DOCSLIB.ORG

Preventing Enemy Coalitions Preventing Enemy Timothy W

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Preventing Enemy Coalitions Preventing Enemy Timothy W Preventing Enemy Coalitions Preventing Enemy Timothy W. Crawford Coalitions How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics How do states dis- suade adversaries from organizing against them? When do they succeed in splitting opponents that have formed or are likely to form an alliance? How do such “wedge strategies” inºuence larger patterns of international politics? Scholars have focused much attention on how alliances form and whether they are driven by balancing, bandwagoning, or other dynamics.1 They have paid less attention to the role of wedge strategies in disrupting or preventing the formation of alliances and to understanding how and when those strategies succeed.2 Timothy W. Crawford is Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston College. For helpful comments and discussion on earlier drafts, the author would like to thank Jonathan Caverley, Michael Glosny, Stacie Goddard, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, Ronald Krebs, Orly Mishan, T.V. Paul, Evan Resnick, Norrin Ripsman, Robert Ross, Jack Snyder, Karen Yarhi-Milo, and the anony- mous reviewers. He would also like to thank participants in conference panels at meetings of the American Political Science Association and International Studies Association, as well as seminar participants at Harvard University’s John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Massa- chusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program, for their comments and suggestions. The following Boston College undergraduate and graduate research assistants also deserve thanks: Raakhi Agrawal, Danielle Cardona, Jonathan Culp, Alexandre Provencher-Gravel, and Amanda Rothschild. 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); Paul Schroeder, “Histor- ical Reality versus Neo-realist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108–148; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137– 168; Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003); and T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Palo Alto, Ca- lif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). 2. For an initial effort by this author, see Timothy W. Crawford, “Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940–41,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 1–38. Other important recent studies include Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “United We Stand, Divided They Fall: Use of Coercion and Rewards as Alliance Balancing Strategy,” Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown Univer- sity, 2002; Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stacie E. Goddard, “When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/09), pp. 110–142; Daniel H. Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Re- ligious Conºict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); and Michael Glosny, “The Grand Strategies of Rising Powers: Reassurance, Coercion, and Balancing Responses,” Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. Key discussions are also found in Daniel H. Nexon, “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Poli- International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 155–189 © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 155 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00036 by guest on 01 October 2021 International Security 35:4 156 I deªne a “wedge strategy” as a state’s attempt to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance at an acceptable cost. When the strategy is successful, the state (i.e., the divider) gains advantage by reducing the number and strength of enemies organized against it. Because wedge strat- egies can turn opponents into neutrals or allies, they can trigger surprising power shifts with signiªcant consequences for war and peace and the trajec- tory of international politics. Adolf Hitler’s diplomatic coup of August 1939— the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact—dismantled the only counterbalancing coalition that could have derailed German aggression against Poland.3 On the other side of Eurasia, the Soviet Union secured Japanese neutrality in an April 1941 pact that held until August 1945, when the Soviet Union invaded Japanese-occupied Manchuria. The pact drove a wedge into the Axis alliance and was a boon to Soviet security after Germany’s invasion. In particular, Japan’s continued neutrality in late 1941 and early 1942 allowed massive trans- fers of Soviet military power from the Far East to the western front.4 Knowing tics, Vol. 61, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 340–347; Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 148–181; Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coer- cion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 171–172; Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth, eds., The Balance of Power in World History (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 77–78; Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 188–191; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 337–338; Richard Rosecrance and Chih-Cheng Lo, “Balancing, Stability, and War: The Mysterious Case of the Napoleonic International System,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 479–500; Frederick H. Hartmann, The Rela- tions of Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 333–337; George Liska, Nations in Alli- ance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 42– 60; and Ivo D. Duchacek, Conºict and Cooperation among Nations (New York: Holt Rinehart, 1960), pp. 372–377. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 134; George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 132; A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), pp. 278–279; and Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118. For cross-disciplinary insights, see Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier, and Adrian Vermeule, “Divide and Conquer,” Olin Working Pa- per, No. 467 (Chicago: University of Chicago Law and Economics, May 26, 2009), http://ssrn.com/ abstractϭ1414319. 3. I discuss this case at length below. 4. See Boris Slavinsky, The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941–1945, trans. Geoffrey Jukes (New York: Routledge, 2004); and George A. Lensen, The Strange Neutrality: Soviet- Japanese Relations during the Second World War, 1941–1945 (Tallahassee: Diplomatic Press, 1974). “It is possible,” wrote Paul W. Schroeder, “that Russia was saved [in 1941] because Japan persisted in her refusal to launch an attack upon Siberia.” Schroeder, The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 166; see also p. 48. The Soviet redeployments from the Far East “played a vital role in the war in the west [and had] a signiªcant role in halting German forces on the approaches to Moscow and in launching the Red Army’s en- Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00036 by guest on 01 October 2021 Preventing Enemy Coalitions 157 more about when wedge strategies work and why can help scholars better ex- plain such intrinsically important historical contingencies as these. There are ªve other main reasons why it is useful to understand how wedge strategies work and when they are likely to succeed. First, leaders can use this information to craft policies designed to divide their adversaries or to defend their own states’ alliances. In particular, conceptual models of wedge strate- gies can help to frame options to divide potential adversaries in real-world scenarios. They can also highlight critical variables and favorable conditions, as well as the chances of success or failure.5 Second, understanding how and when wedge strategies work can illumi- nate a principal cause of war: states’ disagreements about relative power.6 A major source of such disagreements is differing expectations about who will ally with whom and who will decide to be neutral when conºict turns violent. Wedge strategies foster these kinds of disagreements and the uncertainties that underpin them. Third, knowing more about how wedge strategies work can strengthen scholars’ grasp of the substance of states’ external balancing behavior and thus contribute to more accurate theories of balancing.7 As substitutes to arms and alliance building, wedge strategies are among the options available to states seeking to balance against threats. A fuller understanding of wedge strategies can therefore help scholars better assess the presence of balancing behavior in speciªc cases, as well as the prevalence of balancing in international politics more broadly. Fourth, knowing how and when wedge strategies work can enable scholars suing counteroffensive.” David M. Glantz, The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: “Au- gust Storm” (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 5–6; for details of the transfers, see pp. 43–44 n. 11. 5. See Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), chap.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Origins of the European Integration: Staunch Italians, Cautious British Actors and the Intelligence Dimension (1942-1946) Di Claudia Nasini
    Eurostudium3w gennaio-marzo 2014 The Origins of the European Integration: Staunch Italians, Cautious British Actors and the Intelligence Dimension (1942-1946) di Claudia Nasini The idea of unity in Europe is a concept stretching back to the Middle Ages to the exponents of the Respublica Christiana. Meanwhile the Enlightenment philosophers and political thinkers recurrently advocated it as a way of embracing all the countries of the Continent in some kind of pacific order1. Yet, until the second half of the twentieth century the nationalist ethos of Europeans prevented any limitation of national sovereignty. The First World War, the millions of casualties and economic ruin in Europe made the surrendering of sovereignty a conceivable way of overcoming the causes of recurring conflicts by bringing justice and prosperity to the Old World. During the inter-war years, it became evident that the European countries were too small to solve by their own efforts the problem of a modern economy2. As a result of the misery caused by world economic crisis and the European countries’ retreating in economic isolationism, various forms of Fascism emerged in almost half of the countries of Europe3. The League of Nations failed to prevent international unrest because it had neither the political power nor the material strength to enable itself to carry 1 Cfr. Andrea Bosco, Federal Idea, vol. I, The History of Federalism from Enlightenment to 1945, London and New York, Lothian foundation, 1991, p. 99 and fll.; and J.B. Duroselle, “Europe as an historical concept”, in C. Grove Haines (ed.by) European Integration, Baltimore, 1958, pp.
    [Show full text]
  • A Dynamic Approach to NATO Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives Rethinking Coercive Diplomacy A Dynamic Approach to NATO Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo Henning Køhler Knutsen Master Thesis, Department of Political Science Faculty of Social Sciences UNIVERSITY OF OSLO Spring 2012 II Rethinking Coercive Diplomacy A Dynamic Approach to NATO Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo Henning Køhler Knutsen III © Henning Køhler Knutsen 2012 Rethinking Coercive Diplomacy: A Dynamic Approach to NATO Coercive Diplomacy in Bosnia and Kosovo Henning Køhler Knutsen http://www.duo.uio.no/ Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo IV Abstract After the Cold War, with the advent of low-interest, “optional”, post-modern warfare, regional conflicts and failed states have illuminated the radars in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states. For these countries, as the expected need for military force relinquished, its actual use increased. Left with a need for improved tools for handling the increasing number of international security issues, the strategy of coercive diplomacy has never been of more current interest. This thesis seeks to address a lacuna in contemporary theorizing about coercive diplomacy, namely the under-theorization of the adversary. Through within-case and cross-case analysis of the NATO interventions in Bosnia- Herzegovina and Kosovo, I attempt to show how both scientists and political decision-makers can benefit from a more in-depth analysis of the coerced. The thesis takes the theoretical framework developed by Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock as a starting point. As a significant step in the right direction, their model of coercive diplomacy better accounts for the motivations, interests, and expected reactions of the target state.
    [Show full text]
  • Gunboat Diplomacy of the Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire
    Journal of International Eastern European Studies/Uluslararası Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, Vol./Yıl. 2, No/Sayı. 2, Winter/Kış 2020) ISSN: 2687-3346 Araştırma Makalesi Gunboat Diplomacy of the Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire: With Particular Reference to the Salonika Incident (1876) and Armenian Reform Demands (1879-80) Fikrettin Yavuz* (ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3161-457X) Makale Gönderim Tarihi Makale Kabul Tarihi 01.12.2020 08.12.2020 Abstract Throughout history, gunboat, a small vessel of a naval force, has been turned into a term of coercive diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy, associated with chiefly the activities of the Great Powers, means the use of naval power directly or indirectly as an aggressive diplomatic instrument. It seems highly probable to see many examples of this coercive diplomacy in the world history, particularly after the French Revolution. Naturally, the Ottoman Empire, always attracted attention of the Great Powers, was exposed to this policy of the Powers. During the nineteen century, the rivalry among the European Powers on the Ottoman territorial integrity became a common characteristic that led them to implement gunboat diplomacy on all occasions. In this context, this article firstly offers a critical analysis of gunboat diplomacy of the Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire within the dimension of two specific examples: The Salonika Incident and Armenian reform demands. In addition, it aims to contribute to the understanding of gunboat diplomacy of the Great Powers and Ottoman response by evaluating it from native and foreign literatures. Keywords: European Powers, Ottomans, Gunboat Diplomacy, Salonika, Armenian, Reform * Assoc. Prof. Dr., Sakarya University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of History, Turkey, [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • Leo Valiani and Arthur Koestler - a Friendship for Life
    Ilona FRIED Leo Valiani and Arthur Koestler - A Friendship for Life. Letters Between 1942 and 1953 Leo Valiani and Arthur Koestler - A Friendship for Life. Letters Between 1942 and 1953 Ilona FRIED Eötvös Loránd University Budapest Hungary The correspondence between Valiani and Koestler started in Mexico in 1942, on Valiani’s arrival there, (he actually arrived in Mexico in December 1941 and stayed there until July 1943). As it is well known they got to know each other during their arrest at Roland Garros, and had all the months of the detention at Le Vernet d’Ariège for exchanging ideas and sharing views and readings. Both of them had come from a cosmopolitan Central-European background and there were only 4 years of difference of age between them (Koestler was born in 1905, under the name Kösztler Artúr, in Budapest, whereas Valiani was born in Fiume, then belonging to Hungary, under the name of Weiczen Leo in 1909). There was much in common between the two of them, also from the point of view of their political beliefs. Koestler as a journalist had been condemned to death during the Spanish Civil War, was released through the intervention of the British government. He published Spanish testament about the Spanish Civil War, a novel that had already made him famous. As he could not accept the Molotov- Ribbentrop pact he had left the Communist Party. He went to France where, he was again arrested.1 Koestler was set free after four months, after which he joined the French Foreign Legion and later on managed to enter Britain again where he served in the Pioneer Corps.
    [Show full text]
  • Proliferation Persuasion FINAL ETD FILE
    Proliferation Persuasion: Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology by Tristan A. Volpe B.A. in Political Science, June 2007, University of California, Los Angeles A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 31, 2015 Dissertation directed by Charles L. Glaser Professor of Political Science and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Tristan A. Volpe has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of July 13, 2015. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. Proliferation Persuasion: Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology Tristan A. Volpe Dissertation Research Committee: Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Dissertation Director George Anzelon, Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Committee Member Alexander B. Downes, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Committee Member George Quester, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, University of Maryland, College Park, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2015 by Tristan Volpe All rights reserved iii Disclaimer Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability
    [Show full text]
  • Coercive Diplomacy, Theories and Application: a Case Study on Us Administration and Libya
    Department of Political Science Major in Politics, Philosophy and Economics Chair in Conflict and Development COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, THEORIES AND APPLICATION: A CASE STUDY ON US ADMINISTRATION AND LIBYA SUPERVISOR CANDIDATE Prof. Francesco Niccolò Moro Silvia Romeo, 072842 Academic year 2015/2016 Contents Introduction 1 1. First chapter: a coercive diplomacy overview 3 1.1. The changing global context of coercive diplomacy 3 1.2. What is coercive diplomacy? Theories and definitions 4 Table 1:1 Compellence and deterrence 6 1.3. Understanding the concept of coercion 7 1.4. How to reach success 10 1.5. Famous cases of success and failure 12 1.5.1 Kosovo 13 1.5.2 Afghanistan 15 Table 1:2 American objectives and coercive results 16 1.5.3 China 16 2. Second chapter: US administration and Libya 18 2.1 Libya and US: pre 9/11 context 18 2.2 First period: 1969-1989 18 2.3 Second period: 1989-1999 22 2.4 Third period: 1999-2003 25 2.5 Consequences: Libya in the post WMD era 31 2.5.1 Arab Spring and NATO’s no-fly zone 33 2.5.2 Brief overview after the fall of Qaddafi’s regime 37 3. Third chapter: the challenges of coercive diplomacy 41 3.1 Why coercive diplomacy is hard? 41 Table 3:1 Coercive diplomacy is problematic 43 Table 3:2 Cases of success-failure overview 45 3.2 Coercive diplomacy and the war on terrorism 47 Conclusion 50 Italian summary 53 Bibliography and sitography 59 Introduction Carl von Clausewitz once said: “War is a continuation of politics by other means”.
    [Show full text]
  • “Decided Preponderance at Sea”: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought Kevin Rowlands Royal Navy
    Naval War College Review Volume 65 Article 9 Number 4 Autumn 2012 “Decided Preponderance at Sea”: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought Kevin Rowlands Royal Navy Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Rowlands, Kevin (2012) "“Decided Preponderance at Sea”: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought," Naval War College Review: Vol. 65 : No. 4 , Article 9. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss4/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Rowlands: “Decided Preponderance at Sea”: Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thou “DECIDED PREPONDERANCE AT SEA” Naval Diplomacy in Strategic Thought Commander Kevin Rowlands, Royal Navy liver Cromwell famously declared that “a man-o’-war is the best ambas- O sador”; a twenty-first-century equivalent represents the U.S. Navy in posters and on T-shirts and sweatshirts as an aircraft carrier over the caption “90,000 tons of diplomacy.” Though the images may be different, the message is the same—yet “naval diplomacy” is not a readily understood term. From the coercion delivered by the gunboats of the Pax Britannica to the modern-day ex- ercise of soft power through hardware, interpretations of what constitutes naval diplomacy are wide-ranging. Strategists have undoubtedly long been aware of its existence, but over the centuries few have been moved to study or document it in any substantial way.
    [Show full text]
  • Master Thesis in Political Science with a Focus on Crisis Management and Security
    THE SWEDISH NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE 2012-06-04 1 (45) Annelie Gregor Master Thesis, 15 Credits Master Thesis in Political Science with a Focus on Crisis Management and Security Author: Annelie Gregor Date: 2012-06-04 Advisor: Professor Fredrik Bynander Examinator: Professor Jan Hallenberg Limited Military Pressure – An Analytical Framework to Assess No-Fly Zones as a Single Instrument in Coercive Diplomacy Abstract: Coercive diplomacy attempts to use military force in a limited fashion as a diplomatic and political tool in order to persuade an opponent to cease aggression rather than to bludgeon him into stopping. The use of limited military force in coercive diplomacy is not a military strategy, but rather a refined political and psychological instrument used for resolving a crisis. One relatively new instrument in the toolbox of limited force when engaging in coercive diplomacy, fashioned to deter adversaries, is the use of no-fly zones. The term no-fly zone describes the physical area of a nation that is patrolled using the airpower of another sovereign state or coalition. However, despite its relatively frequent use in its short history, it has largely been ignored in theoretical studies of coercive diplomacy. As scholars, such as Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, have presented a critical view on the limitations of approaching a study on a single instrument in coercive diplomacy, this paper grounds the argument that there is still value in this approach. Thus, the research question is posed as follows: Given that the conditions of coercive diplomacy mainly focus on an array of coercive instruments at a political level, are the conditions in the theories of coercive diplomacy sufficient to explain the political success of the military instrument of no-fly zones? Hence, this paper illustrates the theoretical reach of the theories of coercive diplomacy by highlighting the fungibility of the coercive diplomacy’s theoretical ‘success conditions’ when assessing a single military instrument.
    [Show full text]
  • The Home Front and War in the Twentieth Century
    THE HOME FRONT AND WAR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Proceedings of the Tenth Military History Symposium October 20-22. 1982 Edited by James Titus United States Air Force Acdemy and Office of Air Force History Headquarters USAF 1984 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Military History Symposium (U.S.) (10th : 1982) (United States Air Force Academy) The home front and war in the twentieth century Sponsored by: The Department of History and The Association of Graduates. Includes index. 1. Military history, Modem-20th century-Congresses. 2. War and society-History-20th century4ongresses. 3. War--Economic aspects-Congresses. 4. War-Economic aspects-United States4ongresses. 5. United States-Social conditions-Congresses. I. Titus, James. 11. United States Air Force Academy. Dept. of History. 111. United States Air Force Academy. Assocation of Graduates. IV. Title. D431.M54 1982 303.6'6 83-600203 ISBN 0-912799-01-3 For sale by Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402 11 THE TENTH MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM October 20-22, 1982 United States Air Force Academy Sponsored by The Department of History and The Association of Graduates ******* Executive Director, Tenth Military History Symposium: Lieutenant Colonel James Titus Deputy Director, Tenth Military History Symposium: Major Sidney F. Baker, USA Professor and Head, Department of History: Colonel Carl W. Reddel President, Association of Graduates: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Eller, USAF. Retired Symposium Committee Members: Captain John G. Albert Captain Mark L. Dues Captain Bernard E. Harvey Captain Vernon K. Lane Captain Robert C. Owen Captain Michael W.
    [Show full text]
  • The OSS in the Italian Resistance: a Post Cold War Interpretation by Claudia Nasini
    Eurostudium3w luglio-settembre 2012 The OSS in the Italian Resistance: A Post Cold War Interpretation by Claudia Nasini The Italian Resistance requires a more complex account than that traditionally portrayed by official historiography, which mostly claims that Italian Partisan Patriots constituted the core of Resistance to Nazi rule1. New evidence, from both the US and Italian intelligence archives, shows that numerous American agents, hundreds of Italian government soldiers and countless fully‐fledged American spies of Italian nationality participated in the Liberation of Italy. This article explores the missing part of the story of the Resistance in the VI Partisan Ligurian Zone in the Northwest of Italy. It describes the manifold cooperation between Italian and American agents in support of local Partisans. It also shows how several factors hindered traditional historiography, not only ideological bias – albeit very important – but also the protagonistsʹ preference for secrecy2. Last but not least, the prolonged lack of documentation played an 1 This interpretation not only appears in the renown work ‐ rather outdated but still considered a point of reference in this field – by R. Battaglia, Storia della Resistenza italiana (8 settembre 1943‐ maggio 1945), Torino, Einaudi, 1964, p. 528 and passim. This idea has also recently been maintained in the work by D. Ellwood, “Gli alleati e la Resistenza”, in E. Collotti, R. Sandri, F. Sessi (ed. by), Dizionario della Resistenza. Storia e geografia della Liberazione, vol. I, Torino, Einaudi, 2001, in particular pp. 246‐248. This interpretation reemerges in equally renown reconstructions, particularly one we will return to dwell upon, that of one of the main Italian expert of Partisan Resistance, G.
    [Show full text]
  • On Coercion in International Law
    \\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\52-1\NYI101.txt unknown Seq: 1 26-DEC-19 14:27 ON COERCION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW MOHAMED S. HELAL* I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 2 R II. TALES OF COERCION ............................. 10 R A. The Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election .......................... 10 R B. The 2017 North Korean Nuclear Crisis ......... 24 R C. The 2018 Murder of Washington Post Columnist Jamal Khashoggi ............................. 37 R III. THE PROHIBITION ON INTERVENTION AND THE CONCEPT OF COERCION .......................... 47 R A. The Prohibition on Intervention in the Internal or External Affairs of States ...................... 47 R 1. The Doctrinal and Political Origins of the Prohibition on Intervention ................ 49 R 2. The Sources, Scope, and Content of the Prohibition on Intervention ................ 54 R B. Unlawful Ends: Intervention in the Domaine Reserv´ e´ of States............................. 65 R C. Unlawful Means: Coercion as the Instrument of Intervention.................................. 69 R 1. The Concept of Coercion................... 70 R 2. Defining Unlawful Coercion ............... 74 R a. The Nature of Coercion: Occurrent Coercion and Dispositional Coercion ........................... 75 R b. Measuring Coercion: The Impact of Coercion vs. The Legality of Coercion ........................... 76 R * Assistant Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law & Affiliated Faculty, Mershon Center for International Security Studies – The Ohio State Univer- sity. I thank Steven Darnell and Andrea Hearon for excellent research assis- tance, Matt Cooper of the Moritz College of Law Library for invaluable help with sources used in this article, and the editors of the N.Y.U. Journal of International Law & Politics for their outstanding work. For valuable feed- back on previous drafts of this article, I acknowledge with much gratitude Christiane Ahlborn, Cinnamon Carlarne, Ashley Deeks, Larissa van den Herik, Sean Murphy, Tom Ruys, Lucca Ferro, Peter Tzeng, J.
    [Show full text]
  • The Internment of 'Enemy Aliens'
    “FRENCH APOCALYPSE”? THE INTERNMENT OF ‘ENEMY ALIENS’ IN FRANCE (1939-1940) By Luisa von Richthofen Submitted to Central European University Department of History In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Katalin Straner Second Reader: Professor Michael L. Miller CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2017 STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either in full or part, may be made only in accordance with the instructions given by the Author and lodged in the Central European Library. Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page must form a part of any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author. CEU eTD Collection 2 ABSTRACT This thesis deals with the internment of “enemy aliens” in France after the declaration of war on Germany in September 1939. It has sometimes been assumed that the camp system established under the Third Republic in the second half of the 1930s paved the way for more restrictive internment policies under the regime of Vichy and eventually to the deportation and extermination of the Jews of France. This thesis’ underlying query is to probe these continuities. It uses new archival material to describe the underlying logic of the internment between September 1939 and June 1940. It also pays special attention to the few, little explored instances of organized resistance against the internment policy. It finds that that though the Vichy regime continued to use certain structures, institutions and legal frameworks inherited from the Third Republic, the claim that there is a discernable, straight line between the French internment camps and Auschwitz cannot be substantiated.
    [Show full text]