ScotMUN 2020 th th 13 ​ – 15 ​ March ​ ​

Committee Study Guide: UN Human Rights Council

Table of Contents

WELCOME LETTER FROM THE CHAIRS 3 ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ INTRODUCTION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 4 ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ THE QUESTION OF CHINA’S RE-EDUCATION CAMPS 5

COMBATTING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 14

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Welcome Letter from the Chairs

Dearest delegates,

We are very pleased to welcome you to the Human Rights Council at ScotMun 2020 here in Edinburgh.

I’m Jonas, the Director of this fine committee. I study Management at the London School of Economics and am currently in my final year. After having launched my MUN addiction in high school already, I attended a grand total of 28 conferences, with this being my 7th time chairing. This will be my first time chairing the UNHRC, so I’m excited to see how it will go and what you, dear ,delegates, will be doing with the topics! MUN takes up a disturbing amount of my time, but when I’m not working on a conference, you can usually find me either coding, trying to organise events with chocolate fountains, or playing Civilization.

I’m Fiona, Co chair to this committee. I am currently doing my masters in Fine Art and History of Art at the University of Edinburgh, so I look forward to showing you what this city has to offer. Having started MUN in high school at the early age of 14, I have thoroughly enjoyed all 11 of my conferences in which my roles have varied, with the highlight being chairing a 400 delegate Human Rights committee At EAMUN which took place at the UNEP headquarters in Nairobi. Growing up in multiple countries has allowed me to understand varying points of view and cultural beliefs. I believe MUN has the ability to spark the change that is needed to better the world. When I am not in conference I will most likely ​ be covered in paint at the studio. I look forward to hearing your creative solutions to the challenging issues we have chosen to discuss.

Hi everyone! My name is Kiril, and I am chairing the Human Rights Council at the 2020 edition of ScotMUN along with the two other fabulous individuals. I grew up in Russia and Germany, having finished secondary school at the Russian Embassy in Berlin. Now I study Economics in my bachelor's final semester at the University of Mannheim. Here I have commenced my MUN journey in 2017 and am presently serving my term as Vice-President of our society. Besides my passions for economics and debating, I am an avid traveller, having visited almost 60 countries throughout my life and enjoy the arts, reading as well as the small things in life. I look forward to an electrifying debate, intriguing conversations on the sidelines of the conference room and hopefully quality memes. See you in March!

For this year, we selected the topics of “The Question of China’s Re-Education Camps” and “Combatting Violence against Women in armed Conflict” due to their unparalleled geopolitical relevance. We felt that it was the duty of the UN’s Human Rights Council to address these issues, which we perceived to be in need of resolution as soon as possible. With the recent troubles in Hong Kong, it is important to not lose sight of other regional issues that may otherwise be drowned out between more popular media headlines. This is why we chose to discuss the issue of the Xinjiang re-education camps. Further, the violent treatment of women in armed conflict is a topic that is broad in scope, but enormous in relevance. We should not ignore this particular civilian group that so often bears most of a conflict’s burden.

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Introduction to The Human Rights Council

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is a body within the United Nations responsible for the protection and promotion of human rights around the world. Further, the UNHRC seeks to address and prevent human rights violations. Its purpose is simply to discuss any and all issues pertaining to human rights that require attention and then subsequently make recommendations on them.

The UNHRC was established in 2006 as a replacement for the UN Commission on Human Rights. It meets at the UN offices in Geneva, where its 47 member states are elected for terms of three years by the General Assembly. During this process, the UNGA takes into consideration the promotion and protection in those countries as well as the pledges they made. Countries cannot be a member of the UNHRC for two consecutive terms.

Members of the UNHRC are elected as part of regional groups, with each group having a dedicated number of seats:

- Africa (13 seats) - Asia-Pacific (13 seats) - Latin America and Caribbean (8 seats) - Eastern Europe (7 seats) - Western Europe, North America, and others (6 seats)

The work of the UNHRC is largely advisory in nature. It uses mechanisms such as the Advisory Committee (the council’s “think tank”), the Universal Periodic Review, and the Complaint Procedure (a procedure that allows individuals and organisations to bring human rights violations to the council’s attention). Thus, it makes frequent use of independent experts, special rapporteurs, and other working groups to monitor and understand situations, in order to then make accurate recommendations based on their data.

Overall, the UNHRC’s founding resolution states that it “shall be responsible for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind in a fair and equal manner” and it “should address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and make recommendations thereon”. Delegates should keep this in mind when bringing forth their resolutions.

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Topic A: The question of China's Re-Education Camps

Topic Background

Introduction China's Re-education camps are predominantly located in the province of Xinjiang. Officially called Vocational Education and Training Centers by the government of the People's Republic of China, some in the international community has named them internment camps operated by the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region government, for the purpose of teaching Uyghur Muslims since 2017 as part of a "people's war on terror" announced in 2014. The camps were established under General Secretary Xi Jinping administration and led by hard-line party secretary Chen Quanguo. These camps are reportedly operated outside the legal system; many Uyghurs have reportedly been interned without trial and no charges have been levied against them. Local authorities are reportedly holding hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and Muslims from other ethnic minorities in these camps, for the stated purpose of combating extremism and terrorism as well as to promote Sinicization Sinicization is defined as bringing people who are not of Chinese descent under the influence of Chinese culture. It is a process where societies that are traditionally non-Chinese are put under the influence of the Han Chinese communities, by adapting to their culture, customs, and way of life. Xinjiang province is located in the North West of China.

As of 2018, it was estimated that the Chinese authorities may have detained hundreds of thousands, perhaps a million, of Uyghurs,Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Hui Muslims and other ethnic Turkic Muslims, Christians as well as some foreign citizens such as Kazakhstanis, who are kept in these secretive internment camps throughout the region. In May 2018, Randall Schriver of the United States Department of Defence claimed that "at least a million but likely closer to three million citizens" were imprisoned in detention centers in a strong condemnation of the "concentration camps". In August 2018, a United Nations human rights panel said that it had

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received many credible reports that 1 million ethnic Uyghurs in China have been held in "re-education camps". There have also been multiple reports from media, politicians and researchers comparing the camps to the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

In November 2019 a major set of leaked documents reveal new information about China's oppression of Muslims in Xinjiang, they have since been translated and published, by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. The documents include explicit directives to arrest Uighurs with foreign citizenship and to track Uighurs living abroad. They suggest that China's embassies and consulates are involved in the global pursuit. Chinese ambassador to the UK Liu Xiaoming said the measures had safeguarded local people and there had not been a single terrorist attack in Xinjiang in the past three years. "The region now enjoys social stability and unity among ethnic groups. People there are living a happy life with a much stronger sense of fulfilment and security”. The punishment-and-reward system helps determine whether inmates are allowed contact with family and when they are released. They are only considered for release once four Communist Party committees have seen evidence they have been transformed.

The leaked documents also reveal how the Chinese government uses mass surveillance and a predictive-policing programme that analyses personal data. One document shows how the system flagged 1.8m people simply because they had a data sharing app called Zapya on their phone. The authorities then ordered the investigation of 40,557 of them "one by one". The document says "if it is not possible to eliminate suspicion" they should be sent for "concentrated training". The documents continue and state "In total disregard of the facts, some people in the West have been fiercely slandering and smearing China over Xinjiang in an attempt to create an excuse to interfere in China's internal affairs, disrupt China's counter-terrorism efforts in Xinjiang and thwart China's steady development.

History and Current Situation Xinjiang (mandarin for “new borders” or “new frontier”), officially Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ (XUAR), is China’s largest, northwesternmost and one of its least densely populated provinces. Turkic minority groups preponderantly populate the province, the majority of whom adheres to the Islamic faith. The Uighur people constitute the largest Muslim-majority ethnic group in Xinjiang with a population of over 11 million residents, followed by the Kazakhs with around 1,6 million people. Henceforth, around 46% of the province’s population is Uighur, 14% belong to other nationally recognised and unrecognised minority groups, and 40% are Han Chinese. The Uighur population predominantly lives in the southern parts of the province and mostly resides in rural areas. The wealthier north, in particular, Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi, has a higher share of ethnic Han Chinese inhabitants.

Chinese authorities claim Xinjiang has been part of China for over two thousand years. However, while China has been active in the region politically and militarily for centuries, no permanent territorial control was ensured before 1877, when Imperial China’s Qing Dynasty recaptured the region after a ten-year rebellion that established an independent kingdom with extensive diplomatic recognition1. After the collapse of the empire, local movements established an independent state of East Turkistan twice – once ​ ​ between 1933 and 1934 in the southern part of Xinjiang and later between 1944 and 1949 within its northern territories. Only commencing 1949 the province has been continuously under the control of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1955 the province of Xinjiang was formally replaced by Xinjiang ​ ​ ​ Uygur Autonomous Region, and the Uighur people received recognition as an ethnic minority. ​

The subsequent decades of Xinjiang’s incorporation into the People’s Republic of China saw a stark influx of Han Chinese in multiple consecutive immigration waves into the region, which was facilitated by the People's Republic. The first nationwide census in 1953 recorded a Uighur share of 75% in Xinjiang’s total

1 The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse – Dwyer (2005)

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population, whereas Han Chinese only compromised around 6% of the population2. Since then, the region’s ethnic and religious makeup has changed drastically – today, the Uighurs constitute less than half of the autonomous region’s population and only 13% of the population of its capital Urumqi. Some ​ scholars suggest that mass migration to the region as well as economic disparities between Uighur and Han groups were a key driver in exacerbating pushes for independence and local conflict3.

Public expression of secessionism was heavily suppressed before the begin of the reform and opening-up ​ paradigm of Deng Xiaoping’s administration in 1978 and the Chinese rule saw little resistance in Xinjiang, while it openly employed minority-friendly policies. A widespread independence movement arose in the 1980s, however peaceful protests mostly ceased in the wake of the violent crackdown on nationwide protest movements and the Tiananmen Square Incident in 19894. The 1990s saw a violent independence ​ ​ movement emerging, culminating in a series of spontaneous uprisings in 1996 and subsequent years. The PRC reacted with harsher anti-insurgency measures and monist cultural policies. In the last two decades, the Chinese authorities have launched more packages of economic, linguistic and cultural measures directed at integration and assimilation objectives. Recent policies include the establishment of Mandarin as the primary language of education, encouragement of rural Uighur residents to leave Xinjiang as migrant workers in labour-intensive factories in other parts of China and financial incentives for inter-ethnic marriages5. Overt assimilation policies are often accompanied by covert efforts to undermine local language and culture, which often disregard pluralistic principles set out in Chinese law. An example for such an effort would be the mergers of minority- and Mandarin-language schools in the name of efficiency, after which the language of instruction in the newly formed institution is determined as Mandarin6.

Between 2008 and 2017, China experienced 82 violent terrorist attacks, most of whose are associated with militant Turkic groups. These incidents claimed many lives with 796 dead and further 999 injured 7 people .​ The most severe year was 2014, where 322 dead and 478 injured victims suffered in 37 recorded attacks. It is also the year when the People’s Republic’s government tightened its security and surveillance measures in Xinjiang and proclaimed the Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism. It ​ ​ encompasses a massive build-up in police presence, mass surveillance in the cyberspace and public as well as private spaces through the deployment of so-called fanghuiju cadres, which were mandatorily ​ ​ 8 hosted in people’s homes in the light of the Becoming Family Campaign . Reports state that members of ​ ​ ​ the targeted minorities are categorised as “trustworthy”, “average” or “untrustworthy” through an assessment of a multitude of social categories such as their employment or their social and familial networks9. A citizen’s assessment determines his level of surveillance. Starting early 2017, local authorities in XUAR commenced establishing the so-called “counter-extremism training centres” and ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ “education and transformation training centres”. However, it was not until May 2018, when the ​ ​ government formally acknowledged their existence as voluntary re-education centres.

On November 16th, 2019, 24 internal documents of the Chinese administration were leaked and published in The New York Times. Those include 96 pages of internal speeches by Xi Jinping, 102 pages of ​ ​ internal speeches by other officials and 161 pages of directives and reports on the surveillance and control of the Uighur population in Xinjiang and 44 pages of material from internal investigations into

2 Ethnic Composition of Xinjiang Population: Past and Present - Kozhirova et al. (2016) 3 Migration, Modernisation and Ethnic Estrangement: Uyghur migration to Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, PRC - Hopper and Webb (2009) 4 The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse – Dwyer (2005) 5 China: Assimilating or radicalising Uighurs? – At a Glance, European Parliament (November 2014) 6 The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse – Dwyer (2005) 7 Global Terrorism Database (GTD) dataset 2018 8 Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims – Human Rights Watch (2018) 9 ibid.

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local officials10. The documents highlight the graveness of the human rights situation in Xinjiang, explicitly depicting the methods of the Chinese administration in treating the local population, influencing public coverage and internal procedures within the regional and national power apparatus. One paper records a speech of Xi stating “we [the Chinese government] must be as harsh as them and show absolutely no mercy” in the aftermath of the 2014 Urumqi bombing. This rhetoric reappears in multiple other documents showing that the upper echelons of the Chinese government blame the violence of militant groups in recent years on the liberal policies of the preceding decades and a lack of control and repression11 – this logic shapes the state’s Strike Hard and People’s Fight Against Terrorism policy in ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Xinjiang since 2014.

th On November 24 ,​ 2019 another set of classified papers was unveiled by the International Consortium of ​ Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) containing documents with directives on the management of internment facilities in Xinjiang and other sensitive information. Their contents strongly contradict the People’s Republic’s official narrative of “re-education camps”. Among other things, some of the released bulletins elaborate on online surveillance of the Uighur population through the Integrated Joint Operation ​ 12 Platform, which helps authorities to match citizens’ movements and online behaviour with their identity ​ . One bulletin describes how 1.8 million Uighurs were flagged for downloading the data sharing app Zapya, and thousands were questioned and detained as a consequence "if it [was] not possible to ​ eliminate suspicion". The papers also give an account of the secrecy and the firm security features of the internment camps as well as indoctrination methods in great detail.

In the light of China’s harsh treatment of Muslim residents of Xinjiang, Uighurs and members of other affected minorities of Chinese nationality who live abroad have also been targeted by Chinese authorities. There is evidence of blackmailing of members of Uighur communities in the European Union and the United States to keep silence about the detainment of their relatives by threatening further measures against those13. Some countries, such as Egypt, Thailand, Malaysia and Afghanistan, have forcibly deported members of Uighur communities at the PRCs requests, where they might face torture or ill-treatment14. Under the principle of non-refoulement in customary international law, states are prohibited from returning an individual to a country where they may face serious human rights violations. The principle is enshrined in article 33 of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and article 3 of ​ ​ Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. ​ Previous International Action For years there has been growing international concern about China’s brutal treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang as part of its “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Extremism.” There are credible estimates of at least one million Turkic Muslims being indefinitely detained in “political education” camps. China’s harsh repression also involves widespread surveillance and the destruction of Turkic Muslim cultural and religious heritage across Xinjiang.

United Nations

10 ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims – The New th York Times (16 ​ November 2019), ​ https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html 11 ibid. 12 th Read the China Cables Documents – ICIJ (24 ​ November 2019), ​ https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/read-the-china-cables-documents/ 13 th How China intimidates Uighurs abroad by threatening their families – Deutsche Welle (11 ​ July 2019), ​ https://www.dw.com/en/how-china-intimidates-uighurs-abroad-by-threatening-their-families/a-49554977 14 Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims – Human Rights Watch (2018)

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On 10 September 2017, Human Rights Watch released a report that said "The Chinese government should immediately free people held in unlawful 'political education' centers in Xinjiang and shut them down."

On 21 May 2018, during the resumed session of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations in the UN, Kelley Currie, the U.S. representative to the U.N. for economic and social affairs raised the mass detention of Uyghurs in re-education camps, and she said that "reports of mass incarcerations in the Xinjiang were documented by looking at Chinese procurement requests on Chinese websites requesting Chinese companies to tender offers to build political re-education camps".

On 10 August 2018, United Nations human rights experts expressed alarm over many credible reports that China had detained a million or more ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Gay McDougall, a member of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, said that "In the name of combating religious extremism, China had turned Xinjiang into something resembling a massive internment camp, shrouded in secrecy, a sort of no-rights zone".On 9 September 2018, Human Rights Watch released a 117-page report, "'Eradicating Ideological Viruses': China's Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang's Muslims", which accused China of the systematic mass detention of tens of thousands of ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslims in political re-education camps without being charged or tried and presented new evidence of the Chinese government's mass arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment, and the increasingly pervasive controls on daily life.The report also urged foreign governments to pursue a range of multilateral and unilateral actions against China for its actions, including "targeted sanctions" against those responsible.

On 10 September 2018, U.N. human rights chief Michelle Bachelet called on China to ease restrictions on her and her office's team, urging China to allow observers into Xinjiang and expressing concern about the situation there. She said, "The UN rights group had shown that Uyghurs and other Muslims are being detained in camps across Xinjiang and I expect discussions with Chinese officials to begin soon".On 8 July 2019 British UN Ambassador Karen Pierce delivered the joint statement on Xinjiang at the General Assembly’s Third Committee, 22 countries signed a statement to the UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights in which they called for an end to mass detentions in China and expressed concerns over widespread surveillance and repression. The nations include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdomsigned a letter condemning China's mass detention of Uyghurs and other minority groups, urging the Chinese government to close the camps.

The countries said they shared concerns raised by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination regarding “credible reports of mass detention; efforts to restrict cultural and religious practices; mass surveillance disproportionately targeting ethnic Uyghurs; and other human rights violations and abuses.” They called on China to comply with its national and international obligations to respect human rights, including freedom of religion, and allow UN human rights monitors access to detention centers.

Conversely in July 2019, a joint statement was signed by 37 countries including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Sudan, Angola, Algeria, Nigeria, DR Congo, North Korea, Serbia, Russia, Venezuela, Philippines, Myanmar, Pakistan and Syria signed a joint letter to the UNHRC ​ ​ ​ ​ commending China's "remarkable achievements in the field of human rights", claiming "Now safety and security has returned to Xinjiang and the fundamental human rights of people of all

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ethnic groups there are safeguarded." Ultimately 50 countries including Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Djibouti and Palestine signed the letter.

European Union Members of the European Parliament strongly condemn that hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and ethnic Kazakhs are being sent to political “re-education camps” based on a system of predictive policing, in a resolution adopted on Thursday. They urge the Chinese government to immediately end the practice of arbitrary detentions without any charge, trial or conviction for a criminal offence and to immediately and unconditionally release all detained persons, including this year’s laureate of the Sakharov Prize, Ilham Tohti. There is solid information that Uyghurs and other primarily Muslim ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang province are subject to arbitrary detention, torture, egregious restrictions on religious practice and extensive digitised surveillance, MEPs argue. They call on the Chinese authorities to give independent journalists and international observers free access to Xinjiang province to examine the situation on the ground. MEPs also express their deep concern regarding reports about Uyghurs abroad being harassed by the Chinese authorities in order to compel them to inform against other Uyghurs, return to Xinjiang or remain silent about the situation there, sometimes by detaining their family members. MEPs finally stress that tools used so far by the EU have not led to tangible progress in China’s human rights record, which has only deteriorated during the last decade. They recall it is vital that the EU raises the issue of human rights violation in China at every political and human rights dialogue with the Chinese authorities. MEPs call on the Council to adopt targeted sanctions and freeze assets, if deemed appropriate and effective, against the Chinese officials responsible for severe repression of basic rights in Xinjiang. The resolution was adopted by a show of hands.

Action from China The Chinese government denied the existence of re-education camps in Xinjiang, until October 2018, when it officially legalized them. When international media had asked about the re-education camps, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it had not heard of this situation.

In August 2018, a Chinese state-run tabloid, Golden Times, defended the crackdown in Xinjiang after a U.N. anti-discrimination committee raised concerns over China's treatment of Uyghurs. According to the Global Times, China prevented Xinjiang from becoming 'China's Syria' or 'China's Libya', and local authorities' policies saved countless lives and avoided a 'great tragedy'. The paper published another editorial the day after, titled "Xinjiang policies justified". At a UN meeting in Geneva, the delegation from China told the United Nations Human Rights Committee that "There is no such thing as re-education centers in Xinjiang and it is completely untrue that China put 1 million Uyghurs into re-education camps". A Chinese delegation said that "Xinjiang citizens, including the Uyghurs, enjoy equal freedom and rights." They claimed that "Some minor offenders of religious extremism or separatism have been taken to 'vocational education and employment training centers with a view to assisting in their rehabilitation.'' Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang said "anti-China forces had made false accusations against China for political purposes and a few foreign media outlets misrepresented the committee's discussions and were smearing China's anti-terror and crime-fighting measures in Xinjiang" after a U.N. human rights committee raised concern over reported mass detentions of ethnic Uyghurs. Liu Xiaoming, Ambassador of China to the United Kingdom, wrote an article in response to a Financial Times report entitled "Crackdown in Xinjiang: Where have all the people gone?". Liu's response said: "The education and training measures taken by the local government of Xinjiang have not only effectively prevented the infiltration of religious extremism and helped those lost in extremist ideas to find their way back, but also provided them with employment training in order to build a better life."

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In September 2018, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang condemned a report about the re-education camps issued by Human Rights Watch. He said: "This organisation has always been full of prejudice and distorting facts about China." Geng also added that: "Xinjiang is enjoying overall social stability, sound economic development and harmonious coexistence of different ethnic groups. The series of measures implemented in Xinjiang are meant to improve stability, development, solidarity and people's livelihood, crack down on ethnic separatist activities and violent and terrorist crimes, safeguard national security, and protect people's lives and property." On 11 September 2018, China called for U.N. human rights chief Michelle Bachelet to "respect its sovereignty", after she urged China to allow monitors into Xinjiang and expressed concern about the situation there. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said: "China urges the U.N. human rights high commissioner and office to scrupulously abide by the mission and principles of the U.N. charter, respect China's sovereignty, fairly and objectively carry out its duties, and not listen to one-sided information".

On 16 October 2018, a CCTV prime-time program aired a 15 minute episode on what was termed as Xinjiang's 'Vocational Skills Educational Training Centers', featuring the Muslim internees. Sinologist Manya Koetse documented that it received a mixture of supportive and critical responses on the Sina Weibo social media platform.

In March 2019, against the background of the US considering imposing sanctions against Chen Quanguo, who is the region's most senior Communist Party official, Xinjiang governor Shohrat Zakir denied the existence of the camps. On 18 March 2019, the Chinese government released a white paper about the counter-terrorism, de-radicalization in Xinjiang. The white paper claims "A country under the rule of law, China respects and protects human rights in accordance with the principles of its Constitution." The white paper also claims Xinjiang has not had violent terrorist cases for more than two consecutive years, extremist penetration has been effectively curbed, and social security has improved significantly.

Later In July 2019, the Chinese government released another white paper that claims "The Uygur people adopted Islam not of their own volition … but had it forced upon them by religious wars and the ruling class." A Global Times opinion piece the same month claimed that the re-education camps employed "the advanced version of normal social govern" and said the process is "the victory of all the Chinese people including Xinjiang people". In November 2019, the Chinese ambassador in London responded questions about newly leaked documents on Xinjiang by calling the documents "fake news."

On 6 December 2019, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying accused the US of hypocrisy on human rights issues relating to allegations of torture at Guantanamo Bay detention camp.

Topic Resolution

Identifying the Issue and Discussion The People’s Republic of China is accused of arbitrary detention, torture and mistreatment in detention centres and political education camps as well as the lack of due process in the wake of the mass arrest of ethnic minorities. In August 2018, a United Nations human rights panel estimated the number of detained Uighurs and other Muslim minorities at over one million, while other estimates reach even higher15. Given the recent leaks of sensitive party documents regarding the issue, it is likely that a high number of people contain to be detained. Contrary to this perspective, the Ambassador of China to

15 th U.N. says it has credible reports that China holds million Uighurs in secret camps - Reuters (10 ​ August ​ 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-that-china-holds-million- uighurs-in-secret-camps-idUSKBN1KV1SU

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Australia claimed that “the trainees in the centres have all completed their studies” and found work “with the assistance of the local government” and called recent allegations of human rights breaches “fake news”16.

There are two main lines of arguments in favour of the stringent policies in Xinjiang employed by the People’s Republic of China. First, the harsh treatment of the local minorities is to be seen within the context of anti-terrorism combat in China and abroad. Officials argue that the latest series of terrorist attacks have claimed many lives and endangered many more – prompting the necessity to react. It is interesting to note that the Chinese government over the past decades moved from declaring militant groups in Xinjiang “separatists” to identifying them as “Islamic extremists” or “terrorists”. That shift occurred in the context of the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11th, 2001 and the global fight against Islamic terrorism to legitimise its recent interference in Xinjiang17. Such a narrative is clearly observable in the rhetoric of the public and leaked internal statements of Chinese party officials. Security and stability can be regarded as imperative guiding values in the state’s policy choice. Furthermore, authorities acknowledge the enforced measures as effective steps in decreasing ​ ​ ​ ethnic and religious violence, demonstrated by the circumstance that militant attacks have significantly ​ less civil casualties since 2017 contrary to the preceding years. On a similar note, China claims to have adopted legal policies that “strike the right balance between compassion and severity” and boasts of successfully having arrested almost 13’000 terrorists since 201418. Some scholars argue that the Chinese harsh and arbitrary crackdown on Muslim majorities might have adverse consequences for long-term stability and the rise of local religious and political extremism19.

Second, while the People’s Republic of China admits the existence of detention centres and political education camps in Xinjiang, which do serve the goals of ensuring security and stability, it attempts to portray them as educational facilities, which constitute no violations of human rights. Henceforth, their establishment and facilitation are not only lawful and enhance social stability, but also benefit the individual detainees. One leaked directive defined answers to critical questions from children of detained relatives, who are returning from their place of study to Xinjiang. "Treasure this chance for free education that the party and government have provided to thoroughly eradicate erroneous thinking, and also learn Chinese and job skills," one answer said. "This offers a great foundation for a happy life for your family.”20

Challenges to Resolution China is restricting action and investigation taking place within Xinjiang especially the camps themselves. Additionally china's influence on allies and economically linked countries may sway the voting on any resolution critical of the Chinese government. Western nations may be unwilling to impose harsh sanctions due to their dependency on chinese exports and imports. China's growing influence on the world's economy makes this issue even harder to resolve.

Points resolutions could address [This can be a bullet pointed section if you wish, just bring together what you have discussed in the ‘Topic resolution’ subheading and make it succinct! This could be where you allow your vision

16 th Chinese ambassador says Xinjiang 'trainees' have graduated in rare press conference – CNN (19 ​ December ​ 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/19/asia/china-australia-xinjiang-cheng-jingye-intl-hnk/index.html 17 The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse – Dwyer (2005) 18 th China says 13,000 'terrorists' arrested in Xinjiang since 2014 – Reuters (18 ​ March 2019), ​ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang/china-says-13000-terrorists-arrested-in-xinjiang-since-2014 -idUSKCN1QZ08T 19 The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse – Dwyer (2005) 20 ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims – The New th York Times (16 ​ November 2019), ​ https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html

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of the direction you want the committee to go to come through a little – and the sorts of solutions you as a chairing team want to see]

Bibliography and Further Reading

BBC News. (2020). Data leak details China's 'brainwashing system'. [online] Available at: ​ ​ https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-50511063 [Accessed 26 Jan. 2020].

Wikipedia. (2020). Xinjiang Re education camps. [online] Available at: ​ ​ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang_e-education_camps [Accessed 26 Jan. 2020].

GOV.UK. (2020). Joint statement on human rights violations and abuses in Xinjiang. [online] Available ​ ​ at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-statement-on-xinjiang [Accessed 26 Jan. 2020].

Palmer, Palmer, Garrett, Cook and Stokes (2020). Leaked Documents Expose the Machinery of ​ China’s Prison Camps. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: ​ https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/27/leaked-documents-expose-the-machinery-of-chinas-prison-camp s/ [Accessed 26 Jan. 2020].

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Topic B: Combatting Discrimination against Women in post-conflict Societies

Topic Background

Introduction 21 years ago, the UN Security Council for the first time explicitly debated the protection of civilians. At the end of this debate, it noted that civilians constitute the vast majority of casualties in conflicts across the world, and that for this reason, the issue has become more and more apparent to the international community.

In addition, the grand statement of this council included a request to the Secretary-General to submit a detailed periodic report on the status of civilians in combat situations as well as recommendations to improve this situation. To date, 15 such reports have been submitted with over 200 recommendations in total, covering all aspects of civilian protection. And while many of them have been implemented, there has been a distinct lack of clear action on the issue of protecting women in combat situations in particular.

Particularly in societies with pre-existing discrimination towards women, violent conflict has a tendency to immensely heighten risks of their human rights being violated. With access to essential services being heavily restricted or removed entirely, conflict effectively destroys the guarantee of safety for vulnerable populations. This is particularly dangerous for women, who tend to be viewed as more connected to the land and are subsequently often particularly targeted by combattants as a tactic of war in order to lower the enemy’s morale.

However, while the UN does much work to solve these conflicts, too little attention is given to the roles of women in post-conflict societies. In this situation, society finds itself in a peculiar position: The blurry border between a decrease in violence and an attempt at rebuilding. This situation is characterised by a few factors that all need to be individually addressed to combat the issue:

Firstly, a breakdown of the rule of law. With a post-conflict country comes a relatively weak government, unable to provide the monopoly on violence and security for its citizens that it should. This role is thus frequently taken by anyone ranging from village communities to warlords. This is particularly troublesome in nations with destroyed infrastructure, as reaching the remotest parts of the nations subsequently becomes nigh-impossible - especially due to the fact that the government also lacks the resources to establish a police presence in such remote parts.

Secondly, the availability of small arms. A large portion of the population previously involved in conflict will now return home, bringing with them massive amounts of small arms. These now tend to go cheaply on the market, as much of the population turns to primary-sector pursuits such as farming, thus seeking to trade in that AK47 for a plow and a shovel. This in turn makes small arms available en-masse for new rebel groups, warlords, or other violent factions, who further contribute to the instability of whichever government has been left in place, and therefore seal the fate of any security-providing government institutions.

Thirdly, social structures break down and gender-based violence is normalised. After the conflict has so heavily impacted civilian life, it is very difficult to return to pre-conflict structures. Thus, many are used to the way things were done during the days of war and continue to do them so. This is not to say that they themselves would ever engage in gender-based violence, but they would also not actively seek a resolution to it, as it is something that is no longer unusual.

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The final key point in this topic is the importance of women in post-conflict reconstruction. Family survival may come to heavily depend on them, since much of the male population is gone for purposes of conflict and may never return. Therefore, it is essential that women receive the education they require. However, especially in post-conflict societies, this is hindered by a lack of access to education. Whether it is due to the fact that educational opportunities simply do not exist or whether it is the fear of threats and targeted attacks against women who do pursue education, this access must be secured to effectively re-develop a functional society.

Previous International Action - UNSC Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325)21 - “On Women, Peace, and Security” - Calls for increased participation of women in UN peacemaking and security efforts - Special focus: Including women in UN reporting systems

- UNSC Resolution 1820 (S/RES/1820)22 - “On Acts of Sexual Violence Against Civilians in Armed Conflicts” - First resolution devoted to addressing sexual violence in conflict situations - Brought forth a few follow-up resolutions: - S/RES/1888 - S/RES/1889 - S/RES/1960 - Follow-up resolutions focused on preventing

- UNSC Resolution 2242 (S/RES/2242)23 - “On Women and Peace and Security” - Focused on gender-based violence as a tactic of terrorism

Topic Resolution

Current Situation - Case Study - Democratic Republic of the Congo Since the mid-1990s, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been ravaged by war and violence. This is mainly caused by an untold number of armed groups, army units, and further illegal armed actors. To this very day, innocent people and women and girls in particular are attacked and killed by all sides. Congo’s rich mineral deposits mean that an unstable political situation is in the interest of the relevant rebel groups, since that makes the former’s exploitation without government permission much easier.

Congo is still in the process of recovering from a few violent conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s. As a post-conflict society, it is to this day marked by severe crime rates as well as a large number of rebel groups.

In a 2011 report, the International Trade Union Confederation issued a report on violence in the DRC, and it once again found that women bear the brunt of this conflict24. Officially, war ended in 2004 with the conclusion of the Second Congo War. However, the East of the country saw a continuation of the conflict until today. Military operations of Congo’s official government have slowed down its expansion, but have still not successfully eradicated rebel groups.

21 UN Security Council, 2000 22 UN Security Council, 2008 23 UN Security Council, 2015 24 Violence against Women in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Whose responsibility? Whose complicity?, 2011

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Sexual and gender-based violence has become a defining feature of this conflict. Here, we can clearly see an application of the reasons mentioned above. Firstly, sexual violence has become normalised during these conflicts. Rebel groups see themselves as better and have little regard for the rights of those they oppress. Subsequently, the violation of women’s rights is used as a tool to display dominance and power over said oppressed groups. This has heavily affected the perception of women’s rights in rebel-affected areas. Secondly, these rebel groups are only able to leverage their power due to the availability of small arms. Their presence in the country means that the rebel issue can never be fully solved, since a gun dropped by one rebel group is easily picked up by another. Thirdly, an inability of a relatively weak government to actively police affected areas allows gender-based violence to flourish. The DRC has harsh punishments for and laws against such abuses, but little to no ability to actually enforce them. Despite attempts to improve the justice system and police forces, impunity remains the default and corruption is able to reign free.

However, the DRC displays another important element to the issue: Economic incentive for the continuation of conflict. Quite obviously, shortening a conflict and ending rebel activity will do wonders for the treatment of women in that area, and the UN does much work in this field. However, particularly in the DRC, there is an economic incentive for rebel groups to continue their work. The natural resources from Congolese mines are used in the production of electronics such as phones, computers, DVD players, and even video game systems. It follows that the industrial economies of the world are highly interested in these resources and will pay any price to acquire them - with little regard for their origin. Thus, the ITUC report finds that there must be more transparency in mineral trade.

To address the issue at hand, delegates must see the root causes of the issue. Whether it is minerals or other primary goods, there is almost always some sort of incentive for rebel groups in post-conflict societies to continue to perpetrate violence. Delegates should find and mitigate this factor.

Identifying the Issue and Discussion To solve the issue of violence against women in post-conflict societies, delegates must address both causes and symptoms.

As mentioned above, delegates should address the causes of the continuation of violence after conflict by focusing on peacebuilding. In other words, ways in which the post-conflict situation could be stabilised and the need for further violence removed. This should include finding and tackling the reason for continued violence, but also the catalysts that allow this situation to occur, such as, but not limited to, an ineffective, weak, and sometimes corrupt government, the large supply of small arms, and the prevalence of discriminatory mindsets.

However, the issue also has various symptoms that need to be mitigated as short-term solutions to the issue. These include the fact that women in post-conflict situations are disproportionately targeted as tactics of terrorism and for seeking education. How will delegates improve efforts to bring education and safety to women, especially in rural areas? It is very important to note that generally, top-down solutions to this have failed, and thus bottom-up approaches should be in focus. In other words, delegates must focus on involving local communities and build projects with their support and cooperation, since this is the only way of changing mindsets and making genuine change.

Before concluding this guide, there is a final and extremely important note to make. Throughout history, women have always been at the centre of conflict, be it as combatants, part of organised civil society, human rights defenders, but - most importantly - they have always worked as formal and informal peacebuilders. What delegates must understand to solve the issue is that

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historically, post-conflict situations have always provided opportunities for transformation of societal structures and norms, in other words, women’s human rights. There should be attention paid to removing the exclusion of women from efforts in conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and post-conflict social transition.

Challenges to Resolution The biggest challenge to any resolution is that the most powerful actors affected by change, namely rebel groups and corrupt government officials, will actively work towards maintaining the status quo, since this is how they profit the most. Subsequently, any resolution must somehow address their sources of profit and remove them.

Another major challenge to progress is the fact that most of the areas most in need of female emancipation are rural and sparsely populated. Any solution directly addressing all of them will have to somehow mitigate immense costs of being effective over such vast distances and cultural differences.

Points resolutions could address Resolutions should, in no particular order, address the following points: - Rebuild government services Government services need to be made more effective and functional. So far, gender-based violence in post-conflict regions usually goes unpunished. This must obviously change. Delegates may want to present ideas on how to reconstruct essential safety services such as police, the justice system, or sexual and reproductive healthcare.

- Educate women To stabilise a post-conflict situation, the education of women is essential. As mentioned above, the inclusion of women in conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction efforts is an essential part of any long-term solution.

- Reduce small arms presence Reducing the presence of small arms in post-conflict societies severely hinders the formation of violent rebel groups and subsequently facilitates and expedites reconstruction of a stable, peaceful society.

- Educate the population Historically, post-conflict situations have always brought a change in social structures. Thus, such situations should be seen as opportunities to change mindsets through bottom-up approaches to education. Delegates must solve the issue of changing the perception of women’s inclusion in society while understanding the cultural differences of affected populations.

- Tackling rebel groups’ motives As mentioned above, rebel groups represent some of the most powerful actors in post-conflict societies and in order to end their abuses of women’s rights, delegates must address their motives - in most cases, economic in nature.

Bibliography and Further Reading Ohchr.org. (2019). Women’s Human Rights and gender-related in Situations of Conflict. [online] Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WRGS/Pages/PeaceAndSecurity.aspx [Accessed 25 Jan. 2020].

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UN Security Council (2000). SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325 (2000). [online] Un.org. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenEleme nt [Accessed 25 Jan. 2020].

UN Security Council (2008). SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1820 (2008). [online] Un.org. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/pdf/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 25 Jan. 2020].

UN Security Council (2015). SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2242 (2015). [online] Un.org. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/311/09/pdf/N1531109.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 25 Jan. 2020].

UN Security Council (2016). SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 2331 (2016). [online] Un.org. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/311/09/pdf/N1531109.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed 25 Jan. 2020].

Violence against Women in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Whose responsibility? Whose complicity? (2011). [online] ituc-csi.org. International Trade Union Confederation. Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/ituc_violence_rdc_eng_lr.pdf.pdf [Accessed 25 Jan. 2020].

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