China's Forced Assimilation Policy Toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang

國立中山大學亞太事務英語碩士學位程

碩士論文 International Master Program in Asia-Pacific Affairs National Sun Yat-sen University Master Thesis

中國針對新疆維吾爾族的強迫同化政策

China‟s forced assimilation policy toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang

研究生：米華

Michal Cieslik 指導教授：林文程 教授

Prof. Lin Wencheng

中華民國 109 年 7 月

July 2020 i

摘要

本研究之目的在探討新疆維吾爾族與中華人民共和國政府之間的衝突起源及現狀並著重於 1949 年人民解放軍發起和平解放後，中華人民共和國政府所實施的種族政策。本研究同 時從中華人民共和國政府以及新疆維吾爾少數民族兩方角度出發，探討這些政策所帶來的 影響並於最後一個章節研究國際對此衝突的回應。本文以文件分析法為主要研究方式，探 討強行同化政策的可行性。然而，根據本文所引述之資料所顯示，其可能性極低。除此之 外，若中華人民共和國政府不改變對維吾爾少數民族的執政方式，維吾爾族將持續激烈的 反抗並可能引發一些暴力衝突。

關鍵詞：維吾爾族，新疆，少數民族政策，中華人民共和國，衝突

ii

Abstract

This study seeks to explore the origins and the current situation of the ongoing conflict in

Xinjiang, China, between the region‟s Uyghur ethnic minority population and the PRC government. Special attention is paid to the Chinese government ethnic policies since the region‟s “peaceful liberation” in 1949 by the PLA. The study also explores the aftermath of these policies from the perspective of the Chinese government and the Xinjiang‟s Uyghur minority.

The last section of the study explores the international responses to the conflict. Through utilizing a document analysis as a primary research method, this paper aims to answer whether the forced assimilation policy works. The findings presented in this study strongly suggest that the answer to the above question is no. This paper also suggests that unless China changes its approach to the region‟s Uyghur minority, the strong resistance among the Uyghurs will continue, leading to occasional violent incidents.

Key words: Uyghur, Xinjiang, ethnic minority policies, PRC, conflict

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Table of contents

Thesis Validation Letter……………………………………………………………………………i

摘要...... ii

Abstract...... iii

Table of contents...... iv

Chapter 1 – Introduction...... 1

I. Who are the Uyghurs? ...... 1

II. Motivation...... 4

III. Aim and research questions...... 5

IV. Literature review...... 6

V. Theoretical framework...... 10

VI. Methodology and study limitations…...... 11

Chapter 2 – History of Xinjiang...... 13

I. Ancient times...... 14

II. Islamicisation of Xinjiang...... 19

III. Qing conquest and incorporation of Xinjiang...... 24

IV. Xinjiang under the Republic of China...... 29

Chapter 3 – PRC state and integration of Xinjiang...... 32

I. The communist rule begins...... 32

iv

II. The „opening up‟ of Xinjiang...... 39

III. The 1990s and the „Strike Hard‟...... 44

IV. Xinjiang in the aftermath of the 9/11...... 53

V. Xinjiang under the leadership of Xi Jinping...... 60

Chapter 4 – Uyghur voices and the international response...... 67

I. Uyghur grievances...... 67

II. Uyghur diaspora...... 72

III. International perspective...... 79

Chapter 5 – Conclusion…………...... 91

Bibliography...... 94

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

I. Who are the Uyghurs?

China is a huge and diverse country with a population of over 1.4 billion people. About

92% of this 1.4 billion people comprise of the ethnic Han Chinese. Only the remaining 8% are the different ethnic minorities, thus we could say that China is a very homogenous country.

However, with such a vast population like China even 8% is a lot of people, in this case about

100 million. Among these 100 million people there are about 10 million Uyghurs who are primarily located in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) which is located in the northwestern corner of the country and borders countries such as Afghanistan, India, Pakistan,

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Mongolia. Xinjiang is the biggest administrative region of China and its total land mass accounts for roughly 1.6 million square kilometers. If

Xinjiang was a separate country its size would be comparable with Iran, which is currently 17th biggest country in the world. This clearly demonstrates the enormous size of that region.

According to the 2010 Chinese government‟s population census, Xinjiang was primarily inhabited by two ethnic groups, Han Chinese and Uyghurs with the total population of around 22 million people. Uyghurs account for 45.84% of the total population, which translates to around

10 million people. The second biggest group was the Han Chinese and they represent 40.48% of the total population, which translates to around 8.8 million people. Right now Uyghurs still represent the majority of people in the region. However with the steady influx of the Han

Chinese the situation is slowly changing. The remaining 3.4 million people who represent 13.68% of Xinjiang‟s inhabitants are: Kazakhs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Manchu, Kyrgyz, Hui, Tatars, Tibetans,

Mongols, Russians and other (Asia Dialogue, 2016).

- 1 -

Uyghurs are an ethnic Turkic group with their distinctive culture and language. They are predominantly Muslims and most of them live in the southern region of Xinjiang with the main center being Kashgar. Northern part of the region is the hub of mainly Han Chinese with Urumqi at the center, which is also the capital of Xinjiang and its biggest city (Millward 2007:30-31).

Despite of the fact that Xinjiang is officially a part of China, culturally and ethnically the region‟s majority differ significantly from Han Chinese. Uyghurs have their own culture and language which are more closely related to the cultures and languages of Central Asian republics with Islam at the center. Because of that as well as the historical differences, which will be further discussed in the following chapters, the political situation in Xinjiang is very complicated with the majority of Uyghurs expressing dissatisfaction about their current circumstances.

Simply put, many Uyghurs would rather see themselves outside of China, in their own country or at least having the real autonomy not just one on the paper, where they could freely express their true Turkic-Uyghur identity and religious freedom without the state‟s intervention. As a result of that attitude, Xinjiang for over a century has been a witness to nearly a constant struggle for independence and freedom, where the different interests of Uyghurs and Hans would often collide. Since the 1980s when the conflict has been increasingly ravaging the region, the situation has evolved into something that has a potential of being a destabilizing force for the communist rule (Holdstock 2015:3-4).

As a response, since 1996 the Chinese government launched a punitive campaign against the so called “three evils” – terrorism, separatism and extremism (Millward 2007:341). This campaign includes security surveillance, home raids, imprisonment or forced participation in the so called “reeducation camps” of people suspected of the above mentioned activities. The government puts the blame on Islamic insurgents, who happen to be mainly Uyghurs and who,

- 2 - according to the Chinese government, want to establish an independent state called East

Turkestan in the province of Xinjiang (BBC 2014).

Until July 2009, which was the time that had seen the most violent riots to date in China, in the city of Urumqi, where the bloody clashes between Uyghurs and Han Chinese resulted in nearly 200 people dead, many foreign media outlets paid little or no attention to the Xinjiang region and the ongoing conflict (Holdstock 2015:183). However, this has changed after the 2009 event. The region is rich in natural resources, mainly gas, oil and coal which is, according to some scholars, the main reason why China exercises a tight control over the region. In the past few decades the regions has seen and increased flow of investment as well as Han migration. In this way the Chinese government hopes to stabilize the region and bring it closer to the mainland.

Xinjiang also serves as a transit area for energy transportation from Kazakhstan (Millward 2007).

Abroad, the Uyghur diaspora seeks to internationalize the conflict and bring more assistance from other countries, mainly USA. The World Uyghur Congress, the biggest transnational Uyghur organization, goes as far as saying that Chinese government‟s political and economic campaigns are responsible for the “cultural genocide” of the Uyghur people (WUC

2013). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP,) on the other hand, maintains that Uyghurs have hostile intentions and that their aim is to spread evil in China. These perceptions, unfortunately, have led to a feeling of threat against the Uyghurs. They are now often perceived as terrorists and trouble makers, both in and outside China (Holdstock 2015:188).

The Xinjiang conflict is unique in the sense that it stems from the clash between the

Uyghurs, who often feel marginalized and inferior to Hans, and the CCP fight against the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. This struggle strengthens the sense of their separate

- 3 - identity. As mentioned before, Uyghurs are ethnically Turks and they differ culturally and linguistically from the Hans. In this case where identity becomes more noticeable, the violent conflict becomes more likely. The idea of the „self‟ and „other‟ gets reinforced. Strong attachment to one‟s roots and believes creates the sense of antagonism between the groups and is a force that often leads to a conflict. In that sense, the Uyghur identity can be understood as both the cause as well as the effect of the conflict.

With the recent advancements in the surveillance technology, China has now the power to control its citizens more thoroughly and ruthlessly than ever before. For the Uyghur people, whose perception in China in general is rather negative, it poses additional threat to their ways of life, their wellbeing and their very identity (Wired 2019). In this light of ever tighter state‟s control, it‟s more important than ever to pay close attention to the development of the situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

II. Motivation

There are a few factors that motivated me to choose this particular topic. Firstly, I originally come from Poland, which between 1945 and 1989 was a communist state that was tightly connected to the Soviet Union. There was no democracy and even talking about it could get people in trouble, just like in today‟s China. I was born in 1989, the year that had seen the collapse of the Soviet Block so I haven‟t experienced the hardships of these times; however, I‟ve heard enough stories from my parents and grandparents, who had the first-hand experience, to know the difficulties of everyday life that people who live in the communist states face on a daily basis. Because of that I sympathize with Uyghurs and through that paper I‟d like to learn more about their situation. Secondly, doing the research on this paper presents an opportunity to

- 4 - explore more deeply how the ethnic policy in China works and for me that is a matter of personal interest. Lastly, as I already mentioned before, I sympathize with Uyghurs and my hope is that this research paper will contribute to finding a way to improve the situation in the region.

III. Aim and research questions

This thesis seeks to explore and discuss the current geopolitical situation of Uyghurs in

Xinjiang. In this paper I will try to find out what it means to be a Uyghur and how the Uyghur identity is constructed and in turn challenged by the different actors of the Xinjiang conflict.

Through the process of the document analysis the study will aim to assess the overall situation of

Uyghurs in Xinjiang and possibly find out an alternative solution that could be used to improve the lives of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The main question that this paper attempts to answer is:

Does the forced assimilation policy work? The additional question that draws a bigger picture of the conflict and places it on the international arena is: What‟s the international response to the situation of Uyghurs in Xinjiang? This question is answered in chapter 4.

At this point I‟d like to clarify the two possible outcomes of the main question.

Affirmative answer to that question would mean that the ideal scenario behind the ethnic integration policy was fully realized by the PRC government. In that hypothetical scenario the

Uyghur population of Xinjiang voluntarily pleads allegiance to the CCP and refers to themselves as Chinese (zhonghua minzu) as their primary identity and their Uyghur identity becomes secondary. This is the ultimate goal of the ethnic integration policy in China.

The negative answer to that question would mean that the ethnic minority to whom the ethnic policy is directed rejected the Chinese identity (zhonghua minzu) as their primary identity

- 5 - and continues to identify primarily with their native ethnic group, which in the case of the group discussed here is the Uyghurs.

The recommendations I make in the conclusion section of this work will be based on the answer to that question.

Sub-questions that will help to guide the research are:

 What are the ethnic integration policies in China and what‟s their goal?

 What are the results of these policies?

 How do Uyghurs respond to the integration efforts?

This thesis also serves as an update of the existing literature, as mentioned in the literature review section. This aim is achieved by discussing the new developments in the current situation of the ongoing Xinjiang conflict that are not present in the older sources.

IV. Literature review

In order to gain a broader perspective of the conflict, the views of some of the leading scholars on the Xinjiang issue are presented below.

In an interview for the Goergetown Journal of International Affairs, Dr. James Millward discusses “the Uyghur crisis in Xinjiang”. According to Dr. Millward, the Uyghur people dissatisfaction with their situation is mainly a result of repressive and restrictive policies pushed by the central government. Nearly every aspect of Uyghur lives is tightly controlled by the state which in turn is the main reason of frustration, anger and resentment toward the PRC rule. Dr.

Millward gives examples of DNA harvesting, “social credit score”, mass detention among many other methods of control (Millward 2019a)

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Similar to Dr. Millward assessment is the position of another great scholar on the subject,

Dr. Sean Roberts. In his article titled “Fear and Loathing in Xinjiang: Ethnic Cleansing in the

21st Century”, posted on the Fair Observer, Dr. Roberts also believes that the Uyghurs‟ grievances in the region can be attributed to the government‟s increasing oppression against

Uyghurs justified as security measures. He also points out that the government actively seeks to change Uyghur identity into Chinese identity. Dr. Roberts also addresses the issue of mass detention, calling it a “form of ethnic cleansing which draws from all of these mass atrocities of the past while benefiting from the technologies of control available to states in the 21st century”

(Roberts 2018). Other methods of control mentioned by Dr. Roberts include lack of political voice for the Uyghur community, destruction of Uyghur social capita, repression of the Uyghur language and destruction of “substance in Uyghur culture” (Roberts 2018).

Both of these authors also seem to agree that these repressive policies are also responsible for at least some of the violent responses among the Uyghurs. Sean Roberts, in his article titled

“Is China Really Facing a Terrorist Threat From Uighurs in Xinjiang?”, goes as far as to say that, the current situation is a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Roberts 2017). These same policies that were supposed to stabilize the region greatly exaggerated the threat and led to Uyghur militant behavior.

Another scholar, Dr. Michael Clarke in chapter 1 of his book called “Xinjiang and

China‟s Rise in Central Asia, 1949-2009”, presents three arguments regarding the implementation of policies with respect to Xinjiang and their outcome:

1. Since the incorporation of Xinjiang, the region has been a part of the

territorialization of China.

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2. State‟s failure at fully penetrating Xinjiang left it prone to be governed by

alternative political authorities. This resulted in a state of „permanent provocation‟, where

state‟s aim of integration is undermined by Uyghurs desire for self-governance.

3. The region is considered a strategic and economic asset that strengthens

China‟s regional and global power. It serves the government‟s foreign policies in Central

Asia and domestic policy of integrationism toward Xinjiang.

Dr. Clarke also presents two ways of looking at China‟s foreign policy in Central Asia, which plays a big role in the development of the situation in the XUAR. Firstly, China‟s approach is singularly affected by its imperatives in Xinjiang and secondly, Beijing‟s diplomacy in the region is driven by a desire for geopolitical advantage over the US (Clarke 2011:134).

Thus we can see that China‟s interests are shaped by Xinjiang‟s security issues and the region‟s economic development

This political approach to the region, however, is not compatible with the wishes of

Uyghur population who, as noted by Dr. Roberts in his article titled “Development with Chinese

Characteristics in Xinjiang: A Solution to Ethnic Tension or Part of the Problem” which can be found in the book called China's Frontier Regions: Ethnicity, Economic Integration and Foreign

Relations, see Xinjiang as their homeland and source of their culture. Because of this it‟s not surprising that the conflict results in violence. According to Dr. Roberts a possible solution to the problem would require a more “grassroots” approach to the region and one that is more human- centric. That would essentially mean that Uyghur should be allowed to contribute to the region‟s development plan, the government should support the Uyghur language and limit Han migration.

This generally would require some degree of real autonomy (Roberts 2016:26-27).

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Other suggestions that could potentially improve the Uyghur situation come from Dr.

James Millward. During his interview for the Asia Experts Forum, Dr. Millward identified western media coverage of the Xinjiang conflict as a helpful tool in pressuring Chinese government. Dr. Millward stated that increased awareness of the general public puts more pressure on the CCP‟s government which in turn negatively affects China‟s soft power and its ability to project positive image. This could be a potential obstacle in dealing with Central Asian countries, which are predominantly Muslim, and successful implementation of Xi‟s Belt and

Road Initiative (Millward 2018b).

Another suggestion comes from Dr. Michael Clarke who has noted in his article called

“China, Xinjiang and the internationalization of the Uyghur issue”, that Beijing‟s approach in building “„harmonious society‟ where citizens of all ethnic groups abide by a shared concept of nationhood” coupled with simultaneous labeling of Uyghurs as separatists and terrorists will produce the opposite effect. Dr. Clarke suggests that if China “wishes to diminish the influence and profile of the Uyghur issue internationally it would do well to tone down its vehement attacks on Kadeer and not assume that tactics that work domestically will produce the same results in western democratic societies” (Clarke 2010).

All of the above mentioned scholars are among the leading researchers in the field related to the Xinjiang conflict. Over the years their contributions provided valuable insights on how the situation in Xinjiang evolved and what were the underlining causes of the ongoing conflict as well as the methods used by the Chinese government to control the Uyghur population. However, with the recent escalation of violence in the region, especially during the past decade, and the ever newer, more sophisticated and stricter methods of control employed by Chinese government to control the Uyghur population, methods that include high-tech surveillance cameras with

- 9 - facial recognition and mass detentions centers, the so called “reeducation camps” (Millward

2019b), I found that most of the literature on the subject of Xinjiang and Uyghur people doesn‟t include these new developments in their situation. Therefore, with this study, my hope is to contribute to the existing literature by updating it through discussion of these new methods of control and their effects on the Xinjiang population.

V. Theoretical framework

To analyze the situation in Xinjiang I will use the ethnic integration theory. The main reason for choosing this particular theory is that, during the research process the Chinese government was identified as a main actor in the conflict, thus the political decisions and more specifically the ethnic policies employed by the government will have the most immediate and profound impact on the situation. In this light, my belief is that, this theory will help to better explain and understand the government decision making process as well as why in some states the “differing linguistic, religious and cultural backgrounds can become fault-lines that result in open antagonism between the ethnic groups” (Giddens, 2006: 499).

There are three main models to the ethnic integration theory: assimilation, the „melting pot‟ and multiculturalism (Giddens, 2006).

Assimilation means “that immigrants abandon their original customs and practices, molding their behavior to the values and norms of the majority. An assimilationist approach demands that immigrants change their language, dress, lifestyle and cultural outlook as part of integration into a new social order” (Giddens, 2006:497).

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In the „melting pot‟ model “rather than the traditions of the immigrants being dissolved in favor of these dominant among the pre-existing population, they become blended to form new, evolving cultural patterns” (Giddens, 2006:497).

In the last model of multiculturalism “ethnic cultures are given full validity to exist separately, yet participate in the larger society‟s economic and political life” (Giddens,

2006:498).

VI. Methodology and the study limitations

This study utilizes the qualitative process of document analysis as a research method.

During the process of preliminary data examination three main actors could be identified: the

Uyghur people living in Xinjiang, the Uyghur diaspora and the Chinese government. The government is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party and is the main actor in the conflict.

Uyghur diaspora appears to have a quite substantial influence on the international public opinion, thus plays an important role in the conflict. And lastly, Uyghurs who live in Xinjiang and who are forced to suffer the conflict related issues on a day to day basis.

The qualitative methods of the text analysis have served to explore and develop a deeper understanding of the genesis as well as the current situation of the Xinjiang conflict. This method also gives room for the exploration of the ethnic policies employed by the Chinese government to mitigate the situation in Xinjiang. The study also illustrates the struggle between a strong authoritarian state and a minority group who happened to be perceived as a terrorist threat.

The data was collected from various sources. These included publications and news items released by the Chinese government, academic works such as books and journal articles,

- 11 - conferences, documentaries and reports from Uyghur diaspora organizations. These items created an overall picture of the situation and the foundation for the analysis.

It should be noted that some of the documents analyzed for the purpose of this study were the official documents released by the CCP. Because of this there‟s a risk that the data released by the Chinese government might be biased and some of the facts might be downplayed or even omitted. Additionally, during the research I‟ve encountered difficulties accessing some of the information. Many of the documents I found that could be useful required paid subscription or were limited to the academic scholars only. Lastly, some of the sources I identified were entirely in Chinese which proved difficult to read for me since my ability to use Chinese is intermediate at best. Because of this I decided not to rely on Chinese sources, knowing that the risk of misunderstanding a crucial piece of information was quite high.

This, however, creates a possibility for the future research about this topic by further developing and expanding it by utilizing the restricted information and/or Chinese language sources.

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Chapter 2 - History of Xinjiang

The oases around the Tarim basin were once a part of a famous trade route known as the

Silk Road. The territory that is today known as Xinjiang served as a hub that connected Middle

East and Europe. It was not only goods that travelled along these routes. The region served as cultural transmitter as well. Various scientific branches such as astronomy, medicine and mathematics travelled from Persia (present-day Iran) to China via these routes (Millward 2007:1-

2).

If we looked at a topographical map of Xinjiang, we would notice two mountain ranges stretching across the region. One is the Kunlun Shan in the south and the other is Tian Shan in the north. At the center lies Taklimakan Desert covering 337,000 square kilometers, which is almost exactly the size of present-day Finland. Around the desert, however, we can find many oases fed by mountain rivers. This created fertile land, which in turn attracted settlers who founded many towns along the mountain ranges.

The Xinjiang region is home to the Uyghur people. The Uyghurs are Turkic people and are predominantly Muslim. During the recent decades the region has been a witness to numerous violent riots and conflicts, some of which resulted in deaths of dozens of people, like it was in the case of the 2009 Urumqi riots which left nearly 200 people dead (Dillon 2011). In order to have a better understanding of the origins of the conflict we need to take a closer look at the history of Uyghur people, their identity and the region as whole.

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I. Ancient times

The Xinjiang region was a home to various people across the millennia of its history. The early evidence of human habitation comes from a woman buried in Quewrighul near Loulan, around 2000 B.C. The sheep‟s wool she was buried in indicates the knowledge of animal husbandry and agriculture. These early people were probably Indo-Europeans (Millward and

Perdue 2004:33-34).

Another early group of the region‟s inhabitants were the Yuezhi people. Yuezhi inhabited the region around Dunhuang and Gansu Corridor for millennia. This group was attacked by the

Xiongnu people around second century BCE. Xiongnu people were a confederation of Altaic- speaking, nomadic tribes from Mongolia. After the attack some Yuezhi moved to Qinghai, some others moved into the Tarim basin. However, the main group migrated to the Ili valley. These people formed an empire called Kushan and they ruled over the Hellenic states of Bactria and were politically influential in the Tarim basin during the first century CE. Linguistically, Yuezhi indicate connection between them and later agrarian people from the Tarim and Turpan basins indicating a close interrelationship between the nomadic Yuezhi and sedentary people in

Xinjiang (Millward and Perdue 2004:34-35).

In the meantime the Xiongnu people formed an empire encompassing Mongolia, north- west China and Zungharia. After defeating Yuezhi the Xiongnu had established their presence south of the Tian Shan and imposed taxes and conscripting labor from Loulan and other Tarim basin cities. Far to the east, the Han dynasty had been paying tributes to Xiongnu for decades in order to prevent the hostility from Xiongnu. Eventually, in 139 BCE, Han court decided that enough is enough and sent General Zhang Qian to Yuezhi in Bactria to ask for help against the

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Xiongnu. The attempt however, failed. After that, the Han court decided to push them away from the Turpan and Tarim basins. In around 120 BCE the Han managed to penetrate the Gansu corridor and established military agricultural colonies. The next 60 years were marked by the military struggle between the Xiongnu and Han (Millward and Perdue 2004:35-36).

For the Xiongnu people the importance of the Tarim and Turpan basins lied in the region‟s agricultural products, manpower and tax revenue. The Han, on the other hand, valued it for strategic position. The campaigns were bloody and led to the massacres of local people. In 57

BCE the Han managed to divide the Xiongnu into northern and southern factions. After that, the

Han relied less on expensive military campaigns and more on military agricultural colonies

(Millward and Perdue 2004:36).

During over 300 year long struggle for the dominance in the region (between 162 BCE ad

150 CE), the Xiongnu controlled Turpan and Tarim basin for some 70 years, while Han managed to rule for about 125 years. Overall that period could be described as an inconclusive tug of war.

Thus, the assertion that Xinjiang was Chinese during the Han dynasty is oversimplified. What is more important, however, is that the pattern of rivalry between the Xiongnu and Han. A nomadic power from the north exploits the Tarim and Turpan basins as an agricultural base and the China- based power tries to weaken its power through the control of southern Xinjiang (Millward and

Perdue 2004:36).

The long conflict between the Xiongnu and the Han also brought some positive developments as well, the most important of which seems to be the establishment of the „Silk

Road‟. The Silk Road initially served military and political reasons. During the Xiongnu and Han struggle, General Zhang Qian, who was originally sent to seek help of Yuezhi tribes, upon his

- 15 - return he brought back the reports of the potential interest of the Western Regions in developing the commercial relationships with the Han. From then on, the Silk Road served as a bridge between and the East and the West. It came out of the Gansu Corridor and in Xinjiang separated into three main routes: southern, central and northern. The Silk Road allowed for the exchange of commodities, knowledge and inventions, greatly benefiting all those who lived along its routes

(Millward 2007:18-19).

After the decline of the Xiongu and fall of the Han (221 CE) the next 400 years until sixth century were poorly documented. The archeological records and religious and administrative documents suggest that the Kushan empire influenced and perhaps even controlled southern Tarim basin for some time. There is also evidence suggesting the Chinese- style agricultural settlements. However, larger principalities were ruled by the local monarchs.

Around that time Buddhism played an important role, especially in Khotan and Kocho (Millward and Perdue 2004:37).

Around the mid-fourth century a new nomad confederation from Mongolia arose, called

Ruanruan, which exercised control over the region as big as that of Xiongnu, eventually taking

Zungharia. Around 100 years later, Ruanruan allowed the control of the region to fall to the

Hephthalites who in turn invaded the Tarim city-sates. The Hephthalites interfered very little in the affairs of the Tarim cities. They ruled the Tarim basin region until around 560, when they were in turn invaded by another power from Mongolia the Kök Türk. Around the same time, powers from Tibet, Arabia and Turkestan entered into a new geopolitical struggle that would soon engulf the southern Xinjiang (Millward and Perdue 2004:37).

- 16 -

The Türks were a tribe under the Ruanruan rulership – in other words they looked

Mongol as well. In 583 the Türks overthrew the ruling Ruanruan tribe and divided the former empire into the western and eastern khanate. The western khanate included Zungharia and western Tarim basin. Türks maintained diplomatic relations with Byzantium and even warred with Persia (Millward and Perdue 2004:38).

At the same time Chinese powers involved themselves in Türks politics and the Xinjiang region. Under the Sui dynasty the Chinese encouraged Türk factionalism and established their presence in Hami and in the southern Tarim basin. The Sui successor, the Tang dynasty continued those policies. Similarly to the Hans, the Tangs tried to weaken the western nomad tribes trough diplomatic and military means. However, unlike the Hans, the Tang dynasty had much higher level of association with the northern people. They often intermarried with the nomadic conquerors from the north. This resulted in some element of the Turkic and Chinese cultures to blend. This could explain the reason why the Tangs succeeded in annexing the eastern branch of the Türk empire. The Tang then mobilized its new Türk allies and in the 620s and 630s they launched a campaign against the Turpan and Tarim oases states. This resulted in the establishment of Turpan and subsequently Kucha generalship. The political influence of the

Tang era was marked not by the Sinicization but rather Turkicization of southern Xinjiang. This was especially visible in the cities of Turpan and Kucha, where presence of the Turkic troops was especially strong. Thus, similarly to the Han period, we can‟t really say that during the Tang era Xinjiang was Chinese territory considering the influence from other cultures like Türks, Tibet,

Arabs as well as Tang. At that time Xinjiang began its transition into a more linguistically and culturally Turkic region, the tendency that continues today (Millward and Perdue 2004:38-39).

- 17 -

In 657 the Tang dynasty reached its greatest territorial extent in Central Asia. But only five years later, Transoxiana rebelled against the Tang rule and shorty after that the Western

Türks were once again autonomous. The Tang also lost the control in southern Xinjiang to Tibet from 670 to the 690s. From 730 to 751, the Tang once again took over western Türk tribes and consolidated control of Zungharia and the Tarim basin. They conquered the Tashkent and executed its king. However, the king‟s son escaped and sought help among the Arabs from

Samarkand. The Arabs and the Tangs, fought against each other in 751 in the Battle of Talas with Türk soldiers present on both sides. During the battle the Türks under the Tang banner turned against their rulers ultimately leading to the Tang‟s defeat. This battle did not, however, end the Tang rule. It was the An Lushan rebellion in 755 in the heartland of Chinese Empire that forced the Tang forces to retreat from Xinjiang and until the Qing dynasty, no China-based power ruled Xinjiang (Millward and Perdue 2004:39-40).

Between 630s and the An Lushan rebellion, the Tang enjoyed around 100 years of control over the Tarim city-states. During that century the Tibetans also ruled the region for about 20 years. Tibet and Tang fought wars over control of the Pamir and Karakoram Passes.

The struggles went along three frontier regions – the Sino-Mongolia, the Sino-Tibetan and the

Pamir-Tian Shan – shaped the fate of Xinjiang, especially the Tarim and Turpan basins

(Millward and Perdue 2004:39).

In the seventh century the Uyghurs came onto the geopolitical scene. During that time

Uyghurs turned out to be a major conquering power. Similarly to their predecessors, they originated in Mongolian core lands of the Orkhon River valley. The term “Uyghur” and the tribes using this name to describe themselves had been components of Türk Empire in the past.

In 744 Uyghurs overthrew the ruling Türk house and established their own state in central

- 18 -

Mongolia. Uyghurs helped the Tang during their struggles against Tibet and against An Lushan rebellion. The Uyghur khaghanate lasted until 840 when it was destroyed by a massive attack of the Kyrgyz. After that the Uyghur tribes moved to the Tian Shan region, establishing a state centered in Beshbaliq as a winter capital and Khocho as a summer capital. The Khocho Uyghur domain extended east as far as Hami and west to Kucha (Millward and Perdue 2004:40).

Uyghurs began mainly as Turko-Mongolian steppe nomads, however, even after they sedentarized in Xinjiang, they were no Muslims. They embraced Buddhism and tolerated

Christianity but opposed Islam. They intermarried with the Iranians and other Indo-European peoples. In other words the Uyghurs of the Uyghur empire are not the only ancestors of today‟s

Uyghurs. Moreover the Muslim Uyghurs of the Tarim basin and Turpan area were not even known as “Uyghur” until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Millward and Perdue

2004:41).

II. Islamicisation of Xinjiang

The Uyghurs were by no means rude barbarians. Their capitol in Khocho was a busy center that maintained the ties with Soghdia, India and China. This eventually led to a political, cultural and economic blending, including the peoples themselves. During the Tang, the Five

Dynasties, Song, Liao and Jin, Uyghurs maintained good relations with those China-based powers. They supported Buddhism and Nestorian Christianity (Millward and Perdue 2004:42).

The Uyghur dynasty based in Kucha-Urumchi-Turpan-Hami, was longer-lived than any other regional power that came before or after. In the 1130s Uyghurstan (name given to it by later Islamic sources), could not resist the new arising powers in the east, but it found a way to accommodate them, thus ensuring its survival. They accepted the newly established power of the

- 19 -

Kara Khitai as overlord and in 1209 they also submitted to the rising Mongol empire. This ensured their survival until 1370, when they were finally destroyed by the Chaghataid Mongols

(Millward and Perdue 2004:43-44).

To the west a confederation of Turkic tribes, led by the Kurluks, had migrated west and called themselves “khan”, the highest Turko-Mongolian ruling title. These tribes are known today as Karakhanids. The Karakhanids converted to Islam after they successfully destroyed the

Samanid dynasty and effectively took control over the predominantly Muslim Transoxiana

(Millward and Perdue 2004:44).

While we can trace today‟s Uyghur name to the Uyghur Khocho (Uyghurstan), the source of their religion lies within the Karakhanids. Both Khocho Uyghur and Karakhanid rulers intermarried with local population. This had a political, historical and cultural impact upon the population of these two states. Therefore, it‟s somewhat difficult to construct a linear narrative of

Uyghur history. However, it can be argued that, both the Uyghur state and the Karakhanids can be considered Uyghurs since the ancestry of their respective ruling houses can be traced to

Orkhon-based Uyghur khanate (Millward 2007:45).

Another important step along the road of Islamicisation of Xinjiang was the conversion of the Buddhist kingdom of Khotan. Sometime before 1006 Karakhanids took the city-state of

Khotan and ended its local autonomy and thus started the process of Islamization and

Turkicisation. This event along with the above mentioned destruction of the Samanid dynasty made the Karakhanids the first Turkic dynasty to rule in Islamic Central Asia (Millward and

Perdue 2004:46).

- 20 -

During the twelfth century another important player entered the region – the Kara Khitay.

The Khitay were Mongol speaking tribe which ruled northern China as the Liao dynasty from

907 to 1125. In the late 1120s the state of Khitan was destroyed by the Jin dynasty. One of the royal members, Yelü Dashi managed to flee to Mongolia where he gathered some followers. He then went to Beshbaliq where he found more followers and accepted the submission of the

Uyghurs. By 1141 he ruled over Uyghur and Karakhanid empires. Yelü Dashi brought with him the knowledge of Chinese governing practices. He allowed Uyghurs and Karakhanids a great deal of autonomy for as long as they paid their taxed and tributes. However, despite of making a few changes on the local level, the oppressive taxes caused resentment among the elites and eventually led to Uyghur rebellion in 1209. Uyghurs pledged their allegiance to Genghis Khan.

By then Genghis Khan managed to unify many tribes in Mongolia and by 1208 he defeated the

Naiman chief Küchlük who in turn fled to Kara Khitay and in 1211 effectively usurped the control of the state (Millward 2007:46-47).

The state of Kara Khitay had been hospitable to the different religions that dominated the state‟s dominion. However, after the Küchlük took power he put an end to the tolerant practices of the state. He started a pogrom of its Muslim citizens. Eventually Genghis Khan sent an army against Küchlük who fled south and died while trying to cross the Pamirs (Millward 2007:47).

Before Genghis Khan death in 1227 he divided his empire among his sons. This arrangement resulted in centuries of instability, particularly on the territory of the former Kara

Khitay. It was easy to control the areas of Transoxiana and southern Xinjiang, however the Great

Khans from farther east were the ones controlling the revenues from the Muslim and Uyghur cities. The Uyghur kingdom was Beijing‟s subject until the early fourteenth century. There was a constant tension between the Mongols from Mongolia and those who ruled in China. This

- 21 - resulted in the struggles similar to those during the Han-Xiongnu and Tang-Türk rivalry. From the thirteenth through seventeenth century the complex struggles and opportunistic alliances between Mongols and Turks ensured a long epoch of military flux throughout the region

(Millward and Perdue 2004:47).

In the meantime the fate of Uyghur dynasty was centered in the modern Turpan and

Urumchi area and was controlled by China during the Mongol rule. When required they provided the military support to their Mongol rulers. During the late thirteenth century the eastern part of

Xinjiang became a front in the conflict between China-based power (The Great Khan Khubilai) and steppe-based power (Ögödeids and Chaghataids). The conflict resulted in the devastation of the Turpan‟s region infrastructure and eventual escape of the Uyghur ruling house to China. The victorious steppe-based power finally freed themselves from the interference of China-based

Mongolian ruling house (Millward and Perdue 2004:48).

Another major event that further pushed the process of Islamicisation was in the 1330s, when the Chaghataid khan Tarmashirin converted to Islam. The move alienated Buddhist,

Christian and shamanist nomads from Issyk Kul and the Ili area. They in turn, rebelled against the Tarmashirin khan and caused a split to western and eastern part. The western, Islamic

Chaghataids were based in Transoxiana and the eastern Chaghataids ruled over the Tarim basin and the former Uyghurstan from what now came to be called “Moghulistan”. Around this time the Xinjiang began to take its current shape (Millward and Perdue 2004:48).

“Moghul” refers to the Chaghataids who ruled over Xinjiang and Transoxiana between fourteenth and seventeenth century. Similarly to Turks before, they too became Muslims, making

Islam the dominant religion among the nomadic tribesmen and oasis dwellers, including Uyghur

- 22 - kingdom in the Turpan area who used to be Buddhist. By the time the new wave of Mongols (the

Zunghars) conquered the Tarim basin, the region had become fully Muslim (Millward 2007:67).

During the centuries of the Moghul rule, the power over the northern and southern

Xinjiang was only in name, except few exceptions. Among these exceptions were the kingmakers from the Dughlat clan and Sufi masters from Naqshbandi, with the latter increasingly gaining influence in the sixteenth century which culminated in the monopolization of power the Tarim basin in the second half of the seventeenth century.

The period of Moghul rule was characterized by the quickening of the commercial exchanges from China. Despite of the occasional conflicts, the trade and cultural exchange flowed regularly between the Ming dynasty and the Xinjiang region. The Ming sent foreign traders into diplomatic protocols and called them tributaries. The trade imposed by the Ming dynasty required merchants to have official status. This gave the Xinjiang rulers an opportunity to play along with the Ming pretensions of superiority while contracting out the right to organize

“embassies” to the highest bidder. However, the most significant development in the region was the continuous process of Islamization. By the time a new wave of Mongols (Zunghars) arrived onto the scene the area of Tarim basin with its inhabitants had become fully Muslim. The Sufis, or Islamic mystics, were largely responsible for the spread of Islam among the Turkic and

Mongol people (Millward and Perdue 2004:49).

The Sufi order was a branch of the Naqhbandiyya, descended from Makhdun-I A‟zam.

The order became active in the Tarim basin in the sixteenth century, and was led by Makhdun-I

A‟zam‟s son Ishaq Wali. Later his disciples became known as the Ishaqiyya. He successfully converted Kyrgyz tribes and managed to make Chaghataid ruler his disciple. Another descendent

- 23 - of Makhdun-I A‟zam, Khoja Muhammad Yusuf, came to the east and preached in the Tarim basin, Uyghurstan and western China. He was later poisoned and replaced by his son Khoja Afaq.

His disciples became known as Afaqiyya (Millward and Perdue 2004:49).

The Ishaqiyya and Afaqiyya became rivals. The Ishaqiyya established in Yarkand and the

Afaqiyya in Kashgar. In the 1670s the Ishaqiyya managed to drive Khoja Afaq from Kashgar. He went on to seek help from the Fifth Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama played the Mongol card, leading to the conquest of the Tarim basin by another Mongol power, the Zunghars (Millward

2007:86).

III. Qing conquest and incorporation of Xinjiang

The Qing dynasty was founded by Nurhachi, who in the late sixteenth century had waged a war against other tribes in Manchuria and extracted tributes from them. In 1616, he declared himself a ruler of a new dynasty, controlling most of Manchuria. In 1644 his successors had taken Beijing and over the next four decades conquered all of China. In the 1650s Russians founded the fortress of Albazin, which was destroyed twice by the Manchu army. The dispute was settled in the Nerchisnk treaty of 1689, which stabilized the frontier and eliminated the autonomy of peoples in the borderland. The treaty lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union

(Millward 2007:89-91).

Another power striving for the dominance in the region was the Zunghars. The Zunghars came to power after defeating other Oirat tribes of western Mongolia. The Zunghar leader Batur

Hungtaiji took control around the same time when the Qing took Beijing. In 1640 during a Great

Assembly almost all the Mongols gathered with the Tibetan lamas and formed a loose confederation. The confederation nearly ended after the Batur‟s death but in 1670 his nephew,

- 24 -

Galdan, returned from Tibet and took charge of the khanate. During Galdan‟s rule the Zunghars created a real state. The Zunghars allied themselves with Afaq Khoja and took control over the

Tarim and Turpan basins. From then on the Zunghar state was the dominant power in Xinjiang

(Millward and Perdue 2004:50-51).

The situation took a familiar form, where a Mongol power was threatening a China-based power. In an attempt to expand his power into eastern Mongolia, Galdan challenged the Qing emperor Kangxi. In 1690 Kangxi‟s troops stopped the Galdan forces in the Battle of Ulan

Butong, however Galdan managed to escape, which infuriated the Qing emperor who promised to exterminate Galdan and his Zunghars. In 1696 Qing armies crushed Galdan in the Battle of

Jaomodo. Most of the conflict happened outside of Xinjiang, nonetheless it was a strategic place that provided resources for both sides (Millward 2007:90-91).

In 1697 Galdan‟s nephew Tsewang Rabdan, took control of Zunghar and until his death in 1727 he tried to expand his power by maintaining control of the Tarim basin and continuously fighting off the Qing efforts to weaken his state. In 1731 the Qing emperor provoked by the continual raids launched a large military campaign against Zunghars. The Qing managed to push them back but failed to capture Urumchi. Both sides needed a rest and after a round of negotiations the truce was established which lasted for 20 years.

In 1755 Qing armies marched against the Zunghars and quickly gained control over the region. Because of the internal conflict between the Zunghars, the confederation could offer little resistance to advancing Qing troops. After the victory the Qing attempted to divide the Xinjiang region into four sub-khanates each ruled by a different chief. Soon after, the Qing decided to withdraw their forces back to the mainland (Millward 2007:95).

- 25 -

In the meantime one of the former Zunghar chieftains Amursana, decided that he‟d become a king of all tribes. In the past Amursana sought help from the Qing emperor Qianlong to put him on the throne of Zungharia. However, after the conquer Qianlong divided Zungharia into four parts, each ruled by a different khan in order to weaken the state and maintain full control over it. Amursana, thought that it‟s his right to rule over the whole Zungharia so he revolted against the Qianlong emperor. After hearing the news the Qing emperor Qianlong became enraged and launched a massive campaign against the Amursana. He also insisted on exterminating all of the Zunghar people, except women, children and elderly whom he intended to enslave. This deliberate ethnic genocide was a “final solution” to China‟s problem with the north-west frontier (Millward and Perdue 2004:53-54).

In 1759 after numerous massacres on the native Zunghar population, the Qing finally consolidated their authority and started settling its own Chinese citizens in the region. The emperor conquered the Zungharian plateau and the Tarim basin which was inhabited by the

Uyghurs, this effectively brought both the northern and southern regions of the Tian Shan mountains under his rule (Millward and Perdue 2004).

After the conquest of Xinjiang was completed the Qing generals faced some serious problems. They had to govern an area of over 2 million square kilometers big, roughly the size of

Mexico, with its 600,000 population scattered across extremely rough terrain. The policies the

Qing used incorporated the elements of coercion, commercial incentives and the promotion of colonial style settlement. It started with the military forces first. The military garrison in Ili served as an administrative center for the entire region. These policies proved to be quite successful and the reason for this lied not only in the military presence but also in flexibility in accommodating the local interests. This is an obvious contrast when we compare it with the

- 26 - modern state‟s programs that focus on imposing uniformity and transforming local society

(Millward and Perdue 2004), which will be discussed in more details in chapter 3.

The Qing saw their conquest as a continuation of the Han and Tang accomplishments. In the eyes of the Qing dynasty they were merely restoring the borders and that served as a justification of their conquest. They also knew that the presence of Han soldiers, farmers and scholars would not be enough to integrate the region more closely with the Chinese heartland.

During the conquest the Qing cut off the trade routes that oriented Xinjiang and Mongolia away from Beijing. They controlled the trade at the border with Russia and limited contacts with Tibet.

The Qing also managed to create more commercial routes between China and Xinjiang. All these efforts coupled with the tax base still could not support the Qing administration. The imperial rule in Xinxiang, however, was never really fully secure. Eventually during 1820s as a result of the local people grievances, the Chinese presence was challenged in Kashgar and other nearby cities. The region was repeatedly invaded by neighboring Kokand khanate. In 1827 Qing armies drove out the Kokand forces which allowed the first Han to settle into southern Xinjiang. This marked a shift from an accommodative approach of minimal interference in local people affairs to a policy of full-scale assimilation of the Chinese norms as a way of securing the territory

(Millward 2007:112-113).

In 1862 a large rebellion broke out among the Chinese Muslims (Hui) in the provinces of

Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai which eventually also spread to Xinjiang where Hui were joined by the Uyghurs. The uprising was fueled by the local people grievances over heavy taxation and forced labor and with that the Qing lost the control over Xinjiang. This created a power vacuum that was quickly filled by Yakub Beg (a warlord from Kokand). He then created an emirate with

Kashgar at the center. The rebellion and its leader is sometimes mistakenly taken as Uyghur fight

- 27 - for independence. However, Yakub Beg was not a Uyghur freedom fighter but a Kokandi who forced his dominance upon the people of the Tarim basin (Millward 2007:117).

The era of Yakub Beg was marked by tight security, central planning and the enforcement of the rule of Sharia. After he secured his position he started depicting himself as a defender of faith and a holy warrior against Chinese. Local Uyghur population was not exactly happy with these changes. They were not used to the strict adherence to the Islamic norms enforced by Beg‟s regime and at the top of that they were forced to pay high taxes. Also the burden of supplying his large army was put on the local population. The reign of Yakub Beg can be characterized as an occupation regime for the most part (Millward 2007:118).

Around the same time the imperial rivalry between Russia and the Great Britain was becoming more tangible in Central Asia. Russia, which had conquered the Transoxiana during the 1850s and 1860s, loomed over the border and in 1871 it did indeed annex the Ili valley. Beg used this as an opportunity and signed a commercial treaty that allowed Russian traders in his cities. Beg simultaneously sought out to maintain good relations with the British. Thanks to these political moves the Qing were unable to launch any military campaigns that would allow them to take back the Xinjiang until late 1870s. Under the Yakub Beg‟s rule and his diplomatic strategies

Xinjiang for the first time became known to the rest of the world and played a role in the larger game of imperial expansion and globalization (Millward 2007:120).

Finally, in 1877, General Zuo Zongtang managed to reconquer Xinjiang. However, the victory put a huge strain on the Qing‟s treasury, amounting to a one sixth of the annual budget.

And even before the expedition was launched, there was a big debate among the politicians who argued if reconquering Xinjiang has any value to the empire (Millward and Tursun 2004:63).

- 28 -

The reconquering of Xinjiang resulted in a collapse of Yakub Beg‟s emirate and his death.

As a result Russian forces that were allowed to station in the region, thanks to Beg‟s good relations with the Russian empire, were forced to withdraw and in 1884 Qing administration officially adapted the name Xinjiang (新疆), which is usually translated as “new frontier”, the name that reflects the region‟s remoteness and its perception in the Chinese heartland. At the same time the Xinjiang was assigned provincial status and thus it was formally incorporated into the Chinese empire. (Dillon 2004:20)

The formal incorporation of Xinjiang marked a change in the ruling elites‟ mindset. From then on the region was viewed as an integral part of the empire. Xinjiang‟s political scene was almost immediately dominated by Han Chinese with their Chinese style administration. The officials encouraged Han migration to the region and provided Confucian education to some of

Xinjiang‟s Turkic inhabitants. However, in 1911, the year that marked the Republican revolution, the Qing dynasty came to an end and on January 1, 1912 Republic of China was officially inaugurated (Millward and Tursun 2004::67)

IV. Xinjiang under the Republic of China

Shortly after the establishment of the Republic, Yang Zengxin secured his position as a governor of Xinjiang. He managed to isolate Xinjiang from the Chinese heartland and exercised strict control over the region until his assassination in 1928. His successor, Jin Shuren, didn‟t exercise the level of control as his predecessor did and he abandoned the previous tradition of co- opting indigenous leaders, consequently he alienated different ethnic groups along with their leaders. Eventually, this strategy led to large scale rebellions with one of the warlord from Gansu,

Ma Zhongying, entering Xinjiang, using a pretext of supporting local Muslims. Jin‟s attempt to

- 29 - counter Ma by appointing Sheng Shicai failed and it resulted in a coup in 1933. Jin‟s office was then passed to Sheng Shicai, who held a strong anti-Japanese stance and quickly secured a strong support from the Soviets (Dillon 2004:22, Millward and Tursun 2004:68)

By the end of 1933, Sheng‟s position was still not secure due to the presence of Ma‟s forces to the north and the creation of a new rival polity, the Sharia-governed Turkic-Islamic

Republic of East-Turkistan (TIRET). Its leaders had an idea for an independent state and this was perceived as a threat by the Soviets. They were afraid that the TIRET‟s ideology would influence

Soviet controlled Central Asia. Soviets then decided to interfere and they forced Ma to move south to Kashgar where in 1934 he dislodged the TIRET regime. This was followed by Sheng‟s military offensive and Ma‟s disappearance into the Soviet Union. After that, Sheng secured his position and despite of the fact that he officially was still a Guomindang subordinate he de facto ruled independently. He then prohibited the presence of any separatist movement and appointed a few leaders from the local population in order to gain their loyalty. From then on the oasis dwellers were referred to as Uyghurs (Millward 2007:207-208)

Throughout the 1930s and 1940s Xinjiang was a destabilized region. Sheng was continuously forced to deal with Turkic Muslims rebellions. Sheng frequently applied the strategy of shifting his outside patrons which eventually led to his downfall in 1944. In late 1944,

Kazakh and Uyghur movements forced Sheng and his troops out of the Ili region and with the support from the Soviet Union in November the same year the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in northern Xinjiang was established. The ETR lasted until 1949 (Millward 2007:215).

During its initial existence the ETR was oriented towards Islam, however only a year later it shifted to more secular and pro-Soviet approach. Eventually, the Soviets insistence on a

- 30 - cease-fire with the Guomindang troops still present in Xinjiang led to a mutual distrust and ended up in the coalition break up in 1947. From then on it governed the northern part of

Xinjiang by itself. However, with the 1949 entrance of the People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) to the region, the ETR rule was effectively terminated and from then on the Chinese Communist

Party has been the ruling organ in Xinjiang (Millward 2007:235).

The communist rule was marked by the ever increasing level of control over the Xinjiang population, mainly Uyghurs. Over time this led to numerous clashes with the Chinese state. To this day Xinjiang is considered the most restive region of China. Many scholars believe that the situation is at least partially a result of the government‟s policies in the region and the tight control it maintains. Chapter 3 will present more detailed account of the Chinese Communist

Party rule after 1949 up to the present day. It will discuss the policies and methods used by the

PRC government that allow for this tight level of control as well as the aftermath of the government‟s approach to the region.

- 31 -

Chapter 3 – The PRC state and integration of Xinjiang

Throughout chapter 2, it was demonstrated that the region attracted various politico- religious formations, which aspired to rule the territory and its people. When in 1949 Xinjiang became an “inseparable part of China”, the event started a project of integrating the region more closely with “the motherland”.

I. The communist rule begins

According to the 2003 White Paper on history and development in Xinjiang,

”Xinjiang was peacefully liberated on September 25, 1949 […]. The people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang greeted the founding of the People‟s Republic of China together with the rest of the Chinese people on October 1, 1949” (Xinjiang White Paper 2003a).

This line of thinking is still present among the PRC‟s officials. This, however, could not be further from the truth which this chapter will demonstrate.

During the early 1950s, the Chinese government faced many challenges. Most of the

Chinese citizens were supportive towards the CCP and its goals. However, this was not the case for Xinjiang. Although there were some communist present in Xinjiang during that time, they were mainly associated with the ETR and the Soviet Union. They made the PRC act with some degree of caution. Initially, the most pressing task was to train the local Turkic cadres. This was not an easy task, given their association with the ETR and the Soviet Union. This was accomplished through mass mobilization campaigns and promotion of non-Han candidates for positions of local authority (Millward and Tursun 2004:85-86).

- 32 -

Another starting point of the 1950s was the land reform movement. This served the same political purposes and also set the stage for the process of collectivization of agriculture. The government was confiscating property en masse and simultaneously was recruiting “activists” whose job was to undermine local elites. The PLA teams that carried out these tasks introduced new forms of local organizations. This made possible to recruit the Party‟s own operatives to govern local society.

Islam was yet another target of those early land reforms. Initially, the government allowed for modest supervision towards the practice of Islam. However, soon the cadres started an all-embracing process of institutionalization of Islam. The first step was the confiscation of mosques‟ properties and arable land. This policy was designed to undermine the influence of the

Islamic clerics and major land owners as well. Islam was further weakened when the communist authorities completely eliminated the Islamic taxes. Over time, the Islamic courts and the judge system were abolished and replaced with the PRC courts (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:300,

Dillon 2004:55).

Another strategy was the incorporation of clerics on the institutional level and putting them on the Beijing-based Chinese Islamic Association (CIA) payroll. This allowed for the

Beijing approved religious curriculum to be distributed in Xinjiang. This meant (and still means) that interpretation of Islam, both in the written and spoken form, has to be first approved by the state. Furthermore, the CIA has the right to educate and approve the officially practicing clerics.

The above mentioned curriculum also contains the indoctrination in the basics of socialism. In other words, the state can decide what constitutes the “the lawful and illegal religious activities”, something that continues to this day and is justified in the 2019 White Paper:

- 33 -

“[…] local regulations specify the rights and interests of religious groups, religious staff, and venues for religious activities, and draw a clear line between lawful and illegal religious activities, providing legal guarantees for people of all ethnic groups to engage in lawful religious activities.” (White Paper 2019).

Within its first decade of rule the PRC managed to substantially undermine the position of Islam. Islamic counter-cultures were not able to oppose these new restrictions and during the

Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Islam was further undermined (these two devastating aspects of Mao era will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter).

In 1954 the Xinjiang Production Constriction Corps (Bingtuan) were established and they represented another dimension of CCP power in the region. The core of the Bingtuans was composed of the former Guomindang troops who after the demobilization were employed in these semi-military working corps. Bingtuan‟s main purpose was to promote economic development and also when needed, serve as militia. This twofold nature of Bingtuans was illustrated in another passage from the 2003 White Paper:

“As an important force for stability in Xinjiang and for consolidating frontier defense, the XPCC adheres to the principle of attaching equal importance to production and militia duties. It has set up in frontier areas a “four-in-one” system of joint defense that links the PLA, the Armed Police, the XPCC and the ordinary people, playing an irreplaceable special role in the past five decades in smashing and resisting internal and external separatists‟ attempts at sabotage and infiltration, and in maintaining the stability and safety of the borders of the motherland.” (White Paper 2003b).

Throughout the 1950s to 1970s many of the resettled migrants were employed by the

Production Corps. Bingtuans were also responsible for handling Han refugees during the Great

Leap Forward famine and young Chinese “patriots” during the Cultural Revolution. This partly forced and partly endorsed Han settlement to Xinjiang resulted in a dramatic change of

- 34 -

Xinjiang‟s demographic. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Han migration to Xinjiang to cultivate the wasteland was seen as an act of national heroism. Between 1954 and 1961, around 1.5 million people migrated to the region (Toops 2004:256) and about 3 million between 1950 and

1970 (Bovingdon 2004:23-34).

Aside from the strategy of colonizing the Xinjiang region with Hans, the PRC government designated the province into the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955 as a way to police the Uyghur separatist sentiments. The real reason wasn‟t to give Uyghurs a real autonomy but to keep them within the “Chinese house”. Through the process of politico- administrative engineering, the Chinese government managed to take over the territory by designating “sub-autonomies” to monitor ethnic groups (Bovingdon 2004:14). As a result the

Uyghur capacity to govern themselves was seriously undermined. Non-Han officials, however, were kept in positions of authority in order to avoid the appearance of colonialism. This contributed to the general acceptance of the PRC rule. However, at the same time the real power was kept in the hands of upper-level officials, who, not surprisingly, were mainly Han (Millward and Tursun 2004:91).

Just one year after the Xinjiang‟s designation into the Autonomous Region, CCP chairman Mao initiated the Hundred Flowers movement, where he called for open criticism of the party. The movement revealed some discontent in Xinjiang regarding its “autonomy”. Some of the criticism was directed towards the environmental damage caused by the Bingtuans and

Han officials indifference regarding Uyghur issues. Around the same time the Sino-Soviet relations were quickly deteriorating. Given the Xinjiang historical relationship with the Soviet

Union it‟s not surprising that the split negatively affected the economy, non-Han officials and even the Turkic language script. The campaign‟s main focus in Xinjiang was on the Islamic

- 35 - figures and “local nationalism” and resulted in a purge of many Turkic officials. This cultural intolerance, coupled with the prosecution of Soviet supporters further intensified during the

Mao‟s next campaign, the Great Leap Forward (Millward and Tursun 2004:92).

The Great Leap Forward (1958 – 1962) was an utopian vision that turned out to be one of the most devastating periods in the Chinese history. The campaign followed the same general guidelines in Xinjiang as in other parts of China. It started with merging of the local agricultural producers into people‟s communes. The people in charge of these communes set some unrealistic production targets and when they couldn‟t reach those targets, they simply hid their failures and reported the false, much exaggerated production values. In Xinjiang, similarly as elsewhere in

China, the Great Leap Forward produced famine. However, Xinjiang was still much better off than the rest of China (Millward and Tursun 2004:93).

The experience of the Great Leap Forward in Xinjiang was different than in the eastern provinces. Because the majority of the people in the region were non-Han, by 1958 the government abandoned its even-handed approach of the ethnic matters and condemned the Han chauvinism. This was forgotten during the Mao‟s assimilationist approach to the region, when the party launched its Religious Reform movement, with a strong anti-Islam tone. Wang Enmao, who at the time was the Communist Party Chief of Xinjiang, emphasized the need of the full assimilation of all the nationalities within China, in his mind, it was necessary for the country‟s development. Around the same time, the Bingtuans were in a process of massive expansion, clearing farms and developing industry. The completion of Urumchi-Hami railroad in 1962 allowed for even bigger migration of Hans into the region (Millward and Tursun 2004:93-94).

- 36 -

The Great Leap Forward policies, which emphasized the anti-Soviet and anti-local nationalism, resulted in the more intense penetration of the Xinjiang. Mass scale Han migration, economic instability and the need to send the grain from the predominantly Uyghur south to support the shortcomings of the Han northeast, left many Uyghurs angry and dissatisfied and coupled with the strong Soviet propaganda, from April to May 1962, tens of thousands of them

(along with many Kazaks and others) left for the Soviet territory. The huge Uyghur migration was only stopped when a significant PLA and Bingtuan forces sealed the border (Millward and

Tursun 2004:94).

After the devastating results of the Great Leap Forward became known, Mao was forced to let go of his direct leadership. The ruling cadre that included Deng Xiaoping was in favor of more gradual approach. The new authorities in Xinjiang also displayed more tolerance for local non-Han cultures and revised their emphasis on the full assimilation of all China‟s nationalities.

The brief period of positive change lasted only a few years, after which the charismatic Mao managed to arise the youth into attacking the CCP and government power holders. From 1966 the “Red Guards” travelled around the country and attacked the headquarters (Millward and

Tursun 2004:95). The main premise of the Cultural Revolution was the destruction of the Four

Olds, which meant the destruction of everything that had any relation to the traditional Chinese past – which included the destruction of old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas. Mao believed that the Four Olds are the reason that is holding back China‟s development (Rohr 2018).

In the eyes of Mao and his supporters, in Xinjiang, the Four Olds were represented mainly by the

Islam. Mao‟s Red Guards attacked Islam and Central Asian customs. Many religious texts like

Koran, Islamic mosques and other Islamic symbols were burned or destroyed. There exist some

- 37 - accounts of the religious incumbents‟ torture and the “religious” parades on the streets where the

Islamic leaders would be accompanied by pigs that served as pennants in mosques.

The above mentioned Red Guards formed an organization called the Second Red

Headquarters in Urumchi. They attacked Wang Enmao and his supporters who in turn formed their own organization called the First Red Headquarters to defend themselves. Between 1967 and 1968 there was a constant turmoil in Xinjiang province, with constant clashes between the

Mao‟s supporters on the one hand and Enmao‟s on the other. The events in Xinjiang had spun out of control and there was a possibility similar to the one during the Republic of China rule, that the government may lose its control completely (Millward and Tursun 2004:95).

Finally, by the summer 1968, the armed military conflict in Xinjiang ended. Wang

Enmao was forced out and one of the Fourth Field Army officers Long Shujin took over. Long and the people behind him promoted radical political and economic agendas of his superior Lin

Biao, Mao and his wife, Jiang Qin. Luckily for Xinjiang, Lin‟s coup attempt had failed and eventually led to his death in September 1971. Long Shujin was purged by Beijng and Yang

Yong and Seypidin Ezizi took control of Xinjiang. They brought back with them more moderate political approach to the region. Overall the period of Cultural Revolution damaged Xinjiang‟s economy more seriously than other regions of China. The region went from a grain surplus production province to a grain-deficit one. The main reason for that was the overzealous approach of the Bingtuan members who instead of focusing on cultivating the land, heavily engaged themselves in the region‟s politics and armed conflict (Millward and Tursun 2004:96).

The periods of Great Leap Forward and subsequent Cultural Revolution, finally undermined even the little power the Uyghurs and some other non-Han citizens had in Xinjiang.

- 38 -

Almost all of the top non-Han officials were purged, many of whom were secretly executed. The cultural xenophobia, intolerance and forced assimilation lasted until 1978 when Deng Xiaoping emerged at the top of the CCP ranks and somewhat “restored the balance”.

II. The „opening up‟ of Xinjiang

After Mao‟s death (1976), Deng Xiaoping rose as Mao‟s successor in 1978. He was faced with a difficult job of restoring the political and economic havoc of the Cultural Revolution. The

1980s turned out to be a decade of some major political and social changes in China. Deng initiated the policies of controlled tolerance of ethnic minorities and their religious institutions

(Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004:308).

In the early 1980s Xinjiang was still struggling to recover from the previous decades of chaos. The region was still grain-deficit province and relied on the other provinces to supply it

(the situation would last until 1985). Xinjiang‟s population had increased to about 13 million in total as well as the Han proportion of the population to around 40% (Holdstock 2015:53).

Since 1953, every five years Chinese leaders were presenting the so called Five-year

Plans. The sixth (1981-85) and the seventh (1986-90) plans focused mainly on the development of the eastern provinces and the western regions such as Xinjiang were left with a job of supplying these provinces with raw materials needed for their development. The rationale for this particular development was that some regions had to get rich first in order for this accumulated wealth to be eventually transferred to other, poorer regions. The voices of opposition that called for the more balanced development that would include at least some of the areas of Xinjiang were ignored. Xinjiang‟s main area of investment during the 1980s was infrastructure.

(Holdstock 2015:53-54).

- 39 -

Between 1979 and 1981 Wang Feng served as chairman of the XUAR. He implemented an eight-point plan for agricultural policy. The policy instituted the new “household responsibility system” permitted the restoration of private plots and allowed the commune members to keep their own livestock for private use. Under the Wang‟s leadership many members of the CCP members purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated. Wang also attempted to include more ethnic minorities to positions of authority (Clarke 2007).

Around the same time, Hu Yaobang, the second in command after Deng, was an essential figure in implementing Deng‟s reforms of „opening up‟. He was the first one that attempted the shift in the governance structure of Xinjiang back to the more tolerant one that had been initially adopted in the early 1950s. The reason for this push was the 1980 Aksu riot over the killing of

Uyghur youth by two Han men. After travelling around Tibet and some other minority areas, Hu proposed that the minority regions should become genuinely autonomous. This was achieved by transferring some of the Han cadres to other parts of China and the encouragement of the local monitories cultures. Hu‟s proposals, unfortunately, weren‟t fully accepted in Xinjiang and the

Han cadres didn‟t leave the region and there wasn‟t much going on to grand the real autonomy to

Xinjiang (Holdstock 2015:230).

During the Deng‟s reform era, the most noticeable change in Xinjiang occurred with the relation to Islam. After seventeen years Xinjiang‟s Islamic Association was permitted to meet,

Uyghurs were once again allowed to use Arabic alphabet to write their language, and thousands of mosques were built or reopened. The association enhanced “unity” between Muslims and non-

Muslims and established contact with Muslims abroad. The association was also warned to be patriotic and not to undermine “national unity” through its religious practices (Clarke 2007).

This new level of religious tolerance was an attempt to convince potential trading and investment

- 40 - partners from Muslim countries that Islam in China is being practiced freely. These religious freedoms were not welcomed by all Uyghurs. Some of the more secular Uyghurs from Urumchi argued that religion had been too conservative and it would stifle the modernization. These voices were coming from small urban elites, nonetheless it was an illustration of the potential fault lines present in the Uyghur society (Holdstock 2015:231).

Among other positive changes introduced in Xinjiang during the Deng‟s reform era was the Party‟s decision to allocate a US$4.3 million state aid package in order to alleviate southern

Xinjiang malaise. Furthermore, agricultural and pastoral taxes were decreased and the amount of goods available designed to target minorities was also increased. Major infrastructure were also undertaken in order to connect the southern part with the rest of Xinjiang. The overall strategy that these developments encapsulated as well as revival of ethnic minority religious and cultural practices was the renewed emphasis on the instruments of integration. The situation bares some similarities to the 1949-1955 period, when the communist government initially allowed for a degree of religious and cultural “freedom” that was, however, abruptly interrupted by the Great

Leap forward (Clarke 2007). During that time the increasing freedom of expression could be observed as well. Many Uyghur intellectuals promoted work of some of the local writers, many of them from before the Communist era (Holdstock 2015:233).

In 1984 the Chinese government enacted “People‟s Republic of China Ethnic Autonomy

Law”, which was amended in 2001. The Law gives the ethnic minorities in China a political system that allows assembling autonomous government body, provides various benefits to ethnic minorities and protects their rights. The system was designed to achieve greater ethnic equality in China (CECC 2006). Articles 9 and 10 are of particular importance:

- 41 -

“Article 10 Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas guarantee the freedom of the nationalities in these areas to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and their freedom to preserve or reform their own folkways and customs. Article 11 Autonomous agencies in ethnic autonomous areas guarantee the freedom of religious belief to citizens of the various nationalities”

Other benefits included in the PRC‟s Ethnic Autonomy Law regarding the government jobs sector included (CECC 2006):

“Article 16 In the people's congress of an ethnic autonomous area, in addition to the deputies from the nationality exercising regional autonomy in the administrative area, the other nationalities inhabiting the area are also entitled to appropriate representation Article 17 The chairman of an autonomous region, the prefect of an autonomous prefecture or the head of an autonomous county shall be a citizen of the nationality exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned. Article 18 The cadres in the departments under autonomous agencies in an ethnic autonomous area should be equitably drawn from among citizens of the nationality exercising regional autonomy and the other ethnic minorities in the area.”

Further discussion will reveal if the PRC government is respecting its own laws regarding ethnic minorities. This will be especially relevant when discussing the 1990s, the post 9/11 as well as the Xi‟s policies in Xinjiang.

Towards the end of 1985 some stresses related to the reforms could be experienced in China. Two trends were especially visible at the time. First, there had been the resurgence in the philosophical debate regarding issues concerning “socialist alienation” and the relevance of Marxist theory. Second, there had been a trend in social mobilization, especially among students. There had been a numerous protests in Beijing between September and December 1986. One of these protests included a group of

Uyghur students raising their grievances over the use of China‟s only nuclear testing site in Xinjiang in Lop Nor where between 1964 and 1996 China had tasted their nuclear arsenal multiple times (Clarke 2007). The nuclear tests caused many health related issues

- 42 - over the years, especially among the surrounding towns that were mainly inhabited by

Uyghurs. This will be discussed in more details in chapter 4.

Around the same time the protests in Urumchi took place, where students demanded that Han officials should be replaced with those from among the ethnic minorities and also greater autonomy for Xinjiang. The still predominantly Han Xinjiang authorities didn‟t make any concessions towards these demands and pointed out that the current international situation (Cold War era) demands the continuation of the nuclear tests (Clarke 2007). Just two years after the PRC government passed the Autonomous

Ethnic Minority Law, it had become clear that the central government doesn‟t have a genuine intention of implementing its own laws.

Towards the end of the 1980s the Sino-Soviet relations improved. Soviet consulates in Xinjiang reopened and on the other side of the border China opened its own consulates in the Soviet Central Asian republics. The period had seen a significant growth in the total value of foreign trade from US$ 17.1 million to around US$ 250 million, mainly with the Soviet Central Asia (Clarke 2007).

Overall, the period between 1978 and the late 1980s in Xinjiang was characterized by state‟s attempts in integration. Despite of the reforms launched by Deng

Xiaoping and his supporters, the post-Mao perception of leadership had not changed and the Chinese rule in Xinjiang was still seen as essential. The tendencies of further integrating Xinjiang, without much attention to the local minorities‟ grievances, had persisted throughout the period. However, the political atmosphere that allowed for the

Mao era policies criticism, had at the same time allowed for the questioning of the PRC

- 43 - legitimacy in Xinjiang, especially among the Uyghurs. The social unrest of the late 1980s coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had wide-reaching implications for the PRC rule in Xinjiang. During the 1990s Xinjiang would become the most restive region in China with numerous riots, many of which had resulted in deaths.

III. The 1990s and the „Strike Hard”

What followed in the 1990s was a great increase in violent Uyghur resistance. The degree of resistance varied from harmless demonstration, to riots and even bomb detonations. James

Millward referred to this resistance as “three clusters of events”. The first was the Baren uprising in April of 1990. The second was a serious of bombings between 1992 and 1993, including civilian targets, and the third was a combination of events that included the creation of the

“Shanghai Five” organization in 1996 (which in 2001 became Shanghai Cooperation

Organization) and the implementation of the high-profile “Strike Hard” campaign (Millward

2004).

After the period of social unrest experienced in Xinjiang from mid to the late 1980s, the

Chinese government realized that the potential for the regional instability came from the

„splittism at home and abroad‟. From then on this line of reasoning became an explanation for most of the mass events in Xinjiang. The possible explanation to this “hard” approach is that

Xinjiang is of great strategic value to the PRC government and this makes the authorities more security-conscious. If the period of instability gets prolonged this gives an opportunity to the neighboring hostile forces to intervene and cause further disruption. However, after the fall of the

Soviet Union this was no longer the case (Holdstock 2015:82). Because of this, the more likely explanation for the authorities approach to Xinjiang lies in the CCP political ideology, where the

- 44 - government claims that its main goal is to develop the region for the benefit of all. This approach is captured in a 2009 White Paper on „development and progress in Xinjiang‟:

“Since 1949, particularly after China's reform and opening-up in the late 1970s, Xinjiang has entered an era of rapid economic and social progress and enhanced comprehensive strength, with the local residents enjoying the most tangible benefits. Proceeding from the state development strategy and the fundamental interests of the people of various ethnic groups, the Chinese government has paid great attention to the development and construction of Xinjiang. It has made it a national basic policy to help the frontier areas develop their economy for the common good and wealth, and worked out timely a series of strategic decisions to promote Xinjiang's development” (White Paper 2009).

According to the previously mentioned government‟s own Law on Ethnic Regional

Autonomy and the above statement from the 2009 White Paper, the state is required to promote the development and prosperity among all ethnic groups, so for the Chinese government to admit that its policies had failed would mean undermining its own legitimacy.

There were, however, some signs that the government was getting serious about the development of Xinjiang and the wellbeing of its ethnic minorities. In the early 1990s the Eight

Five-year Plan (1991-95) was adopted and there was an increase in the region‟s investment. This was mainly due to the discovery of the oilfield in the Tarim Basin. The investment required the construction of new roads and railways and soon the oilfields would produce large revenues. But because the company was state-owned most of the profits went to the central government. For the Uyghurs, most of their economic opportunities came from the removal of trade restrictions.

Inn 1992 the government opened up the Xinjiang border to the rest of the world, in this case, mainly newly established Central Asian republics that formed after the collapse of the Soviet

Union. The hope was to develop trade, tourism and joint investment and at the same time boost

Xinjiang‟s economy (Holdstock 2015:88).

- 45 -

The initial results looked very promising. The border trade in one year, between 1991- and1992, increased a whopping 350%. This border trade actually benefited many Uyghur men, who because of their cultural and linguistic proximity to the new Central Asian republics played a role as middlemen. Although this period was short lived it actually allowed to strengthen the

Uyghur middle class and even allowed for a few millionaires to emerge, among whom was

Rebiya Kadeer (more on her in chapter 4) (Holdstock 2015:90).

The cross-border trade not only helped the middle class Uyghurs but also allowed for the renewal of ties between friends and relatives, many of whom had previously migrated to the

Soviet Union during the 1960s to escape Mao‟s devastating policies and the subsequent hardships. However, the establishment of the new Central Asia ethnic-majority states created a national sentiment among Uyghurs and awoke a desire for independent „Uyghurstan‟. During the

1990s many of the new Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, allowed for the establishment of many organizations that promoted human rights and even Uyghur nationalism. These organizations‟ main purpose was to support Uyghurs in Xinjiang and spread awareness of Uyghurs‟ concerns abroad (Holdstock 2015:91).

While the cross-border trade mainly benefited Uyghurs from the north, the southern part of Xinjiang with its Uyghur inhabitants remained largely neglected. Most of the southern

Uyghurs were engaged in agriculture business and the state did very little to help them. The state established quota system forced many farmers to grow cotton, despite it producing little if any profit. At the top of that these farmers were required to contribute their labor on „communal projects‟. Despite these hardships from early to mid-1990s there weren‟t any major protests. This isn‟t to say that Uyghurs didn‟t complain about their situation. More likely explanation lies in the increased surveillance after the Baren incident (Holdstock 2015:95).

- 46 -

In 1984, Akto township in Baren county was named an “Ethnic Unity Model Town”.

This turned out to be somewhat ironic when in April 1990 the county witnessed an armed uprising against the communist rule. The Baren incident is considered the first major confrontation between the PRC authorities and the Uyghurs (Millward 2004).

On the morning of April 5th 1990, a group of several hundred angry men rushed off from the mosque and surrounded the local government building. Some of the protesters, as reported by the Chinese government, carried banners predicting the defeat of the communist ideology by religion. The situation got even worse when additional 300 more people joined the mob and the two officials that were sent to negotiate were killed by the angry crowd. After that the armed police units were sent but they were unable to subdue the rioters either. Later on two police vehicles were set on fire and their six crew members were killed using knives and axes. It wasn‟t until the next day when the order was restored, when the PLA troops reinforced the police forces.

The uprising was blamed on the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIP), led by Zahideen Yusup.

Yusup reportedly died during the fight with the police. The official reporting from the PRC, doesn‟t mention the possibility of the local grievances as a potential trigger for the riots.

According to the Chinese authorities the sole reason for the uprising lies solely in the religious radicalism. The event was the first in line to trigger increased security measures against the

Uyghur population (Millward 2004).

Now let‟s go back to the agricultural development (or lack thereof) in southern Xinjiang.

In order to counter the unjust policies of the state, Uyghur farmers used the same tactics as the other farmers in the rest of China; they faked their productions reports, worked slowly and conspired against the officials (Holdstock 2015:37).

- 47 -

This, however, wasn‟t the case in the eastern Xinjiang where the Uyghur farmers were much better off than their southern brethren. The possible explanation lies in the different measure of policy implementation. The Hami farmers in the east had greater degree of freedom when choosing what crops to grow. They were also required to do much less communal work.

Historically, Eastern Xinjiang had been more closely allied with the Chinese heartland and the proportion of the Han citizens was also higher. Many Uyghurs from the Hami area speak

Chinese. This suggests that the authorities were playing favorites and rewarding those farmers for being more closely integrated (Holdstock 2015:40). The difference in the economic situation between the eastern and southern Uyghur farmers, calls for caution when generalizing about the

Uyghur grievances in Xinjiang.

Around the mid-1990s the gap between the countryside and the city was becoming more visible, not just in Xinjiang but in other areas of China as well. However, the gap difference in

Xinjiang was even more profound than the rest of the country, especially in the Uyghur dominated south. The main reason for this widening income gap between the city and the countryside lies in the government‟s conviction that the more people live in the city the better for the economy. In Xinjiang, however, Han settlers were the ones moving to the cities thus taking most of the money, while poor Uyghur farmers from the south remained poor.

Additional factors contributing to the Uyghur impoverishment came from the renewed vigor of the Bingtuans. The huge growth in the Xinjiang population came mainly from the Han migration, however, this time most of the migration was voluntary, which differs from the previous, state-induced Han migration. The invigorated Bingtuans expanded further south into

Xinjiang, contributing to the desertification and a water shortage. The main reason of Uyghur impoverishment comes from national policy. During the 1960s citizens relied on the state‟s help

- 48 - to meet their housing, employment and health needs. Many people worked for state-owned enterprise (SOE), thinking that it will provide them with a stable income and other benefits.

However, after the state allowed for private ownership many inefficient SOEs went bankrupt resulting in millions of people losing their jobs. While many Han people simply found a job in the private sector, it wasn‟t so easy for the Uyghurs. Many of them didn‟t‟ speak Chinese and were less skilled compared with their Han counterparts. Also the preferential ethnic minority policies, that demanded a certain quota of the employees to come from the non-Han populace, didn‟t‟ apply in the private sector (Millward 2007:289).

Another problem preventing Uyghurs in getting a job in the private sector was the guanxi practice, where the social relations between people are utilized, in a covert manner, that allow for the accomplishment of the desired outcome for family and friends. This conflicts with the rational-legal system. However, the guanxi practice has its historical roots in ancient China and during the Deng era it increased significantly. Thus, one can assume that this practice applies to

Xinjiang as well, with particular interest in the oil and gas extraction companies, license handling and foreign investment, mainly run by the Hans (Becquelin 2000).

The higher rates of unemployment among the Uyghurs brought a sense of being left out and increased the perception of discrimination. The expending private sector created a problem of corruption, where those in the position of power used their authority to gain an unfair advantage. Between 1990 and 2000 Xinjiang‟s economy was the highest among the non-coastal provinces. However, the regions with the highest GDP per capita were all in Han dominated areas, the minority dominated areas were inversely proportional in terms of prosperity. Over time

Uyghurs and other minorities were getting poorer with Xinjiang‟s natural resources fueling the

Han dominated north. This again stands in direct contradiction of PRC‟s own Law on ethnic

- 49 - minorities where the promise was to develop the region for the greater good of all (Millward

2007:295-297).

The sharp decline in relations between Uyghurs and the Hans in the 1990s can be explained as a result of policies shift that caused the inequality in Xinjiang, something that continues to get worse with the constant influx of the new Han migrants. The increasing level of resentment towards Han, as mentioned before, started to find its expression in riots, demonstrations and even violent attacks. The first violent riot was the previously discussed

Baren uprising. Throughout the 1990s there were many more, however, this paper will only discuss the events that James Millward described as „three clusters of events‟ , as well as the subsequent response from the PRC government.

The second cluster of events (first one being the Baren incident), was a serious of explosions and bomb detonations targeting the civilians in 1992-93, which resulted in several fatalities. The series of bombings in that time period started with bus bombs in Urumchi on

February 5, 1992, resulting in three deaths and twenty three injured. Five men were convicted and subsequently executed in 1995. After that another several explosions, in Yinning, Kashgar and other areas in Xinjiang occurred. The bombs targeted stores, markets, hotels and cultural activity centers (Millward 2004).

The third cluster of events, which lasted from the spring of 1996 to the winter of 1997, included protests, bomb incidents and assassinations of Uyghur officials. The third cluster corresponds with the inauguration of the Shanghai Five in 1996 and the initiation of the Strike

Hard campaign (Millward 2004). However, before we further discuss these two events let‟s first take a look at the Document no. 7

- 50 -

In March 1996 during the meeting of the seven most powerful men in China, the

Standing Committee of the Communist Party‟s Politburo, a special session regarding the

Xinjiang had taken place. The results of that meeting were presented in the so called „Document

No. 7‟. Some of the more sensible directives presented in the document included:

“Properly and correctly resolve the conflict between people of every nationality. When resolving problems which occur between ethnic groups or within an ethnic group, adhere to the principle of seeking truth from the facts and resolve it accordingly. Do not resolve everything unselectively as an ethnic problem. Prevent conflicts between people from becoming an ethnic conflict.” (CACCP 1996).

When discussing religion, the document turned out to be less compromising:

“Religious problems will generally be treated as a conflict among people. Legally strengthen the leadership and control over religion and comprehensively and correctly realize and implement the religion policy of the Party. Take strong measures to prevent and fight against the infiltration and sabotaging activities of foreign religious powers. Restrict all illegal religious activities. Severely control the building of new mosques. Mosques built without permission from the government have to be handled according to registration methods of practicing sites of religion. Relocate or replace quickly people who are hesitant or support ethnic separatism. Give leadership positions in mosques and religious organizations to dependable, talented people who love the motherland. Stop illegal organizations such as underground religious schools, kung-fu schools and Koran studies meetings. Handle the illegal criminal activities of underground religion students according to the law.” (CACCP 1996).

Another point of focus in the document revolved around the issues of ensuring security through the economic development:

“While performing the task of maintaining the stability of southern Xinjiang well as a major point, take great effort to strengthen the economic development of the region with great effort. With the money of the central government and the help of the locals, quickly complete the southern Xinjiang railway, push the development of cotton production and petroleum as well as the petrol-chemical industry in order to change the region's poor and backward face. Based on the planned types of construction and assigned monetary investment, combined with the implementation of the 9th Five Year Plan, the National

- 51 -

Plan Committees and Departments have to make an effort to help the economic construction and social development of the Xinjiang.” (CACCP 1996).

The appearance of the prosperity in the region seems to be more important than to actually improve the livelihood of the local population. The need for further surveillance is emphasized instead. The religion was seen as a source of potential threat, thus the need for the tight control. The major take away is that, for as long as the region maintains a stable economic growth, everything is going to be fine.

Shortly after the Standing Committee meeting, the Strike Hard campaign was launched in

1996. The campaign cracked down on “illegal religious activities”. In reality the campaign gave the authorities the green light to punish and control the Uyghur minority solely based on their religious affiliation. After the 9/11 and the subsequent „war on terror‟ the Strike Hard was reframed to include separatism and ethnic unrest and link them with Islamist terrorism around the globe. This aspect of the campaign will be discussed in more details in the next section of this chapter.

Another major development that influenced Xinjiang and its Uyghur population was the establishment of the Shanghai Five in 1996, which in 2001 became known as the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Initially, the Shanghai Five had five member states: China, Russia, Tajikistan,

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The organization assembled annually to discuss matters concerning, the border control, insurgent Islamic forces and so on. Mainly the issues related to security. One of the organization‟s ambition was to reduce the tensions in the region, which emerged shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These efforts included: a non-aggression pact, exchange of military observers and to notify one another in case of the military drills conducted near the members‟ borders (Dillon 2004:85)

- 52 -

The PRC also insisted that the other member states clamp down on the Uyghurs exile and diasporic organizations that promoted the Uyghur human rights and sometimes openly called for independence from China. In the eyes of the Chinese government these were the splittist organizations that threatened the state‟s security. The other members‟ main incentive was based on the economic potential of having close relations with China. This marked a change in handling of Uyghur minorities among the members‟ states, from initially supportive of the

Uyghur cause to more accommodating towards the Chinese authorities. In 2001 the Shanghai

Five transformed into a higher level of intergovernmental cooperation and was also joined by

Uzbekistan. After the 9/11 the organization put more emphasis on combating the so called “three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism” (Dillon 2004:115). Currently the organization includes 8 members with addition of India and Pakistan which joined the organization in 2017.

Shortly after the organization was formed many Uyghur groups were banned and members were often harassed by the local security forces. Many organizations relocated to countries that don‟t have extradition agreements with China, mainly Germany and the United

States (Holdstock 2015:52).

IV. Xinjiang in the aftermath of the 9/11

Just nine days before the 9/11 the then Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan (in office from 1994 to 2010), organized a trade fair in Urumchi to attract international investment. While he acknowledged some acts of separatism he also emphasized that: “by no means is Xinjiang a place where violence and terrorist accidents take place very often”. The statement was dramatically changed when the major terrorist incidents happened on September 11, 2001. The

PRC government sought to combine its domestic anti-terrorist efforts with the U.S. led “War on terrorism”. All of a sudden “a handful of separatists” became “a full-blown terrorist

- 53 - organization”. Many Uyghurs were suddenly labeled as Islamic terrorists, with the alleged ties to the Taliban fighters (Millward 2004). This perception of threat quickly gained momentum and the state took this opportunity to clamp down on all kinds of Uyghur dissent. All within the broader campaign of the international fight against terrorism.

The PRC State Council released a document in 2002 called: “East Turkistan Terrorist

Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity” where all the alleged terrorist acts committed by the

Uyghur separatists are accounted for. Furthermore, the document implies a genuine request for the international support:

“The Chinese government opposes terrorism in any form; at the same time it opposes the application of double standards concerning the anti-terrorism issue. Any tolerance or indulgence toward the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces will not harm China and the Chinese people alone. Today, as the international community becomes more clearly and deeply aware of the harm brought about by terrorism, we hope that all peace loving people throughout the world, regardless of ethnic status or religious belief, region or country, political or social system, will fully recognize the nature of the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces and the serious harm caused by them, see through all their disguises, and jointly crack down on their terrorist activities, leaving not a single opportunity for them to exploit to their advantage. (PRC State Council 2002)”

The document is often vague when referring to the “East Turkistan”, nevertheless the

PRC succeeded in convincing the USA about the potential threat of this terrorist organization and in August 2002 the organization was officially added as the East Turkistan Islamic

Movement (ETIM) to the US list of terrorist organizations. It also presented a long history of

Xinjiang separatists and extremist, who committed terrorist crimes against China, all the way back to the beginning of the twentieth century. There were more limitations regarding the document. It almost seemed too convenient for the government to suddenly admit to its long struggle with the terrorists. It also mentions several other terrorist organizations, some of which were previously unknown (Millward 2007:323-324).

- 54 -

After the US placed ETIM on its list of international organizations, Xinjiang became visible to the global security experts. Many of these experts treated the Chinese government assertions as facts, which helped to establish a Uyghur terrorist threat perception around the world. There was also an issue of the Guantanamo Uyghur fighters accused of fighting alongside al-Qaeda and assassinations of local officials. Among all the incidents presented in the document, the assassinations could most likely be labeled as „terrorism‟, however, the identities of those committing these crimes remain unknown. There are many possible reasons for the killings. In

China, local officials are generally disliked, and known for their corruption and the abuse of power, so the violence against them is not uncommon. In Shanghai there was a man who killed six police officers as a revenge for allegedly torturing him while interrogating him about a stolen bike; on the other occasion a teenager stabbed a PRC official for seizing his land and extorting money. None of these acts was described as terrorism. As for the Guantanamo Uyghurs, in the

2003 announcement, 15 of them were deemed low-risk and were to be released. Their testimonies suggested that they were simply at the wrong place at the wrong time and most of them had previously been refugees (Holdstock 2015:159-161).

The United States used the „war on terror‟ to establish their military presence in Central

Asian countries. Within a few months after the 9/11 the US had military bases in Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan, with Tajikistan allowing for the usage of their own military facilities. This was the first time where the American presence was tangible in the region. This, of course made China very nervous, despite of the countries improved relations. Initially, China was proactive and supportive towards American efforts: Some of the actions included (Mackerras 2009:133):

 Voting for an anti-terrorism resolution in the UN Security Council;

 Supporting Pakistan and its pro-US efforts against Osama bin Laden;

- 55 -

 Providing intelligence information on terrorist networks and activities in the

region; and

 Freezing the accounts of terrorist suspects in Chinese banks.

The US approval of the China‟s domestic terrorism problems, made discussing the

Xinjiang problems without linking them to violence and terrorism quite difficult. Many of the

China‟s neighboring countries followed the US lead. In 2002 Nepal extradited three Uyghurs to

Xinjiang, to whom it previously granted a refugee status. The SCO members also showed their support. Explosion in Bishkek in 2002, for example, went from an accident involving a fireworks container to the Uyghur terrorist attack (Holdstock 2015:162).

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the evidence suggests that the Uyghur terrorist threat had been insignificant and the Chinese claims about the eminent danger of the Uyghur terrorists are exaggerated. That isn‟t to say there is no threat at all, but simply the scale is smaller than the one depicted by the PRC state. China used the pretext of „terrorism‟ to tighten its control over the social, religious and cultural aspects of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.

Following the 9/11 event the PRC government made some substantial changes in the country‟s criminal and security laws. From then on being a member of the organization that the government deems to be suspected of terrorism became criminal, even if no actual crime was committed. There was no legal definition of what constituted such a group, so the government had green light to apply it to any organization that it saw as a threat to the country‟s security.

There was an increase in the number of crimes punishable by death, amendments to the religious laws, rules that forbid imams from preaching outside their designated town and that the mosques were not allowed to accept worshippers from the outside. The illegal religious activities now included such vague activities as: „slandering the authorities, „stirring up trouble‟, „spreading

- 56 - rumors‟ and „distorting history‟. The restrictions on renovation of the existing mosques were also imposed. The religious education among the young Uyghur was restricted as well. People under

18 were forbidden from entering the mosques. Further restrictions on traditional storytelling and folk songs, traditionally communicated by the elders, were imposed. Religious personnel were required to undergo „political re-education‟. The aim was to establish correct ideology and improve the qualities of the political leaders (Holdstock 2015:165).

The religious restriction imposed on the Uyghur population in Xinjiang after the 9/11 terrorist attack, had the opposite effect from the one intended by the Chinese government.

Instead of further integrating Xinjiang and its people, the restrictions brought even more resistance and grievances among the Uyghur population, which eventually culminated in the violent Urumchi riots in July 2009.

On July 5th 2009 a series of violent riots broke out in the city of Urumchi. Initially, the riots started simply as a protest but quickly escalated into violent attacks that mainly targeted

Han Chinese. The immediate cause of the riots can be traced back to the earlier small-scale fight between Uyghur and Han workers in a toy factory on June 25th 2009. On that date a dispute between the two ethnic groups arose when the Hans accused Uyghurs of a sexual assault of a

Han Chinese female. The argument quickly turned into violent fight that left two Uyghurs dead and over a hundred others injured, mainly Uyghurs (Shan and Chen 2009).

To this day the Urumchi riots are still known to be the bloodiest incident in China. The event left 197 people dead and over a 1700 injured. Some observes describe the Urumchi riots as

“China‟s 9/11” (Shan and Chen 2009). The event triggered a mass-scale surveillance of the

Uyghurs in Xinjiang. This means that, the already difficult situation of Uyghurs became even worse. The riots had been taken very seriously by the authorities, as matter of fact so seriously

- 57 - that the President Hu Jintao cut short his trip to Europe and even cancelled his participation in the upcoming G8 summit.

The riots caught the authorities by surprise and called into question China‟s major ethnic minority policies, the goal of creating the harmonious society under the zhonghua minzu (中華民

族) and the western development strategy. The term zhonghua minzu refers to the Chinese identity as understood by the Chinese government. Ultimately, the Communist leadership would like to see all the ethnic minorities to identify as Chinese rather than their own ethnicity and/or nationality (Holdstock 2015:14). It became evident that the ethnic policies do not function very well, especially in Xinjiang, where the locals use their own language, have their own distinct culture and religion (Shan and Chen 2009).

Learning from the experience of the 2008 riots in Tibet, the government allowed the foreign journalists to enter the Xinjiang, but censored the online information access and all cell phone services. This time the western media didn‟t‟ bash China like it was the case during the

2008 riots in Tibet. This is due the perception of Tibetans as peace-loving people by the westerners, whereas Uyghurs, are seen as Muslim terrorists thanks to Chinese efforts in spreading awareness of its own domestic terrorism since the 9/11 (Shan and Chen 2009).

The ethnic policies in China include a number of preferential treatment policies in education (i.e., extra points on the college admission exams), family planning (i.e., minorities are allowed to have more than one child), legal issues and special quota system. Unfortunately, these policies, despite the fact that they were design to promote national integration, produced quite the opposite effect, and brought Hans and other ethnic groups further apart. Beijing‟s belief that the economic development (the approach that had been used since the Deng‟s reforms era) will

- 58 - eventually reduce the Uyghur‟s sentiment towards independence and solve the region‟s ethnic tensions, persisted throughout Hu‟s presidency (Shan and Chen 2009).

In April 2010, Wang Lequan was removed from his office as Communist Party Secretary of Xinjiang. The event signified a policy shift in the region. It started with the internet access restoration by his successor, Zhang Chunxian. The next step signaling that the region‟s concerns are being taken seriously was the convening of special work forum. The goal was to create a plan that would create prosperity for all. Similar to the „Open up the West‟ campaign, which happened to benefit mainly Han Chinese and created more inequality instead. During the forum it was acknowledged that southern Xinjiang is in the need of more help. The strategy included the numbers of rich cities from the east and the center to be twinned with Xinjiang‟s poorly developed regions and the creation of special economic zones in Kashgar and Horgos. Some other policy changes sought to directly combat poverty among both Uyghurs and Han alike.

Salaries were boosted and state support for the unemployment increased as well. In order to attract new investment to the region, the government offered two years tax income free period for the new businesses. The government also introduced a tax on the price of gas and oil, (of which Xinjiang is the biggest producer in China) that greatly increased the region‟s revenue

(Holdstock 2015:199).

The Xinjiang Work Forum proved to be an improvement over that previous development plan, however, it aimed at helping the sectors of the economy that most Uyghurs were still excluded or under-represented.

- 59 -

V. Xinjiang under the leadership of Xi Jinping

Another major change with regards to the authorities approach to Xinjiang came when Xi

Jinping replaced Hu Jintao as a General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of China in 2012 and also as a President of the People‟s Republic of China the following year. Xi Jinping represents a more hardline approach towards Uyghur Muslims. His main focus is on inclusive economic development which, at least in theory, ought to bring ethnic unity and stability.

As mentioned in the previous section the ethnic policy in China rests on the notion of zhonghua minzu, therefore any sudden change in ethnic policy is unlikely. Xi Jinping pushes for a balance between the national unity and ethnic autonomy and he emphasizes the pursuing of the

„Chinese Dream‟. Xi advocates „eight musts‟, however his „ethnic intermingling‟ that he proposed potentially point to a gradual policy adjustments. The CCP has reconsidered the previous approach that focused on economic solution alone to combat Uyghur‟s dissatisfaction by offering ethnic unity and stability thus any radical shift in ethnic policy is highly unlikely

(Xinhua, 2013).

The „eight musts‟ are at the center of the ethnic policy. According to the CCP it‟s a

“correct path”. These „eight musts‟ consist of: “we must persist in the dominant role of the people; we must persist in liberating and developing social productive forces; we must persist in moving reform and opening-up forward; we must persist in safeguarding social fairness and justice; we must persist in marching the path of being well-to-do together; we must persist in stimulating social harmony; we must persist in peaceful development; and we must persist in the leadership of the Party” (Beach, 2013). In the mind of the Chinese officials this maintains national unity, equality between all ethnicities, improves the autonomous regions, creates prosperity among all the ethnicities, etc., (Hao, 2018:4)

- 60 -

While the Chinese state emphasizes stability in XUAR as one if its main objectives it does not completely departure from the idea of an economic development as a solution to the discontent present among the Uyghur population. Through „ethnic intermingling‟ the state pushes for racial homogenization (New York Times 2018). Inter-ethnic marriages and deployment of Uyghurs in the inland provinces has become a common practice in the post-2009 era. The CCP promotes these practices through various subsidies, better housing, improved health care etc. (Leibold, 2016)

The government promotes the idea of a „development […] with Chinese characteristics‟ that is suitable to Xinjiang. The term „Chinese characteristics‟ refers to a set of conditions that creates the basis for the ethnic stability. According to Xi the tradition has long established roots dating all the way back to the beginning of the Chinese civilization where various ethnic groups interacted with one another and were economically dependent. This view puts an emphasis on the idea of a united and multicultural nation (Hua, 2018:3-4).

Strategies such as „leapfrog development‟ and „lasting stability‟ are emphasized by the state. The former indicates a holistic model of development of the region. The strategy is supposed to address the issues of income disparity between the Han and Uyghurs. The focus is on the livelihood of ordinary Uyghurs. A switch from urban Northern Xinjiang to rural Southern

Xinjiang with its Uyghur population still constituting a majority in the region can be observed

(Xinhua, 2010). The development encompasses the central government-led initiative to prioritize the integration of Xinjiang with China. To achieve this goal the state initiated the construction of high-speed trains, new roads and other projects focusing on making the region a center for the so called New Silk Road. Additionally, the CCP government promised to continue the work of alleviating poverty and narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. Some of

- 61 - the more concrete examples included: employment for at least one of the family members, eliminating fees for the high school students of southern Xinjiang, mandating the enterprises to higher at least 25% of staff from among the ethnic minorities and support for the development of traditional textile industry (CECC 2015).

In the eyes of Xi Jinping it‟s the isolation of the Southern Xinjiang that is a major cause of the terrorist activities. The CCP calls for increased focus on bilingual education, employment and alleviating the poverty etc. To achieve these goals the state paired some of the rich and influential cities of the coastal provinces with the poorer cities of Southern Xinjiang.

In January 2014, the Xinjiang authorities increased their spending on public security bureau to 1 billion US dollars, which represents a 100% increase. During his 2014 visit Xi said that the region of Kashgar will become a new front line against terrorism (Lum, 2015).

During the Third Plenum of Party Congress in 2013, the officials has proclaimed the establishment of a new Central State Security Committee, which was tasked with developing security measures in the country as well as Xinjiang. The concern was also voiced about the maintaining the balance between fighting the extremist behavior and the protection of the right of the civilians (Lum, 2015).

Xi Jinping also stresses the importance of ethnic unity. For him it is vital that the residents of Xinjiang identify themselves with the Chinese state and for the same reasons it calls for the respect of its citizens towards its diverse cultures and various ethnicities. It appears that the state does not initiate any new strategies but reinvents the existing ones and stresses the importance of creation of multicultural Xinjiang (Xinhua, 2010).

Another aspect of ethnic policy towards Uyghurs in Xinjiang is evident in the CCP attempt in „modernize‟ Uyghurs. Within the broader range of the Western Development Plan,

- 62 -

Xinjiang authorities call for education and re-education of the Uyghur population. In the process of doing so the importance of secularizing public space is emphasized

Starting 2013 a mass campaign has been initiated where thousands of officials have been sent to work in villages in order to promote ideological values among the Uyghurs as well as to strengthen the idea of „minzu‟ above their own ethnicity.

Xi Jinping actively promotes the so called “Project Beauty”, where Uyghur women are actively discouraged from wearing the traditional veils covering their faces. The project also appeals to men to shave off their beards (Gosh 2013). According to the Xinjiang government the project “encourages grassroots women to participate in social affairs and lead healthy lives and supports the embroidery and ethnic clothing industry by providing special funds, financial aid and small loans for women” (Liu 2013). The Uyghurs themselves, however, are afraid that the practice will further erode their culture and undermine their identity (Gosh 2013). Other directions from the party include: banning students, teachers and public servants from fasting during „Ramadan‟. While doing all this, it is clear that the CCP targets everything connected to

Islam and religious behaviors. The justifications used aim at preventing the influence of the extremist element.

Xinjiang has also become a region of increased efforts of securitization. This area represents yet another aspect of the ethnic policy in Xinjiang. Xi Jinping took full advantage of the new technological advancements and installed sophisticated surveillance, equipped with facial recognition technology. Other methods of control in the Beijing‟s arsenal include iris scanners, DNA sampling and 3D identification imagery of Uyghurs (Hayes 2019).

The increased surveillance did not put an end to the conflict between the authorities and the Uyghurs. As matter of facts things continue to escalate and the violence continues. After the

- 63 -

Urumchi riots two major terrorist incidents happened that stand out. The first was the

Tiananmen Square Attack on October 28th 2013, where a vehicle crushed into a crowd killing five (including the three attackers in the vehicle. The second was the Kunming attack on March

1st 2014, where a group of knife-wielding terrorist attacked the people on the Kunming railway station, stabbing to death 31 passengers. The response of the authorities led by Xi Jinping was similar to that of his predecessors. The need for tighter security was emphasized and stricter response to „illegal activities‟. The presence of security forces was increased as well (Holdstock

2015:14).

Starting in 2014, Xi Jinping, went a step further, and introduced the so called re- education camps as a part of the Strike Hard campaign to combat terrorism. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of camps. It is estimated that even up to a million Muslim prisoners

(mainly Uyghurs) are currently locked up without a trial. The Chinese government initially refused to even acknowledge the existence of these camps. Once it did, the CCP denied the number of detainees being so high. According to the Chinese government, people who are being detained willingly attend special “vocational schools”. Very often the people who are being pulled into these camps are thrown there based on vague accusations. The official purpose of those camps is to “combat terrorism and religious extremism”. The prisoners are forced to speak

Chinese, study propaganda materials and sing patriotic songs. Many scholars believe that these

“re-education” present one of the biggest threats to human rights in the 21st century (Sudworth

2018). In their letter to the World Bank president David Malpass U.S. Representative James

McGovern and U.S. Senator Marco Rubio expressed their concern about the development of these so called “vocational schools”. They stayed that “a growing body of convincing and credible evidence indicates mass internment camps are centers for social control and political

- 64 - indoctrination”. They point to the mistreatment and even torture of the prisoners. According to the authors the detainees are forced to renounce their religion and culture. Many of these prisoners are “forcibly separated from their children, many of whom are sent to boarding schools and orphanages where native language and culture are forbidden”. They framed these actions on the part of the Chinese government as “crimes against humanity […] against Uyghurs and other

Turkic Muslim minorities” (CECC, 2019).

In 2017 Xi Jinping announced a „Great Wall of Steel‟. The initiative aims at guarding national unity ethnic solitarily and social stability. The year prior, he had already appointed Chen

Quanguo a Secretary of the XUAR. Before taking the position in Xinjiang, Chen was Secretary of Tibet where he developed a new model of intensive policing and „grid surveillance‟. These included: convenience police stations and double-linked household management. The latter worked on the basis of mutual responsibility where the linked households were responsible for each other‟s actions. His term in Tibet proved to be effective in eliminating self-immolation protests. The above mentioned intensive policing methods were now to be applied in Xinjiang and its Uyghur population (Groot 2018).

All these methods aim at preventive policing. The officials are encouraged to be hyper- vigilant and if something happens because of their misconduct they‟re going to be held responsible.

For Xi Jinping, Xinjiang is particularly important as a transitory region between China and Eurasia as a part of his wider „Belt and Road‟ initiative – a development strategy that involve investments in Europe, Asia and Africa For that reason Xi puts a huge emphasis on the region‟s stability, hence the draconian methods of control (Hayes 2019). However, it is evident that the strategy is backfiring and instead of integrating Xinjiang closer with the Chinese

- 65 - heartland it is producing more resistance on the part of the Uyghurs. The next chapter will explore the Uyghur side of the conflict. It will focus on methods of resistance used by Uyghurs in Xinjiang and abroad as well as their grievances.

- 66 -

Chapter 4 – Uyghur voices and the international response

The previous chapter focused mainly on the Chinese side of the conflict, more specifically the government‟s side. It presented the methods utilized by the government to integrate Xinjiang and its Uyghur population more closely, as well as the aftermath of the process since the “liberation” of the region in 1949 by the communist regime. This chapter will present the Uyghur side of the conflict. It will start with the introduction of the grievances of the

Uyghurs living in Xinjiang as well as the methods of resistance utilized by them. In the next section, the focus will switch to the Uyghur diaspora, represented by various organizations abroad, including the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and people like Rebiya Kadeer, whom many Uyghurs call “the Mother of all Uyghurs” (Sterling 2009) and how they represent the

Uyghur cause on the international arena. The last section will cover the international responses to the Xinjiang conflict and the situation of the Uyghur people.

I. Uyghur grievances

One of the most pressing concerns expressed by the Uyghurs living in Xinjiang is the constant migration of the Han Chinese. Initially, the major destination of Hans was Urumchi and the area around Ili and that‟s where most of the Han migrants still reside. However, in the recent years, after the initiation of the “Western Development Plan”, which focused a lot more on the economic development of Xinjiang and the completion of the railway to Kashgar city, the Han migration is headed towards these areas as well. These new areas of Han migration include the southern oases which are considered the Uyghur heartland. (Fuller and Starr 2004).

The constant influx of the Han Chinese into the southern oases has a devastating impact in the eyes of the Uyghur dwellers. The cotton cultivation and inefficient Han agriculture is

- 67 - quickly draining the water resources of the oases and disabling the traditional Uyghur irrigation systems. The type of agriculture that started the basis of Uyghur civilization will soon be gone.

The inefficient water usage is causing another problem of rapid desertification in Turpan and

Khotan areas (Hruby and Li 2016).

The mass Han migration brought even more problems in the areas of education and job market. Because of the new demands of the modern job market, the Uyghurs must master

Chinese. That often means that they have to give up the education in their own native Uyghur language in order to increase the chances of getting a job in the future. Some of the Uyghurs, in order to preserve their language send their sons to the Chinese schools while their daughters are sent to minority-language schools. This, however, is a contributing factor in creating the income disparity between men and women.

The education system poses its own sets of problem in Xinjiang. To tackle the high unemployment rates in Xinjiang, the PRC government initiated the bilingual education system, where the students would be taught in both Uyghur and Chinese. However, over time more and more subjects were taught in Chinese and less in Uyghur. This is because of the underlining belief of the Chinese officials that the Uyghur language and the belief in Islam is an obstacle on the road to the Uyghur prosperity. This belief persists, despite the fact that ethnic minorities are guaranteed the right to use their own language by the China‟s Constitution and Regional Ethnic

Autonomy Law (UHRP 2015).

In the end the Chinese language mastery does not guarantee the job, as noted by an

Uyghur interviewee who said: “If Han comes from inner land, there‟s always a job ready for him.

Even if the Uyghur can speak Chinese and has the requisite skills, the Han won‟t give him or her

- 68 - the job”. As the time passes the Uyghur language becomes more and more obsolete. Many

Uyghurs believe that‟s the result of deliberate state‟s policies that put more and more emphasis on Chinese, in both education and the job market, in order to diminish the significance of the

Uyghur language and further undermine the Uyghur identity (UHRP 2015).

Despite Xinjiang being the prosperous place as a whole, the income gap between the

Hans and Uyghurs still persists. Even when the native Uyghurs have higher education levels compared to the Han inter-provincial migrants, they still make 39% less on average than the Han migrants. The income disparity exists in both formal and informal sectors. It turns out that the income gap was independent of education and work experience, meaning that the discriminating factor was largely based on ethnicity (Howell 2013).

The economic situation of Uyghurs looks even worse when one takes into account that

Uyghurs are much less likely to start their own business than the Han Chinese. As the state control sector of the economy continuous to shrink, the risk of Uyghurs being pushed further to the margins of the local economic life will increase. The scale of the problem becomes quite evident when one looks at ranks of the unemployed – most of them are from ethnic minority members: Uyghurs, Kazaks and Kyrgyz. The situation persists despite the members of these ethnic groups being literate and often having educational attainments (Fuller and Starr 2004). No wonder the degree of resistance and dissatisfaction towards the PRC rule continuous to increase.

With the rise of the private sector the situation could be potentially leavened by the participation of the locals. However, the prosperity of Xinjiang is still closely dependent on the state‟s employment, with the investment going mainly to oil and gas industry and infrastructure construction, both of which are perceived as a threat to Uyghur aspirations. While the coastal

- 69 - provinces benefit greatly from the international investment and fair employment norms, almost all investment in Xinjiang comes from other places in China, more often than not from Hans, who are not particularly concerned with the Uyghur grievances (Fuller and Starr 2004).

As time progresses and Uyghurs have more and more reasons to complain, many of them turn to Islam, seeking solace from their everyday hardships. However, even here, they encounter severe restrictions imposed by the state.

As mentioned in chapter 3, the government‟s clamp down on Islam in Xinjiang is part of the „Strike Hard‟ campaign, where the government actively combats what it calls the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism. This stands in direct opposition to the period of greater tolerance and even support during the 1980s and early 1990s. The current restrictions include: a ban on Muslim greetings, possession of halal food, fasting during Ramadan and even a ban on certain Muslim names. The party also strictly controls the religious text. The texts need to be officially approved by the state first and must carry a message of social unity, too. Uyghurs under 18 are forbidden from entering mosques as well. This makes the older generation afraid that the young Uyghurs will lose the sense of their Uyghur identity, which is precisely what the

PRC government wants. Uyghurs are often forced to eat pork and drink alcohol, which is against their beliefs (RFI 2018).

The sense of injustice and prejudice among Uyghurs deepens even further, when one realizes that the restrictions on Islam among them are far stricter than among other Muslims in

China. The state declared that the area of education and social welfare are off-limits to Islamic influences. This reduces the religious activities to prayers in mosques and among the family

- 70 - circle (Fuller and Starr 2004). The religious restrictions are one of the biggest concerns among

Uyghurs as their Muslim practices are big part of their cultural identity.

Despite of the fact that, Uyghurs live in the so called autonomous region, in reality, they have very little to say on the political scene, where the decisions about their destiny are often made. One could argue that it‟s the case for the whole China, since it‟s a communist state, however, in Xinjiang it‟s worse, since most of the officials in Xinjiang are Han Chinese, despite the Uyghurs officially being the most numerous ethnic group in the region (Fuller and Starr

2004).

Another source of Uyghur grievances comes from China‟s former nuclear test site, in Lop

Nor, with 46 confirmed detonations. Over the years the nuclear tests and the subsequent radioactive fallout caused an estimated 210,000 deaths. The areas surrounding the nuclear test site have a cancer rate 35% higher than the rest of China and also higher levels of Leukemia, various tumors and birth defects (Scull 2011).

Next on the list is the destruction of old towns, most notably the old city in Kashgar. The demolition began in 2009. The official reason for the destruction of the old city, according to

Chinese authorities, was the weak structural integrity of the buildings and consequently, they posed a danger in the event of an earthquake. Many Uyghurs saw it as a deliberate attack on their culture and identity, prompted by the violent events earlier that year. The real explanation, however, might be more pragmatic, nobody was making a fortune on it (Holdstock 2015:72).

In the Chinese system of land ownership and city finance, all land is owned by the state.

The house residents only own their houses, not the land its build on. Same applies to the countryside; the farmers only lease the land they farm. Since the late 1980s the main source of

- 71 - revenues for cities in China has been selling land leases to real estate companies, which can in turn build on that land, even when it is currently occupied, for as long as the compensation is offered to the inhabitants (Holdstock 2015:38).

When discussing the government‟s policies of assimilation in Xinjiang, it is important to remember that in case of Uyghurs, those policies are feared by them as they represent integration into a culture of a larger ethnic group, which stands in direct opposition of the so called “melting pot‟ where participants voluntary give up their cultural values in order to create a new one.

Uyghurs deeply fear that it would essentially mean the end of their culture and identity and absorption into a larger Chinese identity (zhonghua minzu). For that reason they mistrust the

Chinese idea of multi-ethnic society and continue the uneven fight to preserve their unique identity, language, culture and traditions. For Uyghurs, to assimilate means to die. (Fuller and

Starr 2004).

To counterbalance the PRC‟s assimilationist policies, Uyghur engage in „covert‟ methods of resistance. These include using Uygur language as much as possible and using the geographical time zone instead of the national one which is two hours ahead. Uyghur also use songs, stories and jokes as a way of expressing their discontent in a manner that is safe for them

(Holdstock 2015:156). Another area of Uyghur resistance includes the Uyghur diaspora abroad, which will be discussed in more details in the section below.

II. Uyghur diaspora

Throughout this paper it was established that the current political climate doesn‟t allow for any kind of dissent and regime-critical Uyghur voices. The authorities keep a watchful eye on the potential “splittist” activities among Uyghurs. This has been the case for the past three

- 72 - decades and got even worse after the September 11 terrorist attack in New York in 2001 and the subsequent China‟s participation in the war on terror as described in chapter 3. Any kind of opposition has been severely sanctioned and only the regime-endorsing voices can be heard.

Because of that many Uyghurs abandoned their aspiration for independent Xinjiang and migrated abroad to a place with greater freedom of expression (Gladney 2004:376).

Currently, the countries with the most significant Uyghur diaspora include Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. Some Uyghurs also migrated to Western Europe, Australia and North America. It is estimated that between 500,000 to 600,000 Uyghurs constitute the current Uyghur diaspora (Kuscu 2014). During the last two decades, many of these Uyghurs founded exile groups to spread awareness about Uyghurs‟ situation in Xinjiang and to discredit the PRC government.

After the “peaceful liberation” of Xinjiang by the PLA in 1949, Uyghur leaders had to demonstrate their allegiance to the new communist regime or flee the country in order to avoid persecution. Among these early migrants were Emin Bughra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin who eventually found their way to Turkey where they campaigned for the Uyghur independence.

Starting in the 1970s, Aptekin‟s son Erkin Aptekin also played an important role in the exile community through his profession in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and news that were broadcasted into the PRC and the Soviet Union. In 1991 he established the Eastern Turkistan

Union in Europe (ETUE) in Munich. From around mid-1990s, more Uyghur organizations emerged to represent the silenced Uyghur voices in Xinjiang. It wasn‟t long before the organizations started competing on the world-wide forums, all claiming to be the sole representative body of all the Uyghurs (Gladney 2004:379-380).

- 73 -

One of these groups was the East Turkistan National Freedom Center (ETNFC) established in Washington in 1996. The ETNFC was a group that focused mainly on seeking independence from the PRC and an overall East Turkistan identity rather than Uyghur ethnicity.

In September 2004, the group established the Government-in-exile of East Turkistan Republic with Anwar Yusuf Turani as a prime minister. The group even outlined a detailed constitution that included East Turkistan‟s peoples, state‟s symbols, holidays etc., (ETNFC 2004).

Another diasporic organization was the East Turkistan National Congress (ETNC), which originated in 1999 in Munich. The ETNC asserted that it is the sole umbrella organization for all the Uyghurs. In 2004 the group merged with World Uyghur Youth Congress (WUYC) and formed a new umbrella organization called World Uyghur Congress (WUC). The WUC leadership proclaims to serve “the collective interest of the Uyghur people both in East Turkistan and abroad”. The purpose is to “promote the right of the Uyghur people to use peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to determine the political future of East Turkestan”.

Furthermore, the organization aspires to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Xinjiang issues

(WUC 2010).

In the eyes of the organization all of the Hans settled in the region after 1949 are there illegally, which is emphasized in one of the WUC documents:

“East Turkistan is the homeland of the Turkic speaking Uyghurs and other Central Asian peoples such as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tatars and Tajiks.

According to latest Chinese census in 2010, the current population of East Turkestan is 21.81 million including 8.75 ethnic Han Chinese (40.1%) illegal settled in East Turkistan after 1949 (the ethnic Han Chinese numbered 200,000 in 1949)” (WUC 2016).

- 74 -

At the first Congress in 2004, Erkin Alptekin was elected president of the WUC and he was in the office for two years, between 2004 and 2006. In 2006, during the second Congress

Rebiya Kadeer was unanimously elected the new president and remained one until November

2017 when during the sixth Congress she was replaced by Dolkun Isa. Dolkun is the third and current president of WUC. Kadeer stated that “it is time for the younger generation to take up the leadership role at the WUC”. After assuming the office he announced he “will soon chart out a new and peaceful and pragmatic policy approach to securing the Uyghur people‟s freedom and rights”, he also appealed to the Chinese “leaders to respect China‟s constitution and regional ethnic autonomy laws” and at the same time encouraged them to negotiate in order “to find a permanent solution to the issue of East Turkistan through mutual respect and dialogue” (WUC

2017).

Several other more notable Uyghur diaspora organizations affiliated with the WUC are the Uyghur American Association (UAA), the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) and

Uyghur Canadian Association (UCA). This paper, however, will mainly focus on the WUC, as it is considered an umbrella organization and detailed analysis of every Uyghur diaspora association is beyond the scope of this paper.

In order to increase the organization capacity and to train the current and the future leaders of the Uyghur community, the WUC reached out to the Unrepresented Nations and

Peoples Organization (UNPO) and established co-operation. Since 1991, when the organization was first established, the UNPO played an important role as a medium for unrepresented nations, not recognized by the international forums such as for example the UN. In May 2007, approximately 50 Uyghurs attended a workshop hosted by the UNPO in Hague, Holland. During

- 75 - the workshop, the attendees discussed “topics such as grass-roots democratization campaigns, human rights advocacy, and nonviolent organization and action” (WUC 2007).

The WUC gained momentum in 2005, after Kadeer was released from a prison in China, where she spent six years. This was only possible after the extensive pressure from the U.S.

Rebiya Kadeer was arrested in 1999. In 2000, she was sentenced to eight years in prison for allegedly revealing the state‟s secrets. Amnesty International, adopted her as a prisoner of conscience and on several occasions pressured the Chinese government to release her. The international recognition of Rebiya‟s fate coupled with extensive pressure from the Uyghur diaspora eventually made the U.S. government to put more pressure on the PRC government.

Upon her release in 2005, she was assigned political asylum in Washington, USA, where the main Uyghur diasporic groups operate in North America (Eckholm 2009).

Soon after Kadeer was released, the WUC adopted a resolution which named her the

“Mother of all Uyghurs and of East Turkistan”. She was even able to get a private audience with such prominent leaders as Kofi Annan and also George W. Bush in June 2007 (Eckholm 2009).

From the symbolic point of view, these meetings are of great value for the diaspora and a diplomatic thorn for the Chinese government. The same level of dissatisfaction was expressed when Kadeer was nominated for a Nobel Peace Price on several occasions.

During her 11 years long rule as a president of the WUC (2006 – 2017), Kadeer‟s charisma, peaceful appearance and adherence to moderate Islam, attracted attention and sympathy among the international leaders and the international audience. Because of her, the world expended its awareness to include Uyghurs‟ situation, whereas previously the main focus was on Tibet‟s peace-loving people with the prominent Dalai Lama at the top.

- 76 -

Some of the above paragraphs included information on how the Chinese government reacted to the rise of Rebiya Kadeer. In the following section the PRC‟s general perception of the

Uyghur diaspora will be demonstrated and how they attempt to discredit their activities.

Since September 11, 2001, according to the Chinese authorities the Uyghur diaspora was forced to change their tactics and their current campaign is “deceptively” focused on “striving for human rights” and the following trends can be observed. Firstly, the diasporic groups attempt to discredit the PRC by depicting the situation where the Chinese authorities are responsible for the terrorism in Xinjiang and in the same way they try to avoid the responsibility for the violent and terrorist acts. Secondly, the diaspora‟s attempts in building the exile government are nothing more than acts of a number of splittists and do not represent the interest of any ethnic group in

Xinjiang and these actions aim at spreading the disinformation among the international public opinion. Thirdly, the East Turkistan terrorist organizations still continue to establish terrorist camps and continue their splittist activities. Lastly, the diasporic groups aim to convince public opinion about the “Xinjiang question” and facilitate a referendum. However, according to the authorities there is no “Xinjiang question” (Li 2013). Furthermore, the PRC uses the regional cooperation arrangements like the SCO and various incentives for the member countries to sanction the exiled Uyghur activities.

In the next several paragraphs, the presence of Uyghur diaspora in cyberspace will be discussed. Before the emergence of and popularization of world-wide-web in the 1990s, the diaspora communities worked towards their goals through conferences, press releases, printed materials such as books, journals etc. However, for the past two decades or so, the diasporic organizations greatly benefited from the new means of communication, including the virtual space. The ever increasing accessibility of the internet made the internet one of the major tools

- 77 - for communication among the Uyghur activists (Kuscu 2014). Thus, by employing this mass communication technology, to some extent, Uyghur, overcame the boundaries of time and space and most importantly political censorship.

Through the successful application of cyberspace technology, the internet access allowed the diaspora to reach wider audience and simultaneously create greater awareness among the international community about the Uyghurs and their cause. Additionally, the diasporic organizations‟ websites and forums have increased the participation among the members in issues related to their homeland. Sharing information and coordinating events have never been easier. The internet offers a space where the diaspora members can engage and exchange ideas about various topics such as history, culture, democracy. It increased the numbers of participants from a small group of diaspora elites to anybody interested in the topic and with the access to the internet. It also allowed for a discussion that has a potential to shape the national identity (Kuscu

2014).

Starting around the mid-1990s, Uyghur diaspora set up websites to promote awareness about the Uyghurs and their struggles. Initially, some of the websites operated only in the language of the host states. However, with the emergence of bigger and better organized groups such as the WUC, the available languages included English, Turkish, Japanese, Chinese, German,

Uyghur, Arabic and Russian. Thus the targeted audience increased greatly as well. The use of cyberspace allowed the diaspora to contribute the development of a more unified Uyghur identity

(Kuscu 2014). On the diasporic websites, the distinctiveness of the Uygur culture and language is emphasized. These efforts aim at highlighting the difference between the Han and the Uyghur people.

- 78 -

It is worth remembering that the most prominent diasporic leaders have not visited

Xinjiang in many years, sometimes decades, due to understandable fear of prosecution by the

Chinese authorities. It is possible that these people might have “lost touch” with the prevailing sentiment among the Uyghur population living in Xinjiang. They have not experienced the improved living conditions in the region. Thus, the diaspora‟s opinions might not accurately reflect the real mindset of Uyghur people. It is also evident that because of the “Great Firewall of

China” (internet filter), Uyghur diasporic virtual dissent has been completely blocked and is therefore very difficult for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang to learn about the diaspora‟s endeavors.

III. International perspective

This section will introduce some of the biggest international organizations such as the

United Nations (UN), the Amnesty International (AI) and the Human Rights Watch (HRW), and countries such as the Unites States, Russia, Turkey, neighboring Central Asian republics and

Muslim countries in general and their current perspective regarding the Xinjiang conflict and its

Uyghur population.

Amnesty International

In August 2018 the Amnesty International held a session regarding racial discrimination in China and subsequently created a report and later submitted it to the United Nations

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The reports focused on the discrimination against Tibetans and Uyghurs. This paper, however, will only focus on the discrimination against Uyghurs.

The first section of the report, focuses on the unfair trials and how the Chinese

“authorities have ascribed numerous violent incidents which occurred in the XUAR or the

- 79 - regions in China to Uyghur individuals and have used these to justify a heavy-handed response against Uyghurs.” Because of the state‟s „Strike Hard‟ campaign “top officials prioritized speed in making arrests and convening trials, while also calling for greater “co-operation” between prosecuting authorities and courts. This raised concerns that accused individuals would not receive fair trials” (AI 2018).

Another area of discrimination against Uyghurs identified by the AI is the arbitrary detention. The reports states that since 2016 “hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and members of other predominantly Muslim ethnicities were arbitrarily detained for unspecified periods and forced to study Chinese laws and policies without any independent court proceedings or access to lawyers or their families”. Many Uyghurs while held in custody “for prolonged periods […] are “at risk of torture and other ill-treatment (AI 2018).

Uyghurs are also subject to travel restrictions. It has been reported “the XUAR had confiscated the passports of Uyghurs” and that “all XUAR residents would be required to present biometric data – such as DNA samples and body scan images – before being permitted to travel abroad”. There have also been reports of “numerous checkpoints on roads, as well as security checks and metal detectors at entrances to public parks (AI 2018).

In the recent years China attempted to force those Uyghurs who had left Xinjiang to come back by harassing their relatives who still reside in Xinjiang. Moreover, the Chinese government pressured countries with the asylum-seeking Uyghurs to deport them back to China and according the AI‟s report those people “are at risk of arbitrary detention, and torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of punishment” (AI 2018).

- 80 -

The Amnesty also notices the marginalization of the Uyghur language and restrictions on religious and cultural practices. The restrictions on the Uyghur language are mainly applied through the promotion of Chinese language and Chinese identity (zhonghua minzu) among

Uyghurs. The restrictions on the religious practices include spreading “extremist thought”,

“refusing to watch public radio and TV programmes, wearing burkas, having an “abnormal” beard, resisting national policies and publishing, downloading, storing or reading articles, publications or audio-visuals materials containing extremist content” (AI 2018).

Other restrictions on rights to freedom and expression include, the overwhelming surveillance, where the “authorities have tried to ensure that nobody uses encrypted messaging apps […] that have no encryption or other privacy” settings and even utilized “technology including DNA, biometrics and facial recognition”, detention for free speech, press freedom restriction and crackdown on protests (AI 2018).

United Nations

On August 13 2018, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination held a hearing in which Chinese delegates were asked questions regarding the state of racial discrimination in China. The Chinese delegate, Yu Jianhua, ensured the Committee that the

Chinese “Constitution reflected more fully the ethnic policy focused on ethnic equality and solidarity”. During the dialogue the followed, the Committee experts started by congratulating

China “for creating extraordinary prosperity and lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, [however], remained concerned over the growing inequality, particularly for ethnic minorities who continued to disproportionally experience poverty (UN 2018)”. Furthermore, in the eyes of the Committee experts:

- 81 -

“China was lacking an anti-racial discrimination law and a national human rights institution in line with the Paris Principles, while the recent Foreign Non-Governmental Organization Management Law and the Charity Law imposed restrictions on the funding and operations of domestic non-governmental organizations. A great source of concern was racial discrimination in the context of laws fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism, particularly against Tibetans, Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. In the name of combatting “religious extremism” and maintaining “social stability”, an Expert said citing “credible sources”, China had turned the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region into something that resembled a massive internment camp shrouded in secrecy, a “no rights zone”, while members of the Xinjiang Uyghur minority, along with others who were identified as Muslim, were being treated as enemies of the State based on nothing more than their ethno-religious identity. Experts recognized China‟s vigorous efforts to promote education among ethnic minorities, and in this context raised concerns about the quality of and access to education in ethnic minority areas and the provision of bilingual education for ethnic minorities, which was sometimes at the detriment of ethnic languages” (UN 2018).

The UN also went a step further when the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres discussed the Xinjiang issue during his visit in Beijing in April 2019. China has been increasingly “attacked” for its ill treatment of the Uyghur Muslims of Xinjiang, as discussed throughout the paper, and the unjustified detention of up to a million Uyghurs on what China calls the “vocational camps”. Mr. Gutteres, in his conversation with the Chinese president Xi

Jinping, expressed his full support in allowing the UN “to investigate reports of disappearances and arbitrary detentions, particularly of Muslims in the Xinjiang region. (Nichols 2019)”

Human Rights Watch

In its annual review of human rights, the HRW compiled a World Report 2019, with a whole section about China and also Xinjiang. The report starts with Xi‟s political intention to rule indefinitely after the amendment to the constitution which removed the term limits for the presidency. According to the report “this move was also emblematic of the increasing repression under Xi‟s rule (HRW 2019).

- 82 -

Following the subsection about Xinjiang, the report points to the Chinese authorities‟ hostile approach to “expression of Uyghur identity” and justified its repression “as a necessary response to threats of terrorism”. Those methods are justified through an ongoing “Strike Hard

Campaign against Violent Extremism”. The situation got even worse in 2016 when Communist

Party Secretary Chen Quanguo was transferred from Tiber to Xinjiang. According to the report:

“Since then, authorities have stepped up mass arbitrary detention, including in pretrial detention centers and prisons, both of which are formal facilities, and in “political education” camps, which have no basis under Chinese law. Credible estimates indicate that 1 million people are being indefinitely held in the camps, where Turkic Muslims are being forced to learn Mandarin Chinese, praise the government and party, and abandon many aspects of their distinct identity. Those who resist or are deemed to have failed to “learn” are punished” (HRW 2019).

The report then goes on and further discusses the restrictions on personal life and gives the examples of passports recollection and the need to apply for permission even when travelling from one town to the next. The report also mentions the “persistent political indoctrination, […] and unprecedented levels of control over religious practices”. The people in Xinjiang are also victims of a constant “high-tech mass surveillance systems that make use of QR codes, biometrics, artificial intelligence, phone spyware, and big data”. The Chinese government also encourages its officials to stay in Uyghur homes in order to monitor them. Furthermore, the report mentions that the Chinese government “pressured some Uyghurs […] living outside the country to return to China” (HRW 2019).

From the above analysis of the three international organizations and related documents it should be clear that the main focus of these organizations is the issue of human right violations against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. The reports present similar narrative in terms of what

- 83 - kinds of violations are committed against Uyghurs. The following section of this chapter will present the position of the certain countries regarding the Xinjiang conflict

United States

The current bilateral relations, as described by the U.S. Department of State, start off by stating that: “The United States seeks a constructive, results-oriented relationship with China

(State 2018)”. The document does not directly mention the Xinjiang conflict and its Uyghur population, there is, however, a section that discusses the human rights violations:

“The United States also seeks progress on areas of disagreement such as […] lack of respect for human rights and religious freedom” (State 2018).

More detailed position regarding the Xinjiang issue and its Uyghur population is expressed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, David Ranz. Mr. Ranz in his speech in front of the WUC members started by pointing out “the Chinese government‟s rampant abuse of the human rights and religious freedoms of Uyghurs […] is an urgent issue impacting the broader region”. He also mentions approximately one million arbitrarily detained

Uyghurs and “the deteriorating state of religious freedom”. He then encourages “all governments, to press China privately and publicly […] to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals, including the members if its ethnic minority population” (Ranz 2019).

Mr. Ranz expressed the position of the United States about the Xinjiang issue in the following way:

“The United States will continue to call on China to reverse its counterproductive policies that conflate terrorism with peaceful religious and political expression, to release all those arbitrarily detained, and to cease efforts to coerce members of its Muslim minority groups residing abroad to return to China to face an uncertain fate” (Ranz 2019).

- 84 -

Another document issued by the Congressional – Executive Commission on China

(CECC) also discusses the ethnic minority rights violations in China. The document pointed out that since August 2017 China had not allowed the visit from the UN Special Rapporteur on

Minority Issues and that the “Party […] changed the mechanisms they use to implement policies toward ethnic minorities, as the Party‟s United Front Department (UFWD) assumed control of the work of the government departments overseeing ethnic affair” and according to some observers “the UFWD‟s newly expanded powers represented an official move toward tighter

Party control over ethnic affairs and policies promoting ethnic assimilation over ethnic pluralism”

(CECC 2018)

The section of the report that dealt more specifically with the issues regarding Xinjiang and its minority populations, especially Uyghurs, the report focused on the problems of mass detention of Muslims and other human rights violations such as “intrusive homestay programs”, restrictions on religious freedom. Regarding the mass detention the reports states:

“[…] authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regions (XUAR) intensified an integrated state surveillance and security apparatus that reportedly targeted members of the region‟s predominantly Muslim ethnic minority populations, resulting in detention and severe limits on their freedom of movement,1 expression,2 and religion.3 XUAR officials reportedly arbitrarily detained Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui, and others in extrajudicial facilities known as „„political reeducation‟‟ centers or camps.4 Reports from international rights groups, scholars, and media organizations indicated that as many as 800,000 to 1.1 million individuals had been or remained detained at such facilities since around April 2017” (CECC 2018).

And regarding the intrusive homestay:

“[…] authorities assign cadres and government workers (usually of Han ethnicity) to live with ethnic minority families in their homes for certain periods of time, in part, according to official rhetoric, to contribute to stability and security in the XUAR” (CECC 2108).

- 85 -

Last year, the Trump administration also stepped up and tried to persuade other countries to voice their criticism regarding the human rights violations of Uyghurs in China. The call for more support in solving the Xinjiang issue comes at a time when both countries are engaged in a trade war. The US also attempts to convince other countries to reject Huawei‟s 5G technology, with many American officials considering it to be a danger to the state‟s security. Despite of the

Trump administration attempts, many countries are still reluctant to criticize the PRC government because of the investments China made in their respective countries (Politi and

Williams 2019).

Most recently, the Trump administration imposed sanctions against Chinese officials as a result of their involvement over human right violation in Xinjiang. One of the targeted officials is

Chen Quanguo, current Communist Secretary of XUAR. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement: "The United States will not stand idly by as the (Chinese Communist Party) carries out human rights abuses targeting Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and members of other minority groups in Xinjiang, to include forced labor, arbitrary mass detention, and forced population control, and attempts to erase their culture and Muslim faith." Some of the experts noted the significance of the move, saying that in the past the US stayed clear of the Chinese officials

(CNN 2020). The sanctions were possible because they were a part of the Global Magnitsky

Human Rights Accountability Act, passed by the United States in 2016. This act allows for imposing penalties on foreign officials (The New York Times 2020).

Russia

The current relations with China, under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, “are more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s”. The two countries held a joint military exercises

- 86 - for the first time in the Baltic Sea in July 2017 and their bilateral trade grew quite substantially between 2016 and 2018. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin had met more than 20 times since Xi‟s ascent to power and China‟s president even gave Putin “first-ever friendship medal” and called him “my best, most intimate friend” (Dobbins, Shatz and Wyne 2019). As noted in the previous chapter, Russia and China are the permanent members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO). One of the focus of the organization is the security cooperation within the combating the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism framework. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that Russia is supportive of China‟s treatment of Uyghurs. Russia, along with 36 other states have written to the UN and expressed its support of China‟s policies in Xinjiang. This stands in a big contrast to a strong opposition expressed by most of the western countries who mainly criticized the arbitrary detention of up to one million Muslims (ABC 2019). The letter written in support of the China‟s policies said:

“Faced with the grave challenge of terrorism and extremism, China has undertaken a series of counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures in Xinjiang, including setting up vocational education and training centers” (ABC 2019).

The letter also claimed that “security had returned to Xinjiang and the fundamental human rights […] had been safeguarded.” Other countries which signed the supportive letter include: Saudi Arabia, many African countries, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba, Belarus,

Myanmar, the Philippines, Syria, Pakistan, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and

Bahrain (ABC 2019).

Turkey

Turkey has for a long time sympathized with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, mainly due to close cultural and linguistic similarities. Both, Uyghurs and Turkish people have ethnic Turkic

- 87 - background. Since around 1950s Turkey was one of the top choices among the Uyghur diaspora.

It is estimated that Turkey currently houses between 15,000 and 50,000 Uyghurs. It has been reported that Turkish diplomats in South East Asia helped Uyghur refugees by providing them the necessary travel documents (Tiezzi 2019).

However, the current president of Turkey Tayyip Erdogan has cherished his country relations with China more than the Uyghur rights. It wasn‟t until 2015 when major anti-Chinese demonstrations broke out in Istanbul. At that time Erdogan acknowledged that “claims about

China‟s pressure on our siblings in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region lead to sensitivity in our public”. At the same time though, Erdogan argued that some other unnamed forces exploited the situation and caused unnecessary trouble in Turkey-China relations. After arresting

100 Uyghurs en route to Saudi Arabia in 2016, Turkey‟s desire to establish even closer relations with China grew stronger. After Turkey became part of the Xi‟s “Belt and Road” initiative, the

Uyghur rights violations in Xinjiang became somewhat less important (Tiezzi 2019).

In this light, the statement denouncing China for “violating the fundamental human rights of Uyghur Turks and other Muslim communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, was a little bit surprising. Furthermore, the Turkish ministry called the camps “a great shame for humanity” and demanded that China shut them down. This sudden change of position can be attributed to the accumulated anger of Turkish people that resulted in mass anti-Chinese protests and finally forced the Turkish government in taking a more pro Uyghur stance that reflected the public sympathy for the Uyghur cause (Tiezzi 2019).

China responded in its usual way, stating that the harsh policies in Xinjiang are an important part of their combating the three evils strategy and are necessary to ensure safety to all

- 88 - of China‟s citizens and that the “vocational centers” is a place where a deradicalization process takes places and are not “concentration camps” (Tiezzi 2019).

Except Turkey, no other major Muslim-majority country has condemned China for its human rights abuses against Uyghurs. Many experts explain the situation as a result of significant foreign investment from Beijing across many Muslim countries and their inclusion in

Xi‟s “Belt and Road” initiative. Some countries, like Saudi Arabia, Syria, Pakistan, Oman,

Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain with their predominantly Muslim population signed the previously mentioned letter that supports China‟s policies towards the region and its Uyghur population (ABC 2019).

Central Asian Republics

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are all Central Asian republics, they are all members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and together they are all home to majority of today‟s Uyghur diaspora population.

Within the SCO the member states closely cooperate on security issues and occasionally conduct military exercises. It‟s all part of the fight against the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism that is supposed to be a part of Central Asia region as well. Unfortunately for

Uyghurs, the SCO established definition of terrorism also includes targeting the often non- violent domestic political opposition. Many Uyghur activists in Central Asia and Uyghur refugees are forced to come back to China via the Chinese government pressure on the other

SCO member states (Szadziewski 2011).

Many Uyghurs, who fled to Central Asia SCO states, are currently no better than those already there. This shows a great influence that China already has in the region. The strong

- 89 - economic relationship that exists between China and the other Central Asia SCO member states brings more repression to Uyghurs. Their existence is almost invisible to other SCO members

(Szadziewski 2011).

In case of Kazakhstan the situation is a little bit more complex. Currently, China and

Kazakhstan maintain strong economic and political ties. However, the ongoing conflict in

Xinjiang, that involve the Kazakhs minority too, could have some negative effects over the long run on the China-Kazakhstan relationship, especially given the strong anti-Chinese sentiment among the general population who protested against the arbitrary detention of up to a million

Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities, including Kazakhs (Kozhanova 2019).

- 90 -

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

When we look back at the history of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region, it should be obvious that it is a complex issue. Since the ancient times the region was often engaged in conflict between various nomad tribes as well as China. However, the Chinese claim that Xinjiang has been an integral part of China since the ancient times is an exaggeration. Throughout this paper it was demonstrated that until 1949 and the “peaceful liberation”, Xinjiang had never been fully integrated with China and there were many times prior to 1949 when the region was beyond

Beijing‟s influence. As a matter of fact, this was the case for most of the region‟s history, starting from the ancient times.

Thus, the state‟s approach to the region and its Uyghur population is based on a false premise of the region‟s being an integral part of China since the ancient times. Nonetheless, this does not stop the PRC government from exercising a tight level of control and openly encouraging the Uyghur minority to adapt Chinese identity (zhonghua minzu) against their wishes. The current level of control and the subsequent punishment that is imposed, primarily on the Muslim Uyghur population, for the activities that the state deems dangerous, is unbelievably harsh and cruel. Because of China‟s efforts to further integrate Xinjiang and its Uyghur population, anybody who opposes these efforts risks being arbitrary locked up in one of the region‟s “vocational camps” for unspecified period of time.

Given the current circumstances in the region, the answer to the thesis‟ main question, which is: „does the forced assimilation policy work?‟ is no. The current policies that aim at further integrating the Uyghurs into the Chinese society are failing. It was pointed out in this paper that the government does not respect its own laws protecting the ethnic minorities. The

- 91 -

Uyghurs are being pushed to their limits and many of them do not see any other way but to violently resist the government‟s policies. This has been the case since the mid-1990s when an increase in violent incidents was observed. The state‟s policies that aimed at transforming

Uyghur national identity are backfiring. The PRC government has failed to achieve its major goal that is to make the Uyghur minority to identify primary as Chinese rather than their own ethnicity.

This calls for a major change of approach to Xinjiang and its Uyghur population. In order to mitigate the situation the PRC government has to start implementing and respecting their own laws on ethnic minorities, laws that are part of the state‟s constitution. The Uyghurs should be allowed to participate in the region‟s overall economic growth, instead of being excluded from it.

The government has to step in and make sure that companies hire their employees based on their credentials and achievements and not based on their ethnicity or guanxi. Next, considering that the Uyghurs are still the dominant ethnic group in the XUAR, the number of Uyghur officials in the region should also reflect that proportion or at least be close to it. Lastly, all the arbitrary detained Uyghurs as well as members of other ethnic minorities should be released as soon as possible.

As for the international response, given China‟s fear of “losing face” and how much the state cares about its image of a responsible international stakeholder, the other countries should take advantage of that and continue to put pressure on China for its human rights abuses.

Because of China‟s current status as one of the most powerful countries in the world and its strong economic ties with many countries, it will probably take a while before we will see any significant improvement among the Xinjiang Uyghurs. However, if more and more countries and

- 92 - organizations keep pressuring China, eventually the Chinese government will have to respond.

Otherwise, the state is risking weakening its soft power or even ”losing its face” which is the regime‟s worst fear, not to mention that the Uyghurs will continue to resent and resist the government initiated polices, possibly resulting in more violence over time.

- 93 -

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