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The Power-Hungry Are Fueling Violence in the Central African Republic
Note: This is the English translation of an op-ed in French that originally appeared in Le Monde and was written by Enough Project Analyst and Researcher, Nathalia Dukhan. The power-hungry are fueling violence in the Central African Republic By Nathalia Dukhan August 21, 2017 Fourteen armed factions, a multitude of local militia groups, invasions by mercenaries from neighboring countries, and a militia army — in August 2017, less than a year after the official retreat of the French military operation, Sangaris, this is the situation confronting the Central African Republic (CAR). More than 80 percent of the country is controlled by or under the influence of armed militia groups. The security and humanitarian situation has been disastrous for the past 10 months. In recent days, the towns of Bangassou, Gambo and Béma, situated in the east of the country, have been the scene of massacres and sectarian violence. While the leaders of the armed groups shoulder much of the blame, they are not the only ones responsible for this escalation of violence. Political actors and their support networks, operating more discretely in the background but equally hungry for power and personal gain, are supporting and perpetuating these crimes. This political system, based on the manipulation of violence, is fueling trafficking, threatening the stability of the region and leaving the population of an entire country in profound distress. To bring an end to this crisis, there is an urgent need to delegitimize these actors who are perpetrating violence and yet involved in the peace process, to strengthen the implementation of judicial mechanisms and targeted sanctions and to tackle these trafficking networks, in order to pave the way for a peace dialogue. -
African Dialects
African Dialects • Adangme (Ghana ) • Afrikaans (Southern Africa ) • Akan: Asante (Ashanti) dialect (Ghana ) • Akan: Fante dialect (Ghana ) • Akan: Twi (Akwapem) dialect (Ghana ) • Amharic (Amarigna; Amarinya) (Ethiopia ) • Awing (Cameroon ) • Bakuba (Busoong, Kuba, Bushong) (Congo ) • Bambara (Mali; Senegal; Burkina ) • Bamoun (Cameroons ) • Bargu (Bariba) (Benin; Nigeria; Togo ) • Bassa (Gbasa) (Liberia ) • ici-Bemba (Wemba) (Congo; Zambia ) • Berba (Benin ) • Bihari: Mauritian Bhojpuri dialect - Latin Script (Mauritius ) • Bobo (Bwamou) (Burkina ) • Bulu (Boulou) (Cameroons ) • Chirpon-Lete-Anum (Cherepong; Guan) (Ghana ) • Ciokwe (Chokwe) (Angola; Congo ) • Creole, Indian Ocean: Mauritian dialect (Mauritius ) • Creole, Indian Ocean: Seychelles dialect (Kreol) (Seychelles ) • Dagbani (Dagbane; Dagomba) (Ghana; Togo ) • Diola (Jola) (Upper West Africa ) • Diola (Jola): Fogny (Jóola Fóoñi) dialect (The Gambia; Guinea; Senegal ) • Duala (Douala) (Cameroons ) • Dyula (Jula) (Burkina ) • Efik (Nigeria ) • Ekoi: Ejagham dialect (Cameroons; Nigeria ) • Ewe (Benin; Ghana; Togo ) • Ewe: Ge (Mina) dialect (Benin; Togo ) • Ewe: Watyi (Ouatchi, Waci) dialect (Benin; Togo ) • Ewondo (Cameroons ) • Fang (Equitorial Guinea ) • Fõ (Fon; Dahoméen) (Benin ) • Frafra (Ghana ) • Ful (Fula; Fulani; Fulfulde; Peul; Toucouleur) (West Africa ) • Ful: Torado dialect (Senegal ) • Gã: Accra dialect (Ghana; Togo ) • Gambai (Ngambai; Ngambaye) (Chad ) • olu-Ganda (Luganda) (Uganda ) • Gbaya (Baya) (Central African Republic; Cameroons; Congo ) • Gben (Ben) (Togo -
Africa's Role in Nation-Building: an Examination of African-Led Peace
AFRICA’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING An Examination of African-Led Peace Operations James Dobbins, James Pumzile Machakaire, Andrew Radin, Stephanie Pezard, Jonathan S. Blake, Laura Bosco, Nathan Chandler, Wandile Langa, Charles Nyuykonge, Kitenge Fabrice Tunda C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2978 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0264-6 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: U.S. Air Force photo/ Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane; Feisal Omar/REUTERS. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Since the turn of the century, the African Union (AU) and subregional organizations in Africa have taken on increasing responsibilities for peace operations throughout that continent. -
Region: West Africa (14 Countries) (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo)
Region: West Africa (14 Countries) (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo) Project title: Emergency assistance for early detection and prevention of avian influenza in Western Africa Project number: TCP/RAF/3016 (E) Starting date: November 2005 Completion date: April 2007 Government counterpart Ministries of Agriculture responsible for project execution: FAO contribution: US$ 400 000 Signed: ..................................... Signed: ........................................ (on behalf of Government) Jacques Diouf Director-General (on behalf of FAO) Date of signature: ..................... Date of signature: ........................ I. BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION In line with the FAO/World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) Global Strategy for the Progressive Control of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), this project has been developed to provide support to the regional grouping of West African countries to strengthen emergency preparedness against the eventuality of HPAI being introduced into this currently free area. There is growing evidence that the avian influenza, which has been responsible for serious disease outbreaks in poultry and humans in several Asian countries since 2003, is spread through a number of sources, including poor biosecurity at poultry farms, movement of poultry and poultry products and live market trade, illegal and legal trade in wild birds. Although unproven, it is also suspected that the virus could possibly be carried over long distances along the migratory bird flyways to regions previously unaffected (Table 1) is a cause of serious concern for the region. Avian influenza subtype H5N1 could be transported along these routes to densely populated areas in the South Asian Subcontinent and to the Middle East, Africa and Europe. -
Building Resilience in Africa's Drylands
REGIONAL INITIATIVE FOR AFRICA Building resilience in Africa’s drylands FOCUS COUNTRIES Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. OVERALL GOAL Enhance the capacity of dryland countries to anticipate, mitigate and respond to shocks, threats and crises affecting their livelihoods. ABOUT THE REGIONAL INITIATIVE Populations in Africa are increasingly exposed to the negative impact of natural and human-induced disasters such as drought, floods, disease epidemics and conflicts which threaten the agriculture production systems and livelihoods of vulnerable communities. The initiative on “Building Resilience in Africa’s Drylands” was developed to enhance the capacity of these communities to withstand and bounce back from these crises. It aims to strengthen institutional capacity for resilience; support early warning and information management systems; build community level resilience; and respond to emergencies and crises. ZIMBABWE Vegetable farming in Chirumhanzi district. ©FAO/Believe Nyakudjara ZIMBABWE Emergency drought mitigation for livestock in Matabeleland province. ©FAO/Believe Nyakudjara practices and knowledge in the region. The Regional MAKING A DIFFERENCE Initiative also seeks to support countries in meeting one of the key commitments of the Malabo Declaration on The Regional initiative strengthens institutional capacity reducing the number of people in Africa vulnerable to for resilience; supports early warning and information climate change and other threats. management systems; builds community level resilience; and responds to emergencies and crises. Priority actions include: IN PRACTICE > Provide support in areas of resilience policy development and implementation, resilience To achieve resilience in Africa’s drylands in the focus measurement, vulnerability analysis, and strategy countries, the initiative is focusing its efforts on: development and implementation. -
Eu Emergency Trust Fund for Africa Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa
EU EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY AND ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA he Emergency Trust Fund for Africa complements the long-standing and comprehensive partnership that European Union and Africa enjoy together. Established at the Valletta Summit on Migration in November 2015, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was created to address the root causes of instability, forced Tdisplacement and irregular migration and to contribute to better migration management. The Valletta Summit brought together European and African Heads of State and Government in an effort to strengthen cooperation and address the current challenges but also the opportunities of migration. The Trust Fund for Africa is worth over €3.3 billion, with over 88% of the contributions coming from the EU, and around 12% from EU Member States and other donors. The bulk of its resources are dedicated to the creation of jobs and Economic Development, especially for young people and women in local communities, with a focus on vocational training and the creation of micro and small enterprises. The other priority areas are supporting Resilience to support basic services for local populations, Migration Management, e.g. to prevent irregular migration and fight human trafficking, as well as Stability and Governance, in particular by promoting conflict prevention, addressing human rights abuses and enforcing the rule of law. THE STATE OF PLAY OF THE EU EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA To date, 146 programmes across the three regions have been approved for a total amount of approximately €2.4 billion divided as follows: Horn of Africa 818.1 million, North of Africa €285 million, Sahel/Lake Chad €1263 million, and cross-cindow projects €21.6 million. -
Armed Conflicts
Map 22 1 . 1. Armed conicts Ukraine Turkey Syria Palestine Afghanistan Iraq Israel Algeria Pakistan Libya Egypt India Myanmar Mali Niger Chad Sudan Thailand Yemen Burkina Philippines Faso Nigeria South Ethiopia CAR Sudan Colombia Somalia Cameroon DRC Burundi Countries with armed conflicts End2018 of armed conflict in Alert 2019 1. Armed conflicts • 34 armed conflicts were reported in 2018, 33 of them remained active at end of the year. Most of the conflicts occurred in Africa (16), followed by Asia (nine), the Middle East (six), Europe (two) and America (one). • The violence affecting Cameroon’s English-speaking majority regions since 2016 escalated during the year, becoming a war scenario with serious consequences for the civilian population. • In an atmosphere characterised by systematic ceasefire violations and the imposition of international sanctions, South Sudan reached a new peace agreement, though there was scepticism about its viability. • The increase and spread of violence in the CAR plunged it into the third most serious humanitarian crisis in the world, according to the United Nations. • The situation in Colombia deteriorated as a result of the fragility of the peace process and the finalisation of the ceasefire agreement between the government and the ELN guerrilla group. • High-intensity violence persisted in Afghanistan, but significant progress was made in the exploratory peace process. • The levels of violence in southern Thailand were the lowest since the conflict began in 2004. • There were less deaths linked to the conflict with the PKK in Turkey, but repression continued against Kurdish civilians and the risk of destabilisation grew due to the repercussions of the conflict in Syria. -
Chad/Cameroon Development Project
Chad/Cameroon Development Project Project Update No. 30 Mid-Year Report 2011 Chad Export Project Project Update No. 30 Mid-Year Report 2011 This report has been prepared by Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc., in its capacity as Operator of the Consortium and as Project Management Company on behalf of the Tchad Oil Transportation Company S.A. (TOTCO) and the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company S.A. (COTCO). Preface his Project Update, the thirtieth such report for the Chad Export Project (also referred to as the T Chad/Cameroon Development Project), covers the period from January through June, 2011. The report reflects the activities of the project operating company and its prime contractors, with a particular focus on compliance with the Environmental Management Plan (EMP). Several entities share responsibility for implementing the project. • Oilfield development and production in Chad is conducted by Esso Exploration and Production Chad Inc. (EEPCI) on behalf of the Consortium (Esso, Petronas, Chevron). • Pipeline activities in Chad are conducted by the Tchad Oil Transportation Company S.A. (TOTCO). • Pipeline activities in Cameroon are conducted by the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company S.A. (COTCO). • During construction, EEPCI provided project management services to TOTCO and COTCO. These reports are submitted through, and subject to verification by, the World Bank and Lender Group as a reporting requirement of the project’s partnership with the Bank and the two host countries. This report also represents a commitment to transparency by Esso and its co-venture partners. By publishing this information, the project wishes to make it possible for the World Bank and Lender Group, the citizens of the host countries, interested non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others to stay well informed about the project as it unfolds. -
Chad O Z Humanitarian Z a L a P / 9 1 0
2021 https://www.unicef.org/appeals/chad o z Humanitarian z a l a P / 9 1 0 2 Action for / d a h C F E Children C I N U © A girl living in Baga Sola refugee site in Lake Chad province walks home after attending her UNICEF-supported school. Chad HIGHLIGHTS IN NEED Chad is facing conflict-induced displacements, destructive rains, floods, loss of crops and 6.4 3.1 the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Over 3 million schoolchildren (58 per cent girls) are affected by nationwide school closures; almost 1.8 million children under 5 million million years are suffering from global acute malnutrition, including 500,000 who are severely 3 4 malnourished;1 and over 300,000 refugee children are at risk of not being vaccinated.2 people children UNICEF will implement a multi-sectoral and gender-sensitive strategy linking humanitarian action and development programming. This will include disease outbreak prevention and control, including in relation to COVID-19, early detection, quality treatment for severe acute malnutrition (SAM), distance and school-based learning, school materials for displaced, returnee and refugee children; and capacity building for the provision of care, referrals and psychosocial support. 2017 2021 UNICEF requests US$59.5 million to respond to humanitarian needs in Chad. Thirty per cent of these funds will support the COVID-19 response. TO BE REACHED 1.2 1.1 million million people5 children6 KEY PLANNED TARGETS 403,437 370,000 children admitted for children vaccinated against 2017 2021 treatment for severe acute measles malnutrition FUNDING REQUIREMENTS US$ 59.5 100,000 223,500 million people accessing a children receiving individual sufficient quantity of safe learning materials water Figures are provisional and subject to change upon finalization of the inter-agency planning documents. -
Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic
Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic: Challenges and Priorities High-level dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic, 21-22 June 2016 Cover Photo: High-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR at the United Nations headquarters on 21 June 2016. Panellists in the center of the photograph from left to right: Adedeji Ebo, Chief, SSRU/OROLSI/DPKO; Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation; Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic; Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence of Central African Republic; Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA. Photo: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic The report was produced by the Security Sector Reform Unit, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. © United Nations Security Sector Reform Unit, 2016 Map of the Central African Republic 14° 16° 18° 20° 22° 24° 26° AmAm Timan Timan The boundaries and names shown and the designations é oukal used on this map do not implay official endorsement or CENTRAL AFRICAN A acceptance by the United Nations. t a SUDAN lou REPUBLIC m u B a a l O h a r r S h Birao e a l r B Al Fifi 'A 10 10 h r ° a a ° B b C h a VAKAGA r i CHAD Sarh k Garba Sarh Bahr Aou CENTRAL Ouanda AFRICAN Djallé REPUBLIC Doba BAMINGUI-BANGORAN Sam -
De Travail168
DOCUMENTS DE TRAVAIL168 Trajectories and Origins Survey on Population Diversity in France Initial findings October 2010 By the TeO research team Co-ordinated by Cris Beauchemin, Christelle Hamelle and Patrick Simon Trajectories and Origins Survey on Population Diversity in France Initial findings October 2010 Contents Introduction Trajectories and Origins (TeO), a Survey on Population Diversity in France 5 Glossary 7 Chapter 1 The Populations Surveyed Bertrand Lhommeau, Patrick Simon 11 Chapter 2 Migration Is Not Only Immigration Cris Beauchemin, Catherine Borrel, Corinne Régnard 19 Chapter 3 Between Here and There: a Glimpse of “Transnational” Practices in the Population Living in Metropolitan France 25 Cris Beauchemin, Hugues Lagrange, Mirna Safi Chapter 4 Diversity of Linguistic Practises Stéphanie Condon, Corinne Régnard 31 Chapter 5 Educational Attainment of Immigrants and their Descendants 37 Laure Moguérou, Yaël Brinbaum, Jean-Luc Primon Chapter 6 Educational Trajectories and Experiences of Young Descendants of Immigrants in France 45 Yaël Brinbaum, Laure Moguérou, Jean-Luc Primon Chapter 7 Labour market Situation of Persons aged 18-50 by Sex and Origin 53 Bertrand Lhommeau, Dominique Meurs, Jean-Luc Primon Chapter 8 Occupations of Descendants of Immigrants and their Fathers: Is Occupational Inheritance Determined 61 by Geographical Origin? Mahrez Okba Chapter 9 Working Hours and Wages Bertrand Lhommeau, Dominique Meurs, Jean-Luc Primon 69 Chapter 10 The Experience of Migration, Self-perceived Health and Non-Use of Healthcare Service -
French Intervention in Africa Reflects Its National Politics
5/11/2017 Africa at LSE – French Intervention in Africa Reflects its National Politics French Intervention in Africa Reflects its National Politics Eva Nelson analyses the underlying motivations in France’s foreign policy towards Africa. The long view of French foreign policy in Africa is paved by conflict of interest. Some politicians are tempted to pull out of the continent for fear of accusation of neocolonialism, somewhat incompatible with President Hollande’s definition of the Francafrique. Others, looking forward to re election, are more preoccupied with appeasing national fears of terrorism by keeping a grip on the Sahel – which they hope will secure them votes from an electorate that begs for heightened national security. This paradox in policy is best witnessed by asymmetric reactions to recent French intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic. Civil wars were taking place at the same time in both countries, but the French media and public opinion reacted differently to each. The government received praise for intervening in Northern Mali, while involvement in the Central African Republic was barely covered, if not overlooked, by the French domestic audience. How to explain such a divide in public opinion for two identical military interventions? Unsurprisingly, it was due to the perceived relationship between the global jihad narrative and domestic security issues, and reinforced by public denial of France’s postcolonial responsibility for conflict in Central Africa. Refugee families from Mali in Mentao refugee camp, northern Burkina Faso Photo Credit: Oxfam International via Flickr (http://bit.ly/2dDJsgj) CC BYNCND 2.0 In early 2012, rebels from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg independence movement, seized strategic cities in Mali’s northern territory before eventually overthrowing the government.