The Revived Serbian Nationalism During Milosevic's Era and the God-Given Answer to the Kosovo Question

ΕΘΝΙΚΟ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΠΟΔΙΣΤΡΙΑΚΟ ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ

ΣΧΟΛΗ Οικονομικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών

Τμήμα Πολιτικής Επιστήμης και Δημόσιας Διοίκησης

ΠΡΟΓΡΑΜΜΑ ΜΕΤΑΠΤΥΧΙΑΚΩΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΩΝ Σπουδές Νοτιοανατολικής Ευρώπης: Πολιτική, Ιστορία, Οικονομία

ΔΙΠΛΩΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ

The revived Serbian nationalism during Milosevic's era and the God-given answer to the Kosovo question

ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ Κ. ΜΠΟΥΡΛΕΤΟΣ

Επιβλέπων Παντελής Λέκκας, Καθηγητής

ΑΘΗΝΑ

Σεπτέμβριος 2019

ΔΙΠΛΩΜΑΤΙΚΗ ΕΡΓΑΣΙΑ

The revived Serbian nationalism during Milosevic's era and the God-given answer to the Kosovo question

Ιωάννης Κ. Μπουρλέτος Α.Μ.: 181220

ΕΠΙΒΛΕΠΩΝ Παντελής Λέκκας, Καθηγητής

Σεπτέμβριος 2019 2

Table of Contents ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ ...... 3 ABSTRACT ...... 5 A. INTRODUCTION ...... 6 B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...... 9 C. MAIN ANALYSIS ...... 13 I. From Communism to the End of the Federal State ...... 13 1. Serbian Intellectuals and the Albanian Awakening Before and After Tito ..... 14 2. The Defeat of 1974 ...... 15 II. Τhe Intellectuals as the Forefathers of the New Nationalism ...... 18 III. The Milosevic Era ...... 21 1. Between Left and Right ...... 22 IV. The Shaping of Collective Identity and "Kosovo Belongs to the Serbs" ...... 24 1. The Cultural Renovation and the Search for New Role Models ...... 26 2. The Militants of the State ...... 27 V. Religion, Nationalism and the God-Given Right ...... 30 1. The Serbian Orthodox Church Throughout History ...... 31 2. Rehabilitating the Church ...... 32 D. CONCLUSION ...... 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 38

ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

Η δεκαετία του 1990 ήταν δεκαετία αλλαγών για τη Σερβία. Η κατάρρευση του

κομμουνιστικού καθεστώτος είχε ως αποτέλεσμα μια σειρά από απόπειρες για

επανορισμό και επανατοποθέτηση της ύπαρξης του κάθε έθνους, υπό την

προϋπόθεση της αυτονομίας τους. Ο εθνικισμός, επομένως, αποκτά πρωτεύοντα ρόλο

σε όλη την έκταση της περιοχής, αφού ποτέ δε θα μπορούσε να είναι απών από μία

τέτοια προσπάθεια. Αυτή η εργασία, εστιάζοντας στο συγκεκριμένο παράδειγμα του

Σερβικού εθνικισμού, σπαρμένο και καλλιεργημένο καθ'όλη τη διάρκεια της

εγκαθίδρυσης μίας Σερβικής διοίκησης - η οποία θα τίθεντο ως διάδοχος της

προηγούμενης κομμουνιστικής διοίκησης στο σύστημα του συνασπισμού θα

στοχεύσει σε μία βαθύτερη ανάλυση του ερωτήματος του Κοσόβου. Η έμφαση θα

δοθεί στη σύνδεση του εθνικισμού με τις αναγεννημένες εθνικές ταυτότητες που θα

έψαχναν απαραιτήτως μία πληθώρα από κοινά στοιχεία πάνω τα οποία θα

αποτελούσαν το εύφορο έδαφος για δημιουργία και ευημερία, και τις οποίες παρείχαν

οι πολυμήχανοι διαννοούμενοι και η Εκκλησία. Χρησιμοποιώντας κυρίως τις θεωρίες

του Anderson, του Kedourie και του Gellner η παρούσα διατριβή θα δείξει πώς το

ερώτημα του Κοσόβου είναι, ουσιαστικά, η προσπάθεια της Σερβικής ταυτότητας να

κυριαρχήσει έναντι του πρώην αυτόνομου τομέα της Γιουγκοσλαβίας. Η εγκαθίδρυση

της ενοποιημένης ιδέας κατά την περίοδο του Τίτου μετατρέπεται στον αναγεννημένο

εθνικισμό του Μιλόσεβιτς, που θα συνδυάσει τελικά στοιχεία φαινομενικά

ανομοιογενή και, πολλές φορές, αντικρουόμενα. Θα επιχειρήσω να δείξω πως αυτά

τα αντικρουόμενα στοιχεία χρησιμοποιούνται με σκοπό την επανεγγραφή της

ιστορίας και, ως εκ τούτου, την προώθηση της σερβικής ταυτότητας ως συνώνυμη με

την Γιουγκοσλαβική, με τον ταυτόχρονο υποβιβασμό των υπολοίπων. 4

ΛΕΞΕΙΣ ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Εθνικισμός, Σερβία, Κόσοβο, Μιλόσεβιτς, Διανοούμενοι

ABSTRACT

The 1990s were the decade of change in Yugoslavia. The collapse of the communist regime resulted in a series of attempts to re-define and relocate each nation's existence, under the condition of their autonomy. Nationalism, therefore, obtains a prominent role throughout the region, since it could never be absent from such a venture. This paper, focusing on the specific example of the Serbian nationalism, sown and grown throughout the years of the establishment of a Serbian governance - that would pose as the heir of the previous communist one in the federal system -, will attempt a deeper analysis of the Kosovo question. The emphasis will fall on the connection of nationalism and the creation of revived national identities that would necessarily seek a plethora of common elements on which to build and prosper, ingeniously provided by the intellectuals and the Church. By mainly utilising the theories of Anderson, Kedourie and Gellner the present thesis will show how the Kosovo question is, in its essence, the effort for the Serbian identity to dominate over a former autonomous Yugoslavian province. The establishment of the unified idea in Tito's era becomes Milosevic's revived nationalism, that will eventually combine seemingly disparate and, sometimes, controversial elements. I argue that these controversial clues are used in order to revise history and, as a consequence, to promote the Serbian identity as synonymous to the Yugoslav identity and simultaneously undermine the others.

KEYWORDS: Nationalism, Serbia, Kosovo, Milosevic, Intellectuals

A. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the communist regimes that took place during the early 1990s entirely changed the world, and the international status quo which was agreed on after the end of the WWII in Yalta (Jundt 2005: p.101) does no longer exist. For the Balkans, the end of communism is synonymous with the break of Yugoslavia, among other things.1 The collapse of Yugoslavia and the creation of the nation states is only the result of a long-term process which took place within the federal state. The establishment of a common identity which aimed to the cohesion of the different nationalities proved to be fruitless, and led to a new wave of nationalisms throughout Europe.

In post-WWII Yugoslavia, Tito's governance tried to enforce a policy of unification to overcome the conflicts among the national group. He emphasised the creation of a narrative that promoted Brotherhood and Unity amongst the different ethnicities in the socialist federal state. He, therefore, tried to formulate an identity that would pertain in both the national and socialist traits of the people. To achieve that he organised a network of institutions which contributed to the establishment of the "new Yugoslav socialist culture" (Ramet 2006: p.xiv). This was an effort for the common national identity to be based on the glorious past of Resistance while still maintaining at its forefront the partisan ideas. Apart from the utilisation of the prolific partisan writers to ensure the creation of the unified idea (Ramet 2006: p.xiv), Tito's policy also included the ban of ethnic-nationalist rhetoric. In general terms this enforced a balanced policy in order to face the nationalities' separating demands. This was not the first time in history when the establishment of a unified idea took place, but it certainly was outstanding. The search of the common elements which could connect people living in the area created a historical conundrum, whose importance dramatically escalated during the establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. However, the logic behind the creation of a common identity after the WWI differed from the one during Tito's governance. In contrast to the Kingdom of Serbia, as Scholar Dinka Corkalo Biruski observed, it was more than the ideology of brotherhood that kept ethnic tensions at bay during Tito's era ( Biruski 2012: p.332). It was the inter-communal ties in social networks (Biruski 2012: p.332) which tried to restrict the dominance of Serbia over the other nationalities. In spite of the successful coexistence under Tito, the establishment of the unified idea did not actually occur and the peaceful years were succeeded by uprising nationalisms which led to the war in the 1990s. One of the main issues of the collapse of the federation correlated with the character of the autonomous provinces and especially with the territory of Kosovo, where numerous traumatic military expeditions took place. The Kosovo

1 See Mazower's The Balkans: A Short History. 7 question still remains in the centre of the international community nowadays, and the present thesis will make an attempt to delve into it, drawing on the connection and the continuity of the Yugoslav identity to the Serbian one, and most importantly, from the perspective of the Serbian nationalism.

According to what was mentioned above, a crucial issue for the unification of the Yugoslav people was the position of the Serbs in it. The other nationalities felt that the Serbian dominance within the Federation undermined their role in both an administrative as well as a cultural level. This situation led to conflicts which sapped the future of the federal state. Thus, a new hypothesis appears as to there being a turning point which led to the national demands that endangered the entire federal construction and made coexistence seem impossible. From all the uprising nationalisms in the region this dissertation will investigate the Serbian one, and more especially this form of nationalism as it was expressed during Milosevic's era. This was a revived nationalism which was activated by the oppression of the autonomous provinces, recentralisation of the system of governance and the rehabilitation of the Church (Ramet 2006: p.26-27). The role of the Church is significant for the history of Serbia's culture. This is the reason why a question is brought forward about the character of this specific nationalism. According to Loezidis, Serbian movements "incorporate religious themes that within a cycle of mutual reinforcing adaptation, turns adaptation into a key process of national formation" (Loezidis 2009: p.203). However, the plausibility of nationalism as non-religious, despite its obviously religious attributes, will be brought to light.

Leaving the vision of federalism under Serbian dominance this revived nationalism looks for a unified and strong Serbia. Under this doctrine this nationalism recognised Serbian dominance in ex-Yugoslavia over the other nationalities. At this point, a new conversation is initiated. Firstly, the connection of the Serbian culture with the idea of unification and, secondly, the meaning of the autonomous provinces in this imperialistic nationalism. Hence, this dissertation will focus on the Kosovo question. This region has a prominent position in the Serbian nationalism and acted as an unlimited source of ideas and a way to enforce the Serbian identity which led to mass mobilisation, enacted with the war. Through a policy of enforcement of Serbian identity over the rival Albanian identity, it will be easier to clarify the elements which construct the Serbian culture and lead to the creation of the Serbian national identity as "imagined"2 and narrated by Milosevic's nationalism. As a consequence, it is deemed significant to analyse the level to which this mass mobilisation reached and the ways in which it was finally expressed. It might be that the reaction of the political system against Milosevic's nationalism is the answer to the above questions.

This thesis, therefore, will investigate the cultural elements which are part of the national ones and which, during Milosevic's era, were turned into a new form of nationalism. The main focus of the research will be the effect of nationalism on the

2 The term is borrowed from Anderson's book Imagined Communities. 8 mentality and ideas of Serbian society. In this sense, it will be an analysis of the structure of this society during the enforcement of his policy. The role of intellectuals will be examined as the actors who assisted the synthesis of nationalism. The dissertation will not be an analysis of diplomatic history, analysing the law and the conditions of the status quo of the autonomous province of Kosovo. Instead of presenting the war and the international agreements over the Kosovo question, beginning with the constitutional changes of the 1970s, this thesis will analyse the impact of the incidents on the national identity of Serbia. Also, it will investigate the brainstorming over the Kosovar national identity that was formed by opposing the enforcement of national Serbian identity. As a result, the way in which the enhancement of the autonomous character of the province was connected to the myth and legends of the Serbian past and how it led to the reconstruction of the Serbian history to suit Serbian nationalism. Before giving answers to the questions abovementioned it is crucial to define the phenomenon of nationalism an examine the various approaches to subject, as they have been given by different theorists.

B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to analyse the main theme of that thesis it is important to clarify some basic terms from the theory and define the theoretical framework in which it belongs. This thesis falls under the theoretical field of "nationalism". Therefore an important question which one ought to answer is how we can define the phenomenon of nationalism itself. First of all, nationalism is a political ideology in which the nation is the centre of interest or, even better, is referred to. However, this statement simply leads to two further questions; firstly, what is a political ideology and secondly what exactly is the ''nation''?

The definition of political ideology is far from easy to achieve because it should exclude any subjective element or give a notion of liberation or subjugation (Heywood 2014: p.28-30). In fact, the study of any political ideology should never be part of an assessment process. This is the reason why a neutral framework in which any ideology - conservative or liberal - can be anlysed is necessary. Therefore, political ideology can be determined as any cohesive body of ideas which has a specific vision of the world and wants to change the world according to the way this group of ideas perceives it. This definition demonstrates that political ideology is a social phenomenon, which cannot be perceived solely by one individual, yet it depends and answers to individuals. According to Lekkas: "Ideology refers to a group of ideas that do not refer to single individuals, but to social entities, which adopt it as a part of their communal life. Therefore, an ideology cannot be perceived as an ambiguous amount of sub-ideas, referring to specific personal experiences, but to the totality of ideas that are social, meaning that they amount to a shared possession of human groups and a common ground of their shared experience" (Lekkas 2011: pp.14-15).3

Taking that terminology into account, one can define two levels in every ideology; a descriptive and a normative function. But, before clarifying these two functions in the case of nationalism, we understand from its name that it focuses on the nation, which stands in the centre of that specific political thought. Nation and ideologies are both modern phenomena. The division of the transition4 from tradition to modernity happens in three fields: economy, authority or organising states and ideas. The two abovementioned phenomena belong to the second and the third field of transition. Essentially, the national state finds an answer within the body of thought which requests a state based on national identity, a term that, according to Renan, is new and unknown to antiquity (Renan 1882: p.3). He also mentions that there is a

3 My translation. 4 The transition from tradition to modernity takes place in different chronologies and ways varying from area to area. One can define three significant marks in history for this transition according to the field in which they are mentioned. For example, in the field of economy the Industrial Revolution is a historical start for the transition. About the governance or state's authority the transition is located in the change from Feudalism to the modern states and at the level of thought or mentality the Enlightenment opens the secularisation of thought and the disenchantment of society. 10 historical process of convergent facts which led to this result and led to a unity among people and a new form of state organisation. However the question still remains about the elements, the principles and the ideas defining this kind of governance.

At this point, the explanation of the two functions of ideology per se will answer the abovementioned question. In its descriptive level it determines the limits and presents the image of the national idea and the normative definitions of the boundaries, while determining the elements which are to be included or excluded. This is the main difference between nationalism and racism. The essential point is that nationalism poses as a cohesive glue in society and it creates an environment of common elements in its centre for its people. From that point of view, it has a positive impact with an internal productive situation whose target is unity, utilising the power of inclusion and exclusion.5 Due to that, it is incommensurable and contains different characteristics from one society to another. This also separates it from racism. The central abstraction of racism is that it focuses on race and makes it impermeable, dividing one nation from the other, which renders it unable to lead to a unitary outcome. The distinction between cultural and biological racism that Balibar makes also underlines the Serbian insistence on their culture's dominance over the others in the region.6 On the other hand, nationalism divides other nations, but is essentially egalitarian within one. This dichotomy plays an important role for this thesis, since racism existed in the ex-coexisting national groups of Yugoslavia from the Serbian side, but failed to have any mobilising effects on society, which was, instead, managed by Milosevic's nationalism.

Nationalism is also not equable. Its significant difference from other ideologies is the plasticity and its co-existence with other ideologies. It can also have specific, yet still extended limits, meaning that its boundaries are not restricted to these of the state. The examples of pan-nationalisms, such as Panturkism and Panslavism, confirm this view. The religion does not demand the element of common- belonging. This fact can create an extended framework with followers with different cultural backgrounds as long as they indisputably accept the said doctrine. Contrary to that nationalism formulates frameworks for people who already share a common belonging, showcasing that its plasticity still adheres to prerequisites.

One of the major theories of nationalism which is a tool for that thesis is Kedourie's theory, presenting the connection of the idea of self-determination with it. The most significant element in this is the term of the will. In modernity, the term liberty is the main target of the person of modernity acting as an individual who has broken the bonds with the God who gave the order. In this era, he is self-ruling and self-being. 7 The power of the will leads to self-determination that the person searches for total freedom. However, the only way to reach this goal is the voluntary provision of the state, the result of secular thought in a cosmological society in the era of

5 See Van den Berghe's "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective". 6 See Balibar, "Is there a 'neo-racism'?". 7 See E. Kedourie's Nationalism. 11 disenchantment and rationalism. This provision probably does not look like freedom, but is a result of choice and it constitutes the only way to approach freedom. The turn towards rationalism is a new authority in modernity. The only way for the individual to be convinced to give his or her freedom away is for the national state to which he or she feels a connection and its welfare to actually benefit the individual. Society in modernity needs cohesion and unity, which can only be managed through nationalism.

Returning to Renan's image of nation in "What is a nation?" as a modern product, one ought to wonder why this process takes place in modernity. The answer leads to another theory of nationalism, an essential tool in that thesis, Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities. Individualism is connected with liberty in the new era of societies. However, it is accompanied by the fear of the modern person who has lost his or her compass during the Enlightenment, because of the transition from tradition to modernity. The answer to the problems of modernity is nationalism. The individual turns to nationalism, because this transition has loosened the connection with the past and there is lack of continuity. The cohesive clue in these societies is provided by "printed capitalism" (Anderson 2006: p.145). With this term he refers to every form which transmits the language which has an important position in his theory. Especially he mentions that "songs, poetry, and national anthems are used as effective agents of nationalism", which leads to the politicisation of culture (Anderson 2006: p145). Nationalism uses the past, the legend and the myth and every clue of the tradition inside modernity and through this way it took the history and reconstructed it in the measures of the "imagined community".

The necessity of cultural bonds is common within the theories of nationalism. Also, theorists who began from a different starting point, such as Gellner in his book Nations and Nationalism, who rejects the existence of the natural sentiment of nationalism and believes that nations are a product of modernity and a construct during the era of industralisation, highlight the significance of culture. In this more socially constructive approach, the nation is a legislated necessity with specific political and cultural boundaries. Nevertheless, the state needs the cultural cohesion in industrialised modern communities, which constitutes the abovementioned agreement among the theories. At this point, bureaucracy, education, literacy, printed news and communication transmit the common cultural elements amongst people. Furthermore, a specific community, the intellectuals, contributes to the same end. This community plays an essential role of transmitting common ideas and constructing a framework, while still being connected to the state. A striking example of that is the effort for the creation of the common Yugoslav identity throughout the region during the first World War, a mission which succeeded the Yugoslav intellectual committee. The same project took place during Tito's era and the socialist years. An intriguing question which should have been answered by the end of the present thesis, is the continuity and the connection of the Yugoslav idea to the Serbian idea, especially in the case the Kosovo question from the perspective of Serbian nationalism. Returning 12 to the role of the intellectuals, the role of the Diaspora is also worth-mentioning. In many cases, their contribution is to bring modernity inside the state, through the transmission of the ideas which were previously external. Diaspora's role is significant for the national idea of Kosovo and every liberating movement in the ex- Yugoslav era.

Concluding the presentation of the theoretical framework it is important to add two more approaches to the phenomenon. The first one is Eric Hobsbawm's approach,8 a historical analysis of the development and the changes of nationalism during modernity. He shows that capitalism causes nationalism in modernity walks parallel to the economic and social development and this evolving process is nationalism's stable point. This ability of national identity to be changed and revised might be an important tool for the present case study and there might be a connection with the transition of the Yugoslav to the Serbian idea and the common elements which the two might share as a result.

Apart from that, Michel Billig's thought about banal nationalism,9 that lacks the range of implementation of other theories, is a minor theory. The fact that it was published when the war took place in the ex-Yugoslav era renders it valuable to this thesis. On the other hand, this connection is not only theoretical, but also practical. According to the author of Banal Nationalism, this type of nationalism is not meaningless. It has the exact opposite effect since this way it proves the strength of this ideology, acting imperceptibly on the individual. To be more specific, he tries to present the "nationalism of daily life". Some examples are the flags, the symbols which are presented in institutions, in language, in sports and international competitions, a common ground for all the ex-Yugoslavic area countries during the war. Daily routine poses a grand route to nationalism, for it is both casual and identity-forming.

Having presented the major tools of that thesis and having referred to the approaches on which that case study is based, one should definitely begin with the actual analysis of the issue in question. What will first be presented is the connection of the Serbian nationalism with Yugoslavism at the level of intellectual thought. Chronologically, the analysis will focus on the post-Tito period of governance, examining why from a period of co-existence the area passed to an era of conflicts, renovation of ideas, uprising nationalisms and different status quo inside the society. Furthermore, it will try to uncover the changes in spiritual field which lead to a new era under Milosevic's leadership.

8 This is a general overview of the book. 9 This is a general overview of the book. 13

C. MAIN ANALYSIS

I. From Communism to the End of the Federal State

Before analysing Serbian nationalism during Milosevic's era, it is important to search for the reasons why this ideology was welcomed by the majority of society. The break-up of the federal state is the end of a long series of events. There was a process leading to this incident, changing the status quo of the region and raising the nationalistic claims - which were inactive during Tito's era. The fourth and final constitution of 1974 enhanced the autonomous provinces and increased the representation and the power of each republic, thus igniting the consequent events. This constitution became an unlimited source of arguments for the Serbian side and augmented the oppositional voices and criticism against the national policy. Milosevic came to power to defend the unprotected national position from the upcoming threat. Investigating the gaps in the policies before Milosevic, one would understand how the mixture of political demands with myths and legends, during a period of reconstruction and amendments of the character of the state turned into a cohesive body of ideas, which is nationalism, which reconstructed the national identity according to the national state. The key in this procedure is Kosovo, a lost territory, after the enhancement of its autonomous character.

According to Ernest Gellner, "[t]he nation unit and the political unit should be congruent" (Gellner 1983: p.1). This approach can characterise the role of the Serbian intellectual through history. The challenge for this community in Serbia is that it ought to have served a different type of governance, and should have also formulated a national identity with intense religious element, leaning to the glorious past of resistance against the Ottoman Empire or anti-Nazi partisan struggle. All these elements constitute a multiple history which would depend on the governance had it had a different position in the hierarchy of its cultural-national identity. That does not mean that they have the same view as the leadership of the state about various national issues and in many cases they even acted as oppositional voices. This was their role during the constitutional amendments which led to the new constitution. Their ideas had a significant effect on Milosevic's nationalism, whose milestone - the SANU Memorandum - is explained later. In general terms, Jasna Dragovic-Soso mentions that, despite the criticism against political actions and power, its independent role was restricted due to the project of building nationalism, not completely, however, as it was mentioned above. Therefore a historical approach to his role, parallel to the incidents which led to Milosevic's rise and dominance of the nationalism, is necessary for better understanding of what is above mentioned. Jasna Dragovic-Soso stated that the primal challenge for the creation of an intellectual community was the minor seizure of the educated class (Dragovic-Soso 2004: p.170). This is the reason why the state in the beginning should have created an educated class, and this, in its turn, explains the close relationship with the government. She 14 added that the administrators and bureaucrats were the protectors of the state policy (Dragovic-Soso 2004: p.170). Later, this tactic will be usual in Serbia with many examples during Tito's and Milosevic's era.

1. Serbian Intellectuals and the Albanian Awakening Before and After Tito

The socialism building project was welcomed by the majority of society and the social factors contributed to their power for the succession of the new Yugoslavia, rising in the end of the WWII. The state which came as a result of the war, was the beginning of the communist governance in the area, where the creation of a federal state consisted of six republics, with Belgrade as its capital. In this pact of states, there were two autonomous provinces that acted as the main issues of assertion in the future for the state which belonged to Serbia in the first place. In general terms, the centre of the Federation was Serbia. According to Dragovic-Soso this positive reaction to the Communist era was owed to the success of the unification of the Serbian nation. In addition to that, in autonomous provinces the dominance of the Serbian community, which remained out the federal state, and the administrative power over the two provinces provoked feelings of deep satisfaction. As the author quoted from the Speech in Zagreb, Tito supported that "the boarders of the federal units in Yugoslavia are not borders of division, but borders of unification" (Dragovic-Soso 2004: p.176). This incident is the official beginning of the Federal state, the creation of the common Yugoslav identity from Tito's regime and the intellectuals community. The most radical change is that that specific communism was the official ideology and principle of the state, as it inserted the culture of the Serbs, leading to the weakness of several traditional institutions, such as the Church.

However, communism in Yugoslavia traced its own route after the Tito-Stalin split. The new state raised their demands and claims from Albania, their main rival state, over Kosovo and enhanced the nationalist voices about the loss of the economic, cultural and political communication with Yugoslavia and the area of Kosovo (Ceku 2015: p.41). This era's importance lies in its ability to give us an understanding over Milosevic's ideology since - apart from the territorial demands risen due to the process of Tito's policy - some spiritual elements were also added. The Tito-Stalin split led to the approach of the West. The state represented itself as a state which respected democratic principles, endangered by the imperialistic demands of Enver Hoxha in Kosovo. During this era, there took place the awaking of the Kosovo question from the Albanian side. Hoxha formulated his own vision for the Kosovo region. According to Ethem Ceku, the communist factor mobilised and affected the process, activating the Albanian nationalism to take position about Kosovo. As Hoxha mentioned: "An internationalist communist party for Kosovo should be created, organised and fortified like steel. The fight should have an Albanian colour. The Albanians of Kosovo must fight under the Albanian flag. Units should be led by 15

Albanians" (Ceku 2015: p.41). He built his own myth having as target the unification with Kosovo and the foreign support from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Albanian historian Paskal Milos and Stavri Dajos argued that this support was impossible and the Kosovo question was another attack in Stalin's agenda against Tito. Analysing the arguments of Hoxha's campaign one detects that the nationalist demands had not such a national character, in spite of its anti-Titoist character with similar claims for other nationalities such as the Macedonians. The dawn of nationalism awakened their ideological opponent. This, in combination with various incidents inside the federation, led to a new state, which we will call 3rd Yugoslavia,10 through the constitutional amendments of 1971, concluding to the new constitution in 1974. The first Serbian national arguments over Kosovo and against the opponents would come to be integrated into the defeat of the decentralisation in 1974. This defeat along with the memory of loss in the Battle of Kosovo would create a new mythical past that would, in its turn, become the coral nationalistic argument over the following years.

2. The Defeat of 1974

During the process for the first constitution there were different opinions about the future of Kosovo to reach to the presently known one. Edvard Kardelj stated that the model followed by the constitution was the Soviet one and nationality in its majority gained the power due to its non-division in separate nationalities (Ceku 2015: p.69). In general terms, as has been stated before, the central role of the six provinces belonged to Serbia. This centralism was intense and the international atmosphere was possible to lead to the creation of an Anti-Albanian sentiment among the Serbs of Kosovo. This sentiment turned into actions with executions and imprisonments (Ceku 2015: p.69). Depending on past endeavours to form their present actions, the Yugoslav government was accused of being friendly towards the fascist Albanian population and their actions took place "in the name of the people" (Ceku 2015: p.81) as a means of protection of the communist state. The Anti- Albanian policy and the effort for Yugoslavisation resulted in the activation of the community of intellectuals from both sides. The attempt to establish Yugoslav educational and cultural programmes found passionate opposition from the intellectuals of the University of Pristina (Ceku 2015: p.69),11 who demanded that significant changes be made. They aimed towards the modernisation of the country, especially in the economic sector. The institutional and civic behaviour thus forced cohesion amongst the Albanians.

10As first appeared the interwar Yugoslavia (Kingdom), and second the federation after the Second World War. 11 The agreement between University of Tirana and Pristina and the mobilisation for the Resistance against Yogoslavism. Selma Riza, Zekerija Rexha, Mehmet Gjevori, Esad Mekuli, Hasan Vokshi etc. 16

After a turn of political events, some of which had Kosovo as their centre of attention,12 in 1974 Kosovo improved its autonomous character with many national institutions and symbols. Despite the changes made, there still remained considerable distance between them and the status quo of the other states. As Ethem Ceku mentions: "[t]he Republic of Serbia was defined as a state based on sovereignty of the nation, whereas the autonomous regions and republics, especially between Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia" (Ceku 2015: p.76). The Albanian doctrine was developed during the years before and after 1974, but as Adem Demaci supported, that was not the ideal victory for them, although, there is no doubt, that the facts included a defeat of the Serbs.

Jasna Dracovic-Soso presented the reasons why these incidents provoked turbulences and she proceeded to analyse them (Dragovic- Soso 2004: p.174-180). One third of the Serbs stayed out of the nation-state because of the weakness in the provinces and the loss of territory. Yugoslav nationalism was expressed by the group of Serbs who identified as religious, and they would soon be turned into minorities casting the shadow of fear of discrimination over the Serbs. Moreover, within the said framework, according to Ceku, Yugoslavia's campaign supported the dilemmas for gaining control in Kosovo in issues concerning the character of the area and the status quo ruling over it (Ceku 2015: p.76). Nevertheless, within Yugoslavia the concerns as well as the criticism against decentralisation were intense. This was easily translated as an uprising of anti-socialist feeling, the return of a criticism with Chetnik roots supported by the Church, and the start of nationalism supporting the position that the Serbian state should have as its goal the Serbian-inhabited territories. A movement of anti-change intellectuals started to be organised and highlighted the obvious conversion of the state into a co-federation.

To sum up, the constitutional framework was constantly changing, giving the chance for controversial ideas to be developed, hence paving the way to upcoming nationalisms. Based on these ideas, the dominant national communities formulated their doctrines about territory. These doctrines were mainly based on real facts and contemporary claims. However, the development of the educational system and the uprising of the intellectual communities provided these policies with the cohesion of co-existence through the history and the inevitable reconstruction of the past. A striking example of this process are the protests organised by the student community in the University of Pristina. In the more institutionally and spiritually developed Serbia, this process marked an era of reconstruction and revision. Throughout the following years the defense and Anti-Albanian movement - or anti-feelings for different nations - could not be mobilised. That closely resembled the difference between racism and nationalism. In this new era, the state needed a cohesive element because, technically, they were dealing with a new state. The cohesion came from Milosevic's policy, with the connection of the defeat of battle in Kosovo with the constitution of 1974. Including the Church in the plans and organising a new

12 Each jurisdictional system and amendments of 1963, 1971 are an example of this fact. 17 bureaucracy he put in action his vision to revise Serbian nationalism. These are some of the elements on which Milosevic depended in order to connect his agenda with another ideological field, and correlate his view with the intellectuals' upcoming oppositional view. The Memorandum marked the clearest move of dispute by the intellectuals.

II. Τhe Intellectuals as the Forefathers of the New Nationalism

A crucial question about Tito's governance is whether it represented an era before the inevitable, hence the awaking of nationalisms and the mass appearance of national demands. The development and the enhancement of the intellectual community proved that the solutions for the handling of the economic crisis were hidden in re-centralisation. Slovenes were the first to oppose via an anti-proposal amendment (Dragovic-Soso 2004: pp.170-184). However, the criticism was intense from the Serbian side due to the concessions of the previous years. When Slobodan Milosevic rose in power, inside the Serbian community anti-communism and nationalism had already been developed (Pavlaković 2006: p.15).

Anti-communism was a product of the incidents mentioned in the previous chapter and the actions of intellectuals in Serbian society. The most striking example of the intellectual's moves was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, known simply as the SANU Memorandum13. This was a draft document produced by a 16-member committee of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), composed in 1986. The criticism was not restricted merely against the amendments and the constitutional changes of 1974, but it was also focused on an entire oppositional view about the way Tito structured the entire state. The main point of this agreement-position was twofold. On the one hand, the group of intellectuals in lieu of the economic crises issued a threat against the Serbs about the cost of the economic crisis as opposed to the other nations. On the other hand, they simultaneously highlighted the threats against the Serbs, because of the enhancement of their autonomous character. During the 1980s, the anti-Tito mentality in society was intense. The Serbs expected that his policy would corrupt Serbia through the industrial development of Slovenia and Croatia. In opposition, in the eyes of Croatia and the other nations the Serbs had acquired a large amount of benefits (Ramet 2006: p.16). What was being developed was the criticism against the communist governance in a nationalistic rhetoric (Pavlaković 2006: p.16) from all the national groups. In Serbia, nationalism found support wherever the Serbs were a minority population. Well-known intellectuals, such as Vuk Draskovic, Vojislav Saselj and Vojislav Kostunica were productive, because they enjoyed the support of the Orthodox Church. As Vjeran Pavlaković stated "argued for national rights for Serbs, often those outside of Serbia, rather than the creation of civil society based on citizenship and respect for individual rights regardless of nationality" (Ramet 2006: p.16).

As a consequence, Milosevic's power was gained under these conditions. He did not fully support the arguments and the anti-communist rhetoric, as he was an active member of the Communist party. In spite of these facts, he could understand

13 See Bokovoy, M. K., Irvin J. and Lilly, C.'s State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia 1945-1992. 19 the beneficial context for the rising mentality14 that was anti-communism, which could lead to an ideology, in this case nationalism. In general terms, a pattern which looked quite similar to every state linked to the international environment of the breakdown of the communist states seemed to have taken shape in Yugoslavia. The disappointment and the disillusion of the previous era were certainly visible. As a result there are two books where the ambiance of the periods is described. Dino Abazovic and Mitja Velikonja mentioned that the collapse of the federation lead to searching cohesion for their nation. Borrowing Anderson's term they tried to build their imagined communities. This process demanded the substitution of the Titoist era heroes. Hence every legend, myth and symbol was transformed into a new narrative that would, consequently, result in the formation of a common-belonging sentiment. The authors added that: "Nationalism of the Yugoslav socialist-era as well as post- Yugoslav ethnic nationalisms differ in the crucial multiethnic integration of all- Yugoslav ideology versus monolithic ethno-confessionalism but are similar in their emphasis on hero worship and mythmaking" (Abazovic and Velikonja 2014: p.97)

Furthermore, returning to the establishment of Serbian nationalism, it is worth- mentioning that there were some oppositional voices which did not share the irredentist visions and searched for a third democratic Yugoslavia (Dragovic-Soso 2004: pp.170-184). The fact is that the democratic blanket is something that could be find in autocratic regimes, and Milosevic's regime is not an exception. The claims in Kosovo from his side were ethical and democratic, due to the suppression of the population he represented. His political career had many facets. He gained the power as an active member of the Communist state and introduced the nationalistic goals without completely rejecting the Titoist system (Pavlaković 2006: p.15). The ground for this policy was fertile in the whole region. More specifically, as Pavlaković mentions "nationalism is not unique to Serbia, but the conditions in Serbia at the end of the 1980s were nearly ideal for the rise of a nationalist leader" (Pavlaković 2006: p.16). She historically supported her opinion, pointing out the tensions and conflicts in the region between ethnic groups. In addition to that, she emphasised the heterogeneity and the strong presence of the minority population within that same area. Nevertheless, these arguments can give a historical or demographic image of the region, but they cannot deeply explain the ideological revival of nationalism.

My position is that the national demands in the form of a cohesive ideology with irredentist claims remained silent for a while under Tito's leadership. Correlating that with the effort for an establishment of a new common idea in a territory with ethnic heterogeneity, Tito's governance tried to vanish the national demand of each ethnic group without total success. Finally, under this perspective there is the minimum of mobiliastion by people because of the existing ideological gap, which would later be covered by Milosevic with his mass mobiliastion-leading policy. In

14 I argue that anti-communism is not an ideology in which a political agenda can be supported or can mobilise people. Anti-communism can only be a part of an ideology, not its basis, because it does not describe a specific plan for society and is, therefore, quite limited. 20 fact, the support of his allies with their actions in the spiritual and intellectual level, the modern capitalism of the era, manifested in both new and traditional media.15 The Church and the new role models were seen as products of the successful state. The transition from the previous era to the new one was under the principle of the "Anti- Bureaucratic Revolution" (Pavlaković 2006: p.13). This movement was an open support to Milosevic and it was not restricted to the Serbian borders. This protest event had effects on Montenegro with its leadership being replaced by Milosevic's protégé (Magaš 1993: pp.165-170). It was a wave of dispute to the existent bureaucratic governance and it focused on the decentralisation and the changes in financial policy supporting the free market, another criticism on how the state faced the economic crisis. As Pavlaković mentions for that movement, "[h]is crafty use of Serbian myths, nationalist symbols, and the media mobilise Serbs in support of his stated goals- restoring Serbia's' strength in the Yugoslav federation and reversing decentralisation" (Pavlaković 2006: p.13). That statement perfectly describes the situation and explains why the reference in the previous chapter was deemed significant. If one did not understand what Serbia lost in the previous era, the fertile ground found by Milosevic and the establishment of a regime with controversial elements and search for homogeneity through nationalism could not be completely conceived. The revolution led to a new society with specific characteristics and, inevitably, to the war. The strange conditions in the political and social level that took place in the region show that nationalism is recognisable in every aspect of society, such as education and culture.

15 See Nenadović's Politika in the Storm of Nationalism. 21

III. The Milosevic Era

Ivan Stambolić, one of Milosevic's people, stated that a "unified and strong Serbia was prerequisite for a strong Yugoslavia" (Ramet 2006: p.37) and Slobodan Milosevic commented publicly that "we must free ourselves of the complex about unitarism ... The Serbian Communists have long been saddled with a complex about unitarism ... and made to feel guilty for a relationship with the Serbia bourgeoisie" (Hopken 1985: p.41). These statements clarify the upcoming mentality in Serbian society. The disillusion from the unified idea was obvious and the effort to abandon the communist policy in aspects such as economy is quite visible. I argue that the economic crisis was the driving force that brought radical developments and created space for the riddance of nationalisms. However, that this is not the main cause. If one supports that this was the deeper reason for the change in the whole area the error of economic determinism is possible. The weakness of the state to deal with the economic crisis led to the increase of the voices speaking for economic liberalism, a trend enforced during the first crisis, when liberalisation proved economically and politically to be an efficient measure. A result of the economic crisis that could possibly lead to social change is found in the fact that the unemployment rates rose to 1.3 million people, as well as that the internal debt was about 40 billion dollars (Boduszynski 2010: pp. 64-65). Therefore, I believe that the development of ideas of self-determination and the rethinking the framework of unification in Yugoslavia as a whole were the direct results of this liberalisation. As a principle, the reforms and the ideas of nationalism were historically linked. In the Balkans, the reforms of the Tanzimat period 16boosted the national ideas and movements in the Turkish society. Thus, the fact that Young Ottomans were able to socially express their ideas about their Turkish identity was being reformed and the Turks defensive of it due to the amassed power of other nations in comparison to theirs. The Serbian community, which felt the threat of the others who benefited from the constitutional framework after 1974, found itself in a similar defensive position.

At the same time, the system had formed a collective and pluralistic character. Superficially, it is about a regional level which turned into liberalisation. Sabrina P. Ramet presents a striking example of that. She argued that "people who were unable to publish a text in one republic might turn around and publish it another republic" (Ramet 2006: p.28). That meant beneficial conditions for the circulation of ideas and liberated the demands of minorities published in the motherland. Furthermore, underground cultural movements arose which disputed the central traditional unified culture and demanded their own space, thus gaining more supporters. Under the circumstances of society's general brainstorming, Milosevic started his own era trying to enforce his view of Serbian culture combining it with that of his allies. As will be seen later, he tried tο reconstruct history and sometimes combine aspects of such controversial positions as were those of the Chetniks and the Partisans. The support of

16 See Carter Findley's "The Tanzimat II." The Cambridge History of Turkey. 22 the Chetnik ideas was indirect and took place thanks to their closeness to the ideas of the Church, which promoted some similar views, such as the revival of monarchy. After his unsuccessful attempt to restore the principle of federal government (Ramet 36), his agenda included the underestimation of autonomy of the province and the transformation of his contemporary bureaucracy into a friendlier one. Milosevic's intervention was total and he wanted to create a state that would perfectly fit him. He was fully aware of the fact that the only way to achieve social coexistence was to promote the Serbian self-awareness. Every bureaucratic means was used towards this end. However, the need for the Serbian identity to dominate was complete and it permeated the entire political spectrum, that is the government and its opposition, too. This is why the political agenda was based on national policy and political conversation and criticism orbited around this fact.

1. Between Left and Right

Enforcing one of the three types of legitimate rule17 the charismatic authority is common in this tradition. More specifically, the recent example of Tito and the traditional pattern of the leader-father correlated with the legend of the South Slav flock (Ramet 2006: p.28). My argument is that Milosevic, without adhering to clear distinctions between left and right, based his policy on the heroic-victimisation motif, using examples right out of history such as the Battle of Kosovo or the Resistance. The Church stated that "this casts the Serbian people as martyrs, eternally victims, and eternally scarified by God" (Ramet 2006: p.28). Nevertheless, Milosevic's strong left tradition ought to be kept in mind. The Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) is the descendant of the League of Communists in Serbia.18 As happened to the majority of parties after the collapse of the communist regimes, the descendant leadership came from the social-democratic family. Obviously, it is easy to understand from the above that SPS followed a nationalistic policy and, in many cases. it was far from its roots in the economic field. However, this can be attributed to nationalism's plasticity as a phenomenon.19 Furthermore, there was great dispute between the government and the opposition over the former's nationalistic policies. Nationalism was rooted in the political system and that was visible after the end of Milosevic's era. The SPS maintained its left ideology, while continuing to maintain and cultivate the legacy and legends of the Partisan Struggle (Pavlaković 20006: p.20).

Subsequently, the national goal was at the top of the political agenda and the future of the descendant states concerned the international community. In this phase, the initially pro-Western feeling between the West and Milosevic starts being

17 See Anthony Giddens' Κοινωνιολογία. 18 See Janusz Bugajski's Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post- Communist Era. 19 see chapter "Theoretical Framework" p.3 23 noticeable. According to Obrad Kesic, the specific characteristic of the Serbian political system is that the opposition is constituted of strong Chetnik voices, supporters of the monarchy (Kesic 20006: p.98). Furthermore, Milosevic could alleviate the negative feeling from the Communist era. Under these circumstances, he seemed as the most efficient solution (Kesic 2006: p.98). Indeed, his rhetoric could drive to mass mobilisation of society enforcing a plan based on the militarisation of society in multiple ways, leading to the creation of social cohesion. The conflicts between his party and the opposition contained many accusations for pro-Chetnik mentality and vice-versa. The collective sentiment produced a great variety of effects, such as discrimination, victimisation, reconstruction of cultural tradition, change in language and institutions. Last but not least, the weakness of the creation of a unified, compact opposition, regardless of its size, with sporadic protests, could not deal with and have influence on a society inspired by Milosevic's compact ideology, which certified many aspects of that specific case of nationalism.

IV. The Shaping of Collective Identity and "Kosovo Belongs to the Serbs"

What are the objective elements that society leans on to connect people? Religion can achieve social unification, but cannot be fully applicated especially in a society constituted by a wide variety of religious people. Of course, Orthodoxy had the leading role, but it was problematic for Milosevic to base his entire policy on that. Language indeed is an objective element, however, it is unable to reflect the social reality where minority presence is dominant. The same problems were noticed in other objective characteristics, such as customs or history. The latter, though, also furtively involves the element of subjectivity, which is obvious in Milosevic's case, as he tries to reconstruct history and legends according to his plans, the most striking example being the Battle of Kosovo (Vickers 1998: pp.12-15). The weakness of the objective elements to work as a cohesive "glue" to turn the interest into a subjective characteristic such as the re-reading of history is mentioned above. A subjective one is the apprehension against race. His policy targeted other groups, such as the Roma,20 and in many cases racist ideas were developed. Internationally, there was a confusion in categorising the Roma as a nation and a national minority (Reinhartz 2006: pp.381- 385). According to Dennis Reinhartz, these discriminations were not limited in this specific ethnic or national group, nor in these aspects of society, since they were also visible in education and the military. Nevertheless, as was mentioned in the first chapter, racism is an inadequate means for mobilisation and unification of the people, acting only as separating device, ergo the need of something else. Returning to Kedourie's theory and the importance of the will for the individual to concede his or her individualism to the national state in which he or she detects the necessary elements to ensure co-existence. Therefore, there is a need to build a common constructed and subjective belonging, which would also refer to the people who participate in this state. The abovementioned elements are imperative to this construction. In order to achieve this the newly established state must annihilate anything that is reminiscent of the past that does not belong to the current narrative of the state.

In Marx's The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte21 one of the first changes of the new regime is the calendar. The importance of that change signifies the beginning of a new era. In this text, Marx speaks about the bourgeois revolutions and despite the fact that Milosevic's rise did not use this mechanism, this example can be used to describe the start of something new. Accordingly, in Kosovo the name- changing policy is a common tactic to Serbianise the area. Dennis Reinhartz mentions an example: "One of the signs of Milosevic's policy toward Kosova was the change of the official reference from Kosovo back to the earlier Serbian formulation of Kosovo and Metohija" (Reinhartz 2006: p.381-385). He explained that this term comes from

20 See G. Mosse's Racism and Nationalism about the distinction between racism and nationalism. 21See Karl Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 25 the Greek word metoh,22 and highlighted that the ownership by the Church took the region back to a previous era. In general, there was a public policy that was not limited to the theoretical level, but was also a technical plan, realised by physical constructions as well as rhetorical.

Nevertheless, as is well-known, actions provoke reactions. As was seen before, with the example of the University of Pristina, the intellectuals opposed and demanded the respect towards Kosovar tradition (Trix 2006: pp.312-317). Obviously, there was an arena of controversial cultures and imposing identities. This battle was long term and Trix presents some examples of a policy with double aim: that of annihilating the Albanian impact and the one of establishing the return of the Serbs in Kosovo. The public places in the capital with the name Vojvode Stepe, Nexhmedin, Vase Carapica, and in 1997, an elementary school named Aleksa Santic proved the extent of this policy (Trix 2006: pp.312-317). Education had a major role as the formulating mentality machine and in building the national identity. The supposed bilingual schools with Albanian and Serbian teachers were solely attended by Albanians (Trix 2006: pp.312-317), which proves the effort for the protection of the Serbs and enforcement of the revised Albanian identity. Language was generally a means of propaganda for Milosevic. It was enforced with the reduction of Latin references and the prioritisation of the Cyrillic alphabet (Ramet 2006: p.35). The roots for this focus lie in the classical scripts of Serbian nationalism. To be more specific, Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, the famous linguistic reformer, stabilised the issue of the Cyrillic alphabet in the Serbian language and his target was the replacement of artificial Slavo-Serbian literacy (Banac 1986: pp.80-81). That points toward the ability of shaping different elements of the Serbian tradition to construct Milosevic's approach on Serbian nationalism. In Kosovo, the dominance of the Cyrillic alphabet was not an exception and Orthodox cultural associations secured the enforcement of his policy (Trix 2006: pp.312-317).

The social engineering of nationalism as an ideology is prevalent in the Serbian case. This takes place not only with abstract theories and the establishment of legitimisation through the creation of a consciousness of common belonging and institutions which represent the nation-state, but also with the extension and enforcement of nationalism in every field of daily routine.23 For example, he was not restricted in the written language, but he wanted to make the Serbian language dominant in every form, turning it into the formal one in Kosovo (Trix 2006: pp.312- 317). This way, his policy change focused on remembering that this land belonged to the Serbs, a representation of their homecoming and the revision of the battle of Kosovo myth. This situation provoked the rejection of the Serbian element, even though it could not lead to the creation of an undivided identity. In contrast to that, Frances Trix comments on the situation as the survival of Kosovar Albanians in an Apartheid society. This side tried to build "its state" with the creation of institutions

22 The Greek word metohi (μετοχή), which means to partake, to share. 23See Michael Billig's Banal Nationalism (Theory, Culture and Society). 26 correlated to Albania. However, with the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova the realistic solution becomes a neutral Kosovar identity followed by a non-violence tactic. In this framework, similar to the Serbian state, Kosovar effort to build its nationalistic doctrine and non-violence policy is a way to separate it from the opposite side under the auspices of the upcoming national institutions which were appearing at the time. In conclusion, it is significant to highlight the impact of the education on contemporary society. Historically, it is a main cause for the rupture of the differences, due to the use of the parallel educational system.24 The different curriculum amply offered different visions on history, explaining the legacy and myths quite differently than before. This is always a shelter for minorities, but it can also pose as an obstacle for homogeneity and, in the case of Kosovo, many independence claims came from the field of education.

1. The Cultural Renovation and the Search for New Role Models

Returning to the elements which built the common-belonging sentiment, Milosevic's policy was not restricted solely in language or education. As has previously been presented, the intellectuals did only not participate in the criticism against the past, but they were also productive in introducing a new wave of cultural production. Close to the intellectuals, media contribution to the regime was not restricted in the support of the new leader, but presented the new role models which appeared during this period as well. These new role models illustrated the new era both in ex-Yugoslavia and in general in communities such as the athletic one. However, the distinct characteristic of this community is the presence of a specific category of role models, products of the increasing corruption, violence and extended militarisation of society. Apart from that, this novel social atmosphere had another social effect, since women's role was far more different in this era, a fact mirrored in society.

At this point it is important to clarify that an active cultural society is not a Serbian characteristic. The accomplishments of its actors were prevalent in the whole federal state and provoked events correlated with nationalism in Serbia. A striking example is the debate over rock music. The introduction of this cultural movement is noteworthy for the reproduction of liberal ideas and correlates with the idea of a unified Yugoslavia. Rock music translated as an arena of production of ideas about freedom or self-determination and its proximity to politics turned it into either a supporter or opponent of the state (Ramet 2006: pp.133-134). Following the political process, rock bands adhered to the common sentiment. At first, there were not any distinctions and many of them were presented as Yugoslavs. Nonetheless, the upcoming nationalism and the strong connection of this kind of music with liberal and

24 See Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Tonny Brems Knudsen's Kosovo between War and Peace: Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship. 27 revolutionary ideas lead them to call themselves Croatian or Bosnian (Ramet 2006: p.144).

However, there were striking examples of cultural movements which maintained a clearly oppositional stance primarily against the idea of unification. To be more specific, a revival of national literacy, culture and history bloomed (Ramet 2006: p.38). In order to formulate a pattern in which the new cultural movements rose, two characteristics could be emphasised. The first one is the strong national character of cultural products. The second one is the appearance of underground cultural movements with political features (Ramet 2006: 28). My argument is that the cultural movements of the period illustrated the loss of the previous character and the establishment of a unified identity. The national revival in Serbia, the last supporter of the federal idea - with the Serbian element at its core, of course - justified this view. The loss of Yugoslavia to Serbia was difficult. For years they viewed Serbian and Yugoslav identities as interchangeable (Gow and Michalski 2006: p.146). This statement might have justified mass mobilisation, support and contribution to the goal during the Milosevic era. In the heart of society, the idea of Yugoslavia was rooted for years and the end of the war found them with the loss of a fundamental belief (Gow and Michalski 2006: p.146) which lead to a new reconstruction marked by the stamp of guilt.

2. The Militants of the State

The reference to the Battle of Kosovo is the central myth of the Serbs' claim in it. The transformation of the myth from folk song to cohesive national myth in written form through education stabilised its power and turned it into a motivational device. However, education was not the only field in which the representation of national symbols was visible. The role of the media in their contemporary form, such as television, radio and tabloids, is the modern capitalism of Milosevic's era and its action justified the theory. The magazines Duga and Intervju and the newspapers Politika and Politika Ekspres (Ramet 2006: p.28) are some examples of media that contributed to the reproduction of Serbian anger towards the others. One of the precious means in Milosevic's strategy was television. Under the control of the state Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) promoted xenophobia (Pavlaković 20-22). Using hate- speech it cultivated the fear that the policy deliberately targeted the Croats, the Kosovar Albanians and the Bosnian Muslims. It is essential to investigate the tactic used by Milosevic to control the media. Of course, he had his supporters, but he also restricted the "alternatives" through the decrease of finances to individuals who invested in the media business. This way, he acted against the powers of opposition which, unable to form a cohesive body, failed to mobilise the people. In general terms, in describing the era Vjeran Pavlaković stated that "[p]olitical mobilisation through the manipulation of national symbols and myths, control of media and 28 alliances with economic criminal elites were key components of the Milosevic regime" (Pavlaković 2006: pp.20-22).

At this point, it is crucial to analyse the new national symbols introduced by the media and the significance of the alliance with criminal elites. Beginning with the symbols, the building project of the new role models in the Yugoslav states improved the national sentiment and pride. The change of regime from communism to autocracy lead to the renovation of the heroic models of the past. The heroes of the wars played an essential role, especially people who participated in the key struggles for the Milosevic regime, but now some new modern icons were added. More specifically, role models of the modern state, such as scientists and athletes, can be characterised as successful products of the national institutions and were deemed ideal for the era (Abazovic and Velikonja 2014: p.97). The substitution of the role models of the past for those of the present illustrates the conflict between tradition and modernity in every field. One of the characteristics, according to Dino Abazovic and Mitia Velikonja, is that this era is an outline for an alternative heroic pantheon of the socialist (Abazovic and Velikokja 2014: p.112). Serbia's state had given great attention to the sports field as early as the 1970s and 1980s. As a result a lot of success came in this field from its national representatives. Nevertheless, this campaign would not have any results, had the state not introduced them in scholarly literature (Abazovic and Velikonja 2014: p.97). Benefiting from the transmission of education and media under Milosevic, the state achieved the creation of a new framework of national heroes. Especially during the war, athletes were militants of the national state not only through their success, but also by turning themselves into idols of hate. During the international competitions, which coincided with the war during the 1990s, there are many striking examples of this mentality, for Serbs and Croats both. As Popov presents, Serbian footballers encouraged the supporters with national symbols and they sang a polemic song which correlated with a past struggle in Kosovo "…we are the warriors from the proud Serbia…greet the Serbian race from Kosovo to Knin, Serbs stand shoulder to shoulder, Serbian Slobo, Serbia is with you…"(Popov and Gojkovic 2000: p.384). Sports had a significant impact on Milosevic's policy and, under the appropriate framework, such as education, it contributed to national political mobilisation. As Baker comments for the ex- Yugoslavian states: "All these elements of public culture and its symbols helped Serbs and Croats to grow the robust flow of nationalism through sports, art and songs. Nationalism and music were strongly connected and mobilized nationalistic movements by tying nationalistic rhetorics with lyrics giving an “ethnic” sense which affected their sentiments and strengthened their beliefs" (Baker 2013: p.410)

Analysing the anthems of the football fans, one can understand that the polemic mentality is rooted in society and that explains the other category of role models which was introduced during the 1990s. Of course these are the political leaders, whose most outstanding example is Milosevic. During his speeches Emmert and Ingrao presented a part which presented him as the successor of Tito. In 29 particular, they wonder: "... who is going to replace Tito. Now we know … Slobodan is a proud name ... Whoever hurt Slobodan, our Slobodan, his head will be ripped off of his body" (Emmert and Ingrao 2006: p.44). However, the close relationship which he developed with criminal elites and the development of the corruption and the militant violent mentality lead to a new category of role models such as gangsters and criminals (Abazovic and Velikonja 2014: p.97). These role models are products of the extensive militarisation of society under Milosevic which changed the social synthesis and had a great impact on women. The study of the change of the latter's social status is significant to completely understand the aspects of Milosevic's nationalism.

Contrary to other ex-communist states, where the collapse of regimes was accompanied by an anti-communist revolution in the mentality of the re- traditionalisation, Milosevic established a "new-old party" (Bijelic 2006: pp.288-290). As has already been seen, Milosevic maintained some elements of his left traditional family when he underlined their nationalistic characteristics. Biljana Bijelic presents some characteristics of Milosevic's nationalism as being kinship, family and the patriarchic culture camouflaged by the political practice of socialism (Bijelic 2006: pp.288-290). It is easily understood that many of the characteristics shared a connection with gender relations in society. To historically understand the role of women one should comment on the women under the services of the state. The change of the regime had a crucial effect on the women's status quo. Dealing with the economic crisis, women were called by the state to actively participate in the renaissance of the state. Now, their role was restricted to the private sphere or fulfilling the role of motherhood (Bijelic 2006: pp.288-290). To avoid misunderstanding the family values as fundamental, cultural values were basic for the communist regime, too. Still, the radical change was the nationalist and conservative injection during the extreme poverty, which caused an increase of the incidents of domestic violence or discrimination against women in the workplace (Bijelic 2006: p.294). This nationalistic mentality was represented by a xenophobic madness, mirrored in the role of women, blaming them for their weakness to fulfill their supposed destiny. To be more specific, the high birth rates among Muslim and Kosovar Albanians became a threat for the Serbs and Serbian women looked unable to accomplish the value of motherhood, especially during wartime. Extensive militarisation made women disappear from the public scene. The striking exception, as Biljana Bijelic presents it, is the paradox of converting the "one man rule" to "one couple rule" through the active participation of Mira Markovic, Milosevic's wife. Her role was multiple and introduced of a specific role model for women under her husband's regime, that wanted to maintain the polemic tones high. Mass militarisation is one of the reasons why the role of women was underestimated or limited to specific actions. Biljana Bijelic added two other causes as well. The first one is the inability of the previous regime to provoke radical changes and secure the existence of women in every social field, and the second one is the importance of their Serbian traditional value. The patriarchal model was rooted and one of the institutions which promoted it was the Church which occupied a significant role in Milosevic's nationalism. 30

V. Religion, Nationalism and the God-Given Right

To begin with, the role of the Church and its effect on the national struggles against the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans is worth mentioning. The millet system used religion as the defining factor for the categorisation of the people in the Ottoman Empire. It also provided the religious leader with privileges and turned the religious institutions into powerful sources of culture. Under its auspices the educational system was organised, based mainly on religious texts. However, under the Ottoman Empire each minority's religious and ethnic education system acted as a source of nationalistic ideas. Taking into account nationalism as a modern phenomenon, one concludes in the paradox of modernity. I argue that a traditional institution, like the Church, introduces society with a modern phenomenon, in this case, nationalism. One of the two striking examples is the Greek nationalism, a religious nationalism instead of an ethnic nationalism. The Church succeeded in keeping the Greek language and customs alive. Simultaneously, the Greeks of the Diaspora tried to import the ideas of enlightenment in a society made conservative and traditional due to the profound impact of the Church on it. The second example of this modern paradox belongs to the area of the ex-Yugoslavia. The Macedonian nationalism is a result of the actions of the two rival Churches of Bulgaria and Greece.25 It is obvious that there is a link between nationalism and religion. The most intriguing point of Yugoslavia, except for the co-existence of different national identities, is the co-existence of three different religious groups - the Catholics, the Orthodox and the Muslims. If religions are taken into account as the source of cultural elements, this might lead to conflicts between the groups.

However this fact creates a plethora of questions. The question here is whether the conflicts which were promoted by the Serbian nationalism are a result of the strong religious element. If that is true, why did this only become obvious during Milosevic's era and in this form of nationalism instead of leading to violent conflicts during the years of the federal state? Which is the role of the Church during these years and which are the changes which it brought to society? If an alliance between the clergy and Milosevic's regimes are taken under consideration, how is that any different from the society in which the vision for Kosovo is the same with the leadership of Serbia? Therefore, finding answers to these questions is necessary to analyse the correlation between the Orthodox Church and Milosevic's governance as well as its effect on the Serbian nationalism of the era.

25 See Victor Roudometof's Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question. 31

1. The Serbian Orthodox Church Throughout History

The main theme of this thesis is Serbian nationalism in Milosevic's era when the demands for Kosovo were a part of a nationalist imperialistic political agenda. Nevertheless, before analysing the action of the Orthodox Church in both practical and ideological levels, it would be valuable to delve into the history of the role of this institution. Thus, the evolution of the relationship between the central government and the clergy would be clarified, as would be the relationship between the new form of Serbian nationalism and the Orthodox Church.

In the book by Sabrina P. Ramet Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic there is an interesting chronology of this issue. She mentions that, before the rise of Milosevic in government, the status quo of the Serbian Orthodox Church was changed and it gained more benefits because its position had been minimised during the Communist era (Ramet 2006: pp.100-103). Tito's communist regime conceived religious differences as unable to aid the plan for the unification of the national groups under the federal Yugoslav state. Under these circumstances, the role of the Church was not dominant. Contrary to that, rival Churches, like the Croatian or Macedonian Church, showed marked development during the communist era. Even though its importance or actions did not vanish, its stance was far from the glorious past. According to the author, the Church was dominant and independent from the central governance in the old Kingdom of Serbia. Furthermore, it managed to confront ideas opposite to its actions and fully incorporate them (Ramet 2006: pp.100-103). In the constitution of 1903, Orthodoxy was established as the official and mandatory religion for Serbs. This privileged status was maintained during the first unification of South Slavs as the "Kingdom of Yugoslavia". That status quo satisfied the major demand which was the unification of the nations. This also pointed towards a dominant unified Serbian Orthodox Church (Ramet 2006: pp.100-103).

The important role that it had enjoyed in the past made the Church a symbol of Serbian culture not only in the eyes of the flock but also to their opponents during the WWII. This continued to be the aim of the attacks of the most aggressive violent form of Croatian nationalism, the Ustaše. Hence, the Church shares the same vision as the Partisan Serbian nationalism during the war against Croatia. However, the mentality behind the vision was different. As Sabrina P Ramet mentions, for the clergy the Resistance was a struggle "against traitorous Croats and imperialistic Nazis" (Ramet 2006: pp.107-108). She describes that the war for the Communists was a "national liberation struggle" (Ramet 2006: pp.107-108). It was obvious that the rhetoric of the Serbian nationalism of the era shares the Marxist ideology of the Partisans, who understood the war as a social revolution. To my mind, it is not a hyperbole to mention that, for the Partisans, the Church was an illustration of the opposite mentality of Serbian nationalism from the side of Chetniks. The author mentions that "Serbian nationalism which has always been close to the heart of the Serbian Church 32 was seen by Communists not merely as an archenemy of the new Yugoslavia, but even as enemy of the Serbian people itself" (Ramet 2006: pp.107-108).

During the communist governance the complete secularisation of society did not take place. There is no doubt that the power of the Church has decreased, but has never vanished. In some cases instead, the Church as an institution acted as the channel of communication with other communist states with strong religious institutions. The Church tried to preserve its power in various ways, such as the creation of associations and efforts for international regime cooperation. However, cases such as the development of the Macedonian Orthodox Church or the disagreement about the national policies in Kosovo are the quintessence of the above statement. The Serbian Church did not abandon its vision about nationalism, but acted as an oppositional nationalist institution.26 More specifically, the criticism about the decentralisation of the state and the concessions in Kosovo was sharp, and embraced the group of intellectuals who supported Milosevic. This is the reason why this thesis needs to refer to these events, seeing that the Orthodox Church vision is fundamental for the era which is presently examined.

2. Rehabilitating the Church

The governments after Tito's death tried a re-approach the Church until the rise of Milosevic when it was recognised as his greatest ally. Sharing a similar vision for the superior role of the Serbs to the other nations of ex-Yugoslavia, the Church tried to cover with its cloak the imperialistic policy of Milosevic's agenda. Not only did Milosevic's construction programmes extend the presence of the religious temples, but also the religious community, once restricted by the Communist governance, succeeded to regain its role as the representative of the Serbian nation. However some questions arise. First of all, in which level is the turn to religion accepted by the civil society? Moreover, how strong was the cultural injection with which the Church provided the Serbian nationalism in order to mobilise people to participate in the war and, thus, ethically legitimise genocide?

The reason why the role of the Church was previously extensively presented, was to showcase how deeply it was rooted in the Serbian culture. The myths and the legends are correlated with the Orthodox heritage. Thus, many theorists tended to search the cause of the war in the religion after the breakup of Yugoslavia. Samuel Huntington in his book Clash of Civilisations,27 tried to analyse the conflicts in the area of the Balkans within this framework. Close to that perspective, Tonny Knudsen and Carsten Laustsen presented Anzulovic's view, who put the blame of the violent

26 See Sabrina P. Ramet's Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics. 27See Σάμιουελ Χάντιγκτον Η σύγκρουση των πολιτισμών και ο ανασχηματισμός της παγκόσμιας τάξης. 33 actions on the religious struggle against the non-pious (Knudsen and Laustsen 2006: p.28). Nonetheless, these approaches did not utterly reflect reality.

Primarily, there was a long-term cohabitation of the different religious groups, a co-existence that did not necessarily equal conflict. In addition to that, the differences and conflicts were different from genocide. Furthermore, the decrease of the Orthodox effect on society during the communist regime was still present amongst people and the national vision of the Church and Milosevic did not totally touch Serbs. To be more specific, Knudsen and Laustsen state that the Serbs were the least religious among the Yugoslavs according to surveys conducted throughout the 1980s. That was something which did not change during the revival in the 1990s. Sabrina Ramet mentions that: "[t]he Serbian Othodox Church would like very much to play a greater role in Serbian society, but a 1994 survey found that only percent of women and 37 percent of men in Serbia considered themselves religious[...] supporters of Milosevic...only 42 percent were believers" (Knudsen and Laustsen 2006: p.258). Also, the Church acted as the bridge of communication and support between Serbian leadership and that of other religious states, such as Greece. However, it is wrong to underestimate its presence. In many cases, the Orthodox doctrine was the cohesive element among the Serbs. Firstly, the national non-believing opponents understand the meaning for a Serbian identity and religious temples became a target for violent actions. This fact strengthened the feeling of defense within civil society. Secondly, the regime formulated the atmosphere for the Islamic threat which correlated with Bosnia and Kosovo. For years, Muslims maintained a non-aggressive position and gained a beneficial environment for all religious groups from the Communist regimes. They managed to have intense presence in the media. Preporod, Glas koncila and Pravoslavilje are some examples of newspapers which intensely - or not - defended the Muslim community in Bosnia or Kosovo. The policy of the decentralisation was a tool to restrict the religious demands to reach an ethnic level. Nevertheless, this fact was an open wound which came into light during the revised nationalism of Milosevic, since these amendments in the character of the state weakened the Serbs.

If one believes, though, that the Church is only a channel of communication or a defender of some traditional elements in society during a period of threat from foreign religions, it would still fail to explain the way in which nationalism can integrate the religion and succeed in the mass mobilisation of a said society. This would only stand in a mixture of national heroic culture with religious claims, leading to the undeniable God-given right (Ramet 2006: p.28). The legends and religion are elements of the glorious past, which surface in modernity through nationalism which, in its own turn, tries to see and revise the past in the modern means it has obtained. Especially during a period where society searches for its cohesive elements after the corruption of the federal state, the myth and revised history as measured by the state are burdened with this responsibility. The most striking example of a legend which supported the imperialistic plans is that of the Battle of Kosovo. According to this, prince Lazar decided to become a martyr and not a traitor and defend the earthly 34 kingdom, but he also gained a position in the kingdom of God as a prize for his sacrifice. This battle was not only against the Turks, but also against the Muslim non- believers. In this case, Serbian nationalism tried to revise history in order to incorporate it, thus formulating a framework for the Albanian national identity as religious or they were mobilised by Muslim fundamentalists against the Serbs of Kosovo (Knudsen and Laustsen 2006: p.30). Therefore, as a fundamental characteristic of religion, nationalism forms the pattern of victimisation and the revenge for the first "genocide". Obviously, the other side did not agree with that interpretation, and supports its descent from the Illyrians, a myth whose presence dates back to the 6th century. For the Albanians the only cohesive element is their language (Rrapaj and Kolasi 2013: pp.185-228), while their religion is Albanianism (Knudsen and Laustsen 2006: p.30). Taking into account that the identity-building project concerns a divided nation, an education by three different educational- religious systems focusing on language could only convince people of unification, while at the same time, it would mobilise them.

Consequently, what did religion mean for the Serbs? Knudsen and Laustsen used the term "national civil religion" (Knudsen and Laustsen 2006: p.28). The term was firstly introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his book Contrat Social. The two authors presented different approaches towards the term, with Rober Bellah's being better suited for the present case study (Knudsen and Laustsen 2006: p.28). As mentioned above, Milosevic understated the value of the Church as used by the religious elements to succeed in the national goal. However, one should not minimise or degrade the role of religion. Nationalism revised the history and re-read the past and tradition through its own filter. The Church as a traditional institution needed to be modernised to assure its survival in modern societies. It maintained the oppositional vision for a national future during the Communist regime, while it preserved the traditional elements. Therefore, religion is a crucial part of the doctrine of nationalism and not merely an institutional ally, even though nationalism should revise it and put it in each framework, as was the case throughout Serbian history.

D. CONCLUSION

To summarise and to give an answer to the reasearch question about the continuity and the relationship between the Yugoslav and Serbian identities we ought to present which characteristics of the Yugoslav identity were eventually maintained in the Serbian one. This fact, though, does not mean that there is a continuity between the two. Any traces of continuity are to be attributed to the aforementioned plasticity by which nationalism is characterised, but does not, at the same time, lessen its being a cohesive ideology, as was proven in the present case study. It has been shown in this paper that Milosevic's governance, in an ideological level and in many cases in practice, operated by combining three separate fields that seem quite incongruous. First, he maintained the communist characteristics which are connected with the Serbian culture and his profile as a charismatic leader. Second, the oppositional voices for the economic policy of the communist regime were transformed into a policy of its own, as was the underestimation of the Serbian community in the federal state after 1974, leading to other nationalities being targeted instead. The revived system of governance, which was a result of the pressure of the other nationalities, and the enhancement of the autonomous provinces with significant Serbian population, was deemed a territorial loss by the Serbian community. Therefore, in order to face that Milosevic searched for the support of the traditional elements of the society, which shared the same vision of the loss of territory, but were, however, opposing to the communist legacy. He found strong support by Church, that provided the state with the myths and legends which justified the irredentist policy and enforced the national identity, while building the nation state, thus utilising a third field that was deemed disparate to the others. Those three fields can be seen as different, yet they were all integral parts of Milosevic's nationalism. The intellectuals acted as tailors, weaving together those incongruous elements and, hence, justifying the plasticity of nationalism without weakening its power and impact on the people. This verifies the lack of continuity of the Yugoslav identity to the Serbian one, even though some of the traits that found the Yugoslav identity, such as the maintenance of a number of features descending from their communist legacy, are kept intact. The Kosovo question, subsequently, showcases the effort of the Serbian identity to become synonymous to the Yugoslav one. What is, therefore, generated from the above is that the revived nationalism revises history and poses the Serbian identity as dominant over the rest. This is evident in the Kosovo policies as well, where an autonomous Yugoslav province is being forcefully given a Serbian identity. In any case, it is inarguable that Kosovo is fought for by both Serbia and Yugoslavia - despite the difference in their visions - and acts, therefore, as a common ground for the two identities.

Nevertheless, the amendments and the final constitution of 1974, which undermined the Serbian role, initiated the conversation on national policy. These events led to a discussion over the national identity, however the balance between the 36 unified Yugoslav idea and the national Serbian identity, connected with the federal system, was fragile. The changes which led to the loss of territory and the increase of the Albanian voices, which wanted to affect the evolving Kosovar national identity, evoked the myths, legends and the glorious past of the Serbian battles against the opponents which were, as a majority, Muslims. These religious aspects was strongly supported by the Church. However, in no case was there a religious nationalism. Having previously seen that religious faith was diminished after the communist years and that the Serb were the least religious in Yugoslavia, the Church acted as an ideological provider and it did not resemble other religious nationalisms in the Balkans, such as Greek one. The turning point for the process of nationalism is the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution and Milosevic's rise in power. After that, with the change of the political staff, Yugoslavia officially turned nationalism as its proponent ideology in its states and, in the case of Serbia, it led to the synthesis of the elements which were part of the revived Serbian nationalism. The dominance of nationalism is obvious in its general acceptance from the entirety of the Serbian political system, whose role was restricted to the criticism of the governmental methods but totally supported its irredentist goals. Obviously, there were anti-nationalist voices around, which were, however, either outnumbered or unable to create a unified anti- governance, anti-nationalist front.

To conclude, it is significant to analyse this case in order to highlight the way in which Milosevic mobilised the crowd. I argue that it is not as important to emphasise on the number of people who accepted the message of the revived nationalism, as its significant effect on Serbian national identity is worth-mentioning, since the incidents of the war connected with the ideal of national guilt. At this point it is clear why the Serbian revived nationalism was correlated with the Kosovo question, showing why this paper focused on this aspect to better understand this nationalism. The strong militarisation of society turned citizens into state militants with every member's abilities, as were seen by the governments, being used by the state to accomplish national goals. These facts cultivate an image of a militant, aggressive, nationalist, irredentist, patriarchic society. These adjectives did not come from a psychological approach, but the change of the collective identity and the dismissal of the collective guilt was a social target. As Eric D. Gordy mentions, quoting Mileta Prodanović and other intellectuals' work, there was an effort towards a new patriotic voice and the change of the international opinion of the Serbs. The relationship between Serbia and the foreign factor was complicated and, in many cases, enhanced the rhetoric of victimisation. This also is correlated with the general disappointment of the Serbs towards the national and international institutions, as a survey proved in 1996 (Gordy 2006: p.170). However, the issue of guilt is crucial and it is what gave space for future analysis of the Serbian nationalism. The search of truth and responsibility within a weak bureaucratic system made the connection of guilt and national identity worth analysing. The heritage of the revived nationalism and the sentiment of guilt which is included in it, lead to a soon-to-be-revised Serbian identity a few years after the creation of the nation-state and the necessary 37 abandonment of its previous approach. The revived nationalism of Milosevic was correlated with the Kosovo question and the vision of the Greater Serbia in general. As long as the issue of the Greater Serbia remains open, the past will never cease to affect it. The heritage of Milosevic's nationalism and the way in which this approach is, in some degree, included in current national policy could be analysed. Its occurrence is attributed to Milosevic's era being part of the legacy of the nation state and included in its history. Therefore a new nationalism would, probably, use it in a new revision of history as is always the case with nationalism, which revises history and re-imagines the communities it concerns.

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Σ. Χάντιγκτον (2017) Η σύγκρουση των πολιτισμών και ο ανασχηματισμός της παγκόσμιας τάξης, Αθήνα: Πατάκης.