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3.13.6

Sudan

Sudan remains one of the most challenging tion to the faltering north-south peace process, peace operation theaters in the world, playing which has been overshadowed by the Darfur cri- host to the UN in the south, an AU-led mission sis, prompting calls for a balanced approach to in Darfur, and the newly authorized hybrid UN- ensure that efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Efforts to would not deflect attention from the implemen- resolve the crisis in Sudan’s western Darfur re- tation of the CPA, which is crucial to peace in gion, including providing adequate support to Sudan. Meanwhile, the SPLM returned to the the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), remained a Government of National Unity in December but major preoccupation for the international com- a clash between the SPLA and an Arab militia munity throughout the year. The compromise around the same time, which left an estimated agreement that led to the authorization of a hy- one hundred people dead, was a manifestation brid UN-AU peace operation—the first of its of the continued tensions between the parties. kind between the two institutions—was wel- comed as a positive step in the tortuous search for solutions to the crisis, but implementation AMIS: Mandate and Functions was painfully slow and marred by continuing AMIS was initially deployed in June 2004 Sudanese objections over the composition of the with 60 observers and a protection force of force. High-profile visits in September 2007 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and in October by a group of eminent elders led by former US president Jimmy Carter and Bishop Desmond Tutu, along with pressure from civil society groups, helped to highlight the gravity of the cri- sis and the need for international action. Secre- tary-General Ban identified Darfur as one of his priorities, and outlined a three-pronged strat- egy—the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force, revitalizing the peace process, and provid- ing humanitarian and reconstruction support to the victims of the crisis—to resolve the conflict. Meanwhile, on 11 October, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) suspended its participation in the government of national unity that was established after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Jan- uary 2005. The SPLM cited lack of implementa- tion of key provisions of the CPA, such as boundary demarcation and wealth-sharing, as the reason for its actions. This move drew atten-

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AMIS: Key Developments in Darfur AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Peacekeeping efforts in 2007 were comple- mented by efforts to revitalize the peace • Authorization Date 28 May 2004 (Agreement with Sudanese process, which had ground to a halt soon after Parties), 30 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1556) the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement • Start Date June 2004 (DPA) in May 2006. Consultations involving • Head of Mission Rodolphe Adada (Congo) (note: both all parties, and led by Salim Ahmed Salim and Adada and General Agwai will remain active in their positions until the Jan Eliasson of the Joint UN-AU Mediation deployment of UNAMID, where they Support Team, culminated in a meeting of the will retain their titles) various nonsignatories of the DPA in Arusha, • Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria) Tanzania, in July 2007. While the Arusha meet- • Police Commissioner Mohase Elias Tsibane (South Africa) ing concluded with an agreement between the • Budget $297.6 million (January–June 2007) majority of rebel groups and Khartoum to con- • Strength as of Troops: 5,222 tinue talks in Sirte, Libya, in October 2007, 30 September 2007 Military Observers: 549 Abdul Wahid Mohammed Nur, founder of the Civilian Police: 1,416 Sudan Liberation Movement, boycotted the For detailed mission information see p. 357. proceedings. The peace talks received a serious blow when, barely a week before the start of the talks, the Justice and Equality Movement and several other groups an- 300 troops. After several attacks in October nounced that they would also boycott the of that year, the AU Peace and Security meeting. The announcements came after an Council expanded the force to 3,000 and gave October meeting of several rebel groups in AMIS a more robust mandate, including pro- Juba, in south Sudan, failed to reach a consen- tection of civilians and proactive deployment sus on the proposed peace talks. At the time of against hostile groups, but it lacked the ca- writing, efforts were under way to jumpstart pacity to do so. In March 2005, AMIS was the stalled peace talks in Libya, and some again expanded, to 6,171 military personnel progress had been achieved in the deployment and 1,586 civilian police. of UNAMID, with the establishment of joint The Darfur crisis continued unabated headquarters and the arrival of new police and throughout 2007, overwhelming the approxi- troop units. But with no commitment of attack mately 7,000 uniformed personnel in the re- helicopters and other force enablers, coupled gion. AMIS’s deployment throughout the with difficulties with the government, espe- year was complicated by severe logistical and cially over the composition of the mission, the financial challenges and was disrupted by in- prospects for a rapid deployment of UNAMID creased hostility from the various belligerent remained slim. groups. This reality fed into the dominant de- bate of the year, over the nature and composi- Power- and Wealth-Sharing tion of a peacekeeping force to replace Progress in implementing the DPA was lim- AMIS. Facing continued resistance from the ited, despite the appointment of Minni Mi- government of Sudan to the deployment of a nawi—the only rebel signatory to the agree- UN-led operation, a compromise was reached ment—as special assistant to the president and on the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force chairman of the Transitional Darfur Regional in Darfur. Subsequently, the Security Council Authority. The process of establishing some adopted Resolution 1769 (2007), authorizing of the key structures provided for in the DPA, deployment of UNAMID, comprising 26,000 such as the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation troops. Commission, lagged significantly, and the few Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 75

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Box 3.6.1 The African Standby Force: Progress 2007

It has been four years since the African munities to undertake complex peace op- members of the extended Group of Eight, Union adopted a policy framework and a erations, including robust military inter- are pending approval by the African chiefs roadmap for operationalization of the vention. of defense and security. African Standby Force (ASF) as part of a While the somewhat ambitious target Plans are under way to commence broader continental security architecture. dates for operationalization of the ASF verification of the operational readiness of On completion, the ASF will be composed could not be met during 2007, policy for- pledged troops from the various subre- of five regional, multidisciplinary (mili- mulation at the AU strategic level pro- gions. In 2006, eastern, western, central, tary, police, and civilian) standby gressed remarkably during the year. This and southern Africa made troop pledges of brigades. As defined in the policy frame- work, undertaken in close collaboration 3,500–4,000, 6,500, 4,000–6,000, and work, each brigade will be equipped to ad- with the regional economic communities, 3,655 respectively. It is crucial that verifi- dress six intervention scenarios, which has produced a uniquely African doctrine, cation begins in earnest in 2008 if the among others include: providing military established a set of standard operating 2010 deadline for complete operational- advice for a political mission, and inter- procedures, and created logistical proce- ization of the ASF is to be met. At the end vening in situations involving war crimes, dures, training and evaluation procedures, of 2007, a draft document spelling out the crimes against humanity, and genocide. and command, control, communication, verification method and process had been Under the roadmap, AU policy for the and information systems. Further policy formulated, but was yet to be discussed ASF will be developed in two phases. The development was pursued in formulating with the regional economic communities. first phase, initially planned to be com- the ASF concept for rapid deployment, a Meanwhile, efforts to establish an ini- pleted by 30 June 2005 (since extended), continental ASF training plan to be com- tial planning capacity for the ASF at the focuses on developing the strategic-level pleted in 2010. The year 2007 also saw AU headquarters in Addis Ababa regis- management capacity of the AU and the the conclusion of a feasibility study on the tered modest progress, as several staff of- regional economic communities to under- development of ASF continental and re- ficers were recruited. However, the take peace operations under Chapter VI of gional logistical depots, which will sup- process of replacing the ASF’s first chief the UN Charter, and/or preventive deploy- port future ASF deployments. These pol- of staff, General Ishaya Isah Hassan, who ment. The second phase focuses on devel- icy instruments, which were developed died in late 2006, has been very slow, oping the strategic management capacity with the technical and financial support of leaving a gap in strategic military guid- of the AU and the regional economic com- the AU’s international partners, especially ance for the ASF.

structures that were put in place hardly func- tory Committee identified four stakeholder tioned. For instance, the Transitional Author- groups—native administration, internally dis- ity, established in October 2006, was only in- placed persons (IDPs), civil society, and intel- augurated in May 2007 amid a lack of clarity lectuals—and consultations were undertaken concerning its relationship with other local in order to identify representatives for each. government entities in Darfur. Meanwhile, rep- Proper representation of all the stakeholders is resentatives of the Sudan Liberation Army–Mi- viewed as key to the success of the DDDC, nawi were appointed to several positions in the but the process has been complicated by the government of Khartoum. But the limited sup- pervasive insecurity on the ground. port for the DPA undercut the effectiveness of The deteriorating security situation forced such appointments, as they were not represen- AMIS to suspend efforts to assess the develop- tative of the various factions in Darfur. ment and reconstruction needs as provided for Meanwhile, the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue by the DPA, significantly hampering wealth- and Consultation (DDDC)—proposed by the sharing efforts. This led to the cancellation of Darfur Peace Agreement—commenced with a planned donor pledging conference that had several preconsultation meetings involving been expected to follow the report of the Dar- local groups in Darfur. The DDDC’s Prepara- fur Joint Assessment Mission. The conference Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 76

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was held hostage by government and rebel movements and proved largely ineffective during 2007. The government objected to the presence of representatives of the nonsignato- ries to the DPA on the commission, while the nonsignatories argued that the commission should be based on the N’Djamena Agreement of 2004. These developments occurred at a time of increased hostility toward AMIS. Between

T PRICE March and September 2007, twenty AMIS peacekeepers were killed. The 29 September and 30 September attacks on an AU base in the town of Haskanita, which left ten peace- keepers dead, were the most deadly hostile ac- tions recorded during this period. Although the motives of the attackers were unknown, AP Photo / AMIS PHOTO by STUAR A peacekeeper injured in attacks on the AMIS base in Haskanita the attacks reinforced the need for the hybrid is rushed to a waiting helicopter, Darfur, Sudan, 30 September 2007. UN-AU force to be sufficiently robust to deter such actions, as well as to adequately defend itself and the civilian population when faced was viewed as a crucial step in raising funds to with such hostility. address the dire socioeconomic challenges that Interethnic and intraethnic fighting also are partly believed to have precipitated the surged in 2007, leading to the deaths of hun- conflict. dreds of civilians. The ethnic feuds were not limited to the rebel movements, but extended Security Arrangements to Arab tribes believed by some to be the Although AMIS maintained over 90 percent backbone of the Janjaweed. Additionally, there of its uniformed personnel on the ground, im- were reports of the government settling Arab plementation of the security arrangements nomads from neighboring countries in areas provided for by the DPA registered limited that were previously abandoned due to the progress. Splintering and infighting among conflict, raising significant concerns about the the rebel movements, as well as fighting prospects of return for IDPs and refugees to against the government, undermined any ef- those areas. A likely sticking point in the up- forts to implement the security provisions. coming round of peace talks will therefore be Contrary to the DPA, the Janjaweed militia the “right of return.” Increasing militarization was not disarmed and remained active, per- of IDP camps also emerged as a major secu- sistently attacking innocent civilians through- rity concern, as the presence of armed persons out the year. Lack of access to areas controlled served as a pretext for attacks on the camps. by nonsignatories to the DPA significantly limited verification of the locations of the par- Humanitarian Situation ties and any monitoring of violations of the The unstable security situation triggered a cease-fire agreement. In fact, by June 2007, fresh wave of refugees and IDPs, swelling the verification of the parties’ locations had only ranks of existing IDP and refugee populations. taken place in two out of the eight sectors.1 An estimated 250,000 civilians were dis- The Cease-Fire Commission—a dual chamber placed during the first three quarters of 2007, for signatories and nonsignatories—was pro- with some humanitarian agencies reporting posed as a compromise at the end of 2006, but substantially more displacements. Several Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 77

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thousand Chadian refugees crossed the border ter” of the mission, a condition that was put for- into Darfur due to cross-border fighting and ward by the government of Sudan. The fact that massive displacement of civilian populations. the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII Humanitarian access was hampered by the in- and included a mandate to protect civilians was creased attacks on humanitarian workers and viewed by many as an important first step, as the poor road conditions during the rainy sea- protecting the vulnerable civilian population is son. The deteriorating security situation led to widely recognized as the most pressing security the suspension of humanitarian activities in challenge in Darfur. On the other hand, many some areas, leaving thousands of civilians expressed concern about the fact that Resolu- without any support systems. Despite these tion 1769’s section on the protection of civil- difficulties in providing aid, Darfur continued ians appeared to have been qualified, stipulat- to play host to the world’s largest humanitar- ing that the mission was authorized only to ian operation, aimed at assisting approxi- “take the necessary action” in protecting civil- mately 4.2 million conflict-affected people. ians and mission staff, rather than the usual au- thorization to “use all necessary means.” In July 2007, the AU and the UN agreed on the ap- From AMIS to UNAMID pointment of Rodolphe Adada and General Faced with serious financial and logistical Martin Luther Agwai as the joint special repre- challenges, AMIS was nonetheless the only in- sentative and force commander of the hybrid ternational force operating in Darfur during UN-AU peacekeeping force, respectively. 2007. The mission continued to implement its The creation and deployment of UNAMID mandate, but with great difficulty, as its per- poses several important and unique challenges. sonnel were deliberately targeted and often Foremost is the ability of the mission to main- went for months without their allowances. tain the African character of the force without Meanwhile, efforts to implement the light and compromising its effectiveness. While AU heavy support packages—agreed to at the end member states have demonstrated a definite of 2006 to bolster AMIS—continued through- willingness to participate in peacekeeping mis- out the year. By September 2007, the full com- sions in their own backyards, their overall ca- plement of the light support package had been pacity is less clear. In particular, most potential deployed, and it was anticipated that imple- African troop contributors lack the force en- mentation of the heavy support package would ablers, such as attack helicopters and armored have been completed before the deployment of personnel carriers, that are essential to UN- the hybrid force in early 2008. However, de- AMID’s effectiveness. In late 2007, offers from ployment of the support packages was delayed Sweden, Norway, and other countries to pro- by a combination of factors, including the poor vide enabling contingents were being stymied security situation, and lack of accommodation by the government of Sudan. A second concern and other facilities meeting UN standards. is that of command and control, especially re- After months of negotiations with the gov- garding the strategic direction of the mission ernment of Sudan, the UN Security Council (an issue elaborated on in Chapter 2 in this Re- adopted Resolution 1769 (2007), authorizing view). While the resolution emphasizes that the the deployment of UNAMID.2 Adopted under mission will adhere to the unity of command Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the mission is principle, there is no guarantee against rifts that to consist of over 26,000 uniformed personnel: may appear at the strategic level. As of No- 19,555 military personnel (including 360 mili- vember 2007, no mechanism had been estab- tary observers and liaison officers), 3,772 po- lished for resolution of potential disagreement lice personnel, and 19 formed police units with between the AU and the UN. Third, the man- 140 officers in each unit. The resolution empha- date does not specify how the mission will in- sized the need to maintain the “African charac- teract with the numerous humanitarian agen- Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 78

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cies on the ground without compromising the providing support to the implementation of the neutrality principle, an especially crucial con- Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This support cern given the hostile environment in Darfur. has been manifested primarily in the mission’s The fourth challenge is how the mission will role as honest broker, providing good offices to secure enough water to support its personnel facilitate the dialogue between the strong cen- without depriving the local population of the tral government of Sudan based in Khartoum, and the nascent government of southern Sudan much-needed resource in the arid environment in Juba. In addition to the mission’s Chapter of Darfur. The fifth challenge concerns cooper- VII mandate to protect civilians under immi- ation of the government of Sudan with respect nent threat of violence, UNMIS has been made to issues such as land acquisition and authoriz- responsible for monitoring compliance with ing night flights. The issue of night flights— cease-fire agreements, and for supervision of which the government denied AMIS—is the redeployment of armed groups—as well as especially crucial in light of UNAMID’s man- police restructuring, human rights monitoring, date to protect civilians, which will be signifi- and support of government efforts to disarm, cantly hampered if the mission’s movement is demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants. limited at night. Finally, coordination among It is mandated to support preparations for the the UN, AU, and various other actors, includ- 2009 general election, and for the 2011 referen- ing the newly authorized UN-EU peace opera- dum on southern independence. Working closely with the UN High Commissioner for tions in neighboring Chad and the Central Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organi- African Republic, will be a critical challenge. zation for Migration, and the World Food Pro- gramme, UNMIS officials have also coordi- nated the massive relief effort that has UNMIS: Background facilitated the return and reintegration of thou- The broad range of tasks and responsibilities sands of refugees and internally displaced per- that fall within the UNMIS mandate are typical sons this year. of modern multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations. Authorized in 2005 by the UN Se- curity Council, UNMIS has been charged with UNMIS: Key Developments and Challenges Military and police deployments were largely UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) implemented in 2007, with deployment of mil- itary peacekeepers and civilian police reaching 97 percent and 96 percent of authorized • Authorization and 24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590) strength, respectively, as of August. UNMIS Start Date undertook a decentralization of mission au- • SRSG and Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) thority from Khartoum to the southern capital Head of Mission • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Jasbir Singh Lidder of Juba, with a view to strengthening the level (India) of contact between UNMIS officials and the • Police Commissioner Kai Vittrup (Denmark) southern authorities. The mission continued to • Budget $846.3 million (1 July 2007–30 June 2008) struggle with severe recruitment and retention • Strength as of Troops: 8,827 challenges among its civilian staff, most no- 31 October 2007 Military Observers: 583 tably the lack of a head of mission beginning Police: 696 in October 2006 when Special Representative International Civilian Staff: 865 of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Jan Pronk Local Civilian Staff: 2,580 was declared persona non grata and expelled UN Volunteers: 253 from the country. This personnel problem was For detailed mission information see p. 311. exacerbated by the growing international atten- tion to the crisis in Darfur, and the intense pres- Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 79

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sure for UNMIS to divert scarce human re- local authorities, has sponsored a number of sources away from the Comprehensive Peace capacity-building initiatives to support the Agreement to the support of the Darfur Peace development of judicial, police, and prison re- Agreement in the west. Only in September form. Positive developments were reflected in was Ashraf Qazi appointed to the position of the anticorruption efforts of Slava Kiir, presi- UNMIS SRSG. dent of the government of southern Sudan, in- cluding a significant reshuffling of the southern Power- and Wealth-Sharing cabinet, and the dismissal of the southern min- The year in review saw limited forward move- ister of finance. Additionally, the establishment ment in the development of southern gover- of the National Human Rights and National nance institutions. The parties came to an Civil Service Commissions, the functioning of agreement on the procedural rules for the the Southern Sudan Peace and Reconciliation National Petroleum Commission, but the per- Commission, and the agreement between the sistent mistrust between them meant that the government of national unity and the govern- enforcement of wealth-sharing agreements ment of southern Sudan with regard to the re- continued to be a challenge. Wealth-sharing spective jurisdictions of the two levels of gov- agreements were further complicated by the ernment, marked significant strides in the slow disbursement of development funding transition to stability in the region. Election from the World Bank–administered Multi- preparations took a step forward as well, when Donor Trust Fund and lower-than-expected oil the pilot census was successfully completed in revenues, both of which resulted in a budget April. The official census, however, was pushed deficit for the government of southern Sudan back from the planned date of November 2007 and strikes by teachers and veterans unhappy to January 2008, and UNMIS continues to about the delays in their wages. monitor and support developments around the The demarcation of the north-south bor- census and other electoral assistance activi- der continues to be highly controversial and ties. Internally, UNMIS has undertaken steps has achieved minimal progress. During 2007, to enhance its capacity to support elections the Technical Border Committee conducted processes in preparation for the January cen- visits to the border region, and plans were sus and the 2009 elections. under way for an UNMIS-supported workshop on international best practices for the border Security demarcation process. It is currently hoped that The security situation in southern Sudan re- the final demarcation of the border will take mains tenuous in the face of ongoing intereth- place in the second quarter of 2008. The status nic violence, banditry, and violent confronta- of the contested area north of Abyei continues tions over cattle and grazing rights. At the same to be unresolved, and persistent restrictions on time, the Lord’s Resistance Army—a Sudan- the movement of UNMIS patrols have chal- based Ugandan rebel group, four of whose lenged fulfillment of the mission’s monitoring leaders have been indicted by the International mandate in the area. Abyei, a region hotly con- Criminal Court—was perceived by some as an tested by the north and south during the 2004 ongoing security threat in 2007. UNMIS has negotiations, and a potential flashpoint for in- attempted to address this generalized insecurity terethnic violence, continues to threaten the by working with local politicians and commu- success of the CPA. nities to promote community-based reconcilia- While the lack of basic infrastructure and tion, and by intensifying patrols in insecure shortages of skilled professionals have ham- areas. As refugee and IDP returns have contin- pered development of a functioning judiciary ued to increase dramatically, there is further in the south, UNMIS, in conjunction with the concern that competition over land and water UN Development Programme (UNDP) and resources, as well as over severely strained Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 80

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services such as education and healthcare, will presence in the contested areas of southern become a new source of tension, particularly Kordofan, the Blue Nile, and Abyei, as well in and around the overcrowded towns of Juba as in the oil-rich Upper Nile. and Malakal. Militia attacks have contributed The work of the National Council for Dis- to insecurity on the primary roads around armament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Juba, and a peacekeeper was killed in an at- (DDR) progressed slowly and, despite some tack on a civilian demining team in the east- promising steps during 2007, the national ern equatorial region in January 2007, com- DDR strategy was not completed. The council pounding concerns about the safety of UN did meet for the first time, in December 2006, and humanitarian staff. In November 2006 a and established a technical subcommittee for violent clash between the Sudan Armed DDR, which UNMIS will support. Notable Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation Army progress on the ground included the formal factions in Malakal resulted in over 150 absorption of southern Sudan’s defense forces deaths and the temporary relocation of into the ranks of the Sudan People’s Libera- nonessential UN staff, while a similar clash tion Army. In other positive security develop- south of Abyei in January 2007 over the inte- ments, the UNMIS civilian police continued gration of troops from other armed groups to be co-located with local police officers, and displaced over 2,000 civilians. In both cases, worked to promote community policing UNMIS negotiated with the Sudan Armed strategies and international human rights stan- Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation dards. In June 2007, the first class of twenty- Army, as well as local leaders, to defuse the nine UN-trained police officers graduated tensions and restore stability. from their program; they are expected to form Security reforms were slow to materialize the nucleus of the new Juba police force. during the year in review, but by August the joint integrated units (JIUs)—which were cre- ated to provide the basis for national security Conclusion under the terms of the CPA—had reached 77 Efforts to deploy the hybrid UN-AU force in percent of their expected strength. The capac- Darfur—which became operational on 31 De- ity of the JIUs to deliver real security guaran- cember 2007—and revitalize the peace tees, however, has been uncertain. While a process while ensuring implementation of the common code of conduct was agreed on by CPA remained the focus of international en- the parties in February, many JIUs lack disci- gagement in Sudan throughout the year. While pline and logistical capabilities, and most con- the authorization of UNAMID is a positive tinue to operate under parallel command and step in bringing stability to the region, its suc- control structures. UNMIS has had a limited cess depends on how rapidly the uniformed role in improving this situation, and in re- and civilian components of the mission are sponding to specific shortcomings in the JIUs, deployed. Sudan’s continued intransigence, as the joint defense board has not yet come to and the UN’s approach to overcoming it, de- an agreement on a request for assistance. This layed deployments in the final months of weakness of the JIUs has been used to defend 2007. UNAMID’s ability to effectuate signifi- the slow pace of Sudan Armed Forces rede- cant change in Darfur also depends on the on- ployment to the north, a crucial step that was going political efforts to reach an inclusive meant to have been completed ahead of the 9 and comprehensive peace agreement. Secre- July 2007 deadline stipulated in the CPA. As tary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s visit to the re- of July 2007, only 66 percent of the troops gion in the summer of 2007 highlighted the in- stationed in south Sudan had been redeployed tense international pressure being placed on the outside the region. Furthermore, there contin- parties to achieve a meaningful political solu- ues to be a significant Sudan Armed Forces tion to the conflict. However, during Secretary- Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 81

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General Ban’s visit, Khartoum appointed groups, achieved unsatisfactory progress. The Ahmed Haroun—a former government minis- postponement of the referendum planned for ter with a pending arrest warrant against him 2007 to January 2008 raised serious questions by the International Criminal Court—to chair a about the elections scheduled for 2009, as committee to oversee human rights violations well as the 2011 referendum on the status of in the country. One of the significant chal- southern Sudan. Despite these delays and lenges in negotiating a comprehensive peace shortcomings, it is hoped that the deployment agreement in the year to come will be to ad- of the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur will dress this lack of cooperation while maintaining generate enough progress to allow for a rebal- an open dialogue with all parties. ancing of attention to include the faltering Implementation of key provisions of the north-south peace process. The challenge for CPA in the north-south peace process, such as the international community is how to ensure wealth-sharing, boundary demarcation, and that resolution of one of the conflicts is not disarmament of militias and other armed achieved at the expense of the other.

Notes 1. Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, PSC/PR/2(LXXIX), 22 June 2007. 2. For details on UNAMID’s mandate see, United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1769, UN Doc. S.2007/468, 30 July 2007.