Ean War, 1854-1856

and ean War, 1854-1856

James Urry Victoria Uiliversity of Wellington, New Zealalzd arm' Lawrence Klippenstein Mer111011iteHeritage Centre, Winnipeg

Mennonites have often been unwilling participants in conflicts between warring armies, in spite of their non-resistant principles. Many "Dutch" Men- nonites who settled in Danzig (Gdansk) and Polish Prussia in the sixteenth century were refugees from the bitter religious wars between the Catholic Hapsburgs and Protestant Dutch. Danzig and the Polish lands, however, were not to prove havens of peace. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Mennonites faced invading armies, sieges and periods of occupa- tion by foreign troops as the region was overrun by Swedish, Prussian and Russian troops.' The first Mennonite emigrants to settle in Russia after 1789 thus understood the ordeals of war from personal experience. During the next twenty-five years an even greater upheaval occurred as Napoleon attempted to dominate European affairs and French and allied armies wrought havoc across large areas of Europe. Prussian Mennonites experienced the full force of this onslaught, and even the colonists settled in distant Russia were obliged to contribute to Russia's dcfcnce against the invading French.' Be- tween 1790 and 1815, an entire generation grew to adulthood in Europe knowing little of peace and security:

War present, war threatened, war in prospect, war not long past, war in every known shape and form, war happening to someone else even if not just then to you yourself, and talk of war as the ultimate conditioner of your existence-this was the common European experience of that ep0ch.j While many Mennonites who migrated to New Russia up to the 1820s had some personal experience of war, the next generation, born and raised in Russia, grew to maturity in an atmosphere of relative peace. Russia though was a militaristic state.4Its army had helped free Europe from the Napoleonic yoke, its emperors often gloried in military display and staffed their court and 10 .loul-rial of Meririoriire St~rdies bureaucracies with military officers. Between 1820 and 1850 Russian armies were involved in a number of campaigns in the Caucasus region (1 829-1 864) and in Central Asia (1839-1843,1847-1853) as the Empire was expanded eastwards. There also was war with Persia and Turkey (1826-1829), the suppression of the Polish insurrection (1830-1831) and in 1849 military intervention in Hungary to destroy the uprising against Austrian rule. Every- where, Russian armies appeared victorious. Living in New Russia Mennonites were largely isolated from these events, although sometimes, like other colonists, they contributed aid to the g~vernment.~During the 1850s, however, war broke out between Russia and a number of European states, with the major theatre of fighting situated in the Crimea, very close to the main Mennonite settlements. Suddenly a new generation had to come to terms with war. The outcome of the Crimean War (from now on referred to as the War), resulted in the defeat of Russian troops on Russian soil, a defeat which was to have a major impact on the future direction of Russian society and consequently on the Mennonites. Politically the War was the result of Britain and France's attempts to prevent the expansion of Russian influence in the Near East and southeastern Europe. Russia's rulers had long dreamed of seizing Constantinople and the Straits separating the Black Sea and the Mediterranean from the Ottomans. They would then control the Black Sea, gain access to the Mediterranean, dominate the Balkans and so fulfill Russia's destiny as a major power in European affairs. In 1853 the outbreak of hostilities between Russian and Turkish forces alarmed both the British and the French governments. Follow- ing the failure of diplomatic efforts, the British and French allied themselves with the Turks and early in 1854 declared war on Russia. Allied fleets entered the Baltic and Black Seas and in September an allied army landed in the Crimea.6 The aim of the invasion was to seize the Russian naval base at Sevas- topol. Strategically the Russians faced a number of difficulties in defending Sevastopol and repulsing the allies. Considerable forces had to be maintained in northern Russia to prevent an allied landing on the Baltic coast. Moreover, uncertainty concerning the neutrality of Prussia, and especially Austria, meant that troops had to be maintained on Russia's long western borders. The army assigned to southern Russia also faced problems. New Russia was still sparsely populated and underdeveloped; communications were poor and the movement of troops and supplies proved extremely difficult. Whereas the allies could supply their armies by sea in a matter of weeks from western Europe, the movement of troops and supplies overland from central Russia often took months. The allied landing was successful in spite of Russian resistance and the Russians were forced to retreat. Sevastopol, refortified by the Russians, was besieged by the allies throughout 1854 and into the sunllner of 1855. Both armies were heavily reinforced until by the summer of 1855 175,000 allied troops faced 170,000 Russian defenders in Sevastopol and considerable troop co~lcelltratio~lselsewhere in the Crimea and southern Russia.' The first record of the Mennonites' response to the War involved the con- tribution of money to aid suffering and wounded soldiers in March/April 1854. Whetller these contributions were entirely voluntary, or had been "requested" or "expected" by the authorities is unclear. Similar donations, however, were forwarded by other settlers administered, like the Mennonites, by the Guardians Committee of the Ministry of State Domains, the government agency which controlled the affairs of foreign colonists. The District Office in each colony appears to have calculated a suitable levy, which in Khortitsa amounted to five silver rubles per full farm and one ruble per l~ousehold (Br.arzdhof-a dwelling assessable for taxation purpo~es).~The Khortitsa colonists managed to raise 4,387 silver rubles 64 kopecks.' How the Molochnaia authorities calculated contributio~lsis not recorded, but a total of 7,500 silver rubles was raised while the Mennonites of the Mariupol District (Bergthal) gave an additional 772 rubles. lo In all the Me~lno~lites raised over 12,000 silver rubles. Their contributions were dutifully acknowledged by the authorities in official statements of gratitude, published in the colonists' newspaper." Earlier, in January 1854, the Molochnaia Mennonites had seen troops marching south to the Crimea. In February the authorities ordered each village to provide wagons to transport soldiers across the Molochnaia River. 'These were troops of the 17th Infantry Division, enroute from their peace- time headquarters at Nizhnii Novgorod.13 Heavy winter snows had fallen and an early thaw caused rivers, streams and dams to overflow. Large areas of ground became waterlogged. The colonists recalled this period (March to April 1854) as the Wasserpod~~od,~~a time when lives were lost as Mennon- ite drivers struggled to aid the troops.15 Delayed by the atrocious conditions, the 2nd Brigade of the Division was fed "delicious fare" in Mennonite homes and each battalion received a hundred hams as an "Easter gift." Once across the Moloch~laiaRiver, the Division's progress was again assisted near Me- litopol by a bridge built at the personal expense of the Mennonite estate owner Johann Cornies of Tashchenak.'%fter the war Major General Volkov of the Tarutinski Regiment, part of the 17th Division, raised an impressive monument in Neu Halbstadt to colnmemorate the Mennonites' assistance during this difficult period.17 The IChortitsa Mennonites also were ordered to supply five hundred wagons and drivers to transport troops and supplies from the city of Ekateri- noslav in the spring of 1854. Each farm had to supply a wagon, as did groups of cottagers (An~iohner)who were also required to contribute towards expenses. In May the District Office received orders to supply labour to improve the post road near the colony so troops and supplies could move easily towards the Crimea. Later, in January 1855, the Khortitsa authorities were instructed to repair the bridge between Schoenwiese and Alexandro~sk.~~ Although the enemy did not invade the Crimea until September 1854, the Cririleari War. 13

Russians had suspected possible moves against their positions as early as 1853. This accounts for the movement of troops early in 1854. By July the Russians were aware that the allies intended to attack Sevastopol and additional troops were ordered south, although most did not arrive until after the allied landing and the first major battle at the Alma River on the 8/20 September." In tlie summer of 1854 the problem of supplying the troops became obvious. By September the Russians had 50,000 troops in the Crimean Penin- sula but their Provisions' Com~nissionwas small and poorly managed. The Crimea, for large parts of the interior, was arid and barren, sparsely populated and quite inadequate for supplying the large numbers of troops and animals massed in the area. Cossaclcs foraged off the country, raided villages and looted estates, making the situation worse."' The transport system was in chaos. Roads to the interior, from where most supplies had to come, were inadequate. The heavy Russian wagons bogged down or collapsed under tlie strain; draft animals died on the journey and the supplies wliich did arrive were often spoiled. To improve the situation tlie new Russian Commander, General Prince M.D. Gorchakov, appointed a skilled Intendant, General F.K. Zatler, to reorganize tlie supply system." The Mennonites offered supplies to the army: food for the soldiers and hay and other feed for horses. In October 1854 2,225 pzrd (36,446 kg) of ~~(lil~ni.i,a toasted rusk which was an essential item of a soldier's diet, as well as a quantity of butter was volunteered by the Khortitsa settlers who also offered to transport the foodstuffs to tlie Crirnea. Later, in November, the Guardians Committee directed the Kliortitsa colonists to transport 130,000 p~rdof srrk1zar.i (2,129 tonnes) to the Crimea and in December two hundred wagons set out on the arduous journey." I11 September tlie Moloclinaia authorities were required to supply one wagon for every tell farms in the colony. Some wagons were loaded with troops, others with supplies, and in the autumn of 1854 4,000 wagons loaded with hay travelled from Molochnaia to the Cri1nea.I3 By the winter of 1854 the Mennonites had grown accustomed to fulfill- ing official requests to ferry troops and to haul supplies. Their farm wagons, sturdily built of wood and iron, their horses, strong, healthy and well har- nessed, were soon recognized by the authorities as ideally s~~itedfor supply duties. The colonists' wagons already possessed a good reputation for their robustness in New Russia and beyond, and the wagon making industry had flourished in the colonies since the 1830s." The wagons were undoubtedly better suited to the task of supplying the army than the average peasant's wagon, usually powered by oxen." Even the colonists' wagons, however, needed some modification for the long journey as most were designed for short trips around the farm and fields. Canvas covers were constructed to protect the loads and additional co~nfortsinstalled for the drivers.'" Usually each wagon had two drivers, sometimes a young son or a hired man, more often a cottager. Each wagon team was responsible for its own food, coolcing utensils and fodder for the horses. The village mayor selected a leader and villagers travelled in convoy, joining other village groups along the way. The Mennonites travelled together wherever possible, sometimes associating with other colonists engaged in the podvod . Drivers frequently became separated from their convoys and returned home alone or with other groiIps. It would appear that supply instructions came from the Ministry of State Domains as directives to tlie Guardians Committee, who then ordered the District Office to instruct village authorities to organize wagons and supplies. These were the normal channels of official communication to foreign colonists and would not have been openly questioned. In Molochnaia the Agricul- ture Union played an important role in organizing supplies and transport- not surprisingly, as during the 1840s Johann Cornies had made the Union responsible for much of the colony's affairs." While the military directly requisitioned peasant goods and ordered peasant work brigades to haul supplies," there is no evidence that Mennonites were subject to direct military command, except in the immediate war zone. Cossack escorts, however, were later assigned to some Mennonite convoys." Though not directly under military orders, the colonists effectively had been drafted for military service, albeit in a non-combative role. Soinetimes goods carried to the front originated in the colony; at otlier times tlie supplies were collected from centres to which drivers were directed. Goods were occasionally transported to other depots. In February 1885, for instance, the Khortitsa colonists were ordered to ferry supplies to Perelcop, b~~twere allowed to unload at Berislav and return 1~01ne.~~'As the siege of Sevastopol intensified, the army's supply situation in the Crimea became more critical. In 1855 the number of trips the colonists had to make, and the time drivers were absent from home, increased significantly. Some Mennonites went all the way to the besieged port, usually unloading their supplies on tlie northern shore as the main town was subject to alrnost continuous bombardment. Otherwise supplies were unloaded at towns along the road to Sevastopol, at Duvanki, Bakhchiserai and Simferopol. The dis- tance by road from Ekaterinoslav, just north of ICIiortitsa, to Sevastopol was 523 versts (558 lcms), from Melitopol, sout11 of Molochnaia, it was 3 14 i~er-sts (335 kms) and from Perekop 205 vel-sts (219 kms).'l But the time taken to complete a journey varied enormously. In winter tlie roads were often frozen and covered with snow; in the spring they turned to a niuddy quagmire, as they did after heavy rain. The unsealed roads were deeply rutted and pot- holed, and in summer dust became a major nuisance. Drivers had great difficulty locating water for themselves and their horses in arid parts of the Crimea. To hinder progress further, tlie roads were often crowded with other transport columns and troops. Roadsides were littered with broken carts, discarded property, abandoned supplies and dead animals, swollen and rot- ting in the ditclies." Once in the Crimea drivers were occasionally delayed by ~r-iiizearlWar- 15 requests to transport supplies to other locations. Some return trips took twenty-five to thirty days from Molochnaia; others up to fifty. In November 1854, the military drafted 6,000 peasant wagons into service, but by December only 2,000 were still serviceable; by the summer of 1855 over 125,000 peasant and colonist wagons had been drafted.3' The actual number of convoys involving Mennonites is uncertain, but one report suggests that between 1854 and 1855 seven to eight groups left Molocl~naia.'~ During 1855, the period of most intense activity, the Molochnaia colonists sent 9,617 wagon loads with 56,604 chetver-t (169,812 litres or 322,643 bushels) of provisions including 35,000 cl7etvei-t (105,000 litres or 199,500 bushels) of animal feed (oats and hay).3' Soon Mennonites were also returning from the Crimea with sick and wounded soldiers. Many were casualties of the fighting, but outbreaks of disease required large numbers of soldiers to be evacuated. Scurvy, dysentery, cholera and typhus were among the most common illnesses. The exact number of casualties due to fighting and disease is unknown, but a recent estimate suggests that between 406,000 and 450,000 Russians died as a result of war between 1853 and 1856.'6 The first major battle at the Alma River (8120 September 1854) occurred shortly after the landings, and the Russians suffered 6,000 casualties. The medical services proved hopelessly inadequate and hundreds of dead, dying and wounded were left unattended for days on the battlefield." The early allied attacks on Sevastopol, and the fighting at Balaclava in early October as the allies attempted to encircle the port, produced more casualties. But the Russian offensive which resulted in the Battle of Inkerman (24 OctoberJ9 November) produced the highest number of dead and wounded. 35,000 Russian troops were engaged, of whom 10,000 became casualties and another 2,000 were killed or wounded in allied attacks on Sevastopol during the same period. Once again medical services were unable to cope with the situation, and soldiers died for want of help as a handful of doctors attempted to save lives.7x The appalling medical situation called for immediate action. Civilian doctors volunteered their help, the most important being N.I. Pirogov who held the Chair of Surgery at the St. Petersburg Academy of Medicine and Surgery. He arrived in the Cri~neain November 1854 and soon reorganized medical service^.^' At the same time a group of nurses arrived, organized by Pirogov with the support of the Tsar's sister, the Grand Duchess Yelena Pavl~vna."~ As early as October 1854, Russian officials had thanked Mennonites for their assistance to the sick and wounded." 111 early December 1854 the Mol- ochnaia colonists offered to take 1,520 wounded back to their colony, while by the end of the month Khortitsa took 357.4' Eventually, over 5,000 Russian soldiers were cared for in the Mennonite colonies.-" At least one hospital was located in the Mennonite village of Gnadenfeld in Molochnaia, but many colonists also took soldiers into their own homes to rec~perate.~~Similar assistance was provided by other foreign colonists in New Russia. Three hospitals for instance were established in Prischib, the major administrative centre in the Molochnaia "German" colony, to the west of the Mennonite township of Halb~tadt.~~ The Russian military, and especially the medical personnel, had nothing but praise for the colonists' efforts.46Whereas the unsprung Russian peasant wagons could carry only two or three patients in great discomfort, the colonists' sprung wagons could carry up to eight in relative comfort. Each convoy, sometimes made up of 150 wagons, was accompanied by a doctor and nurses if they were available.47 The Russians attempted to evacuate all their sick and wounded to base hospitals in the Crimea or southern Russia. As the siege of Sevastopol intensified, casualties increased; by the early summer of 1855 there were 65,000 soldiers requiring medical assistance and during the final assault on the town in September 1855 the Russians suffered 13,000 ca~ualties.~Wnesource reported that between March and October 1855, 88,000 sick and wounded were transferred from Sevastopol to base hospitals, while in Simferopol alone there were 113,000 patients.49Dressing stations and operating hospitals in Sevastopol were places of horror, as the accounts of Leo Tolstoy testify.jO But the base hospitals away from the front, such as those at Kherson and Nikolayev, were far from havens of safety for the wounded. Some hospital administrators, like many regimental supply officers, were corr~pt.~'The treatment soldiers received was often rudimentary and the crowded, unsani- tary conditions were a breeding ground for disease. In 1855, 23% of all patients in Simferopol hospitals died, while in Nikolayev in the early months of 1856 the death rate soared to 43%.j2 It is little wonder that doctors and soldiers preferred the colonies to military hospitals, as the chances of a patient's survival were so much better. Both the allied and Russian armies suffered terribly from sudden outbreaks of infectious disease. As the weather warmed, especially in June and July 1855, cholera broke out among troops and civilians. Some Mennonites also came down with the infection and died."The worse killer, however, was typhus which plagued the army from October through December, killing many patients already weak from wounds or other infections." One Mennon- ite who discovered a nice piece of cloth by the road, soon discarded it when he found it infested with lice." Infestation of clothing and hair by lice was the main means by which typhus was transmitted and the wounded, often infested and infected, brought disease to the colonies causing other Mennonite deaths.j5 Prisoners of war were also transported by the colonists.j7 An English sergeant of the 23rd Regiment of Foot, captured at Inkerman, stayed briefly with a Mennonite family in Einlage, Khortitsa. In his diary he noted that he was well fed, was asked to record his name and regiment along with other prisoners in a Mennonite book and requested to present some of his military buttons to his I~osts.~~A Khortitsa diarist recorded transporting English and Crirllenr~Wnr 17

French prisoners-of-war in early December and this English sergeant may have been among their number.j9 Besides opening their homes to Russian wounded and allied prisoners, the Mennonites also provided refuge to people fleeing the War. The allied navies controlled the Black Sea and to prevent the Russians supplying their forces across the Sea of Azov an allied naval squadron entered its waters in May 1855. Coastal shipping was attacked, the coastal ports shelled and landing parties put ashore to destroy grain stores ar l warehouse^.^^ Mariupol was attacked and also Berdiansk, a port which contained a flourishing Mennonite community of merchants whose property was damaged.61 Many of the citizens of the coastal ports fled inland, some finding refi~gein the colonies. The Mennonite settlers in the Mariupol area (Bergthal) received non-Mennonites into their homes while many of the Mennonite merchants fled to Mo10chnaia.~~ The War was thus a time of considerable disruption in the colonies and provided a host of new problems, experiences, and challenges. The War brought tl~ousandsof outsiders into the colonies: marching troops, colonists and peasants moving supplies, refugees and others. Many Mennonites, however, particularly those in Molochnaia, had grown accustomed over the previous decade to meeting exotic visitors who journeyed to wonder at the Mennonite transformation of the once barren steppe.63A number of Mennon- ites had travelled beyond the colonies to trade or to act as advisors to other foreign colonists, Jewish settlers or model peasants. Some had even ventured into the Crimea, as far as Simferopol, which was an important market centre and the seat of the Taurida provincial government. The War provided many more Mennonites with an opportunity to travel beyond tlie narrow confines of their local village and colony where most had expected to spend their entire lives. Many of the hundreds of Mennonites involved directly in transporting supplies were extremely young, some mere boys. Heinrich Dirks was only thirteen when he accompanied his father to Sevastopol, where he ventured into the town; Jacob Unruh was only fifteen." To the young it was a time of great adventure, and tlie young men involved would recall their experiences for the rest of their lives.h5 Their accounts, written long after- wards, recapture their sense of excitement at being involved in the struggle between powerful nations; the sights and sounds of war, colourful military uniforms, heavy guns, exotic peoples and places, distant mountain land- scapes. The hardships and experiences they shared with other Mennonites 011 the trail often established new friendships which endured long after tlie War ended. Those who came close to the scenes of fighting were often fascinated by the awesome beauty of war: the night sky lighted up by shells, the colour, the noise and acrid smell of e~plosives.~~utsuch experiences were tempered by a realisation of the destructive properties of modern weapons. Heinrich Dirks recalled seeing the burnt and twisted remains of human bodies, spread out on army greatcoats, torn apart by high explosive^.^^ An apprentice blacksmith in Moloclinaia who attempted to dismantle a shell taken back to the colonies, destroyed the smithy and killed him~elf.~Wearthe site of the Battle of Alma, a Russian youth who attempted to retrieve a boot discovered it was still attached to a decomposing leg.6yJohann Goosen of the Molochnaia village of Wernersdorf saw frozen corpses stacked in piles awaiting the spring thaw for burial.70 Away from the discipline of their parents and congregational leaders, many younger Mennonites acquired unsavoury habits:

These boys were told to smoke and also drink brandy to ward off contagious diseases. Father said this did very little good but rather caused them to form disagreeable habits. They also acquired the use of profane language from their rough companions. When they returned home they felt quite out of place with the other boys of the village. Soon they all agreed to break their undesirable habits acquired in the war. Father said war did not tend to improve mankind."

At least one account also reports anti-semitism among Russian soldiers, un- fortunately common at this period, and this too may have been a new experience for many Mennonite~.~" Evidence of the economic cost of the War to the colonists is contradic- tory. No further large gifts of money appear to have been demanded or given beyond the sums raised in 1854.73 Individual colonists undoubtedly contributed gifts of produce and even money, while every householder was required to supply wagons and labour. Established patterns of production and distribu- tion were obviously disrupted or curtailed due to the War, although poor harvests and a locust plague in 1855 prevent a proper calculation of the costs of the War from available figures. Grain for instance could not be exported through the coastal ports blockaded by the allied navies. However, the large number of troops in southern Russia, and the high prices offered for foodstuffs, easily compensated for any loss of overseas marltets. There was also the additional demand for hay to feed the large number of horses used by the military .74 Hermann Niebuhr, the Khortitsa mill owner, recalled the War as tlie first "golden age of milling," as the high prices paid for flour helped secure his family's fortune.75 Daniel Peters, also of Khortitsa, kept a large sheep flock outside the colony and during the War he exchanged sheep, weight for weight, for animals driven south to supply the troops. After their long journey these sheep were often emaciated, so Peters quickly increased the size of his flock. Later he sold the now fattened animals, undoubtedly at a handsome profit, back to the army who were always short of supplies. The War also secured Peters' fortune and he wisely invested his money in land and became an estate ~wner.~TTheWar, and the widespread corruption among regimental supply officers, created numerous opportunities for p~ofiteering.~~While there is no direct evidence of Mennonite involvement in such activities, there is for otlier foreign colonists. Friedrich Fein of the "German" Molochnaia colonies amassed a fortune selling hay, a fortune he too invested in land after tlie War.7x C~.iri~ear~War- 19

Even a modest Mennonite artisan or farmer could profit from the War. Wool, which was still a major product of the colonies, was in demand for uniforms. The wagon industry boomed, almost doubling output between 1853 and 1855.7yBlacksmiths, leather workers and saddlers were kept busy repairing wagons and harness worn and damaged on tlie long journeys. Soldiers' boots and uniforms needed repairing. Farmers found a ready market among the troops for their household produce: butter, cheese, hams, fruit and honey. On trips to tlie Crimea many drivers took extra supplies with them for sale, returning with their purses full of ~noney.~"I11 Khortitsa the District Office was ordered to arrest those operating taverns and selling vodka in its area.x1 Although for many the War brought prosperity, there were also costs. The requirement to supply wagons and drivers fell unequally 011 the conimu- nity. A prosperous farmer could spare a wagon and horses. He could hire a man, or better a youth, to haul his goods, tlius maintaining farm production while also taking advantage of wartime eco~lomicconditions. But a poor cottager or craftsman could little afford the time or the wagons and horses (which many did not possess anyway). In place of supplying a wagon and team many cottagers were required to pay a levy and provide labour service. A Khortitsa resident, obviously a cottager, kept a careful account of these costs. Between Marcli 1854 and March 1855 he paid out over 100 rubles, although he received some expenses back from the govern~nent.~'Apparently the government paid drivers 50 kopecks a day and by the elid of tlie War the Molochnaia colonists had received 169,835 rubles 22 liopeclcs in wages." How much of this money reached the cottagers is unclear. What is clear, l~owever,is that tlie cottagers bore an unequal share of the burden of tlie War in terms of time, costs and dangers of the yod~lod.Many placed their lives at risk on tlie journey and some never returned. Families who lost a healthy son, or worse, a household head, soon found themselves in difficulty, especially if they were poor and lacked resources. It was the already well-off who mostly profited from the War, not the poor. The War tlius accentuated many of the existing eco~lomicand social disparities in the colonies and contributed to tlie bad feelings between landowners and landless which were to erupt into open confro~ltatio~lafter 1 860.84 How Mennonites at tlie time felt about tlie War and their i~ivolvernentis difficult to gather from available sources. The patriotic outpourings in rather dubious verse of tlie noted school teacher Heinricli Heese, have been interpreted as representative of wider colnmunity opinion. During the War Heese wrote a number of poems calling on the colonists to support the Russian cause. His language is often intemperate and his opinions suspect; there are hints of messianism when he compares the War to a struggle between Holy Russia and the satanic forces of darkness epito~nisedby the French Emperor Napoleon 111, the reembodiment of the anti-Christ Napoleon Bonaparte, and tlie evil of a "democratically" governed England." Heese though was neither born nor raised a Mennonite, having joined the faith as an adult. As an administrator, and particularly as a teacher of the Russian language, he had been exposed to tlie policies of Official Nationality promoted by Nicholas 1's Minister of Education, Coulit Uvarov. Such ideas are clearly reflected in his poems, but the majority of colonists would not have been aware of such senti~nents.~~ertainlyP.M. Friesen's claim that the Mennonite community "took the same stance as Heese" in a show of patriotic loyalty, should be treated with ~aution.~' For the majority of the colonists direct i~ivolvementin military conflict was not only a new experience, but also sometliing for which they were poorly prepared. The Mennonite Privilegium of 1800 exempted Mennonites from being forced into military service against their will and from quartering troops "except when they passed through" their settlements." In fact there was nothing very special about these rights, as they were similar to those granted to all foreign colonists under the provisions of Catherine the Great's 1763 Manifesto inviting foreigners to settle in Rus~ia.~'Mennonites and other colonists were only required to assist troops with quartering if and when they passed through their settlements. It appears unlikely that "quartering" extended to physically transporting troops and supplies, and there was certainly no requirement for the colonists to provide wagons, teams and drivers to supply troops distant from their settlements. As it is quite clear that the Mennonites were required to provide these services on official instructions, one can only assume tliat the provisions, and certainly the spirit, of the colonists' Manifesto and the Mennonite Privilegiu~nhad been breached. To most Mennonites, however, their legal rights and obligations were probably unclear. By the 1850s they were used to obeying official commands communicated to them through their organs of "self government." Tlie orders issued by the Guardians Committee came directly from the Ministry of State Dornain~.~~'Those concerning the War as formulated by the Committee appear to have been comprehensive and specific. Eventually even the mode of transport and care of tlie wounded were covered by instructions. For tlieir part. most Mennonites probably did not question their instructions, which were seen to emanate from Imperial commands. The Tsar and other high officials were viewed as benevolent protectors of Mennonite interests. But such views are not the same as patriotism. Meh~onite respect for authority was based on a long-standing servile attitude towark ruling elites. Tlie established estates were viewed as somehow ordained by&vidence, part of the natural order, and their right to rule and to issue commands were not to be q~~estionedunless they conflicted with basic Mennonite princ?ples of faith. Strange "new" ideas like English popular democracy-or worse, tlie Wub- lican sympathies. . of French citizens-were not to be trusted. Surviving accounts reveal tliat many Mennonites provided assistance with enthusiasm. For colony officials there was the promise of official recognition and reward, but even tlie average colonist was willing to exhibit zeal and to exceed official demands. By 1850 Mennonites, especially those in Molochnaia, were accustomed to being looked upon by tlie authorities as C~.inieariWar 21 exemplary citizens, models of industry and enterprise, efficient in all they undertook. Mennonites had a reputation to maintain. But such attitudes were undoubtedly combined with humanitarian motives. The gift of money to assist the wounded, the actual care of casualties, even the supply of food and other goods can be interpreted in this light. The desire to alleviate suffering was based upon religious principles as important perhaps as that of non- resistance. Just because such clearly articulated expressions of Mennonite humanitarian sentiment cannot be found in existing accounts, is no reason to believe they did not exist. For many Mennonites such self-acclamation would have been tantamount to committing the sin of pride. But did not the supply of troops engaged in armed conflict as well as assistance to cure the sick and wounded so they could return to active service conflict with the basic principle of Mennonite non-resistance? Perhaps the question was too sophisticated, ethically and tl~eologically,for the average colonist. Here it is interesting to consider the case of the Kleitie Genieinde, undoubtedly among the foremost defenders of conservative Mennonite principles at this period in Russia. One of the reasons which had contributed to the separation of their first Elder, Klaas Reimer, from the Flemish congrega- tion in the early years of settlement in Molochnaia, had been his objection to the colonists contributing financial aid to the government during Russia's wars with Napoleon." In 1854, however, the Kleiize Genleit7de joined the rest of the Molochnaia colonists in providing money and later participated in hauling supplies." But in a letter to a Swiss Mennonite written shortly after the War, the officials of the Kleitze Genzeiiide admitted that in providing such assistance they "had gone too far in yielding to the demands of the State."" The experience of supplying assistance to the army of a powerful and organized nation-state with which they had previously been closely involved in non-military activities, was something new to the Russian Mennonites. As the situation emerged suddenly and quickly developed into full-scale involvement, the Mennonites had little time or opportunity to debate the rights and wrongs of their involvement. It may well be that some of the congregational leaders held doubts concerning Mennonite involvement, but any such doubts have gone unrec~rded.~~Under Cornies' rule the congregational leaders had learnt, through bitter experience, not to question the demands of government or the colony civil authorities. If they were cowed from malting public statements which conflicted with official opinion, there were very few means by which they could speak out openly, either in public or the press, even if they had experience of such debates, which most did not. Here the Mennonite contrast wit11 the English Society of Friends' attitude to the Crimean War is instructive. The Qualcers opposed the War and even sent representatives to Russia to publicize their pacifist stand.y5But Qualcers, unlike Mennonites at this period, were experienced in direct political action. They lived in a democracy with civil and political rights; they possessed the right to oppose the government and could express their opinions in a "free" press. During the first half of the nineteenth century Quakers had been active in a number of humanitarian reform movements, part of their wider response to tlie industrialised society emerging in Britain at this period." Tlie Russian Mennonites had no such experience on wl~iclito draw; they lived in a country where most of the population lacked basic civil and political rights and where the press was strictly controlled. During 1855 Russia's military position in the Crimea deteriorated. I11 August an attempt to lift the siege of Sevastopol resulted in another bloody encounter and a further Russian defeat at the Cliernaia River. As tlie allies renewed the siege, the Russians concluded that further defence of the town was impossible and in September, in a carefully executed manoeuvre, they abandoned their fortifications and retreated across tlie harbour. The loss of Sevastopol forced the Russians to start peace negotiations. Emperor Nicholas had died in March 1855 and liis successor, Alexander 11, faced increasing problems at home and abroad. As 1855 drew to a close, the threat that other countries would join the allies, particularly Austria and Sweden, hastened the Russians' desire to seek a negotiated settlement. Eventually a peace agreement was signed in Paris in March 1856." An armistice in the Cri~neahad been in force since February and Mennonites, still hauling supplies, saw allied troops in Simferop01.~~ During the War assista~icegiven to tlie army by the Mennonites and otlier foreign colonists was acknowledged by the goveriilnent in official notices published in the newspapers, and in a letter of December 1854 Tsar Nicholas sent thanks to the Me~inonitesfor their help." Following the peace agreement, official rewards were handed out to tlie colonists; the other foreign colonists were presented with various medals but tlie Mennonites accepted only watches and a snuff-box, far less ostentatious forms of recog~iition.~("' Mennonites, however, received over 40% of tlie awards distributed. The list of those receiving awards clearly indicates the central involvement of tlie Mennonite civil leadership in the direction of the colonists' war work (see Table I).'"' The position of the Molochnaia District Mayor, David Friesen, was greatly enhanced by liis work in directing the colonists' war work. Not only did he receive one of the highest awards, but lie was also invited, along witli tlie District Mayor of the major Odessa "German" colony, Liebenthal, to attend Alexander 11's coronation in Moscow. Here he was again thanked by officials for tlie colonists' efforts during tlie War.'"' Friesen's rise in status and his contacts witli government officials marked a shift in the balance of political power in Molochnaia following the War. The District Office reasserted its control of the colony's affairs following Cornies' earlier subordina- tion of the Office to the Agricultural Union.'"' Friesen was to dominate the political life of the colony, amidst increasing controversy, until he was removed by the government in 1 865.'04 But the presentation of awards could not disguise the fact that in battle after battle Russian troops had been defeated. The peace conditions imposed on tlie Russians were a source of hu~niliationto many. Politically and eco- A gold tobacco-box valued at 100 rubles Johann Cornies (estate owner of Tashchenak and Ohrloff) Gold watches Valued at 150 rubles: Moloclzizaia Mei111oizite Colony: District Mayor David Friesen (Halbstadt) District Secretary Johann Wiens (Altonau) District Secretary Peter Wiebe (Tiegerweide) Marillpol Me111zo11iteColoi~y (BEI-gtllal): District Mayor Jacob Peters (Heubuden) District Secretary Peter Unger (Bergthal) District Secretary Abraham Huebert (Schoental) Khortitsa Metzlzoilite Colony: District Mayor Johann Siemens Valued at 100 rubles: President of the Molochnaia Agricultural Union, Philipp Wiebe (Ohrloff) Valued at 80 rubles: Molochlzaia Mennonite Colorly: Molocl~naiaMennonite Agricultural Union members; David Cornies (Ohrloff) Johann Toews (Tiege) Samuel Klei~lsasser(Hutterthal - a Hutterite) Franz Klassen (Ladekopp) Village mayors of Molochnaia; Abraham Driedger (Halbstadt) Kornelius Lepp (Muntau) Heinricll Teichgreb (Blumstein) Christian Waldner (Hutterthal - a Hutterite) Valued at 75 rubles: Molocl~naiaMennonites of Halbstadt not holding office; Johann Neufeld Heinricll Wilms Table 1 : Official Goveri~inentAwards to Meizi~orlitesfor tlzeir services dzirii~gthe Crimean War.

nomically the defeats brought severe repercussions for the Tsar and his government. The new Emperor initiated a series of debates leading eventually to the implementation of major reforms wllicll were to transform the direction of Russian life. Following the War Russian finances were in a sorry state. The actual costs of the War are impossible to estimate with any accuracy, but they placed a tremendous burden on the country."'VThe financial reforms the government had so carefully put in place before the War were undone; the 24 .lourrial of Merrrioriite Strrdirs exchange rate between the silver and paper ruble widened rapidly as inflation increased.Io6 In New Russia, where most Mennonites were settled, land prices escalated as did the price of basic subsistence goods. In Molochnaia the changing economic situation was compounded by the large-scale emigration to Turkey of the neighbouring Nogai Tartars.lo7 For many years Mennonite farmers had utilised Tartar labour to herd sheep, cattle and horses, to haul grain to Berdiansk and to work on their farms. More importantly, large areas of Tartar land were sub-let to Mennonite cultivators, including many landless, or as pasture for Mennonite sheep owners. With the departure of the Tartars, the Molochnaia landowners in the colony moved to secure their labour supply by restricting the rights of Mennonite landless. Meanwhile many landless Iost access to tlle Tartar rent-land and thus any hope of economic independence when the Russians settled Bulgarian immi- grants on the vacated areas. At the same time increasing inflation worsened the economic position of the poorer members of the colonies. The War and the post-war economic situation thus accelerated the conflict between the landowners and the landless which had been brewing since the 1840~.'~" While the post-war economic conditions caused problems for many poor Mennonites, for others it provided an impetus for increased economic expansion. The obvious ability of Mennonites as farmers, artisans and millers was noted by many Russian noblemen serving in the army. After the War Men- nonites were invited to help improve some private estates, either by renting parcels of land or by being contracted to act as managers, millers or specialist craftsmen. The manufacture of wagons continued to flourish as the colonists' vehicles were now even more widely known than before the War. Other Mennonites purchased property away from the colonies. One private purchase of land which eventually developed into an important Mennonite settlemen-Schoenfeld-began when a Russian nobleman who had encoun- tered Mennonites during the War privately sold part of his estate to Mennon- ite farmers.'0y This move away from the colonies was also assisted by an easing of restrictions on the movement of people and the purchase of land, all part of a more general programme of reforms initiated by the government following the War. The most important of these reforms was the abolition of serfdom in 1861. This, however, was but one of many reforms all of which, directly or indirectly, were to affect the Mennonites by the late 1860s and early 1870s."(' These included the integration of Mennonites into the larger society through the abolition of the special administration structures for foreign colonists and other reforms, includii~gnew legal procedures. The most significant reform for the Mennonites, and that which came to concern them most, was the introduction of a system of universal military service through conscription. News of the plans for these reforms caused a panic in the colonies, engen- dered considerable debate and conflict, which eventually resulted in the large-scale emigration of Mennonites to North America after 1874."' During the 1870s, memories of the War coloured both Mennonite and Cririiearz War 25

Russian attitudes in attempts to gain Mennonite exemption from the proposed laws and in later efforts to negotiate a system of alternative service. From the outset Russian officials acknowledged Mennonite objections to military service and there was no intention to force them to serve in combatant roles. The officials argued, however, that the Mennonites could not expect total exemption from state service. They hoped the colonists would accept non- combatant military service. As they viewed the situation Mennonites had already carried out such service during the Crimean War, as "transport" drivers and "hospital" workers."' But Mennonites objected to any involvement with the military. When it appeared that many, if not all, the Mennon- ites would emigrate and that their threat to do so was not just a negotiating ploy, the Russian authorities dispatched a hero of the Crimean War, General Eduard Todleben, to negotiate a new agreement. Todleben, who had been largely responsible for the design of the Sevastopol fortifications which had allowed the defenders to resist for so long, had praised the Mennonites for their assistance during the War in his published account of the siege.Ii3 It is obvious that Mennonite objections to any involvement with military forces had hardened since the end of the War. In a petition to the authorities over the conscription issue, the Kleilze Gemei~zdenoted that they could neither "accept service in any military installations, nor ... take up any medical or supportive service as we did in 1854-1 855 during the Crimean War."Il4 Cornelius Jansen, who had family ties with members of the Kleine Genzeirzde and who promoted the cause of emigration to North America in place of a compromise with Russian officials, obviously had the earlier Mennonite involvement in the War in mind when he drew up a statement arguing that any non-combatant service in the army was contrary to the Mennonite principle of non-resistance.'I5 Jansen apparently raised the issue of the earlier Mennonite involvement in the War at one of the meetings called in Molochnaia to discuss the government's intentions and his comments caused offence.Il6 Another leader of the emigration movement who like Jansen was deported from Russia for his views, Elder Isaak Peters, noted after he reached America that Mennonite rights as outlined in the Privilegium of 1800 had been breached by Mennonite activities during the War."' Mennonite opposition to the proposed conscription of their young men, however, was founded on more than doubts about past activitie~."~By the 1870s some Mennonites were more politically informed and better prepared to deal with the government in defence of their principles than most had been in 1850. In particular the religious leadership had reasserted some of its earlier control of community affairs and they were to play a prominent role in the debates and negotiations over alternative service and in the emigration movement. These leaders had a clearer understanding than their predecessors of what was involved when powerful nation-states decided to reform and modernize their armed forces. During the previous decade the Prussian Mennonites had seen their rights to remain free from military service removed, and were forced to accept non-combatant roles in a reformed Prussian army.119The Russian Mennonites had followed events in Prussia closely and thus were prepared for their struggle with Russian officials. The earlier Mennonite involvement in the Crimean War, however, was probably more an embarrassment than a useful bargaining point for a Men- nonite leadership who preferred to see their people exempted entirely from military control or involvement. This may be the reason why references to the War appear more often in the writings of emigrants to North America than in the accounts of those who stayed. Even after Russian Mennonites gained the right to serve in an alternative form of service outside military control-in the forestry camps-any reference to their role in the War, in published sources at least, might appear to conflict with the principles they had es- poused in order to secure their special rights. This may explain why there is no real discussion of Mennonite involvement in the War in either David H. Epp's history of the Khortitsa settlement, or in Franz Isaak's collection of historical documents on Mol~chnaia."~ Only in works written in Russia after 1890 do references to Mennonite involvement in the War begin to appear. As Mennonites, along with other "German" colonists, came under attack in the Russian press for their alleged "German" sympathies, they found a ready defender in P.V. Kamensky.I2l Quoting freely from Russian reports of Mennonite aid given during the War, ICamensky pointed out that the Mennonites had exhibited great loyalty to Tsar and country when the Empire had been invaded by its enemies.!" Tlius, references to Mennonite involvement in the War now became respectable as proof of Mennonite patriotism and loyalty. This is how P.M. Friesen referred to the War in 191 1, drawing mainly on the sources presented by Kamen~ky."~ But Friesen, and Heinrich Dirks who had published his article on the podvocl in 1907, were writing at a period after Mennonites had once again been involved with the military as a number of young Mennonites had volunteered to serve as medical orderlies during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.'24 The Crimean War marked a watershed in European and Russian affairs. For Europe it saw the end of the political alliances between states which had existed for over forty years. New alliances were established and new states grew in power while others declined. New military techniques and forms of organisation were heralded on the battlefields of the Crimea. In Russia the War led directly to massive reforms. Even if they had not been directly involved in the War, Mennonites would have been affected by its outcome. But their involvement created tensions in Russian Mennonite colnmunities and for a time led some to question their way of life and to reflect upon the principles of their faith. Not for the first time in their history, and certainly not for the last, war unwittingly helped reshape the course of Mennonite life. Notes

We would like to thank Dr. David G. Rempel for his assistance during the writing of this article.

'See Norman Davies, Tlre Deijil's Plcry,qrorrrrcl: A History of Polarrd. Volrrriie I: Tlre Origiris to 1795 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), Part 2. 'On the contributions see P.M. Friesen, Tlre Merrrioriite Brotl~erlroorl irr Rrrssio (1789- 19101 (Fresno: Board of Christian Literature, General Conference of MB Churches, 1978), 828- 29, Delbert Plett, Tlre Golder~Yerrrs: Tlre Merirrorlite Kleirre Geriieiricl~~irr Rrrssio (1812-1849) (Steinbach: D.F.P Publications, 1985), 165. 'GeofTrey Best, kVor crrrrl Society irr Re1~o1~rtio11ar.yErrrol~e. 1770-1870 (Leicester: Leices- ter University Press, 1982). 191 . 'On the relationship between the army, the state and Russian society see John L.H. Keep, Solrliers of tlie Tsar: Ariiry arid Society iri Rrrssio 1462-1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) and specifically for the period with which this paper is concerned, John Shelton Curtiss, Tlre Rirssicrri Arriiy rrrrrler Niclrolas 1.1825-1855 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965). iPerhaps the most infamous form of support was the Mennonites' gift of horses for the military at the time when Russian troops were mobilized during the 1848 uprisings in Western and Eastern Europe; see the official thanks in Ur~terl~rrlt~rrigsI~Iott,firer derrtsclre Arisiecller irir srreclliclieri Rrrsslarzcl (from now on UbI.,) 11 (November, 1848), 81-82, 2 (February, 1849), 1- 2; Franz Isaak, Die Molotsclrrroer hle~rrior~iterr:ei~r Beitrag rrrr Geschiclite derselberi (Halbstadt: H.J. Braun, 1908), 13-15; Friesen, Meririorrite Bratlrerhood, 200. During the 1828129 Turkish war, foreign colonists in the Odessa region provided aid to the Russian army in tlie form of money, goods and the provision of transport. Whether or not the Mennonites, located much further east, were involved is unclear. See P. Conrad Keller. Tlre Gerrrirrrr Colorries irr Sorrtlr Rrrssicr 1804 to 1904 (Saskatoon: Privately Printed, 1968), 1, 104-06. Tor a convenient recent summary of the political and military factors involved in the War, see Michael Hurst, "Crimean War (1853-56)", Moderri Ericgclo~~oediaof Rrrssiarr arid Soviet History (from now on MERSH) 8 (1978), 104-14. For a diplomatic history see David Wetzel, T/IEC~~IIIENII War: a Diploriiatic Histoql (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1985-this source also has an extensive bibliography on the War). For an account of military operations and diplomacy from Russian sources see John Slielton Curtiss, R~rssia'sCririreurr Mlar (Dur- ham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979). 'There is a large literature on military aspects of the War. For an account of the campaigns from Russian sources see Albert Seaton, Tlre Cririlearr War-: a R~rssiariClrrorricle (London: Batsford, 1977), and for a recent reanalysis of the entire campaign, Alan Palmer, Tlre Bnrltrer of Battle: the Story of tlie Crirneari War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987). 'Based on details in a diary by a Neuendorf (Khortitsa) resident in the Mennonite Heritage Centre archives, Winnipeg (Jacob Peters Papers Vo1. 1090). Another copy is available in the Mennonite Library and Archives, Bethel College, Kansas. The author of the diary has not been clearly identified; David G. Rempel has suggested that the author was a Derksen, although the diary was later owned by a Wilhelm Rempel of Neuendorf; the Winnipeg copy has been attributed to a Johann Wall. From now on this source will be referred to as the Ne~rencIorfDiar)~. Silver rubles possessed a higher value than the paper (assignat) rubles, also in circulation at this period. 'Jakob Hermann Niebuhr Chronik (Unpublished ms. in the possession of David G. Rempel, Menlo Park, California) (from now on referred to as the Niebrlhr. Chronik), entry of March 13, 1854. "'The Molochnaia and Mariupol contributions are reported in Ubl., 4 (April, 1854), 25. "lbid.. for the Molochnaia and Mariupol contributions; for Ichortitsa, Ubl., 5 ( May, 1854), 33, 8 (August, 1854), 57. "Tlie Autobiogr.aph)l of H.B. Frieseri 1837 -1926, edited and translated by August Schmidt (Newton, Kan.: typescript, 1974) (from now on referred to as Friesen. Arrtobiography). I3Seaton, Cririiean War, 56; the Division was later involved in the battles at Alma and Inkerman. "To the Mennonites the War period and the transport work were known as the Podwlod or Podu~orlreitfrom the Russian l~od~'od("supply," "carriage," "wagon"); see also the Russian podvodriaya polirrriost ("the obligation to provide transport"). ISFriesen, Arrtohiograpliy. 8; Heinrich Dirks, "Die Podwodzeit," Merirrotiitisches .lahrbrrclr, (from now on M.1, ) (191 I), 34. IhDetails in Ubl., 8 (August, 1854), 58; Cornies was the son of the famous Molochnaia leader Johann Cornies (died 1848). The bridge material alone cost 1000 silver rubles. I7Friesen, Mcrrrrorrite Brotlrer-hood, 580; with a photograph of the monument, 581. lHOn the journeys see Nerrerrrlorf diar)); on the road works see Niebirlrr Cliroriik. "Curtiss, Rirssiarr Arr17~1,326-27; Curtiss, Rirssia's Criniearl War, 300. 2"Curtiss, Rrrssia's Crinrearr War, 337. "lbid.. 337-39; see also Keep, Solrliers of tlre Tsar, 338. "Niehrrhr Chroriilc, entries October 16.17, November 9, December 9. The government acknowledged the gift of srrkhari on December 18. "Friesen, Arrtohiography, 9; on the quantity of hay see Philipp Wiebe, "Ueber den Zustand der Molotschna Mennoniten Colonie im Jahre 1855," Meriironitisclre Blaetter (from now on MBI.) 4 (18561, 52, and Alexander Petzholdt, Reise it17 \c,estlicher~ ~rrrd srrerlliclrer~ errropaeischeri Rirsslarid it11 ./ahre 1855 (Leipzig, 1864), 183. "On the wagon building industry see James Urry, Nor~eBrrt Saints: tile Trarlsforr71atioi7 of Meririorrite Lge ill Rirssia. 1789-1889 (Winnipeg: Hyperion Press, 1989), Chapter 8. 'scornpare the descriptions and illustrations of Mennonite and peasant wagons at this period in Petzholdt, Reise irli n~estlicherr,158-60. '"ee details in Friesen, Arrtol~iogral~lr~~,9, and Dirks, "Podwodzeit," 34-35. I7See the awards presented to members of the Union in Table I below; on the rise of the Union in Molochnaia affairs see Urry, Norle hrrt Sairlts, Chapters 6-7. 'Wn the organization of the transport brigades by the army see Curtiss, Rrrssia's Criirreaii War, 337. '"On the Cossacks see Friesen, Merirlorzite Brotherhoorl, 580, and Friesen, Arrtobiogrrrphy, 15, 19-20. "'Nerreridor:f Diary, entry 19 February 1855. 31Thesedistances are given in E. de Todleben, Defetrse de Sebostopol (St. Petersburg, 1863-74), Volume 1, Appendix 1, 24-25. ?'For a vivid description of the conditions on the road see the contemporary sources quoted in Curtiss, Rrrssia's Crimeari War, 338. "lbid.. 337, 338. '.'Dirks, "Podwodzeit," 34; Jacob Unruh in The Peter Utrrirlr Genealogy 1673-1959 (Kansas: Privately Printed, 19591, 108 (from now on cited as Urirrrh Narrati~je)later claimed his father made fifteen trips, but this seems rather a large number for one person as seven was the maximum number of times one Mennonite could be required to supply wagons. See Friesen, Airtobiography, 19. "Wiebe, "Ueber den Zustand," 52; Petzholdt (Reise iirr ~~estliclre~l,183) gives a figure of 9,627 loads and reports that the loads consisted of cereals. He points out, however, that these were provided in a year when locusts had severely damaged the crops and reduced yields; see Friesen, Autobiograplry, 10-1 1, on the impact of the locusts. 3hCurtiss,Rrrssia's Crii~leanWar, 470. )'Seaton (Crii?iean IVar), 101-02, gives casualties and also quotes contemporary accounts of the horrors of the battlefield following the fighting, 96-97. See also Curtiss, Rrrssiari Ari~ly, 33 1, and Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 340. inseaton, Crir?~eailWar, 172, Curtiss, Rrrssia's Criniearl Wnr, 461. "'On Pirogov (18 10-1881 ) see William L. Mathes, "Pirogov, Nikolai Ivanovich," MERSH, 28 (1982), 84-87; Curtiss, R~rssia'sCrii?reair War, 451-62; Keep, Soldiers of tile Tsar, 34142. '"'John Shelton Curtiss, "Russian Sisters of Mercy in the Crimea, 1854-1855," Slal~orlic re vie^^, 25 (1966), 84-100. "UhI., 10 (October, 1854). 173; see also the reports of the civilian surgeon Anton Christian von Huebbenet, Service des Hospitarrs Rlrsses per7darlt la glterre de Crinree dotis Ies Airjiees 1854-1856 (St Petersburg, 1870), 27-28. "On the Molochnaia and Khortitsa offer see Niebrrhr Cllronik, entries for December 1 and 25, 1854. "Jacob Stach, Die derrtsclrerl Kolo17ier1ir~ Sriedrrrsslar~d (Prischib: Gottlieb Schaad, 1904), 31; Friesen, Mei~rloriiteBrotherl~ood, 578, citing P.V. Alabin, Chetyre Ifoirly (Samara, 1892), 33, 34. -""Die Geschichte der Kolonie Gnadenfeld von 1835 bis 1885 in bezug auf die soziale und oekonomische Entwicklung," MJ, (1910), 32; Friesen, A~trohiography,11-12. Crirtrenr~war 29

""Die deutschen Kolonisten im Krimkriege," Kroeker:~Cl~ristlicher Fnrtriliertkc~ler~der, (1918), 157; this source also reports that in Kaiserstal, Eugenfeld, 54 transports delivered 10,711 wounded and sick soldiers between 26 March and 17 October 1855. In the Swedish colony in the Crimea between 2 March and 31 May 1855, 22,443 soldiers were cared for, with up to 20-30 being quartered in each house: see Wilhelm Isert, "Statistisch-historische Beschreibung der Kolonien im schwedischen Gebiet betreff ihres 100 Jahrigen Bestehens," Neiil~atblrchder. Derrtscl~er~airs Rltsslarld (from now on HER, 1958), 51. Even the colonists near Odessa were required to assist transporting sick and wounded soldiers to the hospitals at Kherson and Nikolayev; see Keller, Gerrtrarl Color~ies,107. '"Eduard Todleben as quoted in Curtiss, Rrrssin's Crirr~ecrrrWar, 340; Huebbenet, Serljice Snr~itaire,63, 114; N Pirogoff [Pirogov], Grrrrrdzlrege cler oll,yertreirierr Kriegsclrirrrrgie: rlach Rerrtir~scer~zerr011s derl Kriegerl irr der Krirtl rrrtd irtl Ka~/kc~.srrsllrld CI~ISiler Hospirolprrrsis (Leipzig: Vogel, 1864), 4041, 49-50. "Huebbenet, SeriYce Sar~itaire,26; Pirogoff, Grrrr1c1:rrege cler c~llgc~rt~ei~~ertKriegsclrirrrr- gie. 4041; Friesen, Alrrobiogral~hy, 11-12, for a description of a Mennonite hospital train. "'Seaton, Crir~lear~War, 197, 2 1 1. -"Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar. 341. "'Leo Tolstoy, Tlre Sebastopnl Sketclres, translated by David McDuff (London: Penguin, 1986), 83-84,102. Tolstoy, the famous Russian novelist and religious thinker served as an artillery officer during the siege. "On the widespread corruption see Curtiss, Rrrssiarr A~IIIJJ,Chapter 11; Curtiss, Rlrssin's Crirtleart War, 462-63; Keep, Soldiers of rlre Tscrr. 336-37. For a Mennonite experiences, see Friesen, Arlrobiography, 14,19-20. "Figures quoted in Keep, Soldiers of tire Tsar, 341. S3Curtiss, Russia's Crirtlear~ War, 459-60; Heinrich Dirks' father, David Tobias Dirks, died in July and was buried in the Crimea; see the account of Wilhelm Dosso quoted in Dirks, "Podwodzeit," 4142. "Curtiss, Rirs.sin's Crirtlerrr~ War, 466-67. ssFriesen, Autobiography. ""Die Geschichte der Kolonie Gnadenfeld," 32; "Die deutschen Kolonisten im ICrimkri- ege," 157; for deaths from infection in Khortitsa see David H. Epp, "The Emergence of German Industry in the South Russian Colonies," (ed. & transl. by John B. Toews), Me1117oniteQlrar- terly Reiieu, (from now on MQR), LV (1981), 322, 366. 57Dirks, 'iPod~od~eit,"40. S*TI~ePrisorlers of Ifororteslr. Tlle Diary of Sergenrlt George Neic~r~rarl.-73rcl Regir~terltof Foot, tlle Ro~lalWelclr Frrsiliers Tu!ier~ Prisorler at Irikerr?rar~,transcribed and ed. by David Inglesant (London: Unwin, 1977), 74-76. S'JNe~rer~dorfDiary, entry 4 December 1854. h"The naval operation increased the difficulties of supply for the Russians, resulting in greater dependency on overland supply routes; see Curtiss, R~rssia'sCr.ir?~ear~ War, 338, 431. filH.Ediger, Erir~rter~rrigeriairs rlleirleril Leberl (Karlsruhe, 1927), 9-10. Gustav E. Reimer and G.R. Gaeddert, Exiled by the Czar: Corr~elirrsJarlserz arld the Great Merlrlor~iteMigratior~ (Newton: Mennonite Publishing House, 1956), 14, 168. h'William Schroeder, T11e Bergthal Colorr)~(Winnipeg: CMBC Publications, Revised edition, 1986), 46. On the rush of refugees to the Swabian colonies situated between Mol- ochnaia and Berdiansk, see Jacob Prinz, Die Kolor~ierl der Br~redergen~einde.Eirt Beitrug :11r Gesclliclrte der delrtscherl Kolorzieri S~redr~rsslar~ds(Moscow, 1898), 14546. Prinz also recorded his memories of the colonists' experiences during the War in "Wie wir Steppenkinder den Krimkrieg erlebten," HER (1957), 87-90. fi'On the visitors and their progress through the colonies see Uny, Nor~eBlrt Sairlts, Chapter 6. h"Dirks, "Podwodzeit," 35-41, Urlrlrh's Narratiiv, 108; see also Friesen, Meritlortire Broth- erhood, 858. hicompare the accounts in note 64 with that in Friesen, Autobiography and the reminis- cences of Mennonites reported in David J. Braeul, "Meine Krimreise im Sommer 1887," Der Bote, 14 (6 April, 1942), 7. "See Dirks, "Podwodzeit," 35-36; Friesen, Alrtobiograplry, 13. h7Dirks, "Podwodzeit," 36. hnPetzholdt,Reise in7 ~.~,estlicherz,345 note; information supplied by David Cornies. L'Friesen, A~rtobiography, 12 7"Braeul, "Meine Krimreise," 7. 71Ur~rrrh'sN~rrotil'~, 109. Friesen (Arrtohiogrci~~hy)reports extensively on the consump- tion of brandy by the drivers. 7'Friesen, A~irobio~qraphy,21; On antisemitism in the army see Keep, Soldiers of tire Tsar, 331 ff. 7'The total sum given by the administrations in the colonies of Khortitsa, Molochnaia and Mariupol (Bergthal) was 12,659 silver rubles, but another source reported that 13,500 rubles out of a total of 25,000 rubles presented by foreign colonists came from Mennonites, see J.R r, "Die Ansiedlungen unserer Gloubensbrueder im suedlichen Russland," MBI., 2 (March, 1855). 18. The difference in the figures is not great, and may reflect the exchange rate between silver and paper rubles. 7JCurtiss, Rrissirr's Crirnearr War. 339. "Epp, "The emergence of German industry," 320-2 1. 7hToldto James Urry by a descendant of the family in Canada, 1974. 77C~rtiss,R~lssiarr A~I~I)J, Chapter 11; Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar, 337, 342. ?#Onthe colonists' speculation in cattle and other goods, and especially on Fein who was so successful that many peasants believed he was in league with the devil, see Wilhelm Hamm, S~redostliclreSteppert 111rc1 Stoeclte (Frankfurt-am-Main: J.D. Sauerlaenders, 1862), 733. On Fein's post-war land purchases see Artur Druecke, Ascar~ioNova: die Gesclrichte eirrer Kolorrie Arllralts irl S~redr~rsslarrcl(Dissertation, Friedrichs-Universitit, Halle-Wittenberg, 1906), 52-53. Fein also received one of the highest awards presented to foreign colonists after the War for their "zeal," Ubl., 7 (July, 18561, 49. 7"Petzholdt, Reise irir ~~~estlicherr,186 note. K"Dirks, "Podwodzeit," 38. KINiel~rrlrrClrro~~ili, entry of 7 May, 1855. In April the authorities were ordered to prevent the sale of vodka to operators of the Einlage ferry, the main means of transport across the Dnieper. K'Nelrrrrdo~:fDiory. H30nthe daily payment see Friesen, Alitobiograpllj~; the colonists in the Odessa region received 75 rubles a month for the supply of a vehicle and driver; Keller, Gernrorl Colorlies, 1, 107. On the total value of wages received see Wiebe, "Ueber den Zustancl," 52. X'Urry, Norle Brit Saints, Chapter 11. As will be noted below the rapid inflation which occurred after the War's end also contributed to this social discord. Heese's poems see Friesen, Mer~rlorriteBrorl~erlroorl. 702-04, and the discussion by George K. Epp, "Russian patriotism among the nineteenth century Russian Mennonites," .IMS, 4 (1986), 120-34. Epp's statement (128), that Heese's poems were not well known Lo his contemporaries, is, however, incorrect as one poem (not quoted by Friesen in the source noted above) dated Einlage, 10 December 1854, was published in rull on the front page of the colonists' newspaper: Heinrich Heese, "Aufruf an meine Brueder!" Ubl., 5 (May, 1855), 33-34. Also Epp's explanation of the origin and aims of the allied invasion of the Crimea (see especially, 125, 131 ), particularly his statement that if the allies were victorious the Crimea would be "returned" to Turkey (until the end of the eighteenth century it had been part of the domains of the Crimean Khanate which owed allegiance to the Ottoman Emperor in Con- stantinople), is without historical foundation. KhOnHeese's life see David H. Epp, Heirrrich Heese ~irlclseirle Zeir (Steinbach: Echo Verlag, 1952). On Official Nationality see Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I arrrl Official Narior~alityirl Rlrssia. 1825-1855 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). K7Friesen,Merlrlorlite Brotlrerhood, 705; the possible reasons for Friesen's comments will be explained below. KHPoints6 and 7 of the Privilegium; see text in Urry, Norle Bur Saints, Appendix 1. KoSeethe official English text issued by the Russians reprinted in Roger P. Bartlett, Hlrnlarl Capital: tlre Serrlerl~erltof Foreigners it1 Russia 1762-1804 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 237-42. "'Although there are no surviving examples of such official instructions to the Mennon- ites, they must have been similar to those issued to the Odessa colonists; see Keller, Gernlatr Colorries, 1,106-08. "See Plett, Golrlerl Years, 165. "'Delbert Plett, Stor.171 arid Triurrlph: the Merltzorlite Kleirle Genreirrde (1850-1875) (Steinbach: D.F.P. Publications, 1986), 146-47,149. 'Ibid.. 149. Cri/,iear~War 31

'"A source that needs further investigation is the possible existence of private correspon- dence between religious leaders in Russia and Prussia (and elsewhere in Europe) where such sentiments might have been expressed. y5Stephen Frick, "The Quaker Deputation to Russia: January-February 1854," .Io~rrrlalof tlle Frierlds Historical Society, LII (1969), 78-96; Frick, "The Christian Appeal of 1855: Friends' Public Response to the Crimean War," Jolrrnal of the Frierlds Historical Society, 52 (19701, 203-10 and on the broader British response see Olive Anderson, "The Reactions of Church and Dissent towards the Crimean War," Jo~rrrlalof Eccelesiasrical History, 16 (1965), 209-20. For other comments on Mennonite and Quaker responses to the War see Lawrence Klippznstein, Merlr~ar~itePacifism and State Service iri R~tssia:a Case Strr(iy in Chur.cl~-State Relatioris 1789-1936 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1984), 38. "Elizabeth Isichei, Victoria11 Quakers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). y7Curtiss, Russia's Criniearl War, Chapters 20, 21. See also Winfried Baumgart, Tlie Peace of Paris, 1856: Studies irl War.,Diplonlacy, arld Peacerliakirzg (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 1981): Wetzel, Crirliearl War, Chapters 9, 10, and Michael Hurst, "Paris, Treaty of (1856)" MERSH 27 (1982),7-14. "'Friesen, Alrtobiography, 21. "See various acknowledgements in Ubl., 4 (April, 1854). 25, 5 (May, 1854), 33, 8 (August, 1854), 58, 10 (October, 1854),73, 7 (July, 1855), 49-51, 8 (August, 1855),61, 9 (September, 1855), 69, 1 (January, 1856), 1-2; see also Friesen, Merlriorlite Brotl~erhood,579. ""'Friesen (Merlrlorlite Brotherllood, 579) is clearly incorrect when he states that only six watches (two in Khortitsa and four in Molochnaia) were distributed. For an illustration of the watch awarded to District Mayor Jacob Peters of the Mariupol Mennonite Colony, later brought to Canada, see Schroeder, Bergthal Colorly, 57. ""Ubl., 7(July, 1856), 50-51; see also Keller, Gernzari Coloriies, 1, 109-10 where the details on the official notice have been abbreviated. ""Uhl., 10 (October, 1856). 73-74 and the report of the Mayors' visit in Ubl., 12 (December, 1856), 90-92 which was reprinted in the Prussian Mennonite paper MBI., 3 (December, 1856), 8 1-82. See also Keller, Ger-nlrrtl Colorzies, 1.1 10-1 2. ""Urry, Norie But Sairlts, Chapter 7. "'-'/hid., Chapter 11. ""Baumgart (Peace of Paris, 1856, 72-73) and Keep (Solrliers of tlle Tsar, 353), present some calculations of the War's cost. "'W. Mc. Pintner, "Inflation in Russia during the Crimean War Period," Slaiic arld East Elrropearl Rei~iel~~,18 (1959), 81-87; on Mennonite reactions see Friesen, A~rtobiogra/~l~y, 21-22. 1i'7M.Pinson, "Russian policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862," Glrrlejl-Dog11Ai~rlrpa Arastirr?lalari Dergisi 1 (1972),35-56, 2-3 (19731 74), 101-14. ""Urry, Norie Blrr Sair~ts,Chapters 8,l 1. '"'Gerhard Toews, Scl~oerfeld:Werde ~rrzrl Opfergarig ciner delrtscheri Siedlfrng irl der Ukrair~e(Winnipeg: Rundschau Publishing, 1939). ""On the reforms see the introduction and documents in Martin McCauley and Peter Waldron, The Enlergerrce of tlre Moderrz Rrrssiarl Stare, 1855-81 (London: Macmillan, 1988); for Mennonite reactions see Urry, Norle Blrt Soirzts, Chapter 11. Il1There is a massive literature on this topic; for an account of the long sequence of negotiations see Klippenstein, Merlrioriite Pacifisr,~,Chapter 3. "'See the discussion, based on Russian archival sources, of the deliberations of the Conscription Commission in Robert Fred. Baumann, Tlze Debates over Uriii~ersalMilitary Service irl Rlrssia 1870-1874 (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1982). 203-06; it is clear that the Commission discussed Mennonite service during the War. "'Todleben as quoted in Curtiss, Rllssia's Cr-ir~iearlWar, 340. "-'Plett, Storrli arzd Tri~rr?lpll,275 (Petition dated 19 July 1872). ""'Thoughts on Indirect Military Service, as that of Artisans, Traindrivers, and the Sanitary Service, etc," reprinted as Appendix 3 in Reimer & Gaeddert, E.viled by tlle Czar, 196-99. Jansen had been visited by English Quakers in the 1860s and was well aware of their pacifist stance. I ["See Ibirl., 164 note 44, 175 note 5 1 ; Isaak, Molotschr~aerMeririor~iteri, 3 10. Jansen apparently claimed that Mennonites had hauled armaments during the War. There is no clear evidence for this, but it is likely that it did occur given the confused situation at the front. "'Is. Peters, "Die Auswanderung der Mennoniten aus Suedrussland," Zttr Heinrntlr, 1 (May 1875). 1. llXTheone aspect of their experience in the Crimean War which may have influenced the choice of the Forestry Service was the desire to keep young Mennonite recruits apart from non- Mennonites, under the direct control of Mennonite civil and religious leaders. The evil effects of allowing young Mennonites to mix, as had occurred during the War, uncontrolled with outsiders, particularly with soldiers, was not to be repeated. "'See Peter Brock, Pacifisnl ir~Europe to 1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 421-30. ""David H. Epp, Die Chor-titzer- Merlrlor~iter~.Vers~rch eirler Dar-stellltr~gdes Er~t\iick- l~tr~gsgar~gesderselberl (Odessa, 1889); Isaak, Molotschnae~~Merlr~or~icer~. Iz1SeeHarvey L. Dyck (editor and translator), "Russian Mennonitism and the challenge of Russian Nationalism, 1889," MQR 56 (1982), 30741; Urry, Nor~eBut Sairrts, Chapter 13. "'P.V. Kamensky, Vopros ili rredoraz~tr~~er~ie(Moscow, 1895). "'Friesen, Merlrror~ite Brother-lroorl, 575-83. ".'On Mennonite involvement in the Russo-Japanese War see Klippenstein, iZlertrlorlite Pacifisnl, 129-35. One other example of Mennonite aid at time of war occurred during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 when money was again given for humanitarian purposes, the provision of medical aid to wounded soldiers including the establishment of hospitals in, or near, the colonies, see Friesen, Merlr~or~iteBr-otlrer-hoorl, 583-84; Klippenstein, Merlrlorrite Pacifisrlr, 75-77. However, in this case there was no direct Mennonite personal involvement as during the Crimean War and the later Russo-Japanese conflicts.