Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic

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Security Sector Reform in the Central African Republic: Challenges and Priorities High-level dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic, 21-22 June 2016

Cover Photo: High-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR at the United Nations headquarters on 21 June 2016. Panellists in the center of the photograph from left to right: Adedeji Ebo, Chief, SSRU/OROLSI/DPKO; Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation; Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic; Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence of Central African Republic; Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA. Photo: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

The report was produced by the Security Sector Reform Unit, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. © United Nations Security Sector Reform Unit, 2016 Map of the Central African Republic

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Map No. 4048 Rev. 8 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support June 2016 Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

Map l i

Foreword

Many political and military crises over the of a professional gendarmerie and police years have afflicted our country and caused is essential to build sustainable peace and both serious violations of human rights security in the country. The security sector and insecurity throughout our land. These in particular can make an effective con- crises have also made the security sector tribution to the protection of people and institutions more fragile. The international securing the land and borders. A revital- community has had to intervene to help ized SSR process offers an opportunity to protect both our people and the country, transform the security sector into one that and a number of strategies on security is more accountable, representative, effec- sector reform have been tried. These, how- tive and efficient. And today, senior offi- ever, have failed thus far and the cycle of cials of the state institutions are working to violence and insecurity persists. The peo- ensure that the new SSR process succeeds. ple of the CAR, who have been brutalized We are already cooperating with multilat- by so much fighting, are waiting for more eral partners and civil society to that end. effective and professional security forces But the efforts made by all of these Gov- which are under civilian control and ac- ernment institutions and actors can bene- countable to the National Assembly. In this fit from technical and financial support. In respect, the importance and timeliness of this respect, we look forward to the donor the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR conference in Brussels this November, and cannot be overstated, and we are particu- hope that the international community larly grateful to the United Nations Group will respond to the needs expressed by the of Friends of SSR and to the Government of Government, and supported by the United Slovakia for facilitating this dialogue. Nations and other partners.

Since his election earlier this year, President Jean Willybiro-Sako Touadéra has focused on national reconcil- Special Minister-Counsellor iation, and to attain his goals, he has taken to the President of the CAR for DDR, on the issue of insecurity. The reform of the SSR and National Reconciliation security sector will be a part of the national Bangui reconciliation process. The development October 2016

Foreword l iii SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES A Word From:

Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary- General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

Security is a key challenge to restoring security forces have a loose structure, an peace and stability in the Central African unbalanced ethnic distribution, a lack of Republic, and one of MINUSCA’s main pri- command, and overall poor management. orities is to assist the CAR in reforming its They still have a long way to go before they national vision of security. The security of reach commonly accepted standards for the people and the state, which is at the such institutions. Furthermore, the security heart of the political dynamic in the CAR, institutions have been at the heart of the touches on democratic rules and good problem in CAR, and they must therefore governance through the distribution of also be an essential part of the solution to tasks and the delineation of responsibili- the problems in the country. ties assigned to respective security institutions involved in providing protection. The There is no doubt that the ability of the in- high-level dialogue on building support ternational community to address the issue for key SSR priorities in the Central African of SSR is central to its long-term efforts in Republic both revealed and confirmed support of the CAR’s democratization, na- the political nature of SSR in the CAR and tional reconciliation and security stabiliza- the challenges that lie ahead. To date, the tion. Implementing a coherent and realistic high-level dialogue represents the most SSR strategy represents a key process and important platform on SSR issues in the a powerful enabler in support of MINUS- CAR since the election of the new CAR CA’s mandate. And while the high-level Government. The dialogue paved the way dialogue clearly demonstrated the political for the formulation of the national SSR will of the CAR national authorities to tackle commitments in the Cadre d’engagement the challenging issues, it also showed that mutuel (Mutual Accountability Framework) significant work lies ahead both politically and the part on SSR of the National Plan for and in terms of resources. Past SSR efforts Recovery and Peacebuilding, which Presi- have failed not only because of political dent Touadéra will present at the Novem- challenges, but also in part due to the inter- ber Brussels donor conference on the CAR. national community’s lack of financial com- I am hopeful that the Brussels event will mitment for SSR efforts. It is therefore my respond positively to the needs identified sincere hope that donors can provide the at the New York dialogue. much needed financial support for the SSR activities that will help to restore peace and The security institutions are meant to pro- stability in the country, and that will help to tect not only the public institutions, but shape a brighter future for the Central Afri- also all the citizens of the CAR, irrespective can Republic. of their ethnicity, religion and traditions, or cultural and political affiliation. Howev- Bangui er, currently the CAR armed and internal October 2016

iv l A Word From Foreword

Since its establishment in 2007, the United will add to the growing body of knowl- Nations Group of Friends of SSR has played edge and lessons on the support to SSR a key role in facilitating and promoting se- in post-conflict contexts. As noted by the curity sector reform as a key item on the Security Council, for SSR to be successful, United Nations agenda. The high-level it is essential to strengthen partnerships dialogue on SSR in the Central African Re- among national, multilateral and bilateral public is the first country-specific meeting partners, and in this respect the involve- of the Group of Friends on a high level after ment of numerous partners in the dialogue, years of consensus building on a normative including from the World Bank and the Eu- basis of SSR within the United Nations. As ropean Union, was significant. Our previ- co-Chairs, Slovakia and South Africa are ous discussions within the Group of Friends very proud to have had the opportunity had highlighted that SSR is firmly linked to to facilitate this important event, and are peace and transition processes, and the di- grateful to the Security Sector Reform Unit alogue on the CAR provided us with an op- in the Office of Rule of Law and Security portunity to discuss the ways in which the Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping United Nations can support the on-going Operations, for the close cooperation and political processes surrounding SSR in the moderation of the event. We sincerely hope CAR. The Group of Friends dedicates itself that the dialogue will galvanize the neces- to maintaining and focusing international sary support on SSR in the CAR. attention on the SSR agenda in the CAR.

It is also our hope that the dialogue will Miroslav Lajčák further contribute, from a field perspective, Minister of Foreign & European Affairs to the implementation of Security Council of the Slovak Republic resolution 2151 (2014), the first stand-alone Bratislava resolution on Security Sector Reform, and October 2016

Foreword l v SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES Moderator’s Overview

The Central African Republic is literally tional consensus on the need to address se- that was held in New York. While the CAR cartographically central to Africa, physi- curity governance deficits in a comprehen- understandably faces resource constraints, cally located at the heart of the continent. sive manner, a commonly agreed agenda primacy of financial responsibility neces- In terms of political geography therefore, for a transformative trajectory is still evolv- sarily rests with the CAR Government. This the CAR is indeed the “centre” of Africa. It ing. A new National Security Policy, based is an essential element of national own- connects the north, south, east and west on the concept of human security and en- ership. Thus, the Government needs the of the continent and shares borders with dorsed by all national stakeholders, is es- support of the international community countries belonging to the entire compass sential for advancing human development in integrating security governance and re- of Africa. Supporting security sector rein the CAR. The politics of SSR is therefore form matters into public expenditure and form (SSR) in the CAR is therefore of stra- a key and foundational area in which the budgeting processes. In this regard, it is en- tegic importance for and relevance for the CAR would need the support of the inter- couraging that the Government is, with the entire African continent and beyond. national community. The United Nations support of the World Bank and the United is particularly well placed to play this role Nations, initiating a Security Sector Public In post conflict and fragile contexts in of facilitating a common security vision, Expenditure Review. As both organizations which the United Nations is engaged, the based on a legitimate social contract and confirmed during the dialogue, this is a key goal of building effective and accountable a political framework in which all citizens area for ensuring the viability, sustainabili- institutions is a key exit strategy for peace- of the country can identify themselves and ty and accountability of the security sector keeping. United Nations member states are stakeholders in security institutions. reform process. have agreed to support security sector reform on the basis of national ownership, The second element of national owner- Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the se- as stated in Security Council resolution of ship – national capacity to implement the curity sector reform and governance pro- April, 2014. common vision – was severally referenced cesses also features as central to the viabil- during the dialogue as a major deficit area ity and sustainability national ownership. National ownership represents the yard- for the CAR. The discussions illustrated a As the New York dialogue richly illustrated, stick for assessing the “success” (viability systemic and systematic dysfunction in the it is important for national actors to be at and sustainability) of such SSR processes, capacity of security institutions to effec- the centre of efforts to identify indicators, and thus, a relevant framework through tively deliver security services. The Forces benchmarks, targets, objectives and scope which to assess the New York CAR dia- armées centrafricaines (FACA) 3 seemed of- of reform processes. From this perspective, logue.1 The United Nations has further ten to seize the focus of the New York CAR the New York dialogue was a major contri- identified four key elements that consti- dialogue, recognized both as a challenge bution to enhancing the level of national tute the basis national ownership:2 and a solution to insecurity. However, the ownership in the CAR’s SSR process. capacity gaps in internal security services 1. Common national security vision; also featured prominently. In this regard, The New York dialogue represented a very 2. Implementation capacity; it should be stressed that while significant instrumental platform in the identification 3. Financing; financial assistance from the international of the main priority areas in which the CAR 4. Monitoring and Evaluation. community would be necessary, it is not can benefit from the support of the inter- a sufficient condition for building nation- national community. These are presented Against these criteria, the “dialogue on al capacity. Exchange of experiences with in five “baskets”, namely: challenges and priorities of SSR in the CAR’” other states who have and/or continue to • Politics of SSR reflected mixed results with respect to the face similar security governance challeng- • Institutional Capacity results of reforming the security sector ef- es (south-south cooperation) would also • Democratic Oversight forts in the CAR thus far, but with encour- be critical. and Accountability aging signs for the path ahead. • Affordability and Sustainability Financing, particularly financial respon- • Coordination of international In terms of the first element of national sibility, is the third element of national support ownership – a common national vision – ownership, which illustrates the challenge the dialogue demonstrated that “we are facing SSR in the CAR, and needs to be It was not lost on the participants that this not there yet.” While there is indeed a na- highlighted in summarizing the dialogue is not the first attempt at SSR in the CAR.

vi l Moderator’s Overview There is indeed a history of mixed results. CAR. It was indeed the first of its kind and The failure of the last SSR process be- an important indicator that, this time, the tween 2008 and 2010 was caused by insuf- path to reform will be transformative, and ficient coordination between partners and a major contribution to a new inclusive so- national authorities, unrealistic expecta- cial contract in the CAR. tions, and unsteady support on the part of the international community. The dialogue Adedeji Ebo was, however, an affirmation of renewed Chief, Security Sector Reform Unit, Office international support to the Government of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, and people of the CAR in meeting the chal- Department of Peacekeeping Operations lenges of building effective, accountable New York and sustainable security institutions in the October 2016

Moderator’s Overview l vii SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES Table of Contents

Map of the Central African Republic i

Foreword by Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR, SSR and National Reconciliation iii

A Word from Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) iv

Foreword by Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of the Slovak Republic v

Moderator’s Overview by Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Chief, Security Sector Reform Unit, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations vi

Abbreviations and Acronyms x

Executive Summary xi

Introduction 1

Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR 1.1 Historical Context 4 1.2 Political Economy 5 1.3 Overview of the security sector 7 Structure of the rule of law and security sector 7 Overview of the United Nations mandate for SSR 8 Multilateral and bilateral support activities 2014-2016 9 1.4 Challenges for the security sector 11 Politics of SSR 11 Institutional Capacity 12 Democratic Accountability 14 Affordability and Sustainability 15 Coordination of international support 15

Part 2: Summary of Dialogues 2.1 Reform Priorities 19 Politics of SSR 19 Institutional Capacity 19 Democratic Accountability 20 Affordability and Sustainability 21 Coordination of international support 21 Further observations 21

viii l Table of Contents Part 3: Recommendations on transforming the security sector 3.1 Politics of SSR 24 3.2 Institutional Capacity 25 3.3 Democratic Accountability 26 3.4 Affordability and Sustainability 27 3.5 Coordination of international support 27

Conclusion 29

Annexes Annex I. Agenda of the High-Level Dialogue 32

Annex II. Agenda of the Inter-Agency Senior SSR Practitioners’ Workshop 34

Annex III. United Nations Group of Friends of SSR Co-Chairs’ Statement 36

Annex IV. Speech of Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic, 21 June 2016 38

Annex V. Speech of Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 21 June 2016 40

Annex VI. Speech of Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 21 June 2016 42

Annex VII. Speech of Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, 21 June 2016 44

Annex VIII. Speech of Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 21 June 2016 46

Annex IX. Speech of Minister of Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration of the Central African Republic, as delivered by Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 22 June 2016 48

Annex X. Speech of Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 22 June 2016 50

Annex XI. Speech of Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic, 22 June 2016 54

Annex XII. Speech of Mr. Jean-Christophe Carret, Country Manager for the Central African Republic, World Bank, 22 June 2016 58

Notes 60

Table of Contents l ix SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES Abbreviations and Acronyms

APRD Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy CAR Central African Republic DPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations DDRR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation DSR Defence Sector Reform DCAF Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General EUMAM RCA European Union Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic EUTM-RCA EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States EUFOR RCA European Union Force in the Central African Republic FACA Central African Armed Forces (Forces armées centrafricaines) GDP Gross Domestic Product HRDDP United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy IDP Internally Displaced Person IMF International Monetary Fund ISF Internal Security Forces ITGN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MISCA African Union Mission in the Central African Republic MoD Ministry of Defence M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NSP National Security Policy NSHC National Security High Council OROLSI Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (DPKO) PNDDRR National Program on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation SSR Security Sector Reform SSRU Security Sector Reform Unit (DPKO) SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General SSPER Security Sector Public Expenditure Review UN United Nations UNCT United Nations Country Team UNDP United Nations Development Programme UFDR Union of Democratic Forces for Unity UNSC United Nations Security Council

x l Abbreviations and Acronyms Executive Summary

The crisis that has swept across the Cen- the United Nations Department of Peace- Overall, the dialogue highlighted that tral African Republic (CAR) since Decem- keeping Operations (DPKO). there is general agreement on some of the ber 2012 led to the near-complete break- key elements of reformed defence and se- down of law and order and collapse of state The main objective of the event was to curity forces, including the FACA, the po- institutions in the country. The struggle for identify the key challenges for SSR in the lice and the gendarmerie, which need to power and wealth in the CAR has had a de- CAR and priorities for SSR support, and be republican, professional, multi-ethnic bilitating effect on the country’s ability to it provided a platform for a discussion and regionally balanced, as well as on the govern itself peacefully and on its ability to among and between a high-level dele- specific resource needs. However, it was develop functioning security institutions. gation from the Central African Republic, evident that there is still some way to go President Faustin-Archange Touadéra has multilateral institutions and United Na- before all the national stakeholders reach recognized that reforming the security sec- tions Member States on this important a commonly shared vision on SSR. The tor is crucial for sustainable peace and de- topic. The delegation from the CAR, which dialogue also exposed some differences velopment in the CAR, and has made secu- included among others Mr. Jean Willybi- between the international community rity sector reform (SSR) a key priority of his ro-Sako, the Special Minister-Counsellor to and the CAR Government on the best way mandate. Previous SSR efforts in the coun- the President of the CAR for DDR/SSR and to address the CAR’s security challenges: try failed in part because of a lack of politi- National Reconciliation, and Mr. Joseph while some national interlocutors por- cal will of national authorities, institutional Yakété, Minister of Defence of the CAR, trayed the non-state armed groups in the governance deficits and the international had the opportunity to lay out its priorities country as criminal elements, and pushed community’s unwillingness to commit the for SSR support. The CAR Government’s for a military solution, the international necessary financial resources in the long high-level participation demonstrated its community emphasized the need for polit- term. However, a change in the political strong desire to coordinate the assistance ical solutions to essentially political prob- landscape in the CAR has opened up many on SSR with the United Nations, as well as lems, and called on the CAR Government new opportunities for the United Nations with the African Union (AU) and the Euro- to engage with armed groups in a candid and the international community more pean Union (EU). and genuine political dialogue about the broadly to enhance engagement with the way forward in the country. From this national authorities on SSR. SSR in the CAR The high-level dialogue revealed and perspective, the United Nations strategic has the potential to transform the relation- confirmed the political nature of SSR and priority in the CAR is the reduction of the ship between the State and its citizens by the challenges that still lie ahead. It also presence of and threat posed by armed enhancing inclusivity and legitimacy of the highlighted a number of reform priorities, groups through political dialogue. State’s security institutions. SSR is also es- including on the politics of SSR, institution- sential for preventing a return to violence. al capacities, democratic accountability, The report makes a number of recom- affordability and sustainability, and coor- mendations on ways to transform the A successful transformation of the securi- dination of international support. The Co- security sector. In the first instance, a dia- ty sector hinges on our understanding of Chairs’ Statement, which is included in this logue between the CAR Government and the specific SSR challenges and support report, underscored that SSR is “a key tool armed groups leading to the peaceful priorities. In this context, the co-chairs of for preventing relapse into conflict” and disarmament, demobilization and reinte- the United Nations Group of Friends of Se- stressed three key elements that must be gration (DDR) of those armed groups will curity Sector Reform, Slovakia and South contained in a strategic approach to SSR: be essential for achieving the ultimate Africa, facilitated a dialogue on building first, “[p]ut in place a national policy and end-state of SSR in the CAR as envisioned support for SSR priorities in the CAR. The governance framework for the security by President Touadéra and the Security dialogue, which took place in New York sector”; second, “[l]ay the ground for the Council, namely the establishment of “pro- on 21 and 22 June, 2016, was chaired by effective functioning, professionalism and fessional, ethnically representative and Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign internal accountability of security institu- regionally balanced national defence and and European Affairs of the Slovak Re- tions, in particular the FACA, gendarmerie internal security forces,” which are under public and co-Chair of the United Nations and police”; and third “[e]nhance coordina- civilian control, accountable to democratic Group of Friends of SSR, and moderated tion of international support, including of institutions and respectful of the rule of law by Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Chief of the Security MINUSCA support, to the national SSR pro- and human rights.4 Such a dialogue, which Sector Reform Unit (SSRU), Office of Rule of cess within a mutual accountability frame- can be facilitated by the United Nations, Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) of work (compact).” will also be important for the development

Executive Summary l xi SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES of a national SSR strategy that is inclusive The specific recommendations on attain- integrity of the CAR and contrib- and sustainable. Furthermore, the report ing these objectives are grouped into the uting to the extension of state au- also recommends that over the course following categories: thority outside Bangui. of the next two years, the United Nations should adopt a support strategy – ideal- Politics of SSR: Democratic Accountability: ly jointly developed and endorsed by the To establish a national security strategic To foster an effective democratic governance African Union, the Economic Community framework and mechanisms for security of the security sector of Central African States (ECCAS) and the management • Establish effective parliamentary European Union. Such a support strategy • Ensure the sustained political en- oversight of the defence forces and should be structured around key priority gagement of the United Nations internal security services; objectives, and underpinned by specific and international partners so as to • Strengthen civilian control of the policy commitments and programmatic foster broader political support for security institutions; initiatives, clearly set out in the Framework these sensitive reforms in the Gov- • Strengthen oversight capacity of of Mutual Accountability (Cadre d’engage- ernment, and so as to engage the civil society and customary institu- ment mutuel) and the National Recovery President in a high-level discussion tions on monitoring of the security and Peacebuilding Plan. The following key on his vision for national security institutions. strategic objectives would address in a and SSR; structured manner what is required on SSR • Facilitate (additional) review, (re) Affordability and Sustainability: in the CAR: validation and eventual adoption To promote the affordability and sustainabil- • Support and facilitate the develop- of the draft National Security Poli- ity of the security sector ment of the national security frame- cy (NSP); create a National Security • Support the Government of the work, including a credible vetting High Council (NSHC) and its Secre- CAR in the preparation and imple- strategy, so as to build a credible tariat (Secretariat-General for Na- mentation of a Security Sector Pub- institutional basis for the transfor- tional Security); lic Expenditure Review (SSPER); mation of the security sector; • Encourage and support the devel- • Mobilize resources for funding a • foster the integration of demo- opment of a national SSR strategy severance package and pension bilized combatants of the armed and/or a national security strategy plan for eligible personnel of secu- groups into the national defence led by the NHSC. rity institutions. and security forces on the basis of a political agreement; To improve the security of the minority and Coordination of International Support • promote and support an enhanced marginalized groups, including CAR’s Mus- To enhance the effectiveness of national- inclusion of marginalized groups, lim citizens ly-led coordination of international support, including Muslims in the security • Assist the Government in develop- including of MINUSCA support, to a national institutions; ing an action plan for the enhanced SSR process • strengthen the institutional and inclusion of Muslim citizens and • Establish a Government-led coor- operational capacities of the se- other minorities in the governance dination mechanisms; curity institutions, with the Euro- of the security sector. • Build partnerships and a strong pean Union playing the leading coordination mechanism between role for supporting defence sector Institutional Capacity: the United Nations, EU and other reform (DSR), and the primary re- To foster the effective functioning, profes- donors and political and security sponsibility for the reform of the sionalism and internal accountability of se- partners, in order to foster a com- police and gendarmerie belonging curity institutions, including internal security mon political and sectoral dia- to the United Nations; institutions and FACA logue with the Government, based • foster democratic accountability • Support institutional development on common messages; avoid over- of the security sector within the and capacity strengthening of the lap between various donors’ inter- framework of the rule of law; internal security forces, so that ventions and reduce the burden of • promote the affordability and sus- they can effectively provide secu- coordination on the Government; tainability of SSR processes; rity, including public order and law and ensure very coordinated inter- • enhance the effectiveness of na- enforcement, in Bangui and other ventions in terms of support to the tionally-led coordination of in- main population centres of the CAR; security sector; ternational support, including of • Establish defence institutions un- • Continue to discuss the CAR within MINUSCA support, to the national der democratic civilian control ca- United Nations Group of Friends SSR process. pable of defending the territorial of SSR.

xii l Executive Summary Introduction

The election of a new President and Na- to be transformational: enhancing inclu- es for SSR in the CAR and priorities for SSR tional Assembly in the Central African Re- sivity and legitimacy and contributing to support. public (CAR) in 2016 represents a major the avoidance of relapse into conflict. This step in the country’s democratic transition, underscores the United Nations overall The dialogue was structured in two peacebuilding and recovery from crisis. strategic objective in the CAR: “to support parts – a high-level event and a work- The new President – Faustin-Archange the creation of conditions conducive to ing-level event. The high-level event Touadéra – has publicly recognized the im- the sustainable reduction of the presence brought together a high-level delegation portant role that the security sector plays of, and threat posed by, armed groups from the CAR Government, the United Na- in sustainable peace and development. In through a comprehensive approach.”7 The tions Integrated Stabilization Mission to this respect, the President has stated that Security Council has emphasized that a po- the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), as Security Sector Reform (SSR) will be a key litical process must remain at the forefront well as representatives from key partners priority of his presidential mandate.5 of the United Nations efforts to create and including the United Nations, the Inter- also maintain the political space that will national Monetary Fund, the World Bank, However, security sector reform is not new be required to address the root causes of the African Union, the European Union in the CAR. In 2008, the country undertook the conflict.8 As part of its overall political and bilateral donors. Discussions focused an innovative security sector reform pro- strategy, the United Nations can support on the challenges and priorities for SSR. cess, which proclaimed national owner- the CAR authorities in implementing an During the working-level event, in-depth ship and a holistic approach to SSR. A na- inclusive process of national reconciliation, discussions built on the outcomes of the tional seminar on SSR took place in Bangui and the promotion of local reconciliation high-level segment of the dialogue, and in April of that year and brought together initiatives that address grievances at all participants had the opportunity to further about 200 national and foreign partici- levels of the society and which would in- elaborate proposals for international sup- pants; they drafted the SSR Chronogram, volve a wide range of stakeholders. As part port for SSR in the CAR. a formal document laying out the 146 ac- of these reconciliation efforts, it will be im- tivities that the CAR was believed to have portant for the United Nations to facilitate Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence of needed, in order to transform its security a dialogue between the CAR Government the CAR, and Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Spe- sector. While President Bozizé committed and the armed groups on resolving secu- cial Minister-Counsellor to the President of to implementing the ambitious SSR plans, rity challenges, and on transforming the the CAR for DDR/SSR and National Recon- and despite initial enthusiasm for the doc- security sector. ciliation, gave remarks during the event. ument, the SSR process stalled in 2009 and Other members of the CAR delegation in- by early 2010, the process was limited to As a first step, the successful transformation cluded Mr. Thierry George Vackat, Member a few technical projects. At the core, the of the security sector depends on identify- of the National Assembly and President of problem was a lack of political will on the ing the challenges and support priorities in the National Defence and Security Com- part of national authorities and ultimately the area of security sector reform. In this re- mission, and General Francois Mobebou, the Government’s resistance to any regard, a dialogue on SSR in the CAR, which Counsellor for SSR to the President of the forms that could weaken its control over took place from 21 to 22 June 2016 in New Republic. In addition, high-level remarks resources. This problem was compounded York, offered an opportunity for the Unit- during the event were also made, amongst by an international community that was ed Nations and the CAR Government to others, by Ms. Annika Söder, State Secre- not willing to commit financially to the consensually identify challenges and sup- tary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden; Mr. Ma- reform process, as evidenced by donor port priorities in the area of SSR. The ini- rio Giro, Deputy Minister for Foreign Af- conferences in 2009 and 2010, which failed tiative was chaired by Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, fairs and International Cooperation, Italy; to raise the requisite resources for some Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Rep- of the more ambitious activities discussed of Slovakia and co-Chair of the Group of resentative of the Secretary-General for during the national SSR seminar.6 Friends of SSR, and moderated by Mr. Ad- MINUSCA; and Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assis- edeji Ebo, Chief of the Security Sector Re- tant Secretary-General in the Department With a different political landscape in the form Unit (SSRU), Office of Rule of Law and of Peacekeeping Operations. CAR, and also the national and internation- Security Institutions (OROLSI) of the Unit- al political will for SSR in the country, the ed Nations Department of Peacekeeping In light of MINUSCA’s new mandate, United Nations support for the CAR’s SSR Operations (DPKO). The overall objective derived from Security Council resolu- efforts has the opportunity and potential of the event was to identify the challeng- tion 2301 (2016), which prioritizes reform

Introduction l 1 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

of the security sector, and based on the context for security sector reform in the New York dialogue, the purpose of this CAR; part II captures the main elements report is, in the first instance, to present of the dialogue, and of the specific reform the outcome of the dialogue on the key priorities discussed at the high-level and SSR challenges and priorities in the CAR. expert-level events; and part III provides Furthermore, the report also provides key recommendations on transforming the strategic, policy-level, and programmat- security sector, including on ways in which ic recommendations, which can help to it can become inclusive, multi-ethnic, re- transform the security sector in the CAR. gionally balanced, professional and repub- The report is structured in three parts: lican, factors which will ultimate determine part I provides an overview of the current the sustainability of reform efforts.

2 l Introduction PART 1 Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

1.1 Historical Context ment and managed to obtain control of Djotodia formally dissolved the Séléka co- The Central African Republic gained its areas in the northeast of the country. The alition. However, this political act did not independence from France in 1960. How- conflict with various rebel groups did not end the widespread abuses committed by ever, five military coups d’état since then, come to an end until June 2008, when two the Séléka rebels. Anti-balaka militias arose with the most recent one in March 2013, of the three main rebel groups – the Union in response to counter the Séléka: anti-bal- have led to repeated cycles of political in- of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) and aka are essentially loosely organized village stability. These coups are both the symp- the Popular Army for the Restoration of De- self-defence groups – mostly composed of toms and the outcome of the misplaced in- mocracy (APRD) – agreed to a peace deal Christians – which ended up violently retal- volvement of the armed forces in the CAR’s with Bozizé’s Government.11 iating against Séléka combatants and also politics. Each successive regime has pro- against the general Muslim population, moted economic development in its own The final coup, which precipitated the giving the conflict a sectarian dimension. way: minerals in particular, but also other most recent crisis in the CAR, took place The resulting violence killed thousands of cash crops provided some fiscal revenues, in March 2013, and saw President Bozizé civilians and left hundreds of thousands and development was also boosted by ousted by Séléka rebels under the lead- displaced. On 5 December 2013, the an- the presence of the former colonial pow- ership of Michel Djotodia. Following ti-balaka coordinated a vicious attack er – France. However, a colonial clientelist pressure from the Economic Community against the Muslim population in the cap- and authoritarian governance style has of Central African States (ECCAS), the Na- ital, where more than 1,000 civilians died. defined the politics of the post-indepen- tional Transitional Council was established dence period, and led to one of the world’s and elected Michel Djotodia, the sole can- Concerned with the alarming escala- lowest socio-economic development sit- didate, as Head of State of the Transition tion of violence, the United Nations Se- uations, resulting in recurring political cri- in April 2013. Hailing from north-eastern curity Council (UNSC) adopted Resolu- ses, persistent conflicts, coups d’état and CAR, the Séléka drew on the grievances tion 2127 on 13 December 2013, which ultimately, state collapse.9 of the minority Muslim community, which authorised the deployment of an Afri- mainly dwells in the north-east of the can-led International Support Mission to In 1965, Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa over- country. Such grievances stemmed from the Central African Republic, known as threw the then President David Dacko. their perceived exclusion and persecution MISCA, to stabilise the CAR, alongside the In 1979, French military assistance helped by successive Christian-led governments.12 French force, Operation Sangaris. The secu- to restore Dacko to the Presidency, which, rity situation also improved following the however, lasted only until he was ousted The March 2013 coup was followed by se- signing of a cease-fire agreement between again in 1981 by the Chief of Staff of the vere human rights abuses and looting by armed groups on 23 July 2014 in Libreville. FACA – Andre Kolingba – in another mil- Séléka combatants, who tended to target The deployment of EUFOR RCA (Febru- itary coup. Twelve years of military rule the Christian population of Bangui and ary 2014 – June 2015) in Bangui and the ended in 1993 when Ange-Felix Patasse other cities. In September 2013, President United Nations Multidimensional Inte- defeated both Kolingba and Dacko in presidential elections. What followed was a turbulent decade, which saw mutinies by soldiers in the capital Bangui over unpaid wages in 1996 and again in 1997, and a failed coup attempt in 2001, in which Ko- lingba attempted to oust Patasse with the help of army chief of staff General François Bozizé.10

While Patasse was able to suppress the coup attempt in 2001 with the help of Libyan and Chadian troops, and Bozizé was sacked, he was less successful in 2003. While Patasse was out of the country, Bozizé and his rebel forces seized Bangui and successfully toppled the President. Bozizé remained in power throughout a further turbulent decade, which saw him elected as President in 2005, and re-elected in 2011. In 2006, rebels took up arms against the Govern- Muslim neighbourhood in Bangui. United Nations Photo/Catianne Tijerina.

4 l Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR grated Stabilization Mission in the Central Internal displacement in the African Republic (MINUSCA), which took Central African Republic, May 2015 SUDAN over from the African-led MISCA in Sep- Capital 50,000+ IDPs International boundary 20,000+ IDPs CHAD 1,300 IDPs tember 2014, was instrumental in restoring Regional boundary 10,000+ IDPs IDP sites 10,000- IDPs VAKAGA security. Enclaves Flood-induced displacement in 2014 Main IDP movements in 2015 2,700 IDPs The political situation became more sta- Source: CMP, IDMC DiDD, UNHCR. Figures as of May 2015. BAMINGUI SOUTH BANGORAN 26,300 IDPs ble following the resignation of Michel 15,100 IDPs SUDAN NANA Djotodia and the selection of Catherine HAUTE KOTTO 7,300 IDPs GRIBIZI Samba-Panza, a former mayor of Bangui, OUHAM OUHAM 64,800 IDPs as interim head of state in January 2014. PENDÉ The transitional authorities launched the 82,500 IDPs OUAKA NANA KÉMO 15,700 IDPs 11,000 IDPs reconciliation process, culminating in the MAMBÉRÉ 48,400 IDPs HAUT-MBOMOU 6,500 IDPs MBOMOU May 2015 Bangui Forum, which brought 18,700 IDPs OMBELLA 6,700 IDPs M’POKO BASSE together some 700 individuals from across MAMBÉRÉ Bangui KOTTO KADEI CAR’s society, including the Séléka and LOBAYE 22,200 IDPs 58,700 IDPs anti-balaka, the transitional Government, SANGHA 35,200 IDPs MBAERE the nation’s political parties, traditional REPUBLIC OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 2,900 IDPs THE CONGO OF THE CONGO chiefs, civil society, and religious groups, CAMEROON so as to define a common vision for the The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this nation’s future.14 Despite occasional out- map do not imply ofﬁcial endorsement or acceptance by IDMC. bursts of violence in Bangui, and clashes 0 100 km www.internal-displacement.org between the ex-Séléka and anti-balaka armed groups along the country’s north– IDPs in CAR as of May 201513 south divide, the transitional authorities successfully organized a referendum on a new Constitution in December 2015, as well as presidential and parliamentary elections (December 2015 – April 2016). The elections resulted in the inauguration of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra on 30 March and a new National Assembly on 3 May 2016.

The recent crisis exacerbated the deeply entrenched systematic socio-economic and political challenges the CAR has been facing since its independence. It also resulted in the near-complete breakdown of its state institutions and of law and order. The low economic activity in the country was further compounded by the destruction of infrastructure and insecurity, and the country has experienced a drop in almost Ambroisine Kpongo, Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic to the United Nations, all socioeconomic indicators. As of Febru- addresses the Security Council. United Nations Photo/Evan Schneider ary 2016, 2.3 million people (about 46% of the total population) were in need of humanitarian assistance.15 What has further 1.2 Political Economy ed in the hands of armed groups, which exacerbated the challenges is a political control natural resources outside Bangui. economy marred by conflict and the fight The CAR is a resource-rich country that suf- The struggle for power and wealth in the for control over the country’s natural re- fers from extreme poverty. The state has CAR has had a debilitating effect on the sources between the Government and the limited reach beyond the capital, and po- country’s ability to govern itself peacefully armed groups, as outlined in the next sec- litical power is concentrated in and around and on its ability to establish functioning tion. Bangui. The country’s wealth is concentrat- institutions, including in the security sec-

Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR l 5 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

tor. Meaningful progress on security sec- as infrastructure such as roads and power The CAR’s economy has been described by tor reform would require consolidation of sources have not been significantly devel- some as a “warlord economy” especially as democratic gains and an inclusive process oped beyond the capital.21 illicit economic networks have sprung up of national reconciliation resulting from in many areas.25 Due to the state’s limited dialogue with the armed groups. Thus, the It should be noted that while agriculture, reach, armed groups have been able to ex- key to effective SSR lies in the ability of the forestry and mining make up the most im- ploit and benefit from the CAR’s abundant opposing sides to arrive at a non-antago- portant economic sectors, all three have natural resources to the detriment of both nistic political economy. suffered significantly since the 2013 - cri the central Government and the people of sis.22 The political and security crisis in the the CAR more broadly. Armed groups cur- The CAR is also one of the least devel- country led to major population displace- rently control mining sites in central CAR. oped countries in the world, despite the ments, which have disrupted the farming Between May 2013 and October 2014, di- country’s abundance of natural resources. cycle and other livelihoods severely, and amonds worth $US 24 million were smug- In 2015, it ranked 187 out of 188 on the have led to crisis-level food insecurity gled out of the country. human development index.16 Even before throughout the CAR.23 the political and security crisis which en- Furthermore, armed groups in the CAR sued in 2013 and devastated the country’s What has compounded the economic have profited from “forceful taxation and economy, the CAR had one of the high- collapse of the country is the flight and illicit trade with gold and diamonds that est poverty rates in the world.17 The GDP displacement of Muslim communities, are smuggled across international bor- for 2015 was $US 1.503 billion,18 which which had previously run many of the ders or sold to Central African diamond amounts to less than 0.01 percent of the trade networks in the CAR. In addition, companies. Moreover armed groups use world economy. Successive crises have rein 2013 the country was suspended from violence, attacks, and threats to collect sulted in an increasingly fragile economy, exporting diamonds under the Kimberley revenue from civilians, business and pub- which is heavily dependent on multilateral Process, which aims at preventing “conflict lic institutions and to conduct widespread foreign aid. Much of public investment is diamonds” from entering the legitimate di- looting.”26 Since 2013, the Séléka and the externally financed and numerous inter- amond trade. By July 2015, the Kimberley anti-balaka have both controlled and prof- national non-governmental organizations Process allowed the trade again from spe- ited from the trade of natural resources, provide services to the population which cial compliant zones.24 and also by taxing the cattle trade, and the Government itself is unable to provide.19

The landlocked country of 4.9 million is sparsely populated and its rich resources remain largely underexploited. Agriculture, mining, and forestry are the key economic sectors. Of these, agriculture represents the largest sector of the economy, occupy- ing nearly four-fifths of the workforce and accounting for half of the country’s GDP. The majority of the population relies on subsistence farming for their livelihoods. Timber is a key source of foreign exchange, but the country has been very vulnerable to price fluctuations as the CAR has been heavily reliant on international commodity markets. Minerals make up over half of the country’s total export earnings; diamonds in particular are a key export, and gold, ura- nium, copper, iron ore and manganese are also mined, but to a lesser extent.20 How- ever, the CAR’s rich resources, which in addition to minerals also include oil, have not been exploited on an industrial scale. The country has not become industrialized Illegal trafficking routes in CAR27

6 l Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR those profits have ultimately allowed these It is important to note that without a fun- fence Staff, ground forces, [an] air force, a groups to perpetuate a continuous state damental change in the relationship be- fluvial battalion, a brigade of protection of instability.28 Furthermore, the armed tween Bangui and the CAR’s north-eastern and security of institutions, a battalion of groups have also profited from the poach- region, it will be difficult to transform the fire-fighters, an engineering brigade, ser- ing of elephant ivory.29 It is clearly evident security institutions of the country in line vices (such as health and armoury) and that these groups have significant eco- with the Security Council’s envisioned end schools and instruction centers,” with the nomic power in the country, and that they state of professional, republican, ethnical- FACA falling under the Ministry of De- have access to and control the key resourc- ly representative and regionally balanced fence.33 A National Defence Council ad- es which would be essential for the effec- security forces. This will ultimately require dresses national security matters, and is tive governance of the CAR.30 chaired by the President; the Na- tional Parliament’s Commission on While armed groups have con- Given the state’s inability to collect revenue Defence and Security is designed to trolled much of the country’s eco- from its resources, which are controlled by provide democratic oversight of the nomic power, the Government has armed groups, the state’s institutions, includ- armed forces. remained reliant on outside help. ing those in the security sector, are dispropor- The financial assistance which the The country’s Internal Security IMF had approved for the CAR be- tionately reliant upon external support and Forces (ISF) are made up of the Na- tween 2013 and 2015 amounts to funding. The state needs to generate a much tional Police and the Gendarmerie. $US 31.5 million. These monies were higher level of domestic revenue in order to There are currently 1,500 police approved specifically for the Transi- officers and 2,161 gendarmerie tional Government’s “emergency ensure the financial viability of its security in- officers. While the Gendarmerie economic recovery program, which stitutions. A new fiscal contract between the was originally under the Minis- aimed to improve macroeconomic State and the citizens of the CAR is required try of Defence, an administrative stability and government capaci- to ensure the sustainability of SSR. decree in 2013 placed it togeth- ty.” 31 Furthermore, the World’s Bank er with the National Police under commitment of $US 100 million the operational command and worth of grants and loans during the same a transformation of the prevailing political control of the Ministry of Interior, Public period aimed to help restore essential gov- culture in Bangui, from a history of exclu- Security, and Territorial Administration. ernment services. The country remains sion to a culture of broader inclusion and The National Police and Gendarmerie heavily reliant on humanitarian organiza- participation of all citizens in the public life. both have training centers in Bangui. tions for the provision of basic services.32 What will be further necessary for sustain- The ISF also includes Water and Forest able peace is a change in the relationship Guards, assigned to police the 5 million Given the state’s inability to collect revenue between various other groups, including acres of dense rainforest, and they num- from its resources, which are controlled the rich elites and the impoverished citi- ber some 466 officers, of which 350 are by armed groups, the state’s institutions, zens of the country, the military and civil- uniformed personnel. They fall under the including those in the security sector, are ians, and importantly between the CAR’s Ministry of Water, Forest, Tourism and En- disproportionately reliant upon external religious groups. vironment. support and funding. The state needs to generate a much higher level of domestic The Customs Service in the CAR falls revenue in order to ensure the financial 1.3 Overview of the under the Ministry of Finance and has viability of its security institutions. A new Security Sector about 518 customs officers. The Justice fiscal contract between the State and the and Penitentiary System, both of which citizens of the CAR is required to ensure 1.3.1 Structure of the rule of law fall under the Ministry of Justice, are the the sustainability of SSR. A transformation and security sector final element of the CAR’s security sec- of the political and economic landscape in tor. The civil-law based judicial system is the CAR will also require addressing the The structure of the CAR’s security sector spread over sixteen prefectures and has regional inequalities with a comprehen- was originally influenced by its histori- three tiers: A constitutional court, three sive security and development strategy cal link with France. The FACA, under the courts of appeal, and twenty-four courts for the north-eastern region. The state will Ministry of Defence, is responsible for the of first instance. There are also thematic also have to address socio-economic mar- country’s territorial defence. Currently, courts: a court of auditors, a permanent ginalization by expanding public services, there are 8,360 troops on the government’s military tribunal and also a children’s tri- including security and justice, to the north- payroll. The defence forces have historical- bunal. A specialized mobile court with east of the country. ly included “the Bureau of the Chief of De- nation-wide jurisdiction addresses inter-

Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR l 7 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

the critical role of SSR in ensuring the de-

Water and Customs Service livery of MINUSCA priority tasks. Through- Forest Guards 518 out 2014 and 2015, and in a context where 466 the security and defence forces have historically been a source of instability and a conflict driver, SSR remained critical for

national reconciliation, peacebuilding and the successful implementation of MINUSCA’s priority tasks. However, con- Internal Security Forces (National Police and sidering MINUSCA’s resource constraints Gendarmerie) and the urgent need to disarm armed 3,661 groups, the mission had decided to prioritize support to the implementation Central African Armed Forces (FACA) of an agreement on disarmament, de- 8,360 mobilization, reintegration and repatria-

tion (DDRR), and to keep SSR as a second layer of priority.

The Council authorized MINUSCA to use its capacities to do the following: firstly, to Distribution of security forces in CAR “support the Transitional Authorities and subsequent elected authorities in devising national criminal cases.34 About 177 mag- main features of resolution 2149 (2014), and implementing security sector reform istrates work in the legal system, and it introduced new decisions on the pri- and vetting processes, including through there are around 150 lawyers for the en- oritization and sequencing of tasks. In the provision of strategic policy advice, in tire population, with a high concentration particular, resolution 2217 (2015) ad- close coordination with EUMAM-RCA”; and of lawyers based in and around Bangui. opted a three-tiered approach to the secondly, to “closely coordinate the provi- Finally, the penitentiary system is made mission’s mandate including immedi- sion of technical assistance and training up of 38 prison facilities, which are ate priority tasks, essential tasks, and between the international partners in the spread evenly across the CAR’s territo- additional tasks. CAR in order to ensure a clear distribution ry, and a total of 40 personnel work in of tasks in the field of SSR, for the benefit of Penitentiary Administration. In the ab- Resolution 2217 (2015) only placed SSR in both the FACA and the CAR internal securi- sence of correction officers, the FACA pro- the second tier of “essential tasks,” despite ty forces (police and gendarmerie).”35 Thus, vide security to the two main prisons in Bangui.

1.3.2 Overview of the United Nations mandate for SSR

On 10 April 2014, the Security Council established the United Nations Multidimen- sional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) through resolution 2149 (2014). For the first year, Security Sector Reform was one of the “additional tasks” of the Mission’s mandate, to be undertaken “as conditions permit.” Since then, there have been two changes to the mandate, which has seen a more strategic prioritization of SSR. On 20 April 2015, the Security Council adopted resolution 2217 (2015) extending MINUSCA’s mandate until 30 April 2016. While the new resolution preserved the Security Council votes on MINUSCA mandate. United Nations Photo/Loey Felipe.

8 l Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR SSR was not an immediate priority of the of the United Nations Charter, adapted the 1.3.3 Multilateral and bilateral international community and of MINUS- mandate of the mission to the new circum- support activities 2014-2016 CA’s mandate, and would not become one stances which prevail in the country. The until 2016. implementation of the mandate would oc- Over the course of the first year of the cur on the basis of prioritized tasks and in mission’s mandate, MINUSCA managed to On 26 July, Security Council resolu- a phased manner where relevant. For the support the CAR in a number of important tion 2301 (2016) extended the mandate first time, SSR became one of the mission’s respects of SSR, including at the Bangui of the United Nations Multidimensional first tier core priority tasks, and the Securi- Forum and on DSR. MINUSCA supported Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central ty Council mandated MINUSCA to “provide the formulation of SSR-related background African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 No- strategic and technical advice to the CAR documents and facilitated the organi- vember 2017. The resolution, which was authorities to design and implement a zation of the Bangui Forum on National adopted unanimously under Chapter VII strategy for the SSR.” 36 Reconciliation, which took place from 4 to 12 May, 2015, and which brought together around 700 individuals from across the More specifically, the resolution mandated MINUSCA with the following SSR tasks CAR’s political spectrum and society, in- and responsibilities:37 cluding the Transitional Government, the armed groups (Séléka and anti-balaka), (i) To provide strategic and technical advice to the CAR authorities to design traditional chiefs, the nation’s political par- and implement a strategy for the SSR, taking into account the work done by ties, religious groups, and civil society, with EUMAM-RCA and in close coordination with EUTM-RCA, and with the aim of en- the overall objective of defining a common suring coherence of the SSR process, including through a clear delineation of revision for the nation’s future.38 On SSR, par- sponsibilities of the FACA, the internal security forces, and other uniformed enti- ticipants endorsed the recommendations ties, as well as the democratic control of both defence and internal security forces; of the local consultations held all over the country prior to the Forum and called for (ii) To support the CAR authorities in developing an approach to the vetting the development of a new vision of the se- of defence and security elements (FACA, police and gendarmerie) which includes curity sector architecture, the lifting of the human rights vetting, in particular to promote accountability of violations of in- embargo on weapons and the rehabilita- ternational and domestic law amongst security forces and in the context of any in- tion, restructuring and operationalization tegration of demobilized armed groups elements into security sector institutions; of the FACA. A key element of the discussion in this working group was the rein- (iii) To take a leading role in supporting the CAR authorities on the reform and forcement of the capabilities of the CAR’s development of the police and the gendarmerie, through the design and imple- internal security forces and their redeploy- mentation of a capacity-building and development plan, undertaken pursuant to an ment throughout the country. overall security sector reform strategy, and by providing technical assistance, in close coordination with other technical assistance providers, to the CAR Government; The main outcome of the Bangui Fo- rum was the adoption of the Republican (iv) To support the CAR Government in developing an incentive structure for Pact (Pacte républicain pour la paix, la police and gendarmerie and the selection, recruitment, vetting and training of réconciliation nationale et la reconstruc- police and gendarmerie to include at least 500 new police and gendarmerie ele- tion en République centrafricaine) and the ments, with the support of donors and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), DDRR Agreement (Accord sur les principes taking into account the need to recruit women, and in full compliance with the UN de DDRR et d’intégration dans les corps en Human rights due diligence policy (HRDDP); uniforme de l’Etat centrafricain). These two documents provided a detailed road map (v) To coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between for peacebuilding activities in the CAR. The the international partners in the CAR, in particular with EUTM-RCA, in order to en- Republican Pact positively reflected the sure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of SSR, for the benefit of both the FACA full commitment of the participants in the and the CAR internal security forces (police and gendarmerie); Forum to a comprehensive reform of the security sector, including the establish- (vi) To coordinate with the CAR authorities in designing a plan for the progres- ment of accountable, multi-ethnic, profes- sive, and coordinated re-operationalization of FACA and other internal security sional and republican defence and internal forces within the framework of the SSR programme and in compliance with the security forces. The Agreement on DDRR HRDDP, in close coordination with EUTM-RCA. and Integration set forth the principle of condition-based individual integration of the ex-combatants of armed groups into

Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR l 9 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

the uniformed statutory forces/services. new Constitution in December 2015 was ed by the EU Military Advisory Mission (EU- Rejecting collective integration of armed a key milestone in laying the normative MAM). The country also made significant groups into the FACA, Gendarmerie and basis for the democratization and civilian progress in reviewing and revising the National Police, the Agreement laid the oversight of the security sector. In this re- legal and regulatory framework of the de- foundation for sustainable SSR. spect, the assistance MINUSCA provided to fence sector. In this respect, the ministry the constitutional drafting committee and drafted important new laws and decrees, Despite the complex and challenging the SRSG’s political engagement with the including a decree on the reorganization of political environment that characterized Constitutional Court was instrumental in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and of the the Transitional Government, MINUSCA, ensuring the inclusion of democratic gov- General Staff (État-major), which outlined in collaboration with other international ernance norms and standards for security a new organogram and staffing table for actors, was able to successfully facilitate institutions in the Constitution. the MoD and General Staff. Furthermore, a political roundtable on security, which it also drafted a decree on the retirement resulted in the adoption of a Declaration Moreover, MINUSCA was successful at and pension of FACA personnel. With the on the Principles of National Security in establishing functioning coordination joint support of EUMAM and MINUSCA, December 2015, and paved the way for mechanisms between the Transitional the MoD also formulated a new draft law the endorsement of a broadly consultative Government and the international com- on the Military Justice Code. However, the draft National Security Policy (NSP) by the munity. The Strategic Committee for transitional authorities were not able to CAR’s Strategic Committee on DDR/SSR DDR/SSR, co-chaired by the SRSG and the adopt these laws and decrees for reasons in March 2016. However, while an ad-hoc Prime Minister, was instrumental in secur- of political expediency. technical committee completed the re- ing the national commitment to the reform view of the draft NSP in August 2016, the initiatives recommended by MINUSCA, On 16 July 2016, the Council of the Eu- ropean Union launched the EU military training mission in the Central African Moreover, MINUSCA was successful at establishing functioning coor- Republic (EUTM RCA). The mission has dination mechanisms between the Transitional Government and the contributed to the EU’s comprehensive approach and to security sector reform in international community. The Strategic Committee for DDR/SSR, co- the country. EUTM RCA is based in Ban- chaired by the SRSG and the Prime Minister, was instrumental in secur- gui and will operate for an initial period ing the national commitment to the reform initiatives recommended by of two years. Major General Eric Hauteclo- MINUSCA, such as the SSR Roadmap and the draft National Security que-Raysz of France is currently serving as the mission’s commander. Following up on Policy. The Technical Committee on SSR, which was hosted by the Af- the EU Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM rican Union and which was comprised of technical experts, such as the RCA), EUTM RCA is working on the devel- ‘Chargés de Mission SSR’ of the ministries and working-level represen- opment of a modern, effective, inclusive and democratically accountable FACA. It tatives from international missions, served as an effective coordination also provides strategic advice to the Minis- platform for the development of SSR proposals. try of Defence and the General Staff, as well as education to officers and non-commissioned officers, and operational training national authorities have yet to approve such as the SSR Roadmap and the draft Na- to the FACA. A political challenge for the the document. The adoption of the draft tional Security Policy. The Technical Com- national authorities and the international NSP is on the agenda of a meeting of the mittee on SSR, which was hosted by the community is to maintain a commitment Strategic Committee for DDR/SSR and Na- African Union and which was comprised to long-term reforms of the defence sec- tional Reconciliation, chaired by President of technical experts, such as the ‘Chargés tor while designing adequate security ar- Touadéra, which has been planned for the de Mission SSR’ of the ministries and work- rangements to address immediate security second half of October 2016. ing-level representatives from internation- needs and challenges.39 al missions, served as an effective coordi- During the transitional period, the Central nation platform for the development of Resolution 2301 gives MINUSCA the man- African Republic also achieved significant SSR proposals. date ‘to take a leading role in supporting progress on establishing the foundation for the CAR authorities on the reform and civilian control and democratic governance In the area of DSR, the Ministry of Defence development of the police and the gen- of the security sector. In fact, the transition- and the Defence Headquarters were par- darmerie, through the design and im- al period marked a clear turning point in tially reorganized and restructured, thanks plementation of a capacity-building and civil-security relations. The adoption of a to the advice and technical support provid- development plan…’ The National Police

10 l Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR Resolution 2301 gives MI- NUSCA the mandate ‘to take a leading role in supporting the CAR authorities on the reform and development of the police and the gendarmerie, through the design and implementation of a capacity-building and development plan…’

and National Gendarmerie, with the support of the Development Pillar of the MI- NUSCA Police, have developed a draft De- velopment and Capacity Building Plan for these two institutions. The document was formulated under difficult conditions, such MINUSCA takes over responsibilities of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African as frequent changes in interlocutors and/ Republic (MISCA). United Nations Photo/Catianne Tijerina or counterparts, including five different -di rectors-general of the National Police with- number of FACA officers are enrolled in mili- population in the north and north-East is a in one year. The draft police development tary education courses in France, which also key SSR challenge, and will be instrumen- plan provides a clear picture of what re- occasionally supplies non-lethal military tal for increasing the legitimacy of the CAR sources are needed, the cost and how the equipment to the CAR. Finally, the United authorities and reducing popular support delivery can be planned over a period of States supports a small FACA contingent of for the armed groups. A related challenge five years, going from 2016 to 2020. A pro- the AU-led Regional Task Force for the elim- for the politics of SSR in the CAR is finding grammatic approach and more in-depth ination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). a way for the Government and the armed police reform are needed in this area. groups to hold a dialogue on ways to transform the security sector and on finding UNDP has also supported the justice sec- 1.4 Challenges for common ground for a national security vi- tor, the police and gendarmerie through a the Security Sector sion and a national security strategy, which number of projects, including the follow- would be viable and sustainable. ing: a Project to Support Reactivation of the 1.4.1 Politics of SSR Criminal Justice System in Bangui (2014) The viability, pace, and sustainability of $197,524; Emergency Restoration of the In the CAR, the security institutions mirror the reform of security institutions will cer- Police and Gendarmerie in Bangui (2014– the characteristics and historical deficits of tainly very much depend on the broader 2015) $2,217,621; Payment of Salaries of the state itself: unaccountable, lacking in political process of national reconcilia- the Police and Gendarmerie (2014–2016) legitimacy, non-inclusive, inefficient in the tion and the vision of the newly elected $899,135; Joint Project to Fight Against provision of services, composed of weak CAR Government. In this regard, the SSR Human Rights Violations and to Revive the institutions and largely focused on Bangui process is intrinsically linked to the DDRR Justice System in the Central African Re- as opposed to the country at large. State process. The integration of demobilized public (2014–2017) $16,553,925. security institutions have historically been combatants into the national army and se- either absent from large parts of the coun- curity services remains the main demand Furthermore, the African Union (AU) has try and/or mistrusted by the population. of the armed groups, and thus a key SSR maintained a political presence in the CAR The absence of the state security forces in challenge. The political dialogue between and provides political and policy advice on the north and north-eastern regions of the the national authorities and the armed SSR to the national authorities. And on the country, combined with the under-repre- groups should therefore yield a political bi-lateral front, France has resumed its de- sentation of the Muslim community in the agreement on the number of ex-combat- fence and security cooperation following FACA and Police and Gendarmerie, have ants to be integrated. However, the cur- the return to constitutional order. A senior fostered a perception of discrimination and rent political environment could have a French officer was appointed as Adviser to marginalization in segments of the CAR’s constraining effect on the reform of the the Minister of Defence in March 2016. A population. Improving the security of the security sector as finding the political will

Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR l 11 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

increasingly considered it as an illegitimate and predatory force. Many soldiers had been accused of human rights abuses such as operation of illegal checkpoints, village burning, and summary execution. There was widespread impunity of criminal elements, due to the absence of military tribu- nals. Because most FACA soldiers are based in Bangui due to logistics and equipment constraints, towns and villages outside the capital were left highly vulnerable to attacks by local or foreign belligerents.

When MINUSCA was deployed to the CAR, the FACA were no longer functional as a result of four major institutional capacity gaps. First the human resources management system was destroyed during the conflict. Due to the destruction of all MINUSCA Coordinates Food Support for Ex-Combatants. United Nations Photo/Catianne Tijerina personnel records the transitional authorities were unable to determine the actu- for a dialogue between the Government Furthermore, while DDRR is a top priority of al size of the army. They could not verify and armed groups has sometimes proved President Touadéra, the Government has yet the identity of all men and women who to be difficult. to engage in a formal dialogue with armed claimed to be members of the FACA. With groups on the draft National DDRR Strategy, the support of EUMAM RCA and MINUSCA, Furthermore, the delineation of roles and which has been developed by the Minister in 2015, the Ministry of Defence success- responsibilities between these security in- Counsellor and Coordinator on DDR and fully registered 7,300 persons into a bio- stitutions is unclear, a problem which was SSR, Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako. Building on metric database. However, a discrepancy compounded by the practice of the Tran- the 10 May 2016 Agreement on the Princi- remains between this database and the sitional Government’s deployment of the ples of DDRR and Integration, the draft PND- payroll of the Ministry of Finance, which military for law enforcement and internal DRR National Strategy lays out the objec- counts 8,400 FACA soldiers. In addition, security duties. Policy frameworks for SSR tives and financial modalities of are often missing and/or anachronistic, the PNDDRR.40 Finally, the Gov- while democratic civilian oversight has ernment will also need to formu- With the support of EUMAM RCA and been lacking or is very weak at best. The late a plan for the integration of MINUSCA, in 2015, the Ministry of De- absence of a strategic framework for SSR a limited number of ex-combat- fence successfully registered 7,300 per- undermines the effectiveness of the na- ants into the FACA and state uni- tional authorities’ current SSR initiatives. formed security services. sons into a biometric database. Howev- er, a discrepancy remains between this In order to ensure the viability and sustain- 1.4.2 Institutional Capacity database and the payroll of the Ministry ability of the security institutions in the CAR, the SSR process needs to be transformational. 1.4.2.1 The Forces armées of Finance, which counts 8,400 FACA So as to achieve this objective of transforma- centrafricaines (FACA) soldiers. In addition, there is no clarity tion, the reform process would need to com- about the legal status of the 3,500 Sélé- bine the technical elements of training and The FACA collapsed during ka fighters who were integrated into the equipping of security institutions with the the offensive of the Séléka of political imperatives of inclusivity, account- March 2013. The command and army by a decree signed by the former ability, affordability and legitimacy. This is control system was destroyed. interim Head of State, Michel Djoto- essential for the desired end-state of effec- Whilst some Muslim soldiers dia, in 2013. It is also not clear whether tive and accountable security institutions joined the Séléka, the major- that are affordable, ethnically representative, ity of the FACA joined the an- the 500-1,000 soldiers who joined the regionally balanced, and republican that can ti-balaka self-defence groups. armed groups are deserters to be dishon- ensure the security of the state and citizens of The FACA had lost the trust of orably discharged from the FACA. the CAR. much of the population, which

12 l Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR there is no clarity about the legal status of the 3,500 Séléka fighters who were integrated into the army by a decree signed by the former interim Head of State, Michel Djotodia, in 2013. It is also not clear whether the 500-1,000 soldiers who joined the armed groups are deserters to be dishon- orably discharged from the FACA.

The national authorities also miss a clear picture of how many soldiers remain fit for service in the FACA. Following a light vetting process called ‘simplified verification’, the Ministry of Defence could only certify that about 3,600 out of 7,300 registered soldiers met the minimum conditions to serve in the FACA. This process is based on biometric thumb print test to ascertain if the soldier is already in the database followed by a self-declaration and attestation MINUSCA Police Commissioner meets Imam of the Central Mosque in Bangui. United Nations Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis that they had not committed acts of human rights violations in the past and will desist Protection Battalion which operates ten sourced and understaffed. Thus, building from committing any in the future. The sim- static guard points in Bangui, the newly their institutional capacity and finding ad- plified verification also led to the diagnosis reactivated Presidential Guard, the small equate funding remains a challenge. Given that 900 persons were overdue for retire- FACA contingents of the tri-partite force the history of these institutions and the ment. Due to a chronic lack of funding for on the border with Sudan and Chad, and role of the FACA in law enforcement, the paying the pensions of retired personnel, the AU-led Regional Task Force combat- delineation of roles and responsibilities the national authorities were always reluc- ting the Lord’s Resistance Army. Due to the between the two forces and the FACA re- tant to discharge overaged soldiers. arms embargo, the FACA remain poorly mains unclear and is a further challenge for equipped and lightly armed: according to national authorities. The second institutional deficit lies with the United Nations Panel of Experts, the the lack of ethnic representativeness of FACA only have 300 small arms and light The occupation of Bangui by the Séléka the FACA, which negatively impacts its weapons, which is insufficient to equip all led to the institutional collapse of the po- legitimacy in the north and north-east of the units currently operational. lice and gendarmerie, which have not yet the country. Indeed, the FACA have histor- recovered from the crisis despite the reha- ically been dominated by three primarily The President has publicly expressed his bilitation of 32 stations. The police acade- Christian ethnic groups, the Gbaya (33%), intention to transform the Central African my and the gendarmerie school currently the Banda (27%) and the Manza (13%). The armed forces from a “projection force” to remain closed. The current strength of other ethnic groups, including the Fulani, a “garrison force” that is professional, eth- approximately 3,600 to 3,700 officers for and which are predominantly Muslim, are nically representative and regionally bal- a total population of 4.6 million inhabi- poorly represented in the FACA. anced, with clear command and control tants corresponds to a ratio of 1 officer structures.41 for 1,277 inhabitants, which is extremely Severe shortcomings in the governance of low. the defence sector combined with a bro- 1.4.2.2 Internal security forces (Police and ken command and control system consti- Gendarmerie) Of the 3,700 registered police and gen- tutes a third set of challenges for the de- darmerie officers, only 800 are deployed fence sector. The military programming law Despite adopting the French policing mod- outside Bangui, so in effect these institu- (2009-2013) is outdated, while a national el and structure at independence, law en- tions have very limited reach beyond the defence strategy is lacking. The Defence forcement and internal security in the CAR capital. There has been no recruitment Headquarters do not have the capacity have over the years become the purview since 2010 and no retirements since 2005. to plan, command, control and sustain of the FACA. The national police and the The 374 officers who are eligible for retire- the operational deployment of the FACA gendarmerie (a police force with military ment are unable to do so because of the outside Bangui. Currently, the only opera- status, unique to French security systems) absence of an institutionalized pension tional FACA units are the 300-strong Static have always been underfunded, under-re- system. Salary arrears are common.

Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR l 13 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

CAR President – Faustin-Archange Touadéra, and Head of MINUSCA – Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, visit town of Kaga-Bandoro. United Nations Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis

The operational capacity of this already very 1.4.3 Democratic Accountability ty institutions which represent and reflect low number of security officers, for a terri- the ethnic and regional composition of the tory as large as France and the Benelux, is Democratic accountability of the security country. further reduced by serious structural prob- sector within the framework of the rule of lems, as there is not a streamlined (and uni- law is essential for a sustainable and viable It should be noted, though, that during fied) police architecture. Gendarmerie and transformation of the security sector. The the transitional period the CAR made police have each their separate (weak) legal main challenge in this respect lies in the significant progress in establishing the framework, separate command and orga- historic absence of democratic account- foundation for civilian control and dem- nizational structure, different leadership, ability as an important and entrenched el- ocratic oversight of the security sector. unclear management, resources, ranks, uni- ement of the political culture, as evidenced A key reform under the Transitional forms, tasks, etc. Also, despite a decree that by the five military coups that occurred in Government was the establishment of was signed by former interim head of State the CAR since it obtained its independence the cabinet post of Minister of Defence, Michel Djotodia to place the gendarmerie from France in 1960. Thus, the key chal- who has organizational and functional under the operational command of the lenge regarding democratic accountability authority over the FACA. Furthermore, Ministry of Interior, the status of the gendar- is, in the first instance, to transform the po- the adoption of the Constitution in De- merie as a military force given the mission litical system, to one in which full civilian cember 2015 was a milestone in laying of protecting persons and property remains control and oversight of the security sector the normative basis for the democratiza- uncertain. The police are the only purely become the norm. In addition, a related tion and civilian oversight of the security civilian security service for the civilian pop- challenge for democratic accountability is sector. ulation. It is thus evident that many broad to democratize the security institutions of and difficult challenges remain on building the state so that the CAR can have genu- Article 27 of the new Constitution42 trans- security institutional capacity in the CAR. inely republican armed forces and securi- lates the decisions made at the Bangui

14 l Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR Forum into constitutional principles gov- work for national security. Finally, Arti- payroll. Ninety per cent of the defence bud- erning the security sector. The article stip- cle 89 outlines the parliamentary oversight get is allocated to the payment of salaries ulates that the defence and security forces functions over the executive. of the armed forces. Thus, a key challenge need to be exclusively composed of Central will be to “right-size” the FACA to ensure its African Republic citizens and that they ex- While there has been significant progress financial viability. It will be important for ist to serve the nation. It further stipulates in developing a framework for democrat- the Government to take substantive de- that the defence and security forces have ic accountability, primarily through the cisions regarding the budget for the CAR to be professional, multi-ethnic, republi- adoption of the new Constitution, many armed forces and internal security forces, can and politically neutral. Furthermore, challenges remain. As a first step, interna- as there is currently a very clear imbalance. the mission of the defence forces is to up- tional support will be required on building A key challenge in this regard will be to hold the territorial integrity of the country the capacity of the National Assembly to align the CAR’s budgetary priorities with and ensure the security of the population exercise effective parliamentary oversight the national security priorities outlined in against all external or internal aggression over the Executive branch, the FACA and the National Security Policy. or threats. It also defines the mission of the internal security forces. The interna- other national security providers as that tional community’s technical support will 1.4.5 Coordination of international of defending the authority of the law and also be required once the National Securi- support upholding the security of people and ty High Council has been established. The property rights. Importantly, it states that biggest challenge, however, will remain The early withdrawal of aid and support the code of conduct of the defence and se- that of transforming the CAR’s political cul- exacerbated the various challenges con- curity forces must prohibit their respective ture to one where democratic governance fronting the CAR over the years. So as to personnel from engaging in political activ- of the security sector is broadly accepted avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, ities. Most notably, Article 27 limits the use as the norm. the international community will need to stay the course and avoid reducing or with- While there has been significant progress in developing a framework for drawing its support once the early phase of SSR is completed. Effective SSR comes democratic accountability, primarily through the adoption of the new at a cost and requires sustained financial Constitution, many challenges remain. As a first step, international sup- support. Thus, a key challenge in the area port will be required on building the capacity of the National Assembly of support will be the international community’s ability to sustain the reform pace to exercise effective parliamentary oversight over the Executive branch, in the long term, which will also be one of the FACA and the internal security forces. The international community’s the key factors that will determine a suc- technical support will also be required once the National Security High cessful outcome. Ensuring that the inter- Council has been established. The biggest challenge, however, will remain national community remains engaged and committed to the overall SSR process will that of transforming the CAR’s political culture to one where democratic be essential if SSR is to be transformational. governance of the security sector is broadly accepted as the norm. Furthermore, an SSR programme will need to be carried out in a way which is consistent with other key political, economic, of the armed forces for public security, and 1.4.4 Affordability and Sustainability social and humanitarian initiatives, regard- redefines it as playing a supporting role of less of whether they are unilateral, bilateral the internal security forces in situations of The envelope of financial support for re- or multilateral. It is therefore critical that public emergency. forms in the CAR, including for SSR, remains the strategic objectives and priorities of wholly inadequate relative to the vast array the national authorities in the area of SSR Furthermore, Article 33 stipulates that of challenges facing the country. The Gov- are addressed within the framework of the the President of the Republic is the Com- ernment’s fiscal revenue only covers 60 per Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment mander-in-Chief of the armed forces cent of the basic state budget, 50 per cent and properly reflected in the Recovery and with responsibility for national defence. of which currently goes towards the pay- Stabilization Strategy, which will be pre- He/she chairs the National Defence Coun- ment of salaries of civil servants and uni- sented at the forthcoming Brussel’s donor cil and the National Defence Committee formed personnel, the latter of which ac- conference on 18 November 2016. The ef- and appoints military officials. And Arti- count for a third of the public servants in fective coordination of international sup- cle 80 states that the general organization the CAR. The share of the state budget allo- port will not only be a key challenge, but of national defence should be determined cated to defence is 22 per cent, compared also instrumental in determining whether by laws; it thus provides a constitutional to 3 per cent for internal security. The FACA or not an SSR programme is successful in basis for the development of a legal frame- are overstaffed with 8,300 persons on its the long term.

Part 1: Security Sector Reform Context in the CAR l 15

PART 2 Summary of Dialogues SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

The United Nations Security Council and event was chaired by Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, The dialogue continued on 22 June 2016 the African Union Peace and Security Minister of Foreign and European Affairs at the expert-level at the Greentree Es- Council have designated SSR as a high pri- of the Slovak Republic, who highlight- tate in Manhasset, NY, and included the ority for peace building and peace sustained the significance of this dialogue for continued participation of the high-level ment in the Central African Republic. Inter- the implementation of Security Council delegation from the CAR, interested mem- national support for SSR, however, remains Resolution 2151 (2014) on SSR, the first ber states, donors, and other partners. palpably inadequate to meet the critical stand-alone resolution of its kind. The The dialogue at Greentree was conducted needs of the national security institutions. event was facilitated and moderated by under Chatham House rules, and as such, In the current context of global austerity the Security Sector Reform Unit, Office the views and recommendations of spe- and competing priorities for international of Rule of Law and Security Institutions cific participants are not attributed in this support, it is crucial to identify priorities es- in the United Nations Department of report. The expert-level workshop had sential to preventing relapse into conflict Peacekeeping Operations. The CAR Gov- two major aims: The first of these was to and to sustaining peace in the CAR. It is ernment participated in the dialogue at help the national authorities of the CAR also equally important to ensure sustained a high level, and demonstrated a strong further develop their strategic vision and financial and political support for SSR at desire to coordinate the assistance on programmatic priorities for the transfor- the national, regional and international SSR with the United Nations, as well as mation of the security sector. Participants levels for the country. with the African Union (AU) and the Eu- focused on how the CAR authorities can ropean Union (EU). Participants focused address the key SSR-related challenges to In this context, the United Nations Group on ways to make progress on SSR as a peace sustainment and socio-economic of Friends of SSR, co-chaired by Slovakia means for preventing a relapse into con- recovery with the support of the United and South Africa, held on 21 June 2016 a flict, and on the priority development Nations system and international partners. high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR needs for security sector transformation The second major aim of the expert-level at the United Nations headquarters. The in the CAR. discussion was to sensitize the CAR nation-

High-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR at the United Nations headquarters. From left to right: Adedeji Ebo, Chief, SSRU/OROLSI/DPKO; Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation; Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic; Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic.Photo: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

18 l Part 2: Summary of Dialogues agreed SSR commitments, goals, priority objectives, strategic results and activities, monitoring and evaluation benchmarks and indicators.

Furthermore, participants also indicat- ed that the CAR needs depoliticized and professional national defence and security forces. Importantly, the architecture of the security sector needs to be balanced, a task which can be achieved by right-sizing security institutions and bal- ancing the allocation of the national budget between the FACA and internal security forces. The respective missions, roles and responsibilities of the FACA, police, gendarmerie and other compo- Dialogue at expert level in Manhasset, New York. Photo: United Nations/Security Sector Reform Unit nents of the security sector must also be al authorities on how they can address key regarding the politics of SSR, institution- redefined. Some participants highlight- institutional development challenges in al capacities, democratic accountability, ed that the personnel of the FACA, police the security sector, to provide an opportu- affordability and sustainability, and coor- and gendarmerie must be inclusive of all nity for the CAR authorities to present their dination of multilateral support. Partic- ethnicities, as well as regionally balanced. priorities and support needs in the defence ipants stressed the key points outlined Finally, the establishment of formal vet- sector and internal security sector, and to below, and also proposed some of the ting mechanisms designed to identify and sensitize international partners and United specific methods, actions and objectives sanction uniformed personnel who have Nations member states about those priori- through which these priorities could be committed human rights violations and ties and needs. realized. other crimes will further both the process of national reconciliation and the fight The list of senior officials who gave re- 2.1.1 Politics of SSR against impunity. marks during the high-level portion of the event, include the following, among oth- A common national vision for SSR, which 2.1.2 Institutional Capacity ers: Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, can be expressed in a National Security Central African Republic; Mr. Jean Willybi- Policy, is important. Participants empha- When it comes to the armed forces, the ro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the sized that the CAR Government has a lead- strategic objective of the Government is to President of the CAR for DDR/SSR and Na- ing role and responsibility for facilitating establish a multi-ethnic and professional tional Reconciliation; Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, a national dialogue aimed at developing FACA, staffed with younger personnel and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs such a vision. Furthermore, participants structured around four regional garrisons, of the Slovak Republic; Ms. Annika Söder, emphasized that a new security sector with the central mission of protecting the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden; governance and support framework needs population and defending the territorial Mr. Mario Giro, Deputy Minister for Foreign to be established, and should consist of the integrity of the CAR. Mobilizing the re- Affairs and International Cooperation, It- following elements: firstly, a National Secu- quired resources from bilateral and multi- aly; Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special rity Policy based on the draft endorsed by lateral partners is essential for the success Representative of the Secretary-General the Transitional Authorities in March 2016; of DSR. During the high-level portion of for the Central African Republic and Head secondly, a national SSR strategy informed the event, the CAR’s Minister of Defence, of MINUSCA; and Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, by a nationally-led assessment of securi- Mr. Joseph Yakété, presented four prior- Assistant-Secretary-General in the Depart- ty institutions and a Public Expenditure ities and related methods and strategies ment of Peacekeeping Operations, United Review (PER) of the security sector; and for the reform of the defence sector and Nations. thirdly, the forthcoming Peacebuilding the reconstruction of the FACA, as out- and Recovery Strategy based on the Peace- lined below. building and Recovery Assessment – Eval- 2.1 Reform Priorities uation du relèvement et de la consolidation The first priority is reforming the gover- de la paix (RCPCA) – and the framework of nance system of the defence sector. In or- During the dialogue, participants high- mutual accountability – Cadre d’engage- der to achieve this priority, the CAR would lighted the following reform priorities ment mutuel, which will outline mutually need to implement the roadmap for the re-

Part 2: Summary of Dialogues l 19 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

form of the FACA adopted at the outset of cure the necessary small arms and lights The support of the international commu- the strategic seminar on the reform of the weapons for the armed forces. Finally, nity for the internal security forces would FACA, the Assises de la défense nationale,43 strengthening the operational capacities further be needed on the following: in June 2015. As Mr. Yakété outlined, some of the FACA would also require the devel- • strengthening of their operational of the key elements in this regard are: de- opment and implementation of an infra- capacity, including for the plan- veloping a new Defence Policy; developing structure plan to establish garrisons in a ning and conduct of operations, a new military doctrine; drafting a new Mil- number of strategic locations. through pre and in-service train- itary Programming Law that respects the ing, and through the procurement principle of affordability; drafting a new The third priority outlined by the min- of specialized equipment; Military Justice Code, to be adopted by the ister is that of defining the operational • strengthening logistics and finan- National Assembly and promulgated by tasks and planning the operational deploy- cial management; building and the President of the CAR; and establishing ment of the FACA. The operational tasks of rehabilitating infrastructure, in- defence zones aligned with the adminis- the FACA tentatively include the follow- cluding rehabilitating the police trative regions. ing: academy and gendarmerie school • escorting convoys along Main in Bangui and all police stations in The minister also highlighted that the Supply Road 1 (MSR 1); provincial capitals; CAR needs to develop and implement • static guarding of public buildings • redeploying the police and gen- a human resources management poli- in Bangui; darmerie outside of Bangui; the cy. The changes to the human resources • protecting the territorial integrity strengthening of the criminal jus- of the FACA should also include the fol- of the CAR, including border secu- tice chain; and lowing: rity in the south of the country; • as was the case with the FACA, the • the retirement of 750 personnel at • participating in the African Union- provision of small arms and light a cost of $US 5 million; led regional task force for the weapons, which will mean that • termination of service of deserters elimination of the Lord’s Resis- the 2127 Sanctions Committee of and physically unfit personnel; tance Army (LRA). the Security Council will need to • design of a policy for the recon- grant an exemption to the arms version of military personnel into The fourth priority is that of mobilizing re- embargo: civil life; sources from bilateral and multilateral part- • establishment of a legal frame- • recruitment of new soldiers to fill ners. In this respect, the minister discussed work for intelligence governance/ the vacancy left by retiring per- the priorities for the reform of the internal oversight, and the design of coor- sonnel; security forces, which are outlined in the dination mechanisms for sharing • reintegration of FACA personnel Institutional Capacity and Development intelligence at the subnational who have joined armed groups in Plan for the police and gendarmerie. The level. the past; key priorities he highlighted in this regard • integration of ex-combatants of include the following: 2.1.3 Democratic Accountability armed groups into the FACA in • revising the legal and regulatory line with established recruitment framework of the police and gen- Participants at the event agreed that criteria. darmerie, including the territorial democratic accountability will be critical organization of the police and for good governance and peace sustain- The second priority is that of strengthen- gendarmerie; ment in the CAR, and identified the fol- ing the operational capacities of the FACA. • clarifying and delineating the lowing key priorities in this area: In this respect, the minister emphasized, respective roles and missions of • strengthening the parliamentary in particular, the need to reestablish units the FACA and the police, partic- oversight and judicial control of that are staffed with personnel who have ularly regarding their respective the executive policies in defence been verified (vérification simplifiée) and missions and chains of command; and security; biometrically registered. Changing mind- strengthening the human re- • establishing an effective Inspec- sets through professional training and sources of the police and gendar- tion and Oversight Service under education of military personnel, with a merie through the recruitment of the Ministry of Internal Securi- specific focus on non-commissioned offi- younger officers, ty, with full judicial competen- cers (NCOs) and officers, will also be cru- • the integration of a limited num- cy to investigate any allegation cial. Operational units will need to be sup- ber of demobilized combat- of misconduct in both police plied with equipment and provided with ants, the retirement of eligible and gendarmerie, and full and logistics support. A partial lifting of the officers, and permanent access to all their facil- arms embargo will enable the CAR to pro- • adoption of a code of conduct. ities;

20 l Part 2: Summary of Dialogues • strengthening of financial over- Two further reforms linked to the afford- tor-wide) activities, milestones and alloca- sight mechanisms; ability and sustainability of the security tion of national budgetary resources for • developing and implementing a sector, which participants emphasized, implementing the commitments articu- national civic education program; are the need to strengthen the institution- lated in an agreed security sector frame- • promoting dialogue between the al capacity of the Customs Service by in- work. Moreover, the degree to which armed forces and civil society; creasing staffing and equipment, and also the Government will be able to extend • restoration and extension of the need to strengthen the effectiveness its authority over the country, including state authority and civilian con- and transparency of the management of through a gradual transfer of responsi- trol of the armed forces through natural resources. bility for the provision of security to local the redeployment of civil ser- communities, can also serve as a helpful vants across the entire territory of 2.1.5 Coordination of international indicator. Importantly, participants high- the CAR. support lighted that what would be particularly useful are indicators that relate to the 2.1.4 Affordability and Sustainability While long-term sustainability of the se- degree to which the newly trained secu- curity sector will depend on the ability rity forces serve the needs of the popula- The affordability and sustainability of se- of the Government to generate revenue, tion of the CAR, and the degree to which curity institutions will be critical to the ef- international support will remain critical they are subject to agreed accountability fective functioning of the security sector in the short to medium term. What will be mechanisms. in the long term. Participants identified a also key is the effective national coordina- number of key priorities in this area. In the tion of international support, and partic- 2.1.6 Further observations first instance, the CAR’s socio-economic ipants highlighted a number of priorities development is contingent on security. in this area. Overall, the dialogue highlighted the So as to have a clear understanding of the overlaps and remaining differences in key strategic issues relating to security They discussed the need to establish a perspectives on the way forward on SSR from an economic perspective, the CAR national SSR structure for coordination, in the CAR, both among the CAR au- should undertake a security sector public which should be composed of the fol- thorities themselves and also between expenditure review (SSPER). This would lowing: a strategic committee; a technical the international community and the also help bring to light the strengths and committee; and a technical support secre- CAR Government. While there is general weaknesses of the public financial man- tariat led by the national coordinator for agreement on some of the key elements agement system. SSR. The effective coordination of interna- of a reformed FACA, which needs to be tional support also requires the adoption republican, professional, multi-ethnic Experts highlighted that an SSPER is de- of a common understanding of “success” and regionally balanced, as well as on the signed to inform the policy making pro- of the SSR process in the CAR, and the specific resource needs, it was evident cess by assessing and providing recom- identification of key indicators of progress that there is still some way to go before mendations on the following dimension on SSR. Agreed indicators, which could be the CAR authorities reach a commonly of public expenditures in the security monitored as part of the proposed frame- shared vision on SSR. While some of the sector: work of mutual accountability between CAR and international participants felt • fiscal stability and affordability; the CAR authorities and the international that there needs to be a holistic approach • allocative efficiency; operational community, would benefit the Govern- to SSR, which should include reforms in efficiency and effectiveness; ment by concentrating the focus on a the area of justice and corrections, human • fiscal transparency and account- defined set of priorities and reducing the rights, intelligence, border management, ability and: transaction costs of coordinating multiple etc., and that a holistic approach to SSR is • reporting on external assistance. partners. essential for a functioning social contract and national consensus, others were more The World Bank and the United Nations Indicators of SSR progress could include, keen to emphasize the needs of reforms have acquired joint experience in this firstly, the degree to which the national of the FACA in particular as the way for- area, and would be able to assist the CAR security sector framework reflects the as- ward on SSR in the CAR. The latter were authorities in conducting such an SSPER, pirations of all segments of the popula- keen to emphasize the specific needs of which would also help the CAR authori- tion, including the demands of the armed the armed forces as the primary focus of ties to assess the overall impact of SSR on groups and without prejudice to the le- the international community’s future SSR public finances. Following such an SSPER, gitimacy of the Government. A further efforts. it will be essential to roll-out public finan- indicator can be the degree of progress cial management reforms of the security on developing, adopting and implement- Furthermore, the dialogue also exposed sector linked to the findings of the review. ing an overall SSR strategy, strategic (sec- differences between the international

Part 2: Summary of Dialogues l 21 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

community and some members of the CAR posed by, armed groups through political delegation on the best way to address the dialogue. While the international commu- CAR’s security challenges: while some na- nity stands ready to continue helping the tional interlocutors portrayed the non-state national authorities to address their secu- armed groups in the country as criminal el- rity challenges, and while criminals must ements, and pushed for a military solution, face justice, it is essential that those who the international community emphasized have legitimate grievances are not mar- the need for political solutions to essential- ginalized further. The consensus view of ly political problems, and called on the CAR the international community was that the Government to engage with armed groups MINUSCA peacekeeping force should not in a frank and genuine dialogue about the be used as a tool to resolve what is essen- political way forward in the country. From tially a political problem, and that a more this perspective, the international commu- concerted and political approach to deal- nity’s strategic priority in the CAR is the ing with the armed groups is the desirable reduction of the presence of, and threat course of action.

22 l Part 2: Summary of Dialogues PART 3 Recommendations on Transforming the Security Sector SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

While the international community and The following key strategic objectives can support the Government’s efforts to the CAR Government share a common would address in a structured manner establish a new national security frame- strategic objective when it comes to SSR, what is required on SSR in the CAR: work. which is to reduce the threats posed by the armed groups, they currently have diver- • Support and facilitate the devel- In order to address the structural deficits gent approaches to accomplishing this ob- opment of the national security of the security sector architecture, it is es- jective. On the one hand, the international framework, including a credible sential that the national authorities adopt community is focused on fostering human vetting strategy, so as to build a the draft National Security Policy (NSP) and security and enhancing effectiveness, in- credible political basis for the trans- finalize a national SSR strategy as a matter clusiveness and accountability of the se- formation of the security sector; of priority. The adoption of a new nation- curity institutions; and on the other hand, • foster the integration of demo- al security framework would yield a newly the CAR Government prioritizes the recon- bilized combatants of the armed designed and rebalanced architecture of struction and redeployment of the FACA groups into the national defence the security sector, including through a with a view of restoring the authority of and security forces on the basis of clear delineation of responsibilities of the the State throughout the national territory. a political agreement; FACA, the internal security forces, and oth- This latter approach entails using force to • promote and support an enhanced er uniformed entities. The NSP provides a dislodge the armed groups that are refus- inclusion of marginalized groups, vision for right-sizing the security sector ing to participate in the national DDRR pro- including Muslims in the security and ensuring a balanced allocation of the gramme. It is evident that there is a need to institutions; national budget between the FACA and in- continue sensitizing the CAR Government • strengthen the institutional and ternal security forces. on the United Nations approach, which operational capacities of the secu- centres on political solutions to what are rity institutions, with a significant As an additional priority objective, the essentially political problems. responsibility of the UN for the po- United Nations should address the critical lice and gendarmerie; and sensitive issue of the integration of a In the area of SSR, the United Nations can • foster democratic accountability limited number of eligible demobilized support the CAR in the development of a of the security sector within the combatants of the armed groups into the national SSR strategy. For such a strategy framework of the rule of law; national defence and security forces. The to be sustainable in the long-term, one of • promote the affordability and sus- integration of some combatants of the the elements of the process of national tainability of SSR processes; ex-Séléka is essential for the process of en- reconciliation that would be particularly • enhance the effectiveness of na- hancing the ethnic and religious makeup helpful is a dialogue with armed groups tionally-led coordination of in- of security institutions, and more impor- on matters of security and on the transfor- ternational support, including of tantly as a political incentive for their en- mation of the security sector. The Security MINUSCA support, to the national gagement to disarm. Importantly, howev- Council sees the end state of SSR in the SSR process. er, it should not undermine the objective CAR as the establishment of “professional, of building professional security forces. ethnically representative and regionally balanced national defence and internal The strategic objective of establishing a security forces,” which are under civilian 3.1 Politics of SSR national security strategic framework and control, accountable to democratic institu- mechanisms for security management can tions and respectful of the rule of law and An agreement between relevant stake- be attained through some of the elements human rights.44 The first step towards this holders on a realistic vision for the future outlined below: end state will be a dialogue between the of the internal security and defence forces Government and the armed groups, which can help to reduce violence in the coun- 3.1.1 Ensuring sustained political can help the CAR to find a way forward try, and thereby ensure greater security for engagement of the United Nations on making the CAR’s security institutions the population. Such an agreement needs and international partners so as ethnically representative and regionally to draw on the draft National Security to foster broader political support balanced. The United Nations can help to Policy, which was agreed under the Tran- for these sensitive reforms in the facilitate such a dialogue. sitional Authorities, and it needs to take Government, and so as to engage into account the outcomes of the Bangui the President in a high-level Furthermore, over the next two years the Forum, including the Republican Pact for discussion on his vision for national United Nations should adopt a support Peace, National Reconciliation and Recon- security and SSR. strategy that is structured around key pri- struction in the CAR, and the agreement ority objectives, and underpinned by spe- with armed groups on the principles of 3.1.2 Facilitating (additional) review, (re) cific policy and programmatic initiatives. DDRR and integration. The United Nations validation and eventual adoption

24 l Part 3: Recommendations on Transforming the Security Sector of the draft NSP; creation of a • Developing an action plan, as stitutions such as local community National Security Council and its part of the political dialogue be- security councils. Secretariat (Secretariat-General for tween the Government and armed National Security), and to that end groups, which outlines the key le- 3.2 Institutional Capacity undertaking the following: gal, political, and technical param- eters, as well as a detailed planning Violence can also be reduced in the coun- • Advocating and supporting inclu- methodology for the integration of try through strengthening institutional sive national consultations on the former combatants; and operational capacities and enhanced NSP as may be determined neces- -- Clarifying the status of FACA de- professionalization of the Central African sary by the new Government; serters who joined the armed national defence and security forces. The • Supporting the future Nation- groups and providing recom- progressive deployment and re-operational Security High Council (NSHC)/ mendations on the issue of alization of the CAR armed forces to secure Conseil supérieur de la sécurite na- the 3,437 combatants of the the borders, as well as the development of tionale with technical assistance; Séléka integrated by presidential professional and effective national police establishing a Secretariat General decree into the FACA in Septem- and gendarmerie, which can over time for National Security, which will be ber 2013. assume a greater role in maintaining law mandated to prepare, facilitate and and order in the capital and beyond, is es- record the meetings of the NSHC 3.1.5 The strategic objective of improving sential to ensuring stability and security and ensure the implementation of the security of the minority and in the rural areas currently held by armed its decisions; marginalized groups, including the groups once these have been dismantled -- Drafting a law on the establish- CAR’s Muslim citizens, can be attained through a DDRR process. Furthermore, the ment of the NSHC, including by assisting the Government in internal security forces need to undertake budgetary provisions. developing an action plan for the the tasks identified in the National Security enhanced inclusion of Muslim Policy. Given the fragility of state security 3.1.3 Encouraging and supporting the citizens and other minorities in the institutions, building national capacity will development of a national SSR governance of the security sector; require mentoring officials through the strategy and/or a national security such a plan could lay out detailed co-location of international experts. strategy led by the NSHC, and to that measures to: end undertaking the following: 3.2.1 The strategic objective of • Increase the representation and fostering the effective functioning, • Facilitating a workshop where rel- inclusivity in the security institu- professionalism and internal evant country experiences from tions through a policy of targeted accountability of security institutions, francophone African countries are recruitment of young Muslims; including internal security institutions presented by SSR experts (Côte • Enhance public security provi- and the FACA can be attained d’Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry); sion in priority areas in the north through some of the intermediate • Adopting a mechanism for the and north-east through de- objectives outlined below. pragmatic vetting of serving per- ploying gendarmerie brigades, sonnel and candidates for recruit- which are representative of the 3.2.1 (i) Intermediate Objective A: Support- ment and integration into the local communities, and by even- ing institutional and capacity strength- FACA, police and gendarmerie as tually establishing reformed ening of the internal security services, so a key SSR commitment of the na- FACA garrisons, ideally with en- that they can effectively provide security, tional SSR strategy; abling capabilities (logistics, including public order and law enforce- • Developing a joint UNDP/MINUS- medical and engineering) to ment, in Bangui and strategically import- CA support program, including ex- support socio-economic develop- ant provinces of the CAR, by: pert advice, financial and technical ment; • Advocating for the CAR author- assistance. • Enhance the participation of Mus- ities to prioritize the reform and lim community leaders in nation- development of internal security 3.1.4 The strategic objective of the al security policy-making bodies, services (police and gendarmerie), integration of a limited number of possibly by setting aside reserved including through the allocation of eligible demobilized combatants of seats in the future National Securi- a greater share of the national bud- the armed groups into the national ty Council; get, and support for institutional defence forces and security services • Decentralize the governance of the reform and capacity development; can be attained through some of security sector, and, where appro- • Reviewing and updating the legal the following elements: priate, establish hybrid security in- framework, including developing

Part 3: Recommendations on Transforming the Security Sector l 25 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

new organic laws on police and any allegation of misconduct in • Formulating a re-operationaliza- gendarmerie, with the support of both police and gendarmerie, and tion and deployment plan jointly MINUSCA policing legal experts; full and permanent access to all between MINUSCA, the EUTM RCA • Supporting national institutions in their facilities; and other partners; the finalization and implementa- • Undertaking feasibility studies for • Supporting the restructuring of tion of the Police and Gendarmerie civil emergency services (e.g. fire the État-Major des armées (EMA) development plan, based on co-lo- brigade). with an appropriate staff model; cation and mentoring provided by • Delivering operational training for MINUSCA police officers and civil- 3.2.1 (ii) Intermediate Objective B: Establish- up to six battalions (EUTM-RCA); ian experts to the Ministry of Inte- ing defence institutions under democratic • Support the deployment of rior, Public Security and Territorial civilian control capable of defending the EUTM RCA trained units through Administration, Directorate Gener- territorial integrity of the CAR and contrib- mentoring/monitoring (MINUSCA al (DG) of the Police and DG of the uting to the extension of state authority Force and other partners). Gendarmerie; outside Bangui, through the following: • Supporting national institutions • Revising the Roadmap for the re- It is important to note in relation to these on the training of existing and the form of the FACA adopted at the recommendations that development orga- selection, recruitment, vetting and outset of the strategic seminar nizations need to provide support for insti- training of at least 500 new police on the reform of the FACA, the tutional development while understand- and gendarmerie elements; Assises de la défense nationale, in ing well that pushing too hard will end • Developing a joint MINUSCA/ June 2015; up creating illegitimate institutions. This UNDP support programme, fund- • The European Union and United is why a clear step by step approach that ed by MINUSCA Asset Budget and Nations developing a joint support privileges best fit to best practices is abso- UNDP core and extra-budgetary plan for the FACA; lutely necessary in the CAR. Thinking clear- funding for infrastructure rehabil- • Advocating and supporting the ly about innovative intermediary steps in itation, equipment and training development of a White Paper institutional development is essential. It is personnel of the CAR policing ser- on Defence and National Secu- not only state institutions that are under- vices; rity (proposed by EUMAM and developed, but private sector institutions -- Rehabilitation and equipment of EUTM). This White Paper would lay and community institutions, as well, and police and gendarmerie acade- out the strategic functions to be therefore the vision for institutional devel- my: estimated cost of $3million performed by security institutions. opment should be sensitive to all aspects over two years (2016-18); It would also outline the financial of societal and economic interactions. • Coordinating international support resources required for the security in the provision of training and institutions to execute their roles. equipment to ensure alignment This document would finally lay 3.3 Democratic with the police development plan out the model for the armed forc- Accountability and compliance with the sanction es, including the form, size and regime; functions of the army. It would As outlined in the United Nations SSR In- • Rethinking the policing model to clarify the main functions of the tegrated Technical Guidance Notes, “[sup- clarify the delineation of function- FACA (Developmental / humanitar- porting] democratic governance of the al and geographic competencies ian / state-building army / protec- security sector within the framework of the between the police and gendar- tion and intervention); rule of law promotes the understanding merie; • Establishing a joint MINUSCA/ that governance related to all persons, in- • Introducing a code of conduct EUTM/Government coordination stitutions, and entities, both public and pri- for individual National Police and mechanism so as to ensure the vate, including the State itself, and ensures Gendarmerie officers, and making alignment of defence sector re- that these are accountable to laws that are it available in local languages (inform processes; publicly promulgated, equally enforced cluding Sango); • In support of the Minister of De- and independently adjudicated, and that • Strengthening internal account- fence, renewing the military doc- [they] are consistent with international ability of policing services by cre- trine, and drafting a new Military human rights norms and standards.”45 Con- ating a capable Inspection and Programming Law for 2016-2020; solidating democratic governance of the Oversight Service, under the Min- • Formulating an equipment and security institutions within the framework istry of Security, Public Order and infrastructure development plan of the rule of law is indeed essential to sus- Immigration/Emigration, with full aligned with the new doctrine of a tainable peace, and for the transformation judicial competency to investigate garrison army; of the security sector.

26 l Part 3: Recommendations on Transforming the Security Sector 3.3.1 As such, a further key strategic ITGNs on National Ownership, the security sector, and propose recom- objective is that of fostering an Democratic Governance, Gender, mendations for aligning the security sector effective democratic governance and the UN approach to SSR and policy framework with available financial of the security sector through the peace processes; resources in a manner designed to ensure intermediate objectives outlined • Involving local communities and fiscal affordability and sustainability. This below. local leaders in SSR, and in securi- can be done by: ty management through mecha- 3.3.1 (i) Intermediate Objective A: Establish- nisms such as local security com- • Mobilizing and deploying inter- ing effective parliamentary oversight of mittees led by Prefects or mayors. national technical expertise, with the defence forces and internal security financial support from the World services through: Bank and the UN/WB Trust Fund’s • Building the 3As of parliamentari- 3.4 Affordability grant for SSPER; ans in oversight of the security sec- and Sustainability • Developing options for stop-gap tor: Authority, Aptitude, Attitude;46 donor funding for the FACA and • Capacity building of the Com- As highlighted in the United Nations In- ISF for 2016-2020, including the mission for Defence and Securi- tegrated Technical Guidance Note on Na- revitalization of the Multi Partner ty of the National Assembly on tional Ownership of Security Sector Re- Trust Fund for the ISF. exercising constructive effective form, one of the basic elements of an SSR oversight of security institutions, process that is based on national owner- The second priority is to mobilize resources including through budgeting and ship is “a process in which national actors for funding a severance package and pen- appropriation. commit, to the extent possible and on a sion plan for security institutions: approx- • Developing a support program for systematic basis, financial resources to the imately 700 FACA and 380 police/gendar- the Commission for Defence and oversight of the reform process. These allo- merie are due for immediate retirement. Security of the National Assembly; cations by the relevant legislative author- The US State Department is currently con- • Capacity building of the adminis- ities, including to non-state actors, should sidering setting aside circa $US 8 million trators and technical staff of the reflect the security needs and aspiration for severance packages for military person- legislature assigned to the Com- of all segments of society.”47 The national nel eligible for retirement in 2016. Howev- mission for Defence and Security. authorities, with the support of MINUSCA, er, there is not yet any pledge of funding UNDP, the World Bank and the European for the pension of the retired members of 3.3.1 (ii) Intermediate Objective B: Strength- Union are finalizing a cost assessment in the FACA. ening civilian control of the security the context of the Recovery and Peace- institutions through: building Assessment. The forthcoming Na- • Encouraging the President and tional Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding 3.5 Coordination of Prime Minister to appoint career will provide further costing estimates for international support civil servants in administrative and the development of security sector insti- policy-making functions in security tutions. The cost of priority projects for the International support remains indispens- institutions; sub-component defence sector reform is able for the CAR. However, the national • Developing the individual capacity assessed at $40 million for five years.48 The coordination of that support needs to be of civilian administrators and tech- full cost estimates for the implementation improved significantly to enable the CAR nical specialists of the CAR Gov- of the capacity development plan for the Government to align enhanced impact of ernment and security institutions Internal Security Forces is $195 million for international support in line with national through training and mentoring, five years. priorities. Thus, the fifth and final strategic and by collocating SSR officers in objective, of enhancing the effectiveness of security institutions. The first priority on the affordability and nationally-led coordination of internation- sustainability of the security sector is to al support, including of MINUSCA support, 3.3.1 (iii) Intermediate Objective C: support the CAR Government in the prepa- to national SSR process, can be achieved Strengthening oversight capacity of civil ration and implementation of the Security through the intermediate objectives out- society and customary institutions on Sector Public Expenditure Review (SSPER), lined below. monitoring of the security institutions which can inform the policy dialogue on through: the future national security architecture. 3.5.1 (i) Intermediate Objective A: Estab- • Facilitating sensitization work- The SSPER can also inform the CAR Gov- lishing Government-led coordination shops for the civil society on prin- ernment and other authorized stakehold- mechanisms by: ciples of effective democratic over- ers about the nature of the expenditure • Adopting a National Plan for Re- sight, based on the United Nations and of the public sector management of covery and Peacebuilding and

Part 3: Recommendations on Transforming the Security Sector l 27 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

a Mutual Accountability Frame- level, chaired by the SRSG, with work (Cadre d’engagement mutuel); secretariat functions performed by • Establishing a thematic coordina- MINUSCA SSRU; tion group for SSR managed by the • Developing and managing Moni- Secretariat of the High Council for toring and Evaluation tools such as National Security with the support synchronization matrix for interna- of MINUSCA SSRU. tional support programs; • Revitalizing the MINUSCA mis- 3.5.1 (ii) Intermediate Objective B: Building sion-wide SSR Task Force, chaired partnerships and a strong coordination by the SRSG or DSRSG-P, with sec- mechanism between the United Nations, retariat support provided by SSRU; EU and other donors, and political and se- • Developing a MINUSCA/UNCT SSR curity partners in order to build a common support plan aligned with the CAR political and sectoral dialogue with the Government national SSR/devel- Government, based on common mes- opment plan once the latter is for- sages; avoiding overlap between various mulated. donors’ interventions and reducing the burden of coordination on the Govern- And finally, so as to keep international at- ment; and ensuring very coordinated tention on SSR in the CAR, the Group of interventions in terms of support to the Friends of SSR should continue discussing security sector. This can be achieved by: the CAR, follow carefully the progress, • Establishing coordination mecha- and take stock periodically of the chal- nisms between international part- lenges, needs and further priorities of the ners at the political and technical country.

28 l Part 3: Recommendations on Transforming the Security Sector Conclusion

The dialogue on security sector reform in The CAR Government and MINUSCA have a the Central African Republic, which took short window of opportunity to deliver on place from 21-22 June, 2016, in New York national SSR commitments outlined in the was the most high-level conversation held Cadre d’engagement mutuel (Framework of on this topic in a long time. It was instru- Mutual Accountability) and the strategic mental in identifying challenges and prior- priorities laid out in the Recovery and Peace- ities on SSR in the CAR. As highlighted in building Plan. The Government has demon- the report, this is not the first time that SSR strated political will to move forward, but it has been attempted in the country. How- will be critical to demonstrate measurable ever, while mindful of the lessons learned progress by the end of 2017 on key areas from previous efforts, neither the newly outlined in this report. At the same time, elected Government nor the international SSR remains under-funded and the interna- community can afford to disengage from tional community is thus best advised to im- SSR in the CAR. We are confident that the prove its support at this critical juncture. We dialogue on SSR as captured in this report appeal to all actors who participated in the has identified the key issues which the dialogue to pledge support to the SSR pro- Government and international partners cess in the CAR. In this regard, the recom- need to address. In this regard, it will be mendations of this report would be useful important that the support to SSR is ap- in informing the Brussels donor conference proached with a sense of urgency. on the key areas requiring SSR support.

Conclusion l 29

ANNEXES SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex I. Agenda of the High-Level Dialogue

High-level dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic

21 June 2016, 10am – 12pm, Conference Room 11 | United Nations Headquarters, New York

AGENDAa

Implementing Security Council Resolution 2151 in the Central African Republic

10.00 – 10.10 Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Keynote speaker and Chair of the High-level segment of the dialogue Moderator: Mr. Adedeji Ebo, Chief, Security Sector Reform Unit, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, DPKO

Progress on SSR as means for preventing relapse into conflict

10.10 – 10.30 Panel members: Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR/National Reconciliation

Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO

Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MINUSCA

Ms. Annika Söder, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Mr. Mario Giro, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Italy

10:30 – 11.00 Moderated question and answer session

a Please consult the annexes for the date of delivery of the respective speeches.

32 l Annex I Priority needs for security sector transformation in the CAR

11.00 – 11.25 Panel members: Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, CAR

Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR/National Reconciliation

Mr. Magdy Martínez-Solimán, Assistant Secretary-General, Assistant Administrator and Director of the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, United Nations Development Programme

Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support

Ms. Erminia Notarangelo, European External Action Service, Head of Division for Central Africa

Mr. Jean-Christophe Carret, Country Manager for the Central African Republic, World Bank

11.25 – 11.50 Moderated question and answer session

Concluding remarks

11.50 – 12.00 H.E. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Annex I l 33 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex II. Agenda of the Inter-Agency Senior SSR Practitioners’ Workshop

United Nations Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force

Inter-Agency Senior SSR Practitioners’ Workshop

21 June – 24 June 2016

SUMMARY AGENDA

Tuesday, 21 June

10.00 – 12.00 Open meeting of the Group of Friends of SSR: “Dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic”, CR-11, United Nations Headquarters, New York

14.00 Departure to Greentree [bus will depart from First Avenue, corner of 45th street]

15.00 Arrival at Greeentree and check-in

18.00 – 19.00 Welcome cocktail

19.00 – 20.00 Dinner

Wednesday, 22 June

07.45 – 08.45 Breakfast

08.45 Arrival of day guests from HQ New York

09.00 – 09.30 Session 1.1: Welcome and introduction

09.30 – 10.45 Session 1.2: Central African Republic – National security framework, DDR-SSR nexus and Vetting Presentation and discussion

10.45 – 11.00 Break

11.00 – 12.30 Session 1.3: International support to the development of security sector institutions (FACA, Police, Gendarmerie) Presentation and discussion

12.30 – 14.00 Lunch

CONCLUSION OF THE CAR DIALOGUE

34 l Annex II 14.00 – 15.00 Session 1.4: Elements of a Plan of Action for S/RES/2151

15.00 – 16.30 Session 1.5: Contributions from IASSRTF Entities and Partners

16.30 – 17.00 Conclusions of the first day

18.00 – 19.00 Cocktail

19.00 – 20.00 Dinner

20.00 – 22.00 Social Event

Thursday, 23 June

07.00 – 08.45 Breakfast

09.00 – 10.30 Session 2.1: Public Expenditure Reviews: Concept and rationale from the UN and WB perspective

10.30 – 11.00 Break

11.00 – 12.30 Session 2.2: Lessons from the PER implementation in Somalia and Liberia; implementation in Guinea Bissau and CAR?

12.30 – 14.00 Lunch

14.00 – 16.00 Session 2.3: Voices from the field: DRC, Iraq, SVC and Gender

16.00 – 16.30 Concluding remarks

Friday, 24 June – SSR Senior Advisors Workshop

07.00 – 08.45 Breakfast

09.00 – 09.15 Opening session with Chief SSR

09.15 – 10.00 Session 1: Integration

10.00 – 10.05 Break

10.05 – 11.00 Session 1 (continued)

11.00 – 11.15 Break

11.15 – 12.00 Session 2: The use of assessed budget for project in mission contexts

12.00 – 12.05 Break

12.05 – 13.00 Session 2 (continued)

13.00 – 14.00 Lunch

14.00 – 14.30 CONCLUSION/WRAP-UP OF SSR SENIOR ADVISERS WORKSHOP

14.30 – 15.00 Packing

15.00 Departure Greentree

Annex II l 35 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex III. United Nations Group of Friends of SSR Co-Chairs’ Statement

Co-Chairs’ Statement

High-level Dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central African Republic

Introduction The dialogue focused on two priorities. a viable governance framework for the se- Firstly, speakers reflected on the elements curity sector. Increased accountability of The co-chairs of the United Nations Group of the national SSR process that are need- the armed and security forces and the es- of Friends of Security Sector Reform (SSR), ed to secure lasting peace and prevent a tablishment of appropriate mechanisms Slovakia and South Africa, facilitated a di- relapse into conflict. Secondly, there was a and tools to exercise oversight by parlia- alogue to build support for SSR priorities focus on immediate and long term reform ment and local communities/civil society in the Central African Republic (CAR). Held needs pertaining to security sector insti- will be crucial. To establish a system of in cooperation with the United Nations tutions including the police, gendarmerie, democratic governance, it will be import- Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, and its Sec- military, and relevant civilian control and ant to initiate and sustain consultations retariat, the SSR Unit/DPKO, the dialogue oversight bodies. Also the role of local on an appropriate formula for decentral- provided a unique platform for a high communities and their capacity to mean- isation and regional/local administration level discussion among and between the ingfully participate in the provision of se- of security as means of introducing mech- Government of CAR and the internation- curity and fulfil their democratic oversight anisms for devolution of power and as al community on this important area and role was noted. means for sustainable extension of state contributed to the implementation of S/ authority beyond Bangui; UN support to RES/2151 (2014) that sets out the guiding Observations SSR in post-conflict environments has principles for international assistance to demonstrated that the process of sepa- national SSR efforts. The dialogue was or- Throughout the high-level segment of the ration of powers between political and ganized in two segments. The high-level dialogue on key SSR priorities in the Cen- military leaders, while a precondition for segment took place on 21 June 2016 at tral African Republic SSR was highlighted civilian control and oversight, is often a the United Nations Headquarters in New as a key tool for preventing relapse into slow and gradual process. Hence, in the York. It brought together high-ranking conflict and as such the need for a strate- immediate aftermath of conflict, leaders representatives of the Government of gic approach to SSR, consisting of three of armed groups may view integration as the Central African Republic, the Special key elements, was stressed: assurance policy and tool to secure im- Representative of the Secretary-General mediate participation in the post-conflict and Head of the United Nations Integrat- 1. Put in place a national policy and gover- political process. To avoid the creation of ed Stabilization Mission to the Central nance framework for the security sector: large and ultimately unsustainable armed African Republic (MINUSCA), as well as forces, dialogue on security sector inte- representatives from key partners includ- Considering the scope of challenges and gration should, from the onset, go beyond ing the United Nations, European Union, needs facing the security sector, a strategic military integration and lay the ground World Bank, African Union and bilateral long-term approach is essential for man- for the emergence of security governance donors. The expert segment of the dia- aging the SSR process. In this regard, the throughout the country. logue was conducted on 22 June, and SSR policy framework should set out the provided a useful opportunity to take SSR commitments, with a common under- Indicators of progress could include: forward the themes identified at the New standing that a failure to progressively im- political accountability for leading a re- York meeting a day earlier, with particular plement this framework will increase the form process in accordance with agreed emphasis on the key elements of national likelihood of relapse into conflict. objectives and principles, including ownership and the importance of nation- those agreed during the Bangui Forum; al responsibility and political consensus in Such a national security policy would in- increased representation within armed this regard. clude tangible steps towards developing and internal security forces according to

36 l Annex III ethnicity, regional representation, gen- coordination, under national leadership • In keeping with S/RES/2151 we en- der and religion; effective decision mak- should facilitate coherence of support. As courage the Secretary-General to pro- ing within national security coordination first step the Government needs to articu- vide comprehensive reporting on SSR and policy making as indicator of political late needs and define its funding strategy, implementation, taking into account will for SSR, establishment of a dedicat- including from domestic resources. the specific objectives and indicators ed monitoring and evaluation capacity discussed, and in particular bring to within the coordination structure to en- Indicators of effective coordination of the attention of the Council any devel- able impact oriented evaluation and en- international support may include evi- opments that may undermine pros- hanced participation of local communi- dence that the Government engages with pects for their fulfilment, as those may ties in security sector policy and decision donors and partners in a transparent and contribute to heightening the risk for making. predictable manner thus building confi- relapse into conflict. dence and sustaining international sup- 2. Lay the ground for the effective func- port for its reform programme. tioning, professionalism and internal accountability of security institutions, Follow-up action in particular the FACA, gendarmerie and police: This High-level Dialogue on building support for key SSR priorities in the Central Identify and undertake tangible steps African Republic has confirmed the im- towards right-sizing the security sector portance of creating a dedicated space for as a prerequisite for its sustainability and exchanging and discussing the most press- professionalization. Additionally, put in ing challenges and opportunities for SSR in place an appropriate and clear delinea- countries emerging from conflict. For the tion between the roles and responsibili- purpose of contributing to the implemen- ties of the FACA, police and gendarmerie tation of immediate SSR priorities as basis and take visible steps to demonstrate for sustaining peace and enabling peace- the application of agreed roles. Adopt a building and recovery to take place in the code of conduct for uniformed person- Central African Republic, we commit to: nel and support its application as means of enhancing trust with citizens and as a • Present this Co-chairs’ Statement to mechanism for developing a culture of the Security Council and the Peace- internal accountability and professional- building Commission. ism. The establishment of Inspector-Gen- • Present this Co-chairs’ Statement to eral functions and empowerment of their the Secretary-General of the United offices would be an important step in the Nations for circulation to relevant UN right direction. Implement a police de- agencies and departments. velopment programme with immediate • Request that the co-chairs of the focus on rehabilitating and equipping high-level dialogue receive a detailed the police and gendarmerie training in- report of the event, including the ex- stitutions. pert level discussions. • Encourage that the observations out- 3. Enhance coordination of international lined in this document inform the support, including of MINUSCA support, development of a comprehensive to the national SSR process within a support plan for SSR in the Central mutual accountability framework (com- African Republic to be presented at pact): the upcoming donors’ conference in Brussels. Key SSR indicators should be included in • Convene a discussion of the Group a mutual accountability framework be- of Friends of SSR to follow up on the tween the Government and the interna- status of the recommendations con- tional community to facilitate allocation tained herein, to ensure continued of international support to clearly defined support to the SSR process in CAR by national goals. A mechanism for donor the international community.

Annex III l 37 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex IV. Speech of Mr. Joseph Yakétéb, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic, 21 June 2016

Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Co-Chairs of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, Assistant Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of MINUSCA, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, Member State representatives and Experts, Dear Friends,

On behalf of the Government of the Cen- share with you our vision and needs in re- garrison army and resume their governing tral African Republic (CAR), I would like to lation to security sector reform in the CAR. powers, with technical support from the start by expressing my sincere thanks to international community. I can assure you all of you who are gathered here today, May I remind you that since Septem- that there is a marked improvement in the on behalf of the international community ber 2014, in response to the upsurge in image and perception of our forces among and the Group of Friends of Security Sec- violence resulting in humanitarian crises, the population. tor Reform, to assist countries such as the a significant proportion of security services Central African Republic that are under- in the Central African Republic are being Unfortunately, this restructuring is en- going reconstruction in accordance with provided by MINUSCA, although the inter- countering limitations due to the sanctions United Nations Security Council resolu- national forces do not have sufficient per- regime, including arms embargo, to which tion 2151. sonnel to cover the whole territory. our country is subject. This is restricting efforts by the Government and international In response to this highly commendable The ageing Central African Armed Forc- partners to support the FACA. move, I would like to re-iterate, on behalf of es (FACA) are now concentrated in Bangui, the people and Government of the Central prone to acts of indiscipline given their lack Ladies and Gentlemen, African Republic, as well as personally, our of activity, and devoid of all operational deepest gratitude and recognition regard- capacity due to the destruction or occupa- As we emerge from crisis, and in anticipa- ing the decisive contribution by the United tion of facilities, and the lack of equipment tion of a potential withdrawal by interna- Nations and the international community and budget. The FACA are currently under- tional forces, a transformation of the na- in resolving the crisis in the CAR. going restructuring, supported by the Eu- tional armed forces is essential. ropean Union Military Advisory Mission in The Government of the CAR is delight- the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA), You will therefore understand that it is vital ed that I have this unique opportunity to to transform from a projection army to a for our country to equip itself with forces

b This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

38 l Annex IV that are professional, representative, re- nel (especially officers) as a first step. This is Defence sector reform requires mobiliza- gionally balanced and capable of protect- a key issue in ensuring that the FACA meets tion and optimization of resources. How- ing the population and the territory, with the standards of a professional republican ever, we currently have an army of men a view to a lasting return to peace, crucial army, with a change of mindsets through without resources, who cannot be trained for national reconciliation and sustainable education in military approach. The Gov- or deployed. In this regard, there is a need development. ernment, under the future European Union for gradual allocation of resources to en- Military Training Mission (EUTM) plan, is able consistent management of personnel, At the instigation of His Excellency the specifically responsible for re-establishing infrastructure and equipment for training President of the Republic, and as expressed units of verified and registered personnel and then for deployment. in the Prime Minister’s general policy state- and ensuring their supervision, retraining ment (validated by the National Assembly and future deployment. After standardized Ladies and Gentlemen, on 10 June 2016), four key priorities have training, each unit will be evaluated be- been agreed. fore being gradually deployed in garrisons It is the Government’s aspiration and will within the military regions. to re-equip the Central African Republic The first priority covers organization and with an army that is professional, young, operations in relation to defence sector In this context, logistical support and the republican, at peace with itself, capable governance. There is a need to modify provision of equipment for the units to be of protecting the population and defend- the form of the armed forces to suit both deployed will be essential to sustaining the ing territorial integrity against all forms of its structure and organization, thereby al- effort in the long term. threats, and above all stopping the coun- lowing better management of the sector try from relapsing into a cycle of violence. and establishing an organic and functional An infrastructure plan will have to take Reconstruction of the FACA, in the context chain of command. The transformation will into account the new positioning of the of overall security sector reform, must form be dependent on a state budget for ongo- army, with the proviso that soldiers can part of the national reconciliation and so- ing operations and obviously for recon- be accompanied by their families in the cial cohesion process. struction of the army. Unfortunately this garrisons to which they are assigned. This budget is currently non-existent. regional deployment will promote securi- In view of these challenges, your support ty and stability and will be a key factor in is essential in mobilizing the multilateral For this approach, priority will need to the economic development of the region. and bilateral resources needed for coordi- be given to introducing a good human The work to be carried out on infrastruc- nated and planned implementation of this resources management policy to ensure ture will help to improve living and work- reform, long-awaited by the population that the CAR has a multi-ethnic, young ing conditions in the FACA barracks, bases, of the Central African Republic, who wish and professional army at all times. This General Staff and training schools. only to see sustainable peace, which is cru- overhaul of the human resources man- cial for development. I would like to appeal agement policy will involve a clean-up of The third priority is the deployment of forc- for your committed and lasting involve- the workforce: retirement, eradication of es, involving regionalization and stationing ment in helping us to transform our army. deserters and lawbreakers, recruitment at garrisons. In close collaboration with MI- of young people, and redeployment and NUSCA, there will be gradual deployments I will close on this hopeful note for my integration of ex-combatants specified in that take into account the security chal- country, trusting that you will not hesitate the forthcoming national Disarmament, lenges facing our country. It is too early to provide us with your support. Demobilization, Reintegration and Repa- to prioritize these mandates but they will triation (DDRR) programme. form part of an overall joint process, which Thank you. will equip regional General Staff with logis- The success of this priority area will essen- tical and engineering capacity and a health tially depend on a realistic Defence Policy, system for soldiers’ families and the local a Military Justice Code, a new Military Pro- population, and will directly contribute to gramming Law and a military doctrine. development of the territory.

The second priority is strengthening oper- The fourth priority relates to resource mo- ational capacities, with training for person- bilization.

Annex IV l 39 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex V. Speech of Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sakoc, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliationn, 21 June 2016

Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and national reconciliation

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Our delegation is delighted to be taking • The President of the Defence Commis- the subregion, and subsequently forces part in this high-level dialogue on security sion of the National Assembly under a UN mandate to help protect the sector reform (SSR) in our country, the Cen- • The Counsellor to the President of the population and the country. tral African Republic. I would like to take Republic on SSR. this opportunity, on behalf of the President A number of DDR/SSR strategies were at- of the Republic, Faustin Archange Touade- Your Excellences, ladies and gentlemen, tempted in 2003, 2008 and since 2013 with ra, his Government and our delegation, to no success, and the cycle of violence and thank the organizers of this meeting and Our country has been shaken by numer- insecurity continues. particularly the Slovak Republic, South Af- ous political and military crises for more rica and the United Nations, for the atten- than 10 years, particularly during 2013, Since his election, in a process that was tion they have afforded us. which have resulted in serious human considered free, transparent and demo- rights violations and widespread insecurity cratic, President Touadera has made the This delegation comprises: throughout the country. All our institutions restoration of security, peace and national • The Minister for National Defence have been weakened, particularly the se- reconciliation a prerequisite to national re- • The Minister of the Interior, Public Securi- curity sector and social cohesion, and this construction and the resumption of lasting ty and Territorial Administration has facilitated the trafficking and prolifera- economic and social development. • The Special Minister-Counsellor to the tion of all kinds of arms and the infiltration President of the Republic, DDR/SSR and of mercenaries, forcing the international To achieve these objectives, the President National Reconciliation (NR) Coordinator community to send in foreign forces from of the Republic decided to address the se-

c This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

40 l Annex V curity problem by designing a three-pillar highlighted the President of the Republic’s It is the Central African Republic’s ardent architecture (DDR/SSR/NR). The strategic programme and major directions, partic- wish to see the efforts being made by all coordination of this is under his authori- ularly with regard to SSR, in line with the these institutions — particularly those of ty, while technical coordination lies with draft national security policy currently be- the new SSR coordination structure put the Special Minister-Counsellor, reporting ing approved, and mentioned four of its in place by the Head of State — benefit to his Cabinet, who is responsible for har- priority interventions: from technical and financial support that monizing the three programmes and pro- is adequate to the task at hand and which cesses entrusted to Counsellors and estab- • Adapting the structure and organization matches the Central African people’s mul- lishing satisfactory relationships with the of the security forces for better sector tiple expectations (schools, hospitals, agri- various ministerial departments, organi- management and re-establishing an or- cultural development, etc.). This will enable zations and bilateral and multilateral part- ganic and functional chain of command the whole SSR process to be resumed as ners supporting the process. This ensures • Establishing a new vision aimed at mov- soon as possible and bring to fruition the good consistency and complementarity ing from a projection army to a garrison President of the Republic’s commitment between the great national reconstruction army and combating the proliferation of to taking up the challenge of finally see- projects. small arms and light weapons (SALW) ing the country’s general and sustainable • Producing a doctrine and implementing recovery, thus putting an end to the myth The President of the Republic affirmed his a defence and security policy of a constant cycle of conflict and violence, political vision and direction in his first ma- • Making efforts to mobilize more resourc- through restructured and better-equipped jor speeches, in particular: es and improve their management, not security and defence forces. forgetting the mobilization of all princi- • In his speech to the nation following his pal partners to comply with SSR and sup- Thank you for listening. inauguration port the reforms. • At the presentation of the flag and instal- lation of new heads of the Central African Furthermore, some 10 Ministers, in par- Armed Forces (FACA) ticular those from the Ministry of Defence • To the population of the Bouar hinter- and Security, and several national NGOs land at the launch of the works to reha- are involved in SSR actions. The popula- bilitate the Leclerc military camp tion, scarred by so many recurrent crises, is • To the Security Council in New York. now impatiently awaiting a return to more effective and professional internal securi- The Head of State believes that the re- ty and defence forces (ISDF). Members of construction of the Central African Armed these forces have already demonstrated a Forces, based around a global reform of positive change in their mentality and be- the security sector, must form part of the haviour towards the local population. process of national reconciliation and social cohesion. To use a military expression, all senior officials of the various state institutions and During his inaugural speech following his technical departments are now under bat- election and inauguration and during sev- tle orders to make sure that the new SSR eral interviews granted to the press, the process succeeds, and that the security President of the National Assembly has sector — and more particularly the Central focused on the attention and support that African Armed Forces (FACA), gendarmerie he will provide to the Government on all and police — finally and effectively con- issues of security, justice and national rec- tributes to protecting the population and onciliation. securing both the territory and its borders.

In his keynote address to the National There is already clear support from the bi- Assembly, which was widely adopted by lateral and multilateral partners, as well as Assembly Members, the Prime Minister from civil society.

Annex V l 41 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex VI. Speech of Mr. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 21 June 2016

H.E. Miroslav Lajčák, Minister of Foreign & European Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Dear Excellencies, Colleagues, Ladies and role of the Group of Friends of SSR in the of Friends of SSR in February 2015. It was Gentlemen, context of today´s meeting. dedicated to consolidating priorities for the implementation of Resolution 2151 on (1) Introduction & context outline Since its establishment in 2007, the Group SSR. During that discussion we identified has played an invaluable role in bringing key priorities that remain most relevant It is my pleasure to welcome you to this SSR onto the UN agenda. We have held and should also guide our deliberations high-level meeting. I believe it will help numerous consultations with regional and today. clarify the key challenges of implementing multilateral-partners including the African Security Sector Reform in the Central Afri- Union. So let me highlight three points that I see can Republic. It should also lead to the un- as the most pertinent to the dialogue on derstanding of crucial priorities and overall We have set up close working relationships SSR in CAR: strategy for the way forward. with the Inter-Agency SSR Task Force and its Secretariat, the SSR Unit in DPKO (Dept. FIRST, we agreed on the relevance of firmly I am also delighted to welcome Special of Peacekeeping Operations) as well as the linking SSR to peace and transition pro- Representative of the Secretary General UNDP. cesses. In this regard we noted the major for the Central African Republic and Head role that Special Representatives of the of the MINUSCA Mr. Parfait Onanga-Any- We have developed working modalities of Secretary-General and senior UN leaders anga. I wish to extend to him and his team the Group providing adequate represen- can play. By this I mean the effective use of congratulations on the excellent support tation of the African continent in its struc- their good offices in support of an on-go- to the CAR authorities. I also appreciate his ture. We are truly grateful to South Africa ing political dialogue surrounding SSR. personal commitment to the dialogue to- and Nigeria for championing SSR at the day. I am sure we will be able to build on global and regional level. SECOND, we made the link between SSR this example as a model for engagement and the Agenda 2030. And we stressed the with senior leaders in other contexts. (3) Resolution 2151 and its relevance to need to better understand what we can do the SSR dialogue on CAR at the earliest stages of stabilization and This event is very timely as the Security peace-building to provide the foundation Council is considering adopting a new res- Ladies and Gentlemen, for development. olution on the mandate of MINUSCA. The dialogue today is intended to con- I am therefore glad that the World Bank is (2) Group of Friends of SSR tribute to the implementation of Resolu- here with us. We will thus be able to con- tion 2151 relevant to the Central African sider how to build national capacities for Before opening the discussion, let me Republic. Let me remind you that we held managing public financing of the security share with you some reflections about the an open high-level meeting of the Group sector.

42 l Annex VI We know that the security sector is an Therefore, I am pleased to see around the important employer and driver of eco- table key partners involved in the support nomic development. It is essential to to SSR in CAR. I especially mean the African examine how to extend these benefits Union and the European Union. And I am beyond the capital to local communities particularly happy to note so many repre- both in terms of security and economic sentatives from the Central African Republic. services. These considerations will also It is necessary for them to contribute to this be significant in preparations for the do- dialogue from their national perspective. nors conference on the Central African Republic. It is planned for November in Finally, I hope for this dialogue to provide Brussels. an additional opportunity to harmonize our common understanding of the chal- THIRD, we agreed to effectively imple- lenges CAR is currently facing. ment the Resolution 2151. For that to happen, more needs to be done towards Excellencies, Colleagues, strengthening partnerships among multilateral and bilateral partners. In partic- Let me now open the discussion. I am look- ular, we agreed to extend and deepen ing forward to hearing your thoughts and cooperation towards joint assessments, comments. planning and evaluation. We also have to more effectively coordinate our efforts on Thank you for your attention! the ground.

Annex VI l 43 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex VII. Speech of Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, 21 June 2016

Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

National security in the Central African Re- Because of their loose structure, unbal- MESSAGES public represents an enormous challenge anced ethnic distribution, lack of com- For the CAR elected authorities – if not the main challenge – to restoring mand, and overall poor management, the peace and stability in the country. Reform- CAR armed and internal security forces are It is now time to adopt a political vision ing the national vision of security is cer- a far cry from any form of commonly ac- based on a global approach. In such con- tainly at the heart of the political dynamic cepted standards. text, drastic and sometimes difficult po- and one of MINUSCA’s top priorities. How- litical choices must be made taking into ever, reforming the minds before reform- In fact they are at the heart of the problem. account the following: ing the institutions may prove an even As such they must also be for the most greater challenge. part the solution to the problem. A sit- • Security must not be seen as just armed uation that is even more critical because security. It must be seen as a key vector This is not a new issue. Repeated failures the judicial system is broken and the pe- of human development and a tool con- to address the root cause of the problem nal infrastructure and organization are in tributing to economic growth and social over the past three decades have plagued a shambles. The whole system is disorga- advancement; every single attempt to restore trust and a nized and deeply fractured. meaningful political dialogue in CAR, grad- • The Security Sector Reform process is ually leading the country towards violence As such, implementing a coherent and predicated upon the genuine accep- and chaos. realistic SSR strategy represents a key pro- tance by all national stakeholders of the cess and powerful enabler in support of political challenges inherent to the pro- Addressing issue of national security MINUSCA mandate. cess. This includes demands from various touches directly on democratic rules and segments of civil society, as well as claims good governance through the distribution There is no doubt that the ability of the from the armed groups; of tasks and delineation of responsibilities international community to address this assigned to each one of the security agen- issue is central to our long-term efforts in • It will be necessary for the Government cies involved in providing protection not support of the country’s political and secu- to take firm political decisions with re- only to the public institutions, but also to rity stabilization. spect to the phasing out of a number the all the communities, irrespective of their origin, religion and traditions, or cultural and political affiliation.

44 l Annex VII of personnel currently serving in the se- drawal of aid and support are among the curity forces who have committed seri- root causes of the problems CAR is experi- ous crimes. This will be part of the fight encing today. against impunity through a formal vetting process aimed at identifying individ- SSR is coming at a cost and demands sub- uals who have committed human rights stantial financial resources, not limited to violations and other crimes. the planning phase. RSS activity must be sustained over a significant time span. Our It is also the time for substantive decisions ability to sustain the reform pace in the regarding the CAR armed forces and se- long haul is one of the key factors of suc- curity budgets. This implies making clear cess. choices in term of the forces’ respective format, structures and equipment for the It is crucial that altogether we are able to next 5 to 10 years. Before making their de- commit ourselves to the overall SSR pro- cision, the Government officials involved cess. It is a mainstream programme that will have to take stock of the projects al- needs to be carried out in a joint and ef- ready ongoing in other sectors of activi- fective fashion in full coherence with the ty (Health, education, public infrastructure, other key political, economic, social and etc…), which are equally important in term humanitarian initiatives, regardless of of general security countrywide. whether they are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. This will imply setting financial priorities in view of the gradual launching of restruc- However, it must be made clear to the CAR turation and adjustment programmes that elected authorities that the SSR process is need to be carried out in parallel with the not a whim but an obligation enshrined in daily operational management of the secu- the Security Council mandate vested in MI- rity forces; NUSCA. It is essential that all together, we ensure a true appropriation of the process For the international community by the CAR Government in order to deliver a better and more effective security appa- The international community must stay the ratus, with clearly defined structures, aims course and avoid reducing or withdrawing and methods that meet the recognized in- its support once the early phase of the SSR ternational standards of ethical leadership, preliminary phase is completed. Early with- compliance practices and impartiality.

Annex VII l 45 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex VIII. Speech of Mr. El-Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 21 June 2016

Mr. El Ghassim Wane, Assistant-Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Ministers, As a first step, we need to adopt a com- In this regard, we recognize the impor- Your Excellencies, mon understanding of success for the SSR tance of a common national vision for SSR, Ladies and Gentlemen, process in CAR and advance the consul- and I note the leading role and responsibil- tations on identifying key indicators of ity of the CAR Government in facilitating a I’m very pleased to welcome you to this progress on SSR. Agreed indicators, which national dialogue and mechanisms to de- important discussion on the priorities and could be monitored as part of the pro- velop such a vision. As outlined in Securi- challenges of reforming security institu- posed framework of mutual accountabil- ty Council Resolution 2151 on SSR, this is tions in CAR. This discussion is only pos- ity between the CAR authorities and the both the inalienable right and the highest sible because of the successful elections International Community, would benefit duty of the CAR Government. in the country and, building on the gains the Government of CAR by concentrating of the transition, the committed efforts of the focus on a defined set of priorities and MINUSCA and the partners assembled President Touadéra and his Government reducing the transaction costs of coordi- here today will stand ready to support the to secure the peace. Therefore, when we nating incongruent priorities of multiple development of a national security sector talk about priorities for SSR in CAR, we are partners. This would also enhance CAR’s framework that would a) outline imme- rightly talking about conditions to prevent ability to attract donor support and would diate needs and approaches required to a relapse into conflict. provide a tool for credibly assessing prog- enhance the effectiveness of its security in- ress. stitutions, and b) clearly articulate the rel- There are three points that I want to make evant political commitments and strategy right at the beginning. First, we need to In sharing for your consideration the po- for distributing prospective SSR-dividends recognize that the expectations of the tential options for indicators of SSR prog- among all relevant stakeholders. I wish new Government and the population are ress, I wish to emphasize that peacekeep- to welcome, in this regard, the forthcom- exceptionally high. Second, now is the ing remains first and foremost a political ing establishment of the European Union time for the national authorities to move instrument that has its greatest impact Training Mission in the Central African beyond their expressions of commitment when deployed in support of a political Republic, which will play a vital role in the to national reconciliation by delivering roadmap to inform its exit strategy. This is area of DSR. short-term progress in establishing an in- a key message of the outcomes of the re- clusive and representative security sector. cent Peace Operations Review. In the Cen- It is also important to stress that a security Third, the envelope of financial support for tral African Republic, a strategic approach sector reform agenda that does not reflect reforms in CAR, including for SSR, remains to SSR constitutes a key component of the the aspirations of the entire population is inadequate relative to the vast array of political roadmap, which in the upcoming unlikely to sustain peace in the long term. challenges facing the country. phase will focus on the sustainable reduc- We have repeatedly learned the lesson that tion of the presence of the armed groups, when deep-rooted grievances are not ad- From this perspective, what should be our and is a central element of MINUSCA’s exit dressed in an inclusive and structured way, joint approach for the way forward? strategy. a relapse into conflict is all but certain.

46 l Annex VII To support CAR on its way towards a bet- d. Finally, indicators should allow us ter future for all its citizens and prevent a to evaluate the degree to which the renewed relapse into conflict, some indica- newly trained security forces serve tors of SSR progress may thus include: the needs of the population of CAR and are subject to agreed account- a. The degree to which the national ability mechanisms both politically security sector framework reflects and legally. the aspirations of all segments of the population, including the legitimate The cumulative effect of progress on the demands of the armed groups and noted indicators would, in my view, consti- without prejudice to the legitimacy tute part of a comprehensive approach to of the Government; the challenge of the armed groups in CAR b. Degree of progress on developing and would lead to the sustainable reduc- and promulgating an overall SSR tion of their presence, which is the desired strategy, timelines and costs for im- aim for all of us to enable the country to plementing the commitments artic- enjoy sustainable development and to re- ulated in an agreed security sector duce the threats against its citizens. framework. c. The degree to which the Govern- The coming period will be challenging for ment of CAR will be able to consult the new Government, as well as for MI- a formula to extend its authority all NUSCA and its partners. I therefore call on over the country, including through a donors and partners present here today to gradual transfer of security provision offer their support for peacebuilding and to local communities as long-term peace-sustainment in CAR. strategy for their practical integration into the security sector and State ad- I thank you for your attention and look for- ministration more broadly; ward to the discussion.

Annex VIII l 47 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex IX. Speech of the Minister of Interiord, Public Security and Territorial Administration of the Central African Republic, as delivered by Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 22 June 201649

Statement by the Minister of Interior, Public Security and Territorial Administration

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

I would like to start by thanking the Group Recent years have been marred by vio- However, the population is starting to lose of Friends of Security Sector Reform for lence, which has weakened and fractured its false impression of the internal security giving the new authorities of the Central the country. State and civil society insti- forces. African Republic the opportunity to pres- tutions and bodies have deteriorated sig- ent, through me, the priorities and needs nificantly. Internal security forces are in a Problems with internal security have many of the Ministry of Interior, Public Security bad state: personnel are in short supply, negative consequences, including the rise and Territorial Administration in terms of ageing, badly trained, badly equipped and of often uncontrollable armed groups and operational security and transformation. demoralized. There is a severe lack of basic self-defence militia, the unregulated circu- equipment such as rolling stock and com- lation of arms, the infringement of the free As we emerge from crisis, the reconstruc- munication devices. The provision of arms movement of people and goods, and the tion of the State and national reconcili- and ammunition is subject to authoriza- plunder of natural resources that the coun- ation are crucial, while support from the tion by the sanctions committee, thereby try needs now more than ever. international community is essential. slowing or limiting operations. The infrastructure is outdated and substandard. Ladies and Gentlemen, Restoring state authority throughout the Gaps and weaknesses seriously affect the country will be a major challenge, which will operational capacity of units. In addition, The internal security forces now need to be involve securing the territory starting with clarification is needed on the remit of gov- simultaneously transformed, restructured Bangui, and continuing the advances made erning powers and jurisdiction for the in- and operationalized, in a complementary by the internal security forces in carrying ternal security forces (ISF) to be restored to and coordinated manner, in order to re-in- out their daily tasks to serve the population. full effectiveness on the ground. state recognizable coherence, profession-

d This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

48 l Annex IX alism and competence, which are crucial The Prime Minister’s general policy state- transformation of the internal security ser- to restoring internal security and ensuring ment (validated by the National Assembly vices and forces must enable: sustainable peace. on 10 June 2016) is clear on this point and identifies the need to validate and imple- • More coherent distribution of tasks This restructuring is based on two prereq- ment the NSP; to reorganize and optimize between the FACA, which are mainly uisites: the gendarmerie and police, focusing on responsible for defending territorial in- complementarity between the two forces; tegrity, and the ISF, which is responsible • The concept of integrated forces: to prioritize the redeployment of the ISF in for internal security for the benefit of the self-governance and independent func- the provinces; and to run redeployment CAR population. tioning of the police and gendarmerie in support programmes funded by technical terms of human resources, management and financial partners. • Better analysis of the number of ISF per- of infrastructure and equipment, sepa- sonnel and resources required in line rate budget, operations management At the technical level, the NSP translates with the major needs. The role of tech- and personnel training into the draft Institutional Capacity and nical and financial partners and funders Development Plan for the ISF, drawn up is particularly important here, both now • Interoperability: the capacity to work during transition, which aims to facilitate and in the long term. with the other security forces (Defence, in-depth reform of the Central African Customs, Water and Forest Guards, mu- Republic internal security system. This Ladies and Gentlemen, nicipal police) while maintaining distinc- five-year plan, valued at $US 225 million, tive characteristics groups all the priority areas around five All citizens have an inalienable right to se- themes: curity. The need to restructure police and gendarmerie services is mentioned in a document • Revision of the legal and regulatory With the support of the international com- with national scope under discussion by framework munity, His Excellency the President of the the authorities of the elected CAR Gov- Republic and the Government are commit- ernment, and which was taken up by the • More efficient human resource man- ted to restoring to the CAR internal secu- Prime Minister on 7 June: the draft Nation- agement through recruitment of young rity forces that are capable of protecting al Security Policy (NSP). This document sets people, integration of certain ex-com- people and property at all times, in all lo- out a framework for the national security batants, background checks, retirements cations and against all forms of aggression. strategy and provides a benchmark for the and revised conditions for the well-being security services to develop sufficient -hu of personnel and their families The country has experienced too much man and material resources to place them violence and rebuilding strong, profes- in the best position to contribute, in the • Strengthening of operational capacity, sional and accountable internal security course of their duties, to restoring the rule conduct of operations and training (in- forces is a priority. Security sector reform of law and to combating all forms of crimi- cluding training in planning, pre- and is a means to living in a safe and peaceful nality and impunity. in-service training, and specialized train- country, which is crucial for sustainable de- ing, by trained and skilled instructors) velopment and will enable the CAR to once Restoring the security of the State, people again play an integral part in the alliance and property will require: reorganization • Rationalization of logistics, through the of nations. and restructuring of the ISF to create re- provision of realistic resources given the publican, professional, representative and allocated budget and through central- This reform will not be possible without regionally balanced forces; rehabilitation ized management your support. It is vital that we can count and (re)construction of infrastructure; on your help, support and assistance to strengthening and rationalization of hu- • Ethics and a code of conduct specific to restore hope, peace and tranquillity to man resources through proper manage- personnel responsible for public security the CAR. ment of the workforce; strengthening of missions to protect the people democratic accountability; and ongoing Please be assured of our unwavering com- links with the reform of the entire penal Ladies and Gentlemen, mitment, the commitment of the whole system. population of the “united, dignified and In-depth transformation of the ISF is a real hard-working” CAR, to achieve this. His Excellency the President of the Repub- challenge which the Central African Re- lic has made security a national priority. public wishes to and must address. This Thank you for your attention.

Annex IX l 49 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex X. Speech of Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sakoe, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the Central African Republic for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation, 22 June 2016

Mr. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Minister-Counsellor to the President of the CAR for DDR/SSR and National Reconciliation

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

22 June 2016 | New York

PRESENTATION

I. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEFENCE FORCES (ISDF) III. MAIN CONSTRAINTS IV. SSR VISION V. SSR OBJECTIVES VI. FUTURE ACTION VII. ADVOCACY FOR RESOURCE MOBILIZATION VIII. CONCLUSION

I. BACKGROUND AND With the support of the international com- • Restore security and build peace and po- CURRENT SITUATION munity, particularly the United Nations, litical stability SSR resumed during the transition period • Reconcile Central Africans in order to en- The security sector reform (SSR) being im- from 2014 to March 2016 under the Emer- courage social cohesion plemented since 2009 in the context of the gency Programme for Sustainable Recov- • Reconcile Central Africans with their ISDF in-depth reform of the Internal Security and ery (PURD). • Create a security environment that is fa- Defence Forces (ISDF) aimed at restoring vourable to vigorous economic revival, security, building peace and making the The return to constitutional order enabled particularly in rural areas, where 67 per ISDF more effective, saw all of its achieve- the democratic election of Faustin Arch- cent of the country’s poor live. ments destroyed following the deep crisis ange Touadera on 14 February 2016 and, into which the CAR fell with the accession since the beginning of April 2016, demo- The ISDF, which are tasked with ensuring to power of the Séléka on 24 March 2013. cratic institutions (Government, National security, territorial integrity and the pro- All the basic infrastructure and equipment Assembly, etc.) have gradually been estab- tection of people and property, are suffer- of the ISDF and of the Administration was lished. The President of the Republic and ing from a number of weaknesses in terms destroyed throughout the national territo- Head of State has now made SSR his num- of numbers and material and logistical ry, and all existing structures were also fun- ber one priority in order to: means. damentally disrupted.

e This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

50 l Annex X They are concentrated in Bangui, to the • Uncontrolled recruitment V. SSR OBJECTIVES detriment of the hinterland, which is ex- • Insufficient training posed to various forms of aggression, in- • Lack of reception and care services for • GENERAL OBJECTIVES cluding: political/military groups (Séléka, young recruits anti-balaka), the Lord’s Resistance Army, • Lack of understanding of men and reg- 1. ISDF zaraguina (bandits), poachers, and massive ulations by superiors, following uncon- cross-border transfers of small arms and trolled recruitment • Redefine the remit and missions of the light weapons (SALW). Other constraints • Appointments to posts of responsibility different ISDF forces are also notable, including long and po- and higher ranks without following the • Establish a disciplined, depoliticized and rous borders, and the State’s very weak statutory provisions professional ISDF capacity to ensure an effective presence in • Weak chain of command • Substantially change the human land- the hinterland. • Lack of definition of respective powers. scape of the internal security forces (ISF) • Provide training in order to provide the The judicial and penitentiary administration 3. Working conditions forces with a republican base is suffering from similar problems, which • Make adequate resources available to are contributing to a deterioration in the • Lack of barracks, gendarmeries and po- the ISF as necessary to respond effective- quality of justice services and to impunity. lice stations ly to threats and aggression • Failure to apply the official texts that are • Comprehensively reform the security II. CHARATERISTICS OF THE ISDF in force sector.

1. Numbers IV. SSR VISION 2. Justice

• Understaffing in relation to the extent of Following the 2016 elections, the overrid- • Define a system of coherent laws known the task and the vast size of the country ing priority has been the sustainable secu- to all • Mixed conglomerate (militia, ex-loyal- rity and defence of the national territory, • Define an effective, impartial and re- ists, ex-mutineers, ex-liberators, Séléka) which is a republican requirement; this sponsible judicial system transferred back into the ISDF, without is the number one freedom, according to • Encourage equitable access to justice prior planning and without training the Head of State. The army needs to be and the applicability of laws • Ageing of the forces (many are beyond reformed so that it can become a truly re- • Establish a demilitarized and profession- the upper age limit). publican, multi-ethnic, apolitical and pro- al prison system under civilian control fessional force. -- Guide the prison system towards 2. Living conditions the reintegration of prisoners In the short term, elements of the restruc- -- Guarantee the respect of interna- • Deplorable socioeconomic conditions, tured ISDF will need to conduct armed tional human rights standards which are partly the cause of a lack of patrols in order to protect the public and -- Guarantee the independence of discipline, non-compliance, racketeering take part in tasks to protect and support ci- the justice system and banditry using service weapons. vilians. This work is necessary for the State -- Strengthen the penal system. to be able to extend its authority over the 3. Concentration of troops in Bangui whole of the national territory. 3. Democratic control

III. MAIN CONSTRAINTS By 2020, there should be a secure environ- • Improve parliamentary and judicial con- ment capable of stimulating sustainable trol of government actions, particularly 1. Equipment development and reducing poverty in a with regard to managing the security ap- democratic and transparent context that is paratus and its reform process • Virtually non-existent since Séléka took respectful of the rule of law. • Ensure permanent monitoring of the num- power in March 2013 ber of state officials and agents in order to • Lack of national policy for equipping the The State will need to be capable of un- improve control of the total wage bill ISDF since independence. dertaking its sovereign duties as the legal • Redeploy administrative staff across the provider of lasting security, to the benefit of whole of the national territory 2. Discipline the people, enabling the free movement of • Improve the provision of basic education goods and people throughout the national • Define and implement a civic education • Lack of a human resource management territory and re-establishing justice, human and communication programme on the policy rights protection and the war on impunity. importance of the role of the ISDF.

Annex X l 51 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

4. Customs • Eliminate illegal barriers throughout the • Adopt a regulatory framework with a country view to decentralization • Improve the performance and capacity • Improve ISDF living conditions • Evaluate and improve the human, mate- of the Customs Administration • Establish joint selection committees in rial and logistical capacities of the Court • Improve the efficiency of the Customs each of the country’s regions, recruiting of Auditors and adopt a settlement bill at Administration to support the State’s dif- on the basis of merit the end of the financial year ferent charges. • Put support in place for the retirement of • Produce and adopt a law on public ac- staff who have reached pensionable age counting 5. Water and forests • Continue and improve training and exercises • Pass regulatory texts for the decentraliza- • Build/in the short term rehabilitate bar- tion of commercial courts for each region • Make natural resource management ef- racks, gendarmeries, police stations and • Retrain teaching staff on civic education. fective and transparent social housing • Protect the environment for more envi- • Put the Administrative and Military Re- 4. Customs ronmental sustainability gions in contact with each other and • Reduce insecurity in Zones of Hunting share civilian and military skills with a • Adopt specific statutes, implement the Interest and the threats to wildlife view to creating defence zones new organization chart and allocate se- • Improve forest, wildlife and environmen- • Equip (including with different uniforms) nior officials according to their skills, after tal legislation. the ISF with the appropriate resources conducting investigations of character necessary for their missions • Computerize the services, provide them 6. Intelligence services • Redeploy the ISDF effectively with equipment and materials (radio • Create a joint ad hoc commission to re- communication, uniforms, scanner) • Determine the legal framework and mis- view and approve texts (National Securi- • Increase staffing, train staff in specific sions of the different intelligence services ty Policy/PNS, ISF Capacity-building and areas (gold, diamonds, timber, hydrocar- • Build the data-collection and analytical Development Plan/PRCD, Law on Mili- bons, precious and rare metals, drugs). capacities of the intelligence services tary Planning/LPM and other regulatory • Improve the coordination of the intelli- texts governing the ISDF, etc.) 5. Waters and forests gence services • Equip the services with modern resources 2. Justice • Organize interministerial meetings aimed at establishing new transhumance VI. FUTURE ACTION • Revise and enact laws and livestock movement corridors from • Rehabilitate/build courts and teams Chad and Sudan 1. ISDF • Train and professionalize judges • Install joint control posts and disarm • Train neighbourhood and village Chiefs transhumant herders • Improve ISDF human resource manage- on the extent of their powers and on ba- • Continue training forest guards ment sic legal rules • Provide the services with equipment (IT, • Redefine ISDF territorial reorganization • Build/rehabilitate prisons radio, GPS, compasses, arms) • Organize ISDF training and exercises • Create a corps of civilian prison officers • Put an end to uncontrolled logging and • Revise the legal and regulatory frame- • Place social workers in prisons to imple- improve its suppression work governing the organization and ment socio-educational activities and con- functioning of the ISDF duct vocational training for prisoners with 6. Intelligence services • Make equipment available to the ISF as a view to their reintegration, taking gen- appropriate to their mission der-related considerations into account. • Establish the legal framework and mis- • Build/reconstruct the necessary infra- sions of the different intelligence services structure in the provinces for ISDF de- 3. Democratic control • Improve the understanding of informa- ployment tion for effective crisis prevention, moni- • Draw up and implement a Law on Mili- • Promote dialogue, joint training, aware- toring of armed terrorist groups and bor- tary Planning ness-raising and civilian/military activ- der control (police, gendarmerie, army) • Provide an administrative system that ities with a view to re-establishing trust • Train specialist agents for each service is adapted to the needs of good gover- between the public and the ISDF • Coordinate information exchange at the nance • Systematize the organizational audit of prefecture and central levels • Contribute to re-establishing public con- each ministry that has responsibility for • Build and equip the services. fidence in the ISF the ISDF

52 l Annex X VII. ADVOCACY FOR RESOURCE • Construction/rehabilitation of Courts MOBILIZATION (USA, UNITED NATIONS, EUROPEAN UNION) ACTION UNDER WAY • Training of ISDF (EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED NATIONS, USA, FRANCE, MINUS- • Establishment of a new SSR coordination CA, EUMAM) and steering structure • Registration and verification of ISDF staff -- Strategic Committee (EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED NATIONS) -- Technical Committee -- Technical Support Secretariat VIII. CONCLUSION -- Programme implementation pools SSR is a long and costly process that takes several years. Its success requires the effec- • Numerous design studies for the ISDF, tive involvement of all stakeholders and from the strategic to the operational level substantial mobilization of technical and • Rehabilitation of Kassaï camp (FRANCE, financial resources for its implementation. LUXEMBOURG, MINUSCA, EUROPEAN UNION) The CAR is therefore relying on the sup- • Rehabilitation of Leclerc camp in Bouar port of its partners to help it achieve this (MINUSCA) delicate process, which is a prerequisite for • Rehabilitation of four gendarmeries in CAR revival. The components of this are: Bangui (EUROPEAN UNION, UNITED NA- security, peace, political stability, econom- TIONS) ic revival and the well-being of the people • Rehabilitation of eight police stations in through poverty reduction and national eight districts of Bangui plus the Gen- reconciliation. eral HQ (UNITED NATIONS, EUROPEAN UNION) Thank you for listening.

Annex X l 53 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex XI. Speech of Mr. Joseph Yakétéf, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic, 22 June 2016

Mr. Joseph Yakété, Minister of Defence, Central African Republic

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

22 June 2016 | New York

Introduction of armed groups in some regions, com- • Lack of operating expenses budget, with On behalf of the CAR Government, mitting abuses against the population many problems in relation to salaries thank you to the Group of Friends of SSR • Widespread illicit circulation of small • Men with no resources who have come together to help countries arms and light weapons (porous borders) • Long-term inactivity, encouraging indis- undergoing reconstruction in line with • Damaging effects of the LRA [Lord’s Re- cipline United Nations Security Council resolu- sistance Army] in the east of the country • Currently undergoing restructuring to re- tion 2151. • Occurrence of transhumance (seasonal sume their governing powers, thanks to migration) technical support from the international Renewed gratitude to the United Nations • Increased incidence of poaching, result- community for its crucial contribution to resolving the ing in the destruction of wildlife • Improvement in image and perception crisis in the CAR. • Abuses and community clashes in the among the population (e.g. civil-military three borders region (north-west) activities) I. Reminder of the current context • Plundering of mineral resources in areas occupied by rebel groups II. SSR vision, defence component Since September 2014, in response to the upsurge in violence resulting in human- The current state of our forces is as follows: The vision of the President of the Re- itarian crises, a significant proportion of public, reiterated in the Prime Minister’s security services in the Central African Re- Serious breakdown in security and defence general policy statement validated by public are being provided by MINUSCA. forces following the series of events expe- the National Assembly on 10 June, is to rienced by the country, resulting in many construct a republican, professional and However, the international forces do not weaknesses in the army. FACA concentrat- multi-ethnic army, capable of fulfilling have sufficient personnel to cover the ed in Bangui and devoid of all operational the following responsibilities entrusted whole territory, which is very large and capacity due to: to it by law: has long porous borders, and to provide • Destruction or occupation of infrastruc- • Defending national territorial integrity, full protection and security for people and ture including river and air approaches property. • Lack of equipment • Protecting the population • Sanctions regime, including arms em- • Taking part in civil-military activities (de- Security challenges bargo, to which our country is subject, velopment army) which is restricting efforts by the Gov- • Supporting the internal security forces • Despite signature of the DDRR Agree- ernment and international partners to when needed and in accordance with ment in May 2015, persistence of pockets support the FACA the law

f This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

54 l Annex XI SSR will therefore require an army whose various transition governments. This is a updating and adaptation of basic doc- form and workforce are suited to the ca- sensitive subject but it would only mean uments, drafting of the Military Justice pacity of the CAR State and a clear, com- applying the military regulations that are Code to be submitted to the National petent and well-defined chain of com- still in force. Assembly for adoption before promul- mand. In addition, to enable deployment • Removal of physically unfit personnel. gation by the President of the Republic, throughout the territory, the FACA will be • A redeployment policy, essential and drafting of a Defence Policy, military organized into garrisons. for good management of the work- doctrine and new Military Programming force, with vocational training suited Law. III. Priorities to the country’s economic situation and financial incentive to leave the mil- Second priority: Operational capacity- To achieve the objectives we have set itary. building ourselves, four major priorities have been • A contractualization policy (re-engage- identified. These are: ment contract). • Priority action: training for personnel, • Organization and operations to ensure • New recruitment in order to lower the especially officers. Key issue in ensuring governance of the defence sector age of the army and stabilize the grade that the FACA meets the standards of • Operational capacity-building pyramid. This recruitment will naturally a professional republican army, with a • Deployment of forces be carried out throughout the country. change of mindsets through education • Resource mobilization It will depend on the departure of those in military approach. To this end, EUMAM leaving the system (retirement) and on and MINUSCA/DAC (Development Assis- First priority: Organization and operations the conditions to be met, and will include tance Committee) have already provided (governance of the defence sector) integration of certain ex-combatants de- a lot of non-operational training. For ex- clared eligible by the DDRR programme. ample: • Modify the form of the armed forces to fit In accordance with the criteria specified -- Training in international hu- the structure and framework, to enable in the forthcoming national DDRR pro- manitarian law by the Inter- better management of defence gramme: national Committee of the • Establish an organic and functional chain -- Reintegration, after verification, Red Cross (ICRC) and MINUSCA of command of FACA who had joined the vari- -- Training for armourers by the • Specify the form in the new Military Pro- ous armed rebel groups and who United Nations Mine Action Ser- gramming Law being prepared wish to return to the national vice (UNMAS) in Benin • Modify the form in line with the State army -- Techniques and procedures for budget for ongoing operations and for -- Integration of ex-Séléka and General Staff, leadership, ethics reconstruction of the army anti-balaka who had never and education, human resource belonged to the FACA, in ac- management, logistics, manage- For this approach, priority will need to be cordance with criteria for ment techniques, developing a given to introducing a good human re- recruitment into the national pool of training officers, etc. sources management policy, to ensure army that the CAR has a multi-ethnic, young and The Government, under the future EUTM professional army at all times. The success of this priority area will plan and in the context of bilateral coop- essentially depend on a realistic Defence eration, is specifically responsible for re-es- This overhaul of the human resources Policy, a Military Justice Code, a new Mili- tablishing units of verified and registered management policy will involve a clean-up tary Programming Law and a military doc- personnel and ensuring their supervision, of the workforce: trine. retraining and future deployment. After • Retirement of personnel who have standardized training, each unit will be reached the age limit: this applies to Establishment of an organic and functional evaluated before being gradually deployed around 750 individuals in the three chain of command: in garrisons within the military regions. personnel categories. Rapid implemen- • recent appointment of the key military tation of this measure seems possible leaders Long-term transformation of the national thanks to $5 million of funding offered • implementation by thematic groups of army, battalion by battalion, into a profes- by the United States, on the condition of the road map adopted at the National sional army, through training officers to finding a contractor. Defence Forum in June 2015, in partner- achieve a profound change in mindset, will • Eradication of deserters and lawbreakers: ship with EUMAM RCA. In the context of result in an instrument that serves institu- this policy decision was not taken by the restructuring the Ministry of Defence: tions and the nation.

Annex XI l 55 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Verification procedure Work has already started on the Kassaï ever, we currently have an army of men First stage: individual registration and bio- camp, using European and MINUSCA fund- without resources, who cannot be trained metric identification for all FACA person- ing. A rehabilitation programme is being or deployed. In this regard, there is a need nel. run at the Leclerc camp in Bouar (instruc- for gradual allocation of resources to en- tion centre for non-commissioned soldiers able consistent management of personnel, Second stage: simplified verification on and second training centre for EUTM), infrastructure and equipment for training an individual basis, with the support of with support from MINUSCA and mobiliz- and then for deployment. MINUSCA and EUMAM, with the aim of ex- ing FACA engineering capacity. In Bangui, cluding individuals who have committed there is an urgent need to reclaim the Béal, Several urgent actions are needed, such as: war crimes and human rights violations or BSS and RDOT barracks so that FACA bat- • Funding foodstuffs to revitalize the basic who are facing prosecution. talions can be redeployed. diet already provided at Kassaï. • Providing personnel with identifiable, Providing logistics support and equipment Third priority: Deployment distinctive combat gear (standard CAR to units to be deployed, which is also es- camouflage) to symbolically re-establish sential to maintaining effort in the long Regionalization and stationing in garri- the feeling of belonging to an upgraded term (rolling stock, individual and group sons. In close collaboration with MINUSCA and revitalized uniformed body, foster- equipment for campaigns, etc.). (monitoring in the first instance), there ing pride and renewed confidence, and will be gradual deployment, taking into also to differentiate legitimate soldiers Arms: granting of 142 UNMAS weapons account the security challenges facing our from those from other factions (armed (request to the sanctions committee to country and also, in the initial years, the groups and GAD). Restarting the 12 bil- partially lift the embargo) and/or supply of extensive need for rehabilitation of infra- lion CFA franc project with Groupe Marck weapons through international aid (bilat- structure and of the social and economic from 2012. eral cooperation). environment. This should give our armies • Rehabilitating the nautical resources of the dual capacity to support the popula- the amphibious battalion so it can rap- Vehicles for tactical transport and com- tion through civil-military actions and to idly ensure, in conjunction with the ISF, mand resources, engineering machinery reclaim their governing powers. It is too surveillance of the Oubangui river and for infrastructure works, response vehicles early to prioritize these mandates; they will control of the southern border of the for fire brigade, etc. form part of an overall process, which will country (combating all forms of traffick- equip regional General Staff with logistical ing and racketeering). Camp equipment and training resources and engineering capacity and provide a • Conducting an audit of the condition of • Preparation by thematic groups of a draft health system for the local population, and aircraft at the air base to estimate the concept for supporting the FACA and a will directly contribute to development of costs of rehabilitating the air fleet, with catalogue of equipment with a view to the territory. priority given to aircraft with surveillance re-organizing support for the garrison or intelligence capacity and those for army In the current context, the FACA may be as- transporting VIPs. • Identification of the logistical principles signed the following tasks: required for this transformation, specify- • escorting convoys along and securing Conclusion ing each area of support and the organi- Main Supply Road 1 zation of resources at each level • defending sensitive locations in Bangui Government aspirations and wishes: • providing territorial control and intel- • Establishment of a CAR army that is pro- Establishment of an infrastructure plan ligence in a well-defined area (Paoua, fessional, young, republican, at peace for the new positioning of the army, Bouar, Boda, etc.) with itself, capable of protecting the with the proviso that soldiers are posted • participating in the African Union Task population and defending territorial in- with their families to garrisons. This re- Force against the LRA in the Obo region, tegrity against all forms of threats, and gional deployment will promote securi- which is under United States control above all stopping the country from re- ty and stability and will be a key factor • controlling the southern border along lapsing into a cycle of violence in the economic development of the the Oubangui river, etc. • Inclusion of the reconstruction of the region. The work to be carried out on FACA, in the context of overall security infrastructure will help improve living Fourth priority: Resource mobilization sector reform, in the national reconcilia- and working conditions in the FACA tion and social cohesion process barracks, bases, General Staff and training Defence sector reform requires mobiliza- • Re-establishment of an intelligence net- schools. tion and optimization of resources. How- work, drawing on the regional General

56 l Annex XI Staff, in conjunction with Ministry of In- terior resources • Anticipated outcomes of the reform: regained security, restoration of State authority, protected population, return of sustainable peace crucial for development • The success of the reform depends on resource mobilization • Hence the need for multilateral and bilateral support from partners and friends for coordinated and planned implementation of this reform, long-awaited by the CAR population, who wish only to see sustainable peace, which is crucial for development

Annex XI l 57 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Annex XII. Speech of Mr. Jean-Christophe Carretg, Country Manager for the Central African Republic, World Bank, 22 June 201650

Mr. Jean-Christophe Carret, Country Manager for the Central African Republic, World Bank

Statement delivered during the high-level dialogue on SSR in the CAR

21 June 2016 | New York

Priority needs for security sector reform

1. Security and development tion in Bangui, road transport and hydro- This tax revenue covers around 60 per cent electric energy. Ten years later, the urban of the core budget (excluding investment, Because of the many conflicts that have project has only just been completed and which is almost nil) of the CAR Govern- marked its history since independence, the the other two are only just starting, thanks ment, half of which is allocated to admin- Central African Republic is currently one of in particular to the presence of MINUSCA. istrative salaries (civilian and security). The the poorest countries in the world: 187 out remainder is provided by the international of 188 in the Human Development Index. It should be noted that, for this reason, community (including France, the Europe- In reality, this translates as: a concentration some of our new projects involve MI- an Union, the African Development Bank, of roads three times lower than the aver- NUSCA, such as the re-opening of the the International Monetary Fund and the age for low-income countries on the (Afri- track between Kaga-Bandoro and Ndele World Bank) in return for public finance can) continent; a level of access to drinking and the distribution of temporary posi- reforms, in particular a gradual increase water and electricity five times lower than tions through the CAR. These projects in tax revenue and regulation of the total the average for the same countries; and a have been designed in partnership with payroll. very high percentage (70 per cent) of ad- MINUSCA and other United Nations agen- olescents and young adults aged 15 to 24 cies such as UNOPS. There are around 30,000 public employees years who have not completed primary in the CAR: 20,000 in the civil service and education. 2. Public finance and the security sector 10,000 in the internal security forces (army, gendarmerie, and police). Security there- One of the reasons for delay in develop- Due to the general insecurity and in par- fore represents significant expenditure, ac- ment in the CAR is insecurity, which has ticular the most recent conflict, the CAR counting for a third of the total payroll, or made it very difficult, if not impossible, for Government’s tax revenue is low and fell around 16.5 per cent of the budget of the development agencies such as the one I significantly during the most recent crisis: CAR Government. However, the progress represent to carry out their work. For exit is currently around 7 per cent of GDP, made in 2015 through “cleaning up” the file ample, when we re-engaged with the rest just over half the level before the crisis of civil servant salaries, as part of public fi- of the international community in 2006 and far below the 18 per cent advocated nance reform, has been almost completely after eight years’ absence, we designed a by the Central African Economic and Mon- cancelled out by the increase in average series of projects considered urgent, par- etary Community (CEMAC) for its member salary due to promotions for soldiers, gen- ticularly in the sectors of water and sanita- states. darmes and police officers.

g This speech was originally delivered in French. This is not an official United Nations translation, and the United Nations does not take responsibility for the accuracy of this translation.

58 l Annex XII It is therefore important, especially for the Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatri- partners contributing to budgetary sup- ation (DDRR) projects, as we are going to port (as money is fungible), to extend the do in the Central African Republic, as I an- reforms in public finance management to nounced here last September, and which the security sector and to anticipate the we are doing in other countries such as impact that a reform of this sector would Mali and the DRC, to quote only the most have on public finance. recent.

3. Security sector public expenditure As the success of DDRR is largely linked to review security sector reform, we are also very interested in contributing to the discussion The security sector represents a significant by conducting a public expenditure re- area of expenditure for a country such as view; this is a procedure we apply regularly the CAR, which has very low tax revenue. in all the countries where we operate, to It is, however, negligible compared to the guide investments in all sectors. A review economic cost of insecurity mentioned of this type enables cross-cutting issues to above, even without considering the cost be addressed, such as efficiency of public to the international community of succes- expenditure, management of the salary sive interventions by peacekeeping forces. file, procurement or accountability. There is therefore a priori a strong economic interest, in terms of social well-being, in We have just completed, in conjunction investing in the security sector in the Cen- with the United Nations, a security sec- tral African Republic. tor public expenditure review in Somalia, which calculates the cost of various reform The World Bank’s mandate does not allow options and considers the options available it to invest in this sector nor even to ac- to the country given its tax revenue. This is tively participate in the debate about its what we propose to do with MINUSCA, the reform. However, it does permit funding European Union, France and the United the reintegration element of Disarmament, States in the Central African Republic.

Annex XII l 59 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN THE CAR: CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES Notes

1 United Nations Security Council 14 Copley, Amy and Amadou Sy (2015), Power, June 2015; cited in Arieff and resolution 2151 (2014), adopted by the “Africa in Focus: Five Takeaways Husted (2015), p. 7. Security Council at its 7161st meeting, from the Bangui Forum on National 27 International Crisis Group (2015), The on 28 April 2014. Reconciliation in the Central African Central African Crisis: From Predation to 2 Security Sector Reform Integrated Republic,” Brookings Institution, Stabilization, Appendix B. Technical Guidance Notes, United May 15. 28 Dhukan, Nathalia (2016), “The Central Nations SSR Task Force, 2012. 15 See the following website for up-to- African Republic crisis – Literature 3 Central African Armed Forces. date date on the people in need in review,” GSDRC, March. 4 United Nations Security Council the CAR: http://www.unocha.org/car 29 Enough Project, Behind the Headlines: resolution 2301 (2016), para. 9. [Accessed on 1 October 2016]. Drivers of Violence in the Central 5 President’s speech to the Nation after 16 United Nations Development African Republic, May 2014; cited his inauguration (30 March 2016); see Programme (2015), Human in Arieff and Husted (2015), p. 7. also, President’s Speech at the Ceremony Development Index. 30 For more information on the of the Transfer of Authority of the FACA 17 See the following website: involvement in the past of both the (4 June 2016). http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ state itself and armed groups in 6 Fuior, Teodora and David Law (2014), centralafricanrepublic/overview. the CAR’s economic woes, see the “Security Sector Reform in the Central 18 See the following website: International Crisis Group’s (ICG) African Republic: Chronicles of a Death http://data.worldbank.org/country/ Africa Report No. 219 entitled The Foretold,” SSR 2.0 Brief – Center for central-african-republic. Central African Crisis: From Predation Security Governance, Issue 1, No.1, 19 See the following website: to Stabilization of 17 June 2014, and 1 October. http://www.worldbank.org/en/ also the ICG’s Africa Report No. 230 7 United Nations Security Council country/centralafricanrepublic/ entitled Central African Republic: resolution 2301 (2016), para. 34. overview. The Roots of Political Violence, 8 Ibid. 20 O’Toole, Thomas E. (2016), “Central of 21 September 2015. 9 For a good overview of the turbulent African Republic” in Encyclopaedia 31 Arieff and Husted (2015), p. 7. history of the CAR, see Tatiana Britannica; see the following website: 32 Ibid. Carayannis and Louisa Lombard’s https://www.britannica.com/place/ 33 For more on the structure of the edited volume Making Sense of the Central-African-Republic/Economy. security sector, see the Report of the Central African Republic (2015). 21 De Vries, Lotje and Tim Glawion (2015), Joint Security Sector Reform (SSR) 10 See “Central African Republic profile – “Speculating on Crisis: The Progressive Assessment Mission to the Central Timeline” available at http://www.bbc. Disintegration of the Central African African Republic, May 2014. Available com/news/world-africa-13150044. Republic’s Political Economy,” Conflict at: http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource- 11 Ibid. Research Unit Report of Netherlands Library/Policy-and-Research-Papers/ 12 Arieff, Alexis and Thomas Husted Institute of International Relations Report-of-the-Joint-Security-Sector- (2015), CRS Report: Crisis in the Central Clingendael, March, p. 42 Reform-Assessment-Mission-to-the- African Republic, August 17. 22 Arieff and Husted (2015),CRS Report: Central-African-Republic 13 Internal Displacement Crisis in the Central African Republic, [Accessed 1 October 2016]. Monitoring Centre Site. See site: August 17, p. 6 34 Ibid. http://www.internal-displacement. 23 Ibid. 35 United Nations Security Council org/sub-saharan-africa/central-african- 24 Ibid.; on the United Nations sanctions resolution 2217 (2015), para. 33. republic/2015/internal-displacement- monitor’s reporting, see Final Report 36 United Nations Security Council in-central-african-republic [accessed of the Panel of Experts on the Central resolution 2301 (2016), para 34. on 1 October 2016]; according to African Republic, October 29, 2014, 37 Ibid. The text in the text box is OCHA, the number of IDPs in October U.N. doc. S/2014/762. a direct citation of the language 2016 is 384,884, which is circa 16,000 25 Arieff and Husted (2015), p. 6. of the resolution. more than in June 2016. For updated 26 Enough Project, Warlord Business: 38 Copley, Amy and Amadou Sy (2015), information on IDPs, see the following CAR’s Violent Armed Groups and “Africa in Focus: Five Takeaways website: http://www.unocha.org/car. their Criminal Operations for Profit and from the Bangui Forum on National

60 l Notes Reconciliation in the Central African Republic”, Brookings Institution, May 15. 39 Responsibility for supporting the reform of the defence sector rests with the new EU Training Mission (EUTM RCA), which was deployed in mid-July 2016 with the mandate to provide strategic advice to the CAR Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, to educate non-commissioned officers and officers, and also to train up to four FACA battalions. 40 PNDDRR stands for “Programme national de desarmement, demobilisation, réintegration et rapatriement” [National Programme on Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation]. 41 President’s Speech at the Ceremony of the Transfer of Authority of the FACA (4 June 2016). 42 The constitution cited here was adopted on 14 December 2015 by the transitional government and signed by Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet, President of the National Transitional Council. 43 National Defence Forum, 18 June 2015, Bangui. 44 United Nations Security Council resolution 2301 (2016), para 9. 45 United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Note on Democratic Governance of the Security Sector, 2012. 46 For the 3As concept, see Adedeji Ebo and Boubacar N’diaye (eds.), 2008, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in West Africa: Opportunities and Challenges, Geneva: DCAF. 47 United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Note on National Ownership of Security Sector Reform, 2012. 48 Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment for CAR, 2016. 49 This speech was originally scheduled to be delivered on 21 June 2016. 50 This speech was originally scheduled to be delivered on 21 June 2016.

Notes l 61

For more information, please contact the Security Sector Reform Unit at [email protected]