Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 73 3.13.6 Sudan Sudan remains one of the most challenging tion to the faltering north-south peace process, peace operation theaters in the world, playing which has been overshadowed by the Darfur cri- host to the UN in the south, an AU-led mission sis, prompting calls for a balanced approach to in Darfur, and the newly authorized hybrid UN- ensure that efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Efforts to would not deflect attention from the implemen- resolve the crisis in Sudan’s western Darfur re- tation of the CPA, which is crucial to peace in gion, including providing adequate support to Sudan. Meanwhile, the SPLM returned to the the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), remained a Government of National Unity in December but major preoccupation for the international com- a clash between the SPLA and an Arab militia munity throughout the year. The compromise around the same time, which left an estimated agreement that led to the authorization of a hy- one hundred people dead, was a manifestation brid UN-AU peace operation—the first of its of the continued tensions between the parties. kind between the two institutions—was wel- comed as a positive step in the tortuous search for solutions to the crisis, but implementation AMIS: Mandate and Functions was painfully slow and marred by continuing AMIS was initially deployed in June 2004 Sudanese objections over the composition of the with 60 observers and a protection force of force. High-profile visits in September 2007 by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and in October by a group of eminent elders led by former US president Jimmy Carter and Bishop Desmond Tutu, along with pressure from civil society groups, helped to highlight the gravity of the cri- sis and the need for international action. Secre- tary-General Ban identified Darfur as one of his priorities, and outlined a three-pronged strat- egy—the deployment of the hybrid UN-AU force, revitalizing the peace process, and provid- ing humanitarian and reconstruction support to the victims of the crisis—to resolve the conflict. Meanwhile, on 11 October, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) suspended its participation in the government of national unity that was established after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Jan- uary 2005. The SPLM cited lack of implementa- tion of key provisions of the CPA, such as boundary demarcation and wealth-sharing, as the reason for its actions. This move drew atten- 73 Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 74 74 • MISSION REVIEWS AMIS: Key Developments in Darfur AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Peacekeeping efforts in 2007 were comple- mented by efforts to revitalize the peace • Authorization Date 28 May 2004 (Agreement with Sudanese process, which had ground to a halt soon after Parties), 30 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1556) the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement • Start Date June 2004 (DPA) in May 2006. Consultations involving • Head of Mission Rodolphe Adada (Congo) (note: both all parties, and led by Salim Ahmed Salim and Adada and General Agwai will remain active in their positions until the Jan Eliasson of the Joint UN-AU Mediation deployment of UNAMID, where they Support Team, culminated in a meeting of the will retain their titles) various nonsignatories of the DPA in Arusha, • Force Commander General Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria) Tanzania, in July 2007. While the Arusha meet- • Police Commissioner Mohase Elias Tsibane (South Africa) ing concluded with an agreement between the • Budget $297.6 million (January–June 2007) majority of rebel groups and Khartoum to con- • Strength as of Troops: 5,222 tinue talks in Sirte, Libya, in October 2007, 30 September 2007 Military Observers: 549 Abdul Wahid Mohammed Nur, founder of the Civilian Police: 1,416 Sudan Liberation Movement, boycotted the For detailed mission information see p. 357. proceedings. The Tripoli peace talks received a serious blow when, barely a week before the start of the talks, the Justice and Equality Movement and several other groups an- 300 troops. After several attacks in October nounced that they would also boycott the of that year, the AU Peace and Security meeting. The announcements came after an Council expanded the force to 3,000 and gave October meeting of several rebel groups in AMIS a more robust mandate, including pro- Juba, in south Sudan, failed to reach a consen- tection of civilians and proactive deployment sus on the proposed peace talks. At the time of against hostile groups, but it lacked the ca- writing, efforts were under way to jumpstart pacity to do so. In March 2005, AMIS was the stalled peace talks in Libya, and some again expanded, to 6,171 military personnel progress had been achieved in the deployment and 1,586 civilian police. of UNAMID, with the establishment of joint The Darfur crisis continued unabated headquarters and the arrival of new police and throughout 2007, overwhelming the approxi- troop units. But with no commitment of attack mately 7,000 uniformed personnel in the re- helicopters and other force enablers, coupled gion. AMIS’s deployment throughout the with difficulties with the government, espe- year was complicated by severe logistical and cially over the composition of the mission, the financial challenges and was disrupted by in- prospects for a rapid deployment of UNAMID creased hostility from the various belligerent remained slim. groups. This reality fed into the dominant de- bate of the year, over the nature and composi- Power- and Wealth-Sharing tion of a peacekeeping force to replace Progress in implementing the DPA was lim- AMIS. Facing continued resistance from the ited, despite the appointment of Minni Mi- government of Sudan to the deployment of a nawi—the only rebel signatory to the agree- UN-led operation, a compromise was reached ment—as special assistant to the president and on the deployment of a hybrid UN-AU force chairman of the Transitional Darfur Regional in Darfur. Subsequently, the Security Council Authority. The process of establishing some adopted Resolution 1769 (2007), authorizing of the key structures provided for in the DPA, deployment of UNAMID, comprising 26,000 such as the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation troops. Commission, lagged significantly, and the few Peacekeeping_3.final.qxd 1/28/08 10:05 AM Page 75 SUDAN • 75 Box 3.6.1 The African Standby Force: Progress 2007 It has been four years since the African munities to undertake complex peace op- members of the extended Group of Eight, Union adopted a policy framework and a erations, including robust military inter- are pending approval by the African chiefs roadmap for operationalization of the vention. of defense and security. African Standby Force (ASF) as part of a While the somewhat ambitious target Plans are under way to commence broader continental security architecture. dates for operationalization of the ASF verification of the operational readiness of On completion, the ASF will be composed could not be met during 2007, policy for- pledged troops from the various subre- of five regional, multidisciplinary (mili- mulation at the AU strategic level pro- gions. In 2006, eastern, western, central, tary, police, and civilian) standby gressed remarkably during the year. This and southern Africa made troop pledges of brigades. As defined in the policy frame- work, undertaken in close collaboration 3,500–4,000, 6,500, 4,000–6,000, and work, each brigade will be equipped to ad- with the regional economic communities, 3,655 respectively. It is crucial that verifi- dress six intervention scenarios, which has produced a uniquely African doctrine, cation begins in earnest in 2008 if the among others include: providing military established a set of standard operating 2010 deadline for complete operational- advice for a political mission, and inter- procedures, and created logistical proce- ization of the ASF is to be met. At the end vening in situations involving war crimes, dures, training and evaluation procedures, of 2007, a draft document spelling out the crimes against humanity, and genocide. and command, control, communication, verification method and process had been Under the roadmap, AU policy for the and information systems. Further policy formulated, but was yet to be discussed ASF will be developed in two phases. The development was pursued in formulating with the regional economic communities. first phase, initially planned to be com- the ASF concept for rapid deployment, a Meanwhile, efforts to establish an ini- pleted by 30 June 2005 (since extended), continental ASF training plan to be com- tial planning capacity for the ASF at the focuses on developing the strategic-level pleted in 2010. The year 2007 also saw AU headquarters in Addis Ababa regis- management capacity of the AU and the the conclusion of a feasibility study on the tered modest progress, as several staff of- regional economic communities to under- development of ASF continental and re- ficers were recruited. However, the take peace operations under Chapter VI of gional logistical depots, which will sup- process of replacing the ASF’s first chief the UN Charter, and/or preventive deploy- port future ASF deployments. These pol- of staff, General Ishaya Isah Hassan, who ment. The second phase focuses on devel- icy instruments, which were developed died in late 2006, has been very slow, oping the strategic management capacity with the technical and financial support of leaving a gap in strategic military guid- of the AU and the regional economic com- the AU’s international partners, especially ance for the ASF. structures that were put in place hardly func- tory Committee identified four stakeholder tioned. For instance, the Transitional Author- groups—native administration, internally dis- ity, established in October 2006, was only in- placed persons (IDPs), civil society, and intel- augurated in May 2007 amid a lack of clarity lectuals—and consultations were undertaken concerning its relationship with other local in order to identify representatives for each.