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Proliferation Persuasion FINAL ETD FILE Proliferation Persuasion: Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology by Tristan A. Volpe B.A. in Political Science, June 2007, University of California, Los Angeles A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 31, 2015 Dissertation directed by Charles L. Glaser Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Tristan A. Volpe has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of July 13, 2015. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. Proliferation Persuasion: Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology Tristan A. Volpe Dissertation Research Committee: Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director George Anzelon, Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Committee Member Alexander B. Downes, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member George Quester, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, University of Maryland, College Park, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2015 by Tristan Volpe All rights reserved iii Disclaimer Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. Auspices The author wrote this document in support of requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations at George Washington University, Washington, DC. The research is funded in part by the LLNL Graduate Scholars Program, and is not a deliverable for any United States government agency. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. iv Acknowledgments I am fortunate and grateful to have developed this dissertation under the direction of two great advisors. Foremost, Charles Glaser trained me in the art and science of security studies, provided laser-sharp constructive insights as the chair of my committee, and set an exemplary role model as a senior scholar. Someone once claimed that Charlie has one of the finest analytic minds in the business. I strongly second this proposition, but should note that his brilliance is surpassed only by how much he cares for his students. As a result, I found working on the dissertation to be a highly enjoyable period of considerable intellectual growth. This is a rare feat for a doctoral student, so I must praise Charlie for pushing me to produce the best work possible while also creating a positive environment for young scholars to thrive. When I took up residence at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to finish the dissertation, my good fortune continued, as I found myself under the guidance of a true national treasure. George Anzelon would be embarrassed if I waxed poetic about the depth of analytic, practical, and field experience he brought to assessing my research. Whereas Charlie helped me correct deductive flaws, George was a true master of foreign nuclear programs. He set the standard for analytic accuracy and honesty, and helped ensure that my casework tracked with reality. I also found George and Charlie to both be extremely humble and kind professionals. It took me years to learn the true impact both of these men have had on their respective fields in part because neither speaks the language of self-aggrandizement. Fortunately, the rest of my dissertation committee held equal reserves of brilliance and v compassion. George Quester joined early on when I was still lost in the nonproliferation regime. He had a knack for embedding trenchant comments within words of overall support. The legendary Alex Downes joined at a key stage and helped me put all the pieces together. Alex is one of the smartest scholars I know, and he created a true esprit de corps among the committee and the larger security institute. From 2012 to 2013, I spent a year in-residence at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs. The institute deserves special mention because it provided an incredible home full of some of the best minds a young security studies scholar could hope to be around. Quite simply, I would not have this dissertation if I were elsewhere for that formative year. Under the leadership of Charles Glaser and Rose Kelanic, the cast of visiting scholars made that a special year (I fondly remember long conversations with Josh Shifrinson), but Austin Carson and my office mate Sameer Lilwani deserve special thanks for listening to me drone on about nuclear technology at lengths. Austin and Sameer helped me frame and clarify the foundations of my research. I am lucky to have them both as friends today. Speaking of good friends, the original kernel of this project surfaced during a conversation with Grant Schneider about Iran’s nuclear program during a muggy summer night in 2011. I still have the notes I feverishly jotted down as we mused about whether Iran had acquired some sort of deterrent with its enrichment program. Grant has a talent for finding profound wrinkles in policy issues. His energy and keen insights fueled my enthusiasm towards the subject. Doug Shaw and Scott Sagan provided crucial encouragement as the project started to emerge at the end of the summer. As I laid the foundations of the dissertation, Todd Sechser’s trailblazing scholarship on coercive vi diplomacy had a major impact on my thinking. I am thankful that Todd ended up reading several iterations of the theory chapter over the years. Two other friends went out of their way to provide me with opportunities at critical junctures. Jonathan Pearl discovered that Lawrence Livermore was in need of political scientists, and that political scientists could in turn learn a lot from all the physical scientists at the lab, so he bravely cut the path for the rest of us to follow. I am grateful to Jon for his professional and personal support, though I will never be able to match his pre-dawn work ethic. I remember showing up at the lab at 7:00 AM, only to find that Jon had already been there writing since dawn. He is one of the hardest working analysts I know. Jane Vaynman is cut from a similar cloth. She has used her success and influence to create numerous opportunities for other junior scholars working in the nuclear trenches. In particular, Jane teamed up with Frank Gavin to host the best academic workshop I’ve ever participated in – full stop. Their Nuclear Studies Research Initiative (NSRI) is a dazzling lodestar of intellectual philanthropy, and I hope to continue participating over the years. Numerous others read and commented on various versions of this dissertation over the past several years (in no particular order): Julia Macdonald, Caitlin Talmadge, Erik Gartzke, Matthew Kroenig, Matthew Furhmann, Alex Montgomery, Andrew Coe, Daniel Jacobs, Jeff Kaplow, Joshua Shifrinson, Inwook Kim, Rachel Stein, Harris Mylonas, Robert Adcock, Mira Rapp-Hooper, James Acton, Adam Stulberg, Brian Radzinsky, Michael Joseph, Rose Kelanic, Rebecca Gibbons, Adam Mount, Timothy McDonnell, Brad Roberts, and a handful of U.S. government officials who will remain vii anonymous. I thank them all for taking the time to read my musings. Their feedback was essential to improving the final product. Several institutions provided generous financial assistance. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory funded my dissertation from 2013 to 2015 as a Lawrence Graduate Scholar. I had a fantastic time at the lab, and the predoctoral scholar program is one of the best available on the market. I highly encourage any doctoral students reading this (not sure why you would be) to apply. The Center for Global Security Research provided a stellar home, and I thank Mona Dreicer for bringing me into the fold along with Bruce Goodwin. I overlapped briefly with Brad Roberts, who quickly distinguished himself as the most interesting and capable nuclear man in the world. I hope to emulate his analytic career and service to the nation. The Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies also proved to be a steady source of assistance and career development on over the years. I also thank the Project on Strategic Stability Evaluation and CSIS Pacific Forum for excellent opportunities to develop aspects of my research. I started my doctoral studies because my parents Alan and Constance raised me to value the pursuit of knowledge in service of the greater societal good. I completed this dissertation with the love and support of Manar. While they have been the primary drivers and supporters of my work, we are embedded within a larger network of family and friends. I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, father, Manar, and the excellent people in our lives that make this work worthwhile. viii Abstract of Dissertation Proliferation Persuasion: Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities.
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