Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang Introduction

A ROUTLEDGE FREEBOOK Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang Introduction 1 - Xinjiang and the dead hand of history 2 - Language, Education, and Uyghur Identity: An Introductory Essay 3 - Xinjiang from the ?Outside-in? and the ?Inside-out' 4 - Ethnic Resurgence and State Response 5 - Xinjiang and the evolution of China?s policy on terrorism: (2009-18) 6 - Conflict in Xinjiang and its resolution 7 - Reeducation Camps READ THE LATEST ON ETHNIC MINORITIES IN XINJIANG WITH THESE KEY TITLES VISIT WWW.ROUTLEDGE.COM/ ASIANSTUDIES TO BROWSE THE FULL ASIAN STUDIES COLLECTION SAVE 20% WITH DISCOUNT CODE F003 Introduction There has been significant coverage in the media in recent years on the increase of violence towards the Xinjiang Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China. This Freebook explores how the Uyghur language, Uyghur culture, Xinjiang geopolitics and Chinese state response have all resulted in and affected the violence in Xinjiang in the Twenty-First Century. The first chapter, by Michael Dillon, gives a brief introduction to Uyghur history including an overview of Xinjiang and its location, Uyghur language and culture, the religious restrictions imposed over the years and various occasions of violence starting from the 1900s. The next chapter, by Joanne Smith and Xiaowei Zang, explores the language and education of the Xinjiang Uyghurs and how this had a direct impact on their identity. This chapter further defines ethnic identity and questions its relationship to social, cultural and religious practices. Chapter three, by Michael Clarke, delves into the problematic nature of geopolitics and explores how Beijing and the West's geopolitical perspectives have influenced and constrained the Uyghur domain. The following chapter, by Debasish Chaudhuri, evaluates the nature of protests and violence led by the Uyghur and how the Chinese state responded. Chapters five and six, both written by Michael Dillon, give an overview of the insurgency in Xinjiang and the resistance of the Uyghur from the 1950s through the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. The final chapter, again written by Michael Dillon, is a recent addition on the subject of the re-education camps that were introduced in 2014. Note to Readers References from the original chapters have not been included in this text. For a fully-referenced version of each chapter, including footnotes, bibliographies, references and endnotes, please see the published title. Links to purchase each specific title can be found on the first page of each chapter. As you read through this Freebook, you will notice that some excerpts reference previous chapters ? please note that these are references to the original text and not the Freebook. *20% discount is only available on titles purchased through www.routledge.com before 28/02/2019 and cannot be combined with any other offer or discount. 4 1 XINJIANG AND THE DEAD HAND OF HISTORY # This chapter is excerpted from Xinjiang in the Twenty-First Century: Islam, Ethnicity and Resistance by Michael Dillon © 2017 Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved. Learn more Introduction Xinjiang and the dead hand of history Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.1 Xinjiang is unable to escape its history of conflict between two apparently irreconcilable forces. On the one hand, there is local Uyghur nationalism, sustained by the authority of a distinctive variant of Sufi Islam. On the other are the attempts by successive governments of China to incorporate this far western region: from the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911) to the Republic under ineffectual presi- dents; warlords; the Nationalist Guomindang (1912–49) and finally the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the Communist Party (1949–present day).2 For centuries the dominant culture of Xinjiang has been Islamic, and the Turkic language, Uyghur, has been the normal medium of discourse among the majority of the population. In spite of increased Chinese migration to parts of Xinjiang, from the viewpoints of geography and culture it remains in essence a region of Central Asia. Conflict between the cultures of local Muslims and the Han Chinese has been endemic for centuries. It is not simply a dispute between the Chinese Com- munist Party (CCP) and ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ as it often maintained. This new book, Xinjiang in the Twenty-First Century: Islam, Ethnicity and Resistance, continues an enquiry into the ongoing conflict in Xinjiang that began with Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Far North-West (London: Routledge, 2004) and was developed in Xinjiang and the Expansion of Chinese Communist Power: Kashghar in the Twentieth Century (Routledge, 2014).3 The underlying rationale of those two books and the present volume is that it is impossible to comprehend the ongoing conflict and the sporadic violent clashes in Xinjiang without a proper appreciation of the history of the protracted and difficult relationship between the Chinese state and Turkic-speaking Uyghurs from which this conflict has emerged. Far from being simply a battle between the Uyghurs and the Chinese Communist Party, the competing traditions of the ‘dead generations’ – on both sides of the conflict – continue to weigh heavily on the antagonists. The Chinese Communist Party and its government are attempting to resolve, or at least suppress, social 2 Introduction and political conflicts while developing the economy of Xinjiang in the interests of China as a whole rather than solely the people of the region. The priority of many Uyghurs is to achieve, if not genuine independence, at least a degree of self- determination in social and religious affairs. These two traditions are mutually incompatible and in direct opposition to each other. On the one hand, the spirit of pan-Chinese nationalism and revolutionary Marxism still permeates the Chinese Communist Party, however much it appears to act as a modernising ruling party controlling a rapidly developing capitalist economy. It also has the advantage of controlling the Chinese state and its armed forces. On the other hand, there is the historical legacy of Islamic culture, which is an integral part of the identity of the Uyghurs. For the Uyghurs the authority of Islam lies in their inherited traditions but also in the knowledge that Islam in Xinjiang is part of a world-wide religion. Devout Muslims claim for their beliefs a spiritual authority that in their eyes cannot be countermanded by any secular power. For the government of the PRC, the authority of the CCP is absolute. Moreover, the traditions of this age-old conflict are ingrained in the collective memory of Xinjiang (and to a lesser extent China) and form part of the continuing narrative of Uyghur resistance to Chinese control. These traditions include, on the Uyghur side, the veneration of shrines, including the pilgrimage to the desert tombs of Imam Asim and his son (the Muslim victors over Buddhist rulers in the twelfth century) that is described in this book, and the narrative of Yakub Beg who founded an independent Islamic khanate in Kashgar in 1867. On the Chinese side there are the recollections of the CCP members who worked and served in Xinjiang in the 1930s, and whose lives and political missions have been described in detail in Xinjiang and the Expansion of Chinese Communist Power: Kashghar in the Twentieth Century . These traditions inform the competing and apparently irreconcilable claims to the sovereignty of Xinjiang but for those involved they also hinder any attempts at resolving the conflict over these claims. Since the end of the twentieth century the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, as it has been known since 1955, has experienced a marked increase in both the frequency and the intensity of violent incidents involving Uyghurs – the Turkic-speaking people who historically constituted the majority population in Xinjiang. This violence has usually involved conflict with the Han-dominated state authorities or Han residents of the region, although on occasion it has taken the form of conflict with other Uyghurs who are considered to have collaborated with the Chinese authorities. Some accounts have attempted to date this escalation from the attack on the United States by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 (9/11). This was only of periph- eral significance on the ground in Xinjiang. The roots of the conflict in Xinjiang are deep and the violence of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is simply the most recent phase. It is certainly the case that the attack on New York and Washington by Saudi militants associated with Al Qaeda, and the subse- quent Global War on Terrorism launched by the Bush administration in the United States, hardened the attitude of the Chinese towards protest and dissent. It enabled Beijing to legitimise its description of all activities relating to the independence Introduction 3 of Xinjiang as a form of terror, but it had little immediate effect on the trajectory of violence in the region. The conflict in Xinjiang had already increased in intensity after two uprisings in Ghulja in the north-western part of the region in 1995 and 1997 and in response to the Chinese state’s Strike Hard campaign that was launched in 1996. There were fears in Beijing that 9/11 might be followed by a major uprising in Xinjiang: the borders of the region were temporarily sealed, especially to foreigners, and normal academic exchanges and many other links were suspended. The anticipated uprising failed to materialise but sporadic and sometimes deadly outbreaks of violent conflict between Uyghurs and the state have continued, mostly in remote rural and mountainous areas.

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