Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

1 SERBIA ing to the closure of several newspapers, notably of the most prominent indepen- IHF FOCUS: The NATO bombing cam- dent political daily in Serbia, Nasa Borba. paign; restrictions on human rights relat- The law severely restricted freedom of ex- ed to the “state of war”; freedom of ex- pression and the media in 1999. pression and the media; peaceful assem- bly; independence of the judiciary; fair The 1998 University Act was part of a gen- trial and detainees’ rights; draft evaders; eral campaign of increasing state control ill-treatment by law enforcement officials; over all the institutions. This had two extra-judicial killings and summary jus- short-term goals: elimination of “inade- tice; security services and right to priva- quate” professors and other education pro- cy; protection of national minorities; free- fessionals from university, and forcing the dom of movement; protection of refugees students to renounce any political activi- and displaced persons; restrictions on uni- ties and engagement. Indicative of the versity independence; social and econom- regime’s intentions was the statement of ic rights. Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party, printed in Glas javnosti2: “We put things in order at the universities, In 1999, Serbian authorities, unsettled by we did the same with the media, and we the massive civil protests in 1996/1997 intend to do the same with the judiciary. (triggered by local election rigging) used With this step by step approach, every- mounting repression as the only response thing in Serbia will be put in order.” to widespread dissatisfaction of citizens. Despite the desire for change among the The atmosphere created in 1998 contin- public, there were indications of a signifi- ued through 1999. At the outset of NATO cant loss of faith in the opposition, as re- intervention (24 March 1999) in the war in flected in poor attendance at the Alliance Kosovo, in addition to fear of bombard- for Changes rallies. The inability of both ments, people feared mostly the escalation the regime and opposition to address key of repression by Serbian authorities and a issues and their focus on either the preser- deteriorating situation in the post-war peri- vation or take over of power plunged Ser- od. These fears appeared to have been bia into a turbulent year of repression and fully justified. Increased repression was violence. presented by the Serbian government as justified in a struggle against “aggressors During 1998, the early stages of the con- and domestic traitors,” and to prevent the flict with increasing government brutality, outbreak of civil war. Kosovo enjoyed both the public and tacit backing of almost the entire political scene The pro-government media were tasked in Serbia. Also in 1998, the adoption of the with shaping perceptions of the war, disre- Public Information Law underscored the garding the information from independent, fact that Serbia was devoid of political ethnic Albanian and international sources alternatives or of genuine pluralism, and and opting instead for strident rhetoric de- facilitated a crackdown on the media lead- monizing Serbia’s “enemies,” both domes-

1 Based on Serbian Helsinki Committee, Report on the Increasing Repression in Serbia, November, and updates. 2 1 March 1999

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tic and foreign. Although during the war expression related to the “state of war,” almost all the media used this approach created an atmosphere of persecution and (associated with economic successes – the denunciation comparable to the Soviet Banja Luka-based weekly Reporter experi- purges under Stalin, adding to the break- enced a circulation boom during the war; down of Serbian society. its 10,000 copies were sold every day on the streets of Belgrade), when the war Misconduct by law enforcement officials ended, the approach to reporting greatly and harassment of individuals continued. changed. The majority of leading dailies – The practice by law enforcement officials Glas javnosti, Blic, Danas, and Vecernje of summoning people for “informative Novosti – started reporting in a more ob- talks” included detention of citizens by the jective manner. A number of local TV and police, subjection to physical violence, radio stations also followed the post-war threats, and demands that they denounce trend. As the media displayed more objec- other citizens. An action named the tivity and professionalism, the authorities “check on citizens’ residence permits” grew more repressive. As a result, dracon- seemed designed to intimidate those citi- ian fines, bans on certain issues and intim- zens who were not politically organized. idation of journalists became more com- Police were empowered to enter the mon. homes of all citizens. Whether this initia- tive by the Ministry of Interior aimed at A series of decrees passed in the context of regulating the registers of military con- Serbian authorities declaring a “state of scripts, listing all refugees or simply intim- war” and beginning in March 1999, fur- idating citizens remained unclear. ther restricted many rights and freedoms of Serbian citizens, creating new “sub-legal” During the war, a decision on the manda- instruments of control available to the Ser- tory possession of IDs by all persons over bian authorities, and affecting freedom of 14 years of age was enforced. This seemed movement, the rights of detainees, the aimed at enabling the state to prepare nec- right to privacy, labor rights and freedom essary mobilization data for children who of expression. would in three or four years’ time be ready for military service. War was also a pretext for the Serbian au- thorities to harass its opponents through During 1999, violent repression in the the judicial system. Trials of deserters were form of assaults on political opponents, clearly aimed at intimidating citizens, journalists and other citizens increased. It since figures indicated good mobilization escalated during the spring war, and diver- results. In Serbia 20,000 young men faced sified and grew more organized in the charges of desertion, while the figure in post-war period. Participants in the Al- Montenegro was 14,0003, and group trials liance for Change protests were beaten by replaced the trials of individuals held dur- uniformed police, plainclothes officers, or ing the wars with Slovenia, Croatia and unidentified men dressed alike and armed Bosnia-Herzegovina. These, combined with baseball bats. A number of deaths of with the de facto reintroduction of legisla- prominent figures, both those once con- tion restricting freedom of opinion and sidered close to the Serbian authorities

3 Meanwhile, Montenegro adopted the Amnesty Act at the end of 1999.

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and political opponents, may have been military value with a substantial risk of politically motivated assassinations.4 An- civilian deaths, such as the headquarters other possible cause may have been dis- of Radio and Television Serbia (RTS) in putes over control of the Mafia-style illegal Belgrade. HWR concluded that NATO ac- trade in Serbia or over import-export busi- tions had in these cases violated interna- ness controlled by state-owned compa- tional humanitarian law. Infrastructural nies. None of these cases had been solved damage done in Serbia by NATO bombing nor any indictments filed by the end of affected power supplies, access to fresh 1999. water and caused environmental pollu- tion, all having serious consequences for The NATO Bombing Campaigns civilians in Serbia.

On 24 March, NATO launched a humani- Restrictions on tarian intervention in the FRY with the stat- Human Rights Associated ed aim of preventing further large-scale with the “State of War”6 human rights abuses and killings of Koso- vo Albanians by Serbian forces in the province. This aim was to be accom- The adoption of the Decree on the Procla- plished by a high-tech air campaign in mation of a State of War on 24 March by which civilian casualties in Serbia and the federal government established the Kosovo were to be minimized. Targets of basis for passing a spate of decrees re- the bombing were to be exclusively of mil- stricting freedoms and rights of citizens. It itary significance. However, in February also marked the beginning of a genuine 2000, Human Rights Watch (HWR) pub- “sub-legal” repression. Just two weeks lished documented evidence that the num- later, the Decree on Enforcement of the ber of incidents causing civilian deaths criminal proceedings act during a state of (about 500 deaths in total) was at least war7 was adopted on 4 April. Provisions of three times higher than the estimate of- the act constituted changes to the criminal fered by the U.S. Defense Department.5 proceedings act in force, directly restricted The report identified four areas in which freedoms and rights of citizens envisaged NATO fell short of its obligation to mini- by the act and the republican and federal mize civilian deaths. These included: the constitutions, and determined terms of de- use of cluster bombs in populated areas; tention, bodies authorizing detention and attacks in populated areas during the day prerogatives of “competent bodies.” when civilians were likely to be present; attacks on mobile targets without ensuring The trend of “sub-legal” regulating of they were military in nature; and its deci- rights and freedoms of citizens continued sion to strike some targets of little or no with the adoption of a spate of decrees by

4 See the case of Slavko Curuvija, in Freedom of Expression and the Media and Extrajudicial Killings and Assaults on Political Opponents. 5 Human Rights Watch, “New Figures on Civilian Deaths in Kosovo War,” 7 February 2000, and “Pentagon Report Whitewashes Civilian Deaths in Yugoslavia,” 8 February 2000. 6 See also IHF statement, “Serbian Government Must Stop Violating Free Expression,” 28 January 1999. 7 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 21/99.

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Serbian President Milan Milutinovic in preliminary investigation against Zarko April.8 These further restricted detainees’ Jokanovic, vice president of Nova rights, increased police and security ser- Demokratija Party. The court was to estab- vice powers, and encroached further on lish whether Jokanovic had committed a labor rights. criminal offense under article 218 of the Serbian penal code (spreading false news The provisions of these decrees were in and misinformation) during his 3 Septem- contravention of the constitution of Serbia ber press conference, by saying that Presi- and freedoms, and rights and duties of in- dent Milan Milutinovic had fallen out of dividuals and citizens related to the invio- grace with the ruling parties. lable right to freedom (article 15), guaran- teed freedom of movement and residence ■ Zvonimir Zivanovic was sentenced to (article 17), inviolability of secrecy of let- five months’ imprisonment after being ters and other communication means (arti- found guilty of committing the criminal of- cle 19), guaranteed freedom of assembly fense of defamation of the FRY, under arti- without approval of and previous applica- cle 157(1) of the penal code, by Svetlana tion to a competent body (article 43) and Djuric, a judge of the District Court in the right of a citizen to publicly criticize Sremska Mitrovica. In June 1999, Zi- the work of state bodies, organizations and vanovic had allegedly cursed President officials, for which he/she could not be Milosevic at his workplace, in the “Mitros” made subject to judicial and other legal meat processing plant in Sremska Mitrovi- proceedings (article 48). ca. After serving a month and a half in jail, he was released on a conditional discharge It was also significant that the Federal As- decision by the Supreme Court of Serbia. sembly, at the session of the Council of Citizens on 24 June, ruled on the suspen- ■ Biserka Apic, a Croat from Sremska sion of a state of war, thus confirming acts Mitrovica, accused of committing a crimi- adopted by the federal government during nal offense of defamation of the FRY, a state of war.9 Furthermore, a decree is- under article 157(1) of the penal code of sued by the president of Serbia on 15 July the FRY, was found guilty and sentenced established abolition of the 24 June de- to four months’ imprisonment (including crees.10 17 days in detention) in August 1999. She was convicted of “publicly slandering the Freedom of Expression and FRY President, Slobodan Milosevic, in the the Media business premises of the Sports Center ‘Pinki’ in Sremska Mitrovica.” Apic ap- Freedom of Expression pealed to the Supreme Court and the case was pending. ■ The First Municipal Public Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade on 10 September 1999 ■ The municipal misdemeanor judge in ordered the First Municipal Court to start Cacak sentenced Svetlana Eric, president

8 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 17/99, 7 April 1999. 9 Official Gazette of the FRY, No. 44/99, 25 June 1999. 10 Proclamation of Act on Confirmation of Decrees Adopted by President of Republic during a State of War. Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 33/99, 16 July 1999)

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of the municipal committee of the Civic and texts by radio and TV stations. Defiant Alliance of Serbia, to pay a fine for having media faced closure. A number of radio spoken publicly at rallies held during a stations and prominent newspapers imme- state of war in June 1999. diately faced problems, including Danas and Dnevni telegraf, and on 15 October Freedom of the Media 1998 Nasa Borba was temporarily banned (in fact the daily never again hit the news- Restrictions on freedom of the media were stands). On 20 October 1998, the afore- manifested in 1999 in the following ways: mentioned decree was covertly trans- bad working conditions; decrease in formed into the notorious Public Informa- salaries; appointments to non-existent and tion Law. inadequate posts, dismissals, and refusal of media directors to enforce judicial deci- Under the Public Information Law, any sions on the reinstatement of workers; re- legal charges laid by any physical or legal moving media from the register; suspen- person against any mass media could be sion of an already initiated or completed used as a pretext for its closure. Long property transformation; refusal to grant standing printed or electronic media could frequencies to the electronic media, or be closed down within 24 hours. The Pub- seizure of previously granted frequencies; lic Information Law not only restricted the bans on media operations (for example, freedom of expression, but its drastic under a Serbian government decree of Oc- penalties in fact abolished it. Arbitrary in- tober 1998); punishments under the public terpretations of generalized provisions and information act, including high fines and high fines enabled the regime to fully con- seizure of private property of owners and trol all media activity. Under the law, “at- chief editors of media organizations and of tempts to overthrow the constitutional the organizations’ property; detention of order” could be interpreted as, for exam- media editors; introduction of wartime ple, support for the opposition’s activities censorship during the NATO air cam- aimed at bringing about a change in polit- paign; criminal prosecution; and imprison- ical power. An owner or editor of a media ment of journalists; and the unsolved mur- institution could be sentenced to pay an der of Slavko Curuvija, founder and editor exorbitant fine ranging from 400,000 to of Dnevni telegraf and Evropljanin. 800,000 dinars (U.S.$ 33,000–66,000). Those journalists or editors who released The Public Information Law or wrote the “controversial” information faced fines of between 100,000 to The adoption of the Decree on Special 400,000 dinars (U.S.$ 8,300–33,300). Measures under Conditions of Threats by the NATO Armed Attacks by the republi- In the year which followed the adoption of can government on 8 October 1998 the law (to 1 November 1999) some 30 plunged the media into their most serious media were ordered to pay fines (some crisis yet. The decree banned publication were suspended) totaling 18 million dinars of “defeatist texts” by print media and re- (U.S.$ 1,5 million). Not only media pub- transmission of foreign media programs lished in Serbia were affected.11

11 Further information is available from the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

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Misuse of Other Legislation spectors closed down the Novi Sad-based Radio 021 and seized its transmitter, al- Enforcement of the Public Information Law legedly in response to non-payment of was not limited only to print media. In the broadcasting fees for February 1999. case of radio and TV, whose audiences outstripped the readerships of print media, ■ In early April, popular Belgrade radio the law was enforced in conjunction with station B92 was closed down. Its premises other legal provisions The Federal and equipment were “taken over” by the Telecommunications Ministry became the Youth Alliance of Belgrade, headed by responsible body for granting transmission Aleksandar Nikacevic, formally a frequencies. The worsening political situa- “founder” of the radio according to the tion in Kosovo in early 1999 and the start court register, although members of the of the NATO air campaign on 23 March Youth Alliance had had no involvement provided the authorities with a pretext to with the station’s activities. Radio B92 staff step up their crackdown on the non-gov- were ejected from the building and re- ernmental media. The case of Studio B is a fused access. At the beginning of April typical example of the direct enforcement 1999, programs were re-launched under of restrictive provisions of the Public Infor- the name of Radio B2-92, under the aus- mation Law, and other media are exam- pices of Radio Studio B. ples of its indirect enforcement. The combination of the Public Information ■ The city judge for misdemeanors sen- Law and other legal provisions was used to tenced Studio B and its editor-in-chief drastically reduce media freedoms, both Dragan Kojadinovic to a fine totaling where print and broadcast media were 150,000 dinars (U.S.$ 15,500) under arti- concerned. In some cases, as with Radio cle 69 of the law, and on the basis of the B92 above, this led to closure. charges laid by Brane Miljus. The latter laid charges against Studio B and its edi- ■ On 21 September, in the vicinity of tor-in-chief because of a statement given Sremska Raca, a van driver was detained by Biljana Plavsic in a live broadcast of the and 8,500 issues of Banja Luka magazine TV station on 23 March. Reporter seized by Serbian police because of “a suspected commission of a breach of ■ On 12 January, Federal Telecommuni- the symbol of the republic” under article cations Ministry inspectors checked the 157 of the penal code of the FRY. On 15 premises of public company, “Cacanski October, the Federal Ministry of the Interi- glas”, the founder of TV Cacak, and subse- or banned distribution of Reporter in the quently banned the latter’s programs due FRY. The decision was made in conformi- to “non-possession of a broadcasting li- ty with article 257(2) of the law on gener- cense”, while senior staff were threatened al administrative procedure, which laid with prosecution. The ban was imposed down that “a body which allows import despite the TV company’s timely applica- can revoke its decision if necessary.” tion to the ministry. Thereafter, the station managed to avoid closure due to public ■ In early October, the Commercial protests which followed the decision. Crimes Department of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior and financial police decided ■ On 25 March, during the air-raid alert, to seal the premises of daily Glas javnosti Federal Telecommunications Ministry in- and ban “ABC grafika” printing house

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from working, due to alleged operational published an advertisement announcing a negligence. The authorization of the finan- multi-media happening organized by the cial police to ban activities of a legal per- student movement “Otpor” in Novi Sad. son (company), under article 22(5.2) of the law on public revenues, set a legal prece- ■ With a financial crisis affecting Magyar dent. No indication was given of how the szo, Serbia’s only Hungarian language ban could be suspended. In this case, the daily, staff went on strike in March in joint enforcement of the aforementioned protest at the inadequate salaries (250 di- law and the Public Information Law made nars – U.S.$ 21 – a month) which were clear the Serbian authorities’ intention to being paid in arrears. Their requests for enforce drastic measures against “undesir- help were turned down by the debt-laden able” media while offering no legal pro- “Forum” holding corporation running the tection whatsoever to the media con- newspaper. Although staff claimed the cerned. newspaper could be financially viable without having to share the debt burden of Harassment of Journalists “Forum,” the Assembly of Vojvodina turned down the daily’s request to be The Public Information Law not only left granted independent legal status. its mark on the media as legal subjects, but also on many journalists, who became vic- The war and wartime censorship, as well tims of harassment, intimidation, and dis- as the draconian fines which (mainly pri- missals. According to the Independent vate) media had to pay, deepened the eco- Journalists’ Association of Serbia’s data, of nomic crisis in the mass media. A group of its 1,100 registered members, 70 percent younger editors and journalists, who were lost their jobs after the adoption of the law. generally considered the best generation The situation was equally bad in the state- of Belgrade journalists in the last decade, run media, which, during the war, fired or lost their jobs. In view of the stringent pro- sent on forced leave many staffers. visions of the Public Information Law, many media owners and journalists ■ On 30 September, police officers as- seemed unlikely to risk endangering the saulted participants of an Alliance for existence of their media and their own Change rally in Brankov calling for the res- livelihoods by writing about or broadcast- ignation of the FRY President Slobodan ing on “sensitive” issues in the future. Milosevic. Up to 30 demonstrators were reportedly beaten. Zoran Djindjic, presi- The law on criminal proceedings, under dent of the Democratic Party, Ljubomir which some journalists faced trial, be- Maddzar and Goran Milicevic, professors longed to an indirect repressive arsenal of of Belgrade University economics faculty, the regime. journalists Julijana Mojsilovic (Reuters), Slavica Lekic (Reporter), Aleksandra ■ On 18 January, Nikola Djuric, owner of Rankovic (Beta), Imre Sabo (photographer the banned City Radio in Nis was sen- of Danas), CNN and other television crews tenced to two months’ imprisonment, or were also beaten. conditional one year in jail by Nis Munic- ipal Court. He was found guilty of unau- ■ In late October, Darinka Nikolic, editor thorized possession and use of a radio sta- of the television supplement of Novi Sad tion, under article 219(1) of the Serbian daily Dnevnik was dismissed because she penal code. Although the Telecommuni-

438 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

cations Ministry had repeatedly stated that invalidation of the Public Information Law, all stations could continue their work until submitted by MPs of the “Vojvodina coali- a final decision on frequency allocation tion,” on the grounds that “if the draft were was made, on 18 August 1998 the min- adopted, an important area of the legal istry's inspectors had banned City Radio, system would go unregulated.” seized its equipment and filed charges against Nikola Djuric. Use of the Media in Propaganda and Discrediting of Opponents ■ The public prosecutor filed misde- meanor charges against Dejan Anastasije- Throughout 1999, government representa- vic, a journalist with the weekly Vreme, tives regularly used media appearances to because of his text headlined “Bloody demonize the independent media, NGOs Weekend in Drenica Area,” published on and their political opponents. 17 March 1998. The text described a mas- sacre of Albanian civilians in Kosovo vil- ■ At a press conference held on 12 Janu- lage Likosani, in the Drenica area. Anas- ary, the joint Vice-Presidents of the Ser- tasijevic stated that during the hearing, the bian government – Ratko Markovic (Ser- investigating judge of Belgrade’s First Mu- bian Socialist Party), Milovan Bojic (Unit- nicipal Court told him he was charged ed Yugoslav Left) and Vojislav Seselj (Ser- with spreading misinformation, distur- bian Radical Party) – presented a docu- bance of public opinion and obstruction of ment allegedly drafted by the CIA and the work of state bodies, and faced a jail sen- Institute for Peace, in fact a document of tence of up to three years if found guilty. the U.S. Institute for Peace, suggesting the Anastasijevic thereafter left the country. scope of U.S. financial assistance to be of- fered to the Serbian non-governmental ■ On 8 March, Krsto Bobot, judge of Bel- media, trade-unions and NGOs. The text grade’s First Municipal Court, sentenced was presented as “proof” that independent Slavko Curuvija, owner of Dnevni telegraf, media and NGOs were foreign mercenar- and the daily’s journalists Srdjan Jankovic ies and traitors. and Zoran Lukovic each to five months’ imprisonment under article 218 of the Ser- ■ President of the Serbian Radical Party bian penal code (spreading of false news and Vice President of the republican gov- and misinformation). The journalists were ernment, Vojislav Seselj, told a 30 Sep- found guilty of “exposing false claims” in tember press conference that “the police the article “The Murdered Man Criticized appropriately intervened against the oppo- Milovan Bojic,” published in the 5 De- sitions’ followers at the Alliance for cember 1998 issue of Dnevni telegraf, im- Change rally on 30 September in Bel- plying that the vice-president of the gov- grade.” When asked about the beating of ernment of Serbia and director of Dedinje journalists, Seselj retorted that “it is an oc- Cardiovascular Institute, Milovan Bojic, cupational hazard ... and ... some journal- had been directly responsible for the mur- ists really yearn for the batons ... the BETA der of Dr. Aleksandar Popovic, Head of agency reporter, Aleksandra Rankovic, Dedinje Cardiovascular Institute, after was hit accidentally. She probably be- Popovic had accused Bojic of corruption. haved like a hooligan. It surprises me that she was not beaten up by the police ten In mid-October, the government of the Re- years ago”. public of Serbia rejected a draft law on the

439 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

■ The wife of President Milosevic, Mirjana ■ Misdemeanor proceedings against Zoran Markovic, went further in an October in- Zivkovic, Mayor of Nis, were underway as terview to Famiglia cristiana, a Vatican of this writing. He was charged with speak- weekly: “... Zoran Djindjic is spearheading ing at a demonstration on 13 July in Nis the NATO collaborationists ... he not only without previously registering the rally with stated that Serbia should be bombarded a competent body, and with having called another three weeks to make Belgrade on citizens to march with him to the district submit, but also helped our enemy deter- court building in which Ivan Novkovic, for- mine their bombardment targets in Ser- mer tape-editor of Leskovac TV, was serv- bia.” In a 20 October press conference, ing his prison sentence.12 Djindjic rejected the accusations and said that official harassment of the Serbian op- ■ On 21 June, police banned Serbian position had entered a new and dangerous refugees form Kosovo from holding a rally phase. in central Belgrade and ordered a 200- strong crowd to leave the Terazijska Peaceful Assembly cesma square. On 22 June, in a summary procedure, the Misdemeanor Court in Article 2 of the decree banning public ral- Belgrade sentenced Svetozar Fisic and lies during a state of war, issued by Serbian Slobodan Karleic, refugees from Prizren President Milan Milutinovic on 7 April, and organizers’ of the protest (Fisic was stipulated that “a public rally can be called also president of the municipal committee and held either anywhere outside or inside of the Democratic Party in Prizren) each to any building, irrespective of its character, 30 days in prison. On a count of violation only if it is previously approved by a com- of the decree on registration of residence petent body. Provisions of para.1 of this ar- during a state of war, they were each sen- ticle are not enforced when a rally is orga- tenced to 10 days’ imprisonment, and on a nized by a state body.” count of violation of the decree banning public rallies during a state of war, they Article 3 of the decree prescribed a were each sentenced to 20 days imprison- 200,000 dinars fine (U.S.$ 16,670) for a ment. legal person calling for, organizing or speaking at a public rally, which has not ■ Aldermen of the Associated Yugoslav been previously approved by an autho- Left and the Serbian Socialist Party in the rized body. The said offense, under para. 1 municipal assembly of Vrnjacka Banja, on of this article, also entailed a 10,000 dinar 5 November, decided that the Alliance for fine (U.S.$ 835) or imprisonment of up to Change had to pay 10,000 dinars (U.S.$ 60 days for a responsible legal person, and 835) to the Serbian authorities before any a 10,000 dinar fine (U.S.$ 835) or impris- public rally would be allowed. onment of up to 60 days for a physical per- son. The decree was clearly aimed at le- Independence of the Judiciary gitimizing all rallies stage-managed by the authorities, such as the rallies and concerts Unsurprisingly, the marked increase in re- in squares and on bridges protesting pressive use of the laws and decrees by the NATO intervention, and at banning all Serbian authorities resulted in increased other public demonstrations. pressure being brought to bear on the ju-

12 See also Fair Trial and Detainees’ Rights.

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diciary. Discontent among judges was ship of the association at staff meetings. known to be high, with many having They also said that those who admitted protested the rigging of the 1996 local membership of the association would be elections and thereafter offering silent re- immediately dismissed, as the nature of sistance to official Serbian policy. At- their functions precluded any political ac- tempts to form a professional association tivity. The Serbian Helsinki Committee for judges, free of party influence, brought noted that there was some irony in associ- members of the profession into conflict ation members being dismissed for al- with political leaders. legedly being politically active, when their accusers were all high-ranking members of On 17 February, the Supreme Court of Ser- the ruling parties (Minister Jankovic as a bia dismissed the appeal of the Associa- member of the Central Committee of the tion of Judges of Serbia against a decision United Yugoslav Left, Balsa Govedarica, of the Ministry of the Interior in Serbia president of the Supreme Court of Serbia, banning the association from entering the as a senior official of the Serbian Socialist register of civil associations and conse- Party). quently obtaining legal person status. The Supreme Court’s decision was justified on ■ Milan Stojanovic, president of the Mu- the grounds that judges were not entitled nicipal Court in Leskovac, at a 20 October to form civil associations and that retired staff meeting about “the political activities judges could not be members of a profes- of judges,” urged his colleagues to admit sional association. The president of the or refute their membership of the Associa- Supreme Court, at a staff meeting of the tion of Judges of Serbia. He added that Belgrade District Court, explained his own “judges [who were] members of the asso- position on the issue: “There is no need for ciation, would be dismissed”. the establishment of a separate association of judges...for only a small group of judges ■ Sasa Obradovic, a judge of the Munici- want to form such an association with a pal Court in Valjevo, submitted his resig- view to representing their political engage- nation on 6 October in writing to the As- ment as a non-party one.” sembly of Serbia, asking for the accep- tance thereof in conformity with article 45 Nonetheless, the Association of Judges of the law on courts of law. The following continued its activities. They reported that reasons for his resignation were given in judges faced constant pressure and that the letter: “... collapse of morale and basic municipal court judges’ salaries were un- social values and subjugation of courts to acceptably low (with a monthly pay equal exclusive party interests has led to degra- to two days’ pay for an unskilled worker), dation of our judiciary, and the criminal which had accelerated the decline of pro- courts, under degraded conditions of crim- fessionalism. inal and legal protection of life, freedom and property, have lost a part of their in- Republican Justice Minister Dragoljub herent legitimacy.” Jankovic accused the association of having a political rather than professional basis Fair Trial and Detainees’ Rights and both Jankovic and president of the Supreme Court, Balsa Govedarica, called War-time legislation provided for viola- on the courts to demand that all judges de- tions of both international and FRY inter- clare their membership or non-member- nally-agreed standards of detainees’ rights,

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including arbitrary arrests, too long deten- cessitates it, the minister can sentence to tion periods, and denying access to legal detention a person endangering the repub- counsel. lic. This protective measure can last as long as there are reasons for it, to a maxi- Article 8(2) of the decree on enforcement mum of 60 days. After that, the judicial of the Criminal Proceedings Act during a bodies are authorized to deal with such a state of war, adopted on 4 April by the fed- person.” eral government, stipulated that detention ordered by an investigative judge, public ■ Ivan Novkovic, a technician at a local prosecutor or Interior Ministry body could TV station in Leskovac, was sentenced to last for up to 30 days. This amendment al- 30 days in prison on 5 July, under the law lowed the police to keep individuals in on public assembly of citizens for “running custody for up to 30 days without being in a videotape critical of the government,” possession of a legal document issued by which allegedly encouraged 20,000 peo- an investigative judge, public or state pros- ple to stage an anti-regime protest. Accord- ecutor. Thereupon criminal proceedings ing to Novkovic’s lawyer, “the defendant against that person could be instituted. Ar- did not have a defense counsel during the ticle 8 constituted an amendment to article trial, and was not informed about his rights. 196(3) of the criminal proceedings law, He was sentenced on the basis of testi- prescribing that detention determined by monies of two Leskovac policemen who the police could last only three days fol- failed to appear in the court and whose lowing arrest. Furthermore, article 8(3) of statements were not read out in court.” the decree stipulated that detention deter- mined by the police or the council of the A further problem was constituted by the first-instance court (article 23.6) could be continuing detention in Serbian prisons of extended by up to three months. Decisions at least 2,066 ethnic Albanians from Koso- extending the period of detention by a fur- vo, both combatants and civilians, taken by ther five months could be made by the Serbian forces to Serbia during the war in council of a higher court. The decree pro- Kosovo and in many cases, at the point of visions therefore appeared to allow for a withdrawal from Kosovo in June. Human person to be kept in custody for nine rights groups attempting to help prisoners months after the filing of an indictment or and their families achieve their release crit- suspension of criminal prosecution. Article icized the Military-Technical Agreement 8(3) constituted an amendment to article which marked the end of the NATO-Yu- 197 of the criminal proceedings law goslav war for making no provisions for the which stipulated a maximum detention cases of these prisoners.13 period during preliminary investigation detention of six months. Draft Evaders

Article 3 of the decree on internal affairs According to unofficial data on offenses during a state of war, adopted by the Ser- related to military service, 20,000 pro- bian government on 7 April, prescribed ceedings were either instituted or complet- that “when the defense of the republic ne- ed in Serbia, and 14,000 in Montenegro.14

13 See Kosovo section for further details. 14 Although the Montenegrin authorities passed an amnesty law for deserters in late 1999, this was not recognized by the FRY authorities in Belgrade.

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All the aforementioned cases, according to and that it would be difficult to stop their Ratko Korlat, acting president of the mili- incursion.” tary court, were in fact proceedings taken over from all the military courts opera- ■ A Democratic Party city counselor in tional in Serbia during the state of war. The the Belgrade Assembly, Goran Vesic, was minimum sentence for the offense of draft tried and found guilty of draft evading in evading was two years in prison, with absentia, even though it was established longer sentences for those draft evaders that he had not been informed of his call- tried in absentia. When passing sentences, up. A military court heard the case on 15 most judges considered all extenuating June and sentenced Vesic to two years in and aggravating circumstances in each prison under article 214(1) and article 226 concrete case. of the FRY penal code. Vesic did not enter prison since his whereabouts were un- Summary procedure was implemented in known to those charged with enforcing the all cases of draft evading and similar of- sentence. fenses. Those found guilty received sen- tences ranging from one year to several Opposition politicians and activists were years in prison. This involved week long mobilized in large numbers, according to criminal proceedings, leading to severe their spokespersons. The Serbian Renewal sentences, while the appeal deadline was Movement said several thousand members limited to three days during the state of of the party were mobilized, among them war (under the decree on enforcement of many presidents and secretaries of Serbian the criminal proceedings act), and not 15 town councils, two republican members of days as otherwise prescribed. However, as parliament and three presidents of munic- almost all the accused were tried in ab- ipal councils from Belgrade. The Democ- sentia, appeals were rare, except those by ratic Party claimed that of 120 members of prosecutors who were dissatisfied with “le- the party’s main committee, 40 were draft- nient” sentences. Although military judges ed while 17 presidents of municipal com- (also draftees) tried to exercise profession- mittees were among the draftees. Maja alism, resulting in some sentences being Tasic, spokeswoman of the Civic Alliance conditional, higher courts often ruled that of Serbia, said that the party’s president prison sentences should be served, after Goran Svilanovic was mobilized on the military prosecutors had appealed. first day of NATO intervention, while members of the party’s presidency, its ■ On 8 June, Zoltan Ric (25), an ethnic main committee and municipal commit- Hungarian from Zrenjanin, was sentenced tees were also drafted. by the Military Court of the Novi Sad Corps to three years in prison for “spread- Torture, Ill-Treatment and ing defeatism and weakening combat re- Misconduct by Law Enforcement solve.” Ric had allegedly tried to convince Officials fellow soldiers at his posting in the vicini- ty of Senta “to surrender to the enemy and The spate of decrees issued in April 1999 advocated the creation of the Hungarian gave police increased powers to search, state up to Belgrade.” Ric claimed in an in- arrest and detain suspects. This increased terview that he had merely remarked that the likelihood of misconduct by law en- “NATO was technologically superior to us forcement officials when dealing with sus-

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pected political opponents of the ruling hostile acts, goods under special regime parties. The intimidatory effects of criminal during a state of war, or hostile propagan- and misdemeanor proceedings were aug- da material. mented by police activities, where people suspected of political activities were sum- Article 5 envisaged that “when security moned for “informative talks,” beaten, and and defense interests exact it, authorized illegally detained in police headquarters. officials can, on the basis of a decision of their superior, open letters and other The decree on enforcement of the criminal parcels, if there is reasonable suspicion proceedings law during a state of war, that a criminal offense has been commit- adopted by the Serbian government on 4 ted.” Article 6 envisaged that authorized April, gave law enforcement officials new police officials could use firearms, if the powers to enter and search private premis- escape of a person caught while commit- es without a warrant. Article 7 stipulated ting a criminal offense could not be other- that “when there is reasonable suspicion wise prevented. that a person has committed a criminal of- fense against constitutional order and se- Several cases of ill-treatment and intimi- curity of the FRY or any other offense en- dating practices by law enforcement offi- tailing prison sentences of a minimum of cials were recorded in 1999, largely in five years, investigative and prosecution connection with street protests organized bodies can search his/her flat, other by the Alliance for Change coalition. premises and persons without the court’s warrant and without the consent of that ■ Svetozar Rakovic, managing editor of person.” The aforementioned provision the newspaper Sindikalni poverenik, was was in contravention of article 207(21) of beaten by police in Belgrade in early Oc- the Serbian constitution, stipulating that an tober. According to Alliance for Change official could enter the home or other reports, Rakovic was attacked by police premises of an individual, without the officers while returning from an Alliance court’s decision and carry out searches for Change protest. He was knocked un- without witnesses, only if such an action conscious by a strong blow to the head, was deemed necessary for the apprehen- whereupon police continued to beat him, sion of a perpetrator of a criminal offense, then dragged him to a van and took him to or for the protection of people and proper- the municipal police headquarters. Semi- ty, as provided for by law. conscious, Rakovic was sentenced the fol- lowing day to 30 days’ imprisonment. Article 4 of the decree on internal affairs during a state of war, adopted by the Ser- ■ Bogoljub Arsenijevic Maki, leader of the bian government on 7 April, envisaged Civic Resistance in Valjevo, was arrested that authorized policemen, on security on 17 August in Belgrade, in front of the grounds and without a search warrant, Movement for a Democratic Serbia head- could search persons during detention or quarters. The municipal public prosecutor arrest. Without a search warrant, autho- in Valjevo charged Arsenijevic with com- rized officials could search persons, their mitting offenses against public order and belongings, vehicles and premises with a peace at a protest rally on 12 July, carrying view to checking if those persons illegally possible sentences of up to ten years in possessed weapons, ammunition, explo- prison. The investigating magistrate sen- sives and other materials necessary for tenced Arsenijevic to one month in deten-

444 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

tion. Arsenijevic stated he had been beat- station for “informative talks” to establish en by several plain clothes officers with “whether he had falsely posed as a police- fists and pistol butts during his arrest and man” and who had sent him to Uzice. had his jaw broken. He was taken to the municipal police headquarters on 29 Extrajudicial Killings and November and held with other detainees Assaults on Political Opponents who had suffered torture before being transferred to Valjevo police station. Valje- The government in Serbia enjoyed undis- vo police took him to a hospital where puted control over the state apparatus tests revealed his jaw was broken. Instead (army, police, magistrates), the media of being given medical treatment, he was (Radio Television Serbia, Politika) and part summoned to testify in court but was un- of the judiciary, all of which helped the able to speak because of his injuries. On government propagate, disseminate and 15 November the first instance court sen- pursue its policy. Although the govern- tenced him to a maximum sentence of ment had these institutional means of re- three years’ imprisonment. pression at its disposal, the increasing phe- nomenon of extrajudicial punishment, ■ On 29 September, Djordje Lazarevic, a mysterious deaths and killings of political student at the Electrical Engineering Facul- opponents in 1999 suggested that Serbian ty, was beaten by police at an Alliance for authorities were seeking additional means Change rally, and sustained serious head to suppress dissent. Such attacks increased and facial injuries. after NATO began its bombing campaign against Serbia, and many incidents took ■ On 20 October, activists of the student place during the period of protests by the organization “Otpor” were taken to a po- Alliance for Change against the federal lice station in Kragujevac, and released and republican government policy in the one hour and a half later. One of the ac- second half of 1999. tivists, Zoran Matovic, stated that he had been handcuffed during the arrest in the ■ The founder and editor of the important center of town, and had been subsequent- daily Dnevni telegraf and biweekly Evropl- ly beaten in a police van after expressing janin, Slavko Curuvija, was shot dead and criticism of Slobodan Milosevic. his wife pistol-whipped by unidentified gunmen in the entrance to their home on ■ At the Alliance for Change rally in Vran- 11 April. Once deemed close to the ruling je on 21 October, police snatched the mi- parties, Curuvija was a high profile critic crophone from Slobodan Vuksanovic, vice of Serbian government policy and his pub- president of the Democratic Party, and or- lications were among the leading targets dered him to leave the podium. prosecuted and fined under the 1998 pub- lic information act. Both Curuvija’s papers ■ On 22 October, during a police raid on received heavy fines and Curuvija was the new headquarters of the Uzice munic- sentenced to five months in prison on 8 ipal committee of the Democratic Party, March.15 Just before his death, Curuvija Milosav Vasic, president of the Indepen- had been named in an attack on “national dent Association of Policemen of Serbia, traitors” in the state-controlled Belgrade was taken by 20 police officers to a police daily Politika ekspres, accusing him of col-

15 See Freedom of Expression and the Media.

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laborating with NATO.16 State-controlled travelling in the car behind were killed. media gave very little coverage to his The SPO claimed the accident had been death and at the time of writing, no one deliberately caused by a truck carrying had been arrested in connection with the sand which had swerved out in front of the killing, the motive for which remained un- two cars. Although police arrived at the clear. scene within five minutes of the accident, the driver and the owner of the truck had ■ A Democratic Party activist, Branislav yet to be traced as of this writing. Kozomara, was assaulted on 27 September by 20 young men while he and his team ■ On 17 October, in Valejvo, an explo- were sticking posters on a notice board in sive device planted at the house of Nebo- Kneza Milosa Street, Belgrade. According jsa Andric exploded. Andric, president of to a colleague, this was a group of para- the Democratic Party’s municipal commit- policemen (young men organized by the tee in Valjevo, one of the leaders of civic police, some of them with criminal protests and correspondent of Danas and records) who had previously harassed De- Radio Free Europe escaped injury in the mocratic Party activists. When the police explosion. patrol arrived at the scene, they checked the documents of both parties, and took ■ Branislav Vasiljevic, bodyguard of De- DP activists to the Stari Grad police station mocratic Party president Zoran Djindjic, where they were detained for about two who was former deputy secretary of the hours. Belgrade City Assembly, was found dead in his flat, with a gun in his hand and a ■ During the Alliance for Changes demon- head wound. Many commentators said strations on 13 October in Novi Beograd, that it was unlikely that Vasiljevic would in the vicinity of Jugopetrol gasolene sta- have committed suicide. tion, a large group of young men in plain- clothes suddenly attacked approximately Security Services and 100 followers of the Alliance for Change, Right to Privacy who were about to start a protest march. At least eight persons were injured before Police controls during the war peaked the attackers withdrew. One of the with the adoption of a decision by the Ser- demonstrators told journalists that police- bian Ministry of the Interior allowing men had ordered the young assailants to searches of private homes, which entered stop the attack, saying “That's enough!”, force on 27 September. The goal of the ac- after which they fled. tion, according to Deputy Minister of the Interior, Lieutenant General Obrad Ste- ■ On 3 October, a mysterious car acci- vanovic, was to gain “insight into personal dent near Lazarevac killed Veselin documents with a view to establishing Boskovic, a leading member of the Serbian whether residence registrations are gen- Renewal Movement (SPO) and brother-in- uine ... [and the] development of a rela- law of the SPO leader, Vuk Draskovic. tionship between the police and citizens Draskovic, who had been travelling in the resulting in an exchange of information same car as Boskovic, escaped with light important for security. The police will injuries, while three of his bodyguards check whether residence data are identical

16 IFEX/ANEM, 13 April 1999

446 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

in all personal documents: ID, driver’s li- charged with having committed the crimi- cense, passports and military service book- nal offense of disclosure of official secrets lets.” It was also significant that the regime under the penal code of the Republic of did not even attempt to legally “underpin” Serbia. this action with an official decision, provi- sion, decree or any sub-legal act. This Freedom of Movement move has encouraged citizens to de- nounce one another to the authorities and Decrees issued during 1999 presented se- is illustrated by the following case: vere new limitations upon the right to free- dom of movement. Article 2 of the decree ■ In the New Belgrade housing estate, on registration of residence during a state “Brotherhood and Unity’” (the largest of war prescribed that registration of resi- local community in New Belgrade, with dences and addresses was mandatory for more than 25,000 inhabitants), local lead- all persons above 14 years of age. Articles ers ordered all tenants to “thoroughly 3–5 stipulated that “registration and de- check all tenants of the building, ... to in- registration of address must be done im- form the police of the appearance of sus- mediately, and at the latest within 24 picious persons or foreigners without resi- hours after arrival in a new location, or dence permits ... to check whether un- change of flat.” Article 6 laid down that known persons allegedly throw garbage the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia could into containers ... to search the apart- determine the area and places into which ments of Shiptari [a pejorative term for citizens could move, reside and stay, if in ethnic Albanians], notably of male mem- possession of a special permit. Article 7 bers of families, who were away during envisaged a 30-day prison sentence for all the war ... to assist the police in checking persons failing to register or de-register tenants’ residence permits and addresses their residences or change of address with- in the building ... etc.” in the prescribed deadline, or those pro- viding false data. ■ Vladimir Nikolic, marketing director of the Board for Municipal Construction Sites Article 9 prescribed that “in addition to in Belgrade and a former employee of the gross breaches established by the act on State Security Service, was arrested on 1 state employees and the act on internal October by members of the Security Ser- affairs, the following violations are con- vice. Security Service members entered sidered as gross offenses of labor duties Nikolic’s flat on 4 October and kept his and obligations: manifestations of nation- wife and two children under virtual al, racial and religious intolerance and “house arrest.” according to Nikolic’s actions against military, political and wife, they did not have a search warrant economic measures of the state bodies, (they allegedly said they did not need possibly weakening the unified defense of one), but nonetheless searched the flat the country.” All these violations could thoroughly and seized Nikolic’s appoint- be punished by “restriction of a person’s ments diary and the hard disk from his movements for up to 60 days” (article computer. Criminal proceedings against 4.1) Nikolic were taken up by the Belgrade District Court. On 6 October, he was

447 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

Protection of National Minorities17 of Vojvodina Hungarians, set up a Provi- sional National Council of Vojvodina Albanians in South Serbia Hungarians. This was a first step towards a resolution of the status of the minority in The “Albanian issue” remained a burning line with a new model of self-rule, put for- issue in Serbia, related to the status of the ward by the SVM in late 1999 and envis- Albanian minority living in south Serbia. aging cultural and territorial autonomy for In the area of Bujanovac, Medveda and municipalities in which Hungarians con- Presevo, there were incidents that fueled stituted a majority. The SVM president, ethnic tensions and threatened to evolve Jozef Kasa, also sent an open letter dated into armed conflicts. Albanians insisted 10 November to the republican Interior these were the result of a terror campaign Minister, Vlajko Stojiljkovic, asking the against them by Serbian forces and called Serbian authorities to act to curb increas- on KFOR and UNMIC in Kosovo for pro- ing attacks on religious institutions and tection. Serbian accounts maintained the priests serving the Hungarian minority. incidents were used by the Albanian mi- nority to justify calls for the annexation of Protection of Asylum Seekers the three municipalities into an “indepen- and Displaced Persons dent Kosovo.” The Belgrade regime’s instrumentalization Muslim-Bosniaks in Sandjak of Serbs living outside Serbia and in Koso- vo led only to most of them becoming Regarding other minorities, growing ten- refugees. The fate of refugees was insepa- sions between Belgrade and Podgorica rable from the political debacle of the contributed to fears among Muslim-Bosni- Greater Serbia project. Unfortunately, de- aks in Sandjak that possible independence spite Serbia’s crushing defeat over Kosovo, for Montenegro would lead to the division the Belgrade regime continued to use of Sandjak into a Serbian and Montenegrin Kosovar Serbs in a bid to achieve separa- part. During the NATO bombing, 2,000 tion of a part of Kosovo, notably Kosovska Muslim-Bosniaks were laid off for “being Mitrovica and the Trepca mines. The au- absent from work three days consecutive- thorities’ refusal to register Kosovar Serb ly.” The Priboj Car Plant laid off 227 work- children for schools in Serbia, and deci- ers, of whom 225 were Muslim-Bosniaks. sion to strip Kosovar Serb pensioners of The independent daily Parlament was or- their pension rights, may be seen as a part dered to pay a 65,000 dinar (U.S.$ 5,500) of this policy. fine. There were ca. 800,000 refugees and dis- Hungarians in Vojvodina placed persons living in Serbia in 1999. Their rights and treatment depended on On 20 August in Subotica, three leading whether they received full refugee status. Vojvodina Hungarian parties, the Democ- While refugee status was granted to Serbs ratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians coming from Croatia in 1991 and those (SVM), the Democratic Community of Vo- coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina, jvodina Hungarians and the Civic Alliance those who fled the Serb-controlled parts of

17 Based on IHF, “Increasing Ethnic Tensions and Violations of Human Rights in Serbia and Montenegro,” 16 June 1999.

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Croatia, those who left Croatia “voluntari- versities in the main had provided support ly” during the mass exodus in 1995, or for the policies of Serbian authorities those coming from the Serb-occupied ter- throughout the previous decade, the 1998 ritory of Bosnia were denied refugee sta- act was seen as seriously restricting uni- tus. versity freedoms.

Many refugees, such as Croatian Serbs As a consequence, the European Rectors’ whom the Belgrade regime had attempted Conference, in May, suspended from its to resettle in Kosovo, sought to emigrate, membership all universities in Serbia. The with the help of the UNHCR and other conference ruled that the act practically agencies. Those who remained were often abolished all university autonomy and the most vulnerable category of refugee. academic freedoms, and that a re-mem- The most vulnerable of all were those of bership claim could be submitted only if the Roma minority from Kosovo, who fled the act were changed. Due to this suspen- after the NATO intervention to Serbia. sion, the Serbian universities were banned Roma refugees received no humanitarian from taking part in upcoming celebrations assistance in Serbia and faced racist at- of the 50th anniversary of the conference, tacks, notably by young “skinheads” in although former Yugoslavia was one of its Belgrade. founders. Until the existing University Act was essentially changed or a new act Misuse of refugees and drastic violations passed, the European Rectors’ Conference of international conventions on the status planned to collaborate only with the Alter- and rights of refugees became manifest native Academic Educational Network. during the NATO intervention in Serbia. Serbian authorities drafted able-bodied Economic and Social Rights18 men, including male refugees from Koso- vo. They also banned able-bodied men in The devastated condition of the Serbian possession of Croatian documents form economy in past years, worsened by eco- leaving Serbia and returning to Croatia. A nomic sanctions and the effects of NATO large number of them were returned from military intervention (including the de- the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina struction of infrastructure and environ- (the northern border with Croatia was then mental damage), had a catastrophic effect closed). on Serbia’s political, economic and social life. The University Act The number of people with no income or The University Act, passed on 26 May means of support – estimated at 2 million 1998, directly resulted in a number of pro- by some sources – illustrated the scale of fessors and other associates from universi- the economic catastrophe. The fear of los- ties being removed from their posts and ing employment felt by many people facing disciplinary proceedings, due to made them more susceptible to manipula- their refusal to sign new, unfavorable em- tion by the government, and less likely to ployment contracts. Although Serbia's uni- report irregularities in the work of their

18 Based on Report by the IHF for the OSCE Review Conference: Human Dimension Issues, Vienna – Istanbul, 1999.

449 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

companies or misuse of state property. KOSOVO19 People reporting misconduct risked losing their jobs, although the official reasons given for such dismissals involved alleged IHF FOCUS: Large-scale violations of in- breaches of the law. ternational humanitarian law; freedom of expression; legal system and the indepen- Ever increasing numbers of people were dence of the judiciary; economic and so- living in poverty, due to lack of work, fail- cial rights. ure to pay wages and pensions, and ever increasing taxes that individuals had to pay. The prospects for private businesses By January 1999, the open violence that looked bleak, except for those close to the erupted in Kosovo in 1998 had reached ruling elite. Few such businesses were pro- extreme proportions, with an offensive of ductive in the normal sense, providing increasing brutality against the Albanian rather a cover for speculation and illegal population in the province by Serb mili- operations. A compromised judiciary, es- tary forces. In March 1999, following re- pecially in the form of the Economic Court peated warnings and a final ultimatum, in Belgrade, continued to allow such prac- NATO launched a humanitarian interven- tices. tion in the form of air strikes against Ser- bia-Montenegro and Serb military forces in Social insecurity and the powerlessness of Kosovo.20 individuals to solve basic problems or pro- vide for dependents brought increasing Until their forced withdrawal in June, Ser- mental health problems, which were the bian militias and other armed forces in result of long-term difficulties. Massive in- Kosovo were carrying out massive warfare vestment was required in all areas of social against Kosovo Albanians and perpetrating and economic life to improve the situa- large-scale ethnic cleansing. A systematic tion, yet there remained no sign that such state-sponsored campaign of deportation investment would be forthcoming. and terror forced the majority of the two million Kosovo Albanian population to flee their homes and seek refuge in neigh- boring countries.

Serbian forces shelled and bombed Alban- ian-populated villages and towns, de- stroyed homes, plundered and looted their property; abducted and summarily and ar- bitrarily executed numerous Albanians, and sexually abused women. It was esti- mated that over 10,000 Kosovo Albanians were murdered, though this figure could not be verified. By early 2000, more than

19 Unless otherwise noted, based on information from the Kosovo Helsinki Committee to the IHF. See also IHF statements and press releases at http://www.ihf-hr.org/appeals.htm 20 See IHF press release, “Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo,” 30 March 1999

450 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

500 mass graves had been found at vari- Kosovo was a central responsibility of the ous locations in Kosovo. The fate of at international community. It said it was least 5,000 Kosovars remained unknown firmly convinced that the Serbian regime and they were listed as “missing” – a fact was the source of the tragedy in Kosovo. It that has considerably charged the post-war said that the principle of humanitarian in- political situation and triggered negative tervention must be upheld and acted upon attitudes among the ethnic Albanian pop- to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; to ulation. Several of those reported “miss- save the Albanians remaining under Serb ing” were believed to be arrested and oppression in Kosovo; and to provide for taken to Serbian prisons, or feared dead. the safe return of those who had fled or Among them were prominent Albanian been deported. At the same time, the IHF civilians and KLA activists. Serbian author- stressed that humanitarian military opera- ities acknowledged only the detention of tions could not be conducted at no risk. 2,066 Albanians in Serbian prisons. On 11 The fate of Albanians – and also many August, two bodies of detainees were re- Serbs – showed that the risks that the allied turned to Kosovo; those of Sali Kurtaj (48) military forces avoided for themselves and Tefik Salihu (73). were transferred to people bearing no re- sponsibility.22 About 120,000 housing units in Kosovo (or about one third of the pre-war contin- Serbian forces began their withdrawal on gent) was destroyed and/or damaged by 12 June, and the international forces Serbian forces, particularly in western (KFOR) with 40,000 peace keepers were Kosovo, e.g. in the towns of Gjakova, Peja, deployed in mid-June 1999, after the Dechan and the Drenica region. Milosevic government had accepted the terms of the UN Resolution 1244 on Koso- Throughout 1998, the IHF and its member vo and the Kumanovo Military-Technical committees repeatedly criticized the UN Agreement. Security Council for being slow to take proper action to save lives in Kosovo and Post-War Role of called for the international community to International Community hold a Dayton-type conference to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The IHF also called for The process of state or entity building in the deployment of a robust and large-scale Kosovo was based legally on UN Security international protection, monitoring and Resolution 1244. Kosovo could be seen as preventive peacekeeping mission in Koso- a de facto international protectorate al- vo, as well as forces to monitor the imple- though the document stopped short of mentation of cease-fires.21 defining it as such. However, the resolu- tion defined the international forces, i.e. On 10 May 1999, the IHF Executive Com- KFOR , as the only legitimate military au- mittee insisted that protection of the Koso- thority in Kosovo and the the UN Mission vo Albanian people and their future in in Kosovo (UNMIK ) as the only legitimate

21 See IHF press releases and reports of 21 January 1998; 2 March 1998; 6 March 1998; 20 March 1998; 24 March 1998; 3 April 1998; 10 June 1998; 27 June 1998; 31 July 1998; 30 August 1998; 17 September 1998; 1 October 1998; 7 October 1998; 7 November 1998; 5 February 1999; 2 March 1999. 22 IHF press release, “Crimes Against Humanity Must Be Stopped,” 10 May 1999.

451 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

civilian authority for the interim period, forcement to be established on an effective pending achievement of a political settle- basis. ment for Kosovo on a model similar to the failed Rambouillet Accords, which antici- In an open letter addressed to the head of pated Kosovo as part of the sovereign FRY. the UNMIK in July, the IHF urged UNMIK to urgently establish the international po- The deployment of KFOR came too late to lice forces in Kosovo in order to secure save the lives of thousands of people and the safety of individuals and property in to prevent the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. In meetings with IGOs and gov- Kosovo, but did bring an end to continuing ernmental representatives, the IHF and the terror by Serbian forces. KFOR’s arrival did Kosovo Helsinki Committee also repeat- bring about the swift return of the over- edly called for international representa- whelming part of Kosovo Albanians and tives in Kosovo to play a much more as- internally displaced persons. However, vi- sertive, robust, and vigorous role. At the olence in Kosovo continued, believed to same time, they called upon Albanians to be primarily ethnically or politically moti- stand up for democracy and human rights vated, on a lower scale. According to the for all individuals living in Kosovo, re- official KFOR data, by the end of January gardless of their ethnic background, and 2000, 292 individuals had been killed (40 not to resort to self-administered justice.23 percent Albanians, 35 percent Serbs and The IHF warned that violence against 27 percent non-identified). The number of Serbs could seriously harm the interna- arsons (primarily against Serb and other tional image of Albanians and decrease minority housing objects) was reported at support for the reconstruction of Kosovo. 1,400. The failure of funding pledged for rebuild- ing Kosovo by the international communi- A security vacuum and the absence of law ty to materialize was indeed to prove a and order in the province contributed to problem through the remainder of 1999, the challenge facing KFOR. While KFOR severely limiting reconstruction plans for was not suitable for police tasks, there was Kosovo. an inconceivable delay in the deployment of an international police task force (IPTF) One serious consequence of the interna- for Kosovo – a task at least as important as tional community’s failure to take suffi- the activities of KFOR. The UNMIK was cient steps to establish law and order in also too slow in establishing its authority, Kosovo was the de facto partitioning of order and security in Kosovo – a task pro- Mitrovica, a town with industrial and vided for by UN Resolution 1244 – to pro- strategic significance as the location of the tect all individuals living in Kosovo, re- important Trepca mines and close to the gardless of their ethnic background. In- Serbian border. The area was technically creasing criminality and reports of orga- under the control of French KFOR forces nized crime (including kidnapping of chil- since the arrival of KFOR, but Serb citizens dren and young women by groups from, maintained effective control over parts of for example, Albania) operating in Kosovo the town. Many Albanian citizens (who underlined the urgent need for law en- made up 70 percent of the local pre-war

23 See also Aaron Rhodes (IHF) and Gazmend Pula (Kosovo Helsinki Committee), “Kosovars Must Stand Up For Democracy, Justice and Human Rights for All,” published in Koha Ditore, 19 August 1999.

452 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

population) were prevented from returning The issue of missing Albanians, the de to their homes. The stand-off which devel- facto partitioning of the town of Mitrovica oped between the two communities devel- – effectively under sull Serbian control – as oped increasingly violent aspects and no well as the still high level of ethnically and obvious progress was made by KFOR re- politically motivated violence due to lack garding the security situation in the of security and a functioning legal frame- town.24 The problems of Mitrovica illus- work represented the three gravest prob- trated that continuing security and law en- lems in the post-war Kosovo, affecting its forcement problems in Kosovo were future development towards peace and threatening the human rights and indeed democracy. All of them demanded the the lives of members of all ethnic groups in presence of efficient, robust and assertive Kosovo, as well as a desirable and efficient law enforcement and full application of resolution of burning problems in Kosovo the UN Resolution 1244 by KFOR and which, again, endangered the desirable UNMIK. final outcome of the entire humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Law Enforcement and Security

As of the end of 1999, the security vacuum Six months after the end of the war in in Kosovo, the absence of functioning ser- Kosovo, security and policing issues con- vices and infrastructure as well as state tinued to cause grave concern. Only 1,899 bodies and the failure of reconstruction international police officers belonging to funds to materialize had led to a situation the IPTF had been deployed in Kosovo, in which the population was at risk of out of a designated total of 3,100. Mean- criminal, ethnically and politically moti- while, an estimated 8,000 are estimated to vated violence while facing urgent eco- be needed as a matter of urgency, as the nomic and social problems. These prob- only effective response to the ongoing eth- lems included shortages of adequate hous- nically motivated violence and criminality ing and of adequate water, sanitation and in Kosovo. However, only 4,000 had been electricity supplies, all of which came promised while just about 2,000 had been under the administrative responsibility of deployed as of April 2000. Following an UNMIK. OSCE conference on human rights in Kosovo on 10 December, KFOR decided While UNMIK had some success in re- to assume some policing duties in Kosovo establishing a media system in Kosovo to help improve the security situation. The (primarily print media), health care and IHF and the Helsinki Committee in Koso- education, complex problems associated vo called repeatedly for the international with the repression and violence suffered community to place the highest priority by the population, including sexual as- upon developing the International Police sault, war traumas, and the widespread Task Force for Kosovo without delay, and breakdown of traditional Albanian struc- noted that KFOR was not the appropriate tures of social life especially since the war body to carry out policing tasks. – a sad irony, since this was preserved dur- ing the years of Serbian repression to 1999 Of equal importance to the establishment – remained. of the IPTF was the question of how to suc-

24 By January 2000, serious acts of violence occurred with deaths among both divided communities. KFOR forces seemed barely unable to limit the escalating violence.

453 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

cessfully reintegrate former Kosovo Libera- were forcefully deported at gunpoint out tion Army (KLA) fighters within Kosovar of their homes by Serb forces and militias. society, as a key to the demilitarization of Western Kosovo and central rural regions the province and the establishment of were worst hit, in an apparent Serbian civilian law enforcement institutions for campaign to partition Kosovo. Entire parts the future. This proved no easy task, with of Peja, Dechani and Gjakova and the many KLA fighters reluctant to lay down rural regions of, for example, Drenica, arms and to resume civilian life. Officially, Shala and Llap were virtually totally de- this task was achieved, but in practice stroyed. KFOR continued to confiscate illegal arms both from Albanian and Serb civilians. International authorities estimated that KLA leaders expressed the wish to estab- over 10,000 Kosovo Albanians were mur- lish a Kosovo defense force, a concept dered, although it has been impossible to clearly entailing an independent Kosovo. confirm this number beyond reasonable KFOR was responsible for disarming KLA doubt as of this writing. Thousands more fighters, while UNMIK had the task of were injured and raped, and a large part bringing former KLA fighters into an em- of ethnic Albanian property destroyed. In bryonic civilian police force for Kosovo, total, about 75 percent of the Kosovo Al- the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). These of- banian population was forcefully deport- ficers were to receive an intensive training ed or displaced, either outside Kosovo by international police instructors fol- (about one million) or internally (about lowed by a 19-week period on duty, ac- 500,000). Half a million Albanians re- companying IPTF officers. By the end of maining in urban centers were virtually 1999, 175 KPS law enforcement officers kept as hostages by Serbian security were patrolling the streets with the IPTF forces. After the war, an estimated and a further 200 were undergoing train- 500,000 Albanians remained without a ing. Although the KLA, together with roof over their heads due to the destruc- UNMIK and KFOR, condemned attacks on tion of their homes. non-Albanians in Kosovo, this was not suf- ficient to prevent attacks by KLA units dri- The extrajudicial executions started with ving Serbs out of the province. the intellectual leadership of Kosovo.25

Abuses against Ethnic Albanians ■ On 24 March – the very night when NATO air strikes were launched – Bajram Until the June withdrawal of Serb forces Kelmendi, the most prominent human from Kosovo, ethnic Albanians were the rights lawyer in Kosovo, was killed with primary targets of ethnically motivated vi- his two sons. Uniformed police officers olence and abuse. In early 1999, wide- abducted them from Kelmendi’s house in spread attacks by Serb forces against Al- the presence of his wife and daughter. The banians escalated into a campaign of sys- following day, their bodies were found left tematic, state-sponsored terror throughout by a roadside. Kosovo. Following the outbreak of war, the capital of Kosovo, Prishtina, and ■ Agim Hajrizi, a trade union leader was major towns turned into ghost towns as killed in his home in Mitrovica along with the majority of their Albanian populations his son and mother.

25 See IHF press release, “Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo,” 30 March 1999.

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■ Latif Kryeziu, president of the largest po- Abuses against Ethnic Serbs litical party in Kosovo, LDK, suffered the same fate. In the summer of 1999, following the de- ployment of KFOR, Helsinki Committees ■ Fehmi Afgani, vice president of the LDK started to receive numerous reports of party, university professor and a leading abuses against Serbs remaining in Kosovo. public intellectual, was arrested by Ser- An overwhelming climate of persecution bian forces and deported towards Mace- against Serbs emerged, presumably to donia, separated from his family. The fol- exact revenge for crimes committed by lowing day he was found killed, with his both the Serbian government and local body dumped by a roadside near Lipljan. Serbs during the war. The abuses against Serbs include kidnappings, murders, in- In the post-war period, Serbian-laid mines timidation, plundering or destruction of were proving a major source of danger to homes and property, and forced evictions. the Kosovo population, particularly chil- As of early 2000, at least 157 Serbs had dren. On average, two people were affect- been killed, with further 124 still uniden- ed by daily casualties caused by land tified killed persons. At least 1,400 houses mines: as of April 2000, 92 individuals (most of them Serb-owned) were set on had died and 298 seriously injured. Mines fire. By the end of January 2000, 192 kid- were also found in at least 200 school nappings were officially registered, 44 of buildings in Kosovo. the victims were Serbs, 35 unidentified and the rest Albanians. Killings and at- Also after the end of the war, Kosovo Al- tacks on ethnic Serbs in Kosovo did not banians remained targets of violence. In decrease as the year continued. Exact some cases, armed Serb civilians (presum- numbers, and the ethnic breakdown of ably including plainclothes Serbian securi- those murdered, were however unknown. ty force members) attacked them. In the According to the Kosovo Helsinki Com- security vacuum which followed the end mittee some 50 percent of the pre-war of the war, there were examples also of Al- Serb population of about 200,000 had left banian violence against Albanians. This Kosovo. Various Serbian sources set the was partly due to the operation of criminal number of the post-war Serb victims much gangs (some from Albania) and in some higher. cases Albanians were threatened for pro- tecting or remaining friendly to non-Al- ■ On 11 July, 17 Serbs were reportedly banian neighbors. Four months after the kidnapped. At that time, as many as 132 war’s end, at least 87 Albanians had been Serbs were reported missing to the Helsin- killed. ki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

In addition, in July and August, some ■ In mid-July, 14 Serbs working in the 20,000 Albanians living in the Albanian- field near Gracko were killed. populated areas of Southern Serbia bor- dering Kosovo (Bujanovac, Medvedja and ■ On 18 August, two Serb youths were Presheva) fled their homes and arrived in killed in village of Kllokot and five others Kosovo. It was feared that intimidation and were injured when several grenades were violence would continue to force ethnic launched from a nearby village populated Albanians to leave their homes for Kosovo. by Albanians.

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According to the Kosovo Helsinki Com- delivered in person, followed a few days mittee, an important factor triggering vio- later by physical assault, in some cases lence by the Albanian population was the even murder. In addition, in a method fear and animosity towards Serbs and the reminiscent of tactics used by Bosnian Serbian regime as well as uncertainty Serbs against Muslims during the war in about the future status of Kosovo, the Bosnia-Herzegovina, increasing numbers Albanians favoring independence from the of Serbs were forced to sign letters trans- FRY. ferring rights over their property to Albani- ans before they flee. These practices were The demilitarization of the KLA remained applied in some cases to whole blocks of an important component for guaranteeing apartments, triggering the simultaneous future security for individuals in Kosovo. departure of tens of families.27 At the same time, many remaining Serbs were also in possession of arms, a fact that In the second half of 1999, the freedom of similarly contributed to insecurity. In addi- movement of Serbs in Kosovo – with the tion to the slow establishment of an inter- exception of Serb enclaves near and national police force in Kosovo and ma- around Prishtina such as Grachanica, nipulation by the Serbian government, the Kosovo Polje, Lipljan, Rahovac, as well as attacks by breakaway groups of the KLA the northern part of Mitrovica and its hin- and by Albanian civilians were responsi- terland – became virtually non-existent: ble for the large exodus of Serbs. they were afraid to make use of public fa- cilities such as hospitals, or to visit shops In early August, violence against Serbs re- and markets. Moreover, they also could maining in Kosovo escalated. not readily avail themselves of humanitar- ian assistance. ■ On 11 August, the UNHCR office in Pr- ishtina said that the situation of the re- ■ On 28 September, two hand grenades maining Serbs in Prishtina (estimated at were thrown into a market place in the Pr- 2,000 from a pre-war figure of more than ishtina Serb-populated suburb of Bresje, 20,000) had noticeably worsened over the killing three Serbs and wounding several past few weeks, with increasingly violent others. attacks on the rise. According to KFOR, there had been at least nine murders and ■ On 28 November, an ethnic Serb pro- seven serious assaults in the city in the pre- fessor at the University of Prishtina, vious week, and bomb and grenade at- Dragoslav Basic (60) was driving through tacks on Serb homes, churches and busi- the center of Prishtina when his car was nesses were a regular occurrence. Two el- stopped by a crowd of some 2,000 Alba- derly Serb women were shot through the nians. Basic was dragged from the vehicle doors of their apartments.26 and beaten to death on the spot, while his wife and mother-in-law, also in the car, According to the UNHCR, in many cases a were badly injured. One month after the warning letter was received ordering Serbs incident, suspects were taken into custody to leave their homes, then the threat was by IPTF officers.

26 UN Kosovo Crisis Update, 11 August 1999, http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm. 27 Ibid.

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■ On 14 December, the bodies of a Serb al authorities were reacting inadequately mother (54) and son (30) who had been to protect Roma.28 murdered were found in their apartment in central Prishtina. Many Roma reported to the ERRC that they had been abducted by Albanian civilians Serbs who left Kosovo faced harsh dis- and brought for interrogation to local KLA crimination from Serbian government au- headquarters, accused of thefts and war- thorities. They were not allowed to claim time cooperation with Serb paramilitaries pensions outside Kosovo and children and even involvement in massacres of Al- were denied the right to register for the banians. Many were seriously ill-treated. next school year. Many Roma women and girls were sexual- ly abused. Albanians also forced their Abuses Against Roma ways into Roma houses and intimidated and threatened individuals (including After the war, Kosovar Roma, often per- women and children), told them to leave ceived by Kosovo Albanians as Serbian the area, and illegally confiscated their collaborators during the war, became tar- property.29 gets of indiscriminate and arbitrary vio- lence by some Albanians. ■ M.P. (from Kacanik) told the ERRC that as soon as the bombing had stopped and The European Roma Rights Center (ERRC, the Serbian Army left, the Albanian army an affiliate of the IHF) documented appeared and started ill-treating Roma. An killings, abductions, “disappearances”, ar- Albanian sniper killed his wife, but he bitrary detentions, torture and other physi- stayed at home with his five children. He cal abuse, rape, expulsions, burning of said that the Albanians came to his house Roma houses, forced entry into Roma three times, beat him and ill-treated his homes and confiscations of Roma proper- children. Once an Albanian put a knife on ty during June and July. The perpetrators his son’s neck and requested money. M.P. were primarily both ethnic Albanian civil- escaped to Urosevac to his relatives and ians and breakaway members of the KLA. then over to Macedonia because Albani- As several thousand Roma tried to leave ans also maltreated him and his family in Kosovo, some were reportedly forced to Urosevac. He paid DM 400 for the trip to return either by refugee camp officials or Macedonia. Serbian authorities. This resulted in the displacement of most of the Roma, both The IHF called upon the KLA and the inside and outside Kosovo. In addition, KFOR to prevent the maltreatment and ex- Roma fleeing Kosovo for Serbia were odus of Serbs and other non-Albanians, forcibly returned by Yugoslav authorities, and to create conditions under which those which in the circumstances amounted to who have fled might return safely to their unlawful refoulement. The ERRC charged homes. The United Nations mission must that both the KFOR and other internation- do more to gather information on missing

28 European Roma Rights Center, “The Current Situation of the Roma in Kosovo,” 9 July 1999, and “Roma in Kosovo Testify,” 2 August 1999. 29 Ibid.

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persons and the confiscation of property, in Some 539 sites of mass graves were iden- order to support eventual court proceed- tified after the war ended, as part of an on- ings, said the IHF.30 going search for burial sites of the victims of war crimes. Of these, about 200 had Abuses against Bosniak Muslims been investigated as of early 2000, with more than 2,000 copses exhumed. About According to Numan Balic, head of the 5,000 were registered as “missing,” be- Bosnian Party of Democratic Action in lieved to be dead or held in Serbian jails. Kosovo (SDA), violence continued also against Bosniak Muslims through late Albanian Prisoners in Serbian Jails 1999. Balic stated that after the withdraw- al of Serb forces, at least 37 Bosniak Mus- At least 2,066 Albanians were arrested, lims had been killed, 16 had been abduct- imprisoned and transferred with the with- ed, and over 800 families had suffered in- drawing Serbian forces to prisons in Ser- timidation, with over 30,000 people flee- bia. The figure refers to that confirmed by ing Kosovo due to fear of attacks by some Serbian authorities and the International Albanians. Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). A number of detainees were subjected to show trials International Humanitarian Law after the war and sentenced to long prison sentences. As of April 2000, about 700 of Although it was known that widespread them had been released and others have human rights abuses in Kosovo by Serb been subjected to show trials on the forces resulted in some 10,000 deaths dur- charges of “terrorism” and “hostile activi- ing the first half of 1999, the process of in- ty.” Their families were not officially in- vestigation by war crimes investigators and formed about their whereabouts and only forensic experts was complicated by the in a few cases have the families been able fact that many suspected perpetrators fled to meet them. Kosovo among the Serb forces which with- drew to Serbia, and also because evidence ■ In April 2000, 144 ethnic Albanians of war crimes appeared to have been de- were facing a summary trial – the largest of stroyed before the withdrawal in June its kind in the history of Serbia – in the Dis- 1999. trict Court of Nish (southern Serbia).

■ In the case of the village of Izbica, con- Among the ethnic Albanians held in Ser- sistent eyewitness accounts as well as bian prisons were several prominent indi- satellite intelligence photos had indicated viduals. the burial of 145 Albanians in a mass grave. However no bodies were found ■ Flora Brovina (48), head of the during exhumation attempts, and satellite Women’s Association of the LDK, doctor, intelligence photos showed evidence of poet, and human rights activist, was arrest- bulldozers tampering with the site, indi- ed on April 21 by Serbian special police cating that the bodies might have earlier who witnesses say were waiting outside been removed by Serbian forces and dis- Brovina’s Prishtina home when she re- posed of elsewhere. turned from her parents’ house. Brovina

30 IHF press release, “Exodus of Serbs Undermines Ideal of a Democratic Kosovo,” 20 July 1999.

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was at some point thereafter taken to a Families of the missing and imprisoned Al- prison in Pozarevac, Serbia. According to banians accused international agencies of reports in August, her son claimed she had doing too little to help their relatives or to become partially paralyzed as a result of keep relatives informed. NGOs such as the her treatment. Following a trial in Serbia, Humanitarian Law Centre were also high- Brovina was sentenced on 6 December to ly critical, claiming that the problem dated 12 years’ imprisonment. back to the failure to include any mention of an amnesty for Albanian political pris- ■ Albin Kurti, head of the Student Union oners in the Military Technical Agreement of Prishtina University and former before Serbian forces withdrew, even spokesman of Adem Demachi, was arrest- though this point had previously been in- ed in May by Serbian security forces. He cluded in the October 1998 Holbrooke- faced a show trial in March 2000 and was Milosevic cease-fire agreement. sentenced to 14 years in prison. The HLC had also compiled a list of 250 Other prominent individuals included missing Serbs from Kosovo, and noted that Halil Matoshi, leading journalist; Bardhyl all missing Serbs, Roma and Albanians Caushi, dean of Prishtina University Law should have the status of disappeared per- Faculty (feared dead); and Ukshin Hoti, Pr- sons, rather than, as the Serbian govern- ishtina University professor and head of ment had argued before the June 1999 the UNIKOMB party. In addition, many withdrawal from Kosovo, as prisoners of Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) activists war. At the end of 1999, work was contin- were held in Serbian prisons. uing to trace missing persons in Serbian jails and in Kosovo. Besides the ICRC, the HLC in Belgrade was maintaining contact with the 1,900 Freedom of Expression Albanians in Serbian prisons, arranging meetings with Albanian lawyers. Howev- The media situation following the end of er, the professional work of the lawyers in- the war was characterized by freedom of volved has involved difficulty and danger the Albanian-language media – particular- as the case of Teki Bokshi has proved: ly printed media – and extreme difficulties experienced by Serbian-language media, ■ On 4 December, a group of three Al- despite the attempts of UNMIK and the banian human rights lawyers were return- OSCE to re-establish a print and broadcast ing from Serbia to Kosovo having finished media system representing all ethnic a visit to some of the detainees in Serbian groups in Kosovo. In practice, the media prisons, when their car was stopped just situation reflected the political realities south of Belgrade. One of the three, Teki after the war. The security vacuum and Bokshi, was abducted by a group of men deep social divisions caused by the recent presenting themselves as Serbian police past also affected the work of journalists in officers. Serbian police denied any in- Kosovo. volvement in the case, and Bokshi was re- leased only after a ransom of DM 50,000 ■ Calls by prominent Albanian leader (U.S.$ 25,600) was delivered to the cap- Veton Surroi, the publisher of the influen- tors two weeks later. The circumstances tial daily Koha Ditore, for an end to ethni- surrounding the abduction remained un- cally motivated violence against Serbs, clear. and strong and unequivocal condemna-

459 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

tion of that practice, resulted in death From these appointees, seven Serbs re- threats against him and his editor-in-chief, signed, citing dissatisfaction with the secu- Baton Haxhiu. An outspoken editorial ac- rity and political situation of Kosovar cusing them of being traitors to the Alban- Serbs, leaving 42 Albanians, four Bosniak ian cause was released by the Kosovapress Moslems, one Rom and one Turk among news agency (close to the KLA). the judges. 297 new judges and prosecu- tors as well as 200 jury judges in Kosovo The former Kosovo Public RTV renamed were to be sworn in and assume their du- RTK (Osova) was being operated under the ties during January 2000. control of the OSCE, who was trying to es- tablish a media control board to uphold Economic and Social Rights professional standards and guard against media bias in this influential medium. In all areas of post-war social life, a ruined However, political leaders in Kosovo were infrastructure combined with disputes said to be demanding a more active role over ownership of remaining property and controlling editorial policy, as well as that rebuilding institutions under the aegis of the full quota of Albanian employees dis- the international community impacted on missed by the Serbian authorities should the lives of Kosovars. According to differ- be re-employed. Ongoing disputes over ent sources, between 60,000 and 120,000 these issues meant that RTV was only or 15-30 percent of all housing stock was broadcasting two hours per day. Prior to destroyed or rendered inhabitable. The the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, it catastrophic economic conditions com- had broadcast all day on two channels. bined with death or injury of male Koso- vars accelerated the breakdown of tradi- Legal System and tional family life and social structures. The Independence of the Judiciary situation of women in Kosovar Albanian life was undergoing change. Prostitution By the end of 1999, little progress was was on the rise in Kosovo cities and the made in re-establishing a judicial system operation of criminal gangs, partly coop- for Kosovo. This was identified by the erating with similar organized groups Kosovo Helsinki Committee as one of the from Albania, was blamed for increasing major difficulties in re-establishing law incidences of abduction of girls and and order in Kosovo. Out of more than young women. On the positive side, self- 400 cases of ethnically and otherwise mo- help groups were helping women train to tivated killings in Kosovo, only five cases do work traditionally reserved for men, in- had been brought to court. cluding rebuilding their homes, driving tractors, and earning money to support Four district courts have been only partial- their families. ly functioning in Kosovo: in Prishtina, Prizren, Mitrovica and Peja. There was a The newly acquired freedom has created Kosovo Attorney General’s Office and a initiative in the fields of private trade and last instance court of appeal. By Novem- small businesses which is expected to ber, the Kosovo UN head Bernhard grow with the establishment of physical Kouchner had appointed 55 judges for and legal security and the rule of law, and criminal law, five for civilian law, and 15 to contribute to normalization of life in district attorneys, in line with UNMIK and Kosovo. Kosovar commission recommendations.

460 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

MONTENEGRO31 sulting the new government in Montene- gro. Not only the political institutions, but also the federal army, and the federal con- IHF FOCUS: Freedom of association; civil stitutional court thereafter represented control over military and police forces; only the Serbian authorities. Montenegrin religious intolerance; hate speech. authorities responded by refusing to recog- nize the legitimacy and legality of any fed- eral institution. Serbia and Montenegro formed a joint state, named the Federal Republic of Yu- Political decision making during the Koso- goslavia in spring 1992. Many observers at vo war, and particularly the rejection of that time questioned the legality and legit- the Rambouillet agreement in 1999, which imacy of the process by which the federa- led to the NATO military intervention, tion was created. The suspicion that the went ahead without the participation of union of Montenegro and Serbia was cre- Montenegro and its legal representatives. ated by the Serbian elite with the intention Nonetheless, the Belgrade authorities car- of assuming the inheritance of the former ried out the recruiting of Montenegrin citi- Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia zens by force and against the decisions of and of masking Serbian aggression against the Montenegrin authorities. The federal the other former SFRY republics was army, under orders from Belgrade, chal- strengthened when it became clear that lenged the authority of the Montenegro power in the new federation remained authorities and threatened the human firmly in the hands of the Serbian political rights of its citizens. The Montenegrin au- elite. Montenegro, although formally an thorities responded by declaring the Fed- equal partner in the federation, remained eral Constitution and the Federal State no under the political, economic and military longer valid and offering Belgrade a docu- control of Serbia in a relationship that ment on redefining the relationships be- could be described as quasi-colonial. tween Montenegro and Serbia, which was in practice rejected by the Belgrade Serbian pressure on Montenegro escalated regime. Serbian pressure on Montenegro after the split in the governing party in was stepped up on the military, political, Montenegro between Milosevic loyalists economic, and media level. Montenegro and critics led by Milo Djukanovic, and continued to face sanctions, both from the especially after the September 1997 agree- international community and from Serbia. ment between a part of the governing Public support for Montenegrin indepen- party that supported Djukanovic and the dence from Belgrade and for Montenegro opposition in Montenegro. Tension in- to move towards integration in European creased after Djukanovic’s victory in the and other international institutions grew in presidential elections at the end of 1997 1999. Equally, the fear that Belgrade might and after the victory of the coalition “For a use the military forces under its control to Better Life” in the 1998 parliamentary prevent Montenegro leaving the FRY in- elections. Despite the results of the Mon- creased. tenegro elections, the political authorities in Belgrade created the federal govern- The unresolved question of the state and ment and federal parliament without con- legal status of Montenegro was a limiting

31 Based on a report written by the Montenegro Helsinki Committee for the IHF.

461 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro)

factor for the development of democratic country. Given that the process of transi- processes and building democratic institu- tion to a multi-party system and democra- tions and civil society in Montenegro. cy had only just begun in Montenegro by Equally concerning was the lack of clear 1999, the restriction would have signifi- political vision and the continuing power cant consequences. struggles among the political elite. The au- thorities also used the difficult situation as The draft law would also require the re- an excuse for not keeping their promises registration of those parties without repre- about the creation of a system of human sentatives in the parliament and local as- rights and democracy in accordance with semblies. If adopted, the law would not be international standards. in accordance with the constitution of Montenegro and international human Freedom of Association rights standards.

Political Parties NGOs

Freedom of association was guaranteed to The newly adopted Law on Non-Govern- the citizens by article 40 of the Montene- mental Organizations contained several grin constitution. The article also guaran- provisions which were not in accordance teed the widest freedom of political, syn- with the Montenegrin constitution. The dicate and other association without fur- law stipulated that the Ministry of Justice ther permission. However, it was obliga- had the power to reject the registration of tory for all these organizations to register a particular NGO. This provision was in officially. The Law on the Association of contradiction of article 40 of the constitu- Citizens passed in 1990 was in accor- tion, which did not provide for the possi- dance with the constitution. The new draft bility to reject registration. The provision laws, one on NGOs (adopted in July by thus gave the Ministry of Justice the power the parliament) and another on political to make arbitrary decisions and prevent parties (not yet adopted as of the end of the foundation of NGOs. 1999), contained provisions restricting the constitutional guarantee of freedom of as- The new law abolished the possibility for sociation. local organizations to register with the local authorities. The centralization would The draft law on political parties would re- inevitably bring many local organizations quire 2,000 Montenegrin citizens as into a very difficult position. grounding members to establish a political party, considerably more than the earlier The new law on NGOs meant obligatory minimum of 50 citizens and therefore nei- re-registration for all NGOs, which would ther justifiable nor unacceptable, accord- not only mean considerable expenditure ing to the Montenegrin Helsinki Commit- by the organizations, but also the possibil- tee. Considering that Montenegro had ity of being refused registration – even if about 650,000 citizens (about 450,000 of they had been working legally for years. which were eligible to vote), the proposed There was no obligatory re-registration for number would constitute a serious viola- all political parties although the constitu- tion of the citizens’ human right to associ- tion did not provide for different treatment ate into political organization and to par- of political organizations and NGOs ticipate freely in the political life of the where registration was concerned.

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The new law also contained provisions al- “official” organizations, many top people lowing for state interference in the internal in the governing party created their own affairs of an NGO. This provision was not NGOs. The government’s policy influ- in accordance with the constitution and enced even the distribution of financial was more restrictive than the law of 1990. support from abroad to NGOs. The role of However, there were no restrictions on the some persons serving as executives of autonomy of political parties – a discrimi- NGOs and in the government at the same natory treatment as the constitution did time discredited the very idea of civil soci- not differentiate between political parties ety in Montenegro, a country with no tra- and NGOs in this respect. dition of civil society. The implementation of the law actually caused a reduction of Article 40 of the constitution stated that the number of NGOs in Montenegro. By the state should support political, syndi- the deadline for re-registration, only about cate and other associations when they 200 NGOs had managed to re-register served public interests. There were consid- (about 15 percent of the previous total). erable funds in the state budget for this During the re-registration period, the au- purpose. The new law authorized the gov- thorities (Ministry of Justice) themselves ernment to pass a regulation on the allo- failed to observe the provisions of the new cation of funds to support NGOs. This pro- law, treating NGOs that had existed for vision was not in accordance with the years (such as the Montenegrin Helsinki constitution because it, again, discriminat- Committee) as organizations that were reg- ed against NGOs: support of political par- istered for the first time, and thus creating ties was not subordinated to government problems for a number of NGOs. decision. According to the Helsinki Com- mittee in Montenegro, it appeared that the Civil Control Over Military authorities wished to bring part of the and Police Forces NGO sector under their control and to create and promote the model of “govern- Military Forces mental NGOs.” Federal Yugoslav military forces located ■ An example of this was provided by the on the territory of Montenegro operated government’s support for the official stu- under the strict control of the authorities in dent organization (The Association of Stu- Belgrade.32 There was no mechanism for dents of Montenegro) without any legal the civil control of these forces. procedure, while other independent stu- dent organizations received no support. In addition, the Belgrade regime had com- pletely usurped the Supreme Council of The adoption of the new law on NGOs Defense proclaimed by the Federal Consti- marked the beginning of a new policy to- tution. As a result, the representatives of wards the civil society sector in Montene- Montenegro were not allowed to partici- gro. The five months following the adop- pate in decision-making regarding war and tion of the law (from July to December) peace, proclamation of a state of war, etc. made the new policy clear. Apart from the This situation made possible the misuse of authorities favoring and financing certain military forces by the Belgrade regime, a

32 The Montenegrin Helsinki Committee noted that terming these forces “Yugoslav” when they are de facto Serbian military forces, is problematic.

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fact that resulted in systematic mass viola- attempted to assume control over inde- tions of human rights. pendent and state media and to establish military censorship. According to the Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, the federal government decid- ■ The military forces instituted judicial ed on 31 provisions allowing the abolition proceedings against many foreign and of basic human rights or their violation, local journalists, including Miodrag Per- and used the military forces to carry them ovic, the founder of the weekly Monitor, out in Montenegro. The forces targeted a and Nebojsa Redzic, editor-in-chief of range of fundamental human rights, in- Radio Free Montenegro. cluding freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, freedom of movement, the se- ■ The military forces attempted to arrest curity of the citizens and property rights, and summon to court Deputy Prime Min- independence of the judiciary and the ister Novak Kilibarda, because he suggest- right to a fair trial, the rights of refugees ed that the military forces should be put and displaced persons, and the right to under civilian control. participate in political life. According to the Montenegrin Helsinki The military forces forcibly drafted men Committee, the Belgrade regime contin- who did not want to participate in the war ued after the war to develop institutions in Kosovo. Some of the draftees were al- which might be used in the future to exert legedly tortured or ill-treated. Federal au- renewed control over Montenegro by thorities established arbitrary military force, including first setting up a federal courts and hired judges who had been the police force (later abandoned) and there- most radical supporters of President Milo- after a new military police force. These sevic. The military forces blocked Mon- military police forces were organized as a tenegrin roads and ports, preventing free special seventh battalion, resembling para- movement and delivery of humanitarian military forces in many aspects. Many of aid to refugees in Montenegro. They sys- the people drafted to this battalion were tematically prevented any economic activ- people with a criminal background. The ity in Montenegro and at one point block- lack of civil control over the military forces aded the town of Cetinje and moved in Montenegro poses a great threat to heavy weapons towards the town, which human rights and democracy. provoked mass protests among the citi- zens. Security and Police Forces

By mid-August, 14,000–16,000 Montene- In 1997, the Montenegrin parliament es- grins were facing charges in a military tablished a mechanism of civil control court for refusing to take part in the war in over the secret police under a parliamen- Kosovo. Although the Montenegrin parlia- tary commission. The mandate of the com- ment passed a law on amnesty at the end mission was not wide enough to ade- of 1999, the Belgrade regime stated it quately carry out its duties. would not observe the law. The number of allegations of ill-treatment During the period of the Kosovo conflict by police decreased, but some of the cases and NATO intervention, the military forces had political implications. In addition, po-

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lice forces were misused for political pur- of absence from work to observe religious poses. holidays was guaranteed only to citizens belonging to certain religious communities ■ In June, the political leader of the (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Moslem and Liberal Alliance of Montenegro and MP, Jewish) but not to those belonging to other Mr. Zivkovic, was physically attacked in religious groups. the street in the town of Kotor by a mem- ber of the reserve police forces. Prime Montenegrin authorities discriminated in Minister Filip Vujanovic apologized for the favor of the Serbian Orthodox Church, incident during a parliamentary session which acquired the status of a state reli- and promised that the case would be fully gion, a position not in accordance with the investigated. However, no investigation constitution. Its privileged status contrast- took place in 1999. Furthermore, the po- ed with that of the Montenegrin Orthodox lice refused to answer a series of requests Church, abolished in 1920 by the regime from the Municipality Court in Kotor, and of Serbian King Alexander Karadjordjevic so obstructed the operation of justice. and reestablished in 1993. The authorities persistently refused to register the church Religious Intolerance and to give it an equal position with other religious communities. Believers of the In the constitution, Montenegro was de- Montenegrin Orthodox Church have had fined as a secular state. The constitution their freedom to worship restricted. accorded largely with international standards regarding freedom of religion in ■ During 1999, the authorities used police articles 11 and 34. However, the authori- forces to prevent believers in Predis, Cek- ties continuously and systematically vio- lici and Gradjani from using their church- lated these constitutional provisions for the es. In each case the premises were in the religious rights and freedoms of Montene- disputed possession of the Serbian Ortho- grin citizens. The constitutional obligation dox Church. to reconcile the relevant law on freedom of religion with the constitutional provi- Members of two small religious communi- sions was not fulfilled, and the law on the ties, the Adventist Church and Jehovah’s legal position of religious communities Witnesses, continued to experience great adopted in 1977 during the communist era difficulties. These two communities were therefore remained in force. prevented on several occasions from building places of worship in Niksic. Their The 1997 law referred to religious com- buildings were the targets of attacks by the munities as organizations posing a threat local board of the Serbian Orthodox to the state and society and believers as Church. Despite having official permission people whose activities should be con- for the buildings, the members of these stantly monitored by the state – in this communities were refused support from case, the police. According to the law, the local authorities. Registration was also a police were charged with registering these problem, as Montenegrin authorities insist- organizations. Furthermore, the law on ed that they had to ask for permission to celebrating religious holidays discriminat- register separately in each municipality, ed against certain religious groups. Ac- thus restricting their activities in Monte- cording to the law, the right to take leave negro.

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Hate Speech

There were many examples of media pub- lishing hate speech in Montenegro in 1999. The most prominent of these were the dailies Dan and Glas Crnogoraca and the media published in Belgrade that ex- erted considerable influence on public opinion in Montenegro (Politika, Politika Ekspres, Vecernje Novosti, Borba, etc.). These media produced strong propaganda in favor of the Serbian forces in Kosovo, while the targets of hate speech included the Montenegrin authorities, in particular President Djukanovic, minorities, NGOs, and the international community.

The Montenegrin Helsinki Committee was also a target of strong hate speech, espe- cially in several issues of the daily Dan. Glas Crnogoraca also waged a campaign against the Committee, as did senior fig- ures of a political party called the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro. ■■■

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