington, D.C.) How Much Do the Panmunjom Agreements Matter? By Liang Tuang Nah April 30, 2018 How impactful are the summit’s agreements and how will they influence the Trump-Kim summit? Beyond perceptions among some that the first Moon-Kim Summit was a resounding success lie deeper implications related to how impactful the various agreements reached at the summit really are, how these agreements influence regional and international security, and how this summit might affect the upcoming Trump-Kim summit to be held in late May or June. How Impactful are the Summit’s Agreements? From a state of serious antagonism several months ago to the meeting last week between North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in, the summit can be seen as a success due to the
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 39
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // raft of positive agreements struck. However, these agreements need to be critically evaluated and they fall into three categories. Firstly those which are easily undone but good for inter-Korean morale; secondly, those which have the potential to bring about enduring positive change; and, lastly, those that sound good but are insubstantial. Referencing the first group, Seoul and Pyongyang have agreed to resume reunions of family members separated by the Korean War, set up a liaison office in Kaesong, and refrain from hostile action at the borders. These signal improving North-South relations but can easily be undone via executive order if disputes arise. Next, both sides pledged to seek a peace treaty replacing the Korean War armistice via multilateral consultations with China and the United States. Such a treaty would be a game changer on the peninsula as it would strongly encourage good behavior from North Korea, and indirectly assure the security of the Kim regime. However, winning the approval of the Trump administration for Washington’s signing of this treaty is contingent upon the DPRK’s denuclearization. Turning to the third and last group, the joint declaration signed by Moon and Kim at the summit commits both North and South to seek complete denuclearization. This appears lofty but is ultimately vague, open to misinterpretations, and has no set time frame. Based on Pyongyang’s poor track record in honoring nuclear disarmament agreements, there exists much skepticism about whether Kim will verifiably disarm and if he ultimately insists on retaining nuclear arms, all the progress from this summit might well collapse. How the Agreements Influence Regional and International Security The Panmunjom Declaration signed by Moon and Kim on April 27 is phrased in rather broad and general terms, but it has to be since it is a consensus document. Fundamentally, the spirit of national reconciliation evident in the declaration is arguably the same as the sentiments shared by both Seoul and Pyongyang during their earlier two summits, in 2007 and 2000. However, some parts stand out due to deeper implications, such as substatement one of point one where, “both sides agreed to… fully implement all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far.” This line implies that Pyongyang has renewed its commitment to the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. This could potentially be used in future nuclear negotiations to prevent Northern delegations from stalling. Another noteworthy subpoint is substatement two of point three where “South and North Korea agreed to carry out (conventional) disarmament in a phased manner, as military tension is alleviated and substantial progress is made in military confidence building.” From a South Korean national security standpoint, this raises eyebrows because the South Korean military is numerically inferior to the Korean People’s Army and any force reduction might exponentially weaken the South to the North’s advantage. As for Pyongyang’s sincerity about this substatement, the military first or “Songun” policy of Jong-un’s father Kim Jong-Il, leads to natural skepticism about the former’s sincerity in slashing troop, tank, and artillery numbers. Also, the sub-statement is highly conditional, is difficult to verify, and may never be realized. Finally, the declaration substantiates Moon’s agreement to attend another summit with Kim in the fall, hence giving South Korea at least another five months of stability as the North will be on its best behavior in the short term. This should boost southern business confidence. How this Summit might affect the Trump-Kim Summit Lastly, with this first summit concluded, it might be fair to assume that Kim is looking to achieve results in terms of sanctions relief, and that failure to obtain concessions within a reasonable time frame might result in a return to antagonistic North Korean policies.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 40
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
That said, if I were in Moon’s shoes, I would recommend that he advise U.S. President Donald Trump not to underestimate Kim and that the former should offer the latter a fair denuclearization deal. Also, since Moon is going to meet Kim again in the fall, he might offer to communicate and possibly support any new improved proposals from Trump to Kim, subject to the preservation of South Korea’s national interests, so that the denuclearization process does not falter. https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/how-much-do-the-panmunjom-agreements-matter/ Return to top
Stratfor (Austin, Texas) Can North Korea Really Give Up Its Nukes? By Rodger Baker April 26, 2018 Ahead of the landmark inter-Korean summit, North Korea has offered to shutter its nuclear test site, suspend intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear weapons tests, and ultimately denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Although it was framed in ambiguous terms, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's announcement serves to set up both the impending meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae In and the subsequent proposed sit-down with U.S. President Donald Trump. A year ago, it appeared as if nothing would get North Korea to budge on its nuclear weapons program and its insistence on being recognized as a nuclear state. Now, it is making numerous public "concessions" even before it sits down with South Korean and U.S. leaders. It is little surprise, then, that there is quite a bit of confusion over just what North Korea wants, what it is willing to do, and whether the North Korean leadership can be trusted to stick to any deals that may be struck. A few years back, Stratfor argued that North Korea's nuclear weapons program was no longer being treated as a bargaining chip to be traded away temporarily in return for economic and political benefits, but instead had become a strategic necessity to ensure the country's future. One of the key changes in the North's assessment was the death of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, who despite giving up his weapons of mass destruction was nevertheless killed in a U.S.-supported overthrow of his government. Nonetheless, North Korea has said it is willing now to denuclearize, raising the question of whether the government is sincere. History may suggest no, but patterns of behavior can change. These developments raise several questions: Could North Korea give up its weapons program? How does the program fit into the North's grand strategy? And is the program its end goal, or a means to an end? A Grand Strategy Informed by History North Korea's grand strategy is centered on a single goal: the unification of the Korean Peninsula. This stems from the North's reading of Korean history. Although a unified Korea is vulnerable to its larger neighbors and was the pathway of invasion between maritime and continental Northeast Asia in the 13th, 16th and 20th centuries, a divided Korea is even more vulnerable. Pyongyang ties its history to the Koguryo kingdom, which lasted from the first to seventh centuries. At its peak, it stretched from the Han River Valley well into modern-day northeastern China. An alliance between the southern Korean kingdom of Silla with Tang China led to the collapse of Koguryo. Much of its territory and population were left in China's hands, and Chinese influence and power were extended, at least loosely, over subsequent Korean kingdoms. The division of Korea after World War II between the two Cold War camps only reinforced the message to North Korea. A divided Korea is weak, a Korea dependent upon foreign power is
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 41
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 // exploitable, and true independence and security come only from self-reliance and indigenous strength. Nuclear Bargaining Chips North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons dates back at least to the 1960s (a time when the South was also engaged in a nuclear weapons program), when it was building on a nascent nuclear power and research program facilitated by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. After then, North Korea took only gradual steps to finalize the program, and several times traded away testing and even facilities to gain economic and political benefits. It was only in the early 21st century that the North took more concerted efforts to complete the program, breaking a taboo on nuclear testing and accelerating its long-range missile programs. In 2008, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il had a stroke, and after his recovery, the nuclear weapons program surged ahead as he sought to complete it before handing over power. The North carried out several missile tests and a second nuclear test in 2009. In 2010, the North sank a South Korean military ship and shelled a South Korean island, and it revealed to a U.S. researcher that it had a uranium enrichment program in addition to its known plutonium program. The sense of heightened tensions led to a resumption of dialogue between the United States and North Korea in 2011, and to a deal on Feb. 29, 2012, a little more than two months after Kim Jong Il's death. The timing was an eerie reflection of the 1994 Agreed Framework, which was struck after a crisis moment and finalized after the death of one leader and the transition to a new one. But the leap day agreement of 2012 was more limited than the 1994 deal, and just as in that earlier agreement, things began to break down after the new North Korean leader solidified his internal control through purges, executions and leadership shuffles. Kim Jong Il's death and the ascension of Kim Jong Un was followed a few months later by Gadhafi's fall. The Libyan leader's slaying came just eight years after he had given up his WMD program in exchange for a return to the international community. The message to North Korea's new rulers was clear: Giving up a nuclear program would do little to end the sense of hostilities and only leave the North vulnerable to later U.S. political and military action. In 2013 the North resumed nuclear testing and accelerated its missile development program, which continued through 2017. As 2018 dawned, there was every expectation that the North was preparing for an atmospheric nuclear test sometime within the year to demonstrate its full nuclear capacity. It also seemed apparent that the United States had grown more serious in its preparation for a military means to stop the North. Instead, in his New Year's address, Kim Jong Un offered to reach out to South Korea, and that move launched a diplomatic offensive that is now about to culminate not only in another inter-Korean summit, but also in the first summit between the sitting leaders of the United States and North Korea. The North has revealed the "concessions" it is willing to make, and it has reduced its demands on the United States and South Korea. Once again, the nuclear program appears to be more of a bargaining chip than a tool of regime survival. A Goal or a Means? So were nuclear weapons the goal all along? Were they the only way that the North could "ensure" the government's security in the face of a hostile United States? Or were they a means to achieve both regime security and a path toward unification? One could argue that, as in several past cases, the North has once again raised the stakes and likelihood of international conflict to the near- breaking point, then provided an opening for others to rush in to ease tensions and buy it more time. Another argument is that the North was unable to gain the assurances it wanted from its nascent nuclear program and that U.S. sanctions this time, backed by China, are actually forcing it back to the table. The reality may not be as stark or as simple.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 42
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
North Korea's nuclear program was always a risk, perhaps more than it was a source of true security. The closer the North got to becoming a nuclear weapons state, the greater the perceived need of the United States to stop that progress — even if it meant using military force. The North took the Gadhafi case to heart, but many have argued that it was a false comparison to begin with, even if the North believed it. Unlike the Libyans, the North Koreans have had tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers within range of their conventional weapons — lives held "hostage" to U.S.-North Korean relations. Furthermore, the North has hundreds of artillery and rocket tubes aimed at Seoul, the capital of a key U.S. ally. Any U.S. attempt to overthrow the Kim government would be met with a war on the peninsula, a war that could quickly spread to include China, Japan and even Russia. The Libyan leader had little such ability to ensure mass casualties for America and its allies. North Korea's nuclear weapons program has reached a critical moment. By most assessments, the North is now capable of placing a nuclear device atop a missile and delivering it to a target. South Korea, Japan and China are within range of the North's nascent capacity. The North has a lower probability of success in striking Hawaii and Guam, and even less proven capacity to reach the continental United States. But the theoretical capability is there. North Korea hasn't yet fully demonstrated re-entry technology capable of shielding a complex nuclear weapon and of delivering it to its target, but it has claimed through its media that such tests have been conclusive. A full demonstration of that capability, the final "proof" of the North's nuclear capability, was expected to be an atmospheric nuclear test over the Pacific, perhaps as early as this year. The test was to have shown that the North was now a nuclear weapons state, one that could no longer be isolated into submission but required engagements and recognition on the international stage. The North's leadership had set 2020 as the goal for recognition. Big Ambition, Small Steps The upcoming U.S.-North Korea summit meeting appears to achieve some of these goals. It gives the North the global recognition it seeks, and it may break the diplomatic and economic box constraining the country's development. The inter-Korean summit will, at least temporarily, provide the North with small steps toward closer integration and cooperation with South Korea, as well as with a small move toward the strategic goal of unification. The North's conventional deterrence remains, and it has signaled it does not demand the withdrawal of U.S. forces — thus keeping them hostage on the peninsula and providing a layer of security for itself. Giving up a WMD program did not ensure the survival of Gadhafi, but neither did the possession of a massive nuclear weapons arsenal ensure the political survival or territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. In the end, it fits within the North's grand strategy to give up its nuclear weapons program, assuming all other elements align to ensure its security, economic prosperity and national reunification. But that is a tall order, and even if the North commits to giving up the program, there are numerous steps to dismantling it, and none of these are truly irreversible. North Korean scientists will not simply forget what they have learned. A future unified Korea, squeezed between Japan and China and seeking independent national strength, may well revive a nuclear weapons program rather than rely on the interests of outside powers for its security. But in the meantime, it is not unbelievable that the North may trade away the public face of its nuclear weapons program — but it will not do so merely to ease sanctions pressure. It will demand a lot more from South Korea and the United States. https://www.stratfor.com/article/can-north-korea-really-give-its-nukes Return to top
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 43
// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1313 //
ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.
DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 44