THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 30 Rue La Boetie Paris 8, Prance
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE 30 Rue La Boetie Paris 8, Prance April 9, 1959 MEMORANDUM TO: New York Office PROM: Abraham Karlikow, Paris Office SUBJ: Situation of the Jewish Community in Morocco This report is based on a five-day visit to Morocco at the end of March. It deals with the following subjects: The general situation in Morocco; Its effects on the Jewish population; Jewish community and welfare institutions and attempts at "integration"; Jewish attitudes toward the long-range future; The Moroccan government and Jewish emigration; Jewish refugees in Tangiers. The general situation in Morocco Politically and economically Morocco is in a state of flux and effervescence. The political upheaval is due to a fight which has riven Istiqlal, the leading and now virtually only important political party in Morocco* On the one hand, there is the more conservative and. traditional wing of the Istiqlal headed by former Moroccan premier Ahmed Balafrej and by the leading ideologist of the party, Allal El Passi; on the other, the more Jacobin wing led by the present premier Abdallah Ibrahim and Mehdi Ben Barka, president of the Consultative Assembly, The strength of the latter group is concentrated in the Moroccan trade unions and in the cities; that of the former group among the middle classes and the traditionalists in the Moroccan hinterland. Both groups are going at each other hammer and tongs. Neither, apparently, feels strong enough to force matters to a showdown at present. In some respects, therefore, their conflict takes on the aspects of a super-heated election campaign — as it may well be, finally, since preparations are being made to hold Morocco's first elections before the end of the year. Another source of excitement recently in Morocco was the challenge to the central government authority by an uprising among the Rif tribes in the north of the country, but this has been subdued, A most important element in Moroccofs internal political struggle is the King of Morocco, Mohammed V, He has been striving to maintain his place above the political arejaa. It is no secret, - 2 - however, that he has been unhappy with Istiqlal attempts during the past few years to eliminate all other parties and independent groups. As Istiqlal made progress in forcing other political parties and independent groups out of successive cabinets, the King sought to throw up other defenses. Last year he issued a charter defining political liberties and rights. It is he who is insisting on elections. With all this internal jockeying for power, however, little has been done in other fields. The first flush of enthusiasm following independence has now passed. There has been growing discontent in the country, and particularly a feeling of lack of direction. This was in part responsible for the breakaway of the Jacobin wing of the party from the Istiqlal, Morocco is now increasingly coming to face with its fundamental problems, but has not shown any real signs that it knows how it wants to deal with them. There are those who say that the Ibrahim cabinet (which theoretically was given office only to prepare for the forthcoming elections) has definite economic and political ideals. It has been in office too short a time, though, for one to see, really, what they are, Morocco's economic difficulties, already very serious, were further complicated last December when Morocco decided not to follow Prance's example in devaluating the franc, although remaining part of the franc zone, Before the shock of the French franc devaluation of last December, Moroccan trade and business had been making some advances from the near-stagnation point of 1957. Actually, according to most reports, 195>8 was not too bad from the point of view of business; and the country's economy has been helped by a steadily growing influx of tourists. The Moroccan refusal to follow the French example in devaluation, however, caused a great deal of chaos and confusion and had severe effects. Suddenly, in January, Moroccan goods found themselves priced out of the market, including the orange crop which is so important j[n the Moroccan trade balance. Moreover, the sub- sequent series of Moroccan regulations and decisions with regard to imports, exports and the flow of capital have been such as to favor the flow of capital from Morocco, though, on the contrary, Morocco desperately needs capital investment. The aim of the new Moroccan government is, obviously to cut the country's economic dependence upon Prance, It has been succeeding to some extent -- but is paying the price for this in grave economic dislocation and readjustment, even though some recovery from the January low-point has been noted in the last month. There appears to be, by all reports, considerable interest among the present Moroccan government leaders in the experience of the Yugoslav and Chinese governments. These are seen as countries which have managed to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. Moroccan labor leaders have gone on visits to China and have been impressed; the two countries now have diplomatic relations with each other; and there is a common commercial interest between the two countries because Morocco takes so much Chinese tea0 Also, more frequently than during any previous visit to Morocco, I heard - 3 - talk about Communists, some of whom are reported now to hold fairly high posts in the government and to be partially responsible for shaping Moroccan economic policies. The interest of the Moroccan leadership, however, I believe, may probably be more accurately described as with state direction and planning than with Communism £er se3 At the same time even Moroccan leaders who are advocates of planning are acutely conscious of their country's need for foreign investment and do not want to take steps which will frighten this off. As Moroccan leadership is pulled between these different economic concepts, so, too, it is of two minds concerning its relations with the Arab world. Morocco has become a member of the Arab League; it is part of the so-called Maghreb Union which includes Algeria and Tunisia; it tries to act as something of a link between the Arab League and Tunisia which has been fighting with the League, At the same time many Moroccan leaders (and especially the King) feel that they have little to learn from other Arab countries, but can profit from maintaining ties with the West. There has been sharp distrust of Nasser, who is now somewhat discredited. There are the hopes that the conflict in Algeria will be settled because this has tended to exacerbate pan-Arab and ultra-nationalist feelings in Morocco. To these, Moroccan leaders obviously feel that they must pay great attention, even though they themselves ar.3 almost entirely of Western education. A good example of Moroccan political schizophrenia revolves around the American bases in Morocco. For public con- sumption, the leaders say they want the United States to leave the country. Actually, they know how valuable to the economy is the wealth and employment brought to Morocco because of the existence of these bases. The U.S. is also giving Morocco some Sl|O million in aid this year. Apparently the leaders feel no such schizophrenia with regard to Israel. As the years have passed, they have followed an increasingly harder line in public utterances and in action concerning Israel, with whom Morocco cut all commerce and com- munication over two years ago. This, of course, has its effects upon the Jewish population even though Moroccan authorities try to insist that their attitude toward Israel has nothing to do with their attitude toward Jews within the country. Really, however, there cannot but be a relationship in practical terms between the external and internal attitudes: because so many Jews in Morocco have relatives in Israel, because of the strong traditional emotional appeal of Israel,and primarily, as we shall see, because of the problem of emigration to Israel. Effects on the Jewish population The recent political upheavals have had no direct con- sequences upon the position of Jews in Morocco* There are, however, Jews at the head of the various organizations who feel that the time may come when Jewish groups may be forced to "choose" - k between the two Istiqlal wings now fighting for power, or other- wise become involved in the struggle -- and are perturbed at what might be the consequences of not choosing well,. One can hear, also, various estimates as to the kind of Jewish community organization and life that may be expected, depending on which side wins eventually,. These estimates will be described below in this paper. The economic shock has, of course, had direct effect on that middle class element in Morocco which is engaged in trade and commerce, and, indirectly, on Jewish workers and artisans as employment dropped. Also, Jewish organizations receiving funds from outside the country have been affected. Bodies like the American Joint Distribution Committee and the ORT previously brought in French francs, exchanged at a one-to-one rate in Morocco, Now, because Morocco has not devaluated, they stand to lose about 18% of the value of any francs or dollars brought in. To avoid this they have been borrowing Moroccan francs in Morocco. The government has shown no inclination to give them a special rate because they are engaged in welfare work. Cash is becoming tight in Morocco, however, because of the flow of capital from the country. It is, therefore, a moot point as to how long Jewish organizations will be able to continue without bringing in dollar funds; and whether they or the Moroccan government will be forced to change policies first* If the general Moroccan internal situation is an effervescent one, that of its Jewish population seems more stable and relaxed than a year or two ago and, in some respects, to have improved.