India–US Relations in the Age of Uncertainty: an Uneasy Courtship

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 India–US Relations in the Age of Uncertainty

In the initial phase of the Obama administration, India’s ruling class and strategic community formed a perception that the spirit of strategic partnership between the two countries might be diluted on account of China looming large in the priorities of this administration. Despite occasional hiccups in their relationship, this perception was overshadowed by the administration’s recognition of India’s role as counterweight to China in the Asia-Pacific region. This book addresses and re-evaluates the perceptions, policies and perspectives of public policy makers and bureaucratic elites in both India and the US in setting and articulating the tone, tenor and substance of the multi-faceted ties between the two countries. The scope of the book is not exclusively limited to the bilateral relationship in the critical areas such as the Indo-US nuclear deal, defence, security, and strategic partnership. Its concerns and ramifications are much wider in global and regional contexts, covering security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, the interface between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), China as a factor in India-US relations, and the fallout of the New Delhi-Washington partnership on South Asia.

B.M. Jain is a former Senior Fellow at the Indian Council of Social Sciences Research (ICSSR, New Delhi) in India, and was Visiting Professor in the Departments of Political Science at both Cleveland State University and Binghamton University, USA. Previously he was Professor of Political Science at the University of Rajasthan at Jaipur, India, and Editor-in-Chief of the Indian Journal of Asian Affairs. He has been a visiting scholar at numerous universities and research institutes in the USA, Europe, and Asia. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Rethinking Asia and International Relations Series Editor – Emilian Kavalski, Australian Catholic University (Sydney) This series seeks to provide thoughtful consideration both of the growing prominence of Asian actors on the global stage and the changes in the study and practice of world affairs that they provoke. It intends to offer a comprehensive parallel assessment of the full spectrum of Asian states, organisations, and regions and their impact on the dynamics of global politics.

The series seeks to encourage conversation on:

• what rules, norms, and strategic cultures are likely to dominate international life in the ‘Asian Century’; • how will global problems be reframed and addressed by a ‘rising Asia’; • which institutions, actors, and states are likely to provide leadership during such ‘shifts to the East’; • whether there is something distinctly ‘Asian’ about the emerging patterns of global politics.

Such comprehensive engagement not only aims to offer a critical assessment of the actual and prospective roles of Asian actors, but also seeks to rethink the concepts, practices, and frameworks of analysis of world politics. This series invites proposals for interdisciplinary research monographs undertaking comparative studies of Asian actors and their impact on the current patterns and likely future trajectories of international relations. Furthermore, it offers a platform for pioneering explorations of the ongoing transformations in global politics as a result of Asia’s increasing centrality to the patterns and practices of world affairs.

Most recent titles 1 India and the Responsibility to Protect Alan Bloomfield

2 Managing Global Risks in the Urban Age: Singapore and the Making of a Global City Yee-Kuang Heng Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 3 The China-Japan Border Dispute: Islands of Contention in Multidisciplinary Perspective Edited by Tim F. Liao, Kimie Hara and Krista Wiegan

4 Risk State: Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty Edited by Sebastian Maslow, Ra Mason and Paul O’Shea India–US Relations in the Age of Uncertainty An uneasy courtship

B.M. Jain Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 B.M. Jain The right of B.M. Jain to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised

in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Names: Jain, B.M., author. Title: India–US relations in the age of uncertainty : an uneasy courtship / by B.M. Jain. Other titles: India–United States relations in the age of uncertainty Series: Rethinking Asia and international relations | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2015037935 Subjects: LCSH: United States–Foreign relations–India. | India–Foreign relations–United States. | World politics–21st century. Classification: LCC E183.8.I4 J274 2016 | DDC 327.73054–dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015037935 ISBN: 978-1-4724-3895-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-58833-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Out of House Publishing Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 To My Parents Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Contents

Preface viii Acknowledgements xii List of abbreviations xiv

1 India and the United States: “complex interdependence” 1

2 India–US relations during the cold war era: an overview 32

3 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 54

4 India–US defence and security relations 81

5 India–US strategic dialogue 112

6 India–US relations: the China factor 140

7 India–US relations: challenges, opportunities, and future directions 159

Select bibliography 180 Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Index 191 Preface

This book has grown out of a research project on India–US strategic partnership in the twenty-first century. I carried out this project as a Senior Fellow of the Indian Council of Social Sciences Research (ICSSR, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, New Delhi) at the Institute of Development (IDS), Jaipur, India. Its central objective was to test the hypothesis that the analytical framework of “complex interdependence” was useful and appropriately relevant to the study of the multifaceted relationship between India and the United States. Perhaps, this is the first independent volume on India–US relations brought out so far in which the theory of “complex interdependence”, developed by Robert A. Keohane and Joseph Nye, has been applied to examine myriad dimensions of Indo-US relations given the complexity of their bilateral ties, rooted in Cold War geopolitics as well as asymmetric power capabilities. Besides, I have introduced a few other important concepts like geo-economics, geopsychology, cooperative partnership, and “alliance of interests”. Given the space constraint, it was not possible to elaborate these concepts, although I very much desired to do so. As per the chapter scheme, I have devoted a comprehensive chapter to the historical background of India–US relations, beginning from the pre-Cold War period, through the Cold War period to the end of the Cold War, and the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, in order to illustrate how and why India–US relations have been profoundly complex and uncertain. It is a truism that India’s non-aligned ideology was a principal variable behind estrangement between the two great democracies throughout the Cold War era. Geopolitical divergences between them led to the superpower Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 rivalry in South Asia. Interestingly enough, contradictory pulls and pressures were visible in the New Delhi–Washington relationship, as manifest during the Kennedy and Nixon administrations. It ought to be underlined that the Kennedy administration (1961–1963) not only accepted India’s leading role in the non-aligned world but also wanted to project India as a model of economic development with American assistance in Third World countries. On the contrary, the Nixon administration’s (1969–1974) deeply entrenched apathy and disdain towards India resulted in the nadir of relations between two countries. Preface ix After the end of the Cold War, ideology was virtually replaced by a sheer pragmatism, as is manifest in military, security, and strategic cooperation between India and the United States. A dramatic transformation took place in their relations in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11). With little choice, the Bush administration not only lifted sanctions on India, imposed by the US in 1998 following India’s multiple nuclear tests, to muster India’s support for its global war on terror, but also sought to engage India as a global power. Military and strategic partnership expanded and deepened dramatically between the two countries. This was reflected in the nuclear deal between the two countries. Due to personal efforts of President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, NSG-45, granted waiver to India, thus bringing India’s nuclear apartheid to an end once and for all. However, despite these breakthroughs, there is a trust deficit in the relationship. Complexity is likely to remain a hallmark in the countries’ bilateral ties because there is a unique blend of convergences and divergences on their respective foreign policy and strategic goals and priorities. That is why there is an imperative need to study and analyse the complex multidimensional relations within the analytical framework of complex interdependence. Further, I am digressing a bit from the main focus of this study in order to demonstrate how the role of personality at times becomes critically important in bilateral relations. I have examined the role and impact of the two charismatic personalities of Jawaharlal Nehru and John F. Kennedy on the one hand, and the two diametrically opposed personalities of Indira Gandhi and Richard M. Nixon on the other, to evaluate India–US relations. In the post-Cold War era, Indo-American relations were deeply impacted by the personalities of Manmohan Singh (2004–2014) and Narendra Modi (May 2014–) in India, and those of George W. Bush (January 2001–January 2009) and Barack Obama (January 2009–) in the United States. Undeniably, the role of President Bush was remarkable in providing a new thrust and momentum to the relationship between New Delhi and Washington. He is credited with injecting fresh blood into the moribund relations between the two countries. It is not an exaggeration to say that President Bush was the first American president who dared go to the extent of making India a global power, even though this was to the great chagrin of his own party, and that of his close strategic partners China and Pakistan. Pursuant to that, Bush won over Congress to bend US laws on nuclear Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 non-proliferation to accommodate India’s energy interests by clinching the nuclear deal in 2006, followed by the 123 Agreement in 2008. As mentioned earlier, his next extraordinary diplomatic feat was his successfully winning over the members of the NSG (now a 48-member group) in granting waiver to India in 2008. Realistically enough, Bush’s leading role in cementing Indo-US ties was an affirmation of an inevitable mutual dependence between India and the United States in key areas such as homeland security, security of the maritime x Preface commons of the Indo-Pacific region, counter-terrorism, security of nuclear assets against the potential threat from radical elements, and stability in Afghanistan. President Obama carried forward that legacy, although with a difference in approach to and emphasis on regional and global issues. During his administration Indo-American partnership witnessed new heights, with the institutionalization of strategic dialogue in 2010 to expand the scope of cooperation in new areas of mutual concern and interest. In particular, the strategic dialogue on homeland security reinforced the imperative of mutual dependence upon the realization that the core existential threat to the internal security of both countries emanates from the common enemy that is extremists and jihadists. Simultaneously, it has been argued that homeland security can be ensured when America ceases pursuing selective counter-terrorism initiatives, which has proved counter-productive because it sends out the wrong signals to radical forces that a cooperative approach, which is essential to demonstrate global solidarity, is lacking. It must be underlined that terrorism has neither a colour nor an ideology, nor any philosophy behind perpetrating violence on an unprecedented scale. This ugliest force must be defeated by the world community without regional or country-specific consideration. But there is an error of judgement on the part of US public policy makers whose security concerns are narrowly structured. This naturally gives extremist groups a psychological advantage in expanding their areas of operation, as we have witnessed in the case of the ISIS, which has launched global jihad by recruiting young people across the world. Henry Kissinger interprets this strategy as a well-planned mission to establish the “global Islamic order”. It ought to be underlined too that the Obama administration’s failure to intervene in a timely fashion in Syria has contributed to magnifying the terror threat manifold. The point I wish to hammer out is that India and the United States cannot escape from compulsive mutual dependence in this ambit. In a vision statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with President Obama on 30 September 2014, both leaders declared that they would “combat terrorist threats” together to keep their homelands safe from potential extremist threats, although this was a vague and indistinct joint statement. What I argue is that whatever compulsions both countries may have, the real challenge of terrorism to their homeland security must not be glossed over. In fact, India’s concerns over Lashkar-e-Taiba, and US concerns Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 about Al Qaeda and ISIS, are interconnected. The threat of each terror group has more or less identical repercussions for both countries. It is another truism that India–US relations are punctuated by uncertainties and characterized by mutual trust deficit – a great psychological barrier to solidifying ties between the two great democracies. So far as the relevance and usefulness of the theoretical framework of complex interdependence is concerned, it has been found in the study that the framework remains valuable in explaining the multifaceted relationship Preface xi between the two countries. At the same time, it must also be borne in mind that India and the United States lack identical worldviews due to their asymmetrical power structures and socio-cultural differences, as well as divergences in national and international priorities. I believe that the application of a complex interdependence framework will prod academia and research scholars of Indo-American studies to refine and advance it further. At the same time, the US needs to better understand the geopsychological impulses of ruling elites of South Asia, based on bitter mem- ories of the past and deeply entrenched congenital hostility between India and Pakistan. I have comprehensively discussed the concept of geopsychology in my book India in the New South Asia: Strategic, Military and Economic Concerns in the Age of Nuclear Diplomacy (London: IB Tauris, 2010). Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Acknowledgements

At the very outset, I wish to express my sincere thanks to the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), New Delhi, for granting me a senior fellowship to carry out a research project on India–US relations at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Jaipur. I want to thank the faculty, office, and library staff at the Institute for extending courtesies and cooperation to me in facilitating the smooth running of the project. I am sincerely thankful to Professor Robert O. Keohane at Princeton University for his forthright comments and valuable suggestions regarding the applicability of “complex interdependence” to the study of Indo-American relations. I owe my deep gratitude to Professor Ian Hall, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, for his valuable comments on theoretical perspectives, especially regarding the applicability of the complex interdependence model to India–US relations. My personal thanks are due to Shalendra Sharma, Professor of Political Science at the University of San Francisco, for his incisive and useful comments on the manuscript. I owe my deep gratitude to Rajesh Bashrur, Professor of International Relations at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, for his valuable feedback and suggestions pertaining to the application of the complex interdependence framework of analysis. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Gregory M. Sadlek, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, Professor William R. Morgan, Associate Dean, Professor David R. Elkins, Chair, Department of Political Science, and Virginia Romero, Administrative Secretary, Cleveland State University, Ohio, for providing me with excellent infrastructure facilities as well as a stimulating academic environment during my stay as Visiting Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Professor in 2013. This enabled me to utilize the enormous library facilities, and also interact with the faculty, and with the graduate and undergraduate students whose feedback was valuable, directly bearing upon the manuscript. My heartfelt thanks go out to all panellists and participants at the conference of the International Studies Association (ISA) held at Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, 4–6 August 2013, for their forthright comments and useful observations on my paper “India–US Strategic Partnership” – an integral part of this book. Acknowledgements xiii I sincerely thank Stephanie Thiel, University of Giessen, Germany, Michael Sharnoff, Founder of Sharnoff’s Global Views, and Spencer Smith, Harvard University, for rendering their willing assistance in editing several chapters of this book. I acknowledge my thanks to Warwick Pipe, Web Content Manager of the World Nuclear Association, for granting me permission to reproduce the map of India in the book. I am extremely grateful to Brenda Sharp, Luke Finley, Linda Paulus, Matthew Twigg, and Eleri Pipien for their patience, cooperation and support at the critical stage of the manuscript. I sincerely thank my wife Manju, whose patience and understanding boosted my morale to finish the book amidst unforeseen problems of one kind or another. I must confess that my daughter Romi at CSU, Cleveland, Ohio, is the real spirit behind this volume. She took time off, despite her numerous editorial and research commitments, to copy-edit the manuscript several times with uncanny acumen. I would be failing in my duties if I did not mention the immense contribution of my son Dr Rahul Jain, working in Canada. He did a marvellous job in preparing the final manuscript in accordance with the house style of Ashgate. This was indeed a tough task, demanding unusual patience and knowledge of technical subtleties. Without the timely and meticulous feedback and support of my daughter and son, this book would not have seen the light of day. Last but not least, I want to express my special thanks to Kirstin Howgate, the Ashgate publisher, for readily accepting my book proposal as well as for liberally extending the deadline to allow me to revise and update the manuscript in light of the policy shift of the new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 List of abbreviations

APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty BJP Bharatiya Janata Party BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa CCI Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative CENTO Central Treaty Organization CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DPG Defence Policy Group DTTI Defence Trade and Technology Initiative EIF Entry into force EU European Union FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FBTR Fast Breeder Test Reactor FDI Foreign direct investment FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FMS Foreign Military Sales FTA Free Trade Agreement HEU Highly enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IAF Indian Air Force ICT Information and communication technology IMF International Monetary Fund INSAT Indian National Satellite IOR Indian Ocean region IR International relations Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 ISI Inter-Services Intelligence ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISRO Indian Space Research Organization JSF Joint Strike Fighter LAC Line of Actual Control LCA Light Combat Aircraft LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba LRMRA Long range maritime reconnaissance aircraft newgenprepdf

List of abbreviations xv LSA Logistics Support Agreement MEA Ministry of External Affairs MoU Memoranda of Understanding MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDA National Democratic Alliance NNPA Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act NPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NSS Nuclear Security Summit PHWR Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor PLA People’s Liberation Army PoK Pakistan occupied Kashmir PRC People’s Republic of China PSI Proliferation Security Initiative R&D Research and Development SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization TAPS Tarapur Atomic Power Station TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UN United Nations UNSC United Nations Security Council UPA United Progressive Alliance USAID United States Agency for International Development USITC United States International Trade Commission USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organization Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 1 India and the United States “Complex interdependence”

Humankind has become so much one family that we cannot ensure our own prosperity except by ensuring that of everyone else. If you wish to be happy yourself, you must resign yourself to seeing others also happy. – Bertrand Russell

Background Since time immemorial, the phenomenon of interdependence has been integral to humankind, beginning from pre-industrial society and through post-industrial to post-modern society. It reflects in philosophical and ecological discourses prior to the onset of the information revolution. Arguably, in the early twentieth century, scientists conceived of interdependence in much broader terms, namely, “human–natural relations”, rather than in a purely economic sense. That is why it was essentially perceived as a science-laden and human-nature-centric concept.1 In this context, Mihaljo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel argue that an “organic” or a truly interdependent society is imperative for the world’s survival. They write:

In nature organic growth proceeds according to a “master plan”, a “blueprint”. According to this master plan diversification among cells is determined by the requirements of the various organs; the size and shape of the organs and, therefore, their growth processes are determined by their function, which in turn depends on the needs of the whole organism.2

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Philosophically, interdependence is inextricably bound up with an “organic bond” which clearly manifests in an ecological system that encompasses the value of mutual dependence of its units, big or small. This makes it a composite whole. From this angle, human civilization has advanced with an underlying integral unity of mutually dependent threads weaved into the fabric of a composite civilization. Certainly, the puissance of interdependence depends largely on the resilience and strength of societal bonds and cultural harmony, reinforced by social and cultural interactions among individuals. 2 India and the United States This implies that, rather than being a segregated entity, the individual is essentially a constituent part of the whole. As the wheels of time rolled, interdependence entered the political discourse in the first half of the twentieth century. For instance, Henry Wallace, US Secretary of Agriculture, viewed various sectors of the agricultural system as “great links in the food distributing chain” and proposed that his Farm Act of 1933 be understood as a “Declaration of Interdependence, recognition of our essential unity and of our absolute reliance one upon another”.3 The notion of interdependence entered the lexicon of the international system more particularly through the diffusion of knowledge with the aid of information and communication technology (ICT), altering the nature of the world politics. In a new power configuration, the role of non-state actors has become conspicuous; for example, non-governmental organizations and transnational corporations exert a sizeable influence today in reshaping the international political and economic order in respect of policy preferences. This illuminates the significance of mutual dependence, obscured so far by the state-centric worldview based on the seventeenth-century Westphalian paradigm of state sovereignty, which is reinforced by a rhetorical affirmation of what Oran R. Young calls the “formal prerogatives of sovereign states”. In fact, a host of factors have contributed to the growth of interdependence, including economic globalization, climate change, the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and revolution in transportation and communication. In this context, Young observes that patterns of human interaction have led to:

[A growing] exchange of ideas and skills on a world-wide basis. Exchanges of this kind are frequently difficult to document for they are not apt to occur in the form of physical transactions as in the case of exchange of commodities. Instead, they occur in such forms as the transmission of intellectual movements (e.g., the present student movement), the exchange of technical skills and know-how, the communication of management techniques, the contagion of fashions and patterns of consumption, and the impact of tourism on human perceptions and expectations.4

Curiously enough, the phenomenon of interdependence has waded through a tortuous trajectory throughout human history, demonstrating that nations survive and prosper better when they are driven by a strong propensity for Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 international transactions. Peter J. Katzenstein opines that “international interdependence is a response to the tremendous growth in world-wide trade and capital flows”.5 He writes that Karl Deutsch equates transactions and interdependence in studying the “problems of national and supranational integration”, and that Deutsch defines both as the mutual predictability of behaviour within or between societies at different levels of transaction flows. These flows have been measured largely in terms of their volume. In his theoretical and historical writings, Deutsch devotes some attention to India and the United States 3 the impact of transactions on political actors, including governments. But in his empirical and quantitative research on international interdependence, he focuses exclusively on the description and interpretation of observable transaction flows between societies.6 The conceptual value of interdependence was recognized as an analytical framework to study international relations (IR) in the early 1970s, even though realism was riding the crest of a wave of popularity, with its main proponents in Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, international politics was looked at through the prism of realism, describing the world as an arena of conflicts and wars. Undoubtedly, the classical realism of Morgenthau dominated IR for decades. Its importance cannot be belittled even today as it has inspired IR scholars to develop the theory of “offensive realism”, chiefly represented in John J. Mearsheimer’s popular work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. At the beginning of the 1970s, Keohane and Nye toyed with the idea of interdependence, rejecting force as an effective instrument of state policy.7 They argued that the concept of interdependence was better capable of explaining the complexities and inherent contradictions of the changing world order; this they discussed in the first edition of their book Power and Interdependence in 1977. In a preface to the second edition, Keohane and Nye clarified that their main objective was to explain “the patterns of change” by integrating “aspects of the realist and liberal traditions”.8 In a preface to the third edition, Keohane and Nye write, “In 1977 we identified three characteristics of ‘complex interdependence’: multiple channels of contact among society, lack of clear hierarchies of issues, and irrelevance of military force.”9 That was a good beginning to comprehending the notion of complex interdependence, primarily as a rejoinder to the traditional realist framework. If viewed from a historical perspective, interaction between states is an exemplar of mutual dependency for myriad reasons such as internal or external security, promotion of trade and commerce, and economic prosperity.10 In other words, the convergence of mutual interests obliges state actors to cooperate with one another in larger interests of peace, stability, and development. However, the pace and degree of interdependence is largely determined by interactive factors such as domestic structures, perceptions of ruling elites, and quality of information. In this regard, Oran R. Young observes, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the level of interdependence in the world system has risen in the contemporary period as a result of the expanding role of various non-state actors and the development of those patterns of interpenetration among actors which are characteristic of systems that are heterogeneous with respect to basic types of actor.11

It may be noted that though American supremacy will continue in the foreseeable future in specific sectors like space exploration, research and 4 India and the United States development in science and technology, medical sciences, and knowledge economy, the United States has realized that its efforts at imposing liberal political and cultural values have proved counter-productive. This is evident from its colossal failure in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, the internal security situation has become nastier, more complicated, and more unstable. American drone strikes, for instance, have not proved efficacious in either weakening the morale of or decimating the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the Af-Pak region. Nor could US air strikes against the ISIS terrorist group prevent the massacre of Yazidis by ISIS in Northern Iraq. In this context, Joseph S. Nye writes, “The problem of American power in the twenty-first century then, is not one of decline but what to do in light of the realization that even the largest country cannot achieve the outcomes it wants without the help of others.”12 Nye’s emphasis on “without the help of others” unambiguously underscores the inevitability of interdependence in the global information age. Moreover, distribution of power alone will be unable to determine the nature and pattern of the interstate relationship in the information age. Instead, the “quality of information” will be a decisive factor in setting the behavioural pattern of states, as well as the nature and potential of cooperation. In other words, the quality of information will enable us to grasp the “intentions and capabilities” of prospective partners as well as to learn about the strategies of non-state actors and jihadists who dare throw an open challenge to the hyper-superpower, America. It means that the impact of information-supplying institutions on state behaviour will be conspicuous, “even when rational egoism persists”.13

Conceptual connotation Interdependence is a multivariant concept. In common parlance, inter dependence means mutual dependence between or among nations to achieve a desired objective or common policy goals, though the nations’ motivations may not necessarily converge. Broadly speaking, interdependence between nations implies a “lack of independence” and autonomy while conducting relations between them. With increasing global economic integration and “shared threat perceptions”, interdependence has become not only relevant but also inevitable. International relations theorists have attempted to define interdependence from diverse angles with multiple interpretations, depending on the political and strategic milieu within “grand shifts” in the international Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 system. In the early 1970s, some prominent IR scholars such as Richard Cooper, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, David Baldwin, Oran R. Young, Peter J. Katzenstein, and K.J. Holsti attempted to define, interpret, and articulate the concept of interdependence in more specific terms. For example, Keohane’s thesis of “hegemonic decline” offers an explanation that mutual dependence is gaining currency in light of non-military challenges and threats.14 According to Rosecrance and Stein, “interdependence suggests a relationship of interests such that if one nation’s India and the United States 5

position changes, other states will be affected by that change”.15 For his part, Kenneth Waltz believes that “interdependence entails a relationship that would be costly to break”.16 He further explains that interdependence is at its “lowest where like units have unequal capacities”.17 Therefore, a fundamental question arises as to whether a high degree of interdependence exists between nations in some specific areas. The answer is in the positive. For instance, there is a high degree of interdependence between the United States and China, especially in the trade and investment field. Their bilateral trade in the year 2013 amounted to $562,184.1 million, of which the US’s trade deficit was worth $318,711.3 million. US firms have an FDI (foreign direct investment) stock of between $50 billion and $70 billion in China.18 But at the same time, they have sharp divergences on critically important issues such as human rights, Tibet’s cultural autonomy, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Taiwan, and US military exercises with South Korea and Japan. David Baldwin is, however, of the view that there cannot be consensus on whether the level of interdependence is increasing or decreasing. He writes:

Although many would agree that interdependence refers to a situation in which states are “significantly” affected by their interaction, there is less agreement as to how to differentiate “significant” effects from “insignifi- cant” ones. Three possibilities may be considered. First, interaction can be equated with interdependence. Sometimes, it denotes a mere intercon- nectedness rather than interdependence. Second, interdependence can be defined in terms of interactions (or transactions) that have reciprocal costly effects. The difficulty with this definition is that many forms of international interaction, such as trade, involve reciprocal costly effects but not mutual dependency.19

The explanation offered by Baldwin does not appear to be sufficient to capture the intrinsic spirit of interdependence in today’s complex international order, in which power is diffused and distributed among multiple actors. However, Baldwin’s assessment is convincing that interdependence “facilitates thinking about the links between dependence and power”. He further elaborates on the value of interdependence in its relationship to power that if A and B are interdependent then “it implies that they possess an ability to influence one another in some respect”.20 This implies that interdependence connotes some Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 kind of “mutual potential power”. In this regard, Baldwin broadly agrees with the views of Keohane and Nye on interdependence in the context of the role of power. From that angle, interdependence needs to be reinterpreted in terms of diverse forms of power – economic, cultural, information, and ideational sources. For instance, there is a compelling reason for America to cooperate with China rather than to work against it in the face of China’s phenomenal rise in the economic and military realm, in which America has high stakes. 6 India and the United States Further, the level of interdependence depends on myriad factors. To Oran Young, in today’s world of complexities there is a growing trend towards an increasing level of interdependence, which is “the result of expanding role of non-state actors and development of those patterns of interdependence among actors which are characteristics of systems that are heterogeneous with respect to basic types of actor”.21 At the same time, it is not difficult to agree with Young that the level of interdependence cannot be accurately measured, since it depends on a host of factors such as structural and institutional constraints, domestic compulsions, situational obligations, and local democratic voices. As discussed before, there is a broad consensus among scholars that interdependence has multiple dimensions: economic, trade, energy, military, security, environment, and several others. Of them, Rosecrance and Stein consider “military alliances” the most important. Why? They argue that military interdependence:

arises when states offer the same defence resources to each other. By pooling their resources, they gain a collective security that each could not attain in isolation, and yet there is no necessary division of labour. Clearly such defence ties might be very costly to break.22

Rosecrance and Stein argue that if war were to cause mutual devastation, states may rather be guided by the common interest to mutually accommodate and co-exist.23 However, their argument does not sound tenable that the “greatest interdependency” prevails among highly developed nations. On the contrary, we come across numerous examples of a higher interdependency between developed and developing nations, for example between the United States and Pakistan and between the United States and India, though inherent motives behind this may not necessarily be identical. This is evident from the fact that the US is dependent on Pakistan’s logistical, military, and intelligence support to defeat extremist forces in Afghanistan, while Pakistan is dependent on the US economic assistance for its existential survival. It should be borne in mind that mutual dependence does not necessarily entail symmetric power structures in military and economic terms. What is important is the persistence of shared challenges and threats such as religious extremism and nuclear terrorism. The classic case of interdependence Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 between India and the United States is evident from the shared threat of terrorism to their homeland security.

Why the study of interdependence? A fundamental question arises as to why international relations theorists are interested in studying the phenomenon of interdependence. David Baldwin explains: India and the United States 7 Interdependence interests international theorists primarily because of its relationship to power. If A and B are mutually dependent on one another, then each could inflict costs on the other by severing the relationship. And the ability to inflict costs on other actors is one measure of influence.24

He further explains, “Just as power relationships vary in scope, weight, domain, and symmetry, so do relationships of interdependency: contextual analysis may be as appropriate for the study of interdependence as it is for the study of power.”25 In other words, interdependence and power are interconnected. In order to understand the role of power, Keohane and Nye have underlined the distinction between “sensitivity interdependence” and “vulnerability interdependence”. They write, “Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?”26 Vulnerability pertains to “an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events after policies have been altered over a period of time”.27 Sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability interdependence in providing power resources to actors.28 Baldwin is critical of Keohane and Nye on the ground that they have overestimated the importance of the distinction just for the sake of understanding the relationship between power and interdependence. Strictly speaking, the changing face of power has drastically altered the contours of international politics. It is within that framework of power that states articulate their foreign policy goals and work out appropriate strategies with the aim of maximizing national interests.29 Normally, cooperation is preferred to confrontation. At times, “offensive realism” propels great powers to justify the use of force, as America did in the case of Iraq in 2003. But, however, with the distribution of power and diffusion of information in the age of ICT, no country, including a “preponderant” power such as the United States, can afford to dictate its terms or impose its will on others to achieve the stipulated goals. In this context, Keohane writes, “it seems unlikely that the United States will reassume the dominant position that it had during the 1950s.”30 He further writes that it is safe to presume that “hegemony will not be restored during our lifetimes. If we are to have cooperation, therefore, it will be cooperation without hegemony.”31 Undeniably, the concept of power has undergone a dramatic transformation since the writings of Baldwin and of Keohane and Nye in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 mid-1970s, when power was essentially understood in terms of “control over actors” and “control over events and outcomes”. By this yardstick, America has no substantive control over events, outcomes, or actors in the international system today, even though it has “enormous advantages” in military, economic, and technological resources. In effect, what counts is not the hegemony of power but rather the shared concern to avert “shared threats” to security and stability, which makes interdependence between nations inevitable.32 8 India and the United States

The post-cold war scenario IR theorists have been seriously wrestling with the applicability of the concept of interdependence to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence that helped avert a direct nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the “nuclear nightmare” has accentuated the level of insecurity and threat perception, rooted in worst case scenarios such as the possibility of extremist groups’ access to nuclear assets due to “inadequate” nuclear command and control systems, with specific reference to Pakistan and Israel.33 In light of this scenario, IR theorists argue that nuclear deterrence has become less relevant when security threats are emanating from the “periphery of the international system” such as North Korea, which is capable of upsetting the balance of peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. By logical implication, the core challenge is to prevent acquisition of nuclear weapons by defiant and irresponsible state actors in the interests of the world community, with the exception of authoritarian regimes and monarchs whose fixed mindsets are a barrier to peace. In this dismal scenario, Michael Mandelbaum suggests “extensive international cooperation” that calls for mutual dependence for mutual survival and security. From Mandelbaum’s observation, it is crystal clear that interdependence between international actors is becoming an inevitable mutual necessity for the human good and for survival. The isolation of a country economically or politically, as was the case with the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, is no longer feasible today. Rather, isolation is being fast replaced by engagement and interdependence.34 Surely, with unprecedented upheaval in the international system in the aftermath of the crumbling of the Soviet empire, a provocative debate ensued among IR theorists to reconceptualize old security paradigms and identify new ones. Thomas Wright observes, “Post-Cold War integration and interdependence was pursued at a time when geopolitical competition between the major states was low and the prospect for cooperation seemed great”.35 Naturally, pundits of foreign policy and strategic affairs were called upon to advance new tools and mechanisms to effectively deal with the potential challenge of non-traditional threats such as global terror, piracy, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, religious extremism, and ethnic conflicts. It must be remembered that Keohane and Nye had foreseen the non-traditional threats, as mentioned above, well before the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union. They have claimed that the onset

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 of the information age in the 1970s brought people from diverse cultures and continents much closer in social, political, and economic terms, with wider international implications. It is in this context that they undertook a joint enterprise to work on the notion of complex interdependence – a product of over three decades of rigorous research. In that long arduous process, they made joint efforts to refine the concept in a more systematic, “coherent”, and consistent manner, which resulted in the unfolding of manifold complex layers of the international system. India and the United States 9 According to Keohane and Nye, complex interdependence has reversed three realistic assumptions that (i) “states are the only significant actors”, (ii) “security is the dominant goal”, and (iii) “force is the dominant instrument”.36 In brief, they underline that realism is “insufficient” to explain the complexity of the changing world order in which economic, political, and cultural globalization has brought the “world closer to complex interdependence on certain issues – for example, climate change and financial markets – and in certain parts of the world – for example, relations among the advanced democracies”.37 This apart, they have attempted to bring home the point that in the era of global interdependence in economics, trade, investment, and “flow of business”, hierarchy among issues no longer remains valid. Keohane and Nye argue that foreign economic policy “touches more domestic economic activity than in the past”.38 New “non-territorial actors” such as multinational or transnational corporations and civil society groups exercise potential influence, as never before, over global and regional issues, ranging from human rights and climate change to gender equality. Interestingly, Fareed Zakaria, in his foreword to the fourth edition of Power and Interdependence, describes their work as “the classic work of international relations theory”.39 He has credited Keohane and Nye with advancing “a powerful, coherent theory, operating at the level of the international system, and thus with great explanatory power”.40 He further elaborates, “It conceives of interdependence as broader than just the realities of economics, recognizing, for example, that the mutual vulnerability of nuclear destruction stopped the Soviet Union and the United States from going to war. Nuclear deterrence is a form of interdependence.”41 But Zakaria’s linking of nuclear deterrence to interdependence appears contradictory. As discussed above, nuclear deterrence has become either “less relevant” or irrelevant due to an asymmetrical balance of powe,r unlike in the East–West conflict during the Cold War era. Given an “increasing complexity and uncertainty” in international relations, no nation can afford to rely on the credibility of nuclear deterrence doctrine. Besides that, more and more irresponsible and so-called “rogue nations” are clandestinely involved in either building or acquiring WMDs. The nuclear threat has recently assumed a far more dangerous proportion with an increasing apprehension that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of jihadists. This view was reinforced by Fred Charles Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defence, who writes, “Now that the bipolar order of the Cold War has crumbled, non-use and deterrence will no Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 longer sustain each other … Deterrence is theoretical; non-use is concrete and unambiguous.”42 Further, we witness the rise of new centres of power such as China, India, Singapore, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a new power configuration, Kenneth Waltz’s balance of power theory has lost its sheen.43 The “dispersed structure of power” has aggravated consternation within the US foreign policy establishment that America cannot lead the world unilaterally in the face of non-military threats such as religious extremism, cybercrimes, 10 India and the United States drug trafficking, piracy, and problems related to energy resources, the environment, and “uses of space and the seas”.44 Keohane and Nye claim that complex interdependence comes “closer to reality than does realism”. In a way, they have challenged realists’ thesis that states are “predominant”, and force is an “effective instrument” of policy. On the contrary, Keohane and Nye underline that there is no “hierarchy of issues” in terms of military and economic power in today’s interdependent world. But structural realism attaches a greater importance to military capabilities in power hierarchy while ignoring the role of transnational actors, multinational corporations, and multilateral financial institutions in the international system. Critiquing Waltz’s structural realism paradigm, Keohane and Nye have offered a well-reasoned theoretical perspective that with a major shift in the traditional notion of power and security in the face of overwhelming non-traditional threats, nations are increasingly becoming mutually dependent to take on the common challenges. Undoubtedly, in an era of interdependence, old security paradigms are col- lapsing; “calculations of power” are becoming “deceptive”. And the nature of the international system is becoming more indistinct and uncertain. Realists also acknowledge that old solutions to new problems in the post-Soviet and the post-9/11 era have become redundant. Henry A. Kissinger, though schooled in classical realism, admits that:

the traditional agenda of international affairs – the balance among major powers, the security of nations – no longer defines our perils or our possibilities … Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling, old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations.45

Further, Keohane and Nye’s argument bears stressing that the 9/11 incident has altered the contours of the international system. The US “war on terror” involves escalating costs in human and material terms; impliedly, America is neither in a position to bear the cost on its own nor can it afford to fight single-handedly. In other words, the tragic events of 9/11 increased the level of interdependence extraordinarily. Not surprisingly, America received overwhelming support from the world community spontaneously. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373 at its 4385th meeting on 28 September 2001, with “steps and Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 strategies” to combat international terrorism. Under the terms of its text, “States were also called on to exchange information and cooperate to prevent and sup- press terrorist acts and to take action against the perpetrators of such acts. States should become parties to, and fully implement as soon as possible, the relevant international conventions and protocols to combat terrorism”.46 As pointed out before, Pakistan, by virtue of its geostrategic location, is irreplaceable for logistical support to the US and NATO forces in fighting India and the United States 11 extremist elements operating in the Af-Pak region. As a blessing in disguise, Pakistan has occupied the status of a frontline state in the US global strategy to eliminate terrorism. Logically, the Pakistan–US relationship offers a classic case of interdependence even though with varying intentions, interests, and goals. Undoubtedly, there is a broad consensus among economists and policy elites that without US economic assistance, Pakistan would have degenerated into a failed state.47 Thus, inevitable mutual dependence has long survived their uneasy strategic alliance. A long-term vulnerability of the United States to terrorism obligated key officials in the White House to reset US relations with India. American policy elites acknowledged that India’s assessment proved correct that terrorism was an existential threat to global and regional security, although American administrations had glossed over India’s threat perception. In this context, Keohane and Nye commented that “before September 11 the United States had poor information about the identity and location of terrorists’ networks within the United States and other Western societies”.48 Despite “enormous advantages” in terms of resources and “technological capabilities”, America found itself helpless before the “violence of the weak”.49 Also, the attacks implied an abysmal failure of the US intelligence agency (CIA) in identifying locations and activities of Al Qaeda, whose tentacles had spread across the world. In brief, America has had to be content with the “changing grammar” of violence. Moreover, America was the victim of its fractured psyche and the perception that it was invul- nerable to “small bands of terrorists due to patterns of asymmetrical interdependence”.50 In this “paralyzing circumstance”, Donald Rumsfeld, former defence secretary, picturesquely illustrates how confused the United States was. He states:

there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.51

Rumsfeld’s statement is a grim reminder to every nation as to how uncertainty causes an irresolvable dilemma. In view of the unpredictable behaviour of state and non-state actors, Nye claims that globalization and transnational issues have rendered the United States, like any other major Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 power, dependent on others to “to obtain the preferred outcomes”.52 He further explains that the

distribution of power on military issues was unipolar, it made no sense to use traditional terms like unipolarity and hegemony to describe the distribution of power on economic and transnational issues where the United States needed the help of others to obtain the preferred outcomes.53 12 India and the United States He suggests that the successful outcome of “the war on terrorism requires years of patient civilian cooperation with others in intelligence sharing, police work, and tracing of financial flows. Such a war cannot be won unilaterally with orders from imperial headquarters”.54 Nye further argues that America can ill afford to be a “hegemon” in today’s awakening world with the “multilingual and multicultural” diffusion of information.55

Anatomy of complex interdependence Keohane and Nye spell out three main characteristics of complex inter dependence, as listed below.

1. Multiple channels connect societies, including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face-to-face and through telecom- munications); and transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These channels can be summarized as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by realists. Transgovernmental applies when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units. 2. The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issues means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda. 3. Military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, where complex interdependence prevails. It may, however, be important in these governments’ relations with governments outside that region, or on other issues. Military force could, for instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues among members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for that alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc.56

Before applying the framework of “complex interdependence” to Indo-US relations, it will be a fruitful exercise to understand the expanding connotation of security that encompasses military, nuclear, economic, social, cultural, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 psychological, energy, strategic, and environmental dimensions, including human security. This validates the proposition that the line between internal and external security has blurred.57 Arguably, security has become a global project to promote peace, security, and stability in the international system. It is a part of “liberal internationalism”. Although there is a vast literature available on the multidimensional concept of security, few attempts have been made to conceptualize security interdependence. This is mainly attributable not only to the absence of security culture but also to the crass ignorance India and the United States 13 about or negligence in internalizing “security practices” and security values in the fast globalizing world. With a paradigm shift, the world community is wrestling with the challenge of how to ensure nuclear security against theft or control of nukes by extremist organizations. It will, therefore, be fitting to illuminate how the imperative of safety and security of nuclear assets against the potential threat of nuclear terrorism propels interdependence among nations to make it work. As discussed before, it is not possible for America to tackle the challenge of nuclear terrorism single-handedly. Therefore, American policy makers have appealed to the international community to extend its concrete support to make the world free of WMDs. Steve Andreasen, a former director for defence policy and arms control, writes that in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons,

into dangerous hands, the United States must establish common objectives with other states. It is a strong coalition of countries that bands together behind the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and agrees on a set of practical steps towards that goal; it can exert powerful pressures to prevent new nuclear-weapons states and make it much less likely that terrorists can get the materials they need to build a nuclear weapon.58

Andreasen’s views reinforce the fact that interdependence is the only mantra if the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world is to be achieved. In this context, he further writes:

Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn have underscored the urgent need for Washington to work with leaders of other countries to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise among states by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities.59

Towards achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world, the US administration has undertaken a series of concrete steps, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched by President George W. Bush in May 2003. The PSI aims not only to “interdict shipment of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, but to cooperate in preventing WMD Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 proliferation facilitators (that is, individuals, companies, other entities) from engaging in this deadly trade”.60 In this regard, President Obama, while making his opening remarks at the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), held in Washington on 13 April 2010, underscored the urgency of addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism. He emphasized the importance of taking swift and effective measures against the chances of nuclear materials, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, falling into the hands of transnational terrorist networks.61 14 India and the United States At the second NSS, held in Seoul in March 2012, some key targets were set up, for example to voluntarily announce the “minimum use” of HEU. At the Hague summit in March 2014, President Obama urged the participating member countries to rethink the consequences of North Korea’s obduracy in pursuing the nuclear weapon programme that constitutes a potential threat not only to its neighbours but also to international peace and security. At the summit’s closing session, President Obama exuded optimism that, due to collective efforts over the past two summits,

12 countries and two dozen nuclear facilities around the world have rid themselves entirely of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Dozens of nations have boosted security at their nuclear storage sites; built their own counter-smuggling teams; or created new centres to improve nuclear security and training. The IAEA is stronger. More countries have ratified the treaties and international partnerships at the heart of our efforts.62

The above initiatives are milestones towards preventing transfer of WMDs, nuclear materials, technology, and equipment. Since nuclear security is a global problem, it is the responsibility of members of the world community to maintain their commitment to achieving the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons in an era of multilateral security interdependence. This chapter illuminates the underlying fact that mutual security dependence has become a global necessity in the face of an existential threat from nuclear and radioactive terrorism. Some strategic thinkers entertain a false belief that since the institutional infrastructure of nuclear states is out of the reach of terrorist groups, there is no likelihood that transnational terrorist organizations will be able to access WMDs. On the contrary, a large majority of strategic analysts do not subscribe to this view. Rather, there is a broad consensus that a wide network of extremist organizations makes nuclear material susceptible to theft, especially in collusion with the hawkish elements in a state apparatus. In brief, the level of security interdependence is fast increasing. In this context, historian John Lewis Gaddis has reminded us that the end of the Cold War “brings not an end to threats, but rather diffusion of them”.63 The post-Cold War “geopolitical cartography”, in Gaddis’s phrase, presents the problem of uncertainty and clarity because of the coupling of forces of integration and fragmentation. According to Gaddis: Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016

A fully integrated world would be one in which individual countries would lose control of their borders and would be dependent on others for critical resources, capital and markets. It would mean, therefore, a progressive loss of national sovereignty, and ultimately the loss of whatever remained of national identity. A fully fragmented world would approxi- mate the Hobbesian state of anarchy.64 India and the United States 15 Truly speaking, in the age of globalization the forces of integration and fragmentation are working together, and simultaneously delivering punches to each other. In between them, interdependence is considered a better and more feasible choice. Some critics argue that interdependence makes smaller nations dependent on big powers for resources, capital-intensive technology, and markets. There may be some grain of truth in their contention. But there is no better alternative to mutual dependence on the issues of mutual stakes and common threats, even though there may be asymmetrical relationships in terms of power capabilities, as we observe in the case of India–US and Pakistan–US relations. Although American supremacy is unquestionable, the US no longer enjoys strategic leverage, for example, over its old allies like Pakistan. The reason is very simple. It is the mutual necessity that has made the two countries close allies. Similarly, India–US security relations are mutually dependent. Both of them have a common interest in ensuring the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean in the face of rising piracy threat to the smooth transaction of goods through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Both countries’ navies conduct joint naval exercises (a detailed account of this will be given in Chapter 4). Despite common security stakes, there is an increasing divergence in security perceptions between New Delhi and Washington because of differing obligations and clashing national interests, for instance on the question of Iran’s nuclear programme or on the issues of the Ukraine crisis, regime change in Iraq, and Israel’s unleashing of unprecedented violence against the Palestinians. Undeniably, the United States, being a global superpower, has international stakes and obligations whereas India, a regional power, does not have similar stakes. Despite asymmetrical power relations, however, both countries need to partner with each other given the “nature and scale” of common threats to their homeland security as well as to the regional and global security.65

Complex interdependence framework: India–US relations The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the relevance and applicability of the “complex interdependence” theory of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in order to better understand the multidimensional relationship between India and the United States. It is also aimed at broadening our understanding of the lasting value of this framework in bilateral relations in an inevitably Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 interdependent world order.66 The application of this analytical framework is likely to unravel the overriding compulsions that dictate India–US strategic partnership. Let it first be clear that there is a nuanced distinction between interdependence and complex interdependence. Unlike in the case of interdependence, use of military force is prohibited between countries interlocked in complex interdependence. For example, interdependence between China and 16 India and the United States India does not forbid the use of military force against each other, while in the case of complex interdependence between India and the United States, use of military force is not permissible to resolve their political and strategic differences. There are two schools of thought in the context of the Indo-US relationship. According to the traditional category, there is hardly any “strategic fit” between India and the United States in terms of “compatible goals” and “appropriate competitive positions”.67 This view was widely circulated by India’s Left parties through debates in the parliament or discussions on TV channels, though electronic media controlled by the corporate world or business community do not give such debates adequate coverage in their programmes. It might be recalled that the Left party had withdrawn political support from the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government led by Manmohan Singh on the issue of the nuclear deal with America, arguing that India had compromized its nuclear sovereignty and autonomy in the foreign policy realm. By contrast, policy elites in the power corridor, including the strategic community, favour strong defence, security, and strategic ties between India and the United States. Their argument hinges on an assumption that there is a congruence of defence and security perceptions and national interests between the countries, for instance on fighting terrorism and on protecting the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean against pirates. They further argue that India’s long-term national security interests demand robust security ties with America. In brief, mutual security dependence in global and regional contexts demands a strong and stable partnership between India and the United States. This apart, “India is an attractive partner for the United States, both because of US worries about a rising China and the clout of India’s burgeoning market”.68 In fact, America’s reclamation of primacy in Asia needs to be seen largely in the context of a potential challenge from the rising China to the US predominance in Asia in economic, military, and strategic terms. In the changing economic investment and security milieu, the United States has crafted a new policy agenda with a pragmatic vision for a secure and peaceful world order with the succour of the like-minded nations such as India. The latter’s democratic and peaceful credentials have sensitized at least a minuscule constituency in America to the image and importance of India as a useful cooperative partner in a new balance of power in an Asia that appears to be gravitating towards China. At the same time, Washington and New Delhi Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 have realized that their relations should not be allowed to be hemmed in by mutual mistrust. A couple of questions arise. Can generalizations be applied to complex interdependence in India–US relations? What are the implications of “different levels” of relationship between the two countries? Will their cultural differences and contrary social outlook and belief systems determine the level of interdependence between them? Answers to these questions depend India and the United States 17 on whether their relations fulfil the three main conditions of complex interdependence, as outlined by Keohane and Nye. Let us briefly discuss the absence of use of military force by the United States while conducting its relations with India. Empirically, there is no palpable evidence to suggest that America has ever used naked military power against India or coerced it into toeing its line, whether on the question of slapping sanctions on Iran because of the latter’s suspected nuclear enrichment programme or on the question of supporting regime change in Iraq. Nor is there overt evidence that America ever threatened India with dire consequences if it failed to amend its Nuclear Liability Act (2010) to ensure that US nuclear companies would get business in India’s huge energy market. It merits a mention that the use of military force by the US against India is irrelevant on several counts. First, India is a major power in terms of human and material resources, economic growth and development, military capabilities, and technological prowess. Second, India is the largest democracy in the world, with liberal political institutions, independent judiciary, and free press. Third, there is no direct conflict of interests between the two countries over strategic resources. The next element in complex interdependence is the lack of hierarchy among issues in terms of non-dominance of the military security agenda. In Indo-US relations, there is a clear-cut absence of hierarchy on bilateral or multilateral issues, while military security is not a dominant issue. The third element is the presence of multiple channels of contact between India and America, reflected in economic engagement and the contribution of the Indian diaspora. As regards economic engagement, Indo-US bilateral trade has witnessed a five-fold increase since 2001, touching $100 billion in 2015. The US ambassador to India Richard Verma, while speaking at Jalandhar in Punjab in May 2015, said that bilateral trade is further expected to increase to $500 billion.69 Furthermore, the US is the fifth largest foreign investor in India, with its cumulative FDI inflows from April 2000 to March 2014 amounting to about $11.92 billion.70 Prospects of US investments could be much brighter if India ensures “transparency”, “predictability” and “legal certainty”, demanded by the administration. Both countries have welcomed progress in raising the level of economic interaction among experts from both sides, underlining the need for addressing trade and investment policy issues in order to “remove obstacles and improve the business environment in both countries”.71 During his visit to India in 2013, US Vice President Joe Biden, a staunch Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 advocate of liberalized trade with India, set an annual bilateral trade target of $500 billion, which he said was achievable if both countries made the “right choices”.72 Besides, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama, in their summit meeting in September 2013, stressed the need for peri- odic bilateral consultation, dialogue, and coordination to increase “oil market transparency” with the aim of controlling the erratic rises in oil prices that have threatened the global economy. However, the quantum of bilateral trade 18 India and the United States does not necessarily support the inevitability of interdependence between India and the United States, as one finds in US–China trade ties.

Links through the indian diaspora India and the United States have numerous “soft power points” of interaction through a three-million-strong Indo-American community. There is no doubt that the Indian diaspora’s influence has steadily grown in the United States since, as Arthur C. Rubinoff notes:

its skills, education, income, and size have increased. It is apparent that the prosperous and demographically significant Indo-American community, typified by physicians and Silicon Valley computer technicians, has remarkably changed not only its image, but also the perception of its home country in the United States.73

Rubinoff further points out that:

the Indo-American community has had a powerful impact on transforming the historically hostile relationship between Washington and New Delhi … the role of Indians in the United States seems to be decisive in altering perceptions of decision-makers between two countries that have limited conflict and conflicting interests.74

He also writes:

[The] Indian-American population in the U.S. (including multiple eth- nicities) grew 68 per cent over the 2000–2010 decade from 1.9 million to 3.19 million. Counting single ethnicity (discounting mixed race), the population grew from 1.67 million to 2.84 million in the same period. That made Indian-Americans the third largest Asian-American group in the U.S. after Chinese-Americans (3.79 million) and Filipino-Americans (3.42 million), but with a much faster growth rate. People who identified themselves as Indian origin comprise the largest segment of the 3.4 million-strong “South Asian Americans”, a 1990s nomenclature engi- neered by the Washington mandarins.75 Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Also, the Indian diaspora in the United States has richly contributed to American political processes. As reported by Chidanand Rajghatta on 10 March 2012, Indians have crossed the 3 million mark in the US, of whom 1 million have voting rights.76 Moreover, President Obama reposed trust in the intelligence and capabilities of Indian-Americans by appointing over 50 of them to his administration in the State, Treasury, Defence, and Commerce Departments.77 Importantly, “more than a dozen Indian-Americans have been given key positions in the White House, while there are hardly any India and the United States 19

important departments where Indian-Americans do not occupy key posts”.78 Notably, they include: Sunil Sabharwal, US Alternate Executive Director at the IMF; Rajiv Shah, Head of US Aid; and Atul Keshap, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia. During his meeting with Prime Minister Singh at the White House on 27 September 2013, President Obama acknowledged that “Indian-Americans make extraordinary contributions to the United States every single day – businessmen, scientists, academics, now Miss America is of Indian-American descent, and I think it’s a signal of how close our countries are”.79 Furthermore, in an interview with The Economic Times, Nancy Powell, the then US ambassador to India, stated that Indians receive more H-1B and L-1 temporary worker visas than any other citizens in the world. In 2012, they received more than 59 per cent of all H-1B visas and more than 35 per cent of all L-1 visas worldwide.80 Clearly, the impact of diasporas depends on their contribution to promoting US national interests in various sectors. Earlier, in a joint statement issued at the White House in November 2010, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had stated that:

the two leaders welcomed the deepening relationship between the world’s two largest democracies. They commended the growing cooperation between their governments, citizens, businesses, universities, and scientific institutions which have thrived on a shared culture of pluralism, education, enterprise, and innovation, and have benefited the people of both countries.81

The statement clearly captures the spirit of multiple links existing between the two countries which need to be strengthened for mutual benefit.

Analysis Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence model is more closely attuned to migration, economic, trade, investment, and ecological issues than to the traditional field of defence and security. It needs to beclarified, however, that complex interdependence between India and the United States exists in the domain of homeland security since both countries are the greatest targets of global terror. That is why they have institutionalized the homeland security Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 dialogue to exchange intelligence on the movements of extremists and jihadists, their plans and targets, and their sources of funds. The inevitability of complex interdependence was acknowledged during the summit meeting between India’s new Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Obama on 30 September 2014. Both leaders have underscored the imperative of working closely to monitor terrorist activities, whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the Middle East, since the internal security of India and the United States is at stake. Interconnected to complex interdependence in homeland security is the 20 India and the United States security of nuclear assets, material, and facilities in the wake of the potentially growing threat of extremist groups, including jihadi elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Recent attempts by the radical ISIS group to take control of nuclear assets of Iran further enhance Indo-American complex interdependence to ensure that nuclear materials do not fall into the hands of ISIS. Complex interdependence in the above-mentioned interconnected security realms provides a larger political and strategic space for mutual dependence between India and the United States. Otherwise, mutual dependence between them in the sectors of defence trade and military cooperation is not so compelling. By logical extension, the shared threats matter more than traditional security dependence or common political ideals and democratic values. Furthermore, Keohane and Nye ascribe the absence of hierarchy in complex interdependence to the information revolution. Jessica T. Mathew is also of the view that “the information technologies diminish hierarchies, spreading power among more people and groups”.82 Since power is more diffused and authorities more “hybrid”, power structure is shifting toward cooperative behaviour between states in pursuit of achieving common goals. This is why the old thesis that interdependence exists between industrialized nations is no longer valid in the information age. But this is not necessarily complex interdependence. What we observe in the case of a highly developed country like the US and a developing nation like India is “complete” and compelling mutual dependence in the realm of homeland security. Such dependence is not as compulsive in economic and trade cooperation between India and the United States as we witness in the case of the United States and China, whose economies are strongly integrated, almost to the extent of the logic of prosperity of the other.83 For example, US–China bilateral trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 to $562 billion in 2013. Moreover, “China is the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities (nearly $1.3 trillion as of April 2014)”.84 Moreover, America has realized that seductive tactics of “carrot and stick” are no longer feasible or efficacious in what it aspires to achieve. The case of Pakistan underscores this reality very clearly. For example, Pakistan has defied US strategic fiat on more than one occasion, be it in its nuclear programme or on the question of logistic support to NATO forces in Afghanistan. Jessica Mathews strikes a similar note: that at times it becomes obligatory for America to help those countries which are not prepared to fulfil American policy agendas. The overriding compulsion is rooted in the fear that “severely weakened states” will encourage conflict.85 In other words, political pressure Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 on weak or failing states could trigger a process of territorial or social fragmentation. The “end result” might be a cultural and “political earthquake” in the country, which is not in US interests.

Complex interdependence: benefits and limitations The model of complex interdependence entails both advantages and disadvantages. Let us first have an overview of major advantages for India. India and the United States 21 First, an upward thrust in interdependence is opportune for India to derive optimal benefit from its strategic partnership with America, for instance in the defence and security realm. India need not depend exclusively on Russian military hardware, even though Moscow continues to be one of its major weapon suppliers. As revealed by India’s new defence minister Arun Jaitley while informing the parliament, the US has overtaken all as the largest defence supplier to India. According to Jaitley:

almost 40 percent of the money spent by India on defence imports in the past three years [has] gone to the Americans, followed by the Russians (30 percent) and the French (14 percent). Israel is a distant fourth with merely four percent share.86

In fact, India’s strategy of fulfilling its defence requirements from diverse sources has instilled confidence among the Indian defence and strategic community. Second, America’s certification of India as an emerging global power prompted China to recognize India’s strategic value in the hierarchy of state actors. This is evident from China’s conclusion of a strategic and cooperative partnership agreement with India in December 2005. Under the agreement, both countries not only conduct joint military exercises but also mutually cooperate on global and regional issues such as climate change, human rights, and Iran’s nuclear programme. Third, the increasing interdependence between New Delhi and Washington has helped deepen the bilateral and multilateral ties which have proved greatly beneficial to both countries. On the one hand, with the personal and persistent efforts of President Bush, the Nuclear Suppliers Group lifted nuclear trade sanctions against India in 2008 that had been in place since 1974. With this, India became legally entitled to access to international nuclear energy markets. On the other hand, the nuclear deal paved the way for US energy companies such as Westinghouse and General Electric (GE) to build nuclear reactors in India, although the latter’s Civil Nuclear Liability Act remains unaltered. Similarly, for the US, interdependence with India yields the following major benefits: sharing of the financial burden in joint monitoring of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean; learning from India’s long experience in desert and high-altitude warfare while conducting joint military exercises; obtaining access to India’s lucrative defence Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 and energy market; creation of more jobs for Americans through trade and commercial ties with India; and hedging against China’s muscle-flexing in the South China Sea to help defend the security and strategic interests of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Furthermore, India’s acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards on its civil nuclear facilities in perpetuity, and also its commitment to unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and unqualified support to the United States on conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), are termed 22 India and the United States a strategic gain for the fulfilment of the principles and objectives of US non-proliferation policy. However, a section of the Indian strategic community is critical of the interdependence model because it is apprehensive of the loss of independence and autonomy of India’s foreign policy. In this regard, Thomas Wright comments,

States are seeking to carve out spheres of independence for themselves to hedge against the risks of interdependence, and these efforts are likely to accelerate over the next decade. These spheres of independence will be imperfect and porous, but they likely mark the first step in a strategy to preserve the state’s autonomy in the face of greater volatility and uncertainty.87

International relations scholars are of the view that the notion of autonomy is a misnomer, a contradiction in the age of interdependence.88 James A. Caporaso makes a subtle and nuanced distinction between autonomy and interdependence. He writes, “While autonomy rests on the idea of self-control, interdependence rests on the notion of mutual control.”89 A recent document on “Non-alignment 2.0”, authored by a group of Indian analysts and policy makers, has recommended that India must not abandon autonomy in its foreign and strategic policy while dealing with global powers. Furthermore, they have suggested that India as a “potential power” must use its leverage “both with the country (i.e. the US) courting it and with potential rivals”.90 But these ideas and recommendations are not in tune with the current global realities of an increasing interdependence in multiple domains. Moreover, interdependence is characterized by the role of institutions and international regimes, the membership of which automatically dilutes member states’ sovereignty to a large extent. So, it is erroneous to argue that on the one hand India needs to strictly pursue full autonomy in the foreign policy domain, while on the other hand it needs partners whether in fulfilling its energy requirements or ensuring its homeland security. Nevertheless, documents like Non-alignment 2.0 tend to impact the thinking of public policy and decision makers, sitting in the South Block. Unfortunately, the Indian ruling class finds it virtually impossible to get out of its strait-jacket mentality even in the fast-changing globalized and interdependent world order. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 This is reflected in India’s reluctance to participate in multilateral naval exercises beyond its own waters. At times, India suffers from the morbid psychology that it should avoid coming closer to the United States militarily, which, India thinks, might send out the wrong signals to China that India has been forging a close military alliance with America. India needs to shed off such psychology if it aspires to consolidate its status as a global player by coming closer in defence and security sectors trilaterally, with America and Japan. India needs to realize that the interdependence model offers a India and the United States 23 better opportunity to achieve its goals and objectives in tune with those of the United States. In the context of China, India is overly sensitive about what China might think of India’s strategic partnership with America, but China never considers Indian sensitivities as to how India will react to its strategic nexus with Pakistan or to its “string of pearls” strategy in South Asia, chiefly directed against India. To be sure, China’s cautious pragmatism, coupled with assertiveness, needs to be factored into the decision-making processes of both New Delhi and Washington. Public policy statements of PLA (People’s Liberation Army) elites are a manifestation of China’s growing political and strategic confidence that it is now safely in the driver’s seat and can steer the destiny of the country as it wishes to, which is reinforced by its launch of soft power diplomacy.91 Despite these dramatic developments in the domain of foreign policy, India is still living in the limbo of darkness. It has not yet defined its strategic goals vis-à-vis the United States, though the latter’s pivot to Asia has been clearly defined and articulated as intended to address the “strategic anxieties” of the many Asian nations which have a fractious relationship with China. Prime Minister Modi’s flurry of visits abroad did not cut much ice with the world chanceries. His Make-in-India campaign, as well as his invitation to foreign investors to invest in India, floundered in the face of bold claims by his party spokespersons about his astounding accomplishments in the domain of foreign policy and diplomacy. It should also be underlined that the degree of complex interdependence between India and the US cannot be accurately measured due to an inherent complexity of intermeshing factors constituted by their domestic structures, including systemic and structural constraints. Other problems stemming from complex interdependence relate to regulating the “overlapping interests” and divergent perceptions on global and national security issues. In this context, Republican Senator John McCain, in a major speech on US–India strategic partnership on the floor of Senate on 26 June 2014, underlined that the logic of a strategic partnership with India is powerful. He said, “If India and the United States are to build a truly strategic partnership, we must each commit to it and defend it in equal measure. We must each build the public support needed to sustain our strategic priorities.”92 In brief, strategic priorities should be clearly defined and laid out by both sides in order to reinvigorate their complex strategic interdependence. Senator McCain further stressed the key commonalities of the Indian and American societies, saying that the “values Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 of our societies – creativity and critical thinking, risk-taking and entrepre- neurialism and social mobility … continue to deepen the interdependence of our peoples across every field of human endeavour”.93 Importantly, India also needs to liberate itself from artificially created complexes such as those emanating from the past non-aligned aura of independence and autonomy in the domains of foreign policy and diplomacy. India must understand that the world is becoming more and more integrated globally, demanding a cooperative, restrained, and rational approach to dealing with partners. Instead, India 24 India and the United States needs to concentrate on the hard-boiled realities of the current international system to maximally benefit from its manifold ties with the United States, although caution and prudence are needed to overhaul its moribund policies anchored to the foibles of Cold War nightmares.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the overriding changes in the international system in light of the revolution in the field of ICT. This has fostered an increasing awareness among national and international actors, including informed and enlightened citizenries, about the strengths and weaknesses of countries in terms of national power resources. This helps policy makers to ascertain the levels of interdependence between nations. The evidence from “disparate indicators” suggests that there is an increasing global trend towards interdependence, especially in the realm of non-military threats such as global terror, climate change, global financial crisis, and maritime piracy. In fact, interdependence is likely to intensify with the escalating costs of myriad risks. For instance, access to or control of WMDs by extremist groups is likely to precipitate an inestimable cost in terms of loss of human and material resources. To deal with the impending horrendous consequences, international policy actors and national and regional elites are required to forge an integrated strategy to save humankind from the worst possible fallout of nuclear catastrophe. The chapter underlines that the security realm bears a stronger imprint of complex interdependence in Indo-US ties than does the interweave of the economies of America and China which makes their economic and trade ties interdependent, although not without irritants and mutual mistrust. Specifically, the security domain in the context of Indo-US complex interdependence encompasses counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, and anti-maritime piracy. This aspect will be taken up in a separate chapter on India’s defence and security relationship. Further, both countries must realize that their mutual dependence is quintessential to jointly dealing with the negative impact on regional peace and stability of China’s muscle-flexing in the South China Sea. The last two administrations have realized that a strong and powerful India will serve as a counterweight to a rising China, which will undoubtedly be in the national interest of both countries. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Further, there is an imperative need to strengthen security and strategic dialogue (SSD) that covers Central Asia, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Despite an inevitably growing interdependence between India and the United States, psycho-cultural incompatibilities persist in terms of mutual images, belief systems, socio-cultural values, and mindsets of bureaucracies. Specifically, the persisting Cold War reservations among bureaucracies in India and the US impact on a proactive collaboration between both countries. Furthermore, there is a need for proactive bilateral dialogues in India and the United States 25 order to rid their bilateral cooperation of rigidity and defined parameters of deliberations. I need to clarify again that Indo-US interdependence is limited to specific issues such as the homeland security of India and the United States, the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, and nuclear terrorism, especially in the context of South Asia. As discussed before, interdependence has heightened by virtue of the fact that the United States is unable to single-handedly deal with the gargantuan challenges emanating from diverse sources such as global terror, climate change, “rogue states”,or “failed states”. As such, I wish to make it clear that the scope of my projection of Indo-US complex interdependence in the security domain is constricted to internal security. This apart, India and the United States have common concerns and interests in dealing with nuclear terrorism and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As such, they are dependent on each other for intelligence and information sharing and “building tighter liaison bonds” to check the top-secret activities of militants who are bent upon accessing Pakistani nuclear assets. A latest example in this regard is that of the Tehrik-e-Taliban – a Pakistani militant group. While issuing a video, it claimed that it had downed a Pakistani military helicopter with a shoulder launch missile in May 2015. It should be recalled that ambassadors of the Philippines and Norway were killed in that mishap. This tragic incident illustrates the magnitude of the militant threat to the state. The Pakistani army, however, rejected the claim of the Tehrik-e-Taliban and attributed the incident to the technical failure. As mentioned before, India–US security interdependence should not be interpreted in the military sense, since the two countries are not bound by complex interdependence for external security. Both of them are capable of defending their respective borders against external threats to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nor are they, as pointed out elsewhere, mutually dependent for their economic security, with complex interdependence conspicuously absent in their bilateral economic and trade ties. I have reiterated that there is an important distinction between interdependence and complex interdependence. Interdependence is applicable to bilateral and multilateral relationships, but it does not necessarily connote boundness, whether for dealing with climate change or protection of human rights. But in complex interdependence mutual dependence is inevitable, as we find in the case of the homeland security of the each country. Also, there are specific Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 elements in complex interdependence that provide a yardstick for evaluating the nature, pattern, and potential of complex interdependence between nations. For instance, while interdependence between two countries does not exclude the use of force and the existence of a hierarchy of issues in their relationship, complex interdependence will be missing if one of the parties, with superior military and economic capabilities, resorts to using military force against its partner to achieve its desired objective or goal. Finally, while assessing complex interdependence between countries it must be seen whether 26 India and the United States there are multiple channels of social and cultural interaction – as we find in the case of the United States, where the Indian diaspora is a strong binding link in the US relationship with India. This aspect has been discussed in greater detail in this chapter. In brief, Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence construct will remain a valid framework for understanding and analysing Indo-US relations on a wide range of complex issues of mutual concern and interest.

Notes

1 Alfred North Whitehead writes that “various parts of nature are so closely interdependent, so densely woven into a single web of being, that none may be abstracted without altering its own identity and that of the whole”, quoted in Joe Smith, Nigel Clark, and Kathryn Yusoff, “Interdependence”, Geography Compass, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2007): pp. 340–59. http://oro.open.ac.uk/7763/1/Interdependence .pdf, accessed 10 January 2016; see also S. Myers and B.R. Barber (eds), The Interdependence Handbook: Looking Back, Living the Present, Choosing the Future (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2004). 2 Mihaljo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel, Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1974). www.globalresearch .ca/mankind-at-the-turning-point-interdependence-is-totalitarian/8245, accessed 10 January 2016. 3 Smith, Clark, and Yusoff, “Interdependence”. 4 Oran R. Young, “Interdependencies in World Politics”, International Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1969): pp. 726–50 (p. 738); James A. Caporaso also attributes interdependence to the “lack of self-sufficiency” and presence of “technological interdependence”: for details, see James A. Caporaso, “Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioural Analysis”, International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1978): pp. 13–43. 5 Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes”, International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1975): pp. 1021–34. See John A Kroll, “The Complexity of Interdependence”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1993): pp. 321–48; Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett, “International Integration and the Interdependence of Economic Variables”, International Organization, Vol. XXVII (Spring 1973): pp. 255–71. 6 Katzenstein, “International Interdependence”, p. 1022; see also Kjell Goldmann and Gunnar Sjostedt (eds), Power, Capabilities, Interdependence (London: Sage, 1979). 7 Joseph S. Nye, “Independence and Interdependence”, Foreign Policy, No. 22 (Spring 1976): pp. 130–61. 8 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2012), p. xxi; Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977”, in Ole Holsti et al. (eds), Change in the International System (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 132–62. 9 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. xxiii; see also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations”, World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (October 1974): pp. 39–62. 10 Dale C. Copeland argues that “economic interdependence is the only factor that brings states together”. For a detailed discussion, see Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations”, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996): pp. 5–41. India and the United States 27

11 Young, “Interdependencies in World Politics”, p. 739. 12 Joseph S. Nye, “The Future of American Power”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November/December 2010): p. 12; Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Superpower Can’t Go it Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth (eds), International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 13 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 246. For its related part, see Richard Burt, Olin Robison, and Barry Fulton, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1998). 14 For a perceptive critique on the “hegemonic paradigm” and its decline, see Amitav Acharya, Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 142–46. 15 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality”, World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (October 1973): pp. 1–27 (p. 2). 16 Cited in ibid., p. 2. 17 Ibid., p. 3. 18 Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, “New Realities in the US–China Investment Relationship”, Rhodium Group/US Chamber of Commerce, April 2014. http:// rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/RHG_New-Realities_29April2014.pdf, accessed 10 January 2016. 19 David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies”, in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Power, Strategy, and Security: A World Politics Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 17; Mary Ann Tetreault, “Measuring Interdependence”, International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1980): pp. 429–43; David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis”, International Organization, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Autumn 1980): pp. 471–506. 20 Baldwin, “Power Analysis” , in Knorr (ed.), Power, Strategy, and Security, p. 19. 21 Young, “Interdependence”, p. 739. 22 Rosecrance and Stein, “Interdependence”, p. 3; Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 2014). 23 Rosecrance and Stein, “Interdependence”, p. 3. 24 Baldwin, “Power Analysis”, in Knorr (ed.), Power, Strategy, and Security, p. 19. 25 Ibid., p. 19. 26 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 10–11. 27 Ibid. 28 Cited in Baldwin, “Power and Analysis”, p. 20. 29 See Walter C. Clemens, Dynamics of International Relations: Conflict and Mutual Gain in an Era of Global Interdependence (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 30 Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 244; Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 31 Keohane, After Hegemony. 32 According to Thomas J. Welch, the distribution of technology resources has altered the nature and form of security. In light of the irreversible role of technological revolution, Welch has articulated security concepts like deterrence. See Thomas J. Welch, “Technology Change and Security”, The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1990): pp. 111–20. 33 For a perceptive analysis of this point, see Robert A. Manning, “The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter”, Foreign Policy (Winter 1997–98): pp. 71–84. 28 India and the United States

34 See Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work”, Foreign Affairs (January/February 1996): pp. 29–30. 35 Thomas Wright, “Sifting through Interdependence”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 2013): p. 8. 36 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. xxvii. 37 Ibid., p. xxviii; see also Philip G. Cerny, “Globalisation and the Changing Logic of Collective Action”, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995): pp. 595–625; Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations”, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996): pp. 5–41; Susan Strange, “The Erosion of the State”, Current History, Vol. 96, No. 613 (1997): pp. 365–69. 38 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 39 Fareed Zakaria, “Foreword”, in Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. xiv. See William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World”, International Security,Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999): pp. 28–31; Barry Buzan, “The Interdependence of Security and Economic Issues in the New World Order”, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). 40 Zakaria, “Foreword”, in Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. xv. See James A. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations”, International Organization, Vol. 46 (1992): pp. 599–632. 41 Zakaria, “Foreword”, p. xv. Keohane and Nye. Beverly Crawford, “The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 23 (1994): pp. 25–55. 42 Fred Charles Ikle, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996): pp. 119–29. (p. 123); Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjens, “Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Fall 1991): pp. 95–110. 43 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000): pp. 5–41. 44 For a perceptive analysis of this point see Joseph S. Nye, “Limits of American Power”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 4 (2002–2003), pp. 545–59; see also Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2012). Fred Ikle, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 2 (January 1973): pp. 266–85. 45 Quoted in Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 3. 46 For the full text of the Security Council’s unanimous resolution on anti-terrorism at its 4385th meeting, 28 September 2001, see United Nations, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation”. www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm, accessed 10 January 2016. 47 Ishrat Hussain, “The Role of Politics in Pakistan’s Economy”, Journal of International Affairs, online, 24 March 2010. http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/ Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 role-politics-pakistans-economy-0/, accessed 10 January 2016. 48 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. xxxi. 49 See Joseph A. Camilleri, “The Competition for Power and Legitimacy in an Age of Transition”, in Solomon Hussein (ed.), Challenges to Global Security: Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition (London: IB Tauris, 2008), pp. 27–52. 50 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. xxxii. 51 Cited in Camilleri, “Competition for Power”, p. 38. 52 Joseph Nye, Power in the Age of Global Information (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 6; Henry J., Nau, Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2011). India and the United States 29

53 Nye, Power in the Age, p. 6. 54 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 55 Nye, “Limits of American Power”; see Kenneth Waltz, “Globalization and American Power”, The National Interest (Spring 2000): pp. 46–57. Joseph Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 56 Ibid., pp. 20–21. 57 See Barry Buzan, “ ‘Change and Insecurity’ Reconsidered”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1999): pp. 1–17; John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System”, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986): pp. 99–142. 58 Steve Andreasen, “A Joint Enterprise: Diplomacy to Achieve a World without Nuclear Weapons”, Arms Control Today (April 2009): p. 14. 59 Ibid. 60 Cited in Olivia Bosch and Peter Van Ham (eds), Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2007). 61 See Mustafa Kibaroglu, “The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Requires Concerted Action”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2014): pp. 209–16. 62 Remarks by President Obama at Closing Session of the Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague, The White House, 25 March 2014. www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2014/03/25/remarks-president-obama-closing-session- nuclear-security-summit, accessed 10 January 2016. 63 John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward the Post-Cold War World”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991): p. 113; see also E. Kapstein, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 64 Gaddis, “Toward the Post-Cold War”. John J. Mearsheimer holds the view that the prospect for peace and stability in the international system depends on a number of great powers in the system. He writes, “Bipolar and multipolar systems both are likely to be more peaceful when power is distributed equally in them. Power inequalities invite war, because they increase an aggressor’s prospect for victory on the battlefield.” John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”, The Atlantic Monthly (August 1990): p. 37. 65 The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported nearly 294 incidents of piracy worldwide from January to September 2009; see “The Growing Threat of Piracy to Regional and Global Security”, doclecture.net, 11 December 2015. http://doclecture.net/1-24703.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 66 See R.J. Barry Jones, Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy Rhetoric and Reality (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). 67 See Deepa Ollapally and Rajesh Rajagopalan, “The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011): pp. 146–62. 68 Ollapally and Rajagopalan, p. 152; see also Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen Cohen, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 “Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011): pp. 163–77. 69 For details see “India–US Trade Wouild Rise to $500 Billion: Richard Verma”, The Economic Times, 22 May 2015. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes. com/2013-07-24/news/40772057_1_us-india-partnership-joe-biden-two-way-trade, accessed 10 January 2016. The Indian government, in its foreign trade policy to be announced at the end of 2015, stressed that it aims to nearly double “India’s exports of goods and services to $900 billion by 2020”, Catherine A. Novelli, “State of the U.S.–India Economic Relationship”, US Department of State, 15 April 2015. www. state.gov/e/rls/rmk/240723.htm, accessed 10 January 2016. 30 India and the United States

70 “Brief on India–US Relations”, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, September 2014. www.indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=41, accessed 10 January 2016. 71 Lalit K. Jha and Ajay Kaul, “India, US Eye Five-fold Increase in Commerce”, Live Mint e-Paper, 28 September 2013. www.livemint.com/Politics/lRSVhd7kwB- KtL07wEGfAqK/India-US-eye-fivefold-increase-in-commerce.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 72 See “Joe Biden for Liberalised Trade Regime, Sets $500 bn Trade Target”, The Economic Times, 24 July 2013. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013- 07-24/news/40772057_1_us-india-partnership-joe-biden-two-way-trade, accessed 10 January 2016. 73 Arthur C. Rubinoff, “The Diaspora as a Factor in U.S.–India Relations”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Fall 2005): pp. 169–88 (p. 169). 74 Ibid., p. 169. 75 For details, see Chidanand Rajghatta on the Indian-American population: “Indians Cross 3 Million Mark in US, 1 Million Have Voting Rights”, The Times of India, 10 March 2012. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Indians- cross-3-million-mark-in-US-1-million-have-voting-rights/articleshow/12205449. cms, accessed 10 January 2016. 76 Ibid. 77 “Indian-Americans Walking the Halls of Power in Barack Obama Administration”, NDTV, (n.d.). www.ndtv.com/photos/news/indian-americans-walking-the-halls- of-power-in-barack-obama-administration-14275, accessed 10 January 2016. 78 “Over 50 Indians in Barack Obama’s White House Team”, Deccan Chronicle, 30 December 2013. www.deccanchronicle.com/131230/news-world/article/over- 50-indians-barack-obamas-white-house-team, accessed 10 January 2016. 79 Ibid. 80 See K.K. Sruthijith, “India–US Trade Should Again Rise Five-fold: Nancy J Powell, US Ambassador to India”, The Economic Times, 27 September 2013. 81 Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India, The White House, 8 November 2010. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/ 08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india, accessed 10 January 2016. 82 Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/ February 1997): pp. 50–62 (p. 52). www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-01-01/ power-shift, accessed 10 January 2016. 83 According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, “U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in China (stock) was $51.4 billion in 2012; China FDI in the United States (stock) was $5.2 billion in 2012. U.S. goods and private services trade with China totaled $579 billion in 2012 … China is currently our [the US’s] 2nd largest goods trading partner with $562 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2013 … The U.S. goods trade deficit with China was $318 billion in 2013 … The U.S. services trade surplus with China was $17 billion in 2012.” “The People’s Republic of China: U.S.–China Trade Facts”, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 4 April 2014. www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/ Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china, accessed 10 January 2016. 84 Wayne M. Morrison writes, “China is currently the United States’ second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. China is estimated to be a $300 billion market for U.S. firms (based on U.S. exports to China and sales by U.S.-invested firms in China). Many U.S. firms view participation in China’s market as critical to staying globally competitive. General Motors (GM), for example, which has invested heavily in China, sold more cars in China than in the United States each year from 2010 to 2013 … China is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities (nearly $1.3 trillion as of April 2014)”. India and the United States 31 “Congressional Research Service, ‘China–U.S. Trade Issues’ ”, 10 July 2014. http:// china.usc.edu/congressional-research-service-china-us-trade-issues-july-10-2014, accessed 10 January 2016. 85 Mathews, “Power Shift”, p. 64. 86 On the United States becoming India’s largest defence supplier, see Manu Pubby, “It’s Official: US Overtakes All to Become India’s Largest Defence Supplier”, India Today, 12 August 2014. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/us-india-strategic-ties- defence-supplier-mod-defence-ministry-arun-jaitley-defence-imports/1/376743. html, accessed 10 January 2016. 87 Wright, “Sifting through Interdependence”, p. 8. 88 See Young, “Interdependence”. 89 Caporaso, “Dependence, Dependency, and Power”, p. 18. 90 Sunil Khilnani et al., NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012), p. 32. 91 See Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013, second edition). 92 “India, US Must Commit to it for True Strategic Partnership”, India News, 27 June 2014. http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/india-us-must-commit-to-it-for- true-strategic-partnership_943095.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 93 “Floor Remarks by Senator John McCain on the U.S.–India Strategic Partner ship”, Democracy Speaks, 27 June 2014. www.democracyspeaks.org/blog/floor- remarks-senator-john-mccain-us-india-strategic-partnership, accessed 11 January 2016. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 2 India–US relations during the cold war era An overview

Historically speaking, India–US relations were hamstrung by the two diametrically opposed pulls of idealism and realism, creating a fundamental impasse in the relationship. However, if perceived in hindsight, the US intelligentsia gave open and unbiased support to the Indian independence movement. Prominent among them were: William James Durant, Andrew Carnegie, William Jennings Bryan, and Richard B. Gregg. They were deeply influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent techniques to break free from the shackles of British imperialism. As such, they called upon the US government to extend unqualified political support to India’s freedom struggle. Of them, Jennings Bryan castigated the abominable character of British imperialism, which siphoned off India’s resources and wealth through the contrivance of discriminatory laws. However, the substantial interest evinced by the intelligentsia was largely negated by the anti-India biases of US officials, whose policy toward India was one of uncertainty and ambivalence. In fact, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State during the Roosevelt administration, acknowledged that the US government had refrained from voicing its legitimate criticism of British rule in India for fear of straining its relationship with the UK. Logically, an inference can be drawn that the Roosevelt administration had only a veiled sympathy for India.1 Even an impassioned appeal from a prominent Congress leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, to President F.D. Roosevelt did not evoke the latter’s active interest in India’s freedom movement.2 The end of World War II brought about a fundamental shift in the pattern of power relationships. The world was clearly polarized between the two ideologically divided power blocs represented by the United States and the Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Soviet Union. Hence, the major task before the Truman administration was to deal with the Soviet threat to the “European balance of power”. President Truman’s perception of the Soviet Union as a “militant state” convinced him that “peace would be safe only if Russian expansion were resisted”.3 Moreover, American policy makers unambiguously visualized that communism might appeal to the war-devastated Europe. Therefore, they focused attention on the speedy economic recovery of Western Europe rather than India–US relations during the cold war era 33 being concerned about the newly independent nations such as India. The Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction of Western Europe, for example, reflected America’s lack of interest in Asia.4 Moreover, India’s non-aligned policy was an anathema to the Truman administration, which had framed the US policy in the context of East–West rivalry. This perception lingered on in US policy making circles until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. This development forced the administration to rethink its Asia policy lest South Asia should fall into the spheres of influence of the Soviet Union and the PRC. From the strategic and military point of view, the US considered the region vitally important to its immediate and long-term interests. No wonder US post-war foreign policy was rooted in realpolitik, which aimed at the fulfilment of US global designs through the application of global containment doctrine. No wonder the Rooseveltian “populist progressivism” of the inter-war period was abandoned, while President Truman’s “hard-nosed” policy prompted the administration to “expand incrementally through spreading investment abroad a network of client states and allies, and military bases located on every continent”.5 If seen in the historical perspective, US relations with South Asia were mainly determined by the geopolitics of the Cold War, spearheaded by the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. Concomitantly, India and Pakistan at that point in time had emerged as two independent and sovereign nations with the partition of British India in August 1947. Given the mutual hatred and hostility rooted in the pre- and post-partition legacy, leaving behind the scars of communal carnage, India and Pakistan pursued diametrically opposed foreign policy paths. On the one hand, India chose to remain non-aligned by keeping itself aloof from military alliances with the two superpowers. On the other hand, Pakistan readily agreed to join the US-sponsored South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), also known as the Baghdad Pact, in 1955, with the aim and intention of bolstering its defence vis-à-vis India.6 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rejected the idea of joining any military bloc, which in his perception was tantamount to the “loss of freedom” and autonomy in conducting relations with the outside world. Furthermore, Nehru made it absolutely clear to America that India would neither abandon nor revise its non-aligned policy despite US attempts at accelerating the arms race in South Asia. In his communication to K.M. Pannikar, 10 November 1953, Nehru wrote: Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016

In effect, Pakistan becomes practically a colony of the United States … The United States imagines that by this policy they have completely outflanked India’s so-called neutralism and will thus bring India to her knees. Whatever the future may hold, this is not going to happen. The first result of all this will be an extreme dislike of the United States in India. As it is, our relations are cool.7 34 India–US relations during the cold war era In fact, Nehru doubted the validity of the containment paradigm. Instead, his primary concern was to keep India isolated from the buffets of the Cold War by pursuing the non-aligned policy to safeguard India’s national interests. In this context, historian S. Gopal writes:

So, in early years, Nehru saw no reason to be thrown off his course of equidistance by the hostility of the great powers. There being no immediate threat to India’s security, she could afford to take a long-term view and build up her industry and defence in the context of non-alignment rather than seek immediate support by involvement in the Cold War.8

So far as Pakistan was concerned, it received massive military and economic aid by virtue of being a member of SEATO and CENTO. It also got US diplomatic succour on Kashmir at the UN, as evident from the US’s use of veto power in favour of Pakistan on numerous occasions. In realistic terms, Pakistan had nothing to do with the containment of communism. Perhaps, owing to their flawed judgement, American policy makers had failed to evaluate Pakistan’s real motivation behind joining the US-led military alliances, or perhaps they ignored it consciously.9 Since Pakistan became an integral partner to the US strategic game plan, US restrictions and regulations were waived in favour of Pakistan on the question of transfer of military assistance. That naturally widened the political rift between New Delhi and Washington.10 Another instance of US policy makers’ misjudgement was their failure to gauge the long-term fallout of fostering the doctrine of “military parity” between India and Pakistan, not only on the peace, security, and stability of the region but also on the US relationship with the democratic India. As subsequent developments reinforced, the US policy of fostering military parity not only exacerbated hostility between New Delhi and Islamabad, and between New Delhi and Washington, but also prompted India to come closer to the Soviet Union geopolitically. Responding positively to India’s political overtures, the Kremlin began cultivating friendship with India – a leading member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Also, the Kremlin leadership extended its political and diplomatic support to India on the Kashmir issue. The Soviet Union exercised its veto power for the first time in India’s favour at the UN Security Council in 1957. Later on, it made an unflinching commitment to fulfilling India’s defence requirements. Thus, the South Asian region was transformed into a dangerous zone of intense rivalry between the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 two superpowers in a bid to advance and consolidate their ideological, security, and strategic interests in the region. In brief, India–US relations in the Cold War era were determined by three major factors: (i) India’s non-aligned policy; (ii) India’s tilt towards the Soviet Union; and (iii) India’s adoption of the socialist economy as a model of economic development. These factors endured in the New Delhi–Washington relationship, varying in degree and intensity, depending on the global and regional political and security environment. India–US relations during the cold war era 35

A new phase Indo-US relations entered a new phase when John F. Kennedy entered the White House on 20 January 1961. President Kennedy firmly believed that the Indo-US estrangement was rooted in the preceding administration’s overemphasis on “military alliances and military assistance”, and “insufficient attention and inadequate economic resources to the non-aligned nations”.11 Significantly enough, his administration attempted to reorient US South Asia policy outside the framework of Cold War politics. Kennedy and his “brain trusts” believed that the preceding administration’s military approach in dealing with South Asia had virtually alienated the region from the United States. While keeping that central argument in mind, Kennedy perceived India’s role as “pivotal”, as a leading non-aligned nation, in ensuring peace, security, and political stability in the region. It is a truism that the United States was allergic to India’s non-aligned policy, especially during the Eisenhower-Dulles administration. On the contrary, Kennedy had a better understanding of and appreciation for India’s non-aligned policy – a major source of irritation between New Delhi and Washington. Dennis Kux writes that Kennedy was more sympathetic to India and “less antagonistic to non-alignment”.12 Interestingly, Kennedy realized that a non-aligned India, as a vibrant democratic nation, was a major force in the stability of the international system. Undoubtedly, India loomed large in Kennedy’s Third World policy calculus. In his perception, India was a “key area” of Asia, capable of winning the economic race with China. He was supportive of projecting India as a model of economic development with US aid to refurbish America’s image among developing nations. During his administration, a record level of economic assistance worth 1 billion dollars was committed to India’s first two years of the Third Five-Year Plan. Moreover, he was a devout supporter of funding India’s Bokaro Steel Plant in the public sector, though the associated resolution was torpedoed by a majority of Congressional members, who were staunchly opposed to subsidizing the socialist India.13 A major shift was reflected in the Kennedy administration’s strategic posture towards the 1962 Sino-Indian War. No doubt, China’s unprovoked aggression against India was not only a shattering blow to India’s non-aligned policy but also a litmus test for US commitment to containing communism. Kennedy immediately responded to Prime Minister Nehru’s appeal for military assis-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 tance. American weapons, including C-13 Hercules transport planes, were immediately supplied to India. Besides, 200 American crew members came to assist the Indian army in lifting troops and supplies. It was a great opportunity for the United States not only to defeat China’s expansionist designs in the region but also to come closer to India.14 Kennedy argued that India needed US military assistance to protect its borders against Communist China – a threat to the security and stability of South Asia.15 Further, one might recall that President Kennedy dispatched a team led by Averell Harriman to India 36 India–US relations during the cold war era in November 1962 to take stock of India’s defence requirements. Harriman conveyed Kennedy’s personal message to Nehru that America would provide India with military aid and armaments to help defend its borders against Chinese misadventure. However, India’s request to forge long-term defence cooperation was turned down by the administration on account of pressure from Pakistan.16

The Kashmir imbroglio Kashmir has been a hot issue of political discourse, partly as a result of the British legacy, ever since India took it up at the UN Security Council in January 1948. Perhaps, Prime Minister Nehru, though a profound student of world history and contemporary international relations, failed to comprehend the complexity of Cold War politics. He threw the ball into the Western court by dragging the Kashmir issue into the UN arena. As feared, the United States and West European countries extended diplomatic support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. India’s chief delegate V.K. Krishna Menon fought India’s case brilliantly with his extraordinary oratory and legal acumen, apparent from his marathon speech that lasted nearly eight hours. However, instead of winning friends at the UN, the sharp-tongued Menon produced more enemies by spewing venom against the West.17 Surely, Kashmir turned out to be an important factor in Indo-US relations. The US pro-Pakistan stance made Islamabad more stubborn on the Kashmir issue. According to S.M. Burke, the “Nehru-Bogra parleys on Kashmir were nearing success, when the United States arms aid to Pakistan created an utterly new situation and upset all chances of Indo-Pakistan conciliation”.18 India criticized the US interventionist role in Kashmir. Instead of branding Pakistan as an aggressor, the US harped on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people. India turned down the American proposal on the grounds that Pakistan’s admission into US-sponsored military pacts had brought about a material change in the circumstances. Though the United States and other Western powers tried to pressure India into accepting their formula, it was the Soviet veto in India’s favour that defeated Western machinations on Kashmir. In brief, a major consequence of the US policy of supporting Pakistan on Kashmir was that India drifted away from the United States while Pakistan came closer to it. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Nevertheless, a major departure in the Kennedy administration’s approach to the Kashmir dispute was perceptible when Kennedy turned down Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan’s suggestion that America apply military and economic aid as a political weapon to make India agree to the Pakistani formula, i.e., holding a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley. Kennedy was fully aware that India would not compromise its vital national interests in Kashmir merely in exchange for US aid, which India could procure from other external sources. However, Pakistani India–US relations during the cold war era 37 hopes were raised when the Sino-Indian War broke out in October 1962. Pakistani military elites felt that the time was propitious to use American aid as leverage to resolve the Kashmir dispute to the Pakistani satisfaction. Nehru maintained that it was an ill-opportune time to discuss the Kashmir issue, when India was faced with the Chinese threat. Nevertheless, it was as a result of the US government’s pressure that ministerial-level talks between Z.A. Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistani delegation, and his Indian counterpart Sardar Swaran Singh were held on 27 December 1962, and were resumed on 16 January 1963. But the talks proved abortive, since India refused to accept the third party mediation that was suggested by the Kennedy administration.19 Kennedy continued his efforts to facilitate direct talks between New Delhi and Islamabad to help resolve the long-standing Kashmir tangle, although Nehru had rejected the US mediatory offer through the services of Eugene Black on the grounds that it involved the “question of sovereignty”. Despite that, President Kennedy sent his Secretary of State Dean Rusk to New Delhi in May 1963 to explore a mutually acceptable formula to resolve the Kashmir issue. Dean Rusk suggested to Nehru the idea of the partition of the Kashmir Valley, which Nehru rejected outright by describing it as “an extremely harmful idea”.20 Rather, Nehru grew sceptical of US impartiality and fairness.21 It must also be noted that President Kennedy’s role was considerably constricted by his special emissaries, who exercised far greater influence on him than officials of the US Department of State. For example, Under Secretary George Ball, Kennedy’s special emissary, after returning from a trip to Islamabad, stressed the need to reverse the pro-India image of the US in Pakistan in order to revitalize US security ties with the Pakistani military regime. Kennedy accepted Ball’s recommendation. In brief, the raison-d’être for the US policy of maintaining the regional balance through military build-up of Pakistan against India remained basically unaltered.

The US military syndrome Initially, the Pentagon gave its approval to the State Department in December 1951 to discuss an arms aid agreement with Pakistan. In principle, that deal was finalized by the middle of 1952. But its premature leakage created an embarrassing situation for US officials. Ambassador Chester Bowles disapproved of the US policy of arming Pakistan, as he believed that Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 India’s non-aligned policy was neither antithetical to American interests in Asia nor an obstacle to the fulfillment of its global objectives. William J. Barnds writes that Bowles and George F. Kennan, an American diplomat and champion of the containment policy, realized that the US policy of supplying military aid to Pakistan “would be exacerbating the tense relations between India and Pakistan, partly by upsetting the balance of power and partly by adding differences over their approaches on the Cold War to their already formidable antagonism”.22 38 India–US relations during the cold war era It should be recalled that in the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was highly influential. Having a deep-seated hatred for non-aligned nations, he described India’s non-aligned policy as an “immoral policy”, saying that there was no middle path between two ideological camps. As such, Pakistan fitted in well with his thinking. On the contrary, Nehru looked upon the US policy of arming Pakistan as a well-orchestrated strategic move to contain India. Vice President Richard Nixon’s visit to South Asian countries in October 1953 proved disappointing to India when Nixon strongly recommended US military aid to Pakistan as a counterweight to the “confirmed neutralism” of India. His pro-Pakistan statements and anti-India biases unambiguously reflected in his memoirs.23 Thus, because of Nixon’s inbred hatred of India’s non-aligned policy, the administration went ahead with providing Pakistan with military assistance in 1954. Fully aware of Nehru’s sensitivity, however, President Eisenhower assured him through a personal letter that American arms to Pakistan were not intended for use against India. Further, he agreed to give sympathetic consideration to fulfilling India’s defence requirements. The US ambassador to India George V. Allen also urged India to shed its fears about the US military deal with Pakistan. However, President Eisenhower’s personal assurance did not cut ice with Nehru. Rather, Nehru accused the United States of making a calculated move to lower India’s image in the non-aligned world by publicly demonstrating that America had no place for non-aligned countries in its defence and foreign policy. What added fuel to the fire was the United States’s inking of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Pakistan in 1954.24 A shift in the US arms policy towards South Asia was apparently perceptible during the Kennedy administration. President Mohammad Ayub Khan’s perception was that the administration had a “pro-Indian attitude”. Khan entertained consternation that America might not maintain its military commitment to defending Pakistan against the Indian threat to its security. In order to assuage that apprehension, Kennedy invited President Ayub Khan to America in July 1961. Kennedy spoke very highly of the US military partnership with Pakistan.25 Chester Bowles commented that Ayub succeeded in manipulating White House officials to procure a squadron of F-104s fighter craft, against the wishes of Kennedy. This shows that Kennedy had to suc- cumb to the pressure of the pro-Pakistan bureaucratic and Congressional lobby.26 Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 President Kennedy fully realized that transfer of sophisticated military hardware to Pakistan would adversely affect the Washington–New Delhi relationship. In order to mollify the ire of Indian critics, his administration reassured the Indian government that military aid to Pakistan was intended to be used against the subversive activities of communist countries only. But, to Kennedy’s profound dismay, Pakistan used American arms on Afghan borders in the Bajaur area along the Durand Line to eject Afghan troops in 1960 and 1961.27 Kennedy immediately ordered an inquiry into the matter, a move India–US relations during the cold war era 39 which was resented by President Ayub Khan. As a mark of protest, Khan sought to embark upon a new strategic plan of coming closer to China despite occasional warnings issued by US officials. It may be noted that William M. Rountree, US ambassador to Pakistan, resigned soon after Kennedy entered the White House. The explanation he offered was that the Kennedy administration had a “positive tilt” towards India. Rountree, who served as Assistant Secretary of State under Foster Dulles, shared Dulles’s predilection in favour of “military alliances and aversions towards neutrals”.28 Rountree’s resignation made public his differences with the Kennedy administration’s South Asia policy. As regards the political chemistry between Nehru and Kennedy, both of them had a great respect and admiration for each other as well as high mutual expectations. Being charismatic leaders in their own ways, Nehru and Kennedy expressed their desire to closely work together on bilateral, regional, and international issues. They realized that better mutual understanding and cooperation was indispensable for peace and security in conflict-ridden regions such as South and Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Kennedy administration was not happy with India’s procurement of MiG-21 fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union. But Kennedy’s positive perception and image of India greatly helped in setting the right tone and tenor in the India–US relationship. At the same time, even though Kennedy was a great admirer of Indian democracy, it should not be construed that the administration had written off its old military ally – Pakistan – in the US security and strategic calculus.29

Festering tension in India–US ties After the assassination of Kennedy in November 1963, his successor Lyndon B. Johnson took a U-turn in his South Asia policy. There were a host of reasons behind that. Firstly, as Dennis Kux observes, President Johnson was “far less knowledgeable about foreign policy than his predecessor”.30 Second, Johnson was desirous of improving the United States’ deteriorating relations with Pakistan that had resulted from Kennedy’s “positive tilt” towards India. Third, there was a lack of personal and political chemistry between Indira Gandhi and Lyndon Johnson, chiefly attributed to Gandhi’s trenchant criticism of the US heavy bombing of Vietnam, which had offended and displeased Johnson. He took personal interest in supervising the wheat Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 shipment to India under US Public Law-480. He instructed his personal staff to delay the shipment just to make Indira Gandhi realize the value of American food aid, without which India could not cope with severe drought conditions at home. Suddenly, an atmosphere of “trust and confidence” between the two countries was seemingly generated during Prime Minister Gandhi’s visit to the United States in March 1966. In a joint statement issued at the end of Gandhi’s visit, President Johnson assured her that “the United States will continue to 40 India–US relations during the cold war era participate generously in the international effort to alleviate India’s immediate food deficit problem”.31 Besides, they discussed a wide range of regional and international issues, among which the China issue figured prominently. Gandhi and Johnson agreed that China’s “aggressive policies” posed “a threat to peace, particularly in Asia”.32 A worse phase of estrangement between the two great democracies began with the coming in of the Nixon administration (1969–1974), which was attributed to a host of factors. First, the Nixon administration perceived US relations with India and Pakistan through the Cold War prism of bashing a non-aligned India and rewarding a militarily aligned Pakistan. Second, the Kennedy administration’s perception of China as a potential threat to Asian peace and security was diametrically opposed to that of the Nixon administration, which perceived China as a stabilizing force in international politics. Third, President Nixon’s past prejudices against India were rooted in his personal experience during his first visit to India in 1953. He felt strongly hurt that instead of giving him the proper respect, India had deliberately ignored him. Fourth, a clash of “personality complexes” produced psychological incompatibility between Indira Gandhi and Richard Nixon, which further complicated India–US ties.33 Because of their clashing political ideology and values, economic thought, and belief systems, the two leaders could not get on together. To explain, Nixon had a deep-seated abhorrence for Mrs Gandhi’s style of conducting India’s foreign policy, which he perceived as tilting heavily towards the Soviet Union. Quite often, Nixon used to dub India a “stooge” of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Gandhi looked upon Nixon with disdain for his arrogance and superiority complex, and also for what she perceived as his total neglect of a long tradition of “moral exceptionalism” in US foreign policy. Specifically, she complained of Nixon’s attempts at fostering the “false notion” of establishing military parity between India and Pakistan by arming the latter to the hilt. The parity doctrine, in her perception, accentuated a fierce armaments race in South Asia.34 Be that as it may, Indo-American relations reached their lowest ebb during the Nixon administration. Undoubtedly, Nixon’s occasional utterances laced with anti-Indianism reflected his deeply entrenched scorn for “Hindu India”, as well as heaping lavish praise on Pakistan’s military leadership. At times, Nixon’s anti-India stance prompted him to accuse India of “Hindu chauvin- ism”. He perceived Indira Gandhi as a “cold blooded practitioner of power Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 politics” devoid of ethical and human values, while she treated Nixon with indifference.35 In fact, Indira Gandhi had never experienced such a frosty relationship with the United States as she did during the Nixon administration. Once she told an interviewer, “I think I had excellent relationship with everybody [American presidents[ except Mr. Nixon. And he had made up his mind beforehand.”36 If viewed within the psychoanalytical framework, both Nixon and Gandhi failed to accommodate each other’s contrary belief systems, India–US relations during the cold war era 41

divergent strategic approaches, and economic philosophies.37 Henry Kissinger concluded that the two:

were not intended by fate to be personally congenial. Mrs. Gandhi’s assumption of almost hereditary moral superiority and her moody silences brought out all of Nixon’s latent insecurities. Her bearing toward Nixon combined a disdain for a symbol of capitalism, quite fashionable in developing countries, with a hint that the obnoxious things she had heard about the President from her intellectual friends could not all be untrue. On the other hand, Nixon had an understanding for leaders who operated on an unessential assessment of the national interests.38

Broadly speaking, Indira Gandhi’s perceptions of the United States were profusely influenced by four major factors. First, her perception was that American policies were hostile and harmful to India’s national interests. She scarcely trusted policy statements of US policy makers, and was accused of being “pro-Moscow”. Gandhi defied the accusation. In reply to a question by Steve Patton of the US News and World Report about whether she was “pro-Soviet” or “anti-American”, she emphatically retorted that she was neither “pro” nor “anti” but only “pro-India”. She further added, “But the Soviet Union helps us when we are in trouble and the Soviet Union has stood by us in times of difficulty”.39 Second, the US free enterprise system, in Indira Gandhi’s perception, was ill-suited to India’s planned socialist economy aimed at alleviating the country’s poverty and socio-economic backwardness. She frankly acknowledged that her government and Congress Party could ill afford to rely on the “market forces” that could not set right the country’s vast socio-economic imbalances. Not only this, she was intrinsically convinced that multilateral international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, chiefly controlled by America, would be of little assistance in promoting Third World economies. She was morally convinced that donor nations would not come forward to disburse economic aid to developing nations without political strings.40 Third, her perception of America was that of an “unreliable partner” that reneged on its commitments, whether on the question of arms supply or on bilateral and multilateral economic aid to India. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Fourth, she reposed complete trust in the Soviet friendship, as manifest in her signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August 1971. The treaty contained a security clause, casting responsibility on the Soviet Union to come to India’s rescue if its security were ever threatened by others. In fact, the treaty acted as a psychological deterrence as, contrary to Pakistani expectations, the US and China did not come to Islamabad’s rescue to prevent the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign nation.41 42 India–US relations during the cold war era

The watershed period It is important to underline that the political turmoil in East Pakistan in 1970–1971 was a watershed in Indo-US relations. Millions of refugees from East Pakistan fled to India in the wake of widespread genocide, rape, arson, and loot committed by the Pakistani army.42 As a consequence, the Indian economy was badly hit. Prime Minister Gandhi undertook a hectic trip to the capitals of several Western countries, including America, in November 1971. She met President Richard Nixon and apprised him of the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army against its own people. But Nixon did not evince interest in discussing that issue. Disenchanted by his indifference, Mrs Gandhi criticized him for ignoring a “man-made tragedy of vast proportions”.43 Clearly, the talks between the two leaders were “painful” and “frosty”. Pakistan waged war against India in December 1971, which complicated the geopolitical environment in the region. Henry Kissinger, National Security Advisor to President Nixon, was dismayed at Yahya Khan’s “irrational decision” to launch the war, while Nixon was bent upon letting down India. Nixon gave clear-cut instructions to Kissinger to be “tough” on India. Kissinger later confirmed this in his memoirs. He wrote:

I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough on India. He just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants us to tilt in favour of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.44

In light of the President’s directive, the Seventh Fleet was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal. But neither the United States nor China intervened on behalf of Pakistan, as the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty acted as a psychological deterrence. In realistic terms, the deployment of the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal in India was a “misapplication” of US global strategy to the regional conflict. In her article in Foreign Affairs in October 1972, Mrs Gandhi lambasted the US decision on the dispatch of the warship Enterprise to support a “ruthless military dictatorship and to intimidate democracy”. She further said, “The United States has yet to resolve the inner contradiction between the tradition of the founding fathers and of Lincoln, and the external image it gives of a superpower pursuing the cold logic of power politics”.45

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 On the question of deployment of the Seventh Fleet, Kissinger wrote that it was merely a demonstration of American friendship towards Pakistan,46 implying that America was more concerned about avoiding a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. Kissinger acknowledged that America was unable to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan, attributing it to “the lack of political imagination” on the part of President Yahya Khan. On 16 December 1971, Pakistani soldiers surrendered before Indian forces, leading to the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign nation. India–US relations during the cold war era 43 Nixon became furious at not being able to prevent Pakistan’s dismemberment. He complained of the “duplicitous action” of Gandhi, who had given him a moral assurance of not complicating the situation arising out of the civil war in East Pakistan. In this regard, a former Pakistani senior official, Ross Massood Hussein, in conversation with the author (B.M. Jain) at an international seminar held in Humboldt University, Berlin, on 30 October 1998, said:

I might be undiplomatic in using the word “stupid.” Thing that you [India] did in 1971, that you did in Bangladesh, you need not have done that because East Pakistan was a plum that had ripened to a point that was about to fall in India’s lap or anybody’s lap. If I were a policymaker in India I would not have gone in for that.47

In effect, the creation of an independent Bangladesh was inevitable. In July 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto signed the historic Simla accord. Under the accord, both countries agreed to resolve all outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, through bilateral peaceful negotiations. In the aftermath of the Simla Agreement, the Nixon administration made renewed diplomatic efforts to improve relations with India, while Pakistan was assigned a low priority in US strategic policies. At this critical juncture, Nixon was taken aback when India carried out its first nuclear test on 18 May 1974, barely three months before his resignation in August 1974 following the Watergate scandal. It is interesting to note that, though the nuclear test was staunchly criticized by the Democratic lobby, there was virtually no reaction from the Republican Party headed by Nixon. After Nixon’s unceremonious exit, Vice President Gerald Ford took over the command of the White House. He wanted to put Indo-US relations on the right track in order to erase the scar of the Nixon administration’s famous tilt towards Pakistan. In this context, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger paid an official visit to India in October 1974. According to the Annual Report, 1974–1975, of the Ministry of External Affairs, “The visit helped remove some past misunderstandings and contributed to a mature and constructive understanding between the two countries on the basis of equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit”.48 Kissinger not only accepted India’s non-aligned policy publicly but also recognized India as a “preeminent power” in South Asia. This apart, Kissinger accepted India’s intention of developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. In brief, his visit to India contributed Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 to improving the soured ties between India and the United States.49 On India’s part, Indira Gandhi expressed her desire to work closely with the Ford administration. In a personal letter to President Gerald Ford, 19 August 1974, she conveyed that India looked forward to building friendly and cooperative relations with the United States. She further wrote,

We admire the American heritage. The United States and India are functioning democracies which have a common interest in promoting world 44 India–US relations during the cold war era peace in which democratic institution and values flourish, and men and women will have full opportunity to work for the fulfilment of their aspirations. We look forward to a continuing dialogue between our two Governments on matters of bilateral and international interest. Our two countries can and should work together to promote understanding, cooperation and peace, especially in this part of the world.50

She further added: “May I assure, Mr. President, of our earnestness in desiring a more positive and constructive relationship between our two countries”.51

A new swing India–US relations received a sudden set-back when Indira Gandhi declared the national emergency on 15 June 1975, which was described as a “black day” in India’s democratic history. America vehemently criticized Gandhi’s declaration of emergency in India. However, the leadership of Prime Minister Morarji Desai brought a glimmer of hope for improved relations between the two great democracies. The Desai government declared that India would pursue a “genuine non-aligned policy”, with the objective of cultivating a “more balanced” relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union. He believed that friendly relations with both the superpowers would be in India’s national interests as an integral part of “beneficial bilateralism”.52 This clearly revealed that Desai’s foreign policy was in sharp contrast to that of Indira Gandhi, accused of heavily tilting towards the Soviet Union.53 Morarji Desai was optimistic about positive transformation in the New Delhi–Washington relationship, though his political rivals quite often dubbed him “a conservative and pro-capitalist” in his economic ideology.54 In the meantime, the Carter administration’s decision, under the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA, 1978), not to supply uranium to India’s Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) dealt a serious blow to the growing friendly ties between the two countries. Morarji Desai visited Washington in June 1978 to convince Congressional members that slapping sanctions on India retrospectively under the NNPA was a clear-cut breach of the August 1963 nuclear agreement between India and the United States. He reminded the members that the United States was under the Treaty obligation to continue to supply uranium for a period of 30 years. But they did not agree with Desai’s argument. However, on Prime Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Minister Desai’s moral assurance to Congressional members that India would never conduct nuclear tests in the future, the Carter administration agreed to resume the supply of enriched uranium fuel to TAPS for a grace period of three years (1978–1981). Later on, France would undertake an obligation to continue its supply until 1993. This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The Janata government led by Prime Minister Desai could not manage to survive its full term. It collapsed as a result of internal party India–US relations during the cold war era 45 contradictions. Desai refused to compromise on his principles and resigned in July 1979. Fresh Parliamentary elections were held in January 1980, in which the Congress Party (I) under the leadership of Indira Gandhi was returned to power. Naturally, a confusion and uncertainty persisted in public opinion-making circles in America about whether Gandhi would resume her previous “pro-Soviet” policy. Interestingly, Gandhi endeav- oured to prove them wrong. During her visit to the United States in July–August 1982, she tried to dispel the lingering misgivings about her. At a press conference there, she expressed the hope to “clear up a lot of misconceptions about India including on a private level … an image that Indira Gandhi is an aggressive iron lady.” Asked if she had succeeded in dispelling this image, she replied, “I don’t know. Actually, I’m having to take iron supplements”.55 At a greeting ceremony at the White House on 29 July 1982, she said,

Our hand of friendship is stretched out to all. One friendship does not come in the way of another … No two countries can have the same angle of vision, but each can try to appreciate the point of view of the other … I take this opportunity to say how much we in India value the help we have received from the United States in our stupendous tasks.56

President Reagan responded that India and the United States “can help to reach a renewed recognition of the mutual importance of strong, constructive ties between India and the United States … We are both strong, proud and independent nations guided by our own perceptions of our national interests.”57 The above statement clearly illustrated that the Reagan administration recognized that despite divergences in perception on national interests, India and the United States could still build a strong and durable partnership in the areas of common concern and interest. Furthermore, in response to a question about whether India was seeking military aid from the US, Gandhi said, “We are not seeking military aid from any country. Whatever we have sought, we have bought.”58 However, she expressed her gratitude for US cooperation, saying, “I should like to acknowledge once again the assistance we got from the United States, particularly from the many American scientists and agricultural experts who did dedicated work in India in the Fifties and Sixties”.59 Succinctly speaking, there was not only a shift in Indira Gandhi’s perception about the United States Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 but also in her appreciation of the Reagan administration for extending its cooperation in consolidating democratic, economic, scientific, and technological ties with India. Undoubtedly, a shift in Indira Gandhi’s policy approach towards the United States was clearly seen during her second tenure as prime minister (1980–1984). She looked upon American friendship and cooperation as being essential for India’s scientific and technological breakthrough. In 1982, she signed an agreement with President Reagan for expanding bilateral economic 46 India–US relations during the cold war era and scientific cooperation. At the same time, she realized that India could ill-afford to dispense with US multilateral aid for India’s various development programmes. It is true that India was one of the major beneficiaries of multilateral aid, and was also a recipient of US economic assistance. Notwithstanding that, Mrs Gandhi refused to compromise India’s core national interests for the sake of foreign aid. At the same time, being a hard-headed pragmatic leader, she avoided offending America unnecessarily, learning from her past follies when she had been a firebrand leader in the company of young Turks like Mohan Dharia and Chandra Shekhar. However, the phase of Indo-US cooperation under Indira Gandhi’s administration ended with her assassination on 31 October 1984. The transition of power was smooth, without intra-party gyration. Her son Rajiv Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister by the unanimous consensus of the Congress Parliamentary Party. The sympathy wave for Rajiv clearly reflected in the national mood when he was returned to power with a record of over three quarters of seats in Parliament in general elections held in January 1985.

A new optimism Rajiv Gandhi, widely known as “Mr Clean”, evoked great admiration and reverence from his fellow citizens. Unlike his mother, he did not carry the baggage of political prejudices or “corrosive practices”. Nor did he possess “his mother’s overwhelming personality, nor her charisma, and probably not her ruthlessness”.60 As said, Rajiv Gandhi was a “reluctant politician” by temperament. It was by an accident of circumstances that he was entrusted with the responsibility of steering the destiny of the nation. Though a fresh entrant into Indian politics, Rajiv, a young leader, had a penchant for transforming India into a modern technological power which prodded him to forge a better understanding with America in order to fulfil India’s high technology needs. President Ronald Reagan was impressed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s qualities as a pragmatic, accommodative, and straightforward leader. There were some palpable reasons for the changed perception in the US administration. Firstly, Rajiv, unlike his mother, had no pre- conceived notions or prejudices against America, as he began his political career afresh with a clean political slate. Second, his modern outlook and approach was seen as a positive signal for forging better relations between Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the two great democracies. Third, his mindset, attuned to doing and learning new things, generated a positive image of India among Americans. And finally, the Reagan administration recognized that an India resurgent in industrial and technological fields might be of immense strength to the United States in the future. In tune with the “improved atmospherics”, the Reagan administration made a momentous decision to sell Cray-XMP-24 supercomputers to India for weather forecasting, with the intent of injecting positive substance into the bilateral relationship. India–US relations during the cold war era 47 So far as Rajiv Gandhi’s perception of America was concerned, he saw no tangible gains in keeping the United States at bay, and believed that political differences need not always adversely affect bilateral and multilateral relationships in the ambit of mutual interest. Indeed, his approach delivered positive goods. His first official visit to America in June 1985 was a watershed in opening a new chapter of friendship between the two countries. The red-carpet treatment was accorded to him. While welcoming him, President Ronald Reagan said: “We respect India’s non-alignment and recognize the pivotal role your country plays in South Asia”.61 Reagan also underlined that although there were “areas of disagreement” between the two countries, there was greater potential to promote better understanding through frank discussions and dialogue. Reagan also praised Rajiv Gandhi for his leadership in reinvigorating the Indian economy.62 He reminded Rajiv Gandhi of his grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru’s 1949 visit to the US as a “voyage of discovery”. He said: “Your visit marks a continuation of that process of mutual discovery”.63 Reagan further said:

Today we celebrate the depth and vitality of the ties between our nations. We Americans place great value on India’s friendship. Our shared democratic ideals serve as a bridge between us. Our cultural differences enrich our relationship. Our mutual commitment to the freedom and dignity of man set us on a different road, a higher road, than governments which deny the human rights so cherished by our peoples.64

More important, President Reagan appreciated India’s pivotal role in South Asia. He said: “We’re supportive of your efforts and those of others in South Asia – to overcome past animosities in seeking stability, security and cooperation in the region”.65 Reagan agreed that the two countries had some “areas of disagreement”, but he assured Gandhi that America was ready to share new technologies as an “important aspect” of Indo-US cooperation. Gandhi’s visit was a benchmark in setting a new tone and tenor in the bilateral relationship in diverse fields, especially in scientific and technological sectors. Prime Minister Gandhi, in his speech at the UN General Assembly in 1985, however, gave a clear hint to the Reagan administration that the two countries “still were at odds on important issues like apartheid, disarmament, and Pakistan”.66 In brief, India and the United States had divergent perceptions on policy issues. Though the Reagan administration was favourably disposed to for- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 ging a defence and security relationship with India, the administration’s decision to provide Advanced Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) to Pakistan to enhance the latter’s air capability raised eyebrows in New Delhi, which charged the US administration with triggering an arms race in South Asia. During his second official visit to the US in October 1987, Rajiv Gandhi, in his meeting with President Reagan at the White House, acknowledged that India drew inspiration from the American constitution in its freedom struggle. He said, 48 India–US relations during the cold war era The relations between our two countries have always held much promise … We have agreed to collaborate at the frontiers of technology. We have reaffirmed the tradition of scientific interaction which has been the hallmark of our relationship. The growth in high technology and trade and transfers has been a source of considerable satisfaction. I hope that the United States would recognize India not just as a market but as a partner in technological progress.67

Rajiv Gandhi’s interactions with Ronald Reagan sparked America’s interest in helping to fulfil Gandhi’s commitment to taking India into the twenty-first century on a trajectory of technological prowess. Reagan not only admired Gandhi’s forward-looking approach to building a resurgent and strong India but also praised his “political integrity” and transparency in mutual dealings. This is exemplified in Gandhi’s candid and straightforward statement on the Afghan imbroglio. Gandhi stated,

I believe that a just solution must ensure a sovereign independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. Foreign intervention and interference must cease. The Afghan refugees must be allowed to return to their homes in honour, dignity and security. We would welcome any earnest efforts in this direction.68

The Cold War era was on the verge of ending, with dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Germany’s reunification in 1990. The Rajiv Gandhi era also came to a close when his party lost at the national polls in 1989. President George Bush (senior) began his political innings in the same year. He continued the legacy of his predecessor and maintained friendly relations with India, although his priority was to defuse the Gulf crisis following the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990. With the onset of the first Gulf War in January 1991, Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, heading a minority government, took the decision to “allow United States military aircraft to refuel at Bombay’s international airport en route from the Pacific to the Persian Gulf”.69 Rajiv Gandhi opposed this, arguing against the government providing the facility at such a critical point in time, when America was bombing Iraq – a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. The refueling facility was immediately withdrawn by the government when the matter came up in the public gaze. However, Shekhar’s sup- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 port to the UN action against Iraq was welcomed by America, which thanked him for logistical and strategic support during the Gulf war. India was heading towards another national election when the Congress Party withdrew its political support to a lame-duck government led by Prime Minister Chaudhary Charan Singh. Rajiv Gandhi was killed by a suicide bomber at an election rally near Chennai in South India on 21 May 1991. It was sheer accident that after Gandhi’s death P.V. Narsimha Rao, a veteran Congress leader, emerged as a consensus leader to occupy the office of Prime India–US relations during the cold war era 49 Minister in June 1991. At that time, India was faced with an unprecedented balance of payment crisis, with barely $1 billion in its Foreign Exchange Reserve. The Rao government was forced to introduce the first generation of structural reforms to the Indian economy in 1991–1992. The rationale behind economic liberalization was to loosen bureaucratic shackles on the private sector of the Indian economy, and to promote trade and investment. His efforts boosted industrial growth and foreign investment. Political atmospherics in the United States changed in India’s favour as the reform process was widely welcomed by Americans. Prime Minister Rao’s six-day official visit to the United States in May 1994 brought Indo-US relations to the threshold of a “bold new era”. While delivering a speech at Harvard University, Rao emphasized that both governments should guard themselves against “Cold War attitudes”. He stated, “History does not often present such a decisive opportunity. We miss it at our own peril”.70 In other words, economic ties formed a new pillar of the renewed friendship. Rao reassured American entrepreneurs that India was committed to staying on the course of economic reforms. He stated, “After decades of centralized economic policies, India recently embarked on a reform programme designed to modernize our economy, liberalized trade, and realize our economic potential”. He further stated, “The momentum of these reforms will carry India into the next century as a single largest free market in the world”.71 In brief, a new chapter of rapprochement began in Indo-American relations. With India’s adoption of a neoliberal “free market” model of development, implying per se the rejection of Nehruvian socialism, the US interest in India grew steadily.

Conclusion This chapter has undertaken an overview of India–US relations beginning from the Roosevelt era to the end of the Cold War, a period lasting over four decades. Both countries witnessed extraordinary vicissitudes, emanating from the deeply entrenched Cold War psychology on both sides. However, the Kennedy and Nixon administrations were distinctively poles apart in terms of values, goals, and approach while dealing with India. The Kennedy administration offers a classic case of benign tilt towards India, be it the US economic, military, or emergency aid or its Kashmir policy, and towards India’s non-aligned policy. On the contrary, the Nixon administration Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 was patently in favour of Pakistan and was widely known for an enduring abhorrence for and calcified prejudices against India. The chapter illuminates how the personality factor at times becomes critically important in defining and setting the tone and tenor in the bilateral relationship, as well as in forming positive or negative perceptions of the ruling leadership. This has been amply demonstrated in the cases of Jawaharlal Nehru and John F. Kennedy, and of Indira Gandhi and Richard Nixon. 50 India–US relations during the cold war era Curiously enough, a shift in Indira Gandhi’s US policy was perceived during the second term of her premiership, which sprang a great surprise on the US administration. Except for minor mutual political bickering, Gandhi regimes (Indira and Rajiv) pulled together well with the Reagan administration. In fact, Rajiv and Reagan displayed a better political chemistry, appreciating each other’s concerns and compulsions, as they were optimistic about the prospects of a strong relationship between “the two great democracies”. However, divergences on specific issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and US military aid to Pakistan were clearly visible. In brief, the study suggests that Indo-American relations during the Cold War period were hamstrung by India’s non-aligned policy, its socialist economy, and a heavy tilt towards the Soviet Union, attributed to its overriding geopolitical compulsions. On the other hand, the US was not neutral on Kashmir, and was most favourably disposed towards Pakistan in providing the latter with massive military assistance. Accidently, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union heralded a dramatic transformation in Indo-US relations. India also embarked upon reevaluating its foreign economic policy as well as its relations with major powers in the altered geopolitical environment. This is manifest in New Delhi’s positive response to Washington’s overtures, made through the Kickleighter proposals in 1991, aimed at building afresh military and security ties with India – unthinkable in the Cold War era. Indeed, a new chapter was inaugu- rated in India–US relations after the end of Cold War politics, and the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The primacy of ideology, the hallmark of the Cold War paradigm, was replaced by the inevitability of pragmatism in redefining and reshaping the New Delhi–Washington relationship.

Notes

1 See The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948). 2 For a different viewpoint, see S. Paul Kapur, “India and the United States from World War II to the Present: A Relationship Transformed”, in Sumit Ganguly (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010). 3 John Lewis Gaddis, “Harry S. Truman and the Origins of Containment”, in Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson (eds), Makers of American Diplomacy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissinger (New York: Scribner, 1974), pp. 189–218. 4 See Raymond Aron, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 1945–1973 (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1974). 5 Franz Schurmann, The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books 1974), p. 6. 6 Manas Chatterji and B.M. Jain, “Introduction: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on South Asia”, in Manas Chatterji and B.M. Jain (eds), Conflict and Peace in South Asia (London: Emerald Publishing Group, 2008), pp. 1–16 (p. 4). 7 Quoted by S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, 1947–56, Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 185. 8 Cited in B.M. Jain, India and the United States, 1961–1963 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1987), p. 10. India–US relations during the cold war era 51

9 For a new insight into this, see Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 10 B.M. Jain, “Regional Security in South Asia”, in Hussein Solomon (ed.), Challenges to Global Security: Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008). 11 Ibid., p. 165. 12 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991 (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1993), p. 181. 13 See Jain, India and the United States. 14 Chatterji and Jain, “Introduction”, p. 8. 15 For a critical evaluation of this question, see B.M. Jain, “India–China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends”, The Round Table, Vol. 93, No. 374 (April 2004): pp. 253–69. 16 For details, see Jain, India and the United States. 17 For details see, Kux, India and the United States, pp. 156–59. 18 Quoted in Jain, India and the United States, p. 21; S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistan Foreign Policy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974). 19 Jain, India and the United States. 20 For a perceptive analysis, see J.K. Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969). 21 Even today, some scholars and a few US officials think that it is through US mediation alone that the Kashmir issue can be resolved permanently. This is a short-sighted view given the increasing political awareness among people on both sides about the Kashmir tangle, attributed to the information explosion through the Internet. It is now pretty clear from public policy statements, right from the Clinton administration to the Obama administration, that America is no longer in favour of mediation to resolve the Kashmir tangle. 22 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 92. 23 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). 24 See Jain, “Regional Security”, p. 90. The author discussed this issue with many scholars in America, including retired ambassadors and policymakers, who shared their frank views that the Eisenhower administration was responsible for antagon- izing India by according special treatment to Pakistan, which created a permanent wedge between the two great democracies. 25 For details pertaining to this, see, Public Papers of the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, DC, 1962), pp. 500–501. 26 Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941–1969. (New Delhi: B.I. Publications, 1972), p. 15. 27 “The President (Ayub) subsequently disclosed in an interview to the New York Times that US representatives had asked the Government of Pakistan whether the latter had used ‘American equipment’ in ejecting Afghan elements from her terri- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 tory; he had replied that ‘if our territory is violated we would spend our time dealing with the enemy rather than putting the American weapons in cotton wool’ ”; “Jun 1961 – ‘Pakhtoonistan’ Dispute. – Military Operations in Frontier Areas. – Pakistani Allegations of Afghan Incursions”, Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archives), Vol. 7, June 1961, p. 18172. http:// web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/1303-1961-06-KS-AJG.pdf, accessed 10 January 2016. 28 Asian Recorder, 26 February–4 March (1962), pp. 44–48. 29 See Jain, India and the United States. 30 Kux, India and the United States, p. 227. 52 India–US relations during the cold war era

31 Joint Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, 29 March 1966. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27518, accessed 10 January 2016. 32 Ibid. 33 See B.M. Jain, Global Power: India’s Foreign Policy 1947–2006 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008). 34 Ibid. 35 For inside knowledge on this point, see Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, Reprint edition, 2011). 36 Quoted in Kux, India and the United States, p. 280. 37 See Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt-Policy Revisited: Nixon–Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia”, in Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph (eds), The Regional Imperative: US Foreign Policy Toward South Asian States (New Delhi: Concept, 1980), pp. 421–50 (pp. 423–24, 435). 38 The Tribune, 31 January 2010. www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100131/spectrum/ main1.htm, accessed 10 January 2016; Kalyani Shankar, Nixon, Indira and India: Politics and Beyond (New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers India Ltd, 2010), p. 8. 39 Mrs Gandhi’s interview with Steve Patton of the US News and World Report, 13 January 1982, in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s Statements on Foreign Policy, January–March 1982 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 1982), p. 20. 40 On this point, see Jain, Global Power, pp. 24–29. 41 Kissinger, White House Years. 42 For a detailed account of the Pakistani army’s repression and President Yahya Khan’s “callous attitude towards human rights” and “human sufferings” in the East Pakistan repression, see Kux, India and the United States, pp. 289–94. 43 Quoted in ibid., pp. 298–99. 44 Quoted in B.M. Jain, South Asia, India and the United States (Jaipur: RBSA, 1987), p. 106. 45 Quoted in Kux, India and the United States, p. 310. 46 Kissinger, White House Years. 47 B.M. Jain and Eva-Maria Hexamer (eds), Nuclearisation in South Asia: Reactions and Responses (Jaipur and New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 1999), p. 192. 48 “Annual Report, 1990–91”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. http://mealib.n ic.in/?2519?000, accessed 10 June 2014. 49 See B.M. Jain, India in the New South Asia: Strategic, Military and Economic Concerns in the Age of Nuclear Diplomacy (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 50 The Gerald Ford Library Archival Material, Collection title CO 61 India, Box 23 (Michigan: President Gerald Ford Library). 51 Ibid. 52 See Kux, India and the United States, pp. 348–50. 53 It may be noted that the 1971 treaty had been dubbed by the United States a “military pact”, accusing India of deviating from professing the so-called pristine character of its non-aligned policy. In this context, the New York Times wrote, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 as reported by Sanjoy Hazarika, 11 April 1995, “He (Morarji) sought to revise Mrs. Gandhi’s tilt toward the Soviet Union and proclaimed a policy of ‘genuine nonalignment’ ”. www.nytimes.com/1995/04/11/obituaries/morarji-desai-dies-at- 99-defeated-indira-gandhi-to-become-premier-of-india.html, accessed 10 January 2016. 54 Paranjoy Guha Thakurta and Shankar Raghuraman, Divided We Stand: India in a Time of Coalitions (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007), p. 470. 55 “A Letter from the Publisher”, Span (September 1982), p. 1. 56 Ibid., p. 2. India–US relations during the cold war era 53

57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid., p. 4. 60 Cited in Jain, Global Power, p. 27. 61 An Essay in Understanding: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Visit to the US, 11–15 June 1985 (New Delhi: United States Information Service), p. 4. 62 Ibid. 63 Span, Vol. XXVI, No. 7 (July 1985), p. 19. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 20. 66 Kux, India and the United States, p. 408. 67 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi Visits Canada and America (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs Publication Division, 13–20 October 1987), p. 48. 68 Ibid., p. 49. 69 Barbara Crossette, “India in an Uproar Over Refueling of U.S. Aircraft”, New York Times, 30 January 1991. 70 P.V. Narsimha Rao, “Contours of Emerging World”, Mainstream Weekly, Vol. XLIX, No. 30, 16 July 2011. www.mainstreamweekly.net/article2895.html, accessed 20 January 2016. 71 Span (June 1994), p. 28. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 3 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation

Introduction Civilian nuclear energy cooperation has been a major issue in Indo-US relations since the heyday of the George W. Bush administration. The nuclear deal initiative was first undertaken by the administration to dispel “core differences” with India which had adversely affected bilateral relations for a long period of time, especially in regard to security and strategic issues. The initiative launched by the United States under a joint statement of July 2005, issued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush, clearly envisioned America’s help in ensuring India’s energy security and promoting its economic growth. The deal, regarded as a “watershed” in the New Delhi–Washington relationship, culminated in an agreement on the Separation Plan in March 2006, followed by the 123 Agreement in October 2008. Before we discuss this subject in detail, it is important to delineate a brief history of non-proliferation efforts that began with the US-sponsored Baruch Plan in 1946. Theoretically speaking, the establishment of a global nuclear non-proliferation regime has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy since the presentation of a proposal by US representative Bernard Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission on 14 June 1946, for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority. This document of the US government states:

Under the Baruch Plan the Atomic Development Authority would oversee the development and use of atomic energy, manage any nuclear

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 installation with the ability to produce nuclear weapons, and inspect any nuclear facility conducting research for peaceful purposes. The plan also prohibited the illegal possession of an atomic bomb; the seizure of facilities administered by the Atomic Development Authority, and punished violators who interfered with inspections. The Atomic Development Authority would answer only to the Security Council, which was charged with punishing those nations that violated the terms of the plan by imposing sanctions. Most importantly, the Baruch Plan would have India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 55 stripped all members of the United Nations Security Council [UNSC] of their veto power concerning the issue of United Nations sanctions against nations that engaged in prohibited activities. Once the plan was fully implemented, the United States was to begin the process of destroying its nuclear arsenal.1

The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan outright, apprehending that it was intended to maintain a US monopoly on nuclear weapons, research, and energy. Also, the Soviet Union disapproved of the idea of surrendering its veto power in the UN Security Council under the plan and, not surprisingly, it ended the US monopoly by successfully carrying out its first nuclear weapon test on 29 August 1949. The test set off a worldwide chain reaction, as the United Kingdom, France, and China conducted nuclear tests in 1952, 1960, and 1964 respectively, forming the nuclear club “P-5”. Thus, international efforts to combat nuclear proliferation ensued with the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, which was implemented in 1970, marking milestone progress towards halting horizontal nuclear proliferation. While initially designated for a period of 25 years, it was made permanent at the NPT Review Conference, held in the city of New York in April–May 1995. However, the NPT suffers from a particular legal lacuna that grants an inalienable right to state parties under its Article IV to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It sounds good in theory, but in practice this provision has been grossly misused by nuclear aspirants. Notwithstanding, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II seemed to “suggest that the world community has taken the tentative first steps towards renouncing nuclear weapons as an instrument of warfare”.2 Apart from multilateral efforts, the nuclear non-proliferation goal was a high priority of US foreign policy. As such, the US government enacted a series of domestic legislation to restrict the spread of weapons by non-weapon states. These included the Symington Amendment (1976), Glenn Amendment (1977), Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (1978), Solarz Amendment (1984), Pressler Amendment (1985), and Brown Amendment (1996). In all, this legislation aimed at preventing acquisition or development of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology by non-nuclear weapon states. For example, the Symington Amendment was invoked against Pakistan in 1977 for its illicit procurement of nuclear material and equipment Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 from diverse sources, including France. The United States faced a Herculean task in preventing the spread of uranium enrichment technology in the volatile regions of South Asia, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. Much to US chagrin, North Korea conducted nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013, openly flouting the NPT regime to which North Korea was a signatory. Also, non-signatory countries like India and Pakistan refused to sign the NPT, arguing that it was discriminatory in nature. 56 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation However, the US non-proliferation goal in South Asia received a set-back when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Because of Pakistan’s geostrategic location, America assigned it the status of a “frontline state” to facilitate an early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In exchange for Pakistan’s strategic cooperation, America channelled massive military aid into Pakistan, which diverted a large chunk to its nuclear building programme. Despite the US administration’s full knowledge about Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear programme, America could not muster enough political courage to slap sanctions on Pakistan under its various non-proliferation legislation such as the Symington (1976) and Pressler (1985) Amendments – that is, until Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. If dispassionately analyzed, US arms aid, touching $4 billion in 1986, not only contributed to the emergence of Pakistan as a nuclear-weapons state but also facilitated the emergence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces by encouraging Pakistan to train Islamic militants in the wake of its efforts to combat Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.3 However, in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, President George Bush (senior) imposed sanctions on Pakistan in October 1990, declining to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. The point to be underscored is this: the United States’s double standards regarding its non-proliferation goal further hardened India’s stance on the NPT.

India’s nuclear energy agenda India’s policy of “atoms for peace” has traversed a tortuous path since the early 1940s. Homi J. Bhabha, the chief architect of India’s nuclear programme, advocated developing indigenous nuclear technology to attain self-sufficiency in the energy sector. He approached Sir Dorabji Tata Trust in November 1945 for financial assistance to set up a fundamental research institute in the country. Towards that end, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was established in December 1945 and was entrusted with the task of promoting fundamental research in physics and mathematics. Bhabha’s main objective in establishing the institute was to develop nuclear technology to fulfil the country’s energy needs.4 It may be mentioned here that Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, the two stalwarts of world peace, were vehemently opposed to the use of Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 nuclear weapons as an instrument of state policy. India not only lent full support to the Washington Declaration of November 1945, but also submitted specific proposals on the abolition of nuclear weapons in the larger interest of world peace and security. Apart from this, it gave full support to the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal report, which called upon the world community to develop efficacious means and mechanisms for international control of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India underscored the imperative of developing nuclear technology for energy purposes. Outlining the thrust of the India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 57 nuclear energy programme, Nehru stated in the Constituent Assembly on 4 April 1948:

Atomic energy is a vast source of power that is coming to the world … if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation that keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from wars indeed, I think, we must develop it for the purpose of using it for peaceful purposes.5

Pursuant to the above policy statement, the Indian government established the Atomic Energy Commission in August 1948, under the direct charge of the prime minister. Nehru reiterated that India was committed to developing nuclear technology for improving the material conditions of the people. While commenting on the establishment of India’s first nuclear reactor, Apsara, at Trombay in January 1957, Nehru categorically declined to use atomic energy “for evil purpose”.6 A similar tone was reflected in his speech before the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament) on 24 July 1957. He said:

We are not interested in and we will not make these bombs, even if we have the capacity to do so and … in no event will we use atomic energy for those most destructive purposes … I hope that will be the policy of all future governments whosoever is in charge.7

From the above statements, two important conclusions may be drawn.

1. Nehru outright rejected the idea of making nuclear weapons, even though India possessed the capacity to do so. 2. He bounded all future governments to refrain from embarking on the policy of developing nuclear technology for destructive purposes. Astonishingly, even China’s unprovoked aggression against India in 1962 did not provoke Nehru into reversing the peaceful nuclear policy.

Given India’s firm commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, the US General Electric Company built India’s first nuclear power station at Tarapur in Mumbai in the 1950s. Another turn in the New Delhi–Washington relationship came about with the historic India–US nuclear cooperation agreement of August 1963. Under the agreement, the US govern- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 ment committed to supplying uranium for TAPS for a period of 30 years. But the supply was suspended by the Carter administration under the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), arguing that India had violated US non-proliferation legislation by detonating a nuclear device in May 1974. Naturally, India’s nuclear programme was severely hampered. Though India argued with the administration that the NNPA could not be invoked retrospectively, its plea was not heeded by the Carter administration. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Morarji Desai went to Washington in June 58 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 1978 to convince US Congress members that India’s nuclear programme was peaceful, and that it had no intention to build a nuclear bomb. As a mark of respect to Desai and his moral commitment, the Carter administration took the decision to resume the supply of uranium for a three-year grace period (1978–1981). Subsequently, upon the administration’s request, France took up the obligation to continue its supply till 1993 – the stipulated end of the 1963 nuclear accord. In contrast to Nehru’s and Desai’s peaceful nuclear policy, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, a hard-core realist, took a U-turn on India’s nuclear stance, announcing that India would keep its nuclear options open. We may recall that Indira Gandhi authorized India’s first nuclear test on 18 May 1974, which was vehemently criticized by America and other western countries, while the Indian government termed it a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). Henry Kissinger described the detonation as a “catastrophe” and an “incen- tive” to many countries to emulate India, while a US Congressman termed it a “crime” committed by India.8 After Indira Gandhi’s assassination in October 1984, her son Rajiv Gandhi took over the reins of the country and followed in the footsteps of his mother, saying that India would not sign the NPT – a discriminatory treaty. He went one step ahead by putting forward the Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order at the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in June 1988. The Plan contained “a package of measures”, under which the international community was urged “to negotiate a binding commitment in general and complete disarmament – a commitment which should be total and without reservation”.9 But his action plan was rejected by the United States and other major powers. His sensitivity was bruised, and he later criticized P-5 nations for failing to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. If viewed from a realistic perspective, America wanted to clip India’s nuclear wings by mounting pressure on it to sign the CTBT, which India had deemed discriminatory. At the August 1996 Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Indian ambassador Arundhati Ghose outright rejected the insertion of the entry into force (EIF) clause in the draft treaty. Ms Ghose conveyed her government’s decision in unmistakable terms, stating that India would exercise its power to block the CD consensus unless the EIF clause was made “less specific”. Under this clause, the treaty would not come into force unless India, Israel, and Pakistan Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 each signed it. Ghose declared, “India cannot accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons”.10 India’s rigid stance on the CTBT draft was resented by P-5 nations, which said that India had nothing to do with global nuclear non-proliferation but that its inherent ambition was to become a nuclear-weapons state. The P-5 members reminded Ghose that Jawaharlal Nehru had given a firm commitment to the world community that India would never make nuclear weapons. Ambassador Ghose replied India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 59 that India was not opposed to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, but was against imposition of the EIF provision as a pressure tactic to make India accede to the CTBT, which, she emphasized, was contrary to practices under international law or international treaties. Meanwhile, Indo-US relations suffered a sudden blow when India carried out five nuclear weapon tests in May 1998. These tests signified a fundamental shift in India’s foreign policy. Though they ended the era of nuclear ambiguity, they provoked Pakistan into following suit by conducting six nuclear weapon tests. Indian intelligence had failed to provide credible feedback on what Pakistan’s reaction or response might be if India carried out nuclear tests. US intelligence agencies were also caught unawares by India’s secret plan to conduct the tests.11 Nevertheless, the Clinton administration pressured Islamabad to refrain from chasing India. But Pakistan defied the administration’s fiat, which proves that Washington had no leverage over Islamabad. The reaction of White House officials was that New Delhi and Islamabad were “part of the problem” for America. President Clinton stated, “They clearly create a dangerous new instability in their region. And, as a result, in accordance with United States law, I have decided to impose economic sanctions against India.”12 Clinton recalled US ambassador to India Richard Celeste to Washington for consultation.13 He was perturbed over the tests carried out by India and Pakistan, and had to announce placing sanctions on India and Pakistan under the 1977 Glenn Amendment. Pakistan was badly hit since it was heavily dependent on US military and economic assistance. Meanwhile, President Clinton asked Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, his point man, to engage India on the issues of nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and regional security in order to reset US relations with India. Keeping that in mind, the bilateral dialogue between Talbott and Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh began in Washington, DC in June 1998. They met 14 times in seven countries in three continents during a period of 18 months, marking a unique bilateral diplomacy in the history of India–US relations. Intensive and expanded talks between Singh and Talbott held in New Delhi in July 1998 injected optimism into India–US relations from the following perspectives. First, the Clinton administration virtually abandoned its policy that India cap, roll back, and eliminate its nuclear programme. Second, the administration appreciated India’s overriding reasons behind its refusal to join the global non-proliferation regime. Third, the administration, having recognized Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 India as a de facto nuclear power, expressed its desire to engage India on global and regional issues. For that, Talbott laid some key “nuclear benchmarks”, which included India’s signing of CTBT. But excepting the CTBT, Jaswant Singh did not raise objection when the administration called upon India to negotiate and join the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Also, India agreed to observe a “strategic restraint regime” in terms of production and deployment of nuclear weapons, including export of nuclear technology and material.14 60 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation Undoubtedly, the most complex element in the Singh–Talbott dialogue was the CTBT issue. But it is a matter of further research as to on what grounds Talbott formed an impression that India would sign the CTBT. Naturally, he received a serious set-back when Singh gave him an inkling that India would not sign the CTBT.15 Talbott, in his book Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, has frankly conceded that ultimately Jaswant Singh won the Indian objective of not signing the CTBT, which he attributed to “the coherence and firmness” of the NDA government. He further elaborated, in his interview to Aziz Haniffa of India Abroad on 21 September 2004:

Jaswant Singh had some objectives. He achieved more of his objectives than I achieved of mine in the realm of non-proliferation and the benchmarks and so forth. Though one reason I would judge the experience to have been mutually beneficial to the United States and India is that there was a larger agenda that was implicit early in the dialogue and explicit as the dialogue went on, which was to change the quality of the US–Indian official relationship. There we both succeeded.16

In realpolitik terms, Talbott also failed in his diplomatic efforts to rope India into the non-proliferation regime. In addition, the Singh–Talbott dialogue left some of the issues relating to the global non-proliferation regime unresolved.17 Another interesting twist in the US diplomatic spin came about when Secretary of State Madeline Albright gave vent to her anger over India’s multiple nuclear tests of May 1998. She snubbed External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh at their meeting at Manila in July 1998, saying, “You lied to us, and democracies don’t do that with each other.”18 Talbott writes,

She was referring to the false sense of assurance Bill Richardson and Tom Pickering had gotten from George Fernandes and Krishnan Raghunath shortly before the test. Jaswant’s head snapped back in surprise. He took a moment to compose himself and said there was a difference between secrecy and deceit.19

Despite these hiccups at times, the Singh–Talbott dialogue laid a strong foundation for civilian nuclear cooperation, the agreement on which was signed in 2006 during President George W. Bush’s visit to New Delhi. Also, the dialogue paved the way for President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 resulting in the setting up of a Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism. A dramatic change occurred in the US non-proliferation policy with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon headquarters in Washington on 11 September 2001(9/11). President George W. Bush waived sanctions against India and Pakistan immediately. Bush said in a White House memorandum that the sanctions were “not in the national security interests of the United States”.20 In other words, Bush subordinated the nuclear non-proliferation goal to the US global “war on terror”. India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 61 Furthermore, Bush announced that India was a responsible nuclear power, constituting no threat to global and regional security. In effect, he did not pressure India to sign the NPT and CTBT. This marked a fundamental departure from the Clinton administration’s emphasis on promoting nuclear non-proliferation. More important, President Bush in his major policy statement announced that his administration would help India become a “major world power”. The overriding factor dictating this thinking was to project India as a credible “counterweight” to a rising China. He pleaded with Congressmen that since India’s nukes broke no laws, there was no harm in bending American laws to accommodate India’s nuclear energy concerns.21

Indo-US nuclear deal: rationale

“Alliance” of interest The initiative for a nuclear deal first came from the Bush administration at a point in time when Indian policy elites were psychologically ill-prepared to accept even its notional value, and when sheer ignorance about its utility surrounded the deal. To elicit the views of India’s ruling class, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in New Delhi in March 2005 and held discussions with Indian leaders. She presented a comprehensive plan to apprise Indian policy makers of how serious the US administration was about strengthening relations between the two countries in various sectors, including energy, climate, and global and regional security. The UPA government’s response to US blueprints for a nuclear deal was positive. Moving forward, the foundation of the Indo-US nuclear deal was laid with the issuance of a joint statement by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington on 18 July 2005. They resolved to establish a “global partnership” in areas of mutual concern and interest by agreeing to expand bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy, dual-use technology, energy and environment, and trade and investment. A host of factors dictated the conclusion of the nuclear deal. First, from the viewpoint of India, nuclear energy cooperation with the United States would help meet its increasing energy requirements since India was deficient in natural uranium. Second, the deal would open the door for India’s access to dual-use technology, long denied by America. Third, India’s nuclear pariah status, in place since May 1974, would come to an end, implying that India could avail itself Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 of “frontier developments” in nuclear technology. Finally, the nuclear deal with America would not only legitimize India’s nuclear weapon status outside the NPT regime but also enhance India’s influence and prestige on the “global stage”.22 From the American perspective, the deal would open up enormous opportunities for American companies in accessing India’s huge market, whose middle-class consumers outnumber America’s total population. Second, the deal indirectly roped India into the global non-proliferation regime through 62 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation the IAEA’s safeguards on its civilian nuclear programme; that would be, in the Bush administration’s perception, a big victory for America. Third, India’s energy dependence on the US would impede India’s pursuit of energy resources in Iran, and might indirectly help America to garner India’s political and diplomatic support on crucial global and regional issues.23

Energy constraint Energy constraint has been a principal determining factor in India’s nuclear deal with the United States. As mentioned earlier, India’s growing energy demand, synchronizing with a lack of adequate domestic energy sources, forced the government to collaborate with the United States. Yasmine Hilton writes:

India is set to become the world’s third largest energy consumer by 2020, after China and the United States. With our burgeoning population and rapid industrialization, domestic energy production cannot keep pace with growing energy demand. Crude imports have grown annually at close to 10% in the last decade and coal imports have grown at over 20% every year during the same time.24

According to Anil Kakodkar, India would need 63,000 megawatts of power by 2032, whereas India was producing just over 3,000 megawatts of power generated by nuclear energy. Compared to that of other countries such as France, USA, and South Korea, India’s electricity-generating capacity is abysmally low.25 According to the World Nuclear Association,

Electricity demand in India is increasing rapidly, and the 1052 billion kilo- watt hours gross produced in 2011 was more than triple India’s output in 1990, though still represented only some 750 kWh per capita for the year. With huge transmission losses – 222 TWh in 2011 – this resulted in only about a 774 billion kWh net consumption. Gross generation comprised 836 TWh from fossil fuels, 33 TWh from nuclear, 131 TWh from hydro and 53 TWh from other renewables … The per capita electricity consumption figure is expected to double by 2020, with 6.3% annual growth,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 and reach 5000–6000 kWh by 2050, requiring about 8000 TWh/yr then.

The World Nuclear Association further says that the Indian government’s

12th five-year plan for 2012–17 is targeting the addition of 94 GWe over the period, costing $247 billion. Three quarters of this would be coal – and only 3.4 GWe nuclear, including two imported 1000 MWe units planned at one site and two indigenous 700 MWe units at another. By India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 63 2032 a total installed capacity of 700 GWe is planned to meet 7–9% GDP growth, and is to include 63 GWe of nuclear generated power.27

Moreover, Indian scientists are seriously engaged in developing an alternative source of nuclear energy not only to meet the country’s increasing energy demand, but also to become self-sufficient in the energy sector. They have been working on designing and developing the thorium-based nuclear reactor as, in their perception, thorium is a feasible alternative source to generate clean and safe power. In this regard, research has already been conducted to evaluate the feasibility of the use of thorium. Current projects on thorium-based reactors are being prominently carried out in the US, the UK, Germany, Russia, Japan, India, France, China, and Brazil. For example, China has allocated over $500 million to build thorium reactors. Further, according to the World Nuclear Association, India has the fourth largest reserves of thorium, accounting for some 12 per cent of the world’s total.28 Nuclear scientists opine that thorium can be a dependable and much cheaper source of nuclear energy. Yet, being a costly programme in initial stages, further R&D will be required. In the experience of Indian scientists, many foreign enterprises have not been willing to share their technological know-how and expertise to assist India in developing thorium-based nuclear energy. Given this hard-boiled reality, Indian nuclear scientist Anil Kakodkar has justified India’s energy collaboration with America. According to the World Nuclear Association,

The target since about 2004 has been for nuclear power to provide 20 GWe by 2020, but in 2007 the [Indian] Prime Minister referred to this as “modest” and capable of being “doubled with the opening up of international cooperation” … in December 2011 parliament was told that more realistic targets were 14,600 MWe by 2020–21 and 27,500 MWe by 2032, relative to present 4780 MWe and 10,080 MWe when reactors under construction were on line in 2017.29

Reaching a nuclear deal: a long journey To win over India, the Bush administration agreed to change its “domestic and international laws.” In order to move quickly to fulfil the US promise to help meet India’s energy needs, American President George W. Bush arrived

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 in New Delhi in March 2006 to clinch the nuclear deal. After a long meeting at Hyderabad House, New Delhi, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh announced the Nuclear Separation Plan at a joint press conference on 2 March 2006. Under the Plan, India agreed to (i) separate its nuclear civilian and military facilities, and place its civilian facilities under the IAEA safeguards; (ii) keep its commitment to unilateral moratorium on future nuclear testing; (iii) adhere to the IAEA’s additional protocols regarding civilian nuclear reactors; and (iv) refrain from transferring sensitive nuclear technology, 64 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation including enrichment technology, to non-nuclear states. And finally, India agreed to abide by the guidelines of the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Under the above arrangements, India would be legally entitled to an uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel from America, with the right to build a separate strategic reserve for nuclear fuel. President Bush reassured India that the United States was committed to firming up its “multifaceted ties” with India, which had been strained owing to the fractured perception about the other. He emphasized that if India and the United States worked closely together, they could reshape the global political and economic order based on peace, prosperity, and harmony. In a rare opportunity to deliver an address from Purana Qila (old fort) in New Delhi on 3 March 2006, he highlighted the salience of US–India relations, saying:

For many years the United States and India were kept apart by the rivalries that divided the world. That’s changed. Our two great democracies are now united by opportunities that can lift our people, and by threats that can bring down all our progress. The United States and India, sepa- rated by half the globe, are closer than ever before, and the partnership between our free nations has the power to transform the world.30

The Indian strategic community welcomed President Bush’s speech, which underscored the imperative of closer and deeper cooperation between the two countries. But the mainstream opposition parties, especially the Left Front, were highly critical of the nuclear deal, speculating that it would undermine India’s autonomy to conduct nuclear tests in the future and implied a “compromise on the national interest”. They argued that the data collected from nuclear tests in 1998 were insufficient to declare a unilateral moratorium on future nuclear tests. Some members argued that Pakistani bombs, originating from China, were “more reliable and effective”, guaranteeing Pakistan’s security. Therefore, pro-nuclear lobbyists suggested that India need not make any commitment to no-first-use or unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. To allay their “unfounded fears”, Prime Minister Singh said in Parliament on 7 March 2006 that India would retain the “sole right to determine” such reactors as civilian. Moreover, under the agreement, India’s 14 thermal power reactors and its future civilian nuclear reactors would be under the IAEA’s safeguards, while India is not under any treaty obligation to open its military nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. In effect, India neither Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 compromised on its national security interest nor did it abandon the right to build a nuclear arsenal.31 It is important to note that the Bush administration treated India as an “exceptional case”, even though India did not sign the NPT and the CTBT. In Bush’s perception, the rationale behind according favourable treatment to India was its impeccable record of nuclear non-proliferation at global and regional levels. The administration was convinced that India’s nuclear programme constituted no existential threat to regional or global security.32 But India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 65 the military regime in Islamabad, while objecting to this, urged the administration to grant similar status to Pakistan since India and Pakistan had both stayed away from signing the NPT and the CTBT. The administration declined to oblige Pakistan, as its non-proliferation record was not above board, citing that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had publicly confessed, on a Pakistani national TV channel on 4 February 2004, that he was involved in leaking nuclear data to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

Controversy over Henry J. Hyde United States–India peaceful atomic energy cooperation act, 2006 A fresh controversy arose in some sections of India and the United States when the Henry J. Hyde United States–India Peaceful Nuclear Energy Cooperation Act was signed into law by President Bush on 18 December 2006. The Act authorized the President to waive certain requirements of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954. Per the Hyde Act, the US Senate requires the President to:

report annually to Congress about US efforts to get India and Pakistan to secure, cap, and reduce their fissile material stockpiles. While this may be U.S. policy, India has signed nothing that commits it to cap or reduce its weapon-grade fissile material stockpiles.33

In this context, India passed legislation against weapons of mass destruction to satisfy US concerns about WMDs. Also, it harmonized its export control list with the NSG and MTCR, and reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer enrichment technology to third countries. However, the Left parties complained that the Hyde Act had prohibited India from conducting nuclear tests in future. They threatened to withdraw political support from the UPA government if it operationalized the agreement.34 L.K. Advani, the leader of the opposition party in Lok Sabha, tried to clarify at the parliamentary party meeting on 30 August 2007 that his “party’s opposition (to the deal) did not spring from anti-Americanism”,35 saying that provisions of the Hyde Act “militated against India’s sovereignty”.36 The BJP’s stance was that “there must be parliamentary approval; consensus must be arrived at through a joint parliamentary committee and the constitution must be amended to make parliamentary approval mandatory for all inter- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 national/bilateral treaties or agreements relating to strategic affairs”.37 Further, the BJP criticized the deal on the grounds that it would compromise the “credibility” of India’s “minimum nuclear deterrence”.38 But it ought to be noted that the nuclear deal neither put any cap on production of fissile material, nor did it prohibit India from using nuclear explosive devices in the future. The majority of strategic analysts were of the view that the nuclear deal had nothing to do with global disarmament or arms control, as it was chiefly concerned with India’s energy requirements. 66 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation Non-proliferation lobbyists in the United States slammed the Bush administration for rewarding India – a non-NPT member – by entering into civil nuclear cooperation agreement with it. The Bush administration defended its decision, arguing that India had passed the WMD Bill in May 2005, which prohibited it from engaging in illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons and technology. However, on the question of India’s nuclear autonomy, Prime Minister Singh made a statement on 17 August 2006 in the Rajya Sabha that the deal neither compromised India’s nuclear sovereignty, nor did it change the “basic orientation” of India’s foreign policy. He stated:

I would like to assure the Hon’ble Members that negotiations with the US regarding the civilian nuclear deal have not led to any change in the basic orientation of our policies, or affected our independent judgment of issues of national interest … The thrust of our foreign policy remains the promotion of our national interest. We are unswerving in our commitment to an independent foreign policy. We do recognize the complexities present in an increasingly inter-dependent and multi-polar world.39

In response, the Indian scientific community and strategic analysts tried to allay the misplaced fear of critics by arguing that the nuclear deal was neither detrimental to national security interests, nor did it undermine India’s nuclear autonomy. Former scientists of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) said that with the country’s

ever increasing energy needs and with a view to end the 33-year-long nuclear isolation, the importance of the deal has to be understood by the people of India and should not be hijacked by the Opposition and the political parties supporting the UPA government, the scientists said in a statement.40

Anil Kakodkar, the then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, lauded the nuclear deal. He argued that India’s domestic production of uranium from the states of Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, and Meghalaya was insufficient to meet India’s increasing energy needs, and that the coal option was not a better option from environmental and financial points of view. Given India’s increasing energy requirements, Kakodkar envisaged nuclear power plants as Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 comprising of 6–8 units of 1000 MW each built over the next nine to ten years. In his words, “We aim to produce 10,000 MW through PHWRs, about 5,000 MW through imported reactors and about 2,500 MW through Fast Breeder Reactors … the aim is to generate 20,000 MW by 2020; half of this to come from PHWR”.41 Kakodkar further underlined that since global fuel resources were under severe stress, the country’s nuclear programme was geared to attaining “self-reliance” for the realization of the second and third stages of India’s nuclear power programme.42 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 67

Figure 3.1 Nuclear Power Projects (NPP) Operating or Under Construction in India

According to the World Nuclear Association, India expects to have 14,600 MWe nuclear capacity by 2020, and aims to generate 25 per cent of electri- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 city from nuclear power by 2025. Figure 3.1 shows India’s planned power projects as of July 2015, which include the setting up of five Nuclear Energy Parks (NEPs). NEPs include Kudankulam (KKNPP) in Tamil Nadu; Jaitapur (JNPP) in Maharashtra’s Ratnagiri district; Gorakhpur Haryana Anu Vidyut Pariyojana (GHAVP) in the Fatehabad district of Haryana; Chhaya-Mithi Virdi in Gujarat’s Bhavnagar district; Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh’s northern coastal Srikakulam district; and Mahi Banswara in Rajasthan.43 68 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation

The 123 agreement In July 2007, India and the United States concluded negotiations on the text of the 123 Agreement for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In August 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh underscored the importance of the deal in the era of “nuclear renaissance”, mandating that India must integrate into the international mainstream of nuclear energy. On the occasion of the dedication of Tarapur’s two high-efficiency nuclear reactors to the country, Singh said that such integration required the NSG to adapt its guidelines to enter into nuclear commerce with India, and that the NSG would do that only when the India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA was finalized. Underscoring the need for international cooperation, he said that India’s modest target of 20,000 MW of nuclear-generated power by 2020 could be doubled with international cooperation.44 He stated, “We need to enable our industries to gain access to cutting edge technology, and we need to create opportunities for our scientists to participate in the international exchange of scientific ideas and technical know-how”.45 At the same time, India’s top priority will be to use thorium for generating nuclear power in order to gradually reduce India’s dependence on uranium.

NSG waiver complexity A major stumbling block to India’s access to nuclear material in the international nuclear market was removed when the NSG granted a waiver to India in its meeting in September 2008. Its decision was welcomed by the US, which described it as a “landmark decision” for strengthening global non-proliferation efforts and tackling the global challenge of producing clean energy. The waiver ended over three decades of India’s nuclear apartheid. It is a patent fact that the NSG – a cartel supervising transfer of nuclear material to non-nuclear states – would never have granted waiver to India without President George W. Bush’s continual persistence and interest, especially considering that the draft for amending the NSG guidelines was prepared by the Bush administration. In fact, some NSG members, including Austria, Ireland, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Norway, were dissat- isfied with the US draft and wanted to incorporate some specific conditions into the 123 Agreement to allow for punitive measures against India in case it conducted nuclear tests in the future. It must also be borne in mind that China Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 was once again exposed when it supported the dissenting members of NSG. P.R. Chari writes:

The role played by China in the IAEA and the NSG was especially dubious. While assuring India and the United States that it would not obstruct a consensus emerging in the NSG to amend the guidelines, China encouraged the dissenting countries to oppose the Indo-US nuclear deal. It also voiced its right to offer a similar nuclear deal to Pakistan, despite India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 69 full knowledge of Pakistan’s appalling record in promoting nuclear proliferation.46

Diplomats Jayantha Dhanapala and William Potter targeted NSG members who had made a political commitment to “refrain from nuclear cooperation with states lacking full scope safeguards. And yet, most of these states were either unaware of these obligations, or have chosen to ignore them.”47 Their indication was toward NSG members who had exercised waiver in India’s favour, rather than sticking to their principled stand. They also flung criticism at America, alleging that Indo-US nuclear cooperation was “a rever- sal of decades of US non-proliferation policy.48 It may be noted that, to court Indian favour, Washington did not ask India to accept a set of comprehensive safeguards when the nuclear deal was clinched.

Operationalization of a nuclear deal: problems and prospects An important breakthrough was accomplished in India–US nuclear cooperation when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee signed the historic 123 Agreement on 10 October 2008, which was implemented on 6 December 2008. Under the Agreement, the “United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”.49 In case of disruption of fuel supply, “the two governments would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries (including countries such as Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India”.50 In his message to Congress on 10 September 2008, President George Bush made it abundantly clear that the 123 Agreement provides only a “comprehensive framework” for US peaceful nuclear cooperation with India. While it will remain in force for 40 years, the agreement can be terminated by following due procedures. President Bush underlined that the “123 Agreement under Article 5(6) records certain political commitments concerning the reliable supply of nuclear fuel given to India”.51 It clearly implies that America is not legally committed to an uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel. Perhaps, India’s political and strategic community is unaware of the said article under 123 Agreement. However, the Agreement permits the enrichment of uranium, subject to the Agreement, by up to 20 per cent in the isotope 235. It permits Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 reprocessing and other alterations in form or content of nuclear material subject to the Agreement; however, in the case of such activities in India, these rights will not come into effect until India establishes a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing under IAEA safeguards and both parties agree on arrangements and procedures under which the reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place.52 The 123 (a section of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954) Agreement has far-reaching consequences for both India and the United States. The 70 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation Agreement brings India into the mainstream of the non-proliferation regime, which, in American perception, is a “tangible gain” for the United States. Second, as mentioned earlier, the Agreement might dissuade India from depending on other sources, such as Iran, for its energy needs. Third, the deal will enable India and America to work together globally in diverse areas, such as cooperation in agriculture development, disaster management, and intensi- fication of military and defence cooperation. The underlying idea behind the nuclear deal, in the US perception, was to rope in India at all levels.53 However, a serious controversy arose over an implicit ambiguity about whether India could build a strategic fuel reserve under the 123 Agreement. While clearing up the doubt, India’s former foreign secretary Shyam Saran emphasized in his statement on 18 February 2008 that India was entitled to build a strategic fuel reserve “to last the lifetime of such reactors”.54 On the contrary, Paul Kerr writes that the Agreement does not define what it means to support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve. Furthermore, the State Department suggests that the United States may not supply India with a fuel reserve sufficient for the lifetime of India’s reactors, though the department’s responses to Questions for the Record in the year 2008 do not specify the size of any such reserve.55

India’s liability legislation Meanwhile, India–US relations turned sour over the enactment of India’s Nuclear Liability Act (August 2010),56 which holds suppliers liable for damages caused by the occurrence of any nuclear mishap in future. The liability legislation takes into account India’s Bhopal Gas tragedy, in which thousands of people had lost their lives and which had caused inestimable material loss(es). Briefly, it is important to understand the link between the Bhopal industrial disaster and the nuclear liability law. It was the world’s worst industrial disaster, occurring in the Union Carbide chemical plant set up at Bhopal by Warren Andersen in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Over 15,000 people died due to the leakage of poisonous methyl isocyanate gas in the plant. But no adequate compensation was given to the victims. Its CEO Andersen, who died aged 92 in September 2014, was jailed but was released on bail on a condition that he would return to India to stand trial. But he managed to avoid facing trial. The experience of the Bhopal tragedy provides a background to the passage of the nuclear liability law. Under Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 this law, prompt compensation will be paid to victims in case of a “nuclear incident” occurring as a consequence of an “act of supplier or his employee”, including supply of defective material. The 2010 Act places responsibility for any nuclear accident with the operator, as is standard internationally, and limits total liability to 300 million SDR (about US$450 million) “or such higher amount that the Central Government may specify by notification”.57 Operator liability is capped at Rs 1500 crore (15 billion rupees, about US$285 million) or such higher amount that the India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 71 Central Government may specify, beyond which the Central Government is liable.58 However, after compensation has been paid by the operator (or its insurers), clause 17(b) of the bill allows the operator to have legal recourse to the supplier for up to 80 years after the plant starts up if in the opinion of an Indian court the “nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services”.59 No doubt, the liability legislation diluted the interest of US energy companies in doing business in India’s “$150 billion” nuclear energy market.60 Lisa Curtis, a Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, comments that the legislation “restricting U.S. companies’ ability to compete for contracts in the civil nuclear sector has angered some U.S. officials, who went to tremendous lengths to convince a skeptical international community of the merits of the deal”.61 It should be noted that India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) in October 2010. US officials argued that India’s liability law (sections 17b and 46) was incongruent with the CSC. During his press briefing on 27 October 2010, US Under Secretary of State William Burns described India’s signature to the CSC as a “very positive step”, while indicating that India would need to take additional steps to address US concerns about its liability policies.62 Earlier, in an interview with India Abroad on 9 June 2010, Assistant Secretary Blake stated that the US wanted to “ensure that the bill that ultimately is enacted is compliant” with the CSC, which provides a framework for channelling liability and providing speedy compensation in the event of a nuclear accident.63 Thus, one can draw an inference about the seriousness of the Obama administration in resolving the impasse over the liability law. President Obama himself broached the liability law issue with Prime Minister Singh and UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi during his official visit to India in November 2010. He frankly told them that the Indian liability law “dampened the enthusiasm of the U.S. nuclear companies to participate in India’s ambitious nuclear energy programme”.64 He urged Sonia Gandhi to review and make suitable amendments to the law. Although Prime Minister Singh and Sonia Gandhi gave moral assurance that something would be done in this regard, they did virtually nothing to move forward in implementing the civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement. However, pursuant to President Obama’s continual efforts towards making India agree to amend its liability legislation, Secretary of State Hillary Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Clinton arrived in India in July 2011 to discuss the issue with Indian policy elites. She urged the Indian government to ratify the CSC by year-end for “full civil nuclear cooperation”. She said: “We would encourage engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that the liability regime that India adopts by law fully conforms with the international requirements under the convention”.65 In view of the growing sensitivity of US nuclear energy companies such as Westinghouse, Prime Minister Singh, during his meeting with President 72 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation Obama on 17 November 2011, assured Obama that India would address “any specific [US] grievances” within the “parameters” of the 2010 law. The US Under Secretary of State William Burns visited India in December 2011. In his meetings with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai, and National Security adviser Shiva Shankar Menon, Burns stressed the importance of continuing the implementation of the nuclear deal and levelling the playing field for foreign and domestic companies wishing to compete in India’s civil nuclear market.66 Although a memorandum of understanding was signed between Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) in 2012 for setting up a nuclear reactor in Gujarat, US concerns over India’s liability law remain unaddressed. Secretary John Kerry made an official visit to New Delhi in June 2013 to attend the fourth strategic dialogue meeting. In his press conference, Kerry apprised the media about the “US chagrin” that his country was not tasting the “fruits” of the civil nuclear agreement by drawing attention to an enormous amount of political capital invested by both Democrats and Republicans to ensure New Delhi’s special exemption by the NSG.67 He emphasized the establishment of a timeline for resolving the thorny issue that prevented Westinghouse from setting up six reactors in Gujarat. Another company, GE, set up an equal number of reactors in Andhra Pradesh, but its reactor design has not yet been cleared by the US nuclear regulator.68 Kerry further shared the information with the New Delhi government and media that India was handed an assurance for importing shale gas from the US, which is likely to accrue by 2016–2017.69 Undoubtedly, the liability law soured Indo-American relations during the UPA regime. This is reflected in Nisha Desai Biswal’s statement before the Senate confirmation proceedings on 12 September 2013, for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia. Biswal acknowledged that India’s nuclear liability law posed a “tough challenge” to the implementation of an India–US nuclear deal. She said, “I think that there has been very slow and halting progress because of the nuclear liability law in India and the hindrances that that has posed to advancing civil nuke cooperation”.70 In response to a question from Democrat Senator Tim Kaine, Desai said, “It is going to be a long and tough road to work through the issues with the nuclear liability law, but it was fundamentally in the interests of both countries to do so”.71 However, in realistic terms, US expectations were belied, and its Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 enthusiasm quickly dissipated, when America realized that it was no longer a beneficiary in return for what it did to integrate India into “the nuclear mainstream”. Whatever Indian critics may say, India badly needs nuclear energy, as more than 400 million of its people do not have access to electricity. India wants to augment its nuclear capacity from 4500 MW to 40,000 MW.72 It is also an unfair criticism that the United States–India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act signed by President Bush India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 73 at the White House on 8 October 2008 runs counter to the spirit of the 123 Agreement signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his US counterpart Condoleezza Rice in August 2008. President Bush, while signing the bill, approved the 123 Agreement, which was later on submitted to Congress. He reassured India that the nuclear agreement did not “change the fuel assurance commitments that the US government had made to the government of India as recorded in the 123 Agreement”.73 It must be noted that, in view of India’s changing political equations, the Modi government was faced with the onerous responsibility of addressing US concerns with the aim of plugging loopholes in the nuclear liability law. Rakesh Sood writes,

The focus should now shift to resolving the ambiguities of the 2010 Nuclear Liability Law. Without this exercise, India can only import nuclear fuel for the existing power plants; it will not be able to undertake the much-needed expansion of the nuclear power sector. It is not only the foreign suppliers who would like clarity on this issue; Indian vendors are equally concerned about its ambiguities.74

In a nutshell, the Modi government cannot afford to gloss over the legitimate concerns of suppliers, even though France is prepared to do business with India without resolving the controversial liability issue.

A breakthrough In the context of ambiguity over the liability legislation, a great breakthrough came about during President Barack Obama’s visit to India in January 2015 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed to limit the liability for US suppliers in case of any nuclear power plant “catastrophe”. As reported by the Guardian on 25 January 2015,

After pressure from US diplomats, the Indian government was thought to have agreed a state-backed insurance scheme that would cap the exposure of nuclear suppliers and open the door to billions of dollars of new contracts. India will also allow closer tracking of spent fuel to limit the risk of it falling into terrorist hands.75 Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 It is clear that Prime Minister Modi not only became pliant but went out of his way to appease President Obama with an intent to kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand, he wanted to demonstrate his close personal chemistry with President Obama. This became evident from Modi’s addressing President Barack Obama as “Barack” several times at the press conference held in Hyderabad House, New Delhi, on 25 January 2015, although President Obama addressed Modi as “Mr Prime Minister” for most of the time. On the other hand, he wanted to show to his fans, and foes as well, 74 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation that his foreign policy and diplomacy was riding on the crest of a popularity wave. But in realpolitik terms President Obama won diplomatic points by making Prime Minister Modi accept terms and conditions favourable for US nuclear companies while bending provisions of the liability law through an indirect route, although without bringing amendment in the law. Obama said, “Today we achieved a breakthrough understanding on two issues that were holding up our civil nuclear cooperation”.76 Practically speaking, the Modi government has given legal assurance to US nuclear companies that “victims of nuclear mishap” will now not be entitled to sue US suppliers under Section 46 of the Nuclear Liability Act. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) issued a press release on 8 February 2015, soon after Obama’s visit, conveying that both governments had finalized the text of the “Administrative Arrangement”77 to implement the 123 Agreement. In this regard, it made some important clarifications. First, the Indian government will not amend the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 (CLND Act 2010); hence, there will be no change in section 17(b) of the liability law, which gives the operator the “right of recourse” against the supplier. Importantly, however, it noted that the right of recourse was possible if it was provided in a written contract in accordance with section 6. Second, section 17 permits but does not make it mandatory for “an operator to include in the contract or exercise a right of recourse”.78 Third, the CLND Act channels the liability for nuclear damage to the Operator (or NPCIL, India’s public sector undertaking) through a “no fault liability regime”. Fourth, section 46 of the Act does not extend to suppliers, and hence victims of nuclear accidents cannot sue suppliers for damages.79 In effect, the onus of payment against damages lies on the NPCIL and the government of India. This was considered a huge diplomatic victory for the Obama administration.

Regional implications At a recent international seminar on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Disarmament: Contemporary Challenges and Prospects”, held in Islamabad in May 2014, international attendees discussed the regional impact of the Indo-US nuclear deal.80 Pakistani panellists vehemently criticized the deal, arguing that India, though non-signatory to the NPT like Pakistan, was given access to civilian nuclear technology through a waiver from the NSG Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 members. They called on the world’s leaders to accord “non-discriminatory treatment” to Pakistan on the question of access to civil nuclear technology.81 Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain, in his keynote address, said that “the India–US nuclear deal is a double-standard in the region, as it rewarded India instead of treating the hostile neighbours equitably”.82 The PPP Senator Sehar Kamran reinforced the view that Western policies of nuclear cooperation based on discrimination and favouritism would only harm peace and stability in South Asia.83 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 75 Peter Lavoy, a former acting assistant secretary, said that the Bush administration prioritized non-proliferation policy in favour of India, but the Obama administration is trying to come up with a more balanced policy. He further said that the India–US deal was more of a political than a strategic affair, and voiced concern that Pakistan “may once again resort to use of non-state actors” in Afghanistan and India. Lavoy emphasized that Pakistan’s nuclear programme had been the “single most troubling concern” for the US. But his comments drew “flak” from participants. Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the non-proliferation programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), has cautioned about the possibility of a “nuclear clash” between India and Pakistan. He has evalu- ated the potential dangers and risks of “proliferating nukes” in Pakistan, in light of its desperation springing from the special status granted to India by President Bush. Even then, in Fitzpatrick’s perception, the chances of nuclear exchange seem “low”. However, he feared that “the more weapons there are, the more potential for theft, sabotage and nuclear terrorism. Worries that Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons technology might again be transferred to nuclear aspirants have not been expunged.”84

Conclusion India has been a major beneficiary of the nuclear deal, given the fact that it urgently requires more than 20 nuclear reactors in order to upgrade its energy profile for faster economic development. It ought to be remembered that India’s international nuclear apartheid ended after nearly three decades, for which the real credit goes to President George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice. Realistically speaking, their political investment in the friendship with India resulted in the granting of waiver to India by NSG-45, even in the face of tough opposition from many members of the Group, including China. To be precise, the Bush administration helped “liberate” India from the “nuclear apartheid regime”. Meanwhile, India’s Nuclear Liability Act (2010) diluted the interest of American companies in doing business in India’s energy markets. At the same time, India’s international credibility was apparently at stake, since New Delhi had made certain “commercial commitments” to give business to private US nuclear companies. The new government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has had an Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 uphill task to make sure that the contentious nuclear liability law does not impede the momentum of bilateral cooperation, not only in the nuclear energy field but also in other domains such as defence, space, health, and education. Keeping this challenge in mind, Prime Minister Modi took a bold but controversial decision to shift financial liability, in case of an unforeseeable nuclear mishap, to the NPCIL and the government by setting up an insurance pool. This implies that Modi failed in his diplomatic efforts to protect India’s national interest, by agreeing to accept the conditions of American companies 76 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation on the question of financial liability. Perhaps, Modi’s only satisfaction is that the Obama administration gave an assurance of diplomatic support for India’s membership of four nuclear regimes: the NSG, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the MTCR. Cumulatively speaking, the nuclear deal is not a zero-sum game. It is a win–win situation for both countries.85

Notes

1 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones 1945–52: The Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946”, http://history.state.gov/milestones/ 1945-1952/baruch-plans, accessed 10 January 2016. 2 Robert A. Manning, “The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter”, Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997–98): pp. 71–84. 3 B.M. Jain, India in the New South Asia: Strategic, Military and Economic Concerns in the Age of Nuclear Diplomacy (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 110–11. 4 Ibid., pp. 43–44. 5 Constituent Assembly of India, Legislative Debates, Vol. 5 (6 April 1948), pp. 3333–34 6 Quoted in “National Nuclear Energy Programme” (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1985), p. 3. 7 Ibid., p. 7. 8 Cited in Baldev Raj Nayar, American Geopolitics and India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976), p. 158. 9 Annual Report 1988–89 (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India), p. 52. 10 See Jain (2010), India in the New South Asia, pp. 57–58. 11 For a detailed and perceptive analysis, see B.M. Jain, “The United States and Nuclear Challenges in South Asia”, in B.M. Jain and Eva-Maria Hexamer (eds), Nuclearisation in South Asia (Jaipur and New Delhi: Rawat Publications, 1999), pp. 77–90. 12 “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on India. Clinton Urges Pakistan: Show Nuclear Restraint”, CNN, 13 May 1998. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/ india.us/, accessed 13 January 2016. 13 Ibid. 14 See P.R. Chari (ed.), Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009, revised edition 2012), p. 180. 15 See the expanded and updated paperback edition: Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 16 Talbott, “Jaswant Achieved More of His Objectives than I”, rediff.com, 21 September 2004. www.rediff.com/news/2004/sep/21inter.htm, accessed 10 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 17 See also R.S. Anderson’s review of Talbott’s book Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb, “Management of Mutual Disappointment?”, Frontline, Vol. 22, No. 12 (4–17 June 2005). 18 Talbott, Engaging India, p. 114. 19 Ibid. 20 BBC News, 23 September 2001. 21 Some members of Congress argued, “Rule-bending for India is bound to encourage some other countries to rethink their nuclear options too”. “Dr. Strangedeal”, The Economist, 9 March 2006. www.economist.com/node/5603449, accessed 10 January 2016. India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 77

22 In this regard, P.R. Chari observes, “India’s other high technology imports from the advanced countries in the world would also be enabled; currently India is hobbled by various technology control and restraint regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group”. P.R. Chari, “Introduction”, in Indo-US Nuclear Deal, p. 11. 23 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 24 Yasmine Hilton, “India Needs Cleaner Air with Cleaner Resources”, Economic Times, 14 December 2013. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-12- 14/news/45191300_1_air-pollution-energy-security-nitrogen-oxide, accessed 11 January 2016. 25 For details see K.R. Balasubramanyam, “Nuclear Energy: N(o) Deal”, Business Today, 14 November 2010. http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/nuclear-energy- n(o)-deal/1/9961.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 26 “Nuclear Power in India”, World Nuclear Association, updated January 2016, www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/India/, accessed 11 January 2016. 27 Ibid. 28 “Asgard’s Fire”, The Economist, 12 April 2014, www.economist.com/news/ science-and-technology/21600656-thorium-element-named-after-norse- god-thunder-may-soon-contribute, accessed 11 January 2016. Alvin Weinberg is credited with the development of a safer thorium reactor. But research could not be carried forward when he lost his job for developing a thorium reactor in the early 1970s. 29 “Nuclear Power in India”, World Nuclear Association. 30 “President’s Visit to India and Pakistan”, The White House, March 2006. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/india-pakistan/, accessed 13 January 2016. 31 “Suo-Motu Statement by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on Discussions on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the US: Implementation of India’s Separation Plan”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 7 March 2006. www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/2167/SuoMotu+Statement+by+Pri me+Minister+Dr+Manmohan+Singh+on+Discussions+on+Civil+Nuclear+Ene rgy+Cooperation+with+the+US+Implementation+of+Indias+Separation+Plan, accessed 13 January 2016. The following key salient elements of the Separation Plan were outlined in Parliament on 7 March 2006: i. India will identify and offer for IAEA safeguards 14 thermal power reactors between 2006–14. There are 22 thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction in the country. ii. We have conveyed that India will not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage. This technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 of development. We do not wish to place any encumbrances on our Fast Breeder programme, and this has been fully ensured in the Separation Plan. iii. India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian. This means that India will not be constrained in any way in building future nuclear facilities, whether civilian or military, as per our national requirements. iv. India has decided to permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in 2010. v. Reprocessing and enrichment capabilities and other facilities associated with the fuel cycle for our strategic programme have been kept out of the Separation Plan. 78 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation vi. We have received commitments from the United States for the reliable supply of fuel to India for reactors that will be offered for safeguards.

32 See Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, “Seizing the Moment: Using the U.S.–India Nuclear Deal to Improve Fissile Material Security”, Arms Control Today, May 2006, pp. 12–17. 33 Siddhart Varadarajan, “The Nuclear Deal , and ‘Minimum Deterrence’”, The Hindu, 10 July 2006. 34 Left Front withdrew political support from the UPA government, reducing it to a minority government. At that critical juncture, the Samajwadi Party, led by Mulayam Singh, announced its political support to the UPA government from outside. 35 The Hindu, 30 August 2007. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 For this part of the discussion, see Siddharth Varadarajan, “The Nuclear Deal and ‘Minimum Deterrence”, The Hindu, 10 July 2006. 39 “Statement of PM in Rajya Sabha on the India–US Nuclear Agreement”, Government of India, 17 August 2006. http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmo- hansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=355, accessed 13 January 2016. 40 The Hindu, 31 August 2008. 41 The Hindu, 5 December 2008. 42 The Hindu, 5 September 2007. 43 “Nuclear Power in India”, World Nuclear Association. 44 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, “India Can’t Afford to Miss Nuclear Renaissance”, The Times of India, 31 August 2007. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-cant-afford-to-miss-nuclear-renaissance-PM/articleshow/2325656.cms, accessed 11 January 2016. 45 Ibid. 46 Chari, “Introduction”, p. 4. 47 Ibid. 48 Willaim C. Potter and Jayantha Dhanapala, “The Perils of Non-Proliferation Amnesia”, The Hindu, 1 September 2007, p. 11. 49 Paul K. Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, RL 33016, 7 May 2012, p. 27. 50 Ibid. 51 Chari, Indo-US Nuclear Deal, p. 356. 52 “Full text of the Presidential Determination on Indo-US Nuclear Deal”, India Today, 12 September 2008. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Full+text+of+the+ Presidential+Determination+on+Indo-US+nuclear+deal/1/15190.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 53 Vikram Sood, “The Nuclear Deal: The Larger Picture”, The Hindu, 5 September 2007. 54 Ibid.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 55 Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India”, p. 28. 56 According to the World Nuclear Association, “This is framed and was debated in the context of strong national awareness of the Bhopal disaster in 1984, probably the world’s worst industrial accident. A Union Carbide (51 per cent US-owned) chemical plant in the central Madhya Pradesh state released a deadly mix of methyl isocyanate and other gases due to operator error and poor plant design, killing some 15,000 people and badly affecting some 100,000 others. The company paid out some US$1 billion in compensation – widely considered inadequate”. “Nuclear Power in India”, ENVIS Centre on NGO and Parliament, 5 May 2015. www. wwfenvis.nic.in/Database/NuclearPowe_4323.aspx, accessed 13 January 2016. India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation 79

57 “Nuclear Power in India”, World Nuclear Association. 58 Ibid. 59 G. Balachandran, “A Primer on the Indian Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010”, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 23 September 2014. www.idsa. in/backgrounder/IndianCivilLiabilityt_gbalachandran_240914.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 60 As pointed out by the World Nuclear Association, “After liability legislation started to deter foreign reactor vendors, early in 2012 the government said it wanted to see coal production increase by 150 Mt/yr (from 440 Mt/yr) to support 60 GWe new coal-fired capacity to be built by 2015. This would involve Rs 56 billion new investment in rail infrastructure.” It should be noted that Russia, which has supplied nuclear reactors at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, and France, which has proposed supply of nuclear reactors at Jaitapur in Maharashtra, have also expressed their concerns about clause (b) of Section 17 of India’s Nuclear Liability Act for damages. India’s relations with Russia and France may be complicated as a result. 61 Lisa Curtis, “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.–India Relationship”, The Heritage Foundation, 20 August 2012. www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/ 08/going-the-extra-mile-for-a-strategic-us-india-relationship, accessed 11 January 2016. 62 Kerr, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India”, p. 4. 63 For details, see Siddharth Varadarajan, “India Signs Nuclear Liability Treaty”, The Hindu, 28 October 2010. 64 The Hindu, 9 November 2010. 65 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Hillary’s India Visit: US Talks Tough on Nuclear Liability”, India Today, 20 July 2011. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/hillary- india-visit-us-talks-tough-nuclear-liability/1/145528.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 66 The Indian Express, 13 December 2011. 67 The Hindu, 23 June 2013. 68 Ibid. 69 The Hindu, 25 June 2013. 70 “Nuclear Liability Law Poses Challenge to Indo-US N-Deal”, The Economic Times, 13 September 2013. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09- 13/news/42041663_1_liability-law-nisha-desai-biswal-civil-nuclear-cooperation, accessed 11 January 2016. 71 “India’s Liability Law a Challenge to US N-Deal”, The Hindustan Times, 13 September 2013. www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-s-liability-law-a- challenge-to-us-n-deal/article1-1121578.aspx, accessed 12 October 2013. 72 The Hindu, 19 August 2010. 73 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Bush Signing Statement on 123 Leaves Flaws Intact”, The Hindu, 10 October 2008. 74 Rakesh Sood, “Agenda for Nuclear Diplomacy”, The Hindu, 27 June 2014. 75 “Obama and Modi Agree to Limit US Liability in Case of Nuclear Disaster”, Guardian, 25 January 2015. www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/obama- modi-limit-us-liability-nuclear-disaster, accessed 11 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 76 “Statements by President Obama and Prime Minister Modi of the Republic of India”, White House Release, 25 January 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the- press-office/2015/01/25/statements-president-obama-and-prime-minister- modi-republic-india, accessed 11 January 2016. 77 “Frequently Asked Questions and Answers on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 and Related Issues”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 8 February 2015. www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/24766/Frequently_Asked_ Questions_and_Answers_on_Civil_Liability_for_Nuclear_Damage_Act_2010_ and_related_issues, accessed 13 January 2016. 78 Ibid. 80 India–US civilian nuclear energy cooperation

79 See Suhasini Haidar, “No Change in Nuclear Liability Law: MEA”, The Hindu, 8 February 2015. www.thehindu.com/news/national/mea-on-indous-negotiations-no- changes-to-the-law/article6871193.ece, accessed 11 January 2016. 80 See “Nuclear Technology: Debating the Prospects of Use in Pakistan”, The Express Tribune, 8 May 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/705549/nuclear-technology- debating-the-prospects-of-use-in-pakistan/, accessed 13 January 2016. 81 “Nuclear Technology: Debating the Prospects of Use in Pakistan”, The Tribune, 8 May 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/705549/nuclear-technology-debating-the-prospects -of-use-in-pakistan/, accessed 11 January 2016. 82 The Express Tribune, 8 May 2014. 83 Ibid. 84 See Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers (London: IISS, The Adelphi Series, Vol. 53, No. 443, 26 March 2014). www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2014-de9e/overcoming-pakistans-nuclear-dangers-7ef0, accessed 11 January 2016. 85 See Ashley Tellis’s views on the new nuclear deal, “It’s Refreshing to Deal With Modi”, Rediff.com, 2 February 2015. www.rediff.com/news/interview/it-is- refreshing-to-deal-with-modi/20150202.htm, accessed 11 January 2016. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 4 India–US defence and security relations

The Indo-US defence relationship has touched new heights in the past two decades, ranging from joint military exercises to defence trade. As reported by Ron Somers, president of the US–India Business Council, US defence sales to India have risen to over $14 billion from just over $200 million in 2001,1 creating job opportunities for thousands of highly skilled people in both countries. Moreover, the announcement of the increase in India’s defence budget by 12 per cent, amounting to $ 37.5 billion, and the raising of the foreign direct investment (FDI) limit in the defence sector from 26 per cent to 49 per cent by the new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, raised high hopes in the Obama administration that there would be a “transformative impact” on India–US defence cooperation. Consequently, US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel paid an explora- tory visit to New Delhi in August 2014 to plumb the new political mood. He offered nearly a dozen projects, involving manufacture of defence hardware under the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI). If the DTTI materializes, both countries will not only co-produce but also co-develop “the next-generation Javelin anti-tank guided missiles”,2 described by Hagel as the US administration’s “unprecedented offer”. How did this shift occur in US defence policy towards India? The answer requires an understanding of the dynamics of change in Indo-US mutual perceptions in the past two decades within the framework of the contemporary international system of interdependence.

Backdrop Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 The shift in Indo-US relations began with the end of the Cold War paradigm, which transformed the two nations from “estranged to engaged democracies”. Both embarked on a new journey with a renewed faith and understanding that they were fully capable of remapping the future of world politics as well as reshaping the international and regional security architecture on the basis of shared values. In other words, the transformation in their relationship was rooted in the altered geopolitical tapestry following the fall of the Soviet empire. 82 India–US defence and security relations Indo-US defence relations picked up momentum with the institutionalization of military-to-military cooperation under the aegis of the “Kickleighter proposals”, put forward by Lieutenant General (retired) Claude M. Kickleighter during his visit to India in 1991. They provided for joint military exercises, exchange of military information, and high-level joint seminars of military officials. During US Secretary of Defence William Perry’s visit to New Delhi in January 1995, both countries signed the Agreed Minute of Defence to expand “the scope of the bilateral relationship to joint exercises and the possibility of technology transfers”.3 As Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Asia and Pacific Affairs, said in an interview with Jacqui S. Porth, uncertainty lingered on throughout Asia after the end of the Cold War, because of which “the challenges facing the United States in the region, are perhaps more dynamic than any place in the world”.4 Responding to a question about why America needed to maintain a forward-deployed military presence in the region, Campbell said that “unlike Europe, where we have sophisticated security architecture that maintains peace and stability, the most important determinant of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region has been and continues to be the presence of large and substantial U.S. forces”.5 Undoubtedly, the US global strategy is primarily aimed at maintaining its unchallenged supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region in the wake of China’s rising economic and military power in the region, causing rivalries between China and its “Asian peers”. It is apt to quote John J. Mearsheimer, who opines that “if China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony.”6 Also, the fifth-generation political leadership in China has made it abundantly clear that though China believes in the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, it has not foreclosed the option of using force to resolve disputes over the question of territorial sovereignty. For instance, Chinese forces seized the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea from Vietnam in 1974; in 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines. As such, at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue on Asian security held in Singapore in May 2014, summit leaders underscored the imperative of cooperation among America, Japan, and India to resolve conflicts in the region. On his part, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stressed the importance of observing the rule of Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 law in resolving Asia’s disputes. He further stated that Japan would pursue a policy of “proactive contribution to peace”.7 Impliedly, while China may not directly threaten American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, its geographically proximate peripheries and US allies want America’s strong military presence in the region as a security hedge against China’s assertive postures. Mearsheimer holds a similar view: “Most of Beijing’s neighbours, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam will join with the United States to contain Chinese power.”8 India–US defence and security relations 83 Moreover, India, a leading power in Asia, and the United States can play a major role in ensuring peace and security in the region through joint and coordinated strategies. At the same time, it must be noted that India is not schooled and trained in an offensive strategic culture. It would, therefore, pre- fer to stay away from a military alignment with America that aims at dealing with China’s potential challenge to its peripheries. Hence, the US defence tie-up with India in East Asia may at best give the US some psychological comfort that India would endorse its rebalance strategy for the region. It is doubtful, however, that India will play a proactive role in the region in sync with American goals or interests. Given the above backdrop, this chapter discusses the rationale behind defence cooperation and bilateral defence trade, and examines challenges at bureaucratic and institutional levels, which impede the realization of the potential to meet global and regional threats emanating from diverse sources. At the end, it spells out future prospects for Indo-US ties in defence and security realms with the installation of the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party government.9

Defence cooperation: rationale and relevance With twin major developments – the collapse of the Soviet empire and the 9/11 terrorist attacks – a new era of defence cooperation began between India and the United States. They pledged to effectively deal with multiple common challenges such as combating terrorism at the global and regional level, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and protecting “free flow” of trade, commerce, and resources through sea lanes of the Indian Ocean against the rising threat of piracy and armed robbery. In realistic terms, convergence of strategic perceptions and interests has brought the two countries closer in the defence, security, and nuclear realms. One might remember that India had endorsed President George W. Bush’s National Missile Defence (NMD) programme, announced in May 2001. Both countries endorsed the idea that missile defences were an integral component of cooperative security, encouraging them to work together closely on the missile-based defence system. The 9/11 occurrence provided an impetus to India and the US “to identify mutually overlapping national security goals and give a new impetus to military ties”.10 To enhance bilateral “military-to-military cooperation”, the India–US Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Defence Policy Group (DPG) was institutionalized when India’s defence secretary and his American counterpart met in New Delhi in December 2001. It is a forum for high-level policy dialogue on security perspectives. According to the Indian embassy, Washington, DC,

The DPG is the apex body for a structured dialogue with the United States for cooperation in the field of defence and security issues. It reviews, provides policy guidance and approves activities of the various 84 India–US defence and security relations bilateral groups under the DPG dealing with military-to-military cooperation, defence acquisitions, production etc. and cooperation in the sphere of research and development.11

The DPG occasionally reviews the progress in joint land, air, and naval exercises to improve performance, achieve better efficiency, and plug loopholes encountered during joint exercises. According to the US Embassy Report 2004:

The military establishments of both countries have much to gain from strengthening this relationship. Clearly, the development of interoper- able procedures, communications and doctrines is only possible through familiarization, understanding and confidence building, focusing on areas of mutual interest and enhancing the professional development of personnel.12

Indo-US military ties were also enhanced with the signing of a ten-year Framework of Defence Agreement between Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his Indian counterpart Pranab Mukherjee in 2005. The stipula- tions commit both countries to work towards an “enhanced level of cooperation” between military forces. Importantly, the 2005 agreement was an improvement on the narrowly structured Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP, 2004) inasmuch as it was broader in scope, with multiple objectives including strengthening capabilities of both militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism, and combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The agreement “talks of increasing opportunities for technology transfer, collaboration, co-production, R&D, including collaboration relating to missile defence, with the implicit understanding that tech sanctions against India will be withdrawn. There is a pledge to ‘increase exchanges of intelligence.’ ”13 A section of defence analysts labelled the agreement “highly detrimental” to the independent and autonomous character of India’s foreign policy. They argue that India needs to be strictly vigilant against any machinations of the Pentagon to rope India into the US strategic game plan by offering incentives like the latest variant of weapon systems. Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee brushed aside the criticism as “baseless”. He reassured the nation that India would not be “subservient” to the US, since the agreement was based on “mutually respectful terms”.14 Viewed from this perspective, an upgradation Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 in military ties was clearly visible when the US aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, and India’s carrier INS Viraat participated in joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal in 2007. It was the same Kitty Hawk carrier that America had dispatched to the Bay of Bengal in the 1971 India–Pakistan War to demonstrate its friendship with Pakistan. In this regard, Mahendra Ved observes:

This sight of two aircraft carriers together underscored the growing importance of India in the military, especially maritime, scheme of things India–US defence and security relations 85 for many. Especially, the US, that wants to set the global agenda without the capacity to be everywhere, and must have partners.15

It may be noted that China expressed its consternation about the negative implications of Indo-US joint naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal for its own maritime and strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). On the other hand, India looks upon China’s increasing strategic hob-nobbing with Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean as a challenge to India’s primacy in the region. Therefore, Indo-US naval cooperation is a strategic necessity for India and the US to outweigh China’s overbearing posture in the IOR.16 During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington in September 2014, both countries agreed to renew the defence agreement for another ten years. Pursuant to that, Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter signed the New Framework for the India–US Defence Relationship in New Delhi on 3 June 2015. Under the new framework agreement, a further improvement upon the 2005 agreement, both countries agreed to “pursue co-development and co-production projects that will offer tangible opportunities for American defence industries to build defence partnership with the Indian industries including in manufacturing under Make-in-India”.17 This apart, both the leaders finalized two project agreements for hi-tech mobile power source and next-generation protective suits for chemical and biological warfare.18 These agreements would certainly bolster India’s defence capabilities as well as brighten prospects for American companies towards increasing defence trade with India – a win–win situation for both countries.

Joint military exercises India and the United States have shared interests in the security of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Malacca, a “strategic chokepoint”, through which oil supply is shipped to major oil-importing countries like China, for which security of the Malacca Strait is inescapably inevitable. India’s then ambassador to the United States, Nirupama Rao, in her lecture on “America’s ‘Asian Pivot’: The View from India” at Brown University, 4 February 2013, stated,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 With a shared interest in maritime security in the region, cooperation in this area between India and the United States has deepened in the past several years … Today, our naval forces conduct regular joint exercises and exchanges. The anti-piracy operations off the coast of Africa, where our navies are working together with forces of other countries have brought in a new dimension that requires continued focus so that we mitigate and remove threats to international and regional maritime commerce.19 86 India–US defence and security relations

Malabar exercises Indo-US naval cooperation witnessed an upward graph in the post-Cold War period, beginning with a large-scale war-game exercise, codenamed “Malabar”. The Malabar exercises involve “contraband control, sea control, air defence exercises and sea replenishment”.20 They were designed to “advance participating nations’ military-to-military coordination and capacity to plan and execute tactical operations in a multinational environment”.21 The Indian navy conducted the Malabar series of naval exercises with the US navy in 1992, 1995, and 1996, which were temporarily suspended when India carried out nuclear tests in May 1998. It is important to mention that the US navy had the largest representation in Malabar-2007, with 13 warships, including nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz.22 The Malabar-2008 exercise, conducted in the Arabian Sea, was aimed at increasing interoperability between the two countries, including counter-piracy and counter-terrorism operations. The Hindu reports that the ten–day Malabar-12 naval exercise was:

16th in the series of structured bilateral exercise since 1992, which has steadily grown in scope and complexity. The interoperability achieved over the years has been operationally beneficial as experienced in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.23

In the 2013 Malabar exercise, the US missile destroyer USS McCampbell and P3C aircraft participated, while the Indian navy employed the homemade Frigate Shivalik, Missile Destroyer Ranvijay and TU-142M aircraft.24 Further, the Malabar exercise, conducted in the Pacific Ocean on 24 July 2014, was aimed at enhancing “multinational maritime relationships” with the participation of the Japanese navy. As reported by The Washington Post, “Ties between New Delhi and Tokyo have strengthened as geopolitical tensions in the region have mounted, and Japan was invited in January (2014) to join the so-called Malabar exercise, an annual event that has been primarily a bilateral U.S.–Indian operation.”25 Clearly, India’s invitation to Japan signalled India’s “forceful” and assertive maritime policy, which was a major breakthrough in boosting multilateral naval exercises. Briefly, these exercises, unthinkable during the Cold War era, have been

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 “hugely successful” in facilitating mutual learning and interoperability in terms of tactics, techniques, and procedures. In this context, the US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Jonathan Greenert underlined the need to improve communications and interoperability between the two navies.26 It may be pointed out that India was initially hesitant to participate in multilateral naval exercises off its coast, primarily because of its past ideological hangover coupled with psychological inhibitions about being a “junior partner” under the US command. More important, India suffers India–US defence and security relations 87 from a fear that China might construe these exercises as directed against China. One might recall that when India conducted the 2007 Malabar exercise off its coast, involving Japan, Australia, and Singapore, China angrily reacted to the multilateral event. Indian defence minister A.K. Antony immediately issued a policy decision that “Indian forces will not participate in any exercise that conveys a sense of military alliance with the US against a third country”.27 That was a puerile and short-sighted decision on India’s part. Strangely enough, while India is extremely sensitive about Chinese reactions, the Beijing leadership does not seem to be concerned about India’s perception of China’s “string of pearls strategy”, aimed at its strategic encirclement. In fact, China has never taken Indian sensitivities seriously, for example over China’s sensitive strategic activities in the Pak-occupied Kashmir, its transfer of military hardware and missiles to Pakistan, or its political hob-nobbing with Nepal.

Bilateral aerial exercises Air cooperation between India and the United States is an integral part of their military relationship, with multiple goals that include humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It comprises exchange of airlift, air land, and airdrop delivery techniques; aeromedical and disaster management exercises; cooperative flight operations; and subject matter expert exchanges in the operations, maintenance, and rigging disciplines.28 In June 2004, exercise Cooperative Cope Thunder was conducted in Alaska, while in November 2005, Cope India-05 exercises were carried out at Kalaikunda in the Indian state of West Bengal. In the Cope India-09 exercises, which focused on the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission,

more than 110 U.S. and Indian paratroopers conducted jumps in the first known airdrops of IAF personnel from U.S. C-17 and C-130J aircraft. India subsequently acquired similar aircraft from the United States. Since then, U.S. Air Force personnel have provided the IAF training on those transports, as well as on U.S.-supplied P-8I maritime reconnaissance planes.29

The overall purpose behind these exercises is to enable both sides to learn and Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 benefit from each other’s practical knowledge and experience in order to deal with the contingencies more effectively.

Yudh abhyas The Indian army has been involved in joint exercises with the US army on low-intensity conflict, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in varied terrains.30 Conceived in 2001, cooperation between the two armies has 88 India–US defence and security relations been expanding steadily since the beginning of Yudh Abhyas (“training for war”) in 2004, as evident from the upgradation of joint army exercises from “company-sized field training to battalion-level, as well as brigade-level command post exercises”.31 The Yudh Abhyas held in 2009 was the largest one and included tanks, combat vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Further, in the Yudh Abhyas held in Alaska in 2010, the US army trained the visiting Indian forces on the Javelin anti-tank missiles system,32 while in Yudh Abhyas-12, three American tanks rolled on the Indian soil for the first time, along with 200 armoured personnel carriers. In May 2013, Yudh Abhyas-13, a brigade command post exercise was held at Fort Bragg in North Carolina which was aimed at developing interoperability between the two forces by sharing techniques, tactics, and procedures, and familiarization of weapons and equipment.33 Furthermore, Exercise Shatrujeet 2013, an amphibious exercise, was conducted “as a table-top event” between the US Marines and Indian army in Trivandrum in September 2013. Both countries have expressed satisfaction over the learning experience related to the critical challenges facing their respective armies. In brief, joint army exercises enable both the armies to effectively meet the threat of insurgency.34 Moreover, there is a significant scope to step up army cooperation to effectively deal with transnational terrorism. America wants India to be a partner in fighting ISIS’s terror – the “deadliest one”. Prime Minister Modi reassured the US administration that India was committed to fighting terrorism anywhere in the world. He made his government’s stance – that America should not treat terrorism selectively by applying different yardsticks – known to the administration.35 Therefore, he urged the administration to take effective measures in controlling Pak-sponsored terrorism against India. How far America shows its seriousness about Indian’s concern is yet to be seen.

Defence trade The buffets of the Cold War era, when India was dependent on the Soviet Union for nearly 70 per cent of its military hardware, had scarcely left scope for US defence trade with India. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, America came forward to forge defence ties with India which gradually culminated in Indo-US defence trade. Given its structural and institutional constraints, India welcomed defence cooperation with the United States as an alternative source for acquiring the latest version of fighter aircraft and other Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 weapon systems. Over the past decade or so, the United States has emerged as a major supplier of sophisticated arms to India, replacing Russia as India’s number one supplier of military hardware. Beginning in 2002, when an agreement for the sale of 12 Raytheon artillery and short-range missile tracker systems, the AN/TPQ 37 Weapon Locating Radars (WLRs), was signed, the US has supplied systems worth nearly US$4 billion to India.36 Robert D. Blackwill, former US envoy to India, in his speech in New Delhi on 5 May 2009, stated, India–US defence and security relations 89 We need intensified interaction between the two militaries on military doctrine, force planning, weapons acquisition, interoperability, joint exercises, intelligence exchange, and threat assessments. In the next five years perhaps nothing would have such a positive long term impact on the bilateral relationship as India’s purchase of its next generation multi-role combat aircraft from the United States.37

According to the US Department of Defence Report, November 2011:

Since 2002, India has signed more than 20 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for defence articles and services such as C-17 and C-130J aircraft, TPQ-37 radars, Self-Protection Suites (SPS) for VVIP aircraft, special- ized tactical equipment, Harpoon missiles, Sensor-Fuzed Weapons, and carrier flight and test pilot school training … The last five years have given us several opportunities to reach a new level of interaction between our militaries through defence trade. The C-130Js delivered beginning in February 2011 are the first U.S. military aircraft to have been delivered to India in half a century and have already been successfully employed to provide critical humanitarian assistance following an earthquake in Sikkim in September 2011.38

Undeniably, India has been facing a serious shortage of fighter aircraft, ascribed to several factors including slackness on the part of India’s defence establishment, and the procedural bureaucratic hurdles, which slowed down acquisition of weapon systems from the US during the UPA-II regime. Moreover, India is planning to phase out Russian variants of MiG -21 and MiG-27 in 2018. Besides, the Indian air force lost nearly 200 fighter aircraft in accidents, which further accentuated the problem of shrinking squadron numbers. Also, India is still struggling to develop an indigenous engine for the Tejas LCA lightweight fighter. Further, Rafale fighter jets from France might take more than five years to be inducted into India’s air fleet. Given these constraints on India, the United States committed to support India’s military modernization, and expressed interest in “collaborative joint research and development”, and co-production of defence items.39 The Indian Navy also got a major impetus when Boeing Company delivered P-81 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft (LRMRA) in December 2012. In the words of Indian Vice-Admiral Bimal Kumar Verma: Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016

The aircraft is equipped with foreign and indigenous sensors for maritime reconnaissance, anti-submarine operations and electronic intelligence missions. The aircraft is fully integrated with state-of-the-art sensors and highly potent anti-surface and anti-submarine weapons. The Indian Navy would be enriched with the induction of the P-8I aircraft, which would greatly enhance India’s maritime surveillance capability in the Indian Ocean Region.40 90 India–US defence and security relations Besides, the US has offered to India its latest Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F-35 Lightning-II aircraft.41 A major breakthrough came about when the United States and India launched the DTTI in 2012, which was “aimed at promoting defence trade, facilitating technology transfers, cutting red tape, and identifying opportunities for co-production and co-development between the two countries”.42 In 2013, the Indian air force inducted the C-17 Globemaster III military tactical transport aircraft, delivered by Boeing, into its operational services. It is “designed to conduct rapid strategic airlift of troops and supply palleted cargo to main operating bases or forward-operating bases in extreme climates worldwide”.43 Further, America has offered to sell highly sophisticated weaponry to India which includes F-18 fighter aircraft, the S-61/H-3A Sea King helicopter, the CBU-97 SFW guided bomb, and the F404 Turbofan for Tejas (LCA) combat aircraft indigenously manufactured by India. Besides, India has ordered the purchase of ten of the latest version of the C-130J Hercules military aircraft, which will tremendously enhance its defence capabilities. But a major problem in the India–US defence relationship is the complicated procedures on procurement and technology transfer. From the Indian side, procurement of defence items takes years to get clearance from cor- rupt and incompetent bureaucrats and ministries, at the cost of the country’s defence requirements, on account of archaic and at times ambiguous rules and cumbersome procedures. Unless the FDI in defence is liberalized and freed from bureaucratic fetters, no foreign company will be attracted to invest in India, especially as the new government has laid emphasis on inviting FDI in the manufacturing sector. In an interview with Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, foreign editor of the Hindustan Times, on 1 July 2014, Sonia Luthra writes:

Buyer-supplier procedures are far from clear. U.S. firms are baffled by the tortuous and ever-changing Indian arms-procurement policy. The offset policy, which requires foreign suppliers of weapons to source a third of subcontracts or components indigenously, is considered a major obstacle to suppliers. Indians complain about the layers of regulatory clearances required by the United States. The list goes on.44

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 From the US side, the real problem confronting transfer of technology to a foreign country, excepting closest allies, is the question of national security and commercial interests. As Mukherjee and Thyagraj explain,

The US insists that recipient countries for its defence technology sign “foundational” technology transfer agreements such as Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange Cooperation Agreement (BECA). To the US, these India–US defence and security relations 91 agreements are seen as being a logical extension of a strategic relationship and are required by the US law. The closest US allies have signed these agreements.45

But Indian government, political parties, and bureaucracies have deeply entrenched reservations and built-in prejudices which make it extremely difficult to translate negotiations into reality. As noted by Indian commentators,

While Indian bureaucracy has problems of capacity, the US bureaucracy is often considered overly legalistic and inflexible. Due to the number of competing bureaucracies and the number of cited US laws and procedures, Indian bureaucrats are often frustrated by their perception of a lack of coordination and clarity on the US side.46

It should be noted that export of US defence equipment is covered under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), administered by the State Department. The equipments or articles that are classified as “dual use”, whether civil or military, are regulated by the Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Act (EAA). The US administration has recently taken several steps to “ease license approvals” for India. But “the perception in India is that the time taken for even routine approvals is too long, and does not allow the US companies to compete”.47 Mark Warner, co-chair of the US Senate India Caucus, has proposed a 100-day action plan to “refresh ties” between the two countries with the installation of the BJP-led government by Narendra Modi, who took the oath of the office of prime minister on 26 May 2014. Warner has exuded great hope and expectation that India–US defence trade would register further exponential growth. There is also a likelihood of major changes in India–US defence and security ties under the government headed by Modi, who is keen to introduce 100 per cent FDI in the defence sector. His Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, while presenting the budget in the Parliament on 10 July 2014, announced an increase from 26 per cent to 49 per cent in FDI in the defence sector. This is good news for US defence companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin in identifying the core areas of defence investment in India. It is a manifestation of a major policy shift. Among other action plans, the Modi government intends to “re-launch the defence policy group, and establish a public-private working group on infrastructure investment”.48 Warner Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 further underlined:

Under Ash Carter’s leadership this was one of the most successful programmes and helped shepherd billions of dollars of defence deals through the pipeline as well as clearing out inefficiencies on both sides of the US–India defence trade to make defence trade simpler, more responsive, and more effective.49 newgenrtpdf

Table 4.1 Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons (sorted by supplier), 2002–2013

Supplier/ No. Weapon designation Weapon description Year of Year (s) of No. Comments recipient Ordered order/ deliveries Delivered (R) or licence licenser (L)

United States L: India 8 P-8A Poseidon ASW aircraft 2008 2012 3 $2b deal (offsets 30% incl. production of components in India); P-8I version; delivery 2012–2015 99 F414 Turbofan 2012 $800–900 m deal (incl. 81 produced in India); for Tejas (LCA) combat aircraft produced in India; selected but contract not yet signed 6 C-130J-30 Hercules Transport aircraft 2013 Probably $1.1b deal (30% offsets incl. production in India of components for all future C-130J); for special forces; delivery by 2016 270 F-125 Turbofan 2013 For modernization of 125 Jaguar combat aircraft; delivery 2015/2016–2023/2024; F-125IN version; selected but contract not yet signed R: India 112 TPE-331 Turboprop 1983 1986–2011 112 For 56 Do-228 MP aircraft from FRG 6 LM-2500 Gas turbine 1999 2010–2012 6 For 3 Shivalik (Project-17) frigates produced in India; possibly from Italian production line 8 AN/TPQ-37 Arty locating 2002 2006 8 Part of $142–190m deal; originally planned for 1998 but Firefinder radar embargoed by USA after Indian nuclear tests in 1998; AN/ TPQ-37(V)3 version 4 AN/TPQ-37 Arty locating 2003 2006–2007 4 Part of $142–190m deal; AN/TPQ-37(V)3 version Firefinder radar 4 LM-2500 Gas turbine 2003 For 1 Vikrant (IAC or Project-71) aircraft carrier produced in India; from Italian production line Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 2016 December 02 at 19:57 University] York [New by Downloaded newgenrtpdf

Supplier/ No. Weapon designation Weapon description Year of Year (s) of No. Comments recipient Ordered order/ deliveries Delivered (R) or licence licenser (L) 17 F404 Turbofan 2004 $105m deal; for Tejas (LCA) combat aircraft produced in India; F404-GE-IN20 version; ordered after Indian Kaveri engine delayed 1 Austin AALS 2006 2007 1 Second-hand; INR2.2b ($48m) deal (incl. modernization); Indian designation Jalashwa 6 S-61/H-3A Helicopter 2006 2007 6 Second-hand; $39m deal; UH-3H version Sea King 24 F404 Turbofan 2007 $100m deal; for Tejas (LCA) combat aircraft produced in India; F-404-GE-F2J3 version 6 C-130J-30 Transport aircraft 2008 2010–2011 6 $962m deal (incl. $596m for aircraft and rest for special Hercules equipment; 30% offsets incl. production in India of components for all future C-130J); for special forces 512 CBU-97 SFW Guided bomb 2010 2013 50 $258m deal; CBU-105 version 20 RGM-84L Anti-ship MI/SSM 2010 2013 12 $170m deal; AGM-84L version Harpoon-2 10 C-17A Globemaster-3Heavy transport ac 2011 2013 5 $4.1b deal (offsets $1.1b); delivery 2013–2014 32 Mk-54 MAKO ASW torpedo 2011 2013 10 $86m deal; for use on P-8I ASW aircraft Paveway Guided bomb 2012 Paveway-2 version 21 RGM-84L Anti-ship MI/SSM 2012 2013 5 AGM-84L version; for use on P-8I ASW aircraft Harpoon-2 28 TPE-331 Turboprop 2012 For 14 Do-228MP MP aircraft from FRG 542 AGM-114K Anti-tank missile 2013 AGM-114R-3 version; for AH-64 combat helicopters; selected HELLFIRE but not yet ordered 812 AGM-114L Anti-tank missile 2013 AGM-114L-3 version; for AH-64 combat helicopters; selected HELLFIRE but not yet ordered Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 2016 December 02 at 19:57 University] York [New by Downloaded newgenrtpdf

Table 4.1 (cont.)

Supplier/ No. Weapon designation Weapon description Year of Year (s) of No. Comments recipient Ordered order/ deliveries Delivered (R) or licence licenser (L)

22 AH-64D Combat helicopter 2013 $1.2–1.4b deal (part of $2.4b deal); AH-64E version; selected Apache but not yet ordered 12 AN/APG-7 Longbow Combat 2013 For AH-64 combat helicopters heli radar 15 CH-47F Helicopter 2013 $1b deal (part of $2.4b deal); selected but not yet ordered Chinook 245 FIM-92 Stinger Portable SAM 2013 FIM-92 Block-1 version; for AH-64 combat helicopters; selected but not yet ordered 4 P-8A Poseidon ASW aircraft 2013 Selected but not yet ordered 6 T-700 Turboshaft 2013 Spares for AH-64 combat helicopters

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, generated 10 January 2014. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php, accessed 11 January 2016. Note: Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations, and acronyms, can be found at www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html. Per this database, the “No. delivered/produced” and the “Year(s) of deliveries” columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The “Comments” column includes publicly reported information on the value of the deal. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 2016 December 02 at 19:57 University] York [New by Downloaded India–US defence and security relations 95

Table 4.1 lists US transfers of weapons to India from 2002 to 2013. But a question arises as to whether a large US investment in the Indian defence industry will have baneful effects on Indo-Russian relations. While the US has already replaced Russia in its military hardware exports to India in the past couple of years, the increasing US defence sales to India might have negative implications. Russia’s misgivings about India’s credibility as a reliable partner might boomerang, for instance, on the question of Russian support to India’s permanent membership to the Security Council. More important, President Vladimir Putin is a hard-core realist who can turn the tables in Moscow’s relations with major powers, including its old partners like India, in order to promote his country’s national interests. There is nothing like irreversible or “all weather friendship” in Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy. His concentration is on restoring Russia’s past glory, power, and influence in world politics. In this scenario, India needs to cultivate a balanced relationship with both Washington and Moscow. As mentioned earlier, the United States has been gradually increasing supplies of military hardware and advanced defence items to India. This is determined by two major considerations: first, to lessen India’s dependence on Russian weapon systems, and second, to capture India’s huge defence market of over $100 billion. As stated in the Congressional Research Service Report, 2012:

New Delhi is undertaking a major military modernization programme, with plans to spend some $100 billion over the next 7–10 years to update its mostly Soviet-era arsenal. U.S. weapons makers are eager to gain a slice of this lucrative pie, and American companies also see in India a potentially huge new market for sophisticated equipment such as surveillance and detection systems.50

Importantly, in its action plan India’s defence ministry, under the BJP-led government which came to power in May 2014, has sought a 25 per cent increase in defence budget, pointing to “ ‘operational gaps’ in manpower, machines and infrastructure”.51

Cooperation in counter-terrorism India and the United States today face the single greatest threat to their Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 homeland security from the common enemy of terrorism. Initially, America ignored India’s repeated forewarnings in the late 1980s and 1990s that extremist organizations were determined to jeopardize international peace and security. It was at the end of the second Clinton administration that the United States expressed its desire to be a “partner in peace” with India. President Bill Clinton’s March 2000 visit to India was a watershed in Indo-US ties, hitherto punctuated by coldness and ambivalence. Prime Minister Vajpayee described the two countries as “natural allies”, sharing common democratic values. 96 India–US defence and security relations The two leaders issued a Vision Statement on 21 March 2000, pledging to narrow down the differences and enhance mutual understanding on issues of common concern.52 It stated:

The two leaders consider combating international terrorism as one of the most important global challenges. They expressed satisfaction at the establishment of the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism and its productive first meeting in February 2000. They agreed that Joint Working Group should continue to meet regularly and become an effective mechanism for the two countries to share information and intensify their cooperation in combating terrorism.53

Post-september 2001 The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks spurred a new understanding between India and the United States. It may be recounted that in the 9/11 carnage, India lost approximately 250 people of its origin. It not only announced its unqualified support to the US “war on terrorism” but also consented to extending its military facilities for use by US forces. During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Indian navy took up an important mission of escorting and protecting high-value shipping through the Strait of Malacca. India’s logistic support enabled the US to refocus its ships on other global commitments in its war on terrorism. India’s provision of transit facilities to US naval ships to allow them to use Indian ports for rest and refuelling greatly helped the United States to conduct its trans-oceanic operations. This apart, allowing over-flight for US air force aircraft was another enabling contribution of India that saved operational planners countless hours.54 Though the 9/11 tragedy brought about a dramatic change in India–US relations, terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 fully convinced America that New Delhi and Washington needed to tackle the problem of terrorism collectively. They agreed that the Af-Pak region was the epicentre of extremism. Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage conveyed a clear message to Islamabad that the United States wanted to see a permanent end to cross-border terrorist infiltration into India. The US government also stressed that India and Pakistan should work towards resolving their differences. White House officials stated that Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 “the United States will remain a steadfast friend and supporter of peace makers on both sides, and will continue to build strong bilateral relations with each country in its own right”.55 Although the US government was supportive of friendly relations between India and Pakistan, its principal objective was to have “parallel improvement” in its relationship with New Delhi and Islamabad so that America’s security and strategic interests in Afghanistan and South Asia could be better served. It is also interesting to note that White House India–US defence and security relations 97 officials have announced time and again that America has no intention to impose itself as a mediator between India and Pakistan. Apparently, it pacified the Indian mood. But, inherently, America is keen to play the role of a facilitating mediator to bring about reconciliation between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Kissinger has, however, discounted that America is any longer interested in playing the role of a mediator, which he primarily attributes to the overcharged emotions on both sides on the Kashmir issue.56 It may be noted that the terrorist attacks on Mumbai on 26 November 2008 (26/11) sent shock waves across the world. A senior US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) official recounted,

On November 26, 2008, several men armed with hand grenades, auto- matic weapons, and satellite phones landed in a rubber raft on the shores of Mumbai. They scattered to soft targets across the city, launched sim- ultaneous attacks that held India’s financial capital under siege for days, and killed more than 170 individuals, including six American citizens.57

America expressed its deep condolences over the gruesome killing of innocent people, and asked Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the 26/11 attacks to justice. President-elect Obama said in his public statement:

These terrorists who targeted innocent civilians will not defeat India’s great democracy, nor shake the will of a global coalition to defeat them. The United States must stand with India and all nations and people who are committed to destroying terrorist networks, and defeating their hate-filled ideology.58

It needs to be underscored that America extended its political, technology-driven expertise and “operational cooperation” to India.59 It fully assisted India in its probe into the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks so as to take it to the logical conclusion that Pakistan-based LeT was behind them. America has already declared Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the mastermind of the Mumbai attacks, a terrorist and announced a $10 million dollar bounty on him. In this regard, Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher recalls that Secretary Condoleezza Rice, during her visit to New Delhi in December 2008, held discussions with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Minister P. Chidambaram on a wide range of issues, especially related to internal security against terrorist threat. Rice shared her country’s experience of handling such threats after the tragic 9/11 attacks, for example on the modality, methods, and techniques of preventing terror attacks. She told Indian leaders that America had to change its security establishment, and emphasized that America was ready to help India in this regard.60 This gave a clear inkling to New Delhi that “the Indian security establishment was not organized to deal with global terrorism”.61 98 India–US defence and security relations The Obama administration underlined the imperative of stamping out terrorism – a singular threat to the homeland security of the United States and India. Towards that objective, US ambassador to India Timothy J. Roemer and India’s Home Affairs secretary G.K. Pillai signed a Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) Memorandum of Understanding on 23 July 2010, in New Delhi. Ambassador Roemer remarked,

In the coming days and months there will be even closer information sharing and collaborative efforts on issues ranging from bomb blast investigations and major event security to mega-city policing, cyber security and border security. The strength of our bilateral relationship continues to grow, and the CCI will further enhance this unprecedented partnership.62

The CCI followed up on the stated commitment of President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Singh to “redouble” their “collective efforts to deal effectively with terrorism” during the latter’s November 2009 visit to America. Both leaders emphasized mutual collaboration not only to fight terrorism but also to dry up financial sources for extremist organizations. Toward this end, they agreed to exchange information and intelligence on the movement of money through banks and hawalas (money laundering).To some extent, the end results of this have been encouraging; it is now becoming increasingly difficult for terrorist organizations to remit money under fake or changed titles. However, tight monitoring at the micro level is required by both governments to curb clandestine money laundering to prevent terrorist operations.63 During her visit to India in May 2012, Secretary Clinton said that the US had reason to believe that Osama Bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri was in Pakistan. Clinton reiterated that Pakistan did not take strong measures against its home-grown terrorists. She lamented that Pakistan did not take adequate “steps to facilitate the capture of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks’ mastermind Hafiz Saeed”.64 But she underlined that Pakistan had lost more than 30,000 people in terrorist attacks in the past ten years, more than

either India or the U.S. have. And it is in their interest and in the interest of their sovereignty to go after terrorists who are operating on their territory and you have to demonstrate that they are not going to cede Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 authority or territory.65

However, Clinton perhaps undermined the primacy of tackling the threat of terrorism by expressing sympathy for Pakistan. Nevertheless, President Obama is caught up in a profound dilemma. On the one hand, his administration is trying to repair its fractured ties with Pakistan, whose role, in the Obama administration’s perception, is indispensable for internal security and stability in Afghanistan after the withdrawal India–US defence and security relations 99 of US forces. On the other hand, the administration, although committed in principle, is unable to pressure Pakistan into bringing the perpetrators of 26/11 to justice. What is needed is a “holistic counter-terrorism” strategy on the part of the US to seriously fight extremist groups and jihadists irrespective of any specific country or region.

Singh–Obama summit: advancement in defence cooperation At their third bilateral summit in Washington in September 2013, Barack Obama and Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement at the White House. According to the statement:

The Leaders reaffirmed their desire to further strengthen defence trade cooperation, endorsing a Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation as a means of enhancing their partnership in defence technology transfer, joint research, co-development, and co-production. President Obama encouraged the further participation of U.S. firms in partnering India’s efforts to enhance its defence capacities.66

The Joint Declaration, September 2013, stated:

The United States and India share common security interests and place each other at the same level as their closest partners. This principle will apply with respect to defence technology transfer, trade, research, co-development and co-production for defence articles and services, including the most advanced and sophisticated technology. They will work to improve licensing processes, and, where applicable, follow expe- dited license approval processes to facilitate this cooperation.67

Commenting on the significance of the Declaration, India’s External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid stated: “I think, it gives major substance to our strategic partnership. It gives more muscle [to the India–US relationship], gives it more content, more strength and I think it gives it more traction”.68 Regarding implications for India–Russia ties, he said,

Everybody knows that we have to diversify and expand. But we do not do this at the cost of traditional friend of ours. There is massive cooper- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 ation between India and Russia, which continues apace, that is not going to be affected.69

However, the US Deputy Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter expressed the US desire to replicate the Russian model of defence cooperation with India when he was asked whether the US proposals on joint venture in defence production were “on the lines of the successful Indo-Russian BrahMos Aerospace Company”. In his words, 100 India–US defence and security relations Yes, that is exactly the same kind of thing where two industry teams are involved in whole product life cycle where the product is both co-produced and developed. That is a new way for the US and India. We do not have the history that Russia does. We are trying to replicate that.70

Limitations of and challenges to India–US defence cooperation

Reluctance over mutual logistic support In order to deepen defence cooperation in extraordinary situations, America urged the Indian government to enter into a Logistics Support Agreement (LSA). The LSA is an international agreement between two eligible parties that agree to provide logistics support, supplies, and services (LSSS) to military forces. It is a mutual arrangement which is beneficial for both countries. But India has been reluctant to enter into an LSA, fearing a loss of freedom and autonomy over foreign policy, and also as it might smack of India’s military alliance with the United States.71 Due to pressure mounted by leftist parties – especially the UPA – the government did not sign the agreement. But India’s then External Affairs Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, assured the nation that the agreement “will not affect the independence of India’s foreign policy.” It would rather provide a “framework for mutual logistical support when deploying defence resources in disaster relief operations or joint exercises”.72 Further, the logistical support, supplies, and services “that will be provided in disaster relief operations abroad will enhance India’s ability to assist affected countries efficiently”.73 The US administration’s argument is that the agreement is mutually beneficial for the reciprocal use of facilities “for maintenance, servicing, communications and refuelling, and medical care”.74 Defence analysts lambast India’s ambivalence on this policy. One might recall that India allowed refuelling facilities during the 1991 Gulf War to US military aircraft at Mumbai’s international airport. When this came to public knowledge, it “set off a political outcry” against the New Delhi government. Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar was accused of “pandering to American imperialism”. The government immediately withdrew the services.75 When America asked for a similar facility during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, New Delhi declined to oblige it. However, as Kronstadt and Pinto point out, during America’s 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, India facilitated coalition ship Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 repairs at its navy yards and naval port calls. They write:

It [India] also provided an escort for coalition ships through the Malacca Straits and reportedly offered the United States use of its airbases and airspace in conducting operations … In another instance of ad hoc logistics cooperation, during 2005–2006 tsunami relief efforts in the IOR, both the U.S. and Indian navies temporarily exchanged communications equipment so as to help coordinate their operations. This trend toward India–US defence and security relations 101 operation-specific exceptions is likely to continue so long as no LSA is concluded.76

An Indian defence analyst observes,

The logistics support agreements that the US has signed with many other countries are mutually beneficial agreements. India thus should move on the pending LSA to strengthen defence and strategic relationship with the US. So far, the Indian government has not clearly indicated any objections to the provisions of the agreement. If there is any objection- able element in the proposed agreement, then it should be identified and the two sides should negotiate to arrive at an agreement that is consistent with their national interests and policies.77

Shackles of bureaucracy As mentioned earlier, despite increasing defence cooperation between New Delhi and Washington, a major challenge stems from the rigid procedural and regulatory systems in both countries. During his visit to New Delhi in 2012, Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta underscored the importance of defence trade between the two countries. He termed India a “linchpin” in America’s new defence strategy, which is focused on “rebalancing” the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, he stressed the necessity to “cut through the bureaucratic red tape on both sides” in order to make Indo-US defence trade “more simple, responsive, and effective”.78 Similarly, Deputy Defence Secretary Ashton Carter said during his visit to New Delhi in July 2012, “We want to knock down any remaining bureaucratic barriers in our defence relationship, and strip away the impediments. And we want to set big goals to achieve.”79 Carter stated that, for its part, the United States had begun to remove bureaucratic restrictions that had obstructed defence trade and joint development between the two countries. He said that the US export control system, though designed to prevent transfer of high-end technology to particular states, “can be confusing, rigid, and controls too many items for the wrong reasons. We know we need to improve it.”80 He mentioned the 2010 Export Control Reform initiative as a step toward improvement. At the same time, the US complaint is that India’s defence establishment lacks transparency and clear-cut rules to promote and regulate defence trade. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Red-tapism in India is too tardy and inflexible to allow quick decisions on pending issues, with the Indian bureaucracy being “cautious” and “slow moving”. It is responsible for delaying procurement of weapon systems, essential for India’s defence modernization. In this regard, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report, authored by Sahibzada Amer Latif, observes that “the Indian civilian bureaucracy has been the main obstacle to deeper military engagement, despite the Indian military’s desire for greater bilateral cooperation”.81 102 India–US defence and security relations Suggesting that India liberalize its defence sector by increasing the percent- age of foreign direct investment to over 50 per cent, Latif and Inderfurth state, “While such an arrangement may offend Indian sensitivities about excessive foreign investment in India’s defence sector, such an arrangement could ultimately be a boon to India’s efforts to develop its own defence industry through exposure to state-of-the-art defence industrial practices and technology transfers”.82 As mentioned earlier, India’s Finance Minister in the Modi-led government announced 49 per cent FDI in defence and insurance sectors, while tabling the budget in the Lok Sabha on 10 July 2014. The Modi government is perceived to be more amenable to defence modernization, which might encourage US private defence industries to invest in India’s defence sector.

Dependence on the private sector Defence trade between India and the United States is a one-sided affair. India does not have any military or defence equipment to sell to America. Though the Obama administration has pushed defence deals under which both countries will co-produce weapons, the dynamics of the seller–buyer relationship have not yet changed. Interestingly, Indo-US defence transactions were once described by an Indian diplomat (Nirupama Rao) as opening a “new frontier” in India–US relations, while critics dub it a “new frontier of dependency”.83 Defence analysts suggest that both countries need to move away from “a buyer–seller relationship” to co-production of weapons systems and joint research in advanced areas in order to upgrade defence cooperation.84 However, co-production of weapon systems is a complicated affair since arms sales “by private U.S. firms to foreign countries are heavily regulated by Washington’s strategic and national security calculations”.85 Recently, India’s Tata Advanced Systems Limited and the US Lockheed Martin agreed to co-produce parts for the C-130J in the Indian city of Hyderabad – “India’s technology corridor”. Also, it should be kept in mind that India and the United States have “systemic differences” in perceptions and approaches that might create irritants in their defence and strategic ties. In this regard, India’s then Ambassador to America Ronen Sen held the view that Indians have “deep-rooted perceptions of the unreliability of the US as a defence partner”.86 Why unreliability? This is rooted in the two countries’ divergent global obligations. India’s strategic Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 goals are limited, and are at best confined to the South and Southeast Asia regions, and Afghanistan. That is why the Modi government has made its stance known to the United States, that though New Delhi is prepared to share intelligence to fight terrorism, it would not be a US partner to fight ISIS.

Future prospects: what needs to be done? The future of India–US defence ties hinges on many factors. Empirically, it has been observed that a gap between their mutual expectations usually India–US defence and security relations 103 produces a clash of interests. For example, the US expects from India more defence contracts, and logistical facilities for its future humanitarian and military operations in the region, while India expects that America relax its bureaucratic restrictions on transfer of advanced technologies. Pragmatism demands that, for a win–win situation, both countries need to develop an “unconstrained vision” to appreciate each other’s concerns, compulsions, and domestic constraints.87 Most importantly, given India’s long-held perception about the US is that it has not been a reliable partner, unlike the former Soviet Union or even Russia,88 the onus is on the US to reverse this in order to cement strategic partnerships with India. Also, an authentic strategic partnership demands that bilateral commitments reflect in practice. For example, if the US expects Indian support on the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme, it will also need to prove its genuine friendship by supporting India on its border issue with China, and on its Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Indo-US defence cooperation is generally characterized as “quasi-informal military alignment”. Be that as it may, China and Moscow have an apprehension about the procurement relationship between India and the United States in the defence sector. To China, this relationship is aimed at containing its increasing power and influence in the region. To Russia, an increasing volume of India–US defence trade will naturally negatively impact Moscow’s defence sales to New Delhi, impliedly a heavy revenue loss to Russia. Moreover, the emerging strategic axis among India, the US, and Japan, though projected as establishing an architecture of Asian security, cannot be comforting to China as it looks upon it as a calibrated move to encircle it in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to deeply engage India with the Pacific region, President Obama invited it to participate as an observer in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit held in Hawaii in 2011. If seen from a wider strategic viewpoint, the strategic move on the part of the Obama administration hinges on several calculations of the administration. First, by inviting India into APEC, America thinks that it might facilitate a trilateral “geoeconomic co-dependency” among New Delhi, Washington, and Tokyo. Second, some strategic analysts perceive that India–US defence partnership is mostly “aspirational”. Third, the United States has been keeping a neutral stance on India’s border dispute with China. Also, the US administration has declined to hold military exercises in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, claimed by China as an integral part of southern Tibet. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 These instances illustrate that Indo-US defence cooperation is more favourably disposed to Washington than to New Delhi.

It is no secret that the United States has become the largest exporter of arms to India, replacing Russia, once India’s largest arms supplier. As reported in the Financial Times, India imported $1.9bn of military kit from the US last year [2013], making it the biggest foreign buyer of US weapons, according to research from IHS Jane’s. The US, which remained the largest exporter of military equipment, displaced Russia 104 India–US defence and security relations as India’s biggest arms supplier. In total, the US exported $25.2bn of military equipment in 2013, compared with $24.9bn the previous year.89

Today, America is keen to enlist India as a preeminent partner in its quest to restrict China’s power projection and influence in Asia. However, India’s increasing dependence on US weapons is likely to produce misgivings about India in the psyche of the Kremlin leadership, while the record of the US has been dismal in terms of abandoning friends when not needed. As the Russian Ambassador to India, Alexander Kadakin, said in an interview to the Hindustan Times in April 2013, in reference to Russia’s lease of an Akula-II nuclear-powered attack submarine to India, “Name a country that will lease you a nuclear submarine. Will the Americans, the British or the French lease you such a platform? This is the unique character of our [India–Russia] privileged strategic partnership. Your people have to realise this.”90 Kadakin’s statement was in connection with Russia’s recent perception of India’s lack of “fairness and transparency in awarding multi-billion dollar military contracts”, with a possibility that Russia might stop bidding for Indian military tenders in the future. He said: “We know what gimmicks are used to manipulate deals. Sometimes, terms of tenders are crafted specifically to get the required results.”91 India will need to seriously introspect that India–US defence cooperation does not adversely affect the India–Russia relationship, especially in the defence sector since defence supplies from Russia constitute a larger chunk than those from the rest of the world, including America. Top-ranking bureaucrats in India’s defence establishment, therefore, need to do intensive homework to maximally protect and advance the country’s manifold national interests, lest US national interests should jeopardize India’s core national interests. Simultaneously, Indian policy elites need to rethink how the changing equation in the relationship between America and Russia over the Ukraine crisis can negatively impact Indo-Russian relations as well as the embryonic strategic triangle involving Russia, China, and India.

Russia–China–India cooperation The notion of the strategic triangle was first mooted by Russian leader Yevgeny Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Primakov with an intent to advance an alternative paradigm – a multipolar globe, as opposed to the US-led unipolar world order, structured on equality and sovereignty. At the same time, the trio made it unambiguously clear that the strategic triangle was neither directed against a third party, nor was it an anti-US move. Rather, as they reiterated, their strategic cooperation was aimed at promoting regional peace and stability. However, strategic cooperation among these three countries seems to have lost its lustre in the past couple of years, for a myriad of reasons. First, there India–US defence and security relations 105 are occasional hiccups in the Sino-Indian relationship over an indefinitely protracted boundary dispute, further vitiated by frequent Chinese incursions into Indian territory. Second, the irreversible Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus, with the common motivation and goal of containing and weakening India, has produced a trust deficit between New Delhi and Beijing. Third, India’s deepening defence and security ties with the United States has produced ripples in the oft-repeated “time-tested friendship” between New Delhi and Moscow. Russia entertains serious reservations over India’s increasing defence trade with the United States as well as over the increasing prospects of co-development and co-production of weapon systems between the two countries. Fourth, the forcible annexation of Ukraine by Russia has irrepara- bly soured relations between Washington and Moscow, indirectly impinging upon the New Delhi–Moscow relationship. Finally, the strongly embedded ego in the personalities of Putin, Jinping, and Modi constricts the potential for realizing the objective and goal of establishing a just and fair multipolar architecture. In light of the above-mentioned problems and constraints surrounding India–China–Russia partnership, there are chances for greater cooperation between India and the US in the realm of defence. The Modi government has already announced the lifting of “FDI caps” in India’s defence sector. During his visit to America in September 2014, Prime Minister Modi invited US defence firms to participate in India’s defence manufacturing sector and collaborate with its indigenous defence organizations. This would facilitate defence trade with foreign firms, sending out the clear message that India is “open for business”. Moreover, unlike the UPA government, the Modi government faces no political compulsions of a coalition government to open up the defence sector to FDI. But the BJP leadership will need to practically demonstrate that it is more mature, more open, more transparent, and more reliable in its promises and commitments.

Conclusion The study suggests that the New Delhi–Washington relationship is constrained by India’s deeply entrenched Cold War aversion to forging an alliance with the United States on the pattern of US alliances with its old allies like Japan and South Korea. Instead of integrating its military capabilities into the US defence system, India, rightly or wrongly, clings to pursuing an independent Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 and autonomous foreign and strategic policy, though making minor adjustments in its strategic policy by lending legitimacy to the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. As mentioned elsewhere, India’s autonomous approach to foreign relations, though an anachronism in today’s interdependent world order, will psychologically constrain its positive tilt towards America. This was evident when Prime Minister Modi publicly acknowledged at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting at Ufa in Russia in July 2015 that Russia would 106 India–US defence and security relations bolster India’s power. Is this not a contradiction in India’s reiterated praise for the US in making India a global power? Or was it Modi’s political rhetoric to appease Russia when he was on Russian soil? These questions need further intensive research. This apart, India’s misgivings about the US transfer of dual-use technology are deeply engrained in the psyche of India’s public policy makers. This is very much likely to obstruct the development of a sturdy, viable, and durable strategic partnership between the two countries. Despite this, the United States will continue to encourage India as a potential counterweight to China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, America will not allow China to reshape the Asian security architecture within the prism of its strategic doctrine, which is based on indigenous Chinese characteristics. Since the gravity of power is shifting to Asia in the twenty-first century, America can ill afford to sidetrack India on global and regional issues. Moreover, the US is aware of Japan’s declining role and influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and is also convinced about North Korea’s unpredictable political and strategic behaviour. In this uncertain power scenario, a better pragmatic option before America is to strengthen India’s capabilities, as well as its desire to play a bigger role in Asia, with the strategic and diplomatic support of the United States. Be that as it may, given India’s defensive mindset, New Delhi will take every precaution in its strategic dealings with America, Japan, and Australia lest China should be antagonized. In this context, it is interesting to note that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s remark fits with China’s disapproval of closer military ties between America and Southeast Asian nations, hinting that “Someone who tries to blow out another’s oil lamp will set his beard on fire”.92 This was termed as a “veiled warning” to the US.93 What is needed is that India and the United States abandon their Cold War reservations in order to ensure a durable bilateral defence relationship – a cornerstone of restricting Chinese influence in Asia. Given their “parallel interests” in the Indian Ocean, India and the United States are also mutually concerned about the implications of the emerging shift of power in China’s favour. They therefore need to work out a well-coordinated joint strategy to deal suitably with China’s increasing naval presence in the IOR. There are tangible benefits for India in forging closer defence and strategic ties with America. At the same time, the geopolitical implications of a close bonding with America ought to be dispassionately analyzed and, accordingly, India Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 ought to develop the “right tools” in its foreign policy and diplomacy to protect and advance its long-term national interests.

Notes

1 “USIBC Launches 14th Executive Defence Mission to DEFEXPO 2014; Continues to Strengthen U.S.–India Defence & Security Partnership”, USIBC Press Release, 4 February 2014. www.usibc.com/press-release/usibc-launches-14th-executive- defense-mission-defexpo-2014-continues-strengthen-us, accessed 11 January 2016. India–US defence and security relations 107

2 Rajat Pandit, “India, US Agree on Arms Deal, but Technology Transfer Remains Key”, The Times of India, 9 August 2014. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/India–US-agree-on-arms-deal-but-technology-transfer-remains-key/articleshow/39912837.cms, accessed 11 January 2016. 3 For a comprehensive discussion, see Brian K. Hedrick, “India’s Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relationships”, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI Letort Papers), US Army War College, November 2009. www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub950.pdf, accessed 11 January 2016. 4 Kurt Campbell, “Ensuring Security in the Asia-Pacific Region”, US Foreign Policy Agenda: An Electronic Journal of the US Information Agency (January 1998): p. 5. 5 Ibid. 6 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2014), p. 361. 7 “Keynote Address: Shinzo Abe”, The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2014, 14th Asia Security Summit 2014. www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/ archive/2014-c20c/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-b0b2/keynote- address-shinzo-abe-a787, accessed 11 January 2016. 8 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 362. 9 Vikas Dhoot, “PM Modi’s US Visit: All Eyes on Outcome of Narendra Modi–Barack Obama Meet; India Inc Hopes High”, The Economic Times, 30 September 2014. 10 “Defence Relations, Shared Strategic Future”, US Embassy in New Delhi. http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/7tIuOzAx8UV0mdK5nGCpJw/ wwwfpppdef.pdf, accessed 11 January 2016. 11 Meeting of the India–US Defence Policy Group, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, 7 August 2003. www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=443, accessed 11 January 2016. 12 “Defence Relations, Shared Strategic Future”, US Embassy in New Delhi. 13 Chidanand Rajghatta, “India, US Sign Defence Pact”, The Times of India, 29 June 2005. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/India-US-sign-defence-pact/ articleshow/1155838.cms, accessed 13 January 2016. 14 Ibid. 15 Mahendra Ved, “Indian Navy’s Malabar and other Exercises”, India Strategic, September 2007. www.indiastrategic.in/topstories45.htm, accessed 13 January 2016. 16 Admiral V.S. Shekhawat, “India’s Maritime Threats”, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (26 August 2012). www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indias- maritime-threats/0/, accessed 11 January 2016. 17 The Economic Times, 4 June 2015. 18 Ibid. 19 Ambassador Nirupama Rao, “America’s ‘Asian Pivot’: The View from India”, Lecture at Brown University, 4 February 2013. www.brown.edu/initiatives/india/ sites/brown.edu.initiatives.india/files/uploads/NirupamaRao-America's'AsianPi vot'TheViewfromIndia-Brown-IndiaInitiativeSeminar2.4.2013.pdf, accessed 13 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 20 “India–US Defence Relations”, Embassy of India, Washington, DC. www. indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=53, accessed 11 January 2016. 21 Quoted in K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto, “India–U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) R42823, 13 November 2012, p. 9. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42823.pdf, accessed 10 March 2014. 22 Ved, “Indian Navy’s Malabar”. 23 “Naval Exercise with U.S. Begins on Saturday”, The Hindu, 6 April 2012. www. thehindu.com/news/national/article3284922.ece, accessed 11 January 2016. 24 “India–US Defence Relations”, Embassy of India. 108 India–US defence and security relations

25 It further observes, “India and Japan started conducting bilateral exercises in 2012. In January this year, the countries’ coast guards staged joint maneuvers in the Arabian Sea. And ties between the Asian democracies are poised to strengthen further under new Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has close relations with his Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe”. “Japan to Join U.S.–India Military Exercises”, The Washington Post, 22 July 2014. www.wsj.com/articles/japan-to- join-u-s-india-military-exercises-1406043468, accessed 11 January 2016. 26 “Need to Engage in Malabar Level Exercise with India: US”, Business Standard, 20 May 2014. www.business-standard.com/article/international/need-to-engage-in- malabar level-exercise-with-india-us-114052000280_1.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 27 “India Invites Japan To Be Part of Malabar Naval Exercises with the US”, Indian Express, 25 January 2014. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/ india-invites-japan-to-be-part-of-malabar-naval-exercises-with-the-us/, accessed 11 January 2016. 28 “U.S. Air Force, India to Begin Bilateral Exercise”, Embassy of the United States, New Delhi, 13 October 2009. http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr101309.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 29 Ibid., p. 10. 30 “India–US Defence Relations”, Embassy of India. 31 Kronstadt and Pinto, “India–US Security Relations”, p. 10. 32 Ibid. 33 Embassy of India, “India–US Defence Relations”. 34 Ibid. 35 For Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s remarks on terrorism during his meeting with President Obama on 30 September 2014, see “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India After Bilateral Meeting”, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 30 September 2014.www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/remarks-president-obama-and- prime-minister-narendra-modi-india-after-bil, accessed 13 January 2016. 36 Ibid. 37 Robert D. Blackwill’s speech on “The Future of US–India Relations”, New Delhi, 5 May 2009. www.anantaaspencentre.in/pdf/p_s/Blackwill_speech_May_05_2009. pdf, accessed 11 January 2016. 38 Report to Congress on U.S.–India Security Cooperation, US Department of Defence, November 2011. www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/20111101_ NDAA_Report_on_US_India_Security_Cooperation.pdf, accessed 13 January 2016. See also Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, “Arms Sales for India: How Military Trade Could Energize U.S.–Indian Relations”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March–April 2011): pp.22–27, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/ 2011-02-18/arms-sales-india. 39 For this part see “Joint Statement [by US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and India’s Minister of External Affairs S.M. Krishna] on the Third US– India Strategic Dialogue”, US Department of State, 13 June 2012. www.state. gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/192267.htm, accessed 11 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 40 “Navy Flies High With Addition of Boeing P-81”, The Hindu, 18 May 2013. www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/navy-flies-high-with-addition-of- boeing-p81/article4724885.ece, accessed 11 January 2016. 41 Gulshan R. Luthra, “US Offers F35 JSF to India as India–US Defence Cooperation Grows”, India Strategic, January 2010. www.indiastrategic.in/topstories462.htm, accessed 11 January 2016. 42 “Indian Air Force Commissions C-17 Globemaster III Aircraft”, airforce-technology. com, 2 September 2013. www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsindian-air-force- commissions-c-17-globemaster-iii-aircraft, accessed 13 January 2016. 43 Ibid. India–US defence and security relations 109

44 Sonia Luthra, “The U.S.–India Defence Relationship: Strengthening Ties and Overcoming Challenges”, National Bureau of Asian Research, 1 July 2014. www. nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=463, accessed 11 January 2016. 45 Anit Mukherjee and Manohar Thyagraj, “Competing Exceptionalisms: US–India Defence Relationship”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (April 2012): pp. 12–28 (p. 15). They further comment, “There are, however, some systemic mismatches between the decision-making systems of both countries that create problems leading to disappointments and mutual recriminations in the day-to-day conduct of the relationship. This must be understood for a proper assessment of the bilateral relationship.” Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Pratiksha Sharma, “Top Senator Proposes First 100 Days Action Plan for India–US”, The Free Press Journal, 30 May 2014. www.freepressjournal.in/top-senator- proposes-first-100-days-action-plan-for-india-us/373833, accessed 13 January 2016. 49 Ibid. 50 Kronstadt and Pinto, “India–US Security Relations”, p. 18. 51 Rajat Pandit, “Defence Ministry Seeks 25% Hike in Budget”, Times of India, 25 May 2014. 52 For details see Span, Vol. XLI, No. 1 (May/June 2000): pp. 10–11. 53 Ibid., p. 13. 54 People, Progress, Partnership: The Transformation of U.S.–India Relations (New Delhi: Embassy of the United States of America, March 2004), pp. 14–15. 55 Ibid., p. 16. 56 Henry A. Kissinger, “US has No Role in Kashmir Dispute”, 9 March 1997. www. jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives1997/97march09.html, accessed 10 March 2014. 57 Cited in Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, The Unfinished Crisis: US Crisis Man agement after the 2008 Mumbai Attacks (Washington, DC: The Henry L Stimson Centre, February 2012), p. 1. www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ Mumbai-Final_1.pdf, accessed 11 January 2016. 58 Mary Lu Carnevale, “Obama Offers Condolences, Says Terrorist Networks Must Be Defeated”, Washington Wire, 28 November 2008. http://blogs.wsj.com/wash- wire/2008/11/28/obama-offers-condolences-says-terrorist-networks-must-be- defeated/, accessed 13 January 2016. 59 For details on the nature and content of America’s assistance to India in the aftermath of 26/11, see Nayak and Krepon, The Unfinished Crisis. 60 Ibid., p. 36. 61 Ibid. 62 Embassy of the United States, “Ambassador Roemer signs U.S.–India Counter-terror Cooperation Agreement”, 23 July 2010. http://newdelhi.usembassy.gov/pr072310.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 63 For Indo-US cooperation on identifying the financial sources of terrorists and money laundering, see www.jmlsg.org.uk/other-helpful-material/article/ Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 money-laundering-terrorist-financing-activities. In addition, experts on both sides are jointly working to deal suitably with the post-serial blasts situation. 64 Ananya Dutta, “Osama’s Successor Al-Zawahiri is in Pakistan: Hillary”, The Hindu, 8 May 2012. www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/osamas- successor-alzawahiri-is-in-pakistan-hillary/article3395939.ece, accessed 11 January 2016. 65 Ibid. 66 For details see “U.S.–India Joint Statement”, The White House, 27 September 2013. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/us-india-joint-statement, accessed 11 January 2016. 110 India–US defence and security relations

67 “India–US Joint Declaration on Defence Cooperation”, Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 28 September 2013. http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ erelease.aspx?relid=99735, accessed 11 January 2016. 68 “Defence Ties with US Not at Russia’s Expense: India”, The Times of India, 1 October 2013. 69 Ibid. 70 “We Want to Replicate Russian Model of Defence Coop: US”, The Economic Times, 18 September 2013. 71 See “INSIGHT – India–US Logistics Support Agreement”, The Global Intelligence Files, 9 September 2013. http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/63/63128_insight-india-us- logistics-support-agreement-.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 72 Sujan Dutta, “US Logistics Pact on Track”, Telegraph, 25 November 2007. www. telegraphindia.com/1071125/asp/nation/story_8590105.asp, accessed 11 January 2016. 73 Ibid. 74 Kronstadt and Pinto, “India–US Security Relations”, p. 8. 75 See Barbara Crossette, “India in an Uproar over Refueling of U.S. Aircraft”, New York Times, 30 January 1991. www.nytimes.com/1991/01/30/world/india-in- an-uproar-over-refueling-of-us-aircraft.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 76 Kronstadt and Pinto, “India–US Security Relations”, p. 9. 77 Saroj Bishoyi, “Logistics Support Agreement”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2013): pp. 151–72 (p. 164). 78 S. Amer Latif and Karl F. Inderfurth, “U.S.–India Defence Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 7 (July 2012); see also the CSIS Wadhwani Chair’s major report on bilateral defence trade, which offers some 41 recommendations for consideration: “U.S.–India Defense Trade”, CSIS, 12 July 2012. http://csis.org/publication/ us-india-defense-trade, accessed 11 January 2016. 79 Karen Parrish, “Carter Urges Closer U.S.–India Defence Cooperation”, US Department of Defence, 23 July 2012. 80 Ibid. 81 Ajai Shukla, “Indian Bureaucracy an Obstacle to Defence Relationship, says US Report”, Business Standard, 22 November 2012. www.business-standard.com/article/ economy-policy/indian-bureaucracy-an-obstacle-to-defence-relationship-says-us- report-112112202036_1.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 82 Latif and Inderfurth, “U.S.–India Defence Trade”. 83 Brahma Chellaney, “Arming the Elephant”, Project Syndicate, 6 November 2013. www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/brahma-chellaney-on-the-lopsided-us- india-defense-partnership, accessed 13 January 2016. 84 C. Raja Mohan, “India–US Relations: Let Us Get Real”, Observer Research Foundation, 6 June 2012. http://orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/ AnalysisDetail.html?cemaid=37880&mmacmaid=37881, accessed 11 January 2016. 85 Kronstadt and Pinto, “India–US Security Relations”. 86 Ronen Sen, “Of Defence and Defensiveness”, The Indian Express, 4 April 2011.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 87 Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defence Carter to the Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, 22 July 2012. www.defence.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcript id=5084, accessed 11 January 2016. 88 See Sunjoy Joshi et al., “Beyond the Plateau in US–India Relations”, The Heritage Foundation, 26 April 2013. www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/ beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations, accessed 11 January 2016. 89 Gill Plimmer and Victor Mallet, “India Becomes Biggest Foreign Buyer of US Weapons”, Financial Times, 24 February 2014. www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ded3be9a-9 c81-11e3-b535-00144feab7de.html#axzz32zp2Fo3i, accessed 11 January 2016. India–US defence and security relations 111

90 Rahul Singh, “Miffed Russia May Stop Arms Sale to India”, The Hindustan Times, 25 April 2013. www.hindustantimes.com/delhi/miffed-russia-may-stop- arms-sale-to-india/story-wrjksSItAHHunee4McddeJ.html, accessed 11 January 2016. 91 Ibid. 92 Zhao Shengnan, “US Must Get Used to China’s Rise”, China Daily USA, 22 May 2014. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/22/content_17534067.htm, accessed 11 January 2016. 93 Patrick Goodenough, “Chinese President in Veiled Warning to the US: Don’t Try to ‘Monopolize Regional Affairs’ ”, CNS News, 22 May 2014. www.cnsnews. com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/chinese-president-veiled-warning-us-don-t- try-monopolize-regional, accessed 11 January 2016; Sourabh Gupta, “US–India Ties: The Limits to Defence Cooperation with New Delhi”, Pacific Forum CSIS, No. 38 (25 July 2011). http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1138.pdf, accessed 11 January 2016. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 5 India–US strategic dialogue

The international system has undergone a dramatic transformation in the past two decades following the end of the Cold War and, resultantly, with the rise of the new centres of power in Asia such as China and India. It is true that the global shift of power from Atlantic to Asia, as a result of the latter’s “economic resurgence”, has enhanced Asia’s economic and strategic leverage at the international level. Concomitantly, America’s declining power has forced its policy elites and strategic affairs pundits to reevaluate the US policy towards India, which shares its democratic values and strategic interests. In its search for new allies and partners, America found that India, the largest functional democracy, rightly fitted into its foreign policy and geostrategic framework. Significantly, in the American perception, the coupling of the largest and the oldest democracies, India and the United States respectively, might go a long way not only in defending and promoting US national interests but also in securing a peaceful and stable world order. Without exaggeration, White House officials began reappraising US policy and diplomacy with an intent to constructively partner with India in diverse sectors, given India’s rise as an economic powerhouse offering a huge market with the potential for India–US private sector partnership. In the perception of President George W. Bush, India’s rise as a global player was a “positive opportunity” for America to secure its “interests” and advance its “values”. He underlined that India offered the promise of a “global balance of power”. To translate this into reality, President Bush came forward in projecting India as an emerging global power in international and regional affairs. Gradually but steadily, India’s international stature began elevating in international and regional organiza- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 tions such as the G-7, the G-20, the EU, ASEAN, BRICS, the SCO, and the G-15. Its vocal role in articulating its pragmatic and creative views on critically important issues such as global financial meltdown and reform of the World Bank and IMF was widely applauded by world leaders. Understandably, India’s global role injected a fresh momentum into the New Delhi–Washington relationship. Given the above backdrop, this chapter will focus on the core areas of strategic dialogue, namely economic collaboration, homeland security, space India–US strategic dialogue 113 cooperation, global and regional security, and India’s membership of the UN Security Council.

Why strategic dialogue? In order to upgrade relations with India at bilateral, regional and global levels in diverse areas of mutual interest, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice initiated a strategic dialogue in early 2000. Over a period of time, it became a regular forum for exchanging views freely on global and regional issues. In this regard, Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in Washington, writes:

During 2001–2003, when the bilateral relationship was at its most intense, the strategic dialogue possessed an intimacy that was displayed in the willingness of both sides to engage in genuinely freewheeling conversation rather than scripted recitation of talking points … This deliberate sharing of information, even on issues that did not involve US–Indian relations directly, provided tangible evidence to Indian policy makers that Washington regarded New Delhi as a true strategic partner.1

In brief, India’s place in the US global agenda was reassured by the US administration. The world chanceries watched the India–US strategic partnership closely, with awe and curiosity, to discover the overriding reasons behind India’s seemingly phenomenal significance for the United States. In this context, Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, a key player in expanding Indo-US ties, emphasized that strategic cooperation between India and the United States was categorically important in strengthening democratic institutions, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and establishing the global non-proliferation regime. Towards that goal, a “renewed” strategic dialogue was proposed by Secretary Rice to advance President Bush’s agenda to make India a global partner of the United States. Ashley Tellis, a devout advocate of robust Indo-US ties, played a sententious role behind the curtain in bringing India and the United States much closer in defence and strategic sectors. He is credited with persuading Ambassador Robert Blackwill that it would be in the US national interest to assign priority to India. In a report released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Tellis has explicitly mentioned some key areas in which both countries Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 have several opportunities to expand and deepen mutual cooperation, which include the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), space technology and its applications, cyber security, agriculture, and health.2 While suggesting the means and mechanism to further enhance the importance of Indo-US strategic dialogue, Tellis writes:

Three process-related elements would conduce greatly to the success of the dialogue. First, the conversation should be conducted at the highest 114 India–US strategic dialogue possible bureaucratic level on both sides to ensure that decision makers, rather than decision executors, have a chance to discuss issues of critical relevance … Second, the previous practice of confidentially briefing the Indian government on the administration’s initiative, both internationally and vis-à-vis third parties – preferably before any public pronounce- ment – should be restored. Third, the strategic dialogue should include the equivalent of a “high policy forum”, where senior policymakers on both sides can engage in “unscripted conversations” on matters of mutual interest, apart from whatever the formal agenda may require.3

Undoubtedly, the Obama administration underlined the primacy of strategic dialogue between the two countries. Characterizing the Indo-US relationship as “one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century”, Obama stated that expanding the US partnership with India would remain one of his “highest priorities”.4 In pursuance of this goal, India–US strategic dialogue was launched on 20 July 2009 during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s visit to India. A joint statement between the two governments was issued regarding their “intentions to accelerate the growth” of their bilateral relationship to enhance “global prosperity and stability” in the twenty-first century. The joint statement read:

The two governments outlined a Strategic Dialogue that will focus on five principal pillars: strategic cooperation; energy and climate change; education and development; economics, trade and agriculture; science and technology, health and innovation. Through a coherent structure of bilateral working groups, the two governments will address a wide range of issues with the goal of producing concrete results.5

The formal institutionalization of the strategic dialogue was a rehash on the part of the Obama administration to reassure New Delhi that it was committed to complying with the agreements, treaties, and MoUs concluded during the preceding administration. Initially President Obama assigned a higher priority to China than to India, which raised eyebrows in New Delhi. But gradually with passage of time, the administration made overtures to India to prioritize Washington’s relations with New Delhi. Hence, during her visit to India in July 2009, Secretary Clinton reiterated in her meetings with Indian leaders that India loomed large in the US worldview. She underlined Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 that the rationale behind launching the strategic dialogue in “new areas” was to reenergize Indo-American relations. The first annual meeting of India–US strategic dialogue was held in Washington, DC on 1–4 June 2010. The Indian side was represented by External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, and the American side by his counterpart Hillary Rodham Clinton.6 According to the US–India joint statement, June 2010, “both the leaders pledged to deepen the people-to-people, business-to-business, and government-to-government linkages between the India–US strategic dialogue 115 world’s oldest and largest democracies, for the mutual benefit of both countries and for the promotion of global peace, stability, economic growth and prosperity”.7 Highlighting its importance, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns said,

Our Strategic Dialogue this week [June 2010] elevates India to the rank of our most important global partners, allowing us to discuss and coordinate policies of global import, including on the future shape of the international economic system and on what we can do together to promote human development in other parts of the world.8

Krishna and Clinton reiterated their commitment to an “open, balanced, and inclusive architecture” of cooperation in Asia. Clinton eulogized India’s role in shaping a “peaceful and prosperous” Asia. However, she underlined that both countries needed to work closely to develop appropriate mechanisms and institutional means to ensure the security of the IOR – a vital lifeline of the global economy.9 Surely, the Indian Ocean has become a centrepiece of the new balance of power, and is emerging as a flashpoint of conflict among major powers in geostrategic and geoeconomic terms. In this scenario, India and the United States have an onerous task to work out suitable strategies to protect the region from the cobweb of clashing interests among major powers, especially in view of China’s “growing empires of ports” abroad. For instance, China is engaged in developing Hambantota port on Sri Lanka’s south coast, and Maro port in the Maldives. Moreover, Colombo is a “trans-shipment hub” for India. As reported, “Chinese warships have stopped at Colombo on the way to Pakistan and to anti-pirate operations in the Gulf of Aden”.10 Pitiably, Indian policy elites have not evolved a conceptual framework to deal with the negative fallout of China establishing a strategic beachhead in the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Though Indian ruling leaders make a lot of hue and cry over how to deal befittingly with China, they demonstrate their shameful helplessness when China frequently makes open intrusions into Indian territory. This was evident in the encroachment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the Indian territory of Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir) when China’s President Xi Jinping was on an official visit to India from 17 to 19 September 2014.11 This issue was raised by Prime Minister Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Modi before President Xi Jinping, whose circuitous reaction was that such incursions occur simply because of undemarcated borders.12 It might be construed that either the PLA was authorized by the Beijing government to freely trespass into the Line of Actual Control (LAC), or the party leadership had no control over the PLA. However, on account of Xi Jinping’s personal intervention in the capacity of chairperson of the Central Military Commission, the Chinese troops ultimately withdrew from Indian territory. This may be termed as a temporary relief. In this regard, an Indian commentator observes, 116 India–US strategic dialogue China’s behaviour tends to turn bizarre on the heels of a bilateral dialogue with India. A recent chronicle of events, highlighted below, suggests that the hopes of a long-term peaceful relationship vanish with incursions. In fact, the PLA spectacle appears as an obsessive compulsive disorder [OCD] syndrome that is activated as a self-assurance exercise, viz., dialogues do not dilute China’s territorial claims, as well as conveying this message to India.13

Furthermore, China’s interventionist role in South Asian affairs has been steadily on the increase. Caught in a psychological dilemma, India fears to tread in the South East or North East Asian regions, while entertaining the fear psychosis that the region falls within an exclusive zone of Chinese influence. This is a pendulous logic. China, in contrast, scarcely cares whether its sensitive strategic activities in the South Asian region will offend India. America too does not appear to be very serious about the hard-boiled reality that China is determined to challenge US supremacy in the Asian region. In this murky scenario, India and the United States need to work out a long-term strategy to check China’s overbearing role in the region. Towards that end, New Delhi and Washington are required to overcome their complexes or strait-jacketed mindsets. On 19 July 2011, at the second annual meeting of strategic dialogue held in New Delhi, Secretary Clinton and External Affairs Minister Krishna reaffirmed their commitment “for consultation, coordination, and cooperation on Afghanistan, and to work jointly in Afghanistan in capacity building, agriculture, and women’s empowerment, expanding on work already under- way. Both sides agreed to Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and inclusive reconciliation”.14 Also, they reviewed the progress in strategic consultations on the Central Asia dialogue launched in June 2011 in New Delhi, and the Middle East Asia dialogue in July 2011 in Washington, DC. Significantly, both sides agreed to include Japan in a trilateral dialogue, the first meeting of which was held in Washington, DC in December 2011; the leaders exchanged views on a wide range of global and regional issues. Indirectly, it was a political message to China that New Delhi, Washington, and Tokyo share common perceptions and interests on global and regional security issues. Strikingly, India did not entertain reservations over Japan’s inclusion in the planning and execution of strategic policies. The growing ties between India and the United States are a testimony to the fact that Secretary Clinton endorsed India’s full member- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 ship of the four multilateral export control regimes – the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. But the road to achieving the target is bumpy, as there are still many ifs and buts, especially on the issue of export control requirements, though India’s record on this issue has been without blemish. Prior to holding the third meeting of the strategic dialogue, Indian Ambassador Nirupama Rao stressed that dialogue meetings provide a “unique bilateral forum” for stock-taking and providing new “political directions” to India–US strategic dialogue 117 India–US strategic partnership. While underlining the importance of the strategic dialogue at the Atlantic Council’s meeting on 30 May 2012, she said,

Our objective was to make our multi-faceted partnership stronger in areas to which both sides attached importance and which are of vital interest and concern to the daily lives of our two peoples. The Dialogue therefore identified five principal pillars for expanding cooperation: strategic cooperation, energy and climate change, education and development, economy, trade and agriculture, science and technology, health and innovation.15

At the third strategic dialogue, held in Washington in June 2012, S.M. Krishna and Hillary Clinton reiterated their commitment to strengthening the bilateral strategic partnership to promote peace and stability in the troubled parts of the world.16 In a joint statement issued on 13 June 2012, both leaders affirmed the importance of maritime security and the peaceful settlement of maritime disputes. It read:

The two sides agreed to continue to consult closely on key global issues, including bilateral exchanges and information sharing in areas such as counter-narcotics, countering piracy, maritime safety, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Determined to curb the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia, both governments planned to improve coordination of their anti-piracy efforts. They also planned to cooperate in addressing the problem of hostage-taking by pirates.17

Despite the deepening strategic cooperation, India and the United States have a clash of interests, for instance, on the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the trade and investment agenda. Also, the strategic dialogue did not explicitly mention how they would address the challenges emanating from internal upheavals in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Not only this, India and America have divergent perceptions on the question of American sanctions against Iran’s suspected nuclear enrichment programme. This apart, India is sceptical about the seriousness of Obama’s rebalance policy in terms of providing the necessary goods and services to make it more transparent, purposeful, and effective. Apparently, Indian policy elites are reluctant to share the underlying logic of the US rebalance Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 strategy. Rather, India perceives this policy as a strategic move on the US part to maintain its supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Fourth and fifth annual meetings of strategic dialogue The fourth strategic dialogue was held in New Delhi in June 2013. Secretary of State John F. Kerry and his Indian counterpart Salman Khurshid discussed a wide range of global and regional issues. Prior to Kerry’s visit, both the 118 India–US strategic dialogue governments were seized with reservations over the operationalization of the 123 Agreement. On the one hand, India wanted America to expedite transfer of dual-use items and technology. On the other hand, America insisted that India should make suitable amendments to its civil nuclear liability legislation to facilitate American nuclear companies’ access to India’s energy market. The issue came up for discussion at the fifth strategic dialogue meeting, held in New Delhi in July 2014. Secretary Kerry and his Indian counterpart Sushma Swaraj urged NPCIL and US companies Westinghouse and General Electric-Hitachi to expedite the necessary work to conclude pricing and contractual details so that the civil energy cooperation agreement could be implemented.18 They reaffirmed their commitment to “full implementation “of the nuclear deal, and called for Pakistan to work towards bringing the perpetrators of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks to justice. In a joint statement issued on 31 July 2014, both sides made a commitment to intensify joint efforts to combat terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and cross-border crime, and recognized the imperative of stopping the genocide, rape, torture, and abduction of women and children of Iraq’s minority Yazidi community by the ISIS terrorist group.19 The question is how to marshal resources to save them. No doubt, regular interaction at the strategic dialogue meetings provides leaders on both sides with an enviable opportunity to discuss and exchange views on many and varied issues of mutual interest. At the same time, there are enormous problems in India–US strategic partnership. For example, India’s blocking of the FTA at the WTO meeting in Geneva in August 2014 invited American ire. Besides that, New Delhi’s relations with Washington became embittered when the United States prohibited Indian companies from selling products alleged to be manufactured by using “stolen and illegal IT products”. According to the reliable figures, software piracy in India “remains at 60 per cent with a whopping $2.9 billion worth of unlicenced software being installed in 2013”,20 which comes next to the piracy rate in China. This is likely to complicate India’s commercial ties with the United States. Apart from this, India has open differences on the “US game plan” of selective counter-proliferation. For that, both countries need to narrow the “non- proliferation credibility deficit” in their relationship.21

India’s sensitivity Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 India is sensitive over the long-term implications of strategic dialogue between Washington and Islamabad. While expressing its consternation, India said that though it is not against strategic dialogue, what troubles it is the US softness on Pakistan, which has been waging a proxy war against India since 1989. In New Delhi’s perception, Washington has not taken commensurate action against Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks to justice. In other words, India’s security concerns have not been “comprehensively addressed” by the United States. Rather, in India’s perception, for instance, India–US strategic dialogue 119 John Kerry has been pampering Pakistan for its effective role in tackling the threat of “extremist forces”. He assured Pakistan that America would provide it with “preferential” market access in line with GSP-plus (Generalized System of Preferences) status. Kerry’s apparent tilt towards Pakistan is a factor to be reckoned with while evaluating future directions in the New Delhi–Washington relationship. It ought to be noted that Kerry took over as Secretary of State at a point in time when America’s declining leverage over Pakistan was conspicuous. Naturally, he is faced with the tough task of reshaping the post-withdrawal scenario in the Af-Pak region. Some strategic pundits foresee that America is likely to compromise with moderate elements in the Taliban to work out a mutually acceptable formula to save Afghanistan from total chaos and anarchy. On the contrary, India has long been opposed to the US–Taliban dialogue, arguing that it will send the wrong signals to US allies and strategic partners that the administration has compromised its much hyped commitment to rooting out Al Qaeda and Taliban forces forever. After being sworn in on 29 September 2014, the new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani oversaw the signing of a bilateral security pact between the United States and Afghanistan on 30 September 2014. Ghani sent a clear message that he wanted not only to improve the ruptured ties with America but also to revive the alliance between the two countries. The security pact “will allow 9,800 American and at least 2,000 NATO troops to remain in Afghanistan … Most of them will help train and assist the struggling Afghan security forces, although some American Special Operations forces will remain to conduct counterterrorism missions.”22 But the important point is whether Western allies will fulfil their promise to channel $16 billion in economic aid, indispensable for a stable Afghanistan. President Ghani, in his inaugural address, called on the Taliban to join peace talks in the larger interest of the country. “The Taliban denounced the security pact as a ‘sinister’ plot by the United States, and used it to launch its first propaganda assault on the new Ghani administration.”23 The pact is intended to counter terrorist threats to ensure internal security and stability, through US and coalition forces imparting training and strengthening capacity building of Afghan security forces. At the same time, President Ghani is concerned about Afghan sovereignty. In the perception of the Taliban also, Afghan sovereignty will be severely jeopardized by international forces stationing on their soil. In fact, the Taliban has praised the Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 former president Karzai for his refusal to sign the security pact with the United States.

Economic collaboration Economic cooperation constitutes a “keystone” of India–US strategic dialogue. One might recall that the Indian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narsimha Rao, kicked off economic reforms in 1991 to 120 India–US strategic dialogue provide impetus for foreign trade and investment by loosening bureaucratic shackles. Welcoming Rao’s neoliberal political agenda, the United States also attempted to “shape new alliances to find new markets and define new global paradigms in a world shorn of classic Cold War imperatives”.24 America recognized that India was an important destination for American companies seeking to do business in various sectors. More important, India’s burgeoning middle class, outnumbering the entire population of America, offered a huge market for its multinational firms to invest in a multi-brand retail sector. No doubt, economic and trade engagement between the two countries picked up momentum in the decade beginning from 1991, resulting in US investment of over $10 billion. It should be noted that President Bill Clinton was strongly in favour of striking private partnership with India. During his visit to India in March 2000, Indo-US Commercial Dialogue and the Indo-US Working Group on Trade were set up to facilitate trade and maximize investment opportunities across a broad range of economic sectors, and to forge “close contacts” between business associations.25 Since then, trade cooperation between the two countries has expanded phe- nomenally. Today, the United States is India’s largest trade and investment partner. The 2008 global economic meltdown further prompted President Obama to seek new markets and investment opportunities in India. He looked to India as one of the potential sources to help ease the baneful effect of the financial crisis on the US economy. During his visit to India in November 2010, President Obama met Indian CEOs in Mumbai, stating in his speech that India provides “an opportunity to sell our exports in one of the fastest growing markets in the world”. Also, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) report describes India as a “growth partner in the US economy” and Indian companies as “partners in the resurgence of the U.S. economy”.26 President Obama took back at least 50,000 jobs for American citizens and business worth $10 billion from India. According to the US–India Joint Fact Sheet released by the US Department of State on 24 June 2013:

At the fourth US–India Strategic Dialogue [held in New Delhi in June 2013], the United States and India reaffirmed that economic collaboration between both governments and private sectors is a keystone of our deepening partnership. Business ties have led the way in achieving Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 a nearly fivefold increase in bilateral trade since 2000. Annual two-way trade is approaching $100 billion, while total two-way foreign direct investment is nearing $30 billion. These developments are drivers of innovation, economic growth, and job creation for both of our nations.

However, in the recent past, both countries have witnessed the worst phase in their trade ties. A tug of war is going on in the pharmaceutical, solar power, and aviation sectors. There are several mechanisms, such as the ministerial-level India–US strategic dialogue 121 Economic and Financial Partnership, to expand and strengthen bilateral economic cooperation and resolve trade-related differences or disputes, apart from the US International Trade Commission (USITC), which examines India’s trade and investment policies. But India was blamed for not cooperating with the USITC, as a result of which American companies were hit hard. The pharmaceutical sector, in particular, has produced irritants in the relationship. What is shocking is, as reported in Business Standard in February 2014, that

the US carried out an open campaign at Capitol Hill called “Harmful Indian Medicines” against the Indian generic drugs industry. USITC has also been holding public hearings in Washington, DC as part of its investigation titled “Trade, investment and industrial policies in India: Effects on the US economy”.27

Also, the US Food and Drug Administration (USFDA) has “intensified its actions against Indian drug companies, especially Ranbaxy, with increased inspections and regulatory measures”.28 It may be added that India is the second largest drug exporter to the United States.29 There are several other issues, such as the US Federal Aviation Administration’s decision to downgrade India’s aviation safety rating, India’s filing of a complaint with WTO against the US over duties on import of steel rod, and the US filing of a case against India on poultry imports.30 Furthermore, as noted in Business Standard, the US is concerned about negative trade surplus with India.

Trade figures indicate why US is getting increasingly miffed with India. The India–US trade reached an all-time high of over $63.7 billion in 2013, with almost $20 billion trade surplus in favour of India. According to the US Census Bureau, in 2013, while US exported goods worth $21.87 billion to India, its import from India was worth $41.82 billion, with the over trade being a record $63.7 billion – an increase of 1.7 per cent from the previous year.31

The Modi government has raised some ray of hope that it might liberally promote FDI in multiple sectors of the Indian economy. As reported in The Times, the Modi government’s priority is to “revive economy”, and encourage Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 a “more reforms, more growth” formula.32 This is partly manifested in the Modi government’s first budget, presented in the parliament in July 2014, raising FDI from 26 per cent to 49 per cent in the insurance and defence sectors. In his keynote address on “Improving US–India Trade Relations”, organized by the National Association of Manufacturers, Senator Mark Warner, Co-Chair of the Senate India Caucus, said that the Modi government “provides a wonderful opportunity to reset the Indo-US relationship”,33 and highly praised its “bold agenda” in raising the FDI cap in various sectors 122 India–US strategic dialogue

Table 5.1 US trade in goods with India, 2014

Month Exports Imports Balance

January 2014 1,582.4 3,675.4 −2,093.0 February 2014 1,366.9 3,043.0 −1,676.1 March 2014 1,714.2 3,882.2 −2,168.0 April 2014 1,401.1 4,457.9 −3,056.8 TOTAL 2014 6,064.7 15,058.6 −8,993.9

Source: “Trade in Goods with India”, United States Census Bureau. www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html, accessed 13 January 2016. All figures are in millions of US dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding.

Table 5.2 US trade in goods with India, 2013

Month Exports Imports Balance

January 2013 1,726.9 3,179.9 −1,453.0 February 2013 1,561.1 2,829.0 −1,268.0 March 2013 1,865.2 3,676.8 −1,811.6 April 2013 1,656.9 4,069.5 −2,412.6 May 2013 1,924.2 4,201.3 −2,277.0 June 2013 2,365.7 3,410.8 −1,045.1 July 2013 1,885.1 3,973.2 −2,088.1 August 2013 2,068.8 3,615.6 −1,546.8 September 2013 1,631.7 3,321.0 −1,689.2 October 2013 1,741.6 3,690.4 −1,948.8 November 2013 1,855.5 2,862.6 −1,007.1 December 2013 1,559.5 3,015.3 −1,455.8 TOTAL 2013 21,842.3 41,845.3 −20,003.0

Source: “Trade in Goods with India”, United States Census Bureau. www. census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5330.html, accessed 13 January 2016. All figures are in millions of US dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding.

like insurance and defence. Reportedly, the US manufacturing sector, which had launched an anti-India campaign, welcomed Modi’s offer to America to partner with India in the manufacturing sector.34 Besides, Modi’s Gujarat Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 model, if applied in the country, might further bolster India–US private sector ties. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide details of US trade in goods with India in 2013 and 2014. It is important to bear in mind whether the Modi government will be able to tide over the monumental challenges facing India–US relations on the trade and investment front. Whether the government will succeed in accelerating the process of further economic reform to attract US entrepreneurs and investors is a big question. For example, while raising the issue of trade India–US strategic dialogue 123 facilitation and the WTO standoff, Prime Minister Modi said during his summit meeting with President Obama at the White House on 30 September 2014, “India supports trade facilitation, but I also hope that we are able to find a solution to our food security concerns”. This clearly implies that India will continue blocking the trade facilitation agreement unless its food security concerns are taken into account.35 In brief, the bright prospects of US companies’ investment in India are constrained by India’s lack of structural reforms, “procedural impediments”, and the “economic populism” of Modi. Unless Modi addresses the built-in misgivings and concerns of US companies, they will not be willing to invest capital and technology in India. Economic cooperation can be accelerated provided that the Modi government, albeit with a huge political mandate, is capable of rationalizing procedural hurdles, opening more markets, implementing policy reforms, and providing a congenial business environment to foreign investors. At the same time, Ashley Tellis has made it absolutely clear that America is unable to financially support Modi’s ambitious mega projects. He writes:

Unlike China and Japan, which possess huge investible reserves, thanks largely to U.S. consumption of their goods, the United States lacks the kind of sovereign wealth funds that would permit it to funnel tens of billions of dollars toward financing Modi’s priority projects.36

Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in an interview with NDTV on 21 June 2014, on the other hand, clearly revealed her mind, saying that Modi needs to prove “by his actions” that his government is socially inclusive, and that “he is the Prime Minister for all of India”.37 She expressed optimism that India–US relations under the Modi government would further flourish.38 Such pronouncements may sound comforting in theory. But if the Modi government suffers from vacuous vision like the UPA, which was charged with policy paralysis, it would be a Herculean task to take the country forward or outpace China in the economic, trade and investment sectors despite the loud promises made by Modi during his electioneering campaigns. In this murky scenario, the Obama administration will need to read between the lines of the BJP’s tall claims in order to articulate the new policy approach towards a resurgent India. The US administration has yet to see whether the Modi government will be able to ensure sufficient economic space for US firms to invest Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 in diverse sectors of the Indian economy. Secretary of State John Kerry, during his visit to Delhi in July 2014 in connection with the fifth round of strategic dialogue, was looking optimistic that the new government would liberally open the doors to US firms for investment in India. Moreover, India is interested in importing Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) from the US, and has been seeking permission for export to India. However, to US disenchantment, negotiations have not yet been concluded on the Bilateral Investment Treaty, which in 124 India–US strategic dialogue the American perception is critically vital for promoting economic growth in both countries.

Homeland security dialogue In order to meet common security challenges in the twenty-first century, India and the United States agreed to establish a Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism in February 2000. The inaugural meeting of the US–India Counterterrorism Working Group was held on 8 February 2000 in Washington, while the joint statement stated:

The two sides expressed concern at the growing menace of international terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking. They unequivocally con- demned all acts, methods, and practice of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.39

Further, during the visit of President Bill Clinton to India in March 2000, he and Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee agreed “that the Joint Working Group should continue to meet regularly and become an effective mechanism for the two countries to share information and intensify their co-operation in combating terrorism”.40 According to the Fact Sheet released by the US Department of State, 31 July 2014, following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, “the United States and India have continued to expand counterterrorism and homeland security cooperation, enhancing global as well as bilateral security through ongoing dialogues, capacity building initiatives, and multilateral efforts such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum”.41 Moving forward, India and the United States signed an agreement on the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative in July 2010 “to expand collaboration on counter-terrorism, information sharing and capacity building”.42 Under this arrangement, India and the United States have pledged to cooperate with each other to dry up the financial sources of terrorist groups, while America has also reassured India about extending US services of scientific and technological expertise to deal suitably with post-serial blast scenarios. In this regard, US investigating agencies offered their technology-driven expertise and “operational cooperation” to India Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 to expedite the process to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks in November 2008 to justice. During President Barack Obama’s visit to India in November 2010, both governments agreed to set up a homeland security dialogue in order to counter terrorist threats to their internal security. As part of the follow-up action, its first meeting was held in New Delhi, beginning on 27 May 2011, in which India’s Home Minister P. Chidambaram and his counterpart Janet Napolitano, US Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, India–US strategic dialogue 125 participated. Both leaders underlined the imperative of mutual cooperation in fighting terrorism. Chidambaram pointed out to Napolitano that India “lives in perhaps the most difficult neighbourhood in the world. The global epicentre of terrorism is in our immediate western neighbourhood.”43 For her part, Napolitano emphasized that since both countries face a “common threat”, they “must develop common approaches to protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring free flow of people and commerce across our borders”.44 Both Chidambaram and Napolitano pledged to “combat terrorism and other challenges, including cyber security, transnational crimes and counter- feit currency”.45 In a joint statement, they agreed to share ideas and experience of the ongoing transformation of their countries’ security-related organizational structures and systems, as well as regulatory frameworks in a democratic and federal environment.46 Chidambaram further elaborated that a vast infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan has for too long flour- ished as an instrument of state policy. He stated, “Our cooperation must cover all aspects of the challenges that we face: anticipating and predicting threats, taking preventive and pre-emptive measures, or responding effectively and quickly to incidents”.47 Napolitano briefed Chidambaram that America had fully cooperated in facilitating India’s “full access” to David Coleman Headley, who was instrumental in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. It should be added that Headley attended over 50 training sessions with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He also confessed his involvement in the Mumbai attacks under cross-examination by defence attorney Charles D. Swift. Accordingly, the District Judge of Chicago Court awarded Headley 35 years of imprisonment. India still needs a more “robust homeland security enterprise”. A group of authors who carried out a research project on US–India homeland security cooperation point out that the private sector offers itself as a domain for increased cooperation and coordination on homeland security matters, as it “plays an important role in building India’s critical infrastructure and is a major actor in ensuring the country’s safety and security”.48 They add a caveat: “However, the development of an effective Indian homeland security enterprise faces a variety of challenges at the political, organizational, technological, and even societal levels. These obstacles must be identified and overcome to improve India’s homeland security enterprise.”49 The authors further observe that India was exposed Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 to helplessness before terrorists on account of lack of modern arms and fire services. They note:

Mumbai’s first responders were overwhelmed in the early minutes of the assaults. Local police officers, many armed only with bamboo sticks and lacking body armour, were powerless to stop the terrorists, while ambu- lances and fire services proved ill-equipped for the crisis, which lasted three days.50 126 India–US strategic dialogue In the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee hearings, Secretary Clinton was asked by the Committee Chairman John Kerry and Ben Cardin, Democrat of Maryland, to “explain why, despite $2.8 billion being channelled into Pakistan last year [2010], there is clear evidence that their intelligence agency, ISI, is assisting and funding a terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and that is inconsistent with our laws”.51 Secretary Clinton replied that Pakistan needed “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, by which it meant a regime in Kabul and a border that were not going to challenge its interests.52 This was reflective of her myopic vision, or rather a biased view in legitimizing Pakistan’s strategic intrusion into Afghanistan on the one hand, and undermining the US priority of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan on the other hand. The Taliban’s multiple attacks on the capital Kabul on 15 April 2012, including targeting the British and German embassies, and also NATO forces (which lost their 12 personnel in the attack), was a great setback to President Obama, who had publicly claimed his success in fighting against the Taliban. It sent a clear message to Obama that the Taliban had reemerged as a force to be reckoned with, capable enough of challenging the US and its allies. In effect, the Taliban has good prospects to rule the roost after the complete withdrawal of American troops by the end of 2016. Nevertheless, the Obama administration is gripped by a profound dilemma. On the one hand, the administration’s prime concern is to repair its fractured ties with Pakistan, the logistical and intelligence support of which is indispensable in fighting and defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements. On the other hand, the administration has no specific clues in bringing the perpetrators of the 26/11 attacks to justice, since America does not have the political leverage over Pakistan which it had in the past. As mentioned earlier, strategic dialogue is a potential mechanism for deepening India–US ties in myriad fields of common interest. In the forthcoming sections, some key issues will be taken up: notable among them are India’s quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the global and regional security architecture, and space cooperation.

India’s case for permanent membership of the Security Council India has long been a serious aspirant for permanent membership in the reformed Security Council. It fulfils all the eligibility criteria laid out by Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the UN, except that it is not a signatory to the NPT and CTBT. Moreover, President George W. Bush declared India “a most responsible” nuclear state, with no history of transferring any sensitive nuclear material or equipment to a third party. Although initially the Bush administration was reluctant to support India’s bid for permanent membership of the Council, it rectified its “administrative aberration” later on. Secretary Rice acknowledged India’s global role in promoting democratic institutions, and therefore supported India’s permanent membership of the Security Council. She said, India–US strategic dialogue 127 “International organizations in general will have to take into account India’s growing role in the world in order to be updated and to be effective”.53 Given India’s incredible peace credentials, President Obama pledged to support India’s bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council while making his speech to the Indian parliament in November 2010.54 The administration perceives that supporting India’s permanent membership is in the US long-term interest since there are no core issues of clashing interest between the two countries. In this regard, Ashley Tellis argues that

supporting permanent membership for India will entail no costs to the United States … India’s presence on the Security Council would be likely to be beneficial to the United States because there are no inherent conflicts of interests on fundamental questions between the two countries. India would continue to be available as a potential partner in any future “coalition of the willing” and propensity to play this role would only be enhanced if Washington were seen to promote India’s quest for status enhancement in various international bodies.55

Critics point out that at times the American argument does not sound convincing that the United States supports India’s candidature on the ground of its being the largest functional democracy. This is so much anodyne rhetoric of the politico-bureaucratic apparatus. The point I wish to hammer out is that US support needs to be seen as a long-term investment aimed at deriving India’s support on global and regional issues in the Council. Strategic analysts believe that, as China steadily grows in power and influence, it will be more obdurate and obstructionist, and naturally America might find it much more difficult to deal with China. Whatever inferences one may draw, it is certain that America feels itself much more comfortable in the company of a democratic and pliant India. Also, America is aware of India’s penchant for enhancing its stature in international institutions. And naturally America will wish to capitalize on this to advance its own national interests. In the administration’s perception, India’s permanent membership would be a fitting counterweight to China’s assertive role in Asia. President Obama reiterated the US backing of India’s permanent membership during his summit meeting with Prime Minister Singh at the White House in September 2013. In their joint statement, Obama praised India’s seminal contribution to the UN. The statement read, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016

Noting the contributions of Indian peacekeepers to global peace and stability for 60 years, the Leaders decided to expand their United Nations peacekeeping cooperation, including capacity building efforts with third countries. Reaffirming that in the years ahead, the United States looks forward to a reformed UN Security Council with India as a permanent member, President Obama and Prime Minister Singh agreed that both their nations bear a responsibility to ensure that the Security Council 128 India–US strategic dialogue continues to effectively play the role in maintaining international peace and security envisioned in the United Nations Charter.56

Be that as it may, the political environment in India has undergone a major transformation at the structural and institutional levels with the change of guards in New Delhi. A couple of questions are raised. Will the Modi government accelerate or impede the pace and dynamism of Indo-US ties? Will Modi’s non-secular image fit in with the US political agenda of promoting liberal and secular values? In pragmatic terms, America is serious about doing business with India rather than being concerned about Modi’s ideological roots. President Obama has made it abundantly clear that his administration has no problem in working with Modi. Rather, he has publicly praised Modi as “a man of action”, even though his political moorings are ineluctably rooted in the nursery of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). But Indian critics and political commentators apprehend the primacy of the RSS, of which Modi is a product in social and cultural terms, in making crucial decisions on national, regional, and international issues with an intent to fulfil its agenda.

Global security India has a track record of being the frontline crusader for global disarmament ever since its independence in August 1947. It may be recalled that India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a staunch supporter of a nuclear-weapon-free world. He called upon the world community to endorse his proposal for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the early 1950s. President George W. Bush reminded Indian ruling leaders of Nehru’s unqualified commitment to and unequivocal support for a permanent ban on all kinds of nuclear tests. He, therefore, urged India to respect his commitment, and set an example by signing the NPT and CTBT. Though India disappointed the international community by declining to sign, the Indian ruling class reaffirmed its pledge to “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons and a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests in future. The Bush administration was fully convinced about India’s impeccable record as a responsible nuclear power. In light of that, President Bush left no stone unturned in persuading Congress to amend the US Atomic Energy Act 1954, as an exceptional case. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 India’s international nuclear isolation as a “pariah” state ended after more than three decades with the granting of waiver by the NSG in September 2008. To India’s dismay, Austria, New Zealand, and some other countries, including China, had opposed the waiver on the grounds that India did not abide by the IAEA’s guidelines, norms, and rules pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation. America made a “strategic bet” on India’s productive role in enhancing peace and security, globally and regionally. India’s commitment to establishing India–US strategic dialogue 129 the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership was reflected in the pledge taken at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, DC. The initiative for the NSS was taken by President Obama in order to raise global awareness about the imperative of tightening control over nuclear materials, preventing sabotage of nuclear assets, and strictly observing transparency to make sure that nuclear material is neither stolen nor transferred to non-state actors – extremist groups. In his historic Prague speech in April 2009, President Obama highlighted the need to bring nuclear materials across the world under national and international control, and he set a target of four years to accomplish this task. Toward that goal, Obama declared that “we will set new standards, expand our cooperation with Russia, [and] pursue new partnerships to lock down these sensitive materials”.57 This objective has yet to be achieved. The Director General of the IAEA, Yukiya Amano, acknowledged in 2013 that “over a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthor- ized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials are reported to the IAEA every year … Some material goes missing and is never found.”58 President Obama called upon the participating nations to commit to reducing the use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and to strengthen national registration and protection of radioactive sources. The difficulty before America is that in today’s world of interdependence, it is unable to force nations to cooperate fully to ensure the security and safety of nuclear materials. In other words, there are constraints on American power that inhibit it from achieving what it desires to achieve.59 So far as India is concerned, its approach to global security is a mix of caution and pragmatism. Though India has regularly participed in the Nuclear Security Summit process, its transparency on the security of nuclear assets and arrangements is questionable. P.R.Chari, one of India’s strategic commentators, writes,

The summits elicited commitments to stronger security measures but failed to convince New Delhi to increase transparency regarding its nuclear security practices. So far, the summits have proved unable to break through India’s penchant for secrecy on what it considers to be matters of national security, so the country’s nuclear security arrangements remain somewhat opaque.60

India has pledged to cooperate on global security-related issues like global Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 terror and non-traditional threats. It has committed over 2 billion US dollars for infrastructure development in Afghanistan – an epicentre of terror – and supports an inclusive Afghanistan. The Obama administration is synchronizing its post-withdrawal strategies in consultation and coordination with India to ensure an internally secure and politically stable Afghanistan. Also, India and America are working closely together to effectively deal with the threat of nuclear and narco-terrorism as well as to prevent nuclear material or nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of 130 India–US strategic dialogue extremists and jihadi organizations. For this, New Delhi and Washington need to have proper coordination between their various intelligence and security agencies.61 To be sure, India’s overall record in promoting the causes of the NSS has been impressive. First, India has complied with legal obligations to ensure security of nuclear materials. Second, India has neither shared nor transferred sensitive nuclear enrichment technology or fissile material to any third party. Third, India is a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and has also ratified it. Fourth, India is a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. P.R. Chari writes,

In addition, India’s record in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which is concerned with preventing trafficking in materials, technology, and equipment relevant to nuclear security, has been exemplary. More significantly, no case of leakage of nuclear materials from India’s extensive nuclear programme, inadvertent or advertent, has ever come to light.62

At the same time, Chari has charged India’s top bureaucracy with harming the national interests by its reluctance to “make public information about its on-site and off-site emergency response arrangements for its civilian nuclear facilities … a general preference for secrecy that stems from the ingrained belief that transparency compromises national security”.63 Moreover, America expects India to be more transparent on the question of the safety of nuclear reactors. It is also feared that coastal areas where India has installed nuclear reactors are cyclone-prone. This is still a debatable issue that needs to be addressed by the Indian government to dispel public doubts. Besides, there is no proper coordination between India’s nuclear policy establishment, and external affairs and defence ministries, making the decision-making process more complex. As a result, India has not fulfilled the commitment it made at the NSS held in Seoul in 2012 to establish an independent regulatory board to oversee its nuclear energy programme. Despite these lapses on India’s part, the latter has reassured America that its commitment to global disarmament is firm and unshakable. In a joint statement issued at the White House during Prime Minister Singh’s meeting with President Obama in September 2013, both leaders reaf- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 firmed their commitment to the global non-proliferation regime. The joint statement read:

In the spirit of their continuing non-proliferation cooperation, the Leaders reviewed the close cooperation of the United States and India to realize India’s intention of joining the multilateral export control regimes. The President reaffirmed the United States support for India’s early membership in these groups. Looking ahead to the 2014 Nuclear India–US strategic dialogue 131 Security Summit in The Hague, India and the United States also will deepen their cooperation, including through the 2010 Memorandum of Understanding with India’s Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, to strengthen global nuclear security. The Leaders stressed the need for diplomacy to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme, and called on Iran to comply with its IAEA and UN Security Council obligations.64

Both leaders deplored the use of chemical weapons by Syria, and stressed that global norms prohibiting the use of chemical weapons must be strictly adhered to by the world community. But the situation in Syria turned worse and more catastrophic due to the US “reluctance to take a leadership role”, and its unwillingness to intervene there militarily. “The conflict in Syria is affecting three core U.S. interests in the Middle East – the security of U.S. allies, the defeat of terrorists who threaten Americans, and the prevention of the development or use of weapons of mass destruction.”65 On the contrary, Russian influence has vastly increased in Syria since President Obama chose to stay away from the civil war there. It is a patent fact that unless Russia fully cooperates in implementing the Security Council’s resolutions passed against Syria, it is well nigh impossible to tackle the ongoing civil war in Syria effectively.66 This apart, America needs to understand the peculiar geopsychology of ruling leaders belonging to volatile regions such as Middle East Asia, in order to elicit their cooperation on strengthening the global non-proliferation regime. In fact, the obduracy of these ruling leaders in not complying with non-proliferation norms is linked to history, culture, nationalism, and religious beliefs, and the belief systems of their countries, communities, and people.67 Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are cases in point. Their autocratic leaders are psychologically prepared to suffer any cost or consequences provided that America and the world community respect their sensibilities and sense of nationalism and understand their psyche and psychopathological frame of mind.68

Regional security The United States had assigned a low priority to South Asia throughout the Cold War period except during the military presence of the Soviet Union Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 in Afghanistan (1979–1989), when America had to fixate on Pakistan for its inevitable strategic support in forcing the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as manifest in the US assigning Pakistan the status of a “frontline state” in its global strategy. As mentioned elsewhere in the book, America’s allergy to India’s non-aligned policy produced a widening hiatus in the Indo-US bilateral relationship. It was attributed partly to the hawkish academic and strategic analysts who projected India as the United States’ incorrigible adversary, and partly to the vacuous vision of American policy makers who 132 India–US strategic dialogue perceived India through Cold War prisms. That is how India was alienated from the United States.69 Without going into details of the horrendous consequences of the Cold War project, India was provoked into tilting towards the Soviet Union in the changing geopolitical environment in South Asia when the triangular relationship of Pakistan, America, and China was visibly poised against India. A radical transformation in the geopolitical and strategic trajectory occurred after the demise of the Soviet Union, which was a major irritant between New Delhi and Washington during the Cold War. India’s moral claim of clinging to an ideological purity in its foreign policy remained no longer valid. Naturally, a new chapter of understanding began between the two countries. Let it be noted that two major developments contributed to the US renewed interest in South Asia – a “flash point of conflict”. First, the emergence of India and Pakistan as de facto nuclear weapon states in May 1998 dealt a serious blow to the US non-proliferation goal. This point has been discussed in details in other chapters. Second, in the aftermath of the dastardly terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and on the Pentagon in Washington, DC on 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush was caught in the quagmire of an unpredictable challenge of unprecedented intensity and scale. Consequently, the Bush administration lifted multiple sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan to garner their unqualified support for the US global war on terror. In fact, the 9/11 tragedy sent shock waves across the world. President Bush declared that the foundation of his country was too strong to be shaken up by any evil force in the world. To meet the challenge of terror, the Bush administration (2001–2009) focused primarily on (i) rooting out terrorism from the globe, especially its epicentre in Afghanistan and Pakistan; (ii) ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials and assets in South Asia; and (iii) preventing extremist groups and jihadi elements from controlling or possessing nukes. The administration perceived that the control of nuclear assets by extremists would mean an occurrence of the worst possible tragedy at the global and regional level. In this regard, several questions emerge. What can India do to prevent the tragedy? Why does India loom large in US non-proliferation policy? How can India and the United States defeat the existential nuclear threat, especially from indigenous extremist groups and jihadists in the Af-Pak region? It is a truism that South Asia Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 is faced with the enormity of nuclear threat. To deal with it, India and America need to undertake collective and well-coordinated security efforts by strengthening the non-proliferation regime, preventing theft of nuclear materials, and improving the nuclear command and control systems in the region. However, India and the United States need to manage their differences over Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China. They cannot have a hundred per cent convergence on all regional or global security issues. But there is a strong current India–US strategic dialogue 133 of converging interests that impels them to cooperate, for instance, in building Afghan capacity for governance and internal stability, and in eliminating “safe havens” in Pakistan for the purpose of regional security and stability. As Evan A. Feigenbaum writes,

The United States and India share important interests: both seek to restore global growth, protect the global commons, enhance global energy security, and ensure a balance of power in Asia. They must therefore increase the scope, quality, and intensity of their cooperation at every level. But the ultimate test of their relationship will be whether Washington and New Delhi can turn their common interests into complementary policies around the world.70

The real challenge to Indo-US cooperative enterprise to ensure the security of nuclear assets in the South Asian region comes from extremists and indigenous jihadi elements operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The developments in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad have demonstrated that the Sharif government is too weak to resist even a mild challenge from indigenous extremist groups. The mercurial political environment in Pakistan presents the real dilemma before New Delhi and Washington as to how to fight jihadists and radical extremists. There is no specific or precise answer in sight at the moment.

Space cooperation India has made significant strides in designing, developing, and opera tionalizing space systems over the past four decades for vital services such as telecommunication, television broadcasting, meteorology, disaster warning, and natural resources survey and management. Towards this, it has established operational space systems, such as the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) and Indian Remote Sensing (IRS), and mechanisms to launch these spacecrafts through PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle).71 As regards India–US space cooperation, it began in the early 1960s when India launched the first US-made rocket, Nike-Apache, from Thumba in November 1963 to conduct ionospheric experiments over the earth’s magnetic equator. India conducted the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 (SITE) in the mid-1970s with NASA. According the Indian Embassy in Washington, DC:

This [SITE] was followed by the establishment of the multipurpose Indian National Satellite (INSAT) System in the 80s. All the four satellites under INSAT-1 series were built by a US company to India’s specifications and three of them were put into orbit by US launch vehicles including INSAT-1B, orbited by the US space Shuttle Challenger. Today, INSAT 134 India–US strategic dialogue has become one of the largest domestic satellite systems in the Asia Pacific region, with all satellites designed and built in India. In continuation to this series of satellites, INSAT-4CR was launched on September 2, 2007 using GSLV from Sriharikota giving further boost to INSAT capability, especially for Direct-To-Home (DTH) television broadcast.72

Since then, space cooperation between India and the United States has been expanding in myriad areas such as space science, earth observation, satellite navigation, Microwave Remote Sensing (MRS), and disaster management.73 They pursued civil space cooperation under the framework of the Joint Working Group on Civil Space in the early twenty-first century. America has demonstrated interest in India’s Chandrayan mission. India launched the Mars Orbiter Mission in 2013. Moreover, it created history when the Indian Mangalyaan, launched in September 2014, entered the Mars orbit successfully in the first attempt. As reported, “With this, India has become the first nation in the world to have entered the Mars orbit in the first attempt. ISRO’s MOM is also the cheapest such mission till now.”74 NASA provided deep space navigation and tracking support services to the mission.

India’s earlier Moon mission, Chandrayaan-1, had two instruments from the United States: the Mini Synthetic Aperture Radar from the Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory and the Moon Mineralogy Mapper, an imaging spectrometer from Brown University and JPL. The Moon Mineralogy Mapper sensor was used in determining the existence of water molecules on the lunar surface.75

Further, the space agencies of India and the United States are collaborating on several projects, including the launching of L- and S-band synthetic aperture radar satellites to better understand earth’s ecosystems to identify earthquake fault-lines, and dormant volcanoes. NASA has already recognized the accomplished skills of India’s space scientists. It is willing to collaborate with India in space research. Many Indians have been drafted into various research programmes on space security. It must also be noted that space collaboration between the two countries has a strategic content, prodding both countries to chalk out a long-term

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 strategy to ensure space security vis-à-vis China’s space projects. Also, India, America, and Japan have undertaken a collaborative venture to monitor China’s space projects to ensure that space can be made safe. This is a gigantic task before the like-minded nations, as China’s space surveillance activities are on the increase, with global ramifications.76 However, India and the United States have both the talent and the scope to collaborate in space research to protect the interests of the international community in a safe and secure space. India–US strategic dialogue 135

Conclusion If viewed from a holistic perspective, strategic dialogue has set up important benchmarks in advancing Indo-US ties in new areas such as cyber and space security, clean energy, and intelligence sharing on homeland security. Though shared interests have prompted India and the US to come closer on security challenges in the IOR, they have not spelt out as yet the specific roadmap to effectively meet the challenges emanating from piracy in the Gulf and the Malacca Strait, as well as from the fallout of China’s naval expansion and its strategic engagement in the Indian Ocean. Also, no blueprint has been prepared so far by India and the US to jointly deal with an impending threat to their security and strategic interests following China’s increasing strategic intrusion in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf region. Similarly, no substantial progress has been registered pertaining to the concrete outcome of the two regional dialogues – on the Middle East and Central Asia – which were initiated a couple of years ago. This apart, the two countries have done little to address the long-term implications of China’s recent political, economic, and strategic hob-nobbing with Afghanistan through the good offices of Pakistan. On the non-proliferation issue, though both countries have made commitments to deepening their bilateral ties in the global and regional security realms, the persisting conflicting perceptions on the NPT, CTBT, and PSI, including Iran’s nuclear programme, have probably diluted the spirit of the strategic dialogue. Moreover, the United States does not subscribe to the geopsychological swing against it, stemming from psycho-cultural prejudices of the people and ruling elites of the volatile regions of South Asia and the Middle East.

Notes

1 Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 34. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 William J. Burns, “India’s Rise and the Promise of U.S.–Indian Partnership”, 1 June 2010. www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2010/136718.htm, accessed 14 January 2016. 5 “US–India Joint Statement”, Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, 20 July 2009. www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126230.htm, accessed 13 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 6 At the first US–India strategic dialogue held in Washington, DC in June 2010, India’s External Affairs Minister Krishna was accompanied by Minister for Human Resource Development Kapil Sibal, Deputy Chairman Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia, and Minister of State for Science and Technology Prithviraj Chavan, as well as officials of the Government of India. Secretary Hillary Clinton was joined by Commerce Secretary Gary Locke, FBI Director Robert Mueller, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden, the President’s Advisor for Science and Technology John Paul Holdren, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah, Deputy National Security Advisor Michael Froman, and other high-ranking US 136 India–US strategic dialogue Government officials. “U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement”, Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State, 3 June 2010. www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2010/06/142645.htm, accessed 13 January 2016. 7 Ibid. 8 William Burns, “India’s Rise and the Promise of U.S.–Indian Partnership”, Speech at Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 1 June 2010. www.state.gov/p/ us/rm/2010/136718.htm, accessed 13 January 2016. 9 Ibid. 10 “The New Masters and Commanders”, The Economist, 8 June 2013. www .economist.com/news/international/21579039-chinas-growing-empire-ports-a broad-mainly-about-trade-not-aggression-new-masters, accessed 13 January 2016. 11 “PM Narendra Modi has Raised Issue of Chinese Incursions with President Xi Jinping”, DNA India, 17 September 2014. www.dnaindia.com/india/report-pm- narendra-modi-has-raised-issue-of-chinese-incursions-with-president-xi- jinping-says-mea-2019533, accessed 13 January 2016. 12 “After Modi-Xi Meeting, China Agrees to Settle Border Dispute Soon, Demarcate LAC” www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/asiantigersmeet/let-china- india-unite-in-development-says-xi/article1-1265395.aspx. 13 Romi Jain, “Invitations and Incursions, Discussions and Dilemmas in India–China Relations – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, 8 August 2014. http://strategicstudyindia. blogspot.co.uk/2014/08/invitations-and-incursions-discussions.html, accessed 13 January 2016. 14 “U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement”. 15 Jason Harmarla, “India–US Strategic Dialogue: Ambassador Rao’s Prepared Remarks – 5/30/12”, Atlantic Council, 30 May 2012. www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/ past-events/indiaus-strategic-dialogue-ambassador-raos-prepared-remarks-5-30-12, accessed 14 January 2016. 16 “Joint Statement on the Third U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue”, Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, 13 June 2012. www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2012/06/192267.htm, accessed 13 January 2016. 17 Ibid. 18 “Joint Statement on the Fifth India–U.S. Strategic Dialogue”, Ministry of External Affairs, 31 July 2014. www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/23799, accessed 13 January 2016. 19 For details, see Barbara Starr, Joshua Berlinger, and Raja Razek, “US Military Carries out Airstrikes, Aid Drops to Iraqi Town Surrounded by ISIS”, CNN, 31 August 2014. www.cnn.com/2014/08/30/world/meast/isis-iraq-syria/index.html, accessed 13 January 2016. 20 See “Software Piracy Rate Falls to 60%, but Costs Industry $2.9 bn”, The Hindu Business Line, 24 June 2014. www.thehindubusinessline.com/features/ smartbuy/tech-news/software-piracy-rate-falls-to-60-but-costs-industry-29-bn/ article6145366.ece, accessed 13 January 2016; see also N.K. Nair, A.K. Barman, and Utpal Chattopadhyay, “Study on Copyright Piracy in India”, sponsored by Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, 1999. http://copyright.gov.in/documents/study%20on%20copyright%20piracy%20 in%20india.pdf, accessed 13 January 2016. 21 For a comprehensive critique of this point, see William C. Potter, “India and the New Look of US Non-Proliferation Policy”, Nonroliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2005): pp. 343–54. 22 New York Times, 1 October 2014. 23 Ibid. 24 Subhash Agrawal, “India and the United States: A New Partnership”, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2 (June 2013): p. 59. India–US strategic dialogue 137

25 For full text see “President Clinton’s Visit to India: Institutional Dialogue between India and the United States”, Government of India, March 2000. http://pib.nic.in/ archieve/indous/indouspr2.html, accessed 13 January 2016. 26 “Barack Obama’s India Visit – Outsourcing US’ Economic Crisis to India”, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, 9 November 2010. www.europe-solidaire.org/ spip.php?article19271, accessed 14 January 2016. 27 Nayanima Basu, “India–US Trade Ties Hit a New Low”, Business Standard, 1 March 2014. www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-us- trade-ties-hit-a-new-low-114030100685_1.html, accessed 13 January 2016. 28 Ibid. 29 Gardiner Harris, “Medicines Made in India Set Off Safety Worries”, The New York Times, 14 February 2014. www.nytimes.com/2014/02/15/world/asia/ medicines-made-in-india-set-off-safety-worries.html?_r=0, accessed 13 January 2016. 30 For details see Basu, “India–US Trade Ties Hit a New Low”. 31 Basu, “India–US Trade Ties Hit a New Low”, further reports, “The US is the fifth largest source of foreign direct investments to India. According to official statistics of September 2013, the cumulative FDI inflows from the US from April 2000 to March 2013 amounted to about $11.6 billion – that’s nearly 6 per cent of the total FDI into India”. 32 The Times, 2 June 2014. 33 “Narendra Modi Government Offers Wonderful Opportunity to Reset Indo-US Ties, Says US Senator Mark Warner”, The Economic Times, 4 June 2014. http:// articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-06-04/news/50329866_1_senator- mark-warner-senate-india-caucus-manufacturing-sector, accessed 13 January 2016. 34 Ibid. 35 “Modi’s US Visit: Modi and Obama Look to Strengthen Indo-US Defence Ties; PM Invites US Defence Firms to Invest in India”, The Economic Times, 30 September 2014. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/43918063. cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst, accessed 13 January 2016. 36 Ashley Tellis, “Kick-Starting US–India Strategic Partnership”, 22 September 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/22/kick-starting-u.s.-indian-strategic -partnership, accessed 13 January 2016. 37 For the full text of Hillary Clinton’s interview with NDTV, 22 June 2014, see www.ndtv.com/india-news/full-transcript-hillary-clinton-to-ndtv-on-iraq-pm- modi-and-plans-for-2016-579939, accessed 13 January 2016. 38 Contrary to his poll promises of acche din (good days), Narendra Modi has so far not been able to deliver on the front of poverty alleviation, including redressal of the grievances of farmers, or transparency in governance. 39 “Joint U.S.–India Statement on Counter-terrorism Working Group”, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, released by the US Department, 8 February 2000. www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=363, accessed 13 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 40 “President Clinton’s Visit to India”. 41 “U.S.–India Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Cooperation”, Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, 31 July 2014. www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2014/07/230049.htm, accessed 13 January 2016. 42 “Brief on India–US Relations”, Embassy of India, Washington, DC. www. indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=41, accessed 13 January 2016. 43 The Hindu, 28 May 2011. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 138 India–US strategic dialogue

48 Brianna Fitch et al., “US–India Homeland Security Cooperation: A Report of the CSIS Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program”, June 2013. http://csis. org/files/publication/130618_Nelson_US-IndiaHomeland_WEB.pdf, accessed 13 January 2016. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 The Hindu, 25 June 2011. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid., p. 35. 54 China’s stance on India’s membership in the reformed UN is ambiguous. On this issue, Chinese leaders have consistently reiterated the official line that India is “well-qualified” and “deserves” to be a permanent member in the Security Council. But they have never said that China will support India’s case. 55 Tellis, India as a New Global Leader, p. 36. 56 “U.S.–India Joint Statement”, The White House, 27 September 2013. www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/us-india-joint-statement, accessed 13 January 2016. 57 P.R. Chari, “India’s Role in the Hague Nuclear Security Summit”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 March 2014. http://carnegieendowment. org/2014/03/18/india-s-role-in-hague-nuclear-security-summit/h4iw, accessed 13 January 2016. 58 Ibid. 59 For an interesting conceptual debate over alliance versus alignment, see Thomas Wilkins, “Alignment, Not Alliance – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2012): pp. 53–76. 60 See P.R. Chari, “India’s Role in the Hague Nuclear Security Summit”. 61 Sunjoy Joshi et al., “Beyond the Plateau in U.S.–India Relations”, The Heritage Foundation, 26 April 2013. www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond- the-plateau-in-us-india-relations, accessed 11 January 2016. 62 Chari, Indo–US Nuclear Deal. 63 Ibid. 64 “US–India Joint Statement”, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 27 September 2013. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/us-india-joint- statement, accessed 14 January 2016. 65 Michael Dunne, “The Costs of U.S. Restraint in Syria”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9 June 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/ costs-of-u.s.-restraint-in-syria, accessed 13 January 2016. 66 See Hussein Solomon, Challenges to Global Security, Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), chapter 1, pp. 27–54 and chapter 12, pp. 271–78. 67 For a detailed discussion and critique of the concept of geopsychology see B.M. Jain, “South Asia in the Global Age”, in India in the New South Asia: Strategic, Military And Economic Concerns in the Age of Nuclear Diplomacy (London: IB Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Tauris, 2010), chapter 1, pp. 1–20; also, for the application of the geopsychological paradigm, see B.M. Jain, “India–Pakistan Engagement with the Greater Middle East: Implications and Options”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology Journal, Vol. 6, Nos. 1–3 (special issue, 2007): pp. 459–82. 68 For a perceptive analysis of this, see Jain, “South Asia in the Global Age”. 69 For a comprehensive background to this, see Stephen P. Cohen, “Balancing Interests: The US and the Subcontinent”, National Interest (Fall 1987): pp. 74–84. 70 Evan A. Feigenbaum, “India’s Rise, America’s Interest: The Fate of the US–Indian Partnership”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2 (March–April 2010): pp. 76–91 (p. 91). India–US strategic dialogue 139

71 “India–US Space Cooperation”, Embassy of India, Washington, DC. www.indianembassy.org/pages.php?id=54, accessed 13 January 2016. 72 Ibid. 73 “U.S.–India Joint Fact Sheet: Cooperation in Space”, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, 24 June 2013. 74 The Economic Times, 24 September 2014. 75 “Commentary. Space Cooperation: A Vital New Front for India–U.S. Relations”, Space News, 7 April 2014. www.spacenews.com/article/opinion/40127space- cooperation-a-vital-new-front-for-india-us-relations, accessed 13 January 2016. 76 Leonard David, “China Space Programme Ramping Up Capabilities, Pentagon Says”, Space.com, 21 May 2013. www.space.com/21251-china-space- capabilities-pentagon-report.html, accessed 13 January 2016. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 6 India–US relations The China factor

“We are more often frightened than hurt; and we suffer more from imagination than from reality.” – Roman Philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca

Human history has been replete with profound predicaments and dotted with contradictions and surprises. Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers picturesquely describes this predicament.1 If this title is modified as “the fall of one nation and the rise of another”, it befittingly explains how the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union came as a boon to China. Naturally, China’s rapid rise did raise eyebrows in the world chanceries, especially in the United States and European countries. In hindsight, the United States had pursued a nuanced form of diplomacy to weaken the former Soviet Union, for instance by launching the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) programme in March 1983 to outpace the Soviet Union in defence capabilities, as well as exhaust it psychologically and financially by provoking Moscow into the space arms race. Besides, the US administration succeeded in winning over President Mikhail Gorbachev, who consented to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of Germany and the end of the Cold War in 1990, and finally the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. There was great jubilation throughout America and Europe over the dissolution the Soviet empire. However, the US could not imagine even in its wildest dreams that China would emerge from the ashes of the Soviet empire, posing a gargantuan “geopolitical challenge” to American hegemony.2 China’s ascendancy to power as an influential global actor has not been abrupt, as some scholars believe it to be. Rather, its rise has been an out- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 come of a well-thought-out, well-crafted, and well-executed strategy, beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s “open door policy” of 1978. The pragmatic Deng, known as an architect of modern China, had envisioned China as an economically powerful, progressive, and self-reliant country. For that, he sought to project China as a responsible nation-state in the world community. Arguably, China has risen up to the status of a global power gradually but consistently. Its increasing economic and military prowess has enabled it to carve out a place of pride in the community of nations. Interestingly, David Shambaugh, The China factor 141 a well-known scholar of Chinese affairs, has taken an unconventional line in describing China as an “unsatisfied power” and, in the subheading of his latest book, a “partial power”.3 Top American leaders have already recognized China as an influential global player which, in their perception, is capable of presenting a potential challenge to US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.4 Had it not been so, America would not have stirred up anti-China hysteria across the world. In his provocative 2012 book, political scientist Aaron L. Friedberg forewarns America that if it does not take suitable measures to counter China’s “growing strength”, the latter will displace it as the leading power in Asia.5 China, with autarchic ambition, is poised to become a superpower, even though this is disclaimed by its political masters. Zhiqun Zhu’s China’s New Diplomacy provides fresh insights into how China’s power trajectory waded through tough times when it was diplomatically isolated following the Tiananmen massacre in June 1989.6 Gradually, China managed to integrate itself into the global economy by becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, after more than a decade of tough negotiations with America and other major powers. More important, the Beijing leadership used its WTO membership as a great opportunity to reach out to the entire globe through trade and investment.7 China’s long-time double digit growth facilitated its fast rise as an economic power next to America, while it superseded Japan in trade and commerce with ASEAN, and surpassed America, in 2012, as the largest trading nation. David Shambaugh has rightly pointed out that since China is thoroughly integrated into the entire gamut of the international system, it cannot be contained.8

Consternation A couple of questions arise. Why are the United States and India worried about China’s ascendancy as a global power? Is China a potential threat to their core national interests? Does China pose a severe challenge to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region? Why has India come closer to America strategically even though they have asymmetrical power capabilities? These are valid questions that will have a set of varying answers. But one thing is certain: that China will remain the United States’ potential competitor, and India’s arch-rival, in virtually every domain. As mentioned earlier, China has been a principal beneficiary of the end of Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the Cold War geopolitical paradigm. Since then, China’s dream and aspir- ation has been to achieve superpower status. Lee Kuan Yee writes, “It is China’s intention to be the greatest power in the world”.9 Indeed, Napoleon’s prescient remark that China’s awakening would shake the world is coming true.10 But it is still a debatable question whether China will become the “No. 1 country” in the world. It is true that China’s perceptions of the post-Cold War international order have undergone a profound transformation in terms of ideology, policy goals, 142 The China factor

approaches, and options.11 Although China is politically a monolithic state, it has embraced the capitalist path of free market economy, driven by pragmatic impulses to adjust to the hard-boiled realism of global interdependence. Simultaneously, it deems its high-profile role in South, Southeast, and Central Asia and the Middle East as compatible with its power capabilities. This is evident from its persistent claim to sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, its expanding security and strategic role in South and Northeast Asia, and its vigorous engagement with Central Asia in the energy sector.12

The US grand strategy Though China does not pose a military threat to the US, it constitutes a challenge to American global hegemony. President George W. Bush, unlike his predecessors, perceived China as a serious “geopolitical” and “geostrategic” competitor to the United States. In the initial phase of his administration, he declared China a strategic rival of America. He did not agree with Kissinger’s thesis that a peaceful and prosperous China advanced American interests. Accordingly, he adopted a contrary approach to dealing with China. For that, he reviewed the US grand strategy to assess the implications of China’s rise for US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. TheFinancial Times reported that the Pentagon report on China’s military capabilities advised Washington planners to seriously consider the possibility of China’s emergence as a strategic rival.13 The National Defence Authorization Act 2000 made it mandatory for the Pentagon to submit an annual report to “address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and the probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy”.14 The Pentagon report, though kept secret for a long time, was released during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington in July 2005. Under the report, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh “declared their resolve to transform the US–India relationship into a global partnership that will provide leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest”.15 The joint statement issued on 18 July 2005 paved the way for civilian nuclear cooperation between New Delhi and Washington. There was whispering within strategic circles that the Bush administration’s strategy was to kill two birds with one stone. “One, it would keep India’s nuclear programme under control, and Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 two, it will effectively use India against China.”16 The above instances reinforce the assumption that the deepening Indo-US partnership, albeit uncertain and fluctuating, is reflective of the US policy of keeping China in check by strengthening its military, defence, and strategic relationship with India. As part of the strategy to maintain a new balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, the Bush administration was determined to deal with “the dragon”, which presented a potential challenge to American supremacy in the region.17 The China factor 143 Moreover, the US is worried about the phenomenal increase in Chinese defence spending, which undermines US security. It has been observed that China is heavily investing

in its military, particularly in its strategic arsenal and capabilities to improve its ability to exercise its power beyond its borders. Washington believes that in every year since 1996, China has increased its defence spending by more than 10 per cent.18

Also, China is a principal challenger to US primacy in the global economy, with the integration of its economy with America’s.19 As Daniel Blumenthal writes, “China is America’s banker. America cannot anger its banker. In fact, China is more like a depositor. It deposits money in U.S. Treasury because its economy does not allow investors to put money elsewhere.”20 Also, China’s burgeoning A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) capabilities have forced America to develop new strategic approaches for the region, and to continue developing advanced military capabilities. Ely Ratner underscores the strategic rationale behind the US presence in Southeast Asia, arguing that “maintenance of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region is critical to advancing U.S. national interests in the 21st century”.21 Moreover, because of China’s incremental role and influence in the region, ASEAN countries perceive the US military and strategic presence in the region as indispensable for the regional peace and stability. The strategic guidance for the Department of Defence, released in January 2012, states that “U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the IOR and South Asia.”22 Some key questions arise. Can the dilemma of a “nightmare” of strategic encirclement by the United States in Asia be resolved? What are the geostrategic options before China to reduce the US presence in Asia? This chapter argues that the future of the strategic dynamic in Asia will largely depend on the extent of strategic restraint exercised by both Beijing and Washington. In a long-term perspective, China aims to mitigate the US influence in the Asia-Pacific region.23 In realistic terms, even if China replaces American supremacy in Asia, its approach to the region will be driven by its desire for territorial expansion and the settlement of disputes with neighbours through coercion and intimidation.24 However, some strategic analysts are of the view that the new leadership in China perceives Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the world through the lens of the strategic challenges lying ahead of it. Nevertheless, they are more concerned about the implications of China’s assertive role as a global actor. For instance, John J. Mearsheimer is of the view that China’s rise will not be peaceful. He writes in his preface to the updated edition of The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “There will be a big trouble in Asia if China grows significantly more powerful”.25 One must know the underlying fact that the national psyche of a country does not automatically change with a change in the global and regional milieu. One 144 The China factor of the overriding reasons behind China’s political ambition to become a superpower is grounded in its history and culture of “self-pride”. Hence, perceptions, beliefs, and national images of Chinese leaders and the people need to be taken into account while evaluating their worldview and relations with the outside world.26 David Shambaugh writes that the “US–China relationship has increasingly tended toward competition in recent years. The two nations co-exist, but in an uneasy and competitive manner – a condition I term competitive co-existence. This is plainly evident in the economic, ideological, normative, security, and geopolitical realms.”27 It will be in the interests of America and China to avoid a “new Cold War”, especially in an era in which power has shifted “from the West to the East”. The Asia-Pacific region is likely to be a flashpoint of conflicts and war in the future and in that scenario China’s cooperation will be crucial for America. For that, White House officials need to prioritize their foreign policy goals in the region. Undoubtedly, America needs China’s political and diplomatic cooperation on global and regional issues impacting on peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Daniel Blumenthal writes that the

United States does need China to disarm North Korea … The same way seems to be true with Iran. The best the United States can get in its diplomacy with China is to stop Beijing from being less helpful. It is a fact that global problems would be easier to manage with Chinese help.28

Nevertheless, Blumenthal foresees that America is destined to go to war with China. Though it is difficult to fully agree with his viewpoint, it is partially true. For example, the Taiwan issue is going to be a litmus test for whether America will be able to sustain its hegemony over Taiwan. A hypothetical question arises. How will America respond if China occupies Taiwan by force? Will the US and China slip into a direct military exchange? What kind of strategic scenario would emerge? One thing that appears to be certain is that one day Taiwan will be occupied by China, whether through peaceful or coercive measures. In that scenario, China will again be a major beneficiary. It will have an economically well-developed Taiwan, implying a further extension of China’s geographical borders. One might remember that Britain returned a well-developed Hong Kong to China in 1997, which enhanced China’s stature as well as its strategic leverage in dealing with outside powers. But more important, China is capable of striking the fear into Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the minds and hearts of ruling leaders in its peripheries that no country in Southeast and Northeast Asia is militarily and economically capable of challenging it. According to an assessment,

Malaysia is the largest trade partner of China in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and China makes vast investments there. Control of the region from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait is vital for the U.S., too. China has been working diligently to integrate The China factor 145 economically these American allies in the region and to neutralize them in the long run, which the U.S. can do nothing about.29

This scenario is a propellant for America to maintain its supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region. America will need to tackle the wider ramifications of China’s power projections30 with diplomatic finesse, coupled with astute decision making. What is that finesse? It is not yet clear. But America is being cautioned to refrain from containing China as it did the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Ashley Tellis has cautioned America to adopt a “balancing strategy”, by increasing the powers of peripheral countries around China so that, with their increasing power capabilities, America can maintain its hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region. The reason for advocating this strategy is that in the age of globalization, China has integrated itself globally, with its membership of the WTO, such that no one can prevent it from expanding its business and investment network. For example, it has already established strategic beachheads in Latin American and African countries.31

China’s threat perceptions China has the world’s largest population and a vast landmass, with 14,500 kilometres of coast-line, and a land border stretching 22,000 kilometres. Its threat perceptions have been shaped and articulated by its geographical location on the world map. Needless to stress, geographically proximate states are perceived by China as a threat to its national security and territorial integrity. It shares borders with a long list of Asian neighbours. “Her land frontier stretches from Vietnam, Burma, Nepal, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan in the South, Southwest Asia and Korea, Outer Mongolia to Russian Siberia and Inner Asia in the north and northeast.”32 It is pertinent to point out that China’s Great Wall was erected with the overriding objective of preventing nomadic invasion from the North, wary as China was of foreign intrusions into and encroachment upon its territories. Hence, the nationalistic fervour of the Chinese people appears much stronger when compared to that of people of most of other nationalities. It is fundamentally derived from China’s socio-psychological structure, rooted in its social beliefs, values, and practices. From a historical perspective, the characteristically peculiar national psyche of the Chinese is the culmination of their bitter experiences at the hands Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 of imperialists, as well as their resulting suppressed national ego and pride.

Modern China has experienced two revolutions: one in 1911 with the establishment of the republic and another in 1949 when a communist regime came to power in Peking. One of the most important motivations in these revolutions was the recovering of national sovereignty and territorial integrity lost to the imperialist powers in the so-called unequal treaties.33 146 The China factor Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Chinese Republic, had given a clarion call for an internecine struggle to abrogate the past treaties imposed on China by colonial powers. After his death, Mao Zedong vigorously carried forward the struggle. Edgar Snow comments:

If, after a nation has been exploited, robbed, opium soaked, plundered, occupied and partitioned by foreign invaders for a century, the people turns upon its persecutors and drives them from the house, along with the society whose weakness permitted the abuses, is it suffering from paranoia?34

China suffered humiliation and insults prior to 1949. Not surprisingly, it has looked upon Western powers as exploiters, divorced from “moral scruples”.35 China’s emergence as a global power is worrisome to the United States. During the Bush Jr administration, Sino-American relations were characterized by ambiguity and mistrust.36 The political and strategic chasm between Washington and Beijing widened because of a clash of interests in volatile regions like the Middle East. Some factors may be enumerated: first, the Bush administration resented China’s missile transfer to countries such as Iran, though China denied the charge. On the contrary, China adroitly exploited Bush’s nicknaming of Iran as part of an “axis of evil” to further consolidate its strategic, economic, and military ties with Tehran. The US administration imposed “half a dozen sanctions” against the Chinese firms which sold weapons to Iran. Second, the US policy of arms transfer to Taiwan continued to be a major irritant in US–China relations. From 2003 to 2006, $4.1 billion of Taiwan’s arms purchases were procured from the United States, nearly 50 per cent of Taiwan’s worldwide sources.37 According to the Defence Industry Daily,

The USA is also selling Taiwan the newest version of its attack helicopter, the AH-64E Apache Guardian. Its Longbow radar mast allows it to use radar guided fire-and-forget missiles, and it also carries Stinger missiles for defence against enemy aircraft. Engine and communications upgrades, including the ability to control UAVs remotely, round out that package. The 30 Apaches would serve alongside Taiwan’s 60+ AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters, as a rapid reaction force able to counterattack beachheads and exploit the hilly island’s natural chokepoints … P-3C sea Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 control aircraft arrived on December 2013.38

As noted earlier, Taiwan will be a litmus test for America. In fact, while keeping China’s existential threat to Taiwan in mind, the Bush administration launched the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) programme to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies – Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea – against an impending threat from China and North Korea. Moreover, China’s economic and strategic assertiveness in Southeast Asia is viewed by The China factor 147 ASEAN countries as a threat to regional peace, security, and stability, as evident in China’s exclusive sovereignty claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands, with their vast oil and natural gas resources, in the South China Sea. China, an “energy hungry” nation, is pooling its diplomatic and military resources to gain unhindered access to the oil and natural resources of the region.39 Therefore, ASEAN countries have demanded America’s greater presence in the region to offset Chinese preponderance. At the Shangri-la Dialogue Summit held in Singapore in May 2014, US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, in a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, told him frankly that conflict over the energy resources in the South China Sea must be resolved multilaterally through reconciliation and peaceful dialogue.40 He also made it clear that the US would make every effort to safeguard the interest of its allies, Vietnam and the Philippines.

Obama’s rebalance policy: India’s strategic fit The US rebalance policy toward the Asia-Pacific region is rooted in fast-altering geostrategic realities, as evident from territorial disputes over the South China Sea and the East China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear threat, and “changing power dynamics”. These developments have propelled the United States to focus greater attention on the growing importance of the region in order to protect its economic and strategic interests through alliances and partnerships with Asian powers. In autumn 2011, President Barack Obama took a series of initiatives to expand the US role in the region. His rebalance is aimed at reassuring US allies and partners, in the face of China’s “assertive and influential” role, that America is not going to “disengage” from the region just because of its “exhaustion” in Iraq and Afghanistan.41 It contains three main sets of initiative: security, economic, and diplomatic. Hence, his “win–win policy” primarily seeks to draw Asia’s emerging powers, such as India, into the US strategic fold to facilitate a new balance of power in America’s favour. Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary, notes that both India and the United States look upon

the emergence of China as a major challenge, not to be contained as in the Cold War days, but to be engaged in a manner that enhanced the prospects of peaceful, plural and balanced security architecture in the Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Asia Pacific region. The US understood that even though India could never be an ally, it would nevertheless pursue, in its own self-interest, policies that would create a strong countervailing presence in the region, supportive of US objectives.42

The fundamental goal of the new US policy is to “broaden the areas of cooperation” with major powers such as India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore to safeguard US interests in the Asia-Pacific region. According 148 The China factor to David Shambaugh, “structural tensions” between the US and China are growing which, in the Obama administration’s perception, threaten global and regional peace, security, and stability. The two countries have divergences in worldview, with “competing visions” of the world order, suggesting an uncertain strategic scenario.43 Some commentators perceive this policy as a “Cold War style” containment of China. This may not be correct in its entirety, since China is too big a country to be contained. At best, a configuration of powers with identical interests may come closer to restricting China’s influence. In this context, Amitav Acharya suggests a consociational security order to manage China’s rise and assertiveness.44 The US “pivot” to Asia is not simply aimed at containing China but has been driven by a much broader set of strategic, economic, and political considerations. Following more than a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration has been trying to place more emphasis on Northeast, Southeast, and South Asian parts of the world, which will be of growing strategic and economic importance in the first half of the twenty-first century. In geostrategic terms, achieving the rebalance is the Obama administration’s grand strategy for US foreign policy.45 Officially, India has adopted a cautious posture vis-à-vis rebalancing, although privately Indian strategic analysts have endorsed the rebalance policy, which in their perception will serve India’s long-term security and strategic interests in view of China’s high-profile power projection and growing assertiveness in South and Southeast Asia. Robert G. Sutter is of the view that Indian policy elites do not want to

“take any risk of unnecessarily provoking China given the huge gap in defence capabilities between New Delhi and Beijing. China is also India’s largest trading partner and an engine for growth. Moreover, India’s historical aversion to alliance-building has led its political establishment to avoid entering into any comprehensive partnership thus far, despite former US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta’s description of India as a linchpin of the rebalance.”46

But Indian policy elites need to remind themselves over and again that China is and will remain India’s sole potential rival in Asia in every domain, be it military, economic, security, or defence.47 In fact, “the continuing distrust of China and potential emergence of China-centric Asia as a growing threat Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 could push India to play a more prominent role in supporting the U.S. rebalance”.48 It may be partially true that Delhi’s support for the US rebalance policy is guided by its perception of China as an aggressive and hostile neigh- bour, as manifest in its frequent encroachment on Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir and the state of Arunachal Pradesh. The China factor will remain deeply embedded in the Indian psyche while India extends support to the Obama administration’s rebalance policy in Asia. At the same time, The China factor 149 Indian support will also depend on the extent to which President Obama is serious about translating the rebalance policy into an “anti-China coalition”. Some critics describe Obama’s commitment to Asia as a mere showcasing of America’s seriousness about dealing with China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Robert G. Sutter writes,

For one thing, the rebalance is said to have been a tactic not a strategic change; it has been a useful political tool to show the American people and international audiences strong evidence of American international resolve at a time of retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan.49

Sceptics doubt whether America can financially afford to consolidate a strategic rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, they apprehend it will provoke a “backlash” from China, including military conflict. Robert G. Sutter and others, while outlining their recommendations, have rejected the critics’ “unfounded charge” that the Obama administration is not serious about implementing the rebalancing policy. They maintain,

The Obama administration’s rebalance in the Asia-Pacific region is in line with broad and long-standing U.S. interest. Contrary to the skeptics … the President and his advisors seem to be committed to the robust engagement in the Asia-Pacific … The Obama administration is making the rebalance a strategic priority and it is likely to move ahead with successful implementation of its Asia-Pacific initiative.50

Critics opine that the rebalancing policy is both “unaffordable” and “unsustainable” because of the Obama administration’s retrenchment in US commitments abroad, as well as the resource crunch hitting the US economy badly. In this context, David Karl writes,

The strategic shift to Asia, which Washington launched with much hoopla two years ago, is premised on two key efforts: 1.) the buildup of U.S. military forces that is plainly directed against China, and 2.) the ambitious set of trade and investment negotiations known as the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” [TPP] that would contest Beijing’s economic hegemony in East Asia. Both initiatives are currently in deep trouble.51 Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016

The TPP is aimed at building a “US-centric trade bloc” in East Asia. But it has not met with success, ascribed to Obama’s failure to revive US economic influence in the region. The point to be hammered out is whether the Obama administration will be able to maintain a “multidimensional” American presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the administration is seized with the problem of assuaging 150 The China factor Beijing’s fear that the rebalance is mainly directed against China, given the fact that the US is poised to reestablish military connections with Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines and with new strategic partners such as India in South Asia.

Dynamics of India–China strategic and cooperative partnership India–China relations entered a new phase with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s path-breaking visit to Beijing in December 1988. His visit marked a new beginning in the process of improving bilateral relations, which had been almost frozen since China’s unprovoked aggression against India in October 1962. More important, Gandhi’s visit paved the way to resolving the border dispute. Border talks between special representatives (SRs), beginning since Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, have registered some progress. So far, 17 rounds of talks between SRs have taken place on the border issue. Up to now, the consensus that has emerged between the two governments is their willingness to demarcate the international borders. At the same time, both countries concluded an agreement on Strategic and Cooperative Partnership in 2005, under which joint military exercises are annually conducted. But these have quite often been called off in the wake of transgression of Chinese troops across the LAC, as evident from recent encroachments in Ladakh in April 2013 and September 2014.52 So far as cooperative partnership is concerned, India and China share mutual concerns and interests. On climate change, for instance, both countries speak in the same tone, arguing that India and China are not mainly responsible for environmental degradation as they are still developing nations, gripped by common problems of poverty and social and economic backwardness. Their identical stance on climate change was reflected at the international conference on climate change held in Copenhagen in December 2009 and in Durban in November 2011. On regional issues such as Iran’s nuclear programme, India and China took a common stance, staying away from openly supporting US unilateral sanctions against Iran. Both New Delhi and Beijing stuck to a consistent position that Iran had an inalienable right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the NPT. Notwithstanding, India and China have a trust deficit in their bilateral relationship. During his visit to India in May 2013, Prime Minister Li Keqiang underlined that both countries needed to work hard to build mutual Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 trust. It has been observed that China does not miss any opportunity to oppose India on crucial issues such as the NSG’s waiver to India, its permanent membership in the UN Security Council, or on the CTBT. In this regard, Lisa Curtis observes, “China’s attempt to scuttle the agreement at the September 2008 Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) meeting was evidence for many Indians that China does not willingly accept India’s rise on the world stage, nor the prospect of U.S.–India ties”.53 In this respect, India’s then Finance Minister P. Chidambaram, while citing China’s position within The China factor 151 the NSG, said, “From time to time, China takes unpredictable positions that raise a number of questions about its attitude toward the rise of India”.54 Furthermore, China has been keeping a tight vigil over expanding and deepening military ties between India and the US. The Beijing leadership is seriously concerned about the US’s sale of advanced weaponry to India, and also the nuclear deal with India. In brief, strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington will remain a potential factor in shaping the future relationship between India and China. Curtis further writes that although there has been a tremendous increase in India–China bilateral trade over the past couple of years, both sides “har- bour deep suspicions of the other’s strategic intentions”.55 The persisting mistrust between New Delhi and Beijing is attributable to several factors, which include a long-standing unresolved border dispute, China’s strengthening of strategic and security ties with Pakistan, and China’s attempts at strategic encirclement of India in South Asia. This is unambiguously evident in China’s infrastructure development in Nepal, construction of Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, building of strategic port facilities in Sittwe (Myanmar) and in Chittagong (Bangladesh), and strategic management of Gwadar Port in Pakistan to “protect sea lanes and ensure uninterrupted energy supplies”. The underlying motive behind the Sino-Pak strategic nexus is India’s geopolitical and geostrategic containment. The Chinese ambassador to India, Wei Wei, has acknowledged that although India and China are cooperative partners, “not rivals, they have differences on certain sensitive issues such as the boundary question, the issue of transborder rivers and the China–Pakistan relations due to various reasons”.56 However, in order to address the problem of the resolution of the border dispute, the two governments signed the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2013. In addition, both countries signed a new Memorandum of Understanding on Reinforcement of Cooperation on Trans-border Rivers during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s official visit to Beijing in October 2013. Be that as it may, the “flowering relations” between the two countries have geopsychological preponderance. China has not refrained from building strategic roads and carrying out various infrastructure and defence projects in the Pak-occupied Kashmir (PoK), despite New Delhi’s registering of com- plaints with Beijing. The Beijing leadership has cared little for Indian sensitivities over China’s $46 billion infrastructure plan, unveiled during President Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Xi Jinping’s visit to Islamabad in April 2015, to develop the China–Pakistan economic corridor to open new trade and transport routes. This will not only facilitate China’s easy access to the oil-rich Gulf region and the Middle East but also challenge the dominant position of the US in the region. India also needs to look again at the strategic implications of this infrastructure project. In brief, the widening trust chasm between New Delhi and Beijing could be considerably bridged if China addressed India’s legitimate concerns seriously and acted upon its promises. 152 The China factor

The Indo-US nuclear deal Sinologists have interpreted the nuclear deal between New Delhi and Washington from diverse angles. Some believed that it will further widen the existing trust deficit between New Delhi and Beijing. In fact, Chinese leaders were obsessed with the nuclear agreement between India and the US, which they thought was aimed at containing China’s rising power. In this context, Christopher Griffin observes,

China met the July 2005 nuclear deal with muddled hostility, as the Chinese government sought to criticize it without undercutting its newly improved relationship with India … The party mouthpiece the People’s Daily meanwhile repeated criticism of the nuclear deal from American analysts, arguing that Washington viewed its relationship with India as a way to pressure China.57

Griffin further cites a March 2006People ’s Daily article that wrote,

The agreement will have its “rippling” effect, which means that Pakistan, which has a similar position as India on the nuclear issue, may make similar demands and Iran may feel even more resentful of the “double principle” in the current nuclear dispute.58

China’s consternation is that the India–US nuclear deal might create misunderstanding between China and Pakistan, since Islamabad perceives the nuclear deal as antithetical to Pakistan’s national security interest. If viewed from this perspective, the Pakistani ISI and top military brass met Chinese military leaders and discussed with them the negative fallout of the India–US nuclear deal, for South Asia in general and for Pakistan in particular. During the military parleys, China agreed to supply a 2,000 megawatt nuclear power plant to Pakistan. This was intended to give a loud message to both India and America that China is neither deterred by the nuclear deal nor is it going to abandon its long-time “all weather ally”, Pakistan. While reacting to the Indo-US nuclear deal, China maintained that both Washington and New Delhi must conform to norms and rules of the global non-proliferation regime. Chinese policy elites and diplomats posted abroad criticized India and the United States for weakening international safeguards Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 on nuclear weapons. But China’s own dubious record of assisting Pakistan and North Korea in developing their nuclear weapon and missile building programme cannot be glossed over. Rather, it is a testimony to an open breach of the global non-proliferation regime. Mohan Malik observes:

China is breathing fire over the U.S.–India nuclear agreement that reverses decades of U.S. policy to allow India, once a nuclear pariah, access to civilian nuclear technology to meet its soaring energy needs. The China factor 153 China is concerned over what it sees as a pro-India tilt in U.S. policy. Beijing seeks to either make India’s NSG membership conditional upon it signing the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapons State or block India’s entry without Pakistan also getting into the NSG.59

To be sure, China’s opposition to the nuclear deal turned out to be “a new source” of tension in India–China relations. To India’s chagrin, China made every effort, at the NSG meeting in Vienna in 2008, to block the waiver to India. As reported in the Economic Times, China was “suspected to have played an active, yet covert, role in instigating the governments of New Zealand, Ireland and Austria to keep up with their resistance to India’s attempts to secure the NSG waiver”.60 Further, in order to deal with the security scenario in light of the Indo-US nuclear deal, China announced a 15 per cent increase in its defence spending, aimed at maintaining its long-standing conventional military superiority over India. Despite the focus of the global media on the nuclear deal, the Beijing leadership felt uneasy over the signing of the New Framework for US–India Defence Relationship by Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in Washington in June 2005. Under the framework, Washington and Delhi committed themselves to collaboration in 13 substantive areas such as joint operations, intelligence sharing, and technology transfer. Undoubtedly, China is also seriously concerned about close defence cooperation between India and the US, which, in perception of the Beijing leadership, would upset the “military balance” in Asia. Chinese leaders perceive the New Framework for Defence Cooperation as a concerted effort to “diminish” China’s influence in the region, and to “expand” US strategic presence in the region. China’s discomfiture increased further when the US assigned India a specific role pertaining to security issues in the IOR, in the wake of China’s increasing naval presence in the region. White House officials are in favour of the United States providing assistance in developing, improving, and strengthening India’s maritime capabilities to enable India to become a “predominant” maritime power in the region, while urging the EU to keep its “arms embargo”61 on China and pressuring Israel to cancel its defence deals with China.62 This gives an ample signal that Washington is determined to curtail China’s military prowess and its assertive power projections in Asia. Christopher Griffin writes, Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016

The lesson of this cooperative experience for the United States and India has been that, while the latter seeks to maintain its strategic autonomy, India needs American support if it is to break away from its longstanding role as a client of Russian arms – a position that left it operating the same weapons as most of its neighbours, including China – and as a player on the wrong side of the growing technological gap between the American defence industrial base and the rest of the world.63 154 The China factor In order to offset the increasing nuclear and defence cooperation between India and the US, China embarked upon recrafting its defence approach to India. Strategic affairs commentators argue that with the maturity of India–China strategic and defence partnership, India might be dissuaded from striking any kind of alliance with the United States.64 No doubt, India’s consternation is rooted in its reluctance to antagonize China, with which it has burgeoning trade ties which might touch the target of 100 billion dollars by the end of 2015. China understands the Indian psyche. Hence, China will try its best to maintain friendly relations with India on the one hand, and simultaneously pursue the policy of weakening and destabilizing India with Pakistan’s cooperation on the other, to retain its “regional strategic ascendancy” in South Asia.

Conclusion This chapter concludes that China will remain a complicating factor in India–US relations, in view of the countries’ sharp differences over strategic goals, whether in South and Central Asia, in Afghanistan, or in the Middle East. This is quite natural since China and the US do not have identical challenges, risks, and threats given their asymmetric power structures. Arguably, for America China is more important than India for several overriding reasons, including burgeoning US–China trade, which touches over $500 billion, five times greater than the volume of Indo-US trade. Also, by virtue of China’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, its vote on critically important issues related to conflict and peace is indispensable for the United States. However, China’s potential threat to the national interests of India and the United States will remain a compelling factor in forging closer ties between them. Simultaneously, India needs to craft a long-term policy to define its over- arching goals and role in regional and global affairs as the unfolding “hegemonic shift” towards China is becoming more apparent. A majority of Chinese affairs analysts share a broad consensus that China’s rise may be peaceful, but its repercussions cannot be said to be soothing for the world community. The reason is simple. It may be recalled that China suffered humiliation at the hands of aliens in the past, and has waded through a long tortuous journey towards nation-building. No doubt, historical narratives are strongly embedded in the Chinese psyche. Besides, the “unbridled capitalist development” without a human face is likely to result in “cyclic degeneration” Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 unless an equitable and inclusive world order is established. It needs to be underlined that India and the United States face enormous challenges and have vast opportunities to help reordering the iniquitous global order while following through with prudent policy strategy. At the same time, the China factor in India–US relations cannot be precisely predicted to remain stable and enduring, but rather depends on the continuity of their congruent interests. It may also be noted that Sino-Indian trade ties are on The China factor 155 the upswing. Also, India needs China’s diplomatic succour for its candidature for a permanent seat on the Security Council. The above factors are indicators that India has in-built limitations in forging military and strategic ties with the US within the framework of the US Asia rebalance policy. I doubt India will fully integrate into the US global and regional framework, given their divergent strategic goals and priorities. It is a matter of conjec- ture whether an India–US–China triangular partnership could be a binding factor rather than an obstacle to the US rebalance policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Though America needs India as a counterweight to China’s growing assertiveness and influence in the Asia-Pacific region, India does not constitute a centrepiece of the US global strategy to sustain its hegemony in the region, since the US is eliciting cooperation from its old allies as well. This obviously obviates the chances of inevitable mutual dependence so far as the China factor in their relationship is concerned. However, American policy makers con- cede that a powerful and strong India will be in the US interests to maintain the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Notes

1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987). 2 For facts on China as an economic powerhouse, see David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 156; Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2012). 3 See also Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 4 See Michael Swaine et al., China’s Military and the US–Japan Alliance in 2030: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013). 5 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012). 6 Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013, second edition). 7 On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of China’s accession, Chinese Ambassador to the WTO Yi Xiaozhun stated, “Joining the WTO means that China obtained a large and stable global market for its products and services. It was this stability that helped China’s exports rank first in the world and made China a large export country of industrial products.” Cited in Zhao Jianying,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 “China’s Entry into WTO Benefits World Economy”, Economic Daily, 9 December 2011. 8 Shambaugh, China Goes Global. 9 Cited in ibid., p. 1. 10 Ibid., p. x. 11 B.M. Jain, India in the New South Asia: Strategic, Military and Economic Concerns in the Age of Nuclear Diplomacy (London: I.B. Tauris, December 2010). 12 See B.M. Jain, “Problematic Trajectory in U.S.–China Relations”, March 2013 Taipei conference paper; Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy. 156 The China factor

13 Claude Arpi, “Indo-US Ties: The China Factor”, Rediff India Abroad, 28 February 2006. www.rediff.com/news/2006/feb/28bush10.htm, accessed 14 January 2016. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 For a brilliant analysis of this, see Ashley Tellis, Balancing without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China, January 2014 Report (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014). 20 Daniel Blumenthal, “The Top 10 Unicorns of China Policy”, Foreign Policy, 3 October 2011. http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/03/the-top-10-unicorns-of-china- policy/, accessed 16 January 2016. 21 Ely Ratner, Resident Power: Building a Politically Sustainable U.S. Military Presence in Southeast Asia and Australia, Center for a New American Security, October 2013. www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_ResidentPower_Ratner. pdf, accessed 14 January 2016. 22 Ibid. 23 See Xenia Dormandy with Rory Kinane, Asia-Pacific Security: A Changing Role for the Security, Chatham House Report (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 2014). www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140416AsiaPacificSecurityDormandyKin ane.pdf, accessed 14 January 2016. 24 Luke T. Chang, China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontier Disputes (London/ New York: Oceana Publications, 1982), p. 41. 25 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 2014), p. xiii. 26 Ibid. 27 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, p. 7. 28 Blumenthal, “The Top 10 Unicorns of China Policy”. 29 Baha Erbas, “India in the Eurasian Cauldron”, Daily Sabah, 16 April 2014. www. dailysabah.com/opinion/2014/04/17/india-in-the-eurasian-cauldron, accessed 14 January 2016. 30 Ibid. 31 See Tellis, Balancing without Containment. 32 Chang, China’s Boundary Treaties, p. 41. 33 Ibid., p. 9. 34 Quoted in B.M. Jain, “China in the New World Order: Perspectives and Policy Approaches”, The Icfai University Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2008): pp. 39–55 (p. 45). 35 Ibid. 36 Juan Gatbonton, “Bush: Washington’s Muscular Foreign Policy”, Hong Kong Business, July 2002, p. 44. 37 Michal Roberge and Youkyung Lee, “China–Taiwan Relations”, Council on Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Foreign Relations, 11 August 2009. www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/ p9223, accessed 14 January 2016. 38 “Taiwan’s Force Modernization: The American Side”, 11 September 2014. www. defenceindustrydaily.com/taiwans-unstalled-force-modernization-04250, accessed 14 January 2016. 39 On this subject, see Jain, “China in the New World Order”, p. 46. 40 The Hindu, 30 May 2014. Joesph Tse-Hei Lee observes, “The latest maritime sovereignty disputes and the cross-Strait ties clearly revealed a qualitative shift in China’s strategy from forging alliance with neighbours to competing with the The China factor 157 U.S. … If China wants to retain some room for manoeuvre, it must devise a viable mechanism for resolving maritime conflicts and engaging with Taiwan.” Joseph Tse-Hei, “Not Too Peaceful: Maritime Rifts and Governance Crises in China”, Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1–2 (2013): pp. 23–36 (p. 34). 41 Robert Sutter et al., Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability (Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2013). www2.gwu.edu/~sigur/ assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf, accessed 14 January 2016. 42 Quoted in Pranay Sharma, “An Overwritten Slate”, Outlook India, 20 September 2010. http://mcomments.outlookindia.com/story.aspx?sid=4&aid=267050, accessed 17 January 2016. 43 Sutter et al., Balancing Acts. 44 See Amitav Acharya, “Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China’s Rise and Asia’s Emerging Security Order”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1 (March 2014): pp. 158–73. 45 Sutter et al., Balancing Acts, p. 9. 46 Ibid., p. 25. 47 For a comprehensive discussion on this aspect, see B.M. Jain, “India–China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends”, The Round Table, Vol. 93, No. 374 (April 2004): pp. 253–69. 48 Sutter et al., Balancing Acts, p. 25. 49 Ibid., p. 27. 50 Ibid., p. 29. As regards its security role, China is wary of the implications of Islamic terrorism in the region, which might have negative fallout in its sensitive province of Xinjiang, where a Muslim separatist movement is already going on. China is also endeavouring to convince Southeast Asian states to overcome the past suspicion they have harboured against China for the latter’s role in aiding and abetting guerilla movements in the region. 51 David J. Karl, “Obama Arrives in Asia Empty-Handed”, International Policy Digest, 23 April 2014. www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/04/23/obama-arrives-asia- empty-handed/, accessed 14 January 2016. 52 “India, China Trying to Resolve ‘Incursion’ Issue”, The Hindu, 21 April 2013, and The Hindu, 18 September 2014. 53 Lisa Curtis, “U.S.–India Relations: The China Factor”, Backgrounder No. 2209, The Heritage Foundation, 25 November 2008, p. 1. 54 Ibid., p. 6. 55 Ibid. 56 Wei Wei, “China’s New Neighbourhood Diplomacy Will Have Positive Impact on Its Relations with India”, News From China, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (February 2014): pp. 15–16. 57 Christopher Griffin, “Containment with Chinese Characteristics”,Asia Outlook, 7 September 2006. www.aei.org/publication/containment-with-chinese-characteristics, accessed 14 January 2016. 58 Ibid. See People’s Daily, March 2006. 59 Mohan Malik, “China Responds to the U.S.–India Nuclear Deal”, China Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Brief, Vol. 6, No. 7 (29 March 2006). www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_ news]=31528&no_cache=1#.VpeNJlnTZqQ, accessed 14 January 2016. 60 See “China Tried to Scuttle NSG Waiver: NSA”, The Economic Times, 12 September 2008. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-09-12/news/ 27703842_1_nsg-waiver-ireland-and-austria-countries, accessed 14 January 2016. 61 Kathleen T. Rhem, “U.S. Argues Against EU Lifting Arms Embargo Against China”, US Department of Defense, 21 July 2005. http://archive.defense.gov/ news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16586, accessed 15 January 2016. 158 The China factor

62 Conal Urquhart, “Israel Scraps Arms Deal with China”, Guardian, 26 June 2005. www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/27/china.israel, accessed 14 January 2016. 63 Griffin, “Containment with Chinese Characteristics”. 64 “India China Bilateral Defence Cooperation in 2014–2015”, Embassy of India, Beijing, China. www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=5& SubMenuId=0, accessed 14 January 2016. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 7 India–US relations Challenges, opportunities, and future directions

Introduction With a dramatic paradigm shift in the US policy towards South Asia, relations between India and the United States have been on the upswing. There was a growing sense amidst India’s political and strategic circles that New Delhi should not miss the opportunity to transform its relationship with Washington into a durable and sturdy partnership. A host of correlates dictated that thinking. First, the shared values and interests made both countries conscious of the imperative of working together to help foster democratic institutions, and safeguard civil rights at global and regional levels. Second, common security concerns about simmering threats to Asia’s peace, security, and stability brought them closer. One might recall that President George W. Bush reiterated on several occasions that China was a potential “strategic competitor” of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and an arch-rival of India in Asia despite ‘visualization of the synergy’ between India and China. In realpolitik terms, the convergence of perception between India and America on global and regional issues of common interest provides them with enormous opportunities to work closely in reshaping the global political order and security architecture. At the same time, their differing perceptions on national goals and objectives pose a gargantuan challenge to their strategic collaboration. The purpose of this chapter is to offer a critique of major challenges facing the multifaceted ties between India and the United States, and to spell out future directions in their relationship. With the end of the Cold War era, ideological cleavages no longer remained

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 a source of irritants between New Delhi and Washington. Furthermore, India’s embrace of neoliberal economic policy brought about a perceptual change in US policy makers towards India, manifest in their offer to forge defence and security cooperation with India. Despite the occasional hiccups in their relationship, for example the imposition of US sanctions on India for conducting nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, the Clinton administration made concerted efforts to reset US ties with India. President Clinton realized that the US “non-proliferation strait-jacket policy”, its massive military aid 160 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions to Pakistan, and also its support to the latter on Kashmir, had greatly contributed to India’s alienation from America. Therefore, to correct the past mis- takes and follies of White House folks, Clinton attempted to craft a balanced policy towards India and Pakistan. This was manifest in the administration’s neutral policy on Kashmir, and Clinton’s “unequivocal condemnation” of Pakistan’s misadventure in India’s Kargil-Dras sector of Jammu and Kashmir in the summer of 1999. Instead of extending blanket support to Pakistan, as in Cold War years, President Clinton took a non-partisan stance, asking Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to immediately pull back Pakistani troops from the Kargil sector. Thus, Clinton’s proactive diplomatic intervention helped prevent the risk of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan over the Kargil conflict. President Clinton’s visit to New Delhi in March 2000 heralded a new era of understanding between New Delhi and Washington. Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Clinton resolved to “partner in peace” to ensure regional and international security. In order to create a conflict-free environment in South Asia, Clinton took one step further, asking Pakistan to permanently end cross-border terrorism. He emphasized that Pakistan’s continual violation of the Line of Control (LoC) was unacceptable to America, and he asked Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf to “uncondi- tionally and unambiguously restore the status quo ante”.1 Further, he gave an unambiguous message to General Musharraf that in the case of a direct conflict between India and Pakistan, America would not intervene on behalf of Pakistan. Clinton warned him that Pakistan might have to pay a heavy price if it ever entertained the idea of coming into direct conflict with India. As regards the Kashmir issue, Clinton stated that though America had no intention to mediate over it, it was ready to facilitate a meaningful dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad. Accordingly, he asked India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue through bilateral peaceful negotiations. The above instances illuminate the point that there was a major policy shift towards India under the Clinton administration. A dramatic transformation occurred in Indo-US relations during the presidency of George W. Bush, who was not only committed to warming up US relations with India but also wanted to make India a “major global player in the 21st century”.2 He was optimistic that India would be a willing partner of the United States as a credible counterweight to China in the face of common geopolitical challenges to both countries. Bush was also aware of India’s Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 lingering grievances against China over the unresolved border dispute since the 1962 war. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11), India’s prompt response in extending uncondi- tional support to the US global war on terror galvanized the change in their strategic ties. America did not miss the opportunity to closely work with India on bilateral, regional, and international issues to promote a peaceful, secure, and stable world order. The changing dynamics of global Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 161 and regional security paved the way for expanding Indo-American relations in areas of mutual interest such as strategic dialogue, defence and security cooperation, civilian nuclear energy cooperation, homeland security against global terror, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Against the above backdrop, forthcoming sections will examine the challenges facing Indo-US relations in critical areas such as bureaucratic perceptions on both sides, the Afghanistan imbroglio, Iran’s nuclear issue, India’s strategic autonomy, and its nuclear liability law.

Enduring challenges Despite the shared democratic values and common security interests, Indo-US relations are hamstrung by uncertainties and, at times, punctuated by eccentricities. This peculiar situation is rooted in domestic challenges, policy planning, and decision-making processes in both countries. The UPA-II government and the second Obama administration were charged with being “indecisive” and “weak” in making decisions or implementing them on critically important bilateral, regional, and international issues. The weak and meek leadership in both countries could not set bilateral relations on a new trajectory of mutual trust. For instance, the UPA government under the feeble leadership of Manmohan Singh failed to take a firm decision to address US concerns about India’s nuclear liability law. Rather, the UPA government broke faith and lost the trust of the US administration by not fulfilling its commitment to facilitate access to the Indian energy market for American companies. Much to the US chagrin, India virtually declined to review its nuclear liability legislation to address the concerns of US firms. On the question of India’s concerns over Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism, the Obama administration did not come up to Indian expectations. The administration’s escapist and nonchalant approach was reflected in its not taking appropriate action against Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of 26/11 to justice. Moreover, as disclosed by a former Indian diplomat, the “former ISI Chief Shuja Pasha was granted diplomatic immunity by Senator Kerry when charged with involvement in the 26/11 terrorist attack”.3 Furthermore, an Indian complaint is that the US has been pursuing a “war on selective terrorism”, where its national interests are directly jeopardized. That is why the Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Modi government declined to send Indian troops to Iraq to fight the terrorist group ISIS. Notably, most of the challenges to Indo-US relations stem from their divergent national interests and contrary perceptions on global and regional issues such as climate change, human rights, and sanctions on Iran. Responding to questions at a Congressional hearing, Robert Willard, US Pacific Commander (PACOM) Admiral, acknowledged that the “relationship with India is strong and growing stronger. It’s not without its challenges”. He further testified, 162 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions We don’t have a long history between the countries, as you know. We went through a Cold War without much of a relationship at all. Following the nuclear tests in the late 1990s, we suspended relations government to government. So we’ve really only been acquainted with India in the past decade.4

His testimony at least revealed what the United States thought of India, i.e., a new acquaintance of a decade or so. Naturally, the looming uncertainty in the India–US relationship raises serious doubts among strategic realists on both sides about whether or not the bilateral relationship will survive longer. The underlying logic behind such scepticism is that there is hardly a solid base for common strategic goals between the two countries. On the contrary, optimists argue that strategic ties between India and the United States will grow stronger and deeper, since they share common threats of monumental intensity, for example in eliminating the terror threat to their national security, in ensuring maritime security, and in overseeing China’s expanding naval activities in the Indian Ocean. This apart, both countries have realized that proactive, cooperative diplomacy can deliver results in promoting global and regional security, gravely threatened by the potential risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist outfits and jihadi elements.

Bureaucratic barriers Bureaucratic rigidities persist in both countries despite the imperative to forge a strong and stable strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington. It is saddening that the top notch bureaucracies on both sides have a decisive say in shaping the tenor and quality of the India–US relationship. Surely, bureaucratic mindsets of the Cold War era are still deeply etched in the two countries’ psyche, and impede the pace and momentum in their relations. According to a group of scholars, the tardy progress in strategic partnership is ascribed to the fact that

significant sections of the vast bureaucracies in both countries remain tied to default positions toward the other that are not conducive to a deeper bilateral partnership. It must be borne in mind that the dramatic changes in India–U.S. relations were driven from the top by political Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 leaders on both sides and pushed through the customary inertia of reluctant bureaucracies by a few energetic decision makers. The same forces of habitual inertia may have struck back after the heady days of con- ceptualizing and implementing the civil nuclear initiative between 2005 and 2008.5

In real terms, the bureaucratic lobby in the United States looks upon India as a “part of the problem” rather than a part of the solution on issues like Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 163 nuclear non-proliferation. Simultaneously, it should be noted that Indian bureaucracy, with a feudal mindset, wields enormous power and authority in decision making, quite often overshadowing that of political bosses. This has led to inordinate delay in procurement of the latest weapons. For example, the Indian defence establishment has not yet identified a project for co-development and co-production, including the Javelin anti-tank missile under the DTTI, which was endorsed by the government during Prime Minister Singh’s visit to Washington in September 2013.6 K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto opine that the US FMS (Foreign Military Sales) system is “overly rigid” and “unsuitable for India’s competitive bidding procurement process”,7 which puts India in a disadvantageous position. From the US perspective, India’s defence policy is “fluid”, with “unclear taxation” policy. In this regard, Kronstadt and Pinto write,

American defence firms often find it difficult to navigate India’s defence procurement environment. Executives have raised concerns about unclear taxation guidelines at the time of sale. In some instances, they reportedly claim the application of retroactive taxes fuels their reluctance to engage India’s fluid defence policy environment. India’s procurement system is highly favourable to known suppliers; Russia, France, and, more recently, Israel, have robust defence relationships with India of a kind that will take the United States time to build. Personal ties can also play important roles in facilitating deals. Boeing’s relative success among U.S. defence firms selling to India seems in part owed to its prior experience with India’s commercial aircraft market.8

Another instance of bizarre handling of a situation is the Devyani Khobragade episode, related to a visa fraud case, which unnecessarily created an irritant in the New Delhi–Washington relationship. In this, both sides were responsible in one way or another. The Indian foreign policy establishment, which blew a simple and straightforward issue out of proportion, was perhaps unaware of US laws, or it considered itself above the law of the land. It may be mentioned that Devyani Khobragade, Deputy Consul-General in New York, was arrested in December 2013 on the charge of visa fraud. She was reported to have been strip-searched and “held with criminals”. The US government maintained throughout that it was “enforcing the law of the land”. But, in a “tit-for-tat” response, New Delhi asked Washington to recall Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 one of its diplomats and withdrew the privileges of US Embassy personnel in New Delhi. The issue was awkwardly handled by India’s electronic media, as if to turn Khobragade into a superhero. Unfortunately, the Indian government dealt with the issue in a novice-like manner rather than deciding it on the merit of the case. What is important to bear in mind is that the Indian diplomat must have displayed fairness and proved her integrity by strictly complying with US laws. This sort of issue should not have been allowed to cloud the bilateral relationship.9 164 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions

Nuclear non-proliferation The nuclear deal has brought with it many paradoxes and dilemmas. One of the paradoxes is that peace defenders/champions and policy moralists in the West who advocate for global nuclear disarmament are themselves involved in nuclear proliferation activities. Realists are struggling hard to seek cooperation from these so-called doves. Thus, the dichotomous approach presents a real challenge to the ongoing global efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Besides, cognitive limitations have further complicated the discourse on disarmament, as is conspicuous in the case of India and the United States. To be sure, India’s commitment to arms control and the global non-proliferation regime has been firm and consistent. It has supported international efforts to strengthen the nuclear security regime, and it also advo- cates for minimum use of highly enriched uranium. However, ambivalence on the part of India about whether or not to sign the NPT and CTBT is causing much anxiety to the world community. This dilemma is rooted in the national security problematic, structured around India’s threat perceptions of its neighbours such as Pakistan and China. However, India is committed to the principle of no-first-use, although the international community is not fully convinced about India’s credibility. It should be noted that the UPA government gave a moral assurance to the Obama administration that it would cooperate on concluding the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). But with the change of guard in New Delhi, the Modi government has given enough hints to America that India would retain its sovereign right to carry out nuclear tests in future if national security so warrants. Nevertheless, the nuclear issue is being hotly debated in relation to whether or not India should abandon its previous commitment to unilateral moratorium on future nuclear tests. It is widely conjectured that the BJP-led government in New Delhi will take drastic decisions on revising the nuclear doctrine as enunciated by the NDA government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. According to a hard-core conservative camp in the BJP, India must abandon the no-first-use component of its nuclear doctrine and instead concentrate on strengthening and rejuvenating nuclear assets in order to deal with the twin threats emanating from Beijing and Islamabad. It is also doubtful that the Modi government will abide by India’s much hyped nuclear doctrine of no-first-use or unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. America must understand that Modi’s decision making, as well as his style of functioning,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 is self-centric. This is qualitatively much different from the traditional style followed by Indian leaders throughout a long historical process, and further nurtured by the Nehru scions. The BJP-dominated government, with an absolute majority in Parliament, may tinker with earlier policies, especially those of the Nehruvian mould, with regard to the nuclear doctrine, arms control, and disarmament, in tune with RSS-cum-BJP ideology and approach. Whether White House officials and American think-tanks such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will come up with a new policy Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 165 approach to deal with the complexities involved in India’s non-proliferation policy under the new dispensation is something to be carefully watched. The complexities are intertwined with Modi’s offbeat style of functioning in dealing with events, issues, and people, his penchant for making quick decisions, and his propensity for confiding in a minuscule coterie of trusted bureaucrats, overshadowing his ministerial colleagues.10

Afghanistan Afghanistan carries geostrategic importance for India. In an undivided India, the British strategy was to protect and promote its imperial interests by keeping its strategic hold over Afghanistan, although the British did not succeed in occupying it. By virtue of its partition in August 1947, India lost its strategic preeminence in Afghanistan, while Pakistan’s geostrategic importance was greatly enhanced because it shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Owing to the loss of border contiguity with Afghanistan after the partition of the British India in August 1947, India’s Afghan policy has been guided by its myriad national interests. First, India’s prime focus is on preventing Afghanistan from becoming Pakistan’s client state, as it did in 1996 with the onset of the Taliban regime. Second, New Delhi will not dilute its political, economic, and strategic engagement with Kabul even after the exit of American troops, as India concluded the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with Afghanistan in 2011 to train the Afghan army and security forces, and build its civilian political capacities. Third, economic engagement with Afghanistan is a key driver in India’s Afghan policy, as is evident from its investment of over US$10 billion in Afghanistan’s various infrastructure development projects, including setting up power plants. Fourth, India’s diplomacy in Afghanistan will be geared to stopping Pakistan from using its religious and ethnic connections with jihadists and the Taliban to target India to destabilize it.11 On the contrary, Pakistan’s diplomatic strategy is poised to deny India a potential role in reshaping the new Afghanistan after withdrawal of NATO and US forces.12 President Obama announced in March 2015 that 9,800 American troops will remain in Afghanistan through 2015, and said that there would be no American troops there by the end of 2016. But the internal security situation has been seriously deteriorating. In May 2015, the bloodiest casualties were suffered across the country since 2001. Moreover, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s reaching out to Pakistan and China is a Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 major shift in Afghanistan’s policy, implying India’s shrinking economic and strategic role in Afghanistan. Also, China’s recent plan of investment worth $40 billion in the “Silk Route Fund” will boost its strategic presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia – a cause of serious concern to India. Hence, the Modi government needs to redefine India’s Afghan policy. The Obama administration has, however, assured India that it will support its proactive role in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, New Delhi has made known its policy stance on Afghanistan to the Obama administration: that a stable 166 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions and inclusive Afghanistan will be in the interests of both countries. Common interests demand that New Delhi and Washington make joint efforts to ensure internal security and political stability in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, both countries have high stakes in Afghanistan. The resurgence of the Taliban, as foreseen by Henry A. Kissinger, will give “a tremendous shot in the arm to jihadism globally – threatening Pakistan with jihadist takeover and possibly intensifying terrorism in India, which has the world’s third-largest Muslim population”.13 Kissinger attests to my geopsychological proposition that the war in Afghanistan is linked to psychological impulses of the Afghan people, who have never surrendered to external forces. They are prepared to make any amount of sacrifice. Kissinger writes, “The truism that the war is, in effect, a battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan population is valid enough in concept”.14 From the geopsychological perspective, India’s strategic perception is not in sync with that of the United States. That is why India did not approve of America’s secret negotiations with the Taliban. In fact, the moral dilemma that grips the Obama administration is its legitimacy crisis,15 after its forces leave Afghanistan. On the one hand, the administration is concerned about fore- stalling the emergence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. On the other hand, it is serious about engaging India in the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. It may be added that Prime Minister Modi and President Obama, in their first summit meeting at the White House on 30 September 2014, agreed to cooperate in counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing to deal with jihadists.16 This is a most challenging task before both governments, especially when Washington has no tenable leverage over Islamabad. Surely, America has begun realizing that because of its ill-conceived diplomacy and flawed policy approach, it has had to pay a heavy price in the region in terms of political, military, and resource investments without palpable gains in return. Rather, as a reluctant power, America is poised to keep its minimum military commitments in the region. According to the bilateral security agreement between Washington and Kabul in September 2014, America will keep 9,800 troops in Afghanistan after withdrawal of its forces by the end of 2014.17 As such, the US policy in Afghanistan is being refashioned and reviewed seriously. Strategic analysts think that though the US military and strategic presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia will remain in one form or the other, it will not embroil itself in Afghanistan’s internal politics. At best, American diplomacy will be geared to its limited role as a facilitator of internal security Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 and stability in the region.18 Why? Because American strategic affairs pundits are of the view that the ultimate solution to the lingering problem of terrorism has to come from Pakistan and Afghanistan rather than from America, based on the latter’s worst experience of over more than a decade since its attack on Afghanistan in October 2001. Undoubtedly, India’s position will weaken after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. On the contrary, Pakistan will vigorously pursue a proactive role in Afghanistan. Besides, China, through its strategic nexus with Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 167 Pakistan, will advance its interests in Afghanistan. This is partially manifest in China’s pursuit of economic, trade, and investment interests in Afghanistan, while it is also engaged in preparing a roadmap, in close collaboration with Pakistan, to work out modalities to reshape a new Afghanistan without India’s strategic presence. Besides, Beijing has myriad interests in Afghanistan, which include “promoting security of China’s western provinces; suppressing potential terrorist threats to Chinese nationals or PRC territory; securing access to the region’s energy resources as well as trade and investment opportunities”.19 Without exaggeration, America has its own limitations that scarcely permit it to outstretch itself after its exit from Afghanistan. Having learnt a bitter lesson from past experience, America will avoid repeating flawed policies. C. Christine Fair has commented that America may not be able to balance “its interests among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. India too is experien- cing its own limitation in the very region over which it claims hegemony.”20 Without keeping itself in the dark, India needs to be discreet in charting a new course of action in dealing with Afghanistan, given the amorphous character of the power equation in the region. It is unlikely that the US will come to India’s rescue if its interests in Afghanistan are threatened by Pakistan or a Pakistan–China configuration. Even if Indo-Pak relations improve, Islamabad would make ceaseless efforts to weaken India’s political, economic, and strategic role in Afghanistan. In this scenario, Teresita H. Schaffer suggests that India and the United States should get closer to deal with the post-withdrawal situation in Afghanistan. She writes,

In Afghanistan, the U.S. has long welcomed India’s economic role, but now also looks on a carefully calibrated Indian security role as a stabilizing factor. Both countries recognize that as the U.S. gets closer to its planned withdrawal of combat troops, it will be essential to deal both with Pakistan’s relationships inside Afghanistan and with its extreme anxiety about Indian intentions there. This will complicate the way the U.S. and India deal with each other on Afghan affairs. But having defined important common goals, they should be able to surface any disagreements, hopefully before they become important obstacles.21

In light of the emerging uncertainty, India and the United States need to coordinate their strategies to prevent the reconfiguration of radical elements in a new Afghanistan, governed by its own people responsible for maintaining Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 internal peace and security, and ensuring the welfare of the Afghan people. It may be noted that at their summit meeting in September 2013, President Obama and Prime Minister Singh exchanged views on Afghanistan, underscoring the need to coordinate joint efforts to address internal problems in Afghanistan. According to a joint statement,

The Leaders recognized that violent extremists continue to pose challenges to Afghanistan’s security and stability and, in this context, emphasized 168 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions the need for coordinated international support to help build the capacity of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. They noted that both India and the United States will remain committed to contribute to peace, stability, and development in Afghanistan during the critical transformation decade (2015–2024).22

India and the United States have parallel interests in a “self-sustaining” and internally secure and stable Afghanistan. New Delhi is concerned about the implications of the US exit for India’s economic, trade, strategic, and security interests. In this regard, the former US ambassador to India Nancy Powell said, in an interview with the Economic Times,

The US and India share a similar vision for peace, democracy and stability in Afghanistan. Indeed, we have a robust bilateral dialogue with India on Afghanistan and we have also convened two rounds of a US–India–Afghanistan trilateral. We welcome India’s leadership and recognise the important role it has played with bilateral economic assistance programmes, private-sector investment and regional economic integration … We will continue to equip and train the Afghan military well beyond 2014, and to keep in place forces that will continue counterterrorism activity.23

Needless to say, no security architecture for Asia can be thought viable unless the primacy of interdependence is recognized by the leadership and bureaucracies of both Washington and New Delhi. They will need to accommodate each other’s divergent interests. In an interdependent globalized world, neither India nor America should expect the other to have identical views on and approaches to global and regional issues. Rather, they need to develop a common understanding that an “appeal to fear over logics” would not work. Keohane and Nye believe that the use of military force is neither feasible nor desirable in the world of complex independence. Gaddis also, even though mildly, forewarns that the US should desist from entertaining the Cold War mindset that it has the “will and capacity to take the lead in policing (or manning) the world”.24

Iran Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 India and Iran are strongly linked by age-old historical and cultural ties, based on shared civilizational values. Interestingly, they shared a geographical border until India got independence in 1947. In addition, India has the second largest Shia Muslim community after Iran. Naturally, Indian Muslims have a close religious affinity with Iran’s Shia-dominated Muslim community. It may be remembered that India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who articulated India’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, underlined the irreversibility of India’s relations with Iran, rooted in their identical Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 169 geopolitical perceptions and interests. Speaking in Tehran in 1958, Nehru emphasized that India and Iran were among the few countries which had a unique civilizational relationship, with “close and long historical contact”. He said that affinities between New Delhi and Tehran “cannot be missed when one looks at monuments, culture, language, cuisine and the literature that defines the two countries. India and Iran shared a common border till 1947.”25 India’s foreign secretary Nirupama Rao, in her keynote address on 5 July 2010 at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, said,

Our approach to Iran is embedded within the rationale that defines our foreign policy – our developmental priorities, our independent national interest, our commitment to multi-polarity over uni-polarity, our con- sciousness of the inequities in the global order today. Our relations with Iran are a fundamental component of our “Look West” policy in our immediate region, just as our “Look East” policy has propelled our relations with the countries of ASEAN and East Asia.26

Economic and energy cooperation provide a solid base for complementarities and interdependencies between India and Iran. Nirupama Rao further underlined that Iran,

which is home to third largest proven oil reserves and second largest gas reserves … is not only located relatively close to India permitting transportation of oil and gas at relatively low cost over sea as well as land, it also has the potential of being a transit country for supply of third country energy to India given its increasing links in this field with the landlocked countries of Central Asia.27

Joint stakeholders India and Iran are joint stakeholders in regional peace, security, and stability. In a strategic sense, Iran is an integral part of what has been defined as India’s “proximate neighbourhood”, which provides India with alternative access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran’s strategic location along the Persian Gulf, which includes the narrow entrance to the Gulf at the Straits of Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Hormuz, is within the security parameter of India.28 For a long time, India has been the largest importer of oil from Iran, and Tehran has treated New Delhi favourably by granting it concessions on oil exports. Adith Charlie writes,

Crude from Iran comes in favourable terms and India gets 60-days of credit for making payments. Moreover, Iranian crude comes at discounted rates in comparison to oil procured from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. 170 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions Forty-five per cent of India’s trade with Iran is settled in Indian rupees. India has been pushing Iran to accept 100 per cent payments in rupees so that its trade deficit, which has been spiralling because of oil import costs, could be controlled.29

However, New Delhi’s relations with Tehran were adversely affected by a shift in India’s policy approach when it voted against Iran at the IAEA Governing Board meetings in 2006 and 2007, apparently to appease America, a new strategic partner of India. This reportedly invited “Iranian reprisal in the form of cancellation of a 25-year, $22-billion liquefied natural gas deal which had terms highly favourable to India. That deal’s scrapping alone left India poorer by several billion dollars.”30 Though India might have reluctantly supported America diplomatically on Iran’s nuclear issue, New Delhi policy elites ought to realize that Iran is a major source of India’s oil requirements. But this is disputed by Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, a former Indian ambassador to the UN. He says that India has alternative sources of oil import, for example from Saudi Arabia, which would be more than willing to fulfil India’s oil requirements. But because of hostile relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, India has stayed away from the controversy by importing oil from Saudi Arabia, Gharekhan asserts. He further says that though India needs Iran’s friendship, the latter also needs India’s friendship for the simple reason that the number of oil buyers is “dwindling fast and Iran is hard put to find alternative buyers, even at discounted prices”.31 According to Iranian sources, its oil exports have fallen by over 30 per cent. Nonetheless, the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project, worth 25 billion dollars, is vitally important for the fulfilment of India’s energy needs. One might recall that President George W. Bush urged India not to conclude new energy contracts with Iran, and he came forward to fulfil India’s energy needs, as reflected in his initiative to conclude the civilian nuclear deal with India in March 2006. Further, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, during her visit to India in May 2012, urged the UPA government to cut back on oil imports from Iran. But to her great dismay, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, known for being “self-effacing”, did not oblige America. Rather, he emphatically told America that India would be guided by its “enlightened” national interests. India’s External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna also apprised Secretary Clinton of the fact that India imported 60 per cent of its Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 oil from the Middle Eastern region, in addition to India’s over $100 billion bilateral trade with countries of that region. It should be remembered that

India, the world’s fourth-biggest oil consumer and Tehran’s top client after China, imported around 358,000 barrels per day (bpd) in the first quarter (2014), up nearly 43 percent from a year ago, according to tanker arrival data obtained from trade sources and compiled by Thomson Reuters Oil Analytics.32 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 171 Moreover, India tried to patch up its political and strategic differences with Iran while clearly telling the Obama administration that it was unable to be a party to the US oil embargo on Iran. On the nuclear issue, India, though against Iran’s nuclear weapon building programme, argued that Iran had a legitimate right to develop a peaceful nuclear programme under the NPT regime. Monish Tourangbam observes,

The problem is that New Delhi and Washington look at Iran through two very different lenses. Given India’s increasing need for energy and its geo-strategic and economic interests in the Persian Gulf, it is imperative to maintain ties with Iran. On the other hand, the US government considers Iran a rogue state which not only sponsors terrorism but also flouts international nuclear energy laws and hence deserving to be shunned by the international community.33

However, a U-turn took place on the issue of India’s oil import from Iran. It has been reported that

India has to cut its Iranian oil imports by nearly two-thirds from the first quarter after the United States asked it to hold the shipments at end-2013 levels, in keeping with the nuclear deal easing sanctions on Tehran, Indian government sources said. India, with the increases already made in the January–March loading plans from Iran has to cut its purchases of the crude to about 110,000 barrels per day (bpd) to drop its intake average to 195,000 bpd for the six months to July 20.34

Besides, America mounted pressure on India to sever its commercial transaction with Iran. The Times of India reported that

Iran is hoping that by the first deadline of July 20, there would be a nuclear agreement with the west – where Iran agrees to limit a uranium enrichment programme, make it transparent and verifiable, while the west lifts sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy.35

Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, in his lecture on “Iran’s Foreign Policy-Towards Stability in West Asia” at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi on 27 February 2014, said, “We are not being intransigent, we Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 have the political will and are determined to implement fully a nuclear deal”.36 The message that he wanted to give was that Iran’s nuclear programme was completely civilian. Given the geopsychological disapproval of US policies in the Middle East, the Obama administration needs to adopt a peace-offensive strategy to assuage the deeply nurtured hatred of America in the Middle East. Though both New Delhi and Washington have a parallel objective of preventing Iran from building a nuclear weapon programme, they sharply 172 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions differ on the issue of slapping sanctions on Iran. This issue can be resolved through mutual dialogue and consultation in the spirit of appreciating each other’s compulsions and constraints. What is more important for both countries is to ensure peace, security, and stability in the Middle East and the Gulf. Iraq is burning. Extremists have raised their ugly heads once again after the withdrawal of US forces in 2011. Therefore, the emerging challenge in this volatile region demands that New Delhi and Washington work out a patient, prudent, and pragmatic approach to promoting stable and peaceful regional order.37 In brief, India needs to balance its competing interests vis-à-vis Iran and America. Hence, India’s foreign policy ought to be conducted through the prism of realism coupled with the spirit of reciprocity and mutual interest.

Pakistan in India–US security ties It may be recalled that during the Cold War era, America looked upon South Asia through the prism of its relations with Pakistan. America’s naïve attempts at establishing military parity between India and Pakistan resulted in a fierce armament race between them, while America’s military and strategic succour to Pakistan bolstered war jingoism between the two historic rivals, India and Pakistan. Be that as it may, Pakistan’s diplomacy, albeit reflecting “Machiavellian tactics”, has been largely successful in comparison to India’s ill-conceived and flawed diplomacy. For instance, Pakistan has managed its good relations with both the United States and China. At times, Pakistan has adroitly played the China card to extract massive military and economic assistance from the United States. Through this, Islamabad has sent out a message to Washington that Pakistan is not without friends. But the Los Angeles Times holds a contrary view, saying that “Beijing could never replace the billions in aid that Washington provides”38 to Pakistan. It may be noted that security cooperation between New Delhi and Washington witnessed a “trust deficit” when President George Bush announced the delivery of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Prime Minister Singh conveyed his “great disappointment at the decision”, which might have negative fallout for India’s security environment.39 White House officials tried to allay Indian fears, explaining that it was part of the Bush administration’s policy of “parallel improvement” of relations with both India and Pakistan. On the one hand, President Bush seemed eager to cultivate India’s friend- Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 ship and wanted to engage India in global and regional affairs on a par with US allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the EU. On the other hand, his decision to funnel military aid into Pakistan, including the transfer of F-16 fighter aircraft, was perceived by New Delhi as a paradox in the administration’s policy. But, at the same time, it is true that the US had a strategic compulsion to assign Pakistan a central role in Afghanistan in pursuit of its war on global terror. In fact, Bush had to walk a tight-rope in maintaining friendly relations with both India and Pakistan.40 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 173 As pointed out earlier, the Pakistani ruling class has been successful in cap- italizing on the US perception that it can neither defeat terrorism nor bring internal security and stability in Afghanistan without Pakistani succour. In other words, the administration needs to manage its complex relationship with Pakistan.41 One might recall that US–Pakistan relations had reached their lowest ebb following the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in drone attacks in November 2011, and the pre-planned physical elimination of Osama Bin Laden by US commandos in a top secret mission carried out in the city of Abbottabad in Pakistan in May 2011. In retaliation, Pakistan denied NATO and US forces access to its land routes. In that difficult hour, America had to, although temporarily, turn to Central Asia for alternative supply routes. Later on, the administration expressed its overt regrets over the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, following which Islamabad agreed to reopen its territory for logistic support to US forces. At the same time, the Obama administration, while redefining its policy and strategy, came forward to engage India in ensuring internal security and political stability in Afghanistan. But the fact is that both New Delhi and Washington have limited options to reshape the political and security architecture of Afghanistan. Understandably, the Taliban and Pakistan’s ISI are working hand-in-glove with each other to deny India strategic and political space in Afghanistan. There is a certainty that in the eventuality of a full withdrawal of American troops, neither the United States nor India would be able to influence Afghanistan’s political destiny or its future course of events. Nevertheless, Xenia Dormandy, former senior associate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, argues that the role of India and the US will be essential for political stability in Kabul and Islamabad. She writes,

To stabilize Afghanistan, Washington must work to stabilize Pakistan, which some experts warn could become a failed state. And it will be hard to stabilize either one without India. Given the rivalry between India and Pakistan, not least over Kashmir and Afghanistan, India’s role is essential.42

More often than not, President Obama has been ambiguous over what kind of relationship America intends to maintain with India and Pakistan. He is sceptical about the US course of action against Pakistan on the question of the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure in the Pak-occupied Kashmir Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 (PoK). A Pentagon report released on 31 October 2014 confirms India’s long-standing charge that Pakistan has been using terrorists to counter the Indian army. The Pentagon, in its six-monthly report to the US Congress, stated, “Afghan and Indian-focused terrorists continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India’s superior military.”43 The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has welcomed the report. Its spokesperson stated, on 4 November 174 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 2014, “If the international community is saying Pakistan is using terrorists as proxies to counter Indian army then it’s welcoming. Issue of terrorism should not be segmented.”44 Despite this stunning revelation by the Pentagon, US military engagement with Pakistan will remain strong in comparison that with India. Both Washington and New Delhi are concerned about the shifting regional balance of power, and are apprehensive about Islamist extremists exploiting the political chaos in their favour. As such, they need to prop up the process of consultation and collaboration on how to prevent Afghanistan from falling into the abyss. America has little ability to influence the future of Afghanistan: this will be determined by political dynamics in South Asia, in which New Delhi and Islamabad have competing and clashing interests. In the bilateral summit meeting on 30 September 2014, Prime Minister Modi and President Obama committed themselves to making “joint and concerted efforts” to disrupt financial and tactical support to “terror outfits” – Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and LeT.45 And in October 2014, Indian’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval discussed with Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel and top brass in the Pentagon the emerging threat from the dreaded Islamic State militant group in the Middle East. But the Modi government has plainly told the US administration that India will not fight against the ISIS terrorist group in the Middle East. Contrary to its loud promises in the national election campaigns, it is following the UPA policy in the Middle East. At the same time, it is also widely believed that the new Indian government has no influence in the Muslim world, especially in the Middle East and the Gulf, where Indians have been held hostage by ISIS.46

The nuclear liability act This apart, the foreign policy establishment in India has not been able to give a guarantee to the American company Westinghouse to set up its plant in Gujarat, although the then External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid gave an assurance to his counterpart John Kerry in June 2013 that the matter would be resolved amicably shortly thereafter, coinciding with Prime Minister Singh’s visit to the US in September 2013 to address the UN General Assembly. But the major problematic issue during the UPA regime was India’s nuclear liability law, as discussed in Chapter 3. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Though India and the US have a relationship of complex interdependence, it is often characterized by bureaucratic mistrust on both sides. Also, it has been observed that the prevailing inferiority–superiority complex syndrome does tend to stymie processes of cooperation in vital fields such as defence and security and civilian nuclear energy. Moreover, Obama’s new national security team either does not have the requisite expertise on South Asia in comparison to the previous team, or lacks the élan to generate a better understanding between the two countries. Surjit Mansingh writes, in this regard, Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 175 that “Secretary of State John Kerry may not have the same fondness for India that Hillary Clinton did”.47

Future directions As said earlier, the “flowering relations” between New Delhi and Washington were primarily the result of President George W. Bush’s proactive initiative to take the New Delhi–Washington relationship to a new height. In his perception, India was a key factor in advancing American interests in the Asia-Pacific region. In effect, the changing power equation in an interdependent world order in the aftermath of 9/11 forced the administration to reassess the US policy towards Asia in the face of China’s growing economic, strategic, and military power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The US policy towards the region will remain anchored to the integration of India into its global geostrategy. As spelt out in this chapter, there is an inbred complexity in India–US ties. Stability in the two countries’ relationship will largely depend on how they work together on “common challenges”, and how each responds to the other’s concerns. Their relations are fragile and full of strategic contradictions, while their foreign policy and security goals are not complementary given their differing stakes and obligations. The future scenario is full of uncertainty. For instance, Russia’s deteriorating relations with the United States on issues like Ukraine, and Moscow’s alleged hand in the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 in July 2014 are ominous signs, especially when India has a long-standing defence and strategic partnership with Russia. The US-led economic sanctions on Russia are likely to complicate international security and stability. The Obama administration needs to open the channel of negotiations with Russia. The latter’s support, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is critically important on energy security, on Afghanistan, and of course on Iran’s nuclear programme. The confrontation between America and Russia may cast a shadow of tension on India–US relations. Moreover, New Delhi has to undertake a balancing task to maintain friendly relations with Washington and Moscow. It is to be carefully watched how India responds to the emerging scenario, which is unpredictable.

Conclusion Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Despite the enthusiasm spawned in the early phase, Indo-US relations have not lived up to mutual expectations and promises. Wrinkles in the two countries’ relationship have started appearing on bilateral and multilateral issues, including transfer of dual-use technology, military aid to Pakistan, trade sanctions against Iran, and political differences over the trade facilitation agreement at the WTO. Besides, bureaucracies in both countries are reluctant to shed fractured perceptions towards the other, modelled on Cold War geopolitics. This apart, countering the rise of China 176 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions remains a most daunting challenge before New Delhi and Washington, since they philosophically entertain contrary views on the question of how to deal with China. For instance, the Obama administration believes that a “strong”, “assertive”, and “prosperous” China is indispensable for international peace, security, and prosperity.48 India does not subscribe to this view, and is sceptical as to whether the United States is really serious about counteracting the increasing influence of China in the Asia-Pacific region. In this scenario, the US should unhesitatingly come forward to extend diplomatic and moral succour to India over China’s continual transgression of India’s borders in the Arunachal Pradesh state, rather than keep its tight-lipped silence. Be that as it may, there is a promising sign for the bilateral relationship in the Modi government’s intention to remove a major irritant in relation to the nuclear deal. The New Delhi government has agreed to US companies’ long-standing demand for the liability burden to be done away with. Notwithstanding, differences between the countries on bilateral and multilateral issues are bound to persist. But “unity in difference”, to use the phrase of Ashley Tellis,49 is the key to cementing Indo-American partnership. For example, if India can help sustain American interests in the Asia-Pacific region, America can muster the moral courage and political stamina to deal with the home-grown extremist elements and jihadists in Pakistan, and diplomatically support India’s legitimate territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh vis-à-vis China. In other words, their convergent national interests, based on shared values and obligations, make the India–US partnership not only mutually dependent but also indispensable for peace, security, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Notes

1 Quoted in B.M. Jain, “Regional Security in South Asia”, in Hussein Solomon (ed.), Challenges to Global Security: Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), p. 94. 2 It has been the US policy since the Bush administration to make India a major global power. There are a large number of references in this regard. Ashley J. Tellis was a key figure in clinching the nuclear deal, and also a great supporter of India during the Bush administrations. See Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis.india.global.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 power.final.pdf, accessed 17 January 2016. 3 G. Parthasarthy, “Indo-US Ties Run into Rough Weather”, The Hindu Business Line, 23 April 2014. www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/g-parthasarathy/ indous-ties-run-into-rough-weather/article5940713.ece, accessed 14 January 2016. 4 “Indo-US Ties Strong, But Not Without Challenges”, The Hindustan Times, 3 March 2012. www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/indo-us-ties-strong-but-not- without-challenges/article1-820117.aspx, accessed 14 January 2016. 5 Sunjoy Joshi et al., “Beyond the Plateau in U.S.–India Relations”, 26 April 2013. www. heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations, accessed 11 January 2016. Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 177

6 “Running on Empty: India’s Defence Sector Procurements”, Albright Stonebridge Group, 6 March 2014. www.albrightstonebridge.com/news/running-empty-indias -defense-sector-procurements, accessed 14 January 2016. 7 K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto “India–U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement”, Congressional Research Service Report 42823, 13 November 2012, p. 28. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42823.pdf, accessed 14 January 2016. 8 Ibid. 9 Romi Jain writes: “New Delhi’s ‘reciprocal action’ was immature and impulsive. It reflects its non-exploration of prudent options to convey its bruised sensitivities, especially in dealing with a ‘strategic partner.’ [Also, it indicates] India’s reluctance to tolerate any move or response that exhibits America’s treatment of India as an unequal partner, especially when the two countries have elevated their relationship to strategic partnership.” Romi Jain, “India’s Reaction to Devyani Khobragade’s Arrest”, Sharnoff’s Global Views, 14 January 2014. www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/india-reaction-khobragade-283/, accessed 14 January 2016. 10 Frank Jack Daniel and Rupam Jain Nair, “Insight: With New Team in Place, Modi Tightens Grip on Power”, Reuters, 14 November 2014. http://in.reuters.com/ article/2014/11/13/india-modi-cabinet-power-idINKCN0IX1A520141113, accessed 14 January 2016. 11 M.K. Bhadrakumar, “Afghanistan – Time for Irrevocable Decisions”, The Hindu, 26 January 2011. 12 First, in Pakistan’s perception its control of Afghanistan is indispensable to its plan to provide “safe havens” to “Kashmiri militants” in Afghanistan. Second, Pakistan’s motive is to maintain power and influence in Afghanistan to gain control over Central Asia’s strategic assets. 13 Washington Post, 26 February 2009. 14 Ibid. 15 Pertaining to this point, see Vandna Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan in 2012”, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January/February 2013): pp. 22–33. 16 “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India After Bilateral Meeting”, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 30 September 2014. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/ remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-narendra-modi-india-after-bil, accessed 14 January 2016. 17 Declan Walsh and Azam Ahmed, “Mending Alliance, U.S. and Afghanistan Sign Long-Term Security Agreement”, New York Times, 30 September 2014. www. nytimes.com/2014/10/01/world/asia/afghanistan-and-us-sign-bilateral-security- agreement.html, accessed 14 January 2016. 18 For a critical note, see M.K. Bhadrakumar, “U.S. Brings Silk Road to India”, The Hindu, 24 December 2010. 19 Richard Weitz, “Beijing Braces for Afghanistan 2014”, China–US Focus, 18 January 2014. www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/beijing-braces-for-afghanistan-2014/, accessed 14 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 20 C. Christine Fair, “Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan?” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011): pp. 179–192 (p. 189). 21 The Hindu, 26 June 2012. 22 “U.S.–India Joint Statement”, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 27 September 2013. www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/us-india-joint- statement, accessed 14 January 2016. 23 Ibid. 24 For details see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2012), pp. 20–24; John Lewis Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold 178 Challenges, opportunities, and future directions War History: Reflections on Revisionism”,Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January/ February 1994). www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1994-01-01/ tragedy-cold-war-history, accessed 14 January 2016. 25 Adith Charlie, “Iran–India Relations: Drifting with Untapped Potential”, Journal of Turkish Weekly, 28 February 2014. www.turkishweekly.net/news/163842/iran- india-relations-drifting-with-untapped-potential.html, accessed 15 January 2016. 26 Nirupama Rao, “Speech at IDSA–IPIS Strategic Dialogue on India and Iran: An Enduring Relationship”, keynote address at IDSA, New Delhi, 5 July 2010. www. idsa.in/KeynoteAddressIndiaandIrananenduringrelationship_nirupamaroy, accessed 15 January 2016. 27 Ibid. 28 Charlie, “Iran–India Relations”. 29 Ibid. 30 Brahma Chellaney, “Is the U.S.–India Relationship Losing Steam?”, Japan Times, 7 June 2012. 31 “Lessons on Diplomacy from an Iranian”, The Hindu, 1 February 2013. 32 For details see Nidhi Verma, “India Cuts Iran Oil Imports Nearly a Fifth in 2013/14”, Reuters, 17 April 2014. www.reuters.com/article/india-iran-imports- idUSL3N0N63BF20140417, accessed 15 January 2016. 33 Monish Tourangbam, “Indo-US Relations: A Reality Check”, Eurasia Review, 18 December 2012. 34 Nidhi Verma, “Exclusive: India to Slash Iran Oil Imports to Meet Nuclear Deal Parameters”, Reuters, 11 March 2014. www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/11/us-in dia-iran-imports-idUSBREA2A0TU20140311, accessed 15 January 2016. 35 Indrani Bagchi, “Iran’s Foreign Minister to Meet Salman Khurshid Today”, The Times of India, 28 February 2014. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ Irans-foreign-minister-to-meet-Salman-Khurshid-today/articleshow/31140531. cms, accessed 15 January 2016. 36 Ibid. 37 A group of scholars, including Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, and Lisa Curtis, write, “The problem that Iran poses is not just one of nuclear proliferation. As the Middle East faces the turbulence generated by the Arab awakening and the schism between the Shia and Sunni communities is exacerbated across the region, both Washington and New Delhi will benefit from framing the Iran challenge within this larger context. Focusing on the regional balance of power would open a much broader template and generate new possibilities for collaboration between New Delhi and Washington. Because the use of force will greatly complicate the prospects for forging this balance of power, a mature U.S.–India partnership on the issue puts the onus on both countries to facilitate a peaceful end to Iran’s nuclear program. For the sake of U.S.–India cooperation, it is necessary for New Delhi to understand that the U.S. will not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran.” Joshi et al., “Beyond the Plateau in U.S.–India Relations”. 38 Alex Rodriguez and Barbara Demick, “Could Pakistan Dump the U.S. for ‘All-Weather Friend’ China?”, Los Angeles Times, 1 October 2011. http://articles. Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 latimes.com/2011/oct/01/world/la-fg-pakistan-china-20111001, accessed 15 January 2016. 39 Tellis, India as a New Global Power, p. 15. 40 See Sumit Ganguly, and Andrew Scobell, “India and the United States: Forging a Security Relationship?” World Policy Journal (Summer 2005): pp. 37–43. 41 See Yochi J. Dreazen, “Pakistan and U.S. Rebuild Strained Military Ties”, The Wall Street Journal, 5 January 2009. 42 Xenia Dormandy, “India: America’s Indispensable Allies”, Christian Science Monitor, 13 March 2009. Challenges, opportunities, and future directions 179

43 “MEA Welcomes Pentagon Reports on Pakistan Using Terrorists Against Indian Army as Proxy”, IBN Live, 4 November 2014. www.ibnlive.com/videos/india/ mea-on-pantagon-724041.html, accessed 15 January 2016. 44 Ibid. 45 The Times of India, 2 October 2014. 46 “Govt. Believes 39 Indians Held Hostage by ISIS Still Alive: Sushma Swaraj”, The Times of India, 28 November 2014. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ india/Govt-believes-39-Indians-held-hostage-by-ISIS-still-alive-Sushma-Swaraj/ articleshow/45305204.cms, accessed 15 January 2016. 47 Surjit Mansingh, “President Obama’s New National Security Team”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013): pp. 388–92. 48 For this, see Tsuneo Watanabe, “US Engagement Policy toward China (2) Realism, Liberalism, and Pragmatism”, The Tokyo Foundation, 31 January 2014. www. tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2014/us-engagement-policy-toward-china2, accessed 17 January 2016. 49 Ashley Tellis, Unity in Difference: Overcoming the US–India Divide (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015). Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Select bibliography

Acharya, Amitav. Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). Agrawal, Subhash. “India and the United States: A New Partnership”, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 2 (June 2011): pp. 57–73. Ahmed, Samina and David Cortright (eds). Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998). Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.). The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Allison, Graham. “How to Stop Nuclear Terror”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (January/February 2004): pp. 64–75. Andreasen, Steve. “A Joint Enterprise: Diplomacy to Achieve a World Without Nuclear Weapons”, Arms Control Today, Vol. 39 (April 2009): pp.14–20. Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 11th edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, 2012). Ayoob, Mohammed. “South Asia’s Dangers and US Foreign Policy”, Orbis, Vol. XLV, No. 1 (Winter 2001): pp. 123–34. Baldwin, David. “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies”, in Klaus Knorr (ed.), Power, Strategy, and Security: A World Politics Reader (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 17. Balz, Dan. “U.S. Urges Pakistan to Forgo Tests”, Washington Post, 18 May 1998. Barnds, William J. India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1972). Barry Buzan, “The Interdependence of Security and Economic Issues in the New World Order”, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 4th edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Behera, Navnita Chadha (ed.). Political Science: India Engages the World, Vol. 4 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013). Bell, Coral. “American Ascendancy and the Pretense of Concert”, The National Interest, No. 57 (Fall 1999): pp. 55–63. Berger, Samuel R. “A Foreign Policy for the Global Age”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000): pp. 22–39. Bertsch, Gary K., Seema Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivastava (eds). Engaging India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Largest Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999). Bhadrakumar, M.K. “U.S. Brings Silk Road to India”, The Hindu, 24 December 2010. Select bibliography 181 Blazevic, Jason J. “Defensive Realism in the Indian Ocean: Oil, Sea Lanes and the Security Dilemma”, China Security, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2009): pp. 59–71. Bowles, Chester. Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941–1969 (New Delhi: B.I. Publications, 1972). Bosch, Olivia and Peter Van Ham (eds). Global Non-Proliferation and Counter- Terrorism: The Impact of UNSCR 1540 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 2007). Boyle, Michael J. “Is the US Drone War Effective?”, Current History (April 2014): pp. 137–42. Bradford, John F. “The Maritime Strategy of the United States: Implications for Indo-Pacific Sea Lanes”,Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 22 (2011): pp. 183–208. Brown, Michel E. (ed.). Grave New World, Security Challenges in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003). Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “The Cold War and its Aftermath”, Foreign Affairs (Fall 1992): pp. 11–49. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). Buzan, Barry. “‘Change and Insecurity’ Reconsidered”, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 20, No. 3 (December 1999): pp. 1–17. Buzan, Barry. “The Interdependence of Security and Economic Issues in the New World Order”, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). Buzan, Barry. “Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTSS): A Theoretical Framework”, World Economics and Politics, Issue 1 (2010): pp. 113–33. Camilleri, Joseph A. “The Competition for Power and Legitimacy in an Age of Transition”, in Solomon Hussein (ed.), Challenges to Global Security: Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition (London: IB Tauris, 2008), pp. 27–52. Caporaso, James A. “Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioural Analysis”, International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter 1978): pp. 13–43. Caporaso, James A. “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations”, International Organization, Vol. 46 (1992): pp. 599–632. Cerny, Philip G. “Globalisation and the Changing Logic of Collective Action”, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995): pp. 595–625. Chadha, Vivek. “Indo-US Defence Relationship”, in S.D. Muni and Vivek Chadha (eds), Asian Strategic Review (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2013), pp. 227–50. Chambers, Michael R. (ed.). South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). Chanda, Nayan. “US Pivot towards Asia is Untenable”, The Times of India, 8 June 2012.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. Little America: The War within the War for Afghanistan (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). Chapman, Graham P. The Geopolitics of South Asia: From Early Empires to the Nuclear Age (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003). Chari, P.R. “India’s Nuclear Programme at the Crossroads”, Times of India, 24 January 2005. Chari, P.R. Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of the United States (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). Chari, P.R. (ed.). Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009, revised edition 2012). 182 Select bibliography Chari, P.R., Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen. Four Crises and a Peace Process (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). Charlie, Adith. “Iran–India Relations: Drifting with Untapped Potential”, Journal of Turkish Weekly, 28 February 2014. Chary, M. Srinivas. The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy toward India Since Independence (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995). Chatterji, Manas and B.M. Jain (eds). Conflict and Peace in South Asia (London: Emerald Group Publishing Ltd., 2008). Chellaney, Brahma. Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India and Japan (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006). Chellaney, Brahma. Nuclear Proliferation: the U.S.–Indian Conflict (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993). Chellaney, Brahma. “US Deal is a Bad Choice for Power Generation”, International Herald Tribune, 27 December 2005. Chengappa, Raj. Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers, 2000). Cimbala, Stephen J. U.S. Nuclear Strategy in the New World Order (New York: Paragon, 1993). Cirincione, Joseph (ed.). Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000). Clary, Christopher. “A.Q. Khan and the Limits of the Non-Proliferation Regime”, Disarmament Forum, No. 4 (2004): pp. 34–41. Clary, Christopher. “Will India Ever Really Be America’s Partner?”, Foreign Policy, 11 June 2012. www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/11/will_india_ever_really_ be_americas_partner, accessed 15 December 2012. Clemens, Walter C. Dynamics of International Relations: Conflict and Mutual Gain in an Era of Global Interdependence (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004). Clinton, Hillary Rodham. “Leading Through Civilian Power, Redefining American Diplomacy and Development”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6 (November–December 2010): pp. 13–24. Cohen, Stephen. “A New Beginning in South Asia”, Policy Brief, No. 55 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, January 2000). Cohen, Stephen P. “Balancing Interests: The U.S. and the Subcontinent”, National Interest (Fall 1987): pp. 74–84. Cohen, Stephen P. and Michael H. Armacost. India: Emerging Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001). Conley, Jerome M. Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons and Options for U.S. Policy in South Asia (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001).

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Cooper, Richard N. “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies”, World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January 1972): pp. 159–81. Copeland, Dale C. “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations”, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996): pp. 5–41. Council on Foreign Relations. A New U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997). Crawford, Beverly, “The New Security Dilemma Under International Economic Interdependence”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 23 (1994): pp. 25–55. Select bibliography 183 Curtis, Lisa. “Going the Extra Mile for a Strategic U.S.–India Relationship”, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 2719, 20 August 2012. www.heritage.org/ research/reports/2012/08/going-the-extra-mile-for-a-strategic-us-india-relationship, accesssed 5 December 2012. Curtis, Lisa. “India Should Partner US to Deter Chinese Influence”, The Economic Times, 6 March 2012. Curtis, Lisa. “U.S.–India Counterterrorism Cooperation: Deepening the Partnership”, Testimony before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, 14 September 2011. Curtis, Lisa. “U.S.–India Relations: The China Factor”, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 2209, 25 November 2008. Curtis, Lisa et al. “Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A Plan for U.S.–Australia– India Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific”, Special Report 99, 3 November 2011. www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/11/shared-goals-converging-interests-a- plan-for-u-s-australia-india-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific, accessed 9 December 2012. Dasgupta, Sunil and Stephen P. Cohen, “Arms Sales for India: How Military Trade Could Energize U.S.–Indian Relations”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March–April 2011): pp. 22–26. Dasgupta, Sunil and Stephen P. Cohen. “Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?”, The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2011): pp. 163–77. Davis, Ted and David M. Hart, “International Cooperation to Manage High-Skill Migration: The Case of India–U.S. Relations”, Review of Policy Research, Vol. 27, No. 4 (July 2010): pp. 509–26. Dittmer, Lowell (ed.). South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005). Dormandy, Xenia. “India: America’s Indispensable Ally”, The Christian Science Monitor, 11 March 2009. Dreazen,Yochi J. “Pakistan and U.S. Rebuild Strained Military Ties”, Wall Street Journal, 5 January 2009. Drezner, Daniel W. “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4 (July/August 2011): pp. 57–68. Fair, C. Christine. “Under the Shrinking U.S. Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan?”, The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2011): pp. 179–92. Farmer, Victoria (ed.). The Future of Nuclear Weapons: US–India Dialogue (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1998). Faruqui, Ahmad. “Beyond Strategic Myopia in South Asia”, Strategic Review, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (Winter 2001): pp. 18–25. Felbab-Brown, Vandna. “Afghanistan in 2012”, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January/ February 2013): pp. 22–33.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Fitzpatrick, Mark. “Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers”, Adelphi Series, Vol. 2014, No. 443 (London: IISS, 2014), pp. 105–40. Freidberg, Aaron L. “Compromise or Conflict? China, the United States, and Stability in Asia”, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005): pp. 7–45. Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System”, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986): pp. 99–142. Gaddis, John Lewis. “Toward the Post-Cold War World”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991): pp. 102–22. 184 Select bibliography Galbraith, J.K. Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969). Ganguly, Sumit. “America and India at a Turning Point”, Current History (March 2005): pp. 120–24. Ganguly, Sumit. “The Kashmir Conundrum”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July/ August 2006): pp. 45–57. Ganguly, Sumit and Nicholas Howenstein. “India–Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan”, International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): pp. 127–40. Ganguly, Sumit and Andrew Scobell. “India and the United States: Forging a Security Partnership?”, World Policy Journal (Summer 2005): pp. 37–43. Ganguly, Sumit, Andrew Scobell, and Brian Shoup (eds). US–Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). Goldmann, Kjell and Gunnar Sjostedt (eds). Power, Capabilities, Interdependence (London: Sage, 1979). Gopal, S. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, 1947–56, Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979). Gould, Harold A. The South Asia Story: the First Sixty Years of U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2010). Green, Michael J., Shearer, Andrew. “Defining U.S. Indian Ocean Strategy”, Washington Quarterly (Spring 2012): pp. 175–89. Hagerty, Devin. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). Hagerty, Devin T. (ed.). South Asia in World Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). Harrison, Selig S. and Geoffrey Kemp. India and America After the Cold War: Report to the Carnegie Endowment Study Group on U.S.–Indian Relations in a Changing International Environment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993). Hussain, Ishrat. “The Role of Politics in Pakistan’s Economy”, Journal of International Affairs, online, 24 March 2010. http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/role-politics-pakistans- economy-0/. Ikenberry, G. John. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Ikle, Fred Charles. “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 2 (January 1973): pp. 266–85. Ikle, Fred Charles. “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996): pp. 119–29. Inayat, Mavara. “US–Indian Strategic Partnership: Implications for Asia and Beyond”, Regional Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (Spring 2006): pp. 3–64. Jain, B.M. Global Power: India’s Foreign Policy, 1947–2006 (Lanham, MD: Lexington

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Books, 2008). Jain, B.M. India and the United States, 1961–1963 (New Delhi: Radiant Publisher, 1987). Jain, B.M. “India–China Relations: Issues and Emerging Trends”, The Round Table, Vol. 93, No. 374 (April 2004): pp. 253–69. Jain, B.M. “Regional Security in South Asia”, in Hussein Solomon (ed.), Challenges to Global Security: Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 90–111. Jasper, Ursula. The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: A Pragmatist Framework for Analysis (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). Select bibliography 185 Jha, Nalini Kant. Nuclear Synergy: Indo-US Strategic Cooperation (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009). Johnson, Rebecca. Unfinished Business: The Negotiations of the CTBT and the End of Nuclear Testing (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2009). Johnson, Rob. A Region in Turmoil: South Asian Conflicts Since 1947 (London: Reaktion Books, 2005). Jones, R.J. Barry, Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy Rhetoric and Reality (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). Kakodkar, Anil. “Reversing the Logic of Nuclear Deal”, The Hindu, 4 July 2011. Kapstein, E. Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). Kapur, Ashok et al. (eds). India and the United States in a Changing World (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002). Kapur, Paul S. “India and the United States from World War II to the Present: A Relationship Transformed”, in Sumit Ganguly (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 251–54. Kargil Review Committee Report (New Delhi: Government of India, 2000). Karnad, Bharat. India’s Nuclear Policy: Credible Minimum Deterrence (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008). Karnad, Bharat. “Peril of a Tight Embrace: India, US, Kashmir and Non-Proliferation Issues”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July–September 2002): pp. 329–40. Katzenstein, Peter J. “International Interdependence: Some Long-term Trends and Recent Changes”, International Organization, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1975): pp. 1021–34. Kaysen, Carl, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjens. “Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Fall 1991): pp. 95–110. Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). Keohane, Robert O. Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (London: Routledge, 2002). Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2012). Kerr, Paul K. “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, Con gressional Research Service, RL 33016, 7 May 2012. Khan, Saira. Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). Khilnani, Sunil, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta et al. Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century (New Delhi: Penguin Books India Pvt Lt, 2014). Kibaroglu, Mustafa. “The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Requires Concerted Action”,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Strategic Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2014): pp. 209–16. Knorr, Klaus (ed.). A World Politics Reader: Power, Strategy, and Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). Krepon, Michael. Better Safe than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009). Krishna, Ashok, Maj.Gen. and P.R. Chari (eds). Kargil: The Tables Turned (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001). Kroll, John A. “The Complexity of Interdependence”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1993): pp. 321–48. 186 Select bibliography Kronstadt, K. Alan and Sonia Pinto. “India–U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) 42823, Washington, DC, 13 November 2012. Kumar, Surendra. “India–US Relations: The Defining Partnership of the 21st Century”, Asian Age, 18 October 2013. Kux, Dennis. India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991 (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1993). Lampton, David M. Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001). Latif, Amer and Karl F. Inderfurth. “U.S.–India Defence Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership”, CSIS Report, Vol. 2, No. 7 (July 2012). http:// csis.informz.net/CSIS/data/images/120713_wadhwanichair_usindiainsight.pdf, accessed 10 July 2014. Lee, Joseph Tse-Hei, Lida V. Nedlisky, and Siu-Keung Cheung (eds). China’s Rise to Power: Conceptions of State Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Limaye, Satu. U.S.–Indian Relations: The Pursuit of Accommodation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). McGoldrick, Fred. “Nuclear Trade Controls, Minding the Gaps”, CSIS Report, January 2013, Washington DC. Malik, V.P. and Jorg Schultz (eds). The Rise of China: Perspectives from Asia and Europe (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2008). Mandelbaum, Michael. “Foreign Policy as Social Work”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January/February 1996): pp. 16–32. Mandhana, Niharika and Biman Mukherji. “US–India Nuclear Deal Still Far off”, The Wall Street Journal, 26 June 2013. Manning, Robert A. “The Nuclear Age: The Next Chapter”, Foreign Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997–98): pp. 71–84. Mansingh, Surjit. “President Obama’s New National Security Team”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013): pp. 388–92. Mathews, Jessica T. “Power Shift”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997): pp. 50–66. Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 2014). Mearsheimer, John J. “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”, The Atlantic Monthly (August 1990): pp. 35–50. Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. “Still under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India”, Indian Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July–September 2009): pp. 209–33. Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. “Warming Relations?”, The Hindu, 24 October 2003.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Menon, Raja. A Nuclear Strategy for India (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000). Mesarovic, Mihaljo and Eduard Pestel. Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report to the Club of Rome (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1974). Mohan, C. Raja. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2004). Mohan, C. Raja. Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006). Mohan, C. Raja. “Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 2010): pp. 133–48. Select bibliography 187 Mohanty, Nirode. America, Pakistan, and the India Factor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Morse, Edward. “The Politics of Interdependence”, International Organization, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring 1969): pp. 311–25. Muni, S.D. and Vivek Chadha (eds). Asian Strategic Review (New Delhi: Pantagon Press, 2013). Myers, S. and B.R. Barber (eds). The Interdependence Handbook: Looking Back, Living the Present, Choosing the Future (New York: International Debate Education Association, 2004). Nau, Henry J. Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2011). Nayar, Baldev Raj. American Geopolitics and India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1976). Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul. India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Nixon, Richard. R.N. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990). Nye, Joseph. The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). Nye, Joseph S. “Limits of American Power”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 4 (2002–2003), pp. 545–59. Nye, Joseph. Power in the Age of Global Information (London: Routledge, 2004). Nye, Joseph. “Redefining the National Interest”,Foreign Affairs (July–August 1999): pp. 22–35. Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Ollapally, Deepa and Rajesh Rajagopalan. “The Pragmatic Challenge to Indian Foreign Policy”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011): pp. 145–62. Pant, Harsh V. “The Pakistan Thorn in China–India–U.S. Relations”, The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2012): pp. 83–95. Paul, T.V. (ed.). International Relations: Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Paul, T.V. “The US–India Nuclear Accord: Implications for the Non-proliferation Regime”, International Journal (Autumn 2007): pp. 845–61. Paul, T.V. and Mahesh Shankar. “Why the US–India Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal”, Survival, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Winter 2007–2008): pp. 111–22. Perkovich, George. “Global Implications of the U.S.–India Deal”, Daedalus, Vol. 139, No. 1 (Winter 2010): pp. 20–31. Perkovich, George. India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). Pocha, Jehangir S. “China and India on Verge of Nuclear Deal”, The Boston Globe, 20 November 2006.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Pomper, Miles A. “Nuclear Suppliers Make Progress on New Rules”, 4 December 2008. www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/NSG_progress, accessed 15 January 2016. Potter, William C. “India and the New Look of US Non-Proliferation Policy”, The James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 8 March 2005. Potter, William C. and Jayantha Dhanapala. “The Perils of Non-Proliferation Amnesia”, The Hindu, 1 September 2007. Ramachandran, R. “Iran Policy was Key to Nuclear Deal with US”, The Hindu, 30 September 2005. Rao, A. “Bowing to U.S. Pressure”, The Times of India, 15 February 2006. 188 Select bibliography Rice, Condoleezza. “The U.S.–India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Opening Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee”, US Department of State Archive, 5 April 2006. http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64136. htm, accessed 7 January 2016. Riedel, Bruce. “The Mumbai Massacre and its Implications for America and South Asia”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): pp. 111–26. Rosecrance, Richard and Arthur Stein. “Interdependence: Myth or Reality”, World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (October 1973): pp. 1–27. Rubinoff, Arthur C. “The Diaspora as a Factor in U.S.–India Relations”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Fall 2005): pp. 169–87. Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella. World Politics: The Menu for Choice (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005). Sasikumar, Karthika. “India’s Emergence as a ‘Responsible’ Nuclear Power”, International Journal, Vol. 62 (Autumn 2007): pp. 825–44. Schaffer, Teresita C. “Building a New Partnership with India”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2002): pp. 31–44. Schaffer, Teresita. Rising India and the U.S. Policy Options (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). Schlesinger, Arthur M. Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965). Schneider, Jerrold E., P.R. Chari, and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (eds). Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 (New York: Routledge, 2003). Schurmann, Franz. The Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974). Sen, Ashish Kumar. “The Nuke Fall Out?”, Outlook India, 7 August 2012. Shafqat, Saeed. “Pakistan Militancy, The Transition to Democracy and Future Relations with the United States”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): pp. 89–109. Shambaugh, David. China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Shambaugh, David. Is China Unstable? (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). Sharma, Amol. “India Weighs Measure to Ease Nuclear Liability”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 October 2010. Sharma, Shalendra D. (ed.). Asia in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security and Foreign Policy (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2000). Sharma, Shalendra D. China and India in the Age of Globalization: A Comparative Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Sibal, Kanwal. “The Arc of the India–US Partnership”, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April–June 2012). www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-arc-of- the-india-us-partnership/, accessed 15 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Sibal, Kanwal. “Crosscurrents in India–US Ties”, The Hindu, 10 July 2013. Singh, Gaurav and Archana Chaudhary. “Areva to Sell Reactors to India’s Nuclear Power”, Bloomberg Online, 4 February 2009. Singh, Jasjit (ed.). Indo-US Relations in a Changing World: Proceedings of the Indo-US Strategic Symposium (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992). Singh, Jaswant. Defending India (New York: Macmillan, 1999). Smith, Joe, Nigel Clark, and Kathryn Yusoff. “Interdependence”, Geography Compass, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2007), pp. 340–59. Select bibliography 189 Solomon, Hussein. Challenges to Global Security, Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008). Soni, Manoj. Understanding the Global Political Earthquake: A Study of Post-Cold War International Systemic Transition and Indo-US Relations (Aldershot, England; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998). Sood, Rakesh. “Agenda for Nuclear Diplomacy”, The Hindu, 27 June 2014. Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). Spear, Joanna and Paul D. Williams (eds). Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012). Squassoni, Sharon. “India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views”, CRS Report for Congress, RL 33292, 21 July 2006. Squassoni, Sharon. “US Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress”, CRS Report for Congress, RL 33016, 4 October 2006. Squassoni, Sharon and Jill Marie Parillo. “US–India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By- Side Comparison of Current Legislation”, CRS Report for Congress, RL33561, 5 September 2006. Srivastava, Anupam and Seema Gahlaut. “The New Energy in the US–India Relationship”, Defence& Security Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 2006): pp. 353–72. Stokes, Bruce. “The U.S. and India Friendship, Warily”, The National Journal, 13 February 2010, pp. 30–36. Storey, Ian. “Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 (March 2003): pp. 40–43. Strange, Susan. “The Erosion of the State”, Current History, Vol . 96, No. 613 (1997): pp. 365–69. Subrahmanyam, K. and G. Parthasarathy. “India Deserves a Nuclear Partnership”, Wall Street Journal, 22 February 2006. Sutter, Robert et al. Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability (George Washington University: Sighur Centre for Asian Studies, August 2013). Talbott, Strobe. Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). Tellis, Ashley. India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). Tellis, Ashley J. A New Friendship: U.S.–India Relations (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2012). Tellis, Ashley J. Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in U.S.–Indian Relations (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2013). Tellis, Ashley J. “Pakistan’s Impending Defeat in Afghanistan”, Commentary, 22 June 2012. www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/22/pakistan-s-impending-defeat-i n-afghanistan/c6sn, accessed 15 January 2016.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Tellis, Ashley. “The Real Meaning of Obama’s Visit”, Forbes India Magazine, 3 December 2010. Tellis, Ashley. Report on Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2014). Tellis, Ashley. “The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India”, Orbis (Winter 2002): pp. 13–45. Tellis, Ashley et al. U.S.–India Relations Ahead of the Strategic Dialogue (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2012). 190 Select bibliography Thyagaraj, Manohar and Raju G.C. Thomas. “The US–Indian Nuclear Agreement: Balancing Energy Needs and Proliferation Goals”, Orbis (Spring 2006): pp. 355–69. Tollison, Robert D. and Thomas D. Willett. “International Integration and the Interdependence of Economic Variables”, International Organization, Vol. XXVII (Spring 1973): pp. 255–71. Tourangbam, Monish, “Indo-US Relations: A Reality Check”, Eurasia Review, 18 December 2012. Twining, Daniel. “America’s Grand Design in Asia”, Washington Quarterly (Summer 2007): pp. 79–93. Van Hollen, Christopher. “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon–Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 4 (April 1980): pp. 339–61. Varadarajan, Siddharth. “The Nuclear Deal and ‘Minimum Deterrence’ ”, The Hindu, 10 July 2006. Walt, Stephen M. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005). Waltz, Kenneth N. “Globalization and American Power”, The National Interest (Spring 2000): pp. 46–56. Waltz, Kenneth N. “The Myth of National Interdependence”, in Charles P. Kindleberger (ed.), The International Corporation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 205–23. Waltz, Kenneth N. “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000): pp. 5–41. Wei, Wei. “China’s New Neighbourhood Diplomacy Will Have Positive Impact on Its Relations with India”, News From China, Vol. XXVI, No. 2 (February 2014): p. 15. Welch, Thomas J. “Technology Change and Security”, Washington Quarterly (Spring 1990): pp. 111–20. Wilkins, Thomas. “‘Alignment’, Not ‘Alliance’ – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2012): pp. 53–76. Wirsing, Robert G. Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in Nuclear Age (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World”, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999): pp. 5–41. Wright, Thomas. “Sifting through Interdependence”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 2013): 7–23. Yetiv, Steve A. Explaining Foreign Policy: US Decision Making in the Gulf Wars (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012). Young, Oran R. “Interdependencies in World Politics”, International Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 1969 ): pp. 726–50. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997). Zhu, Zhiqun. China’s New Diplomacy: Rational, Strategies and Significance (Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013, second edition). Index

123 Agreement (2008) 54, 68, 73, 118; ASEAN 112, 141, 143–4, 147, 169 operationalization of 69–70, 73–4; Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation strategic fuel reserve 74 (APEC) 103 26/11 Mumbai attacks 126, 161 Asia, US “pivot” to 148 9/11 terrorist attacks 10, 83, 160 Asia-Pacific region140 ; US interests in A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) 143 140–2, 145, 147, 149, 155, 159, 176 Atomic Energy Commission Abbottabad 173 (1948) 57, 66 Abe, Shinzo 82, 108 Australia 87, 106, 150 Acharya, Amitav 148 Australia Group 76, 116 Acheson-Lilienthal report (1946) 56 Advani, L.K.: nuclear deal on 65 Baghdad Pact 33 Afghanistan 4, 19–20, 24, 56, 75, 98, Baldvin, David 4–7 102, 116, 119, 126, 131, 135, 145, 148, Ball, George 37 161, 173, 175; Afghan security forces Barnds, William J. 37 119; Rajiv Gandhi’s views on 48 Baruch, Bernard 54; Plan 55 Af-Pak region 4, 11, 96, 119 Bay of Bengal 42 AH-64E Apache Guardian 146 Beijing 143, 148, 150, 167 Airborne Warning and Control Systems Belfer Centre for Science and (AWACS) 47 International Affairs 173 Akula-II, nuclear-powered submarine 104 Berlin Wall, dismantled (1989) 140 Al Qaeda 4, 11, 56, 119, 126, 166 Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Albright, Madeline 60 (BARC) 66 Allen, George V. 38 Bhabha, Homi J. 56 “Alliance” of interest 61 Bhopal Gas tragedy 70 Amano, Yukiya 129 Bhutto, Z.A. 37, 43 America 41–2, 104, 116–20, 130, 141, Biden, Vice President Joe 17 145, 147, 167–8, 170 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 117 American hegemony 140–1; global Bill, Richardson 60 hegemony 142 Biswal, Nisha Desai 72

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Andersen, Warren: Union Carbide BJP 65, 164 chemical plant set up by 70 Black, Eugene 37 Andreasen, Steve 13 Blackwill, Robert 88, 113 “anti-American” 41 Blumenthal, Daniel 143–4 “anti-China coalition” 149 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement Antony, A. K. 87 (2013) 151 Apsara, India’s first nuclear reactor 57 Boucher, Richard 97 Armitage, Richard 96 Bowles, Chester 37–8 Arms Export Control Act (AECA) 91 Brazil 9, 63 Arunachal Pradesh 103, 148, 176 BRICS 112 192 Index

Britain 144 Cold War 33–4, 105, 106, 120, 131–2, Brown Amendment (1996) 55 140–1, 145, 147, 159, 162, 175; Bryan, William Jennings 32 advantages of 20–2 Burke, S.M. 36 complex interdependence 8, 12, Burma 145 20, 24–5, 26; distinction between Burns, William J. 114 interdependence and complex Bush, President George W. (senior) 48, interdependence 15–16; multilateral 128, 142; sanctions on Pakistan 56 security interdependence 14; and Bush, President George W. 13, 54, 60–1 nuclear weapon free world 13; 63–4, 66, 68–9, 75, 112–13, 126, 142, style 148 175; administration 146, 160, 172; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty nuclear deal 54; Nuclear Separation (CTBT) 55, 59–60, 128, 150; EIF Plan on 63; National Missile Defence clause to 58 83; waived sanctions 60 Confederation of Indian Industry Business Standard 121 (CII) 120 containment doctrine 33; paradigm 34 C-130J aircraft 87, 89–90, 102 Convention on Supplementary Campbell, Kurt 82 Compensation for Nuclear Cardin, Ben 126 Damage 71 Carnegie Endowment for International Cope India-05 exercise 87 Peace 164 Copeland, Dale C. 26 Carnegie, Andrew 32 Copenhagen 150 “carrot and stick” 20 Counterterrorism Cooperation Carter administration 44, 57; Initiative 124 uranium supply under Nuclear CTBT 64–5, 126, 135, 164 Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA, Curtis, Lisa 71, 150 1978) 44 cyber security 125, crimes 9 Carter, Ashton 85, 99, 101; India–US defence trade 91; Dean, Rusk 37 bureaucratic restrictions 101 Defence Policy Group (DPG) 83–4 Celeste, Richard, US Ambassador to Defence Trade and Technology India 59 Initiative (DTTI) 81 CENTO 33–4 Desai, Prime Minister Morarji Central Asia 24, 135, 141, 166, 169 44, 57; genuine non-aligned Central Military Commission 115 policy 44 Chari, P.R. 68, 129–30 Deutsch, Karl 2–3 Chidambaram, P. 97, 124–5, 150 Dhanapala, Jayantha 69 China 16, 21, 24, 35, 41–2, 48, 63, 68, distribution of power 11 103, 104, 114–16, 118, 123, 132, doctrine of “military parity” 34 140–1, 146, 148, 150–1, 154, 159, Dorabji Tata Trust 56 162–4, 170; China–Pakistan corridor Dormandy, Xenia 173 151; Indo-US joint naval exercises on Doval, Ajit 174 85; strategic nexus with Pakistan 23 drone strikes 4 China card 172 drug trafficking 10

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Chinmaya, R. Gharekhan 170 DTTI 163 Chittagong 151 Dulles, John Foster 38 CIRUS reactor 77 Durand Line 38 civilian breeder reactors 77 Durant, William James 32 climate change 9, 21, 24–5 Durban 150 Clinton, President Bill 95, 120, 124; administration 159, 160 East Asia 149 Clinton, Hillary 71, 98, 114–17, 126, East China Sea 147 170; interview with NDTV East Pakistan, political turmoil in (June 2014) 123 (1970–71) 41–3 Index 193

East–West rivalry 33 General Electric (GE) 21, 72, 118; Eisenhower, President 38; Hitachi 118 administration 50 Geneva: WTO meeting in 118 EU 112, 153, 172 geopsychological disapproval 171 exercise Cooperative Cope; Thunder: Germany 63, 140; reunification of 140 India and US 87 Ghani, President Ashraf 165; bilateral Exercise Shatrujeet (2013): India security pact 119 and US 88 Ghose, Arundhati 58 Glenn Amendment (1977) 55, 59 F-16 fighter aircraft 172 Global Counter-Terrorism Forum 124 F-18 fighter aircraft 90 global financial crisis 24 F-35, Lightning-II aircraft 90 global interdependence 9 “failed states” 25 global non-proliferation regime 131 failing states 20 global terror 24 Fair, C. Christine 167 Gopal S. 34 Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) 77 Gorbachev, Mikhail 140 FDI (foreign direct investment) 5, Greenert, Admiral Jonathan 86 81, 105, 121; defence sector 91; in Gregg, Richard B. 32 India 17 Griffin, Christopher 152–3 Federal Bureau of Investigation GSP-plus (Generalized System of (FBI) 97 Preferences) 119 Feigenbaum, Evan A. 133 Guardian 73 Fernandes, George 60 Gujarat 122, 174; model 122 Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) Gulf of Aden 115 21, 59, 164 Gulf War (1991) 48, 100; region 117, Fitzpatrick, Mark 75 172, 174 Ford, President Gerald 43 Gwadar Port 151 Foreign Military Sales (FMS); India signed to 89 Hagel, Chuck 81, 147, 174 France 62–3, 89, 163 Hambantota port 115, 151 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 117–18 Harpoon missiles 89 Friedberg, Aaron L. 141 Harriman, Averell 36 frontline state 11 Headley, David Coleman 125 hegemony 7 G-7 112 Henry J. Hyde Act, President Bush on 65 G-15 112 hierarchy 9–11, 21, 25; Keohane and G-20 112 Nye on 20 Gaddis, John Lewis 14; accused of being highly enriched uranium (HEU) 13 “pro-Moscow” and “pro-Soviet” Hilton, Yasmine 62 41, 92; forces of integration and Hindustan Times 104 fragmentation 14–15 Holsti, K.J. 4 Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira 39–40, homeland security 6, 15, 19–20, 25, 124; 43–4; national emergency in India cases of India and the US 7; US–India (June 1975) 44; perceptions of homeland security cooperation 125

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 the United States 41; shift in her Hong Kong 144 perception 45 Hull, Cordell 32 Gandhi, Mahatma 32; nuclear Human Rights 9, 21, 25 weapons on 56 human security 12 Gandhi, Prime Minister Rajiv Hussein, Ross Massood 43 150; Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World 58; Speech (1985) IAEA 62–3; safeguards 69 at General Assembly 47; views on IAF 87 Afghanistan 48 ICT 24 Gandhi, Sonia, UPA chairperson 71 IMF 41, 112 194 Index

India 21, 42–4, 62, 64–5, 70, 75, 97, 112, Israel 21, 153 115, 117, 120, 125, 133, 141, 147, 150, ISRO 134 153, 155, 159, 162, 170; Chandrayan mission 134; emerging global power Jain, Romi 135, 177 21; first nuclear test (18 May 1974) Jaitley, Arun 21, 91 43; the largest functional democracy James A. Caporaso 22 112; Mars Orbiter Mission (2013) 134; Jammu and Kashmir 115, 160 non-proliferation regime 60; nuclear Japan 5, 22, 82, 87, 106, 116, 146–7, pariah 152; permanent membership of 172; India and Japan military Security Council 127; planned socialist exercises 108 economy 41; proxy war against (1989) jihadists 9, 19, 99, 165, 176 118; unilateral moratorium 63–4; Jinping, Xi 106, 115, 151 weapon tests (May 1998) 159 Johnson, President Lyndon B. 39; South Indian diaspora 17, 26; influence in Asia policy 39 US 18–19 Joint Working Group 60; Indian National Satellite (INSAT) 133 Counterterrorism 96, 124 Indian Ocean 15–16, 21, 25, 85, 115, 135, 161–2 Kabul 126, 165–6, 173 Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) 133 Kadakin, Alexander 104 India–US defence cooperation 104; Kaine, Tim 72 Commercial Dialogue 120; defence Kakodkar, Anil 62–3, 66 trade 88; private sector ties 122; Kalpakkam 77 nuclear cooperation agreement (1963) Karachi 133 57; nuclear deal 68, 74, 152; space Kargil-Dras sector 160 cooperation 133; trade 121; Working Karl, David 149 Group 120 Karzai 119 Indo-Pacific region145 , 155, 176 Kashmir 34, 37, 43, 97, 102, 148, 160, Indo-Russian relations 95 173; factor in Indo-US relations 36, Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship 50; Soviet veto on 36 and Cooperation (August 1971) 41; Katzenstein, Peter J. 2, 4 psychological deterrence 42 Kennedy, President John F. 35, 38–9; information age 8, 20; ICT1, 2 Third World policy 35; India’s INS Viraat 84 Bokaro Steel Plant, support to 35; INSAT-1 133 the 1962 Sino-Indian War on 35 INSAT-1B 133 Kennedy, Paul 140 interdependence 1, 4–5, 21–4; and Keohane and Nye 168 climate change 9; multiple dimensions Keohane, Robert, O. 3–5; on complex 6; relationship with power 7; interdependence 9, 15; hierarchy of levels of 24 issues 10 interdependent world order 15 Keqiang, Li 150 International Atomic Energy Agency 21, Kerr, Paul 70 64, 68, 71, 128, 131, 170 Kerry, John 72, 117–19, 123, 126, 161, IOR 106, 115, 135, 143, 153 174, 175 IR theorists: nuclear deterrence on 8 Keshap, Atul 19

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Iran 21, 23, 65, 70, 117, 146, 150, 161, Khan, A.Q. 65 168–71; Iran-Pakistan-India gas Khan, President Mohammad Ayub 36, pipeline 170; nuclear programme 38, 39 21, 131 Khan, President Yahya 42 Iraq 4, 7, 48, 131, 147–9, 172 Khobragade, Devyani 163 Ireland 153 Khurshid, Salman 99, 117, 174 ISIS 4, 20, 88, 102, 118, 125–6, 152, Kickleighter, Claude M. 82; defence 161, 174 proposals 82 Islamabad 65, 96, 118, 133, 152, 173; Kissinger, Henry A. 10, 41–3, 58, 97, military regime in 65 142, 166 Index 195

Kitty Hawk, US aircraft carrier 84 law 73; Modi’s summit with Obama Kremlin 104 (September 2014) 123 Krishna, S.M. 72, 114–17 Mongolia 145 Kronstadt, K. Alan 163 Morgenthau, Hans J. 3 Kronstadt and Pinto 100, 163 Morrison, Wayne M. 30, 31 Kudankulam (KKNPP): nuclear power Moscow 21, 103, 105, 175 reactors 67, 79 “Mr Clean” (Rajiv Gandhi) 46 Kux Dennis 35, 39 MTCR 76, 116 Mukherjee, Pranab 69, 73, 84, 100, 153 LAC 150 multilateral financial institutions 10 Ladakh 115, 150 multi-polar world 66 Laden, Bin 98; elimination of Mumbai: terrorist attacks on (26/11) 97, (2011) 173 98, 118, 124 Lahore 133 Musharraf, President Pervez 160 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) 126, 174 Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement Latif, Sahibzada Amer 101–2 (1954) 38 Latin American 145 Lavoy, Peter 75 Napoleon 141 Libya 65 Napolitano, Janet 124–5 Line of Actual Control (LAC) 115 NASA 133–4 Line of Control (LoC) 160 National Defence Authorization Act Lockheed Martin 91, 102 (2000) 142 Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) 100 National Missile Defence (NMD) 83 “Look East” policy 169 NATO 10, 20, 119, 126, 165, 173 Look West 169 NDA government 60, 164 LSA 101 Nehru scions 164 Nehru, Prime Minister Jawaharlal 32, Malabar exercises (1992, 1995 and 1996) 34, 37, 39, 47, 128; Nehru-Bogra 86; 2007 Malabar exercise 87 parleys on Kashmir 36; US arms Malacca Strait 85, 144 policy on 38–9; nuclear weapons 46, Malaysia 144, 175 58; US role 36 Nehruvian socialism 49 Maldives 115 Nepal 87, 145 Malik, Mohan 152 new balance of power 142 Mandelbaum, Michael 8 new Cold War 144 maritime piracy 24; security 161 New Delhi 5, 34, 86, 96–8, 103, 116, market forces 41 118–19, 142, 148, 151, 163, 171 Maro port 115 New Zealand 128, 153 Marshall Plan 33 Next Steps in Strategic Partnership Mathew, Jessica T. 20 (NSSP, 2004) 84 McCain, John 23 Nike-Apache, US-made rocket 133 Mearsheimer, John J. 3, 29, 82, 143 Nixon, President Richard 38, 41–3; Menon, V.K. Krishna 36 India-US relations 40–41; military Menon, Shiva Shankar 72 aid to Pakistan 38; the Nixon Mesarovic, Mihaljo 1 administration 40; no-first-use64 , 164

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Microwave Remote Sensing (MRS) 134 Non-Aligned Movement 34 Middle East 19, 24, 55, 116–17, 131, 135, non-aligned policy 33–5, 47; India’s 38; 142, 146, 151, 171, 172 non-aligned world 38 Military Sales 163 North East 116 minimum nuclear deterrence 65 North Korea 8, 65, 106, 131, 146–7 Missile Technology Control Regime Northeast Asia 55, 148 (MTCR) 64–5, 116 NPCIL 75, 118 Modi, Prime Minister Narendra 19, NPT 64–5, 74, 126, 128, 135, 150, 73–5, 81, 85, 105, 115, 123, 166, 174; 164, 171 government 122, 164, nuclear liability NSAT-4CR 134 196 Index

NSG 64–5, 74–5, 150; waiver to India People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 23, 63, 68–9, 75, 153 115–16, 142 nuclear assets: South Asia 133 Perry, William 82 Nuclear Liability Act (2010) 17, 70, Persian Gulf 144, 169 73–4; liability regime 71 Pestel, Eduard 1 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act Philippines, the 150; Mischief Reef 82 (1978) 55, 57 Pickering, Tom 60 Nuclear Power Corporation of India Pillai, G.K. 98 Ltd (NPCIL) 72 piracy 10, 118 nuclear power programme 66 Potter, William 68 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Powell, Colin 96 13, 129–31 Powell, Nancy 19, 168 Nuclear Separation Plan, key salient power, the changing face of 7 elements of 77 Pressler (1985) Amendment 55–6 Nuclear Suppliers Group 21, 116 Primakov, Yevgeny 104 nuclear terrorism 25 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Nye, Joseph 3–4; on complex 13, 113 interdependence 9, 15, 19; PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Indo-American complex Vehicle) 133 interdependence 20 Public Law 480 39 Putin, Vladimir 95, 105 Obama, President Barack 17, 19, 72–4, 98–9, 103, 114, 120, 123–4, 127, 129, R&D 63 147, 174; administration 98, 123, Rafale fighter jets 89 176; rebalance policy of 147–9 Rajghatta, Chidanand 18 Observer Research Foundation 171 Rao, Prime Minister Narsimha: “offensive realism” 7 economic reforms (1991) 48–9, 119 Operation Enduring Freedom, Rao, Nirupama 85, 116, 169 Afghanistan 96, 100 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 128 Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) 100 Ratner, Ely 143 Organic bond 1 Reagan, President Ronald: Indo-US ties 45–8 P-3C aircraft 146 Rice, Condoleezza 9, 61, 73, 75, 97, “P-5”: nuclear club 55, 58 113, 126 P-8I, maritime reconnaissance Richard, Cooper 4 planes 87, 89 Roemer, Timothy J: Cooperation Pacific region 103 Initiative (CCI) Memorandum 98 Pakistan 10, 19, 34, 36, 42, 55–6, 60, 75, rogue states 25 97–8, 115, 119, 125, 135, 166; LeT 97; Roosevelt. President F.D.: India’s nuclear assets of 25 freedom movement on 32 Pakistan–China configuration 167 Rosecrance, Richard 4 Pak-occupied Kashmir (PoK) 87, Rountree, William M. 39 151, 173 RSS-cum-BJP ideology 164 Panetta, Leon 101, 148 Rubinoff, Arthur C. 18

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Pannikar, K.M. 33 Rumsfeld, Donald 11, 84, 113 Paracel Islands 82 Russell, Bertrand 1 Parrikar, Manohar 85 Russia 82, 95, 100, 103–5, 129, 131, 163; Pasha, Shuja 161 economic sanctions on 175 Patton, Steve 41 “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE) 58 Sabharwal, Sunil 19 Peking 145 Saeed, Hafiz Muhammad97 , 98 Pentagon 37, 60, 132, 173; China’s Saran, Shyam 70, 147 military capabilities report on 142 Saudi Arabia 170 People’s Daily 152 SCO 112 Index 197

SEATO 33–4 Strategic and Cooperative Partnership security and strategic dialogue (SSD) 24 (2005) 150 Security Council 10, 34, 54, 95, 113, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II 55 126–7, 130–1, 154; resolution 1373 on Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 140 combating international terrorism 10 Strategic Dialogue 114, 117 Sen, Ronen 102 Strategic Partnership Agreement: Seventh Fleet: US global strategy in the Afghanistan (2011) 165 Bay of Bengal 42 “string of pearls” 23 Shah, Rajiv 19 structural realism 10 Shambaugh, David 140, 144, 148 Sun Yat-sen 146 Shanghai Cooperation Organization Supercomputers 46 (SCO): UFA meeting 105 suppression of acts of nuclear Shangri-la Dialogue Summit 147; Asian terrorism 130 security on 82 Sutter, Robert G. 148, 149 Sharif, Prime Minister Nawaz 160; Swaraj, Sushma 118 government 133 Swift, Charles D. 125 Shekhar, Prime Minister Chandra 46, Symington Amendment (1976) 55 48, 100 Syria 131 Shia 168 shift of power, Atlantic to Asia 112 Taiwan 5, 144, 146 Siberia 145 Talbott, Strobe 59; interview to Aziz “Silk Route Fund” 165 Haniffa 60 Simla accord (1972) 43 Taliban 4, 56, 119, 126, 165–6 174 Singapore 9, 82, 87, 147, 150 Tarapur Atomic Power Station Singh, Jaswant 59 (TAPS) 44, 57 Singh, Manmohan 17, 19, 54, 61, 63–4, Tata Advanced Systems Limited 102 66, 71, 97, 99, 142, 161 Tehran 146, 169–71 Singh, Sardar Swaran 37 Tehrik-e-Taliban 25 Singh–Talbott dialogue 60 Tejas, LCA lightweight fighter 89, 90 Sino-Indian War (1962) 37 Tellis, Ashley 113, 123, 127, 145; “unity Sino-Pakistan strategic nexus 105 in difference” on 176 Sittwe (Myanmar) 151 Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) 146 Snow, Edgar 146 Thomson Reuters Oil Analytics 170 soft power 18, 23 Thorium 63, 68 Solarz Amendment (1984) 55 Tibet 5 Somers, Ron: US defence sales 81 Tokyo 86, 103, 116 Sood, Rakesh 73 Tourangbam, Monish 171 South Africa 9 Trans-border rivers 151 South Asia 23, 25, 33, 55–6, 150, “Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP) 149 152, 154, 159, 174; geopolitical Trombay 57 environment 132 Truman, President 33; administration 32–3 South China Sea 5, 21, 24, 82, 142, 147 South East 116 UAVs 146 South Korea 5, 9, 62, 82, 105, 172 Ukraine 105, 175

Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016 Southeast Asia 143, 145, 148 UN General Assembly 174 Soviet Union 33–4, 42, 44, 56, 88, 103, United States 36, 41–4, 54 62, 64, 82, 95, 131–2, 140 105, 115, 118, 120, 123–4, 127, 140, special representatives (SRs) 150 142–3, 153, 155, 159, 162–3, 175 Spratly and Paracel Islands 142 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 88 Sri Lanka 85, 115, 151 “unreliable partner” 41 Stein, Arthur 4 UPA (United Progressive Alliance) 16, Strait of Malacca 15, 96, 100 61, 65–6, 72, 100, 105, 123, 161, 174; Straits of Hormuz 169 regime 72 198 Index

US 23, 41–3, 63, 143–4, 148, 150–2; weapons of mass destruction allies 172; global strategy 155; pivot to (WMDs) 2, 9, 13–14, 24, 65 Asia 23; “rebalancing” in Asia-Pacific Wei Wei 151 region 101, 117; “war on terror” 10 Weinberg, Alvin: thorium reactor 77 US Air Force 87 Welch, Thomas J. 27 US Atomic Energy Act (1954) 65, 69, 128 Western Pacific 143 US Department of Defence Report Westinghouse 21, 72, 118 (November 2011) 89 Westphalian paradigm 2 US Food and Drug Administration White House 11, 18–19, 38, 45, 47, (USFDA): Indian drug 59–60, 73, 96–97, 99, 112, 123, 127, companies on 121 130, 144, 155, 160, 164, 166, 172 US International Trade Commission Whitehead, North 26 (USITC) 121; war on terrorism 96; oil Willard, Robert, US Pacific Commander embargo 171 (PACOM) Admiral 161 US–China relations 146; trade 20 William Burns 71–2 US–India Strategic Dialogue 120 World Bank 41, 112 US–India–Afghanistan trilateral 168 World Nuclear Association 62–3, US-led unipolar world 104 66, 78 US–Pakistan relations 173 World Trade Centre, New York 60, 132 USS Nimitz 86 Wright, Thomas 8 US–Taliban dialogue 119 WTO 118, 121, 123, 141, 145, 175

Vajpayee, A. B., Prime Minister 95, 124, Xiaoping, Deng: “open door policy” 160, 164 (1978) 140 Vietnam 82, 145 Vision Statement, India-US on 96 Yazidis 4; community 118 Yee, Lee Kuan 141 Wallace, Henry: Farm Act of 1933 2 Young, Oran R. 2–4; level of Waltz, Kenneth 2, 3, 5; balance of power interdependence on 6 theory 9 Yudh Abhyas (12 and 13) 88 Warner, Mark 121; 100-day action plan on Indo-US ties 91 Zakaria, Fareed 9 Washington 34–5, 57, 61, 92, 116, 119, Zarif, Javad 171 142–3, 146, 151, 163, 166, 172 Zawahiri, Ayman al 98 Wassenaar Arrangement 76, 116 Zedong, Mao 146 Watergate scandal 43 Zhu, Zhiqun 141 Downloaded by [New York University] at 19:57 02 December 2016