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PROLOGUE Rethinking Policy and Theory In the New Era Of

he events of September 11, 2001 awakened the international community to the reality of mass-casualty violence perpetrated by suicidal terrorists. These T terrorists were motivated by an uncompromisingly sectarian worldview that allowed for the murder of large numbers of innocent civilians in the name of their faith. The attacks confirmed warnings from experts that a new breed of terrorist would transform available technologies into of enormous destructive power. In the , the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon imme- diately engendered a thorough reexamination and enhancement of the nation’s domestic security environment. This process occurred simultaneously with an unprecedented reorganization of government and the passage of sweeping security laws. As these measures fundamentally changed how Americans would respond to future threats of terrorist violence, they also reflected a basic adaptation of policy and theory to a new era of terrorism. Many experts revisited, and continue to revisit, the questions of which policies are best suited to address the new terrorist threat, as well as how to define and characterize terrorism in the new era. The articles in this chapter introduce policy and theoretical questions posed by the events of September 11, 2001. In “Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11,” Bruce Hoffman explores the lessons of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The article examines the nature of the new era of terrorism, its impact on the contemporary global community, and the problem of adapting counterterrorism to the new environment. A contextual discussion of these issues is developed to posit existing and future trends in terrorist violence. In “The Unipolar Moment Revisited,” Charles Krauthammer revisits his 1990 thesis that the post- international environment will be unipolar and centered around U.S. predominance, rather than multipolar and centered around several regional powers. The article discusses unipolarity in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, centering on the meaning of American global power in the new era of terrorism. Viet Dinh’s article, “Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11,” examines the security environment in the United States from a legalistic perspective. The primary points of discussion are the contention that there exists a dichotomy between freedom and security, and the challenge of how to frame and analyze this debate. It is a provocative article.

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Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11

Bruce Hoffman RAND, Arlington, VA, USA

A few hours after the first American air strikes terrorism, one feature of international terrorism against Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001, a has remained constant despite variations in the pre-recorded videotape was broadcast around the number of attacks from year to year. Almost world. A tall, skinny man with a long, scraggly without exception,1 the United States has annu- beard, wearing a camouflage fatigue jacket and ally led the list of countries whose citizens and the headdress of a desert tribesman, with an property were most frequently attacked by ter- AK-47 assault rifle at his side, stood before a rorists.2 But, until September 11, over the pre- rocky backdrop. In measured, yet defiant, lan- ceding 33 years a total of no more than perhaps guage, Usama bin Laden again declared war on 1,000 Americans had been killed by terrorists the United States. Only a few weeks before, his either overseas or even within the United States statement would likely have been dismissed as itself. In less than 90 minutes that day, nearly the inflated rhetoric of a saber-rattling braggart. three times that number were killed.3 To put But with the World Trade Center now laid to those uniquely tragic events in context, during waste, the Pentagon heavily damaged, and the the entirety of the twentieth century no more wreckage of a fourth hijacked passenger aircraft than 14 terrorist operations killed more than strewn across a field in rural Pennsylvania, bin 100 persons at any one time.4 Or, viewed from Laden’s declaration was regarded with a preter- still another perspective, until the attacks on the natural seriousness that would previously have World Trade Center and Pentagon, no single been unimaginable. How bin Laden achieved terrorist operation had ever killed more than this feat, and the light his accomplishment sheds 500 persons at one time.5 Whatever the metric, on understanding the extent to which terrorism therefore, the attacks that day were unparalleled has changed and, in turn, how our responses in their severity and lethal ambitions. must change as well, is the subject of this article. Significantly, too, from a purely terrorist operational perspective, spectacular simultane- ous attacks—using far more prosaic and THE SEPTEMBER 11 arguably conventional means of attack (such as ATTACKS BY THE NUMBERS car bombs, for example)—are relatively uncom- mon. For reasons not well understood, terrorists The enormity and sheer scale of the simultane- typically have not undertaken coordinated oper- ous suicide attacks on September 11 eclipsed ations. This was doubtless less of a choice than anything previously seen in terrorism. Among a reflection of the logistical and other organiza- the most significant characteristics of the opera- tional hurdles and constraints that all but the tion were its ambitious scope and dimensions; most sophisticated terrorist groups are unable to impressive coordination and synchronization; overcome. Indeed, this was one reason why we and the unswerving dedication and determina- were so galvanized by the synchronized attacks tion of the 19 aircraft hijackers who willingly on the American embassies in Nairobi and and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers, Dar-es-Salaam three years ago. The orchestra- and crews of the four aircraft they comman- tion of that operation, coupled with its unusually deered and the approximately 3,000 persons high death and casualty tolls, stood out in a way working at or visiting either the World Trade that, until September 11, few other terrorist Center and the Pentagon. attacks had. During the 1990s, perhaps only one Indeed, in lethality terms alone the other terrorist operation evidenced those same are without precedent. For characteristics of coordination and high lethal- example, since 1968, the year credited with ity: the series of attacks that occurred in marking the advent of modern, international Bombay in March 1993, when 10 coordinated 01- Martin.qxd 2/3/04 5:19 PM Page 3

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car bombings rocked the city, killing nearly 300 of one of the hijackers acknowledging his people and wounding more than 700 others.6 impending martyrdom in an allusion to the Apart from the attacks on the same morning in forthcoming September 11 attacks. October 1983 of the U.S. Marine barracks in The phenomenon of martyrdom terrorism in Beirut (241 persons were killed) and a nearby Islam has a course long been discussed and French paratroops headquarters (where 60 examined. The act itself can be traced back to soldiers perished); the 1981 hijacking of three the Assassins, an off-shoot of the Shia Ismaili Venezuelan passenger jets by a mixed com- movement, who some 700 years ago waged mando of Salvadoran leftists and Puerto Rican a protracted struggle against the European independistas; and the dramatic 1970 hijacking Crusaders’ attempted conquest of the Holy of four commercial aircraft by the PFLP Land. The Assassins embraced an ethos of self- (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), sacrifice, where martyrdom was regarded as a two of which were brought to and then dramat- sacramental act—a highly desirable aspiration ically blown up at Dawson’s Field in Jordan, and divine duty commanded by religious text there have been few successfully executed, and communicated by clerical authorities—that simultaneous terrorist spectaculars.7 is evident today. An important additional moti- Finally, the September 11 attacks not only vation then as now was the promise that the showed a level of patience and detailed plan- martyr would feel no pain in the commission of ning rarely seen among terrorist movements his sacred act and would then ascend immedi- today, but the hijackers stunned the world with ately to a glorious heaven, described as a place their determination to kill themselves as well as replete with “rivers of milk and wine . . . lakes their victims. Suicide attacks differ from other of honey, and the services of 72 virgins,” where terrorist operations precisely because the perpe- the martyr will see the face of Allah and later be trator’s own death is a requirement for the joined by 70 chosen relatives.10 The last will and attack’s success.8 This dimension of terrorist testament of Muhammad Atta, the ringleader operations, however, arguably remains poorly of the September 11 hijackers, along with a understood. In no aspect of the September 11 “primer” for martyrs that he wrote, titled, “The attacks is this clearer than in the debate over Sky Smiles, My Young Son,” clearly evidences whether all 19 of the hijackers knew they were such beliefs.11 on a suicide mission or whether only the 4 persons Equally as misunderstood is the attention actually flying the aircraft into their targets did. focused on the hijackers’ relatively high levels It is a debate that underscores the poverty of our of education, socioeconomic status, and stable understanding of bin Laden, terrorism moti- family ties.12 In point of fact, contrary to popu- vated by a religious imperative in particular, and lar belief and misconception, suicide terrorists the concept of martyrdom. are not exclusively derived from the ranks of The so-called Manual, discovered by the mentally unstable, economically bereft, or British police in March 2000 on the hard drive abject, isolated loners. In the more sophisticated of an al Qaeda member’s computer, is explicit and competent terrorist groups, such as the about operational security (OPSEC) in the sec- LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or tion that discusses tradecraft. For reasons of Tamil Tigers), it is precisely the most battle- operational security, it states, only the leaders of hardened, skilled, and dedicated cadre who an attack should know all the details of the oper- enthusiastically volunteer to commit suicide ation and these should only be revealed to the attacks.13 Observations of the patterns of recent rest of the unit at the last possible moment.9 suicide attacks in Israel and on the West Bank Schooled in this tradecraft, the 19 hijackers and Gaza similarly reveal that the bombers are doubtless understood that they were on a one- not exclusively drawn from the maw of poverty, way mission from the time they were dispatched but have included two sons of millionaires. to the United States. Indeed, the video tape of Finally, in the context of the ongoing Palestinian- bin Laden and his chief lieutenant, Dr. Ayman Israeli conflict, suicide attacks—once one of the Zawahiri, recently broadcast by the Arabic tele- more infrequent (though albeit dramatic, and vision news station al Jazeera contains footage attention-riveting, tactics)—are clearly increasing 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 4

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in frequency, if not severity, assuming new and most catastrophic threat. This left a painfully more lethal forms. vulnerable gap in antiterrorism defenses where a traditional and long-proven tactic—like airline hijacking—was neglected in favor of other, WHERE THE UNITED STATES less conventional threats and where the conse- WENT WRONG IN FAILING quences of using an aircraft as a suicide TO PREDICT THE 9/11 ATTACKS seem to have been ignored. In retrospect, it was not the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo Most importantly, the United States was per- subway and the nine attempts to use bio- haps lulled into believing that mass, simul- weapons by Aum that should have been the taneous attacks in general and those of such dominant influence on our counterterrorist devastating potential as seen in New York thinking, but a 1986 hijacking of a TWA flight and Washington on September 11 were likely in Karachi, where the terrorists’ intention was beyond the capabilities of most terrorists— reported to have been to crash it into the center including those directly connected to, or associ- of Tel Aviv and the 1994 hijacking in Algiers of ated with, Usama bin Laden. The tragic events an Air France passenger plane by terrorists of that September day demonstrate how pro- belonging to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), foundly misplaced such assumptions were. In who similarly planned to crash the fuel-laden this respect, the significance of past successes aircraft with its passengers into the heart of (e.g., in largely foiling a series of planned Paris. The lesson, accordingly, is not that there terrorist operations against American targets need be unrealistic omniscience, but rather that between the August 1998 embassy bombings to there is a need to be able to respond across a the November 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole, broad technological spectrum of potential including more than 60 instances when credible adversarial attacks. evidence of impending attack forced the tempo- We also had long consoled ourselves—and rary closure of American embassies and con- had only recently began to question and debate sulates around the world) and the terrorists’ own the notion—that terrorists were more interested incompetence and propensity for mistakes (e.g., in publicity than killing and therefore had Ahmad Ressam’s bungled attempt to enter the neither the need nor the interest in annihilating United States from Canada in December 1999) large numbers of people.15 For decades, there were perhaps overestimated. Both impressive was widespread acceptance of the observation and disturbing is the likelihood that there was made famous by Brian Jenkins in 1975 that, considerable overlap in the planning for these “Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a attacks and the one in November 2000 against lot of people listening and not a lot of people the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, thus suggesting al dead.”16 Although entirely germane to the forms Qaeda’s operational and organizational capabil- of terrorism that existed in prior decades, for too ity to coordinate major, multiple attacks at one long this antiquated notion was adhered to. On time.14 September 11, bin Laden wiped the slate clean Attention was also arguably focused too of the conventional wisdom on terrorists and exclusively either on the low-end threat posed terrorism and, by doing so, ushered in a new era by car and truck bombs against buildings or the of conflict. more exotic high-end threats, against entire Finally, before September 11 the United societies, involving biological or chemical States arguably lacked the political will to weapons or cyberattacks. The implicit assump- sustain a long and determined counterterrorism tions of much of American planning scenarios campaign. The record of inchoate, unsustained on mass casualty attacks were that they would previous efforts effectively retarded significant involve germ or chemical agents or result progress against this menace. The carnage and from widespread electronic attacks on critical shock of the September 11 attacks laid bare infrastructure. It was therefore presumed that America’s vulnerability and too belatedly any conventional or less extensive incident resulted in a sea change in national attitudes and could be addressed simply by planning for the accompanying political will to combat terrorism 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 5

Rethinking Policy and Theory–•–5

systematically, globally, and, most importantly, boards,21 using satellite telephones and cell without respite.17 phones themselves and, when travelling by air, often flying first class. This “grafting of entirely modern sensibilities and techniques to the most TERRORISM’S CEO radical interpretation of holy war,” Peter Bergen compellingly explains in Holy War, Inc., “is the The cardinal rule of warfare, “know your hallmark of bin Laden’s network.”22 enemy,” was also violated. The United States For bin Laden, the weapons of modern ter- failed to understand and comprehend Usama bin rorism critically are not only the guns and Laden: his vision, his capabilities, his financial bombs that they have long been, but the mini- resources and acumen, as well as his organiza- cam, videotape, television, and the Internet. The tional skills. The broad outline of bin Laden’s professionally produced and edited two hour al curriculum vitae is by now well known: remark- Qaeda recruitment videotape that bin Laden cir- ably, it attracted minimal interest and understand- culated throughout the Middle East during the ing in most quarters prior to September 11.18 summer of 2001—which according to Bergen The scion of a porter turned construction mag- also subtly presaged the September 11 attacks— nate whose prowess at making money was per- is exactly such an example of bin Laden’s haps matched only by his countless progeny and nimble exploitation of “twenty-first-century devout religious piety, the young Usama pur- communications and weapons technology in sued studies not in theology (despite his the service of the most extreme, retrograde issuance of fatwas, or Islamic religious edicts), reading of holy war.”23 The tape, with its but in business and management sciences. Bin graphic footage of infidels attacking Muslims Laden is a graduate of ’s presti- in Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, gious King Abdul-Aziz University, where in Indonesia, and Egypt; children starving under 1981 he obtained a degree in economics and the yoke of the United Nations economic sanc- public administration. He subsequently cut his tions in Iraq; and most vexatiously, the accursed teeth in the family business, later applying the presence of “Crusader” military forces in the corporate management techniques learned both holy land of Arabia, was subsequently con- in the classroom and on the job to transform the verted to CD-ROM and DVD formats for ease terrorist movement he founded, al Qaeda, into in copying onto computers and loading onto the the world’s preeminent terrorist organization.19 World Wide Web for still wider, global dissemi- Bin Laden achieved this by cleverly combin- nation. An even more stunning illustration of his ing the technological munificence of modernity communications acumen and clever manipula- with a rigidly puritanical explication of age-old tion of media was the pre-recorded, pre-produced, tradition and religious practice. He is also the B-roll, or video clip, that bin Laden had queued quintessential product of the 1990s and global- and ready for broadcast within hours of the ism. Bin Laden the terrorism CEO could not commencement of the American air strikes on have existed—and thrived—in any other era. He Afghanistan on Sunday, October 7. was able to overcome the relative geographical In addition to his adroit marrying of technol- isolation caused by his expulsion from the ogy to religion and of harnessing the munifi- Sudan to Afghanistan, engineered by the United cence of modernity and the West as a weapon to States in 1996, by virtue of the invention of the be wielded against his very enemies, bin Laden satellite telephone. With this most emblematic has demonstrated uncommon patience, planning, technological artifice of 1990s global technol- and attention to detail. According to testimony ogy, bin Laden was therefore able to communi- presented at the trial of three of the 1998 East cate with his minions in real time around Africa embassy bombers in Federal District the world.20 Al Qaeda operatives, moreover, Court in New York last year by a former bin routinely made use of the latest technology Laden lieutenant, Ali Muhammad,24 planning for themselves: encrypting messages on Apple the attack on the Nairobi facility commenced PowerMacs or Toshiba laptop computers, com- nearly five years before the operation was municating via e-mail or on Internet bulletin executed. Muhammad also testified that 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 6

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bin Laden himself studied a surveillance and able to challenge its might and directly photograph of the embassy compound, pointing threaten its citizens. to the spot in front of the building where he said Indeed, in an age arguably devoid of ideo- the truck bomb should be positioned. Attention logical leadership, when these impersonal has already been drawn to al Qaeda’s ability to forces are thought to have erased the ability of a commence planning of another operation before single man to affect the course of history, bin the latest one has been executed, as evidenced in Laden—despite all efforts—managed to taunt the case of the embassy bombings and the attack and strike at the United States for years even 27 months later on the U.S.S. Cole. Clearly, before September 11. His effective melding of when necessary, bin Laden devotes specific the strands of religious fervor, Muslim piety, attention—perhaps even to the extent of micro- and a profound sense of grievance into a power- managing—various key aspects of al Qaeda ful ideological force stands—however invidious “spectaculars.” In the famous “home movie”/ and repugnant—as a towering accomplishment. videotape discovered in an al Qaeda safe house In his own inimitable way, bin Laden cast this in Afghanistan that was released by the U.S. struggle as precisely the “clash of civilizations” government in December 2001, bin Laden is that America and its coalition partners have seen discussing various intimate details of the labored so hard to negate. “This is a matter of September 11 attack. At one point, bin Laden religion and creed; it is not what Bush and Blair explains how “we calculated in advance the maintain, that it is a war against terrorism,” he number of casualties from the enemy, who declared in a videotaped speech broadcast over would be killed based on the position of the al Jazeera television on 3 November 2001. tower. We calculated that the floors that would “There is no way to forget the hostility between be hit would be three or four floors. I was the us and the infidels. It is ideological, so Muslims most optimistic of them all. . . . due to my expe- have to ally themselves with Muslims.”29 rience in this field. . . .” alluding to his knowl- Bin Laden, though, is perhaps best viewed as edge of construction techniques gleaned from his a “terrorist CEO”: essentially having applied time with the family business.25 Bin Laden also business administration and modern manage- knew that Muhammad Atta was the operation’s ment techniques to the running of a transna- leader 26 and states that he and his closest lieu- tional terrorist organization. Indeed, what bin tenants “had notification [of the attack] since the Laden apparently has done is to implement for previous Thursday that the event would take al Qaeda the same type of effective organiza- place that day [September 11].”27 tional framework or management approach The portrait of bin Laden that thus emerges is adapted by corporate executives throughout richer, more complex, and more accurate than the much of the industrialized world. Just as large, simple caricature of a hate-filled, mindless fanatic. multinational business conglomerates moved “All men dream: but not equally,” T. E. Lawrence, during the 1990s to flatter, more linear, and net- the legendary Lawrence of Arabia, wrote. worked structures, bin Laden did the same with “Those who dream by night in the dusty al Qaeda. recesses of their minds wake in the day to find Additionally, he defined a flexible strategy that it was vanity: but the dreamers of the day for the group that functions at multiple levels, are dangerous men, for they may act their dream using both top down and bottom up approaches. with open eyes, to make it possible.”28 Bin On the one hand, bin Laden has functioned like Laden is indeed one of the dangerous men that the president or CEO of a large multinational Lawrence described. At a time when the forces corporation: defining specific goals and aims, of globalization, coupled with economic deter- issuing orders, and ensuring their implementa- minism, seemed to have submerged the role tion. This mostly applies to the al Qaeda of the individual charismatic leader of men “spectaculars”: those high-visibility, usually beneath far more powerful, impersonal forces, high-value and high-casualty operations bin Laden has cleverly cast himself as a David like September 11, the attack on the Cole, against the American Goliath: one man standing and the East Africa embassy bombings. On up to the world’s sole remaining superpower the other hand, however, he has operated as a 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 7

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venture capitalist: soliciting ideas from below, terrorist cell from among the expatriate Muslim encouraging creative approaches and “out of the communities in Canada and the United States. box” thinking, and providing funding to those In sum, a distinctly more amateurish level of al proposals he thinks promising. Al Qaeda, unlike Qaeda operations than the professional cadre many other terrorist organizations, therefore, deployed on September 11; Ressam clearly was deliberately has no one, set modus operandi, far less steeled, determined, and dedicated than making it all the more formidable. Instead, bin the hijackers proved themselves to be. Ressam, Laden encourages his followers to mix and of course, panicked when he was confronted by match approaches: employing different tactics a Border Patrol agent immediately upon enter- and different means of operational styles as ing the United States. By comparison, 9 of the needed. At least four different levels of al Qaeda 19 hijackers were stopped and subjected to operational styles can be identified: greater scrutiny and screening by airport per- sonnel on September 11. Unlike Ressam, they 1. The professional cadre. This is the most stuck to their cover stories, did not lose their dedicated, committed, and professional element nerve and, despite having aroused suspicion, of al Qaeda: the persons entrusted with only the were still allowed to board. Richard Reid, most important and high-value attacks—in other the individual who attempted to blow up an words, the “spectaculars.” These are the terrorist American Airlines passenger plane en route teams that are predetermined and carefully from Paris to Miami with an explosive device selected, are provided with very specific target- concealed in his shoe, is another example of the ing instructions, and who are generously funded trained amateur. It should be emphasized, how- (e.g., to the extent that during the days preceding ever, that as inept or even moronic as these indi- the September 11 attacks, Atta and his confeder- viduals might appear, their ability to be lucky ates were sending money back to their paymas- even once and then to inflict incalculable pain ters in the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere). and destruction should not be lightly dismissed. 2. The trained amateurs. At the next level As distinctly second-tier al Qaeda operatives, down are the trained amateurs. These are indi- they are likely seen by their masters as expend- viduals much like Ahmed Ressam, who was able: having neither the investment in training arrested in December 1999 at Port Angeles, nor the requisite personal skills that the less Washington State, shortly after he had entered numerous, but more professional, first-team al the United States from Canada. Ressam, for Qaeda cadre have. example, had some prior background in terror- 3. The local walk-ins. These are local groups ism, having belonged to Algeria’s Armed of Islamic radicals who come up with a terrorist Islamic Group (GIA). After being recruited into attack idea on their own and then attempt to al Qaeda, he was provided with a modicum of obtain funding from al Qaeda for it. This opera- basic terrorist training in Afghanistan. In con- tional level plays to bin Laden’s self-conception trast to the professional cadre, however, Ressam as a venture capitalist. An example of the local was given open-ended targeting instructions walk-in is the group of Islamic radicals in before being dispatched to North America. All Jordan who, observing that American and he was told was to attack some target in the Israeli tourists often stay at the Radisson Hotel United States that involved commercial avia- in Amman, proposed, and were funded by tion. Ressam confessed that he chose Los al Qaeda, to attack the tourists on the eve of the Angeles International Airport because at one millennium. Another example is the cell of time he had passed through there and was at Islamic militants who were arrested in Milan in least vaguely familiar with it. Also, unlike the October 2001 after wiretaps placed by Italian well-funded professionals, Ressam was given authorities revealed discussions of attacks on only $12,000 in “seed money” and instructed to American interests being planned in the expec- raise the rest of his operational funds from petty tation that al Qaeda would fund them. thievery—for example, swiping cell phones and lap tops around his adopted home of Montreal. 4. Like-minded insurgents, guerrillas, and He was also told to recruit members for his terrorists. This level embraces existing insurgent 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 8

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or terrorist groups who over the years have sought to make his own mark in life as a patron benefited from bin Laden’s largesse and/or spir- of jihad—holy war. In the early 1980s, he was itual guidance; received training in Afghanistan drawn to Afghanistan, where he helped to from al Qaeda; or have been provided with rally—and even more critically, fund—the arms, materiel, and other assistance by the orga- Muslim guerrilla forces resisting that country’s nization. These activities reflect bin Laden’s Soviet invaders. Their success in repelling one “revolutionary philanthropy”: that is, the aid he of the world’s two superpowers had a lasting provides to Islamic groups as part of furthering impact on bin Laden. To his mind, Russia’s the cause of global jihad. Among the recipients defeat in Afghanistan set in motion the chain of this assistance have been insurgent forces in of events that resulted in the collapse of the Uzbekistan and Indonesia, Chechnya, and the U.S.S.R. and the demise of communism. It is Philippines, Bosnia and Kashmir, and so on. this same self-confidence coupled with an This philanthropy is meant not only hopefully to abiding sense of divinely ordained historical create a jihad “critical mass” out of these geo- inevitability that has convinced bin Laden that graphically scattered, disparate movements, but he and his fighters cannot but triumph in the also to facilitate a quid pro quo situation, where struggle against America. Indeed, he has often al Qaeda operatives can call on the logistical described the United States as a “paper tiger” on services and manpower resources provided the verge of financial ruin and total collapse— locally by these groups. with the force of Islam poised to push America over the precipice. Underpinning these operational levels is bin Remarkably, given his mindset, bin Laden Laden’s vision, self-perpetuating mythology and would likely cling to the same presumptions skilled acumen at effective communications. His despite the destruction of the Taliban and liber- message is simple. According to bin Laden’s pro- ation of Afghanistan during this first phase of paganda, the United States is a hegemonic, status the war against terrorism. To him and his fol- quo power; opposing change and propping up lowers, the United States is doing even more corrupt and reprobate regimes that would not now than before to promote global stability (in exist but for American backing. Bin Laden also their view, to preserve the status quo) and believes that the United States is risk and casualty ensure the longevity of precisely those morally averse and therefore cannot bear the pain or suf- bankrupt regimes in places like Egypt, Saudi fer the losses inflicted by terrorist attack. Arabia, the Gulf, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Americans and the American military, moreover, elsewhere whom bin Laden and his followers are regarded by bin Laden and his minions as despise. In bin Laden’s perception of the war in cowards: cowards who only fight with high-tech, Afghanistan, most of the fighting has been done airborne-delivered munitions. The Red Army, he by the Northern Alliance—the equivalent of the has observed, at least fought the mujahedin in native levies of imperial times; though instead Afghanistan on the ground; America, bin Laden of being led by British officers as in the has maintained, only fights from the air with past, they are now guided by U.S. military cruise missiles and bombs. In this respect, bin special operations personnel. Moreover, for bin Laden has often argued that terrorism works— Laden—like guerrillas and terrorists every- especially against America. He cites the with- where—not losing is winning. To his mind, drawal of the U.S. Marines, following the 1983 even if terrorism did not work on September 11 barracks bombing, from the multinational force in dealing the knockout blow to American deployed to Beirut and how the deaths of 18 U.S. resolve that bin Laden hoped to achieve, he can Army Rangers (an account of which is described still persuasively claim to have been responsible in the best-selling book by Mark Bowden, Black for having a seismic effect on the United States, Hawk Down, and current film of the same title)— if not the entire world. Whatever else, bin Laden a far smaller number—prompted the precipitous is one of the few persons who can argue that U.S. withdrawal from Somalia a decade later.30 they have changed the course of history. The Finally, it should never be forgotten that United States, in his view, remains fundamen- some 20 years ago bin Laden consciously tally corrupt and weak, on the verge of collapse, 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 9

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as bin Laden crowed in the videotape released Among the key unanswered questions last year about the “trillions of dollars” of eco- include: nomic losses caused by the September 11 attacks. More recently, Ahmed Omar Sheikh, • Why haven’t terrorists regularly used man- the chief suspect in the killing of American jour- portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs/ nalist, Daniel Pearl, echoed this same point. MANPADS) to attack civil aviation? While being led out of a Pakistani court in • Why haven’t terrorists employed such simpler March, he exhorted anyone listening to “sell and more easily obtainable weapons like your dollars, because America will be finished rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to attack soon.”31 civil aviation by targeting planes while taking Today, added to this fundamental enmity is off or landing? now the even more potent and powerful moti- • Why haven’t terrorists used unmanned drones vation of revenge for the destruction of the or one-person ultra-light or micro-light aircraft Taliban and America’s “war on Islam.” To bin to attack heavily defended targets from the air Laden and his followers, despite overwhelming that are too difficult to gain access to on the evidence to the contrary, the United States is ground? probably still regarded as a “paper tiger,” a • Why haven’t terrorists engaged in mass simul- favorite phrase of bin Laden’s, whose collapse taneous attacks with very basic conventional can be attained provided al Qaeda survives the weapons, such as car bombs, more often? current onslaught in Afghanistan in some form • Why haven’t terrorists used tactics of massive or another. Indeed, although weakened, al disruption—both mass transit and electronic Qaeda has not been destroyed and at least some (cyber)—more often? of its capability to inflict pain, albeit at a greatly • Why haven’t terrorists perpetrated more mar- diminished level from September 11, likely still itime attacks, especially against cruise ships remains intact. In this respect, the multiyear loaded with holidaymakers or cargo vessels time lag of all prior al Qaeda spectaculars is carrying hazardous materials (such as liquefied fundamentally disquieting because it suggests natural gas or [LNG])? that some monumental operation might have • Why haven’t terrorists engaged in agricultural already been set in motion just prior to or livestock terrorism (which is far easier and September 11. more effective than against humans) using biological agents? • Why haven’t terrorists exploited the immense FUTURE THREATS AND POTENTIALITIES psychological potential of limited, discrete use of CBRN weapons and cyberattacks more Rather than asking what could or could not hap- often? pen, it might be more profitable to focus on • Why haven’t terrorists targeted industrial or understanding what has not happened for the chemical plants with conventional explosives light this inquiry can shed on possible future al in hopes of replicating a Bhopol with thou- Qaeda attacks. This approach actually remains sands dead or permanently injured? among the most under-studied and in turn con- • And, finally, why—again with the exception spicuous lacunae of terrorism studies. Many of September 11—do terrorists generally seem academic terrorism analyses—when they ven- to lack the rich imaginations of Hollywood ture into the realm of future possibilities if at movie producers, thriller writers, and others? all—do so only tepidly. In the main, they are self-limited to mostly lurid hypotheses of worst- Alarmingly, many of these tactics and case scenarios, almost exclusively involving weapons have in fact already been used by CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological or terrorists—and often with considerable success. nuclear) weapons, as opposed to trying to The 1998 downing of a civilian Lion Air flight understand why—with the exception of from Jaffna to Colombo by Tamil Tigers using a September 11—terrorists have only rarely Russian-manufactured SA-14 is a case in point. realized their true killing potential. The aforementioned series of car bombings 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 10

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that convulsed Bombay in 1993 is another. The techniques as they once did in capacious training IRA’s effective paralyzing of road and rail- camps. Indeed, the attraction for such attacks will commuting traffic around London in 1997 and likely grow as American society itself becomes 1998 is one more as were the similar tactics ever more dependent on electronic means of used by the Japanese Middle Core to shut down commerce and communication. One lesson from commuting in Tokyo a decade earlier. And in last October’s anthrax cases and the immense 1997, the Tamil Tigers launched one of the few disruption it caused the U.S. Postal Service may documented cyber-terrorist attacks when they be to impel more rapidly than might otherwise shut down the servers and e-mail capabilities of have been the case the use of electronic banking the Sri Lanka embassies in Seoul, Washington, and other online commercial activities. The D.C., and Ottawa. As these examples illustrate, attraction therefore for a terrorist group to bring terrorists retain an enormous capability to inflict down a system that is likely to become increas- pain and suffering without resorting to mass ingly dependent on electronic means of commu- destruction or mass casualties on the order of nication and commerce cannot be dismissed. the September 11 attacks. This middle range, Indeed, Zawahiri once scolded his followers for between worst-case scenario and more likely not paying greater attention to the fears and pho- means of attack is where the United States bias of their enemy, in that instance, Americans’ remains dangerously vulnerable. Terrorists seek intense preoccupation with the threat of bioter- constantly to identify vulnerabilities and exploit rorism. The next great challenge from terrorism gaps in U.S. defenses. It was precisely the iden- may therefore be in cyberspace. tification of this vulnerability in the middle Similarly, the attraction to employ more range of America’s pain threshold that led to the exotic, however crude, weapons like low-level events of that tragic day. biological and chemical agents may also increase. Although these materials might be far removed from the heinous capabilities of true CONCLUSION WMD (weapons of mass destruction) another lesson from last October’s anthrax exposure Terrorism is perhaps best viewed as the arche- incidents was that terrorists do not have to kill typal shark in the water. It must constantly move 3,000 people to create panic and foment fear forward to survive and indeed to succeed. and insecurity: five persons dying in mysterious Although survival entails obviating the govern- circumstances is quite effective at unnerving an mental countermeasures designed to unearth and entire nation. destroy the terrorists and their organization, suc- This article has hitherto discussed and hypoth- cess is dependent on overcoming the defenses esized about terrorism. What, in conclusion, and physical security barriers designed to thwart should be done about it? How should it be attack. In these respects, the necessity for change viewed? First, it should be recognized that terror- in order to stay one step ahead of the counter- ism is, always has been, and always will be terrorism curve compels terrorists to change— instrumental: planned, purposeful, and premedi- adjusting and adapting their tactics, modus tated. The challenge that analysts face is in iden- operandi, and sometimes even their weapons sys- tifying and understanding the rationale and tems as needed.32 The better, more determined, “inner logic”33 that motivates terrorists and ani- and more sophisticated terrorists will therefore mates terrorism. It is easier to dismiss terrorists as always find a way to carry on their struggle. irrational homicidal maniacs than to comprehend The loss of physical sanctuaries—the most the depth of their frustration, the core of their long-standing effect that the U.S.-led war on ter- aims and motivations, and to appreciate how rorism is likely to achieve—will signal only the these considerations affect their choice of tactics death knell of terrorism as it has been known. In and targets. To effectively fight terrorism, a a new era of terrorism, “virtual” attacks from better understanding of terrorists and terrorism “virtual sanctuaries,” involving anonymous must be gained than has been the case in the past. cyberassaults may become more appealing for Second, it must be recognized that terrorism a new generation of terrorists unable to absorb is fundamentally a form of psychological the means and methods of conventional assault warfare. This is not to say that people do not 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 11

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tragically die or that assets and property are not NOTES wantonly destroyed. It is, however, important to note that terrorism is designed, as it has always 1. The lone exception was 1995, when a major been, to have profound psychological repercus- increase in non-lethal terrorist attacks against prop- sions on a target audience. Fear and intimidation erty in Germany and Turkey by PKK (Kurdistan are precisely the terrorists’ timeless stock-in- Workers’ Party) not only moved the US to the number trade. Significantly, terrorism is also designed two position but is also credited with accounting for to undermine confidence in government and that year’s dramatic rise in the total number of inci- leadership and to rent the fabric of trust that dents from 322 to 440. See Office of the Coordinator bonds society. It is used to create unbridled for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism fear, dark insecurity, and reverberating panic. 1999. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State Terrorists seek to elicit an irrational, emotional Publication 10321, April 1996, p. 1. response. Countermeasures therefore must be at 2. Several factors can account for this phenome- once designed to blunt that threat but also to uti- non, in addition to America’s position as the sole lize the full range of means that can be brought remaining superpower and leader of the free world. to bear in countering terrorism: psychological as These include the geographical scope and diversity of well as physical; diplomatic as well as military; America’s overseas business interests, the number of economic as well as persuasion. Americans traveling or working abroad, and the Third, the United States and all democratic many U.S. military bases around the world. countries that value personal freedom and funda- 3. See “Timetables of the Hijacked Flights,” in mental civil liberties will remain vulnerable to Reporters, Writers, and Editors of Der Spiegel terrorism. The fundamental asymmetry of `the Magazine, Inside 9–11: What Really Happened (NY: inability to protect all targets all the time against St. Martin’s, 2002), pp. 261–262. all possible attacks ensures that terrorism will 4. Brian M. Jenkins, “The Organization Men: continue to remain attractive to our enemies. In Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack,” in James F. Hoge, Jr. this respect, both political leaders and the and Gideon Rose, How Did This Happen? Terrorism American public must have realistic expectations and the New War (NY: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 5. of what can and cannot be achieved in the war on 5. Some 440 persons perished in a 1978 fire terrorism and, indeed, the vulnerabilities that exist deliberately set by terrorists at a movie theater in inherently in any open and democratic society. Abadan, Iran. Fourth, the enmity felt in many places 6. Celia W. Dugger, “Victims of ’93 Bombay throughout the world towards the United States Terror Wary of U.S. Motives,” New York Times, will likely not diminish. America is invariably 24 September 2001. seen as a hegemonic, status quo power and more 7. Several other potentially high lethality simul- so as the world’s lone superpower. Diplomatic taneous attacks during the 1980s were averted. These efforts, particularly involving renewed public include, a 1985 plot by Sikh separatists in India and diplomacy activities are therefore needed at Canada to simultaneously bomb three aircraft while least to effect and influence successor genera- in flight (one succeeded: the downing of an Air India tions of would-be terrorists, even if the current flight while en route from Montréal, Québec, to generation has already been missed. London, England, in which 329 persons were killed); Finally, terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless a Palestinian plot to bomb two separate Pan Am struggle. Although a war against terrorism may flights in 1982 and perhaps the most infamous and be needed to sustain the political and popular will ambitious of all pre-September 11 incidents: Ramzi that has often been missing in the past, war by Ahmed Yousef’s “Bojinka” plan to bring down definition implies finality. The struggle against 12 American airliners over the Pacific. See Jenkins, terrorism, however, is never-ending. Terrorism “The Organization Men: Anatomy of a Terrorist has existed for 2,000 years and owes its survival Attack,” p. 6. to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and 8. See Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: countermeasures and to continue to identify and Development and Main Characteristics,” in The exploit its opponent’s vulnerabilities. For success International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism against terrorism, efforts must be as tireless, at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Countering innovative, and dynamic as that of the opponent. Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 12

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(Jerusalem and Hewlett, NY: Gefen, 2001), Barbara Epstein (eds), Striking Terror: America’s p. 76. New War (NY: New York Review of Books, 2002), 9. See bin Laden’s comments about this on the pp. 279–299. videotape released by the U.S. Government in 18. It should be noted that on many occasions, the November 2001, a verbatim transcript of which is Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenent, reproduced in ibid., pp. 313–321. warned in Congressional testimony and elsewhere of 10. “Wedded to death in a blaze of glory—Profile: the profound and growing threat posed by bin Laden The suicide bomber,” The Sunday Times (London), and al Qaeda to US national security. 10 March 1996; and Christopher Walker, “Palestinian 19. See Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the ‘Was Duped into Being Suicide Bomber,’” The Times Secret World of Osama bin Laden (NY: Free Press, (London), 27 March 1997. 2001), pp. 14–15. 11. See Reporters, Writers, and Editors, Inside 20. Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism’s CEO: An 9–11, on pp. 304–313. On-Line Interview with Peter Bergen, author of Holy 12. See, for example, Jenkins, “The Organization War, Inc.,” at http://www.theatlantic.com, January Men,” p. 8. 2002. 13. See in particular the work of Dr. Rohan 21. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., p. 28. Gunaratna of St. Andrews University in this area and 22. Ibid., p. 28. specifically his “Suicide Terrorism in Sri Lanka and 23. Ibid., p. 27. India,” in International Policy, Countering Suicide 24. Ali Muhammad, a former major in the Terrors, pp. 97–104. Egyptian Army, enlisted in the U.S. Army, where he 14. It is now believed that planning for the served as a non-commissioned officer at Fort Bragg, attack on an American warship in Aden harbor North Carolina, teaching U.S. Special Forces about commenced some two to three weeks before Middle Eastern culture and politics. Muhammad, the August 1998 attacks on the East Africa embassies. among other al Qaeda operatives, like Wadi Discussion with U.S. Naval Intelligence Service agent el-Hoge, demonstrates how al-Qaeda found the investigating the Cole attack. December 2001. U.S. a comfortable and unthreatening operational 15. See Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, environment. See Hoffman, “Terrorism’s CEO,” “American and the New Terrorism,” Survival, vol. 42, www.theatlantic.com/unbound/interviews/int2002– no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 59–75 and the “America and 01–09.html. the New Terrorism: An Exchange” by Olivier Roy, 25. Reporters, Writers, and Editor, Inside 9–11, Bruce Hoffman, Reuven Paz, Steven Simon and p. 317. Daniel Benjamin, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 26. Ibid., p. 319. 2000, pp. 156–172. In it Simon and Benjamin aver 27. Ibid., p. 317. that I had become “too closely bound to the academic 28. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom fashion of the moment . . .” (p. 171). As I told (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 23. both Simon and Benjamin after September 11: their 29. Neil MacFarquhar with Jim Rutenberg, “Bin observation was indeed correct. Laden, in a Taped Speech, Says Attacks in 16. Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Afghanistan Are a War Against Islam,” New York Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in David Times, November 4, 2001, p. B2. Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), International 29. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A story of Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Modern War (NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999). Helm, 1975), p. 15. 31. Raymond Bonner, “Suspect in Killing of 17. See, for example, the discussion of two former Reporter Is Brash and Threatening in a Pakistani members of the U.S. National Security Staff, Daniel Court,” New York Times, 13 March 2002. Benjamin and Steven Simon, on the effects of the 32. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: al-Shifa on the Clinton Administration and its coun- Orion and NY: Columbia Univ. Press, 1998), terterrorism policy post the August 1998 embassy pp. 180–183. bombings. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, 33. My colleague at St. Andrews University, “A Failure of Intelligence?” in Robert B. Silvers and Dr Magnus Ranstorp’s, formulation. 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 13

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The Unipolar Moment Revisited

Charles Krauthammer

It has been assumed that the old bipolar world would beget a multipolar world with power dispersed to new centers in Japan, Germany (and/or “Europe”), China and a diminished Soviet Union/Russia. [This is] mistaken. The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is an unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western Allies. “The Unipolar Movement,” 19901

In late 1990, shortly before the collapse of the Judt writes mockingly of the “loud boasts Soviet Union, it was clear that the world we had of unipolarity and hegemony” heard in known for half a century was disappearing. The Washington today.4 But as Stephen Brooks and question was what would succeed it. I suggested William Wohlforth argue in a recent review of then that we had already entered the “unipolar the subject, those denying unipolarity can do so moment.” The gap in power between the lead- only by applying a ridiculous standard: that ing nation and all the others was so unprece- America be able to achieve all its goals every- dented as to yield an international structure where all by itself. This is a standard not for unique to modern history: unipolarity. unipolarity but for divinity. Among mortals, and At the time, this thesis was generally seen as in the context of the last half millennium of his- either wild optimism or simple American arro- tory, the current structure of the international gance. The conventional wisdom was that with system is clear: “If today’s American primacy the demise of the Soviet empire the bipolarity of does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing the second half of the 20th century would yield ever will.”5 to multipolarity. The declinist school, led by A second feature of this new post-Cold Paul Kennedy, held that America, suffering from War world, I ventured, would be a resurgent “imperial overstretch,” was already in relative American isolationism. I was wrong. It turns out decline. The Asian enthusiasm, popularized by that the new norm for America is not post- (among others) James Fallows, saw the second World War I withdrawal but post-World War II coming of the Rising Sun. The conventional wis- engagement. In the 1990s, Pat Buchanan gave dom was best captured by Senator Paul Tsongas: 1930s isolationism a run. He ended up carrying “The Cold War is over; Japan won.” Palm Beach. They were wrong, and no one has put it more Finally, I suggested that a third feature of this forcefully than Paul Kennedy himself in a clas- new unipolar world would be an increase rather sic recantation published earlier this year. than a decrease in the threat of war, and that it “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of would come from a new source: weapons of mass power; nothing,” he said of America’s position destruction wielded by rogue states. This would today. “Charlemagne’s empire was merely constitute a revolution in international relations, western European in its reach. The Roman given that in the past it was great powers who empire stretched farther afield, but there was presented the principal threats to world peace. another great empire in Persia, and a larger one Where are we twelve years later? The two in China. There is, therefore, no comparison.”2 defining features of the new post-Cold War Not everyone is convinced. Samuel Huntington world remain: unipolarity and rogue states with argued in 1999 that we had entered not a uni- weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, these char- polar world but a “uni-multipolar world.”3 Tony acteristics have grown even more pronounced. 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 14

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American dominance has not gone unnoticed. The true geopolitical structure of the post- During the 1990s, it was mainly China and Cold War world . . . [is] a single pole of world Russia that denounced unipolarity in their occa- power that consists of the United States at the sional joint communiqués. As the new century apex of the industrial West. Perhaps it is more dawned it was on everyone’s lips. A French accurate to say the United States and behind it foreign minister dubbed the United States not a the West. superpower but a hyperpower. The dominant “The Unipolar Moment,” 1990 concern of foreign policy establishments every- where became understanding and living with the 800-pound American gorilla. Contrary to expectation, the United States has And then September 11 heightened the not regressed to the mean; rather, its dominance asymmetry. It did so in three ways. First, and has dramatically increased. And during our most obviously, it led to a demonstration of holiday from history in the 1990s, the rogue heretofore latent American military power; state/WMD problem grew more acute. Indeed, Kosovo, the first war ever fought and won we are now on the eve of history’s first war over exclusively from the air, had given a hint of weapons of mass destruction. America’s quantum leap in military power (and the enormous gap that had developed between American and European military capabilities). UNIPOLARITY AFTER But it took September 11 for the United States SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 to unleash, with concentrated fury, a fuller dis- play of its power in Afghanistan. Being a rela- There is little need to rehearse the acceleration tively pacific, commercial republic, the United of unipolarity in the 1990s. Japan, whose claim States does not go around looking for demon- to power rested exclusively on economics, went stration wars. This one was thrust upon it. In into economic decline. Germany stagnated. The response, America showed that at a range of Soviet Union ceased to exist, contracting into 7,000 miles and with but a handful of losses, it a smaller, radically weakened Russia. The could destroy within weeks a hardened, fanati- European Union turned inward toward the great cal regime favored by geography and climate in project of integration and built a strong social the “graveyard of empires.” infrastructure at the expense of military capac- Such power might have been demonstrated ity. Only China grew in strength, but coming earlier, but it was not. “I talked with the previ- from so far behind, it will be decades before ous U.S. administration,” said Vladimir Putin it can challenge American primacy—and that shortly after September 11, assumes that its current growth continues unabated. and pointed out the bin Laden issue to them. They The result is the dominance of a single power wrung their hands so helplessly and said, “the unlike anything ever seen. Even at its height Taliban are not turning him over, what can one Britain could always be seriously challenged by do?” I remember I was surprised: If they are the next greatest powers. Britain had a smaller not turning him over, one has to think and do army than the land powers of Europe and its something.6 navy was equaled by the next two navies com- bined. Today, American military spending Nothing was done. President Clinton and exceeds that of the next twenty countries com- others in his administration have protested that bined. Its navy, air force, and space power are nothing could have been done, that even the 1998 unrivaled. Its technology is irresistible. It is African embassy bombings were not enough to dominant by every measure: military, eco- mobilize the American people to strike back nomic, technological, diplomatic, cultural, even seriously against terrorism. The new Bush linguistic, with a myriad of countries trying to Administration, too, did not give the prospect of fend off the inexorable march of Internet-fueled mass-casualty terrorism (and the recommenda- MTV English. tions of the Hart-Rudman Commission) the 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 15

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priority it deserved. Without September 11, the anti-American non-alignment. Russia’s Putin, giant would surely have slept longer. The world seeing both a coincidence of interests in the would have been aware of America’s size and fight against Islamic radicalism and an opportu- potential, but not its ferocity or its full capaci- nity to gain acceptance in the Western camp, ties. (Paul Kennedy’s homage to American dramatically realigned Russian foreign policy power, for example, was offered in the wake of toward the United States. (Russia has already the Afghan campaign.) been rewarded with a larger role in NATO and Second, September 11 demonstrated a new tacit American recognition of Russia’s interests form of American strength. The center of its in its “near abroad.”) China remains more dis- economy was struck, its aviation shut down, tant but, also having a coincidence of interests Congress brought to a halt, the government sent with the United States in fighting Islamic radi- underground, the country paralyzed and fearful. calism, it has cooperated with the Yet within days the markets reopened, the econ- and muted its competition with America in the omy began its recovery, the president mobilized Pacific. the nation, and a united Congress immediately The realignment of the fence-sitters simply underwrote a huge new worldwide campaign accentuates the historical anomaly of American against terror. The Pentagon started planning unipolarity. Our experience with hegemony his- the U.S. military response even as its demol- torically is that it inevitably creates a counterbal- ished western facade still smoldered. ancing coalition of weaker powers, most recently America had long been perceived as invul- against Napoleonic France and Germany (twice) nerable. That illusion was shattered on in the 20th century. Nature abhors a vacuum; September 11, 2001. But with a demonstration history abhors hegemony. Yet during the first of its recuperative powers—an economy and decade of American unipolarity no such counter- political system so deeply rooted and funda- balancing occurred. On the contrary, the great mentally sound that it could spring back to life powers lined up behind the United States, all the within days—that sense of invulnerability more so after September 11. assumed a new character. It was transmuted from impermeability to resilience, the product of unrivaled human, technological, and political The most crucial new element in the post-Cold War world [is] the emergence of a new strate- reserves. gic environment marked by the proliferation of The third effect of September 11 was to weapons of mass destruction. . . . The prolifer- accelerate the realignment of the current great ation of weapons of mass destruction and their powers, such as they are, behind the United means of delivery will constitute the greatest States. In 1990, America’s principal ally was single threat to world security for the rest of NATO. A decade later, its alliance base had our lives. That is what makes a new interna- grown to include former members of the tional order not an imperial dream or a Warsaw Pact. Some of the major powers, how- Wilsonian fantasy but a matter of the sheerest ever, remained uncommitted. Russia and China prudence. It is slowly dawning on the West flirted with the idea of an “anti-hegemonic that there is a need to establish some new alliance.” Russian leaders made ostentatious regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them. . . . Iraq . . . is the prototype of visits to pieces of the old Soviet empire such as this new strategic threat. Cuba and North Korea. India and Pakistan, frozen out by the United States because of their “The Unipolar Moment,” 1990 nuclear testing, remained focused mainly on one another. But after September 11, the bystanders came calling. Pakistan made an immediate The American hegemon has no great power strategic decision to join the American camp. enemies, an historical oddity of the first order. India enlisted with equal alacrity, offering the Yet it does face a serious threat to its domi- United States basing, overflight rights, and a nance, indeed to its essential security. It comes level of cooperation unheard of during its from a source even more historically odd; an half century of Nehruist genuflection to archipelago of rogue states (some connected 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 16

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with transnational terrorists) wielding weapons foreign policy? That the first and most urgent of mass destruction. task is protection from these weapons. The cat- The threat is not trivial. It is the single greatest alyst for this realization was again September 11. danger to the United States because, for all of Throughout the 1990s, it had been assumed that America’s dominance, and for all of its recently WMD posed no emergency because traditional demonstrated resilience, there is one thing it concepts of deterrence would hold. September 11 might not survive: decapitation. The detonation revealed the possibility of future WMD-armed of a dozen nuclear weapons in major American enemies both undeterrable and potentially cities, or the spreading of smallpox or anthrax undetectable. The 9/11 suicide bombers were throughout the general population, is an existen- undeterrable; the author of the subsequent tial threat. It is perhaps the only realistic threat to anthrax attacks has proven undetectable. The America as a functioning hegemon, perhaps even possible alliance of rogue states with such unde- to America as a functioning modern society. terrables and undetectables—and the possible transfer to them of weapons of mass destruc- tion—presents a new strategic situation that It is of course banal to say that modern tech- demands a new strategic doctrine. nology has shrunk the world. But the obvious corollary, that in a shrunken world the divide between regional superpowers and great pow- Any solution will have to include three ers is radically narrowed, is rarely drawn. elements: denying, disarming, and defending. Missiles shrink distance. Nuclear (or chemical First, we will have to develop a new regime, or biological) devices multiply power. Both similar to COCOM (Coordinating Committee can be bought at market. Consequently, the on Export Controls) to deny yet more high geopolitical map is irrevocably altered. Fifty technology to such states. Second, those states years ago, Germany—centrally located, that acquire such weapons anyway will have highly industrial, and heavily populated— to submit to strict outside control or risk being could pose a threat to world security and to physically disarmed. A final element must be the other great powers. It was inconceivable the development of antiballistic missile and air that a relatively small Middle Eastern state defense systems to defend against those with an almost entirely imported industrial weapons that do escape Western control or base could do anything more than threaten its preemption. . . . There is no alternative to con- neighbors. The central truth of the coming era fronting, deterring and, if necessary, disarm- is that this is no longer the case: relatively ing states that brandish and use weapons of small, peripheral, and backward states will be mass destruction. And there is no one to do able to emerge rapidly as threats not only to that but the United States, backed by as many regional, but to world, security. allies as will join the endeavor. “The Unipolar Moment,” 1990 “The Unipolar Moment,” 1990

Like unipolarity, this is historically unique. THE CRISIS OF UNIPOLARITY WMD are not new, nor are rogue states. Their conjunction is. We have had fifty years of expe- Accordingly, not one but a host of new doctrines rience with nuclear weapons—but in the context have come tumbling out since September 11. of bipolarity, which gave the system a pre- First came the with-us-or-against-us ultimatum dictable, if perilous, stability. We have just now to any state aiding, abetting, or harboring terror- entered an era in which the capacity for inflict- ists. Then, pre-emptive attack on any enemy ing mass death, and thus posing a threat both to state developing weapons of mass destruction. world peace and to the dominant power, resides And now, regime change in any such state. in small, peripheral states. The boldness of these policies—or, as much What does this conjunction of unique cir- of the world contends, their arrogance— cumstances—unipolarity and the proliferation is breathtaking. The American anti-terrorism of terrible weapons—mean for American ultimatum, it is said, is high-handed and permits 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 17

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the arbitrary application of American power Scowcroft in the Washington Post on October everywhere. Pre-emption is said to violate 16, 2001, “ . . . our Arab allies, refusing to traditional doctrines of just war. And regime countenance an invasion of an Arab colleague, change, as Henry Kissinger has argued, threat- would have deserted us.” The coalition defined ens 350 years of post-Westphalian international the mission. practice. Taken together, they amount to an Who should define American ends today? unprecedented assertion of American freedom This is a question of agency but it leads direc- of action and a definitive statement of a new tly to a fundamental question of policy. If the American unilateralism. coalition—whether NATO, the wider Western To be sure, these are not the first instances of alliance, ad hoc outfits such as the Gulf War American unilateralism. Before September 11, alliance, the UN, or the “international commu- the Bush Administration had acted unilaterally, nity”—defines America’s mission, we have one but on more minor matters, such as the vision of America’s role in the world. If, on the Kyoto Protocol and the Biological Weapons other hand, the mission defines the coalition, we Convention, and with less bluntness, as in its pro- have an entirely different vision. tracted negotiations with Russia over the ABM treaty. The “axis of evil” speech of January 29, A large segment of American opinion doubts however, took unilateralism to a new level. the legitimacy of unilateral American action Latent resentments about American willfulness but accepts quite readily actions undertaken are latent no more. American dominance, which by the “world community” acting in concert. had been tolerated if not welcomed, is now Why it should matter to Americans that their producing such irritation and hostility in once actions get a Security Council nod from, say, friendly quarters, such as Europe, that some sug- Deng Xiaoping and the butchers of Tiananmen gest we have arrived at the end of the opposition- Square is beyond me. But to many Americans free grace period that America had enjoyed it matters. It is largely for domestic reasons, during the unipolar moment.7 therefore, that American political leaders In short, post-9/11 U.S. unilateralism has pro- make sure to dress unilateral action in multi- duced the first crisis of unipolarity. It revolves lateral clothing. The danger, of course, is that they might come to believe their own pretense. around the central question of the unipolar age: Who will define the hegemon’s ends? “The Unipolar Moment,” 1990 The issue is not one of style but of purpose. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave the classic formulation of unilateralism when he said (regarding the Afghan war and the war on LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM terrorism, but the principle is universal), “The mission determines the coalition.” We take our For many Americans, multilateralism is no pre- friends where we find them, but only in order to tense. On the contrary: It has become the very help us in accomplishing the mission. The mis- core of the liberal internationalist school of sion comes first, and we decide it. American foreign policy. In the October 2002 Contrast this with the classic case study of debate authorizing the use of force in Iraq, the multilateralism at work: the U.S. decision Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed in February 1991 to conclude the Gulf War. As Services Committee, Carl Levin, proposed the Iraqi army was fleeing, the first Bush authorizing the president to act only with Administration had to decide its final goal: the prior approval from the UN Security Council. liberation of Kuwait or regime change in Iraq. It Senator Edward Kennedy put it succinctly stopped at Kuwait. Why? Because, as Brent while addressing the Johns Hopkins School of Scowcroft has explained, going further would Advanced International Studies on September have fractured the coalition, gone against our 27: “I’m waiting for the final recommendation promises to allies, and violated the UN resolu- of the Security Council before I’m going to say tions under which we were acting. “Had we how I’m going to vote.” added occupation of Iraq and removal of This logic is deeply puzzling. How exactly Saddam Hussein to those objectives,” wrote does the Security Council confer moral 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 18

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authority on American action? The Security citizenship: It was argued on myriad foreign Council is a committee of great powers, heirs policy issues that we could not do X because it to the victors in the Second World War. They would leave us “isolated.” Thus in 1997 the manage the world in their own interest. The Senate passed a chemical weapons convention Security Council is, on the very rare occasions that even some of its proponents admitted was when it actually works, realpolitik by commit- unenforceable, largely because of the argument tee. But by what logic is it a repository of inter- that everyone else had signed it and that failure national morality? How does the approval of to ratify would leave us isolated. Isolation, in France and Russia, acting clearly and rationally and of itself, was seen as a diminished and even in pursuit of their own interests in Iraq (largely morally suspect condition. oil and investment), confer legitimacy on an A lesson in isolation occurred during the invasion? 1997 negotiations in Oslo over the land mine That question was beyond me twelve years treaty. One of the rare holdouts, interestingly ago. It remains beyond me now. Yet this kind enough, was Finland. Finding himself scolded of logic utterly dominated the intervening by his neighbors for opposing the land mine Clinton years. The 1990s were marked by ban, the Finnish prime minister noted tartly that an obsession with “international legality” as this was a “very convenient” pose for the “other expressed by this or that Security Council res- Nordic countries” who “want Finland to be their olution. To take one long forgotten example: land mine.” After an Iraqi provocation in February 1998, In many parts of the world, a thin line of President Clinton gave a speech at the Pentagon American GIs is the land mine. The main reason laying the foundation for an attack on Iraq (one we oppose the land mine treaty is that we need of many that never came). He cited as justifica- them in the DMZ in Korea. We man the lines tion for the use of force the need to enforce there. Sweden and France and Canada do not have Iraqi promises made under post-Gulf War to worry about a North Korean invasion killing ceasefire conditions that “the United Nations thousands of their soldiers. As the unipolar power demanded—not the United States—the United and thus guarantor of peace in places where Nations.” Note the formulation. Here is the Swedes do not tread, we need weapons that president of the most powerful nation on earth others do not. Being uniquely situated in the stopping in mid-sentence to stress the primacy world, we cannot afford the empty platitudes of of commitments made to the UN over those allies not quite candid enough to admit that they made to the United States. live under the umbrella of American power. This was not surprising from a president That often leaves us “isolated.” whose first inaugural address pledged Multilateralism is the liberal international- American action when “the will and conscience ist’s means of saving us from this shameful of the international community is defied.” Early condition. But the point of the multilateralist in the Clinton years, Madeleine Albright for- imperative is not merely psychological. It has a mulated the vision of the liberal internationalist clear and coherent geopolitical objective. It is school then in power as “assertive multilateral- a means that defines the ends. Its means— ism.” Its principal diplomatic activity was the internationalism (the moral, legal and strategic pursuit of a dizzying array of universal treaties primacy of international institutions over on chemical weapons, biological weapons, national interests) and legalism (the belief that nuclear testing, global environment, land mines the sinews of stability are laws, treaties and and the like. Its trademark was consultation: binding international contracts)—are in service Clinton was famous for sending Secretary of to a larger vision: remaking the international State Warren Christopher on long trips (for system in the image of domestic civil society. example, through Europe on Balkan policy) or The multilateralist imperative seeks to establish endless shuttles (uncountable pilgrimages to an international order based not on sovereignty Damascus) to consult; he invariably returned and power but on interdependence—a new home empty-handed and diminished. And its order that, as Secretary of State Cordell principal objective was good international Hull said upon returning from the Moscow 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 19

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Conference of 1943, abolishes the “need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance There is much pious talk about a new multi- of power.” lateral world and the promise of the United Liberal internationalism seeks through multi- Nations as guarantor of a new post-Cold War lateralism to transcend power politics, narrow order. But this is to mistake cause and effect, national interest and, ultimately, the nation- the United States and the United Nations. The state itself. The nation-state is seen as some United Nations is guarantor of nothing. Except in a formal sense, it can hardly be said kind of archaic residue of an anarchic past, an to exist. Collective security? In the Gulf, with- affront to the vision of a domesticated interna- out the United States leading and prodding, tional arena. This is why liberal thinkers bribing and blackmailing, no one would have embrace the erosion of sovereignty promised stirred. . . . The world would have written off by the new information technologies and the Kuwait the way the last body pledged to col- easy movement of capital across borders. They lective security, the League of Nations, wrote welcome the decline of sovereignty as the road off Abyssinia. to the new globalism of a norm-driven, legally- “The Unipolar Moment,” 1990 bound international system broken to the mold of domestic society.8 The greatest sovereign, of course, is the American superpower, which is why liberal REALISM AND THE NEW UNILATERALISM internationalists feel such acute discomfort with American dominance. To achieve their The basic division between the two major vision, America too—America especially— foreign policy schools in America centers on the must be domesticated. Their project is thus to question of what is, and what should be, the fun- restrain America by building an entangling web damental basis of international relations: paper of interdependence, tying down Gulliver with or power. Liberal internationalism envisions a myriad strings that diminish his overweening world order that, like domestic society, is gov- power. Who, after all, was the ABM treaty or erned by laws and not men. Realists see this a land mine treaty going to restrain? North vision as hopelessly utopian. The history of Korea? paper treaties—from the prewar Kellogg-Briand This liberal internationalist vision—the Pact and Munich to the post-Cold War Oslo multilateral handcuffing of American power— accords and the 1994 Agreed Framework with is, as Robert Kagan has pointed out, the dominant North Korea—is a history of naiveté and cyni- view in Europe.9 That is to be expected, given cism, a combination both toxic and volatile that Europe’s weakness and America’s power. But it invariably ends badly. Trade agreements with is a mistake to see this as only a European view. Canada are one thing. Pieces of parchment to The idea of a new international community with which existential enemies affix a signature are self-governing institutions and self-enforcing quite another. They are worse than worthless norms—the vision that requires the domestica- because they give a false sense of security and tion of American power—is the view of the breed complacency. For the realist, the ultimate Democratic Party in the United States and of a determinant of the most basic elements of inter- large part of the American foreign policy estab- national life—security, stability and peace—is lishment. They spent the last decade in power power. fashioning precisely those multilateral ties to Which is why a realist would hardly forfeit restrain the American Gulliver and remake him the current unipolarity for the vain promise of into a tame international citizen.10 The multi- goo-goo one-worldism. Nor, however, should a lateralist project is to use—indeed, to use up— realist want to forfeit unipolarity for the famil- current American dominance to create a new iarity of traditional multipolarity. Multipolarity international system in which new norms of is inherently fluid and unpredictable. Europe legalism and interdependence rule in America’s practiced multipolarity for centuries and found place—in short, a system that is no longer it so unstable and bloody, culminating in 1914 unipolar. in the catastrophic collapse of delicately 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 20

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balanced alliance systems, that Europe sought would get out of Kosovo and Bosnia today if it its permanent abolition in political and eco- could. Its principal aim is to maintain the stabil- nomic union. Having abjured multipolarity for ity and relative tranquility of the current inter- the region, it is odd in the extreme to then national system by enforcing, maintaining and prefer multipolarity for the world. extending the current peace. Less can be said about the destiny of unipolar- The form of realism that I am arguing for— ity. It is too new. Yet we do have the history of the call it the new unilateralism—is clear in its last decade, our only modern experience with determination to self-consciously and confi- unipolarity, and it was a decade of unusual stabil- dently deploy American power in pursuit of ity among all major powers. It would be foolish to those global ends. Note: global ends. There is a project from just a ten-year experience, but that form of unilateralism that is devoted only to nar- experience does call into question the basis for the row American self-interest and it has a name, claims that unipolarity is intrinsically unstable or too: It is called isolationism. Critics of the new impossible to sustain in a mass democracy. unilateralism often confuse it with isolationism I would argue that unipolarity, managed because both are prepared to unashamedly exer- benignly, is far more likely to keep the peace. cise American power. But isolationists oppose Benignity is, of course, in the eye of the America acting as a unipolar power not because beholder. But the American claim to benignity they disagree with the unilateral means, but is not mere self-congratulation. We have a track because they deem the ends far too broad. Isola- record. Consider one of history’s rare controlled tionists would abandon the larger world and use experiments. In the 1940s, lines were drawn American power exclusively for the narrowest of through three peoples—Germans, Koreans, and American interests: manning Fortress America Chinese—one side closely bound to the United by defending the American homeland and States, the other to its adversary. It turned into a putting up barriers to trade and immigration. controlled experiment because both states in the The new unilateralism defines American divided lands shared a common culture. Fifty interests far beyond narrow self-defense. In par- years later the results are in. Does anyone doubt ticular, it identifies two other major interests, the superiority, both moral and material, of both global: extending the peace by advancing West Germany vs. East Germany, South Korea democracy and preserving the peace by acting as vs. North Korea, and Taiwan vs. China?11 balancer of last resort. Britain was the balancer in Benignity is also manifest in the way others Europe, joining the weaker coalition against the welcome our power. It is the reason, for exam- stronger to create equilibrium. America’s unique ple, that the Pacific Rim countries are loath to global power allows it to be the balancer in every see our military presence diminished: They region. We balanced Iraq by supporting its know that the United States is not an imperial weaker neighbors in the Gulf War. We balance power with a desire to rule other countries— China by supporting the ring of smaller states at which is why they so readily accept it as a its periphery (from South Korea to Taiwan, even balancer. It is the reason, too, why Europe, so to Vietnam). Our role in the Balkans was essen- seized with complaints about American high- tially to create a microbalance: to support the handedness, nonetheless reacts with alarm to the weaker Bosnian Muslims against their more occasional suggestion that America might with- dominant neighbors, and subsequently to support draw its military presence. America came, but it the weaker Albanian Kosovars against the Serbs. did not come to rule. Unlike other hegemons Of course, both of these tasks often advance and would-be hegemons, it does not entertain a American national interests as well. The promo- grand vision of a new world. No Thousand Year tion of democracy multiplies the number of Reich. No New Soviet Man. It has no great nations likely to be friendly to the United States, desire to remake human nature, to conquer for and regional equilibria produce stability that the extraction of natural resources, or to rule benefits a commercial republic like the United for the simple pleasure of dominion. Indeed, States. America’s (intended) exertions on behalf America is the first hegemonic power in history of pre-emptive non-proliferation, too, are to be obsessed with “exit strategies.” It could clearly in the interest of both the United States not wait to get out of Haiti and Somalia; it and the international system as a whole. 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 21

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Critics find this paradoxical: acting unilaterally Pragmatic realists also value international but for global ends. Why paradoxical? One can support in the interest of sharing burdens, on the hardly argue that depriving Saddam (and poten- theory that sharing decision-making enlists others tially, terrorists) of WMD is not a global end. in our own hegemonic enterprise and makes Unilateralism may be required to pursue this things less costly. If you are too vigorous in end. We may be left isolated in so doing, but we asserting yourself in the short-term, they argue, would be acting nevertheless in the name of you are likely to injure yourself in the long-term global interests—larger than narrow American when you encounter problems that require the self-interest and larger, too, than the narrowly full cooperation of other partners, such as counter- perceived self-interest of smaller, weaker powers terrorism. As Brooks and Wohlforth put it, (even great powers) that dare not confront the “Straining relationships now will lead only to a rising danger. more challenging policy environment later on.”13 What is the essence of that larger interest? If the concern about the new unilateralism is Most broadly defined, it is maintaining a stable, that American assertiveness be judiciously open, and functioning unipolar system. Liberal rationed, and that one needs to think long-term, internationalists disdain that goal as too selfish, it is hard to disagree. One does not go it alone or as it makes paramount the preservation of both dictate terms on every issue. On some issues, American power and independence. Isolationists such as membership in and support of the WTO, reject the goal as too selfless, for defining where the long-term benefit both to the American interests too globally and thus too American national interest and to global inter- generously. ests is demonstrable, one willingly constricts A third critique comes from what might be sovereignty. Trade agreements are easy calls, called pragmatic realists, who see the new uni- however, free trade being perhaps the only lateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and mathematically provable political good. Others whose objections are practical. They are pre- require great skepticism. The Kyoto Protocol, pared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. for example, would have harmed the American They value great power concert. They seek economy while doing nothing for the global Security Council support not because it confers environment. (Increased emissions from China, any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. India, and Third World countries exempt from In their view, a single hegemon risks far more its provisions would have more than made up violent resentment than would a power that for American cuts.) Kyoto failed on its merits, consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing but was nonetheless pushed because the rest of rule-making functions with others.12 the world supported it. The same case was made I have my doubts. The United States made an for the chemical and biological weapons extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get UN treaties—sure, they are useless or worse, but support, share decision-making, assemble a why not give in there in order to build good will coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the for future needs? But appeasing multilateralism fruits of victory in order to honor coalition does not assuage it; appeasement merely legit- goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feel- imizes it. Repeated acquiescence to provisions ing in the region? Did it garner support for sub- that America deems injurious reinforces the sequent Iraq policy dictated by the original notion that legitimacy derives from interna- acquiescence to the coalition? tional consensus, thus undermining America’s The attacks of September 11 were planned future freedom of action—and thus contradict- during the Clinton Administration, an adminis- ing the pragmatic realists’ own goals. tration that made a fetish of consultation America must be guided by its independent and did its utmost to subordinate American judgment, both about its own interest and about hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resent- the global interest. Especially on matters ments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because of national security, war-making, and the the extremist rage against the United States deployment of power, America should neither is engendered by the very structure of the inter- defer nor contract out decision-making, particu- national system, not by the details of our larly when the concessions involve permanent management of it. structural constrictions such as those imposed 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 22

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by an International Criminal Court. Prudence, realists”—is this: What do you do if, at the end yes. No need to act the superpower in East of the day, the Security Council refuses to back Timor or Bosnia. But there is a need to do so in you? Do you allow yourself to be dictated to on Afghanistan and in Iraq. No need to act the issues of vital national—and international— superpower on steel tariffs. But there is a need security? to do so on missile defense. When I first proposed the unipolar model in The prudent exercise of power allows, 1990, I suggested that we should accept both its indeed calls for, occasional concessions on non- burdens and opportunities and that, if America vital issues if only to maintain psychological did not wreck its economy, unipolarity could good will. Arrogance and gratuitous high- last thirty or forty years. That seemed bold at the handedness are counterproductive. But we time. Today, it seems rather modest. The uni- should not delude ourselves as to what psycho- polar moment has become the unipolar era. It logical good will buys. Countries will cooperate remains true, however, that its durability will be with us, first, out of their own self-interest and, decided at home. It will depend largely on second, out of the need and desire to cultivate whether it is welcomed by Americans or seen as good relations with the world’s superpower. a burden to be shed—either because we are too Warm and fuzzy feelings are a distant third. good for the world (the isolationist critique) or Take counterterrorism. After the attack on the because we are not worthy of it (the liberal U.S.S. Cole, Yemen did everything it could to internationalist critique). stymie the American investigation. It lifted not a The new unilateralism argues explicitly and finger to press terrorism. This was under an unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for American administration that was obsessively sustaining America’s unrivaled dominance for accommodating and multilateralist. Today, the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, under the most unilateralist of administrations, assuming we successfully manage the single Yemen has decided to assist in the war on ter- greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass rorism. This was not a result of a sudden attack destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in of good will toward America. It was a result of itself will require the aggressive and confident the war in Afghanistan, which concentrated the application of unipolar power rather than falling mind of heretofore recalcitrant states like Yemen back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing on the costs of non-cooperation with the United multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era States.14 Coalitions are not made by superpowers hinges on whether America is governed by going begging hat in hand. They are made by those who wish to retain, augment and use asserting a position and inviting others to join. unipolarity to advance not just American but What “pragmatic” realists often fail to realize is global ends, or whether America is governed by that unilateralism is the high road to multilater- those who wish to give it up—either by allow- alism. When George Bush senior said of the ing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, “this will not stand,” Fortress America, or by passing on the burden and made it clear that he was prepared to act by gradually transferring power to multilateral alone if necessary, that declaration—and the institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The credibility of American determination to act uni- challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside laterally—in and of itself created a coalition. but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impi- Hafez al-Asad did not join out of feelings of ously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: History good will. He joined because no one wants to be has given you an empire, if you will keep it. left at the dock when the hegemon is sailing. Unilateralism does not mean seeking to act alone. One acts in concert with others if possi- NOTES ble. Unilateralism simply means that one does not allow oneself to be to others. No 1. This quotation, and all subsequent boxed quo- unilateralist would, say, reject Security Council tations in this essay, are from Charles Krauthammer, support for an attack on Iraq. The nontrivial “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs: America question that separates unilateralism from and the World (1990/91), which introduced the idea multilateralism—and that tests the “pragmatic of American unipolarity. That essay was adapted 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 23

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from the first annual Henry M. Jackson Memorial treaties, international institutions, and interdepen- Lecture, September 18, 1990. dence are the great equalizers. Leveling is fine for 2. Kennedy, “The Eagle has Landed,” Financial them. But for us? The greatest power in the world— Times, February 2, 2002. the most dominant power relative to its rivals that the 3. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” world has seen since the Roman empire—is led by Foreign Affairs (March/April 1999). By uni-multipolar people who seek to diminish that dominance and Huntington means a system with a pre-eminent state level the international arena.” whose sole participation is insufficient for the resolu- 11. This is not to claim, by any means, a perfect tion of international issues. The superpower can still record of benignity. America has often made and con- serve as a veto player, but requires other powers to tinues to make alliances with unpleasant authoritarian achieve its ends. regimes. As I argued recently in Time (“Dictatorships 4. Judt, “Its Own Worst Enemy,” New York and Double Standards,” September 23, 2002), such Review of Books, August 15, 2002. alliances are nonetheless justified so long as they are 5. Brooks and Wohlforth, “American Primacy in instrumental (meant to defeat the larger evil) and tem- Perspective,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2002). porary (expire with the emergency). When Hitler was 6. Interview with the German newspaper Bild, defeated, we stopped coddling Stalin. Forty years translated and reported in the Interfax News Bulletin, later, as the Soviet threat receded, the United States September 21, 2001. was instrumental in easing Pinochet out of power and 7. A Sky News poll finds that even the British overthrowing Marcos. We withdrew our support for public considers George W. Bush a greater threat to these dictators once the two conditions that justified world peace than Saddam Hussein. The poll was con- such alliances had disappeared: The global threat of ducted September 2–6, 2002. Soviet communism had receded, and truly democratic 8. See my “A World Imagined,” The New domestic alternatives to these dictators had emerged. Republic, March 15, 1999, from which some of the 12. This basic view is well represented in foregoing discussion is drawn. The National Interest’s Fall 2002 symposium, 9. Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy “September 11th One Year On: Power, Purpose, and Review (June 2002). Strategy in U.S. Foreign Policy.” 10. In “A World Imagined,” I noted the oddity of 13. Brooks and Wohlforth, “American Primacy in an American governing elite adopting a goal—a Perspective.” constrained America—that is more logically the goal 14. The most recent and dramatic demonstration of foreigners: “The ultimate irony is that this is tradi- of this newfound cooperation was the CIA killing on tionally the vision of small nations. They wish to November 4 of an Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen using a level the playing field with the big boys. For them, remotely operated Predator drone.

Foreword: Freedom and Security After September 11

Viet D. Dinh

An oft-repeated refrain since the September 11 for additional security. Some are eager to make terrorist attacks is that Americans must now that exchange, while others consider the price choose between a robust national defense and too dear. Both sides, however, seem to agree their vital civil liberties. Security versus free- that freedom and security are competing virtues, dom: the underlying assumption is that the two and that the expansion of one necessarily entails can coexist only uneasily in times of national the contraction of the other. crisis. The loss of certain freedoms, so goes the This is not a new dichotomy. In 1759, prevailing wisdom, is the price that must be paid Benjamin Franklin reminded his fellow colonists 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 24

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that “they that can give up essential liberty to Americans not just against unwarranted govern- obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither mental intrusion, but also against the incapaci- liberty nor safety.”1 For Franklin, liberty is the tating fear that terrorists seek to engender. To supreme good, and a people capable of surren- ensure the safety of our citizens and the security dering its freedoms in exchange for security is of our Nation, the Department has fundamen- not fit for self-governance, or even “safety.” A tally redefined our mission. The enemy we con- century later, Abraham Lincoln appeared before front is a multinational network of evil that is Congress to justify his unilateral decision to sus- fanatically committed to the slaughter of inno- pend the writ of habeas corpus. “[A]re all the cents. Unlike enemies that we have faced in past laws, but one,” the president asked, “to go unex- wars, this one operates cravenly, in disguise. It ecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, may operate through so-called “sleeper” cells, lest that one be violated?”2 For Lincoln, the sending terrorist agents into potential target Great Emancipator, liberty was an obstacle to areas, where they may assume outwardly nor- the government’s proper functioning and, worse, mal identities, waiting months, sometimes a threat to the government’s very existence. years, before springing into action to carry out The dichotomy between freedom and security or assist terrorist attacks.4 And unlike garden- is not new, but it is false. For security and free- variety criminals the Department has investi- dom are not rivals in the universe of possible gated and prosecuted in the past, terrorists are goods; rather, they are interrelated, mutually rein- willing to give up their own lives to take the forcing goods. Security is the very precondition lives of thousands of innocent citizens. We can- of freedom. Edmund Burke teaches that civil lib- not afford to wait for them to execute their erties cannot exist unless a state exists to vindi- plans; the death toll is too high; the conse- cate them: “[t]he only liberty I mean is a liberty quences too great. We must neutralize terrorists connected with order; that not only exists along before they strike. with order and virtue, but which cannot exist at To respond to this threat of terrorism, the all without them.”3 In the same way that an indi- Department has pursued an aggressive and sys- vidual’s moral right to property would be mean- tematic campaign that utilizes all available ingless unless the government establishes courts information, all authorized investigative tech- of law in which those rights can be declared and niques, and all legal authorities at our disposal. enforced, so too Americans’ civil liberties would The overriding goal is to prevent and disrupt ter- be a nullity unless they are protected from those rorist activity by questioning, investigating, and who seek to destroy our way of life. arresting those who violate the law and threaten If much post-September 11 commentary our national security. In doing so, we take care mistakenly casts security as a rival to freedom, to discharge fully our responsibility to uphold it also exhibits an unduly narrow understanding the laws and Constitution of the United States. of freedom itself. “Freedom” does not refer sim- All investigative techniques we employ are ply to the absence of governmental restraint; it legally permissible under applicable constitu- also refers, at a more fundamental level, to the tional, statutory, and regulatory standards. As the absence of fear. Terrorists do not measure suc- President and the Attorney General have stated cess with a body count. Their objective is to repeatedly, we will not permit, and we have not spread fear among all Americans, preventing permitted, our values to fall victim to the terrorist our nation from playing an active part on the attacks of September 11. world’s stage and our citizens from living their The Department of Justice has taken a lives in the manner to which they are accus- number of concrete steps to advance the goal of tomed. Without confidence in the safety of incapacitating terrorists before they are able to their persons and the security of their Nation, claim another innocent American life. First, Americans will not be able to go about doing the Department has detained a number of those ordinary things that make America an persons on immigration or federal criminal extraordinary nation. charges. Second, in cooperation with our col- As the Department of Justice prosecutes the leagues in state and local law enforcement, the war on terror, we have committed to protect Department’s Anti-Terrorism Task Forces have 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 25

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conducted voluntary interviews of individuals countries, the INS will notify those officials that who may have information relating to our inves- one of their nationals has been arrested or tigation. Third, the Bureau of Prisons has detained. Finally, Immigration Judges preside promulgated a regulation that permits the moni- over legal proceedings involving aliens, and toring of communications between a limited aliens have the right to appeal any adverse deci- class of detainees and their lawyers, after pro- sion, first to the Board of Immigration Appeals, viding notice to the detainees. And fourth, the and then to the federal courts. President has exercised his congressionally del- Second, the Department of Justice has egated authority to establish military commis- conducted voluntary interviews of individuals sions, which would try non-citizen terrorists for who may have information relating to terrorist offenses against the laws of war. activity. On November 9, the Attorney General With respect to detentions, the Department directed all United States Attorneys and members has taken several hundred persons into custody of the joint federal and state Anti-Terrorism in connection with our investigation of the Task Forces, or “ATTFs,” to meet with certain September 11 attacks. Every one of these deten- noncitizens in their jurisdictions. That same day, tions is consistent with established constitu- the Deputy Attorney General issued a memoran- tional and statutory authority. Each of the dum outlining the procedures and questions to be detainees has been charged with a violation of asked during those interviews. The names of either immigration law or criminal law, or is the approximately 5,000 individuals that were sent subject of a material witness warrant issued by a to the ATTFs as part of this effort are those who court. The aim of the strategy is to reduce the we believe may have information that is helpful risk of terrorist attacks on American soil, and to the investigation or to disrupting ongoing the Department’s detention policy already may terrorist activity. The names were compiled using have paid dividends. These detentions may have common-sense criteria that take into account the incapacitated an Al Qaeda sleeper cell that manner, according to our intelligence sources, in was planning to strike a target in Washington, which Al Qaeda traditionally has operated. Thus, DC—perhaps the Capitol building—soon after for example, the list includes individuals who September 11.5 entered the United States with a passport from a The detainees enjoy a variety of rights, both foreign country in which Al Qaeda has operated procedural and substantive. Each of them has the or recruited; who entered the United States after right of access to counsel. In the criminal cases January 1, 2000; and who are males between the and in the case of material witnesses, the person has ages of 18 and 33. the right to a lawyer at the government’s expense The President and Attorney General contin- if he cannot afford one. Persons detained on ually have emphasized that our war on terror- immigration violations also have a right of access ism will be fought not just by our soldiers to counsel, and the Immigration and Naturalization abroad, but also by civilians here at home. The Service provides each person with information Department instituted a program that would about available pro bono representation. Every enable our nation’s guests to play a part in this person detained has access to telephones, which campaign. Non-citizens are being asked, on a they may use to contact their family members or purely voluntary basis, to come forward with attorneys, during normal waking hours. useful and reliable information about persons Once taken into INS custody, aliens are who have committed, or who are about to com- given a copy of the “Detainee Handbook,” mit, terrorist attacks. Those who do so will which details their rights and responsibilities, qualify for the Responsible Cooperators including their living conditions, clothing, Program. They may receive S visas or deferred visitation, and access to legal materials. In action status that would allow them to remain addition, every alien is given a comprehensive in the United States for a period of time. Aliens medical assessment, including dental and men- who are granted S visas may later apply to tal health screenings. Aliens are informed of become permanent residents and, ultimately, their right to communicate with their nation’s American citizens. The Responsible Cooperators consular or diplomatic officers, and, for some Program enables us to extend America’s 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 26

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promise of freedom to those who help us the regulation. Second, the regulation erects a protect that promise. “firewall” between the team monitoring the Third, the Bureau of Prisons on October 31 communications and the outside world, includ- promulgated a regulation permitting the moni- ing persons involved with any ongoing prosecu- toring of attorney-client communications in tion of the client. Third, absent imminent very limited circumstances. Since 1996, BOP violence or terrorism, the government would regulations have subjected a very small group have to obtain court approval before any infor- of the most dangerous federal detainees to mation from monitored communications is used “special administrative measures,” if the for any purpose, including for investigative pur- Attorney General determines that unrestricted poses. And fourth, no privileged information communication with these detainees could would be retained by the monitoring team; only result in death or serious bodily harm to others. information that is not privileged may be Those measures include placing a detainee in retained. administrative detention, limiting or monitor- Finally, the President has authorized military ing his correspondence and telephone calls, commissions to try members of Al Qaeda and restricting his opportunity to receive visitors, other non-citizen terrorists for violations of the and limiting his access to members of the news laws of war. Trying terrorists before military media.6 The pre-existing regulations cut off all commissions offers a number of practical channels of communication through which advantages over ordinary civilian trials. First, detainees could plan or foment acts of terror- commissions enable the government to protect ism, except one: communications through their classified and other sensitive national security attorneys. The new regulation closes this loop- information that would have to be disclosed hole. It permits the monitoring of attorney- publicly before an Article III court. Second, client communications for these detainees only ordinary criminal trials would subject court per- if the Attorney General, after having invoked sonnel, jurors, and other civilians to the threat of the existing special administrative measures terrorist reprisals; the military is better suited to authority, makes the additional finding that rea- coping with these dangers. And third, military sonable suspicion exists to believe that a partic- commissions can operate with more flexible ular detainee may use communications with rules of evidence, which would allow the intro- attorneys to further or facilitate acts of terror- duction all relevant evidence regardless of ism.7 Currently, only 12 of the approximately whether, for example, it has been properly 158,000 inmates in federal custody would be authenticated. eligible for monitoring. The Supreme Court has unanimously upheld The Department has taken steps to protect the constitutionality of military commissions,11 the attorney-client privilege and the detainees’ and since its founding our Nation has used Sixth Amendment right to the effective assis- them to try war criminals, as have our interna- tance of counsel. As an initial matter, not all tional allies. During World War II, President communications between a lawyer and his Roosevelt ordered eight Nazi saboteurs tried client are protected by the attorney-client privi- by military commission. After the Civil War, lege; statements that are designed to facilitate a commission was used to try Confederate crimes, including acts of terrorism, are not sympathizers who conspired to assassinate privileged. The “crime/fraud exception” applies President Lincoln. And during the Revolution- even if the attorney is not aware that he is being ary War, General Washington convened a mili- used to facilitate crime,8 and even if the attorney tary commission to try British Major Andre as takes no action to assist the client.9 a spy. Moreover, the President’s authority to Moreover, the monitoring regulation convene military commissions is confirmed by includes a number of procedural safeguards Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military to protect privileged communications.10 First Justice.12 In 1942, the Supreme Court inter- and foremost, the attorney and client would be preted identical language, then appearing in the given written advance notification that their Articles of War, as recognizing the President’s communication will be monitored pursuant to power to try war crimes before military 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 27

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commissions.13 And America and her allies NOTES made liberal use of military commissions after World War II to try war criminals both in the 1. Benjamin Franklin, Historical Review of European and Pacific theater.14 Pennsylvania (1759), quoted in THE OXFORD After September 11, Americans in their DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS 141 (Anthony own ways have sought answers to the seem- Jay ed., 1996). ingly unfathomable question: why? Because 2. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Americans are somehow different from and bet- Special Session (July 4, 1861), reprinted in 4 ter than the people of the world? I do not think COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 so. We are the people of the world. We are not, (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). as individuals, different from those who would 3. Edmund Burke, Speech at His Arrival at rain terror upon us. But there is something spe- Bristol Before the Election in That City (1774), cial that defines us as Americans—the benefits quoted in ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS and responsibilities of living in this nation. GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN America gives to people who come to her shores DECLINE 64 (1996). the freedom to achieve extraordinary things. 4. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, “Sleeper Cells” of Our uniqueness lies in our ability as ordinary Al Qaeda Are Next Target, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, people to do extraordinary ordinary things as at A1. Americans. It was this foundation of freedom 5. See Jeffrey Bartholet, Al Qaeda Runs for the that was under attack. Hills, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 21, 23. America’s tradition of freedom thus is not an 6. See generally 28 C.F.R. pt. 500 (2001). obstacle to be overcome in our campaign to rid 7. See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001). the world of individuals capable of the evil we 8. See United States v. Soudan, 812 F.2d 920, saw on September 11. It is, rather, an integral 927 (5th Cir. 1986). objective of our campaign to defend and pre- 9. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d serve the security of our nation and the safety of 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1996). our citizens. Indeed, as the images of liberated 10. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(1), (2), (3) Afghan men shaving their beards and freed (2001). Afghan women shedding their burquas elo- 11. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex quently testify, freedom is itself a weapon in our parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). war on terror. Just as we unleash our armed 12. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2001). forces abroad, and empower our law-enforce- 13. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27, 29. ment officers here at home, America’s cam- 14. See generally DEP’TOFARMY, PAM. 27–161–2, paign against terrorism will extend freedom for INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II, at 235 (1962); PHILIP R. our citizens, as well as for the people of the PICCIGALLO, THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL; ALLIED WAR world. CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945–1951 (1979).

REVIEW QUESTIONS

• Why was September 11, 2001 a turning point for international security policy and theory? • How did the attacks on the American homeland affect the global community? • What is the role of the United States in the new security environment? What is the role of the international community? • In what manner has the debate about freedom and security been shaped by the new era of terrorism? • Is the new era of terrorism one of permanent domestic and international security realignment, or will this era evolve and ultimately be supplanted by another environment?

The following books and articles are suggested for further information about understanding issues affecting policy and theory in the new era of terrorism: 01- Martin.qxd 2/2/04 3:08 PM Page 28

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Books Bergen, Peter L. Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. New York: Free Press, 2001. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Howard, Russell D. and Reid L. Sawyer, eds. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings & Interpretations. Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003.

Articles Embar-Sedden, Ayn. “: Are We Under Siege?” American Behavioral Scientist. 45:6 (February 2002). Hoffman, Bruce. “Change and Continuity in Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 24:5 (September 2001). Hugo, Slim. “Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity, and Enmity in War.” International Affairs. 79:3 (April 2003).